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
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BIBLIOTHECA SACRA

AND

THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

CONDUCTED BY

B. B. EDWARDS AND E. A. PARK,

Professors at Andover,

WITH THE SPECIAL CO-OPERATION OF

DR. ROBINSON AND PROF. STUART.

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OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.

The following are some of the notices of the Review, which have appeared in the periodical press.

"Now that the first volume of the Theological Review is completed, we are constrained by a regard to the religious literature of the Christian world, to commend it, so far as our opinion may have weight, to the warm patronage of our clerical and literary friends, as a work of unrivalled merit in its own department, and adapted to give expansion to the mind, and strength to its powers, while it satisfies its thirst for biblical knowledge, beyond any other periodical within the circle of our acquaintance. That we are not alone in this opinion, is clear from the favor with which it meets from the most competent judges on the subject, in our own and other lands. We have before us a letter, unsolicited, from a distinguished Baptist clergyman in this State—saying, 'The article in the last No. on theological education in the United States is of itself worth the subscription for the year. It ought, through other channels, to find its way before the whole religious community. Many of its suggestions are of great importance, and ought to be read by those to whom they are especially appropriate.' The same gentleman makes the following suggestion, which if not original, is yet important—that 'if churches could be prevailed upon, to subscribe for the various theological Reviews, the expense would be unfelt, whilst the benefit to themselves and their pastors would be incalculable. The Review might be sent to the pastor, who after reading it might place it in the library of the church. The limited means of most ministers preclude them from the privilege of possessing more than one, if any, of those Reviews, from which they might derive stimulus and aid in their weekly studies. A plan like that proposed above, could not fail, if carried into effect, equally to benefit them and their people. The whole congregation would share the advantage of the increased variety and richness of the Sabbath services, to say nothing of the topics of profitable conversation, which would be suggested to them, by their more extensive reading, in their intercourse with each other. Happy will be the pastor, who shall succeed in persuading the members of his church to adopt so safe and salutary an expedient. In any event, we cannot refrain from expressing a strong hope, that ministers will, by one means or other, assure themselves of the advantages to be derived from the regular perusal of the pages of the 'Theological Review.'"—*Boston Recorder*.

"The style of the Review, is learned, masterly and profound—although in advance, on the score of learning and research, of any contemporary; and the field which it occupies is of great importance and interest—one that lies at the foundation of all theological study—and which cannot be omitted or overlooked without creating a serious drawback upon the resources and ability of the preacher. It is an honor to our country, and ought to be generously supported."—*New York Evangelist*.

"The November number of the Review sustains its high character as the ablest periodical in the language in theological and biblical literature. It is truly an honor to the country. * * * This periodical is laying at our feet the richest treasures of Theological and classical learning from our own and foreign scholars. We hope it is well sustained. It occupies a place not filled by any other publication."—*Ohio Observer*.

OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.

"As an aid to the Biblical student, this is doubtless the most valuable periodical in the English language. In England it has no rival, and many copies are taken there. The other religious quarterly publications in this country, admitting a wider range of subjects, cannot concentrate so much strength on the department of Biblical learning. None of them, therefore, can adequately supply its place. And its place, among Protestants, whose only authoritative rule of faith is the Bible, is of the first importance. The Bible alone gives us fundamental truths, to which everything else must yield, and by which all ideas derived from other sources must be corrected.

"This work is also furnishing uncommonly rich contributions to the history of religious ideas. Without this, ecclesiastical history is little else than an account of the various outward forms which Christianity has assumed. In this department nothing can be more valuable than the 'Early History of Monasticism, from the Original Sources,' by Professor Emerson.

"Though the *Bibliotheca* is not a controversial work, it furnishes excellent means for deciding some of the most important controversies of the day. It would seem that no one could read the article on the doctrine of the 'Real Presence' in the Eucharist, by Professor Stuart, and the History of Monasticism by Professor Emerson, without being thoroughly cured of all tendencies towards Rome or Oxford.

"A principal recommendation of this work, after all, is the elevated and manly tone of its morality, which renders it a valuable corrective for some of the most dangerous errors of our age. Of this, the articles on the Imprecations in the Psalms, by Professor Edwards, the introduction to the History of Monasticism, and the Historical Sketch of the Christian Sabbath, may be taken as specimens. The reference to specimens, however, seems almost like an act of injustice; for the whole work is manifestly pervaded by a conscientious and fearless regard for truth, the silent influence of which must be more salutary than any direct inculcations of doctrines and maxims."—*New York Observer*.

"This is, perhaps, the most ambitious journal in the United States. We use the word in a good sense, as meaning that there is no journal among us which seems more laudably desirous to take the lead in literary and theological science. Its handsome type and paper give it a pleasing exterior; its typographical errors, though sufficiently numerous, are so comparatively few, as to show that it has the advantage of the best American proof-reading; while for thoroughness of execution in the departments of history and criticism, it aims to be pre-eminent."—*N. Y. Churchman*.

"The Theol. Review is doing much to elevate, or rather to sustain the high character of American theological literature abroad. It certainly has no rival in Europe; at least there is no periodical in Great Britain of a similar character and equal ability; and a feeling of something like jealousy that this should be the fact has more than once been expressed in English notices of the work."—*London News Letter*.

"The Articles [of the first two numbers], as is natural, possess various degrees of merit, but all are more or less valuable, while a few are extremely opportune at the present day; such as the elaborate examination, historical, patristic, and exegetical, of the words descriptive of the Lord's Supper; and the brief account of early Monasticism. All are adapted to interest inquiring students, especially such as are resolved to institute satisfying examinations of the divine word, and of those collateral subjects that throw light upon its pages." "This Journal is unquestionably the best Biblical one in the English language, and we candidly commend it to the attention of those who desire, by studying the sacred Scriptures in their original languages, to arrive at a fundamental knowledge of their contents."—*London Eclectic Review*, November, 1844.

"In two departments the United States have earned for themselves the honor of independent and original excellence, in practical divinity, and sacred geography. Dr. Robinson, Professor of Biblical Literature in the Union Theological Seminary, New York, by his 'Biblical Researches in Palestine,' has earned a European reputation, and his work, not less by its accuracy and thoroughness than by its bold, yet for the most part judiciously restrained originality, forms, by general admission, an era in our knowledge of the Holy Land.

"The subject so well handled in the work last mentioned, Dr. Robinson carries forward in a theological work, which deserves to be widely read in England—we mean the 'Bibliotheca Sacra,' which is at present conducted by Edwards and Park, professors at the Andover Theological Seminary, with the special co-operation of Dr. Robinson and Professor Stuart. A very valuable volume of the work was completed in 1843. The number for February (the last we have seen) contains, besides other pieces, an interesting sketch of 'The Aspect of Literature and Science in the United States, as compared with Europe,' by Dr. Robinson; a learned biographical notice of Aristotle by Professor Park; a useful paper on 'The Structure of the Gospel of Matthew,' translated from the Latin; and the first part of a translation from the unpublished lectures of Professor Tholuck on the very important subject which the Germans term, 'Theological Encyclopædia and Methodology,' meaning a practical introduction to the study of theology, suited to students and divines."—*Foreign Quarterly Review*.

"We rejoice that this Review has been commenced, without interfering with others already in the field; it will do very much for the advancement of good learning generally, particularly of exegesis and Biblical criticism and of systematic theology. The learning and talent and high literary attainments of its conductors, leave no room for doubt that its articles will have the permanent value which it is intended they shall possess, and that the Review will meet a want which has of late been extensively felt among clergymen and students of theology; if we may judge from this number any intelligent layman will also find himself well recompensed for his subscription to it."—*Boston Recorder*.

✂ The work has also been favorably noticed by the N. E. Puritan, Christian Mirror, Vermont Chronicle, Congregational Journal, N. Y. Tribune, Courier & Enquirer, etc.

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AND

THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

NO. V.

FEBRUARY, 1845.

ARTICLE I.

THOUGHTS ON EDUCATION.

By Rev. Charles B. Haddock, D. D., Prof. of Rhetoric and Mental Philosophy, Dartmouth College.

Nothing is more promising, in theory, than *Education*; and nothing less certain, in practice. No science has been more deeply studied; and, in none have fewer important principles been permanently settled. Every age regrets the system, under which it was itself trained, and brings up a new generation to sigh, with similar regrets, for the errors of its predecessors. If we listen to the uniform complaints of the thoughtful, of all times, we shall be inclined to adopt the opinion of Dr. Johnson, that "*Education was as well understood by the ancients as it ever can be,*" and to add, that it was not understood, at all, by them.

Considered as an object of enterprise it is beautiful, sublime even, "worth ambition." It is to unfold the power of thought—thought, which propagates itself forever. It is to discipline the will, the central principle of character, of all finite power, great or good. It is to nurse and mature the social and moral sensibilities of a spiritual and immortal being. Can anything be so interesting to think of, so noble to attempt? Upon the material substance of the earth it seems to be our destiny to leave very little impression. A fire, or a wave of sand passes over them, and our proudest works disappear. Time wears them all away. We search, in vain, for memorials of men beyond a few generations

before us. The coral insect builds up a structure, whose base is the unchanging bed of the sea, and on whose summit men congregate, and contend, and triumph, and pass away, and leave no trace of themselves behind. Why is it, but to intimate to us, that the true impress of our power is to be made upon mind rather than matter? The little worm, embalmed and cofined in the imperishable rock, has all of immortality, which the earth knows. For the earth's noblest creature, its lord, must there not be a loftier destiny, a more enduring memorial? May not man enshrine himself in a nobler mausoleum? Can he not engrave his name upon a work of costlier material and more lasting?

In this view it is not strange, that education has attracted so much attention; that philosophy earnestly investigates the theory of it; that ingenuity patiently devises new methods; and that private charity and public munificence so foster the institutions, which experience has approved, or enterprise proposed for the instruction and discipline of the human mind. For what besides has so much been done? In what other respect, among civilized nations, are men so cared for, and provided for? The powers of the State, and the nearer and more direct influences of domestic life, have no higher or more engrossing object. The great anxiety of mature life is to secure the benefits of education to the young. The intelligent parent deems it the richest legacy to his children. The poor prize it as the means of advancement to their families; the rich as the secret of a power which wealth alone cannot confer. All unite in declamation on its advantages, and in zeal for its improvement.

Accordingly, the apparatus, with which science and experience have furnished us, for the work, has become complicated and prodigious. And it is worthy of remark, that whilst the agency, thus brought into exercise, is almost everywhere gigantic and apparently irresistible, the subject upon which it is designed to act is, in the highest degree susceptible of impression,

" Tremblingly alive all o'er
To each fine impulse."

The circumstances could hardly be more advantageous. Mature intellect is acting upon the docility of infancy; strength engages with flexibility; skill and art are working on simplicity and enthusiasm. It is no wonder, that high hopes are indulged, that prophecy grows eloquent upon the future triumphs of this mighty power. No wonder that to the fond parent and the sanguine

philanthropist come teeming visions, brighter and sweeter than the light which foreshows the day. It is natural; perhaps, it is well. Who could relinquish the hope which never dies in a parent's bosom? What loving heart would live to despair of humanity? Who does not expect almost all he wishes for his children and mankind? Were it otherwise, charity and faith and enterprise would hardly be found on the earth. No good thing is ever done, but to realize a great hope.

To these hopes, springing fresh in every heart, repeated in their original brightness and cherished with undiminished fondness in every successive generation, the sacred writings add their divine sanction. Religion encourages the assurance, that if we "train up a child in the way he should go, when he is old he will not depart from it."

And yet how little, after all, do our best systems accomplish. To how great a degree do men grow up, notwithstanding, by an apparently spontaneous development. How seldom are they made what they become, by any or all of our methods. How much of the best mind in society owes, comparatively, little to our discipline; how much of the worst is bad in spite of it.

In this view the declamation of the schools and the wisdom of sages upon the power of education will sometimes appear to a considerate man equally empty and vain. Fifteen or twenty years of parental life are very apt to cool a little the ardor of our expectations, and moderate somewhat the confidence of our tone upon this topic. The man, who begins with lofty ideas of the omnipotence of education is in danger of living to run into the opposite extreme, and to wonder at the sanguine anticipations of his earlier days, if not to question the utility of systems and methods altogether.

The truth seems to be, that systematic education is but an element in our mental culture. Other influences unite with it, and modify it more than we are aware. No system of instruction can be made to monopolize the pupil's attention; no vigilance can guard all the avenues of thought; no agency of ours can entirely control the mental habits of the most docile and confiding. Our own voice is but one of the hundred that are constantly addressing him. The most engaging train of thought we can inspire in him is not a tithe of those which incessantly follow one another through his mind every waking hour of his life. Impressions are everywhere forced upon him; the ear is always open; the eye drinks in ideas from all around and above him. Every office of

friendship, every reflection of influence of which he is the source or the object, every consciousness of the presence of external objects, animate or inanimate, every hope awaked or blasted, every change without or within him that serves to mark the progress of his existence, is so much done to form his character, so much to give shape and color to his intellectual and moral being. In this sense of the word, a sense much more comprehensive than that, in which we have hitherto used it in these pages, education is always and everywhere going on. We are educated by all we think, and by all we do; by what we see and what we hear. Day and night instruct us; morning and evening, the rising and the setting sun; the moon and the stars, the sunshine and the storm are all eloquent teachers. Secret influences are incessantly stealing into the heart from every scene of nature, and from every incident of life. It is a great mistake to suppose that precepts and restraints are the principal instruments of education. Your circumstances, your wealth, your poverty, your business, your recreations, your history, your prospects, are all efficient instructors of your children. What you do not say, as well as what you say, what you omit to do, no less than what you do, where you are and what you are, in public or in private, have as much to do in forming the character of your son, as the institutions you select for him and the tuition you provide.

It must not be overlooked in estimating the influence of instruction, that the subject of this influence is a free agent, an independent being; and not simply passive, to be moulded, like wax, by the plastic hand of the artist, or carved, like marble. From the beginning the mind has all the attributes of moral freedom. It may be weak; but it will not be compelled; it cannot be dragged nor driven. The tiny spirit in the nurse's arms spurns the foot of power with the indignant self-importance of the Hampdens. Force only awakens freedom. The very ideas we inculcate are no longer the same the moment they find their way into another mind. They become immediately subject to a new power, are colored, modified, dissolved and recombined. Ideas are not quantities, fixed and conveyed at will from one to another. They are merely materials of thought, hints, starting points for a most free, most original, most independent artist. Every new thought is a new premise for the reason, a new stand-point for the imagination. Locks of cotton or hanks of silk are put into the hand of industry; but who can foresee, what they shall come back, of what texture, or hue, whether a coat of mail to shield the

sailor-boy from the storm, or a curtain of gossamer to float before the face of beauty? And who shall divine into what possible forms the materials of thought, which education supplies may be wrought by the free spirit? Who shall set limits to the new combinations of ideas, and consequently new forms of character, which, by the very act of instruction, are we teaching our pupils to create for themselves? Indeed, just in proportion as we succeed in developing the mind, we render it independent of our own control. At every successive stage of education we hold a more disputed empire. Every step we advance, so much is done to rouse the power of thought, and nourish the spirit of self-reliance. Despotism must always be based upon ignorance. There is no more mortifying lesson than is taught us every day, by our impotent attempts to tame and lead about the little heart of infant man. Power is baffled, by an insignificant being, whose puny frame, we feel, that we might crush in our hand. The soul, composed as if it animated a gigantic form, looks out and laughs, or curls the lip, at the assumption of authority. Who has not felt at once, his weakness and his strength, his littleness and his nobility, as he has seen our nature thus erect itself upon the foundation of its native greatness, and saying, in very childhood, "My Master is in heaven."

Again; our ignorance alone is enough to render all systems uncertain. It is regarded as one of the most embarrassing circumstances in medical practice, that the vital functions are carried on in profound darkness. Irregular action and its causes are only intimated by obscure signs in the external man. The mental phenomena, in sickness and health, all thought and feeling, are equally concealed, with the additional security from detection, that they control, to a great degree, even the outward symptoms of their own existence and character. The moral pulse is a very imperfect diagnostic. In vain the most penetrating eye searches the bosom even of a friend. That friend himself but half knows, what is going on there. When he tells us with apparent frankness all the secrets of his heart, how we still long to look into his soul. That sanctuary no eye may profane. The prerogative of moral privacy cannot be taken away. God only knows the heart-sweet thought, to an honest man, that there is one, who knows it—and, therefore, God only "turneth the heart as the rivers of water are turned."

It is worthy of remark also, that we have no direct power over mind, the most docile and yielding, even our own. We cannot

say to this feeling, "Come," and to that feeling, "Go." We cannot command a thought. Our influence, when easiest and strongest, is all indirect. To produce thought in ourselves, it is not enough to say, "I will think." The laws of thought must be observed; the occasions of thought must be presented; the objects of thought must awaken the attention. In no other way can we enjoy the privilege even of forming our own character, and determining our own destiny. Instruction and discipline, therefore, have no exclusive right; they cannot monopolize the work of education. They perform a part; important it may be, but yet a part only; and that on precisely the same principles, according to which all other influences are exerted upon mind. The consequence is, that, with all its freedom, mind is, in spite of itself, subject to incessant education. It cannot stand still. It is never the same to-day that it was yesterday. It never repeats the experience of an hour. Society and solitude, action and repose, man and nature, all things instruct us, all are working changes in us.

The result of these views of education is, obviously, not at all to lessen our interest in its improvement as a science, or to let down our idea of its dignity as an art. It is, undoubtedly, however, to moderate, in some degree, the sanguine expectations of those, who look altogether to schools and systems of instruction for realizing our hopes of the progress of mankind.

We may not effect all we aim at; we may not, at present, approximate to our ideal of a perfect education. But let us not petulantly abandon modes of culture, to which long and large experience has given its sanction, because it does not accomplish impossibilities; nor undervalue our institutions of learning, because they are imperfect. We have a certain degree of direct influence in the development of intellectual and moral character—influence most valuable and important, beginning with the dawn of reason and continuing to the end of life; essentially and forever affecting the usefulness and happiness of all that are dear to us, throughout the whole period of their being. This influence we cannot too much cherish. The schools and colleges, the domestic training, and the public religious instruction, by which it is exerted, are above all price. Private charity and the treasures of the State are not ill employed in extending and perpetuating it. Family government is not well administered, legislation is shortsighted and illiberal, where education is not the prominent object of parental solicitude and deliberative wisdom.

But we had in view, in the commencement of these remarks, a class of influences, less direct, collateral, by which, even where our systems of instruction are most perfect, all the character they develop is materially modified. Some of these we proceed to specify. And the first which occurs to us is the atmosphere of the place—the “genius loci.” Tacitus says of Agricola, “Arcebat eum ab illecebris peccantium, praeter ipsius bonam integramque naturam, quod statim parvulus sedem ac magistram studiorum, Massiliam habuerit, locum Graeca comitate et provinciali parcimonia mixtum, ac bene compositum.” The remark discriminates with a felicity worthy of the superlative beauty of that monument of filial piety, of which it is a fragment, a kind of agency in our early training too seldom appreciated or regarded. It may not be of consequence under what star a man is born. The other planets may have little to do with his destiny. But it is of moment to him, where, upon earth, he is cradled and brought up. The mere physical features of the place are not indifferent; there are correspondences of the outward with the inward world; there are aspects of nature fit to nurse and call out the greatness and loveliness, of which the seeds and germs are in all hearts; external beauty, variety and grandeur appear mirrored, with increased softness and richness, in the calm depths of the spirit which reposes among them. The same system of instruction and the same instructors have, by no means, the same effect on mind in the town and in the country, amid the monotony of a western prairie and among the hills and waterfalls of New England.

There is, however, a local influence of another sort, and still more worthy of regard. An intellectual, spiritual atmosphere, invests the favored spots where great minds have commanded respect, and noble natures have aspired to deserve it. A seat of learning cannot become venerable without age. Time gradually gathers about its halls and groves an air of moral greatness, which no expenditure of money can anticipate. Its ample libraries, and extensive cabinets, the multiform apparatus of science, models of art, and memorials of genius, the slow accumulations of ages, all conspire to give impulse and tone to every mind admitted to its sacred retreats or suffered to repose under its classic shades. A species of grateful enchantment pervades the place; higher dignity is imparted to science; and new charms invite to liberal studies.

It is a hasty conclusion, that, because a man must be, always,

in a great degree, self-taught, he may, therefore, learn equally well, anywhere, at a university or in a farm-house. There is, indeed, no place where mind may not flourish; genius appropriates nutriment to itself from the most sterile soil; it can live upon its own blood. But in propitious scenes, surrounded by congenial objects, saluted by loving and hallowed voices, and stimulated by great examples, it conceives more lofty purposes, and advances with a bolder step. In the presence of greatness it is itself greater. In the atmosphere of thought it is easier to think. To *be*, in such society, is to improve.

There is a necessary greenness and crudeness in new institutions. The scholarship formed in them is like society in new settlements, coarse, rude, noisy, vulgar. The eminent propriety of thought, the delicate sentiment, the grace of mind, the artist-like relief and beauty of expression, which distinguish the already ripening scholar from his coëvals, are almost never the growth of young places.

Another style of mind is the product of private education. It may be conducted among the loveliest scenes of nature, and by the most skilful tutors. Nothing useful may seem to be wanting. But a sort of man is formed wholly unlike the products of the schools. He grows up too much in the shade. He is wanting, generally, in two essential points of character—a true self-reliance and respect for others. He is, accordingly, timid or rash in action, and distrustful or credulous in opinion. We learn to know ourselves and others by the same means, by measuring ourselves with them. Confidence in the duties of life is the result of experience, of trial of ourselves; and respect for mind is produced by acquaintance with mind. Arrogance, presumption, and vanity are the fruits of ignorance,—ignorance which books and tutors never entirely remove; the only certain remedy for it is found in the earnest pursuit of great objects in competition with kindred minds. We learn, in this contest, both our weakness and our strength.

Another of the accidental influences, which modify the effect of systematic education, is example.

We have in mind not the general power of example, in which each is affected by all, and all by each, and a common public sentiment generated, a social character formed; though no man liveth to himself, and thought and feeling everywhere tend to diffusion, to an equilibrium. The influence we allude to is rather that which characterizes here and there an individual, in every

community, gifted somewhat above his fellows, and capable of fusing and remoulding the minds about him. They are ruling spirits in their day and generation; and, whether elevated to attract the admiration of a whole people, or confined to a village popularity, seem evidently "born to command," and exercise, it may be, unconsciously, a formative energy. They lead, by general consent, by an acknowledged native right. Their power is in their temperament, in their will, in their earnestness, mainly. They are impersonations of moral energy. If this character be combined with a proportioned and beautiful intellectual and moral development, we then see humanity in its utmost perfection. The spectacle of such a man silently elevates and rectifies his age, his town, or his village. In a class of students, academical or professional, it raises the standard of ambition, sheds lustre on the pursuits of learning, and insensibly diffuses a liberal and generous love of letters through the whole circle. No teacher can have failed to see how sensibly the example of one true scholar is felt, and how magnanimously it is admired, among his equals and competitors.

In active life the same delightful power is illustrated. A noble heart never beats alone. A renovating spirit never breathes in vain. With living excellence we have inextinguishable sympathies. It consecrates the place of its abode, and leaves memorials of itself sculptured on the imperishable material of which souls are made. A good man with a great and resolute heart cannot live unfelt, nor die to be forgotten. And an earnest bad man is the most flagrant scourge of Heaven. The intellect perverted by him, the hearts he sours, or sears, the hopes he blasts, the happiness he poisons, who thinks of it all without wondering with David, at "the prosperity of the wicked."

For good, or for evil, we are affected more than we are aware by the models of personal energy, with which, in the course of life, it is the lot of us all, more or less to come in contact. Not one escapes, altogether, the contagion of example, more potent than all precepts, more plastic than our arts of education. A master mind, oracular even when not original, in which ordinary thoughts kindle and burn, and by which familiar subjects are electrified, is responsible, to society and to God, for a fearful power.

The only other influence of the same kind, which it occurred to us to notice, is the all important one of government. On this we do not intend to dwell. It is too ample for our space, and too important to be hastily despatched. Government educates the people

by supplying the most important trains of thought, which occupy the waking hours, or fill up the dreams, of the majority of mankind. Office, wealth, personal consideration are all dispensed, or secured, by the civil constitution and administration, under which we live. Other institutions and agencies are controlled by the public policy. If enterprise and ambition are attracted to virtuous and noble objects, if pure purposes and just principles are recommended and engendered by the civil power, if government be, indeed, "a terror to evil doers and a praise to them who do well," it is, in itself the highest and most efficient national education. If, on the other hand, wrong principles are encouraged, and bad passions appealed to, if the objects of ordinary ambition are held out as rewards to the most sagacious, the most wily, the most unscrupulous, it matters little what morals are taught in the books, or what discipline is enforced in the schools; a corrupt government is a fountain of poison.

The practical influences from the foregoing observations are:

1. That our true policy is not to multiply institutions of learning, but to enlarge the foundations and increase the advantages of those we have—to neglect nothing in or about them, which may serve to add dignity to science, or to refine and elevate the taste and the moral feelings. The seat of a college should be, if possible, a rural city; and the more of the monuments of learning and art, and living excellence, we can accumulate in it the better. Money is not wasted upon its architecture or its grounds. Not a new niche is filled with a work of genius, nor a new alcove with books, but to a useful and important end. Not a man raised in its bosom to adorn its annals should be parted with for love or money. Not a fragrant recollection in its history should be allowed to wither and dry up, nor a purifying and ennobling association with its name, or its halls, be suffered to grow dim. Whatever of the true, or beautiful, or great, or good in mind or the products of mind, in nature or art, industry or wealth can procure is part of its means of education. Baldness, sterility, deformity, physical or moral have no genial, wholesome influence upon the sensitive heart of youth.

2. It should be an object never lost sight of to secure in seminaries of learning, and indeed everywhere, examples of the most perfect mental development. Systems which tend to equalize the benefits of education by reducing the standard of practical attainment—lessening, in this way, the difference between the highest and the lowest, have the effect, ultimately, to depress all;

for they remove one of the best incitements to excellence, the actual exemplification of it in a living instance before us, and of us. If a man of preëminent character and attainment should do nothing else but exist, in the eyes of his associates and neighbors, he would live for a most enviable usefulness. And a system which raises up one such man, in a class of students, or a community, really improves and elevates the whole.

3. Good men may not excuse themselves from an active and efficient agency in the government of their country. It is just leaving the principal instrument of power over themselves, and their posterity in wicked hands. It is essentially counteracting their own endeavors to improve society. It is permitting unprincipled men to educate, in fact, to a great degree, their children. What avails it for us, under the plea of avoiding all meddling with secular, and especially civil matters, to labor in the schools, and in the church, regardless of a tremendous power incessantly at work, in high places, and carry its pestiferous influence everywhere, to corrupt and mislead society? How futile to rely on *means*, and yet not use those which a beneficent Providence has put into our hands, of determining, to some extent at least, the character of the government under which we live, and the public policy of the people of which we are a part! If government is a matter of indifference, it may be left to boys. If it is nothing but a scramble for petty titles and a little brief authority, those who love the dust and the noise of popular excitement, and public parade, should be allowed to have the conflicts and the victories all to themselves. But if most of the great objects, which men seek in life, if most of the enterprise, and industry, which fill up that life, if the spirit of the country, its morality, its integrity, its justice, its piety, its whole education, theoretical and practical, are intimately and must be forever connected with the exercise of civil power, no good man, no thoughtful Christian can shrink from his responsibilities as a citizen, can relinquish his birthright as a freeman.

ARTICLE II.

SCHOTT'S FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF RHETORIC AND HOMILETICS.

By Edwards A. Park, Professor at Andover.

[HENRY AUGUSTUS SCHOTT was born at Leipsic on the fifth of December, 1780. His father, Augustus Frederic Schott, was a Professor in the University of Leipsic, and died in 1792. The son was early distinguished for his philological and varied learning. In 1805 he was appointed Extraordinary Professor of Philology; and in 1808, Extraordinary Professor of Theology at Leipsic. In 1809 he was made Doctor and Professor of Theology at Wittenberg. He was called in 1812 to a Professorship of Theology at Jena, where he was Director of the Preacher's Seminary, and Privy Church-Councillor. While the first Professor at Jena, he died on the 29th of December, 1835, in the fifty-sixth year of his age. In his doctrinal opinions he was a supranaturalist. He published in 1806 a new version of the Greek Testament, which in 1825 had passed through three editions. In 1825 he published, in connection with J. F. Winzer, a Latin translation of the Pentateuch. In 1834 appeared his Commentary on the Epistles of the New Testament. In 1811 he published his Epitome of Dogmatic Christian Theology, which in 1822 had passed through two editions; in 1830, his Historico-critical Introduction to the Books of the New Testament; and in 1826 his Letters on Religion and the Christian Faith. In 1807 he published his Brief Sketch of a Theory of Eloquence with special application to the Eloquence of the Pulpit, and in 1813 a second edition of the same. In 1815 appeared his celebrated treatise, entitled, The Theory of Eloquence with special application to Sacred Eloquence in its whole extent, in three volumes. According to the principles detailed in this work he composed numerous essays and sermons, some of which he gave to the press. Among them are, Clerical Discourses and Homilies, with particular reference, in part, to the events of the day, 1815; Christian Religious Discourses on Texts belonging to the Pericope and on others freely chosen, in two volumes, 1814; a New Collection of Clerical Discourses and Homilies, 1822; a New Selection of Homilies, 1830; many occasional

sermons, and many homiletical essays, in three volumes of the Journal for Preachers, which he edited, in connection with Rehkopf, during 1811—12, and in Tzschirner's Memorabilia for the Preacher's Study, etc. The following Article is an abstract of the First Part, pp. 1—462, of his larger Theorie der Beredsamkeit, a work which is universally regarded as the standard German Treatise in the department of Homiletics. It is particularly valuable not only for the copious learning which it exhibits, but also for the high moral sentiment and evangelical piety which it everywhere breathes. The title of the First Part is, the Philosophical and Religious Fundamental Principles of Rhetoric and Homiletics].

† 1. *Origin of Language.*

THERE is in man a deeply seated desire of progress, of improving his condition, of enlarging his sphere of action, of rising higher and higher on the scale of being. He conceives no limit which he does not wish to transcend. He has an instinctive longing to place himself in a state of harmony with his own nature, and with all objects around him. The demand is constantly made upon his soul, Be one, be ever more and more one with thyself and with the world about thee. His desire of unity with himself and with the universe, is analogous to the tendency of all material objects toward one central point. It is a desire which finds its highest gratification in the service of God and in communion with him. It leads man to desire that others may participate in his own states of thinking, feeling and willing. He feels impelled to transfer the thoughts, affections and volitions of his own soul to the souls of other men, and thus to put his fellow beings in harmony with himself. His nature suggests to him a process for attaining this end.

He is instinctively prompted to utter certain sounds which are expressive of his sensations. The faculty of employing particular tones of the voice as representative of particular sensuous feelings, is common to man and the brutes. In man, however, the faculty is more highly developed than in the lower animals. A tune, when considered apart from the words to which it is applied, is the most exalted effort of this power of expression. The imitative sounds are also a peculiar exercise of the same faculty. At first, the power is employed without any conception of the object of that sensation which is felt and expressed. But this mere-

ly instinctive mode of expression cannot satisfy the wants of man. He desires a more extensive communication with his fellow beings. He finds by experience that certain sounds produce a certain impression upon him, and he is prompted to produce the same impression upon others by the employment of the same sounds. The more he attends to these intonations of the voice, so much the more readily does he form a conception of the object of the sensations which they indicate; and when he has once formed this conception, he has a desire to express it. He has this desire in consequence of that tendency of his nature, which has been already noticed, to place himself in sympathy and harmony with beings around him. He therefore feels impelled to designate by his voice the objects which he has conceived. He applies to some of them the sounds which he had previously used as signs of sensation; to others he applies sounds resembling these; for a third class he uses imitative sounds; for a fourth class he employs such utterances as are naturally suggestive, although not strictly imitative; and for still other classes of objects he forms vocal expressions by numerous changes and combinations of sounds, which he had previously assigned to things more easily designated. When he has once invented names for a certain number of objects, his progress in the extension of his vocabulary is obviously facilitated. The distinction, then, between sounds as composing language, and sounds as employed by man in his natural state and by brutes, is the following:—the former are made with an intelligent design, the latter are made under the impulse of a mere sensuous feeling; the former are expressive of conceptions, the latter of mere sensations; the former are articulate, the latter inarticulate. Language, therefore, is the intentional expression of human conceptions by means of articulate and significant sounds, by means of words.

But in process of time words are communicated not only to the ear but also to the eye. Language does not satisfy the desire of man for communion and harmony with the world around him, until it is written as well as oral. It must become a fixed and permanent expression of his states of mind, and thus facilitate the transactions which are necessary for the progress of society, for commerce, for the conduct of States, etc. Spoken language is the *immediate* expression of our conceptions; written language the *mediate*. The former suggests its meaning as soon as perceived by the sense; the latter must first be translated from the language of visible signs into that of audible sounds, before it can

be understood. The eye perceives the word, and suggests the sound of it, and then the signification of it is communicated to the soul. Thus the audible words are appreciated *directly*; the visible, *indirectly*. Hence the spoken language can produce upon the mind and heart a much more rapid and powerful impression, than can be produced by the written language. The former can also express a feeling or idea much more vividly than the latter by means of the variation of tone, which designates the slightest shading of sentiment and appeals at once to the heart. Still, the written language has in its turn some advantages over the oral. It is more favorable to calm, dispassionate thought, to the predominance of the judgment above the imagination and the feelings, to continuous and repeated views of the same proposition. It retains the expressed opinions of men for a longer time than they can be preserved by the most powerful oratory, and during thousands of years it continues to be a treasury of thoughts which, when uttered by the living voice, would be quickly efficacious and quickly forgotten.

§ 2. *The different Susceptibilities of the Soul originating different Forms of Language; the Origin of Prose, Poetry and Eloquence; the distinctive Character of each.*

The various susceptibilities of the soul may be divided into three classes. The first class may be comprehended under the cognitive or knowing faculty, and the following acts are referrible to it; first, perceptions; secondly, conceptions, acts of imagination; thirdly, notions, generalizations, (perceptions of the understanding); fourthly, judgments; fifthly, inferences, conclusions; and sixthly, ideas, (perceptions of the reason). To this general faculty therefore belong the subordinate powers of perception, conception, imagination, understanding, reason, memory. When all these powers act in unison with each other, they constitute the perfection of man's *intellectual* nature. The second class of susceptibilities may be comprehended under the sensitive faculty, and to it may be referred the sensations, and the inward feelings or affections. When all the feelings of man are in harmony with each other, he has reached the perfection of his *sensitive* being. The third class of susceptibilities may be comprehended under the appetitive faculty, or what is sometimes called, in its more general sense, the will. The will, in its more specific and limited meaning, chooses an object, when that object stands in a cer-

tain relation to some previous *inclination* of the soul. If the object be more distinctly perceived by the mind, and the inclination be intelligently directed to it, then is the inclination called *desire*; and if the desire be long continued, it is termed *disposition*, and if the disposition have a certain degree of strength, and a certain measure of excitement, it is denominated *passion*. When all the acts of the will are in unison with each other and with the reason and judgment, when the lower inclinations are kept subordinate to the higher, then is the *moral* nature of man in its state of perfection.

Of the different susceptibilities which have been mentioned, sometimes one, and sometimes another has the predominance in an individual, and characterizes his whole course of action. There is a state of calm contemplation and thoughtfulness; there is a state of animated feeling; there is a state of voluntary desire, and each of these states forms often the peculiarity by which one man is distinguished from another. The occupation of the soul with perceptions, conceptions, notions, judgments, inferences, ideas, does not altogether exclude the contemporaneous indulgence of feelings and affections, but it prevents such a degree of them as may give any other than a meditative character to the mind. So the occupation of the soul with lively feeling presupposes the exercise of the cognitive faculty, but precludes any such degree of the exercise as may in any way diminish the predominance of the sensitive, emotive character of the individual. The feelings are indeed often excited and heightened by the imagination. This power is peculiarly fitted to move the affections, by its presenting to the mind specific images of an object; also by its presenting images resembling and nearly related to the particular feelings which are to be excited; by its presenting images of the cause which precedes, or of the effect which follows the existing emotion; by its presenting images which are in contrast with the object of that emotion, and which therefore make the object so much the more vivid and affecting. As the imagination acts on the feelings, so the feelings react on the imagination, and thus a reciprocal influence is exerted by these distinct susceptibilities, which increases the intensity of each. Similar remarks may be applied to the appetitive part of our nature. The inclinations and desires are excited by the imagination; for the clear images of this faculty arouse the involuntary affections which are the precursors of voluntary acts. The will, in its turn, exerts a reflex influence on the fancy. Whenever we choose an

object we fix our attention upon it; the more attentively we view it, so much the deeper impression does it make on our involuntary feelings; and the more intensely our feelings are excited, so much the greater activity and vivacity are imparted to the imagination. Thus an act of the will vivifies both the affections and the fancy, and receives itself a stimulus from the powers which it reciprocally quickens. All our faculties act and react upon each other, and the man acquires a distinctive character by the preponderance of one or another of his several susceptibilities.

When, therefore, he is in a state of calm, dispassionate thought, he has a desire of unity with himself; that is, of making his intellectual operations consistent with one another, and reducing them to one harmoniously connected train. He has also a desire of unison with others, that is, of making their perceptions and judgments one with his own. This leads him to adopt the language of instruction, and this kind of language is termed *prose*, in its restricted sense. When likewise he is in the state of excited feeling, he naturally inclines to a similar harmony with himself; that is, to a consistency, likeness and union between his affections. He wishes to feel as one man, and not as divided against his own nature. He will not freely express his emotions, unless they are congruous with one another and unite in one general character. He is also instinctively impelled to be in unison with his fellow men, and make his feelings their own. He therefore gives utterance to the feelings of his heart, in order to raise the same affections in the hearts of his fellow beings. His feelings have excited his imagination, and the language which he employs is that of the imagination and the affections united. This kind of language is termed *poetry*. Again, when he is in a state of voluntary desire, he feels the same impulse to be at one with himself; to have all his inclinations and volitions consistent with each other; and also to be at one with other men, to bring their wills into a state of harmony with his own. Hence he expresses himself in a peculiar species of language, called *eloquence*. As his voluntary emotions are excited by previous thoughts and feelings, so the style which he employs for communicating his acts of will contains the elements of the style for the operations of the intellect and of the heart. In other words, eloquence, although distinguished from prose and poetry, has many qualities in common with them both.

In distinguishing prose from eloquence, the word prose is used in a narrower acceptation than ordinary. It is employed to denote

the language of the intellect, and is thus distinct from eloquence, which is the language of the voluntary power. In a more general sense, however, the word prose includes eloquence, and denotes that species of language which is constructed with prominent reference to a particular definite effect upon the mind of the reader or hearer. Thus, the writer of prose, in its limited sense, aims to be didactic, to impart a certain degree of knowledge on a specific subject. He constructs his sentences with obvious reference to the facility and clearness of his communications. The eloquent writer aims to move the will ; to awaken in his readers some particular inclination, or excite them to some definite purpose. But the writer of poetry has no such prominent reference in his composition to a specific effect upon his readers. He does not shape his verses with the prominent design of imparting definite instruction, nor of persuading the will to a particular act. He writes freely, and without the appearance of calculating consequences. When he begins to calculate, he has ceased to be inspired. True, he does instruct and does persuade, but never makes it his prominent aim to produce these effects. As a writer he does calculate, but as a poet he utters his feelings without constraint. After he has written, he considers the influence of his words on others ; but while he is writing, he is borne onward by his own feelings. His object is to bring the feelings of others into a state of sympathy with his own, but this is a *general* object, and the prominent avowal of it would tend to convert his poetry into prose. He must not reduce this general design to any particular form, nor can he, as a poet, devise any specific plan for affecting others in correspondency with his main purpose. He must not select his images or his words with an obvious or primary reference to their effect on his readers, but must be influenced first of all by the spontaneous suggestions of his own feeling, and if he ever thinks of making a stanza useful to his fellow men, the thought must be an incidental one, secondary to the desire of giving vent to his own emotions, concealed from the view of others, and never so prominent as to interfere with his seeming, as well as his real inspiration. It must be, moreover, of a general nature, and must never assume that specific, definite form which characterizes the orator and the didactic prose writer.

Poetry has been defined, the language of the imagination and the feelings. This definition does not imply, that the language prompted by these susceptibilities is never used in simple didactic prose. It teaches, however, that the fancy and the affections

of the prosaic writer are less highly excited than are those of the poet, and his style is less distinctively influenced by them. The imagination is employed in prose for the purpose of illustrating the judgment expressed; it is checked as soon as it has reflected light upon the thought. It is regarded simply as a means subservient to a more important end. It is employed by the poet for the sake of its aesthetical worth, and of the pleasure imparted by it. The writer of prose expresses the convictions of his understanding; the poet expresses ideas of the reason. The objects presented by the former are therefore strictly defined, measured and limited; the favorite objects of the latter are immeasurable and illimitable. Ideas, however, are not presented by the poet in an abstract form; they are combined with some sensible representation. They are made tangible and invested with a living reality. The idea is converted into an ideal. The prose writer represents objects as he finds them, the poet makes new combinations of ideas, is in a sense a creator; hence he is called *ποιητής*. The writer of prose adheres, in the arrangement of his thoughts, to the logical order suggested by his subject. He endeavors to present his theme in its various divisions and subdivisions, and to accommodate all his statements to the capacities of his readers. But the poet so adjusts his ideas as to present a single pleasing image to the mind. He conforms to his own inspired emotions, rather than to the mental necessities of other men. In describing an historical event, he does not, like the prose writer, follow the order of time, and of cause and effect, but plunges at once *in mediam rem*, and details the essential circumstances of the history, wherever he can do it with the least constraint and stiffness; nor does he hesitate to beautify and to idealize the reality, whenever his feelings prompt him to deviate from literal exactness. He gives the general impression of the scene, without being particularly accurate in delineating its minute characteristics.

As all language is a transcript of the inner man, and as prose and poetry are prompted by very dissimilar states of the mind, so the words selected by the poet are different from those selected by the writer of prose. The former will prefer a figurative term to a literal one, where the latter will have an opposite preference. The former will choose bold expressions, new phrases, peculiar constructions, where the latter will adopt a more humble and familiar mode of speech. The poet delights in metre, in rhyme, while the orator is content with a certain *numerus* of style, and the prosaic essayist, historian or philosopher confines himself to

the easiest and simplest flow of language. The matter of a composition must determine the form of it, and as the object of the poet is to please, he must select such a class of words as will not appear hackneyed or tame or unmusical. His style must be free and unfettered, hence his license in the use of words. Poetry may be defined the representation, in language, of that which is adapted to gratify the taste. Now a writer must be, and appear to be himself pleased with an object, in order to make that object pleasing to others. Hence the rules relating to the poet's selection and arrangement of thoughts and words, are less objective and more subjective than are the rules for the prose writer and the orator.

§ 3. *Definition of Eloquence.*

The object of prose, in its more extensive acceptation, is to instruct the intellect or to move the will. When it is adapted to the former purpose, it is called prose, in the more proper and narrow meaning of the word; when it is adapted to the latter purpose it is called *eloquence*.¹ Eloquence implies, first, that a definite object be presented to the mind of the person addressed; secondly, that his inclination be excited to secure that object; thirdly, that he be convinced of the fitness of that object to gratify the excited inclination; and fourthly, that he be convinced of his ability to attain the end for which his desire has been aroused. In order to stimulate this desire, it is necessary to present the object vividly before the mind; and for this purpose to employ the imagination more than it is employed in the simple prosaic style. If we would move the will we must previously arouse the affections, and this also requires a more vigorous exercise of the imagination than is appropriate to the didactic prose. It requires, however, that the imagination be subsidiary to the excitement of volition, and that in eloquence it have a less predominant sway than it has in poetry. Simple prose being addressed to the intellect, and poetry being addressed to the imagination and feeling, eloquence is addressed to the three united, and that for the purpose of affecting a fourth power, the will. In prose the imagination is employed for the sake of illustration; in poetry for the sake of imparting pleasure and enlivening the feelings; in elo-

¹ The Romans often denominated a man *disertus*, who could speak perspicuously, and fluently, so as to satisfy common men; but they called the man *eloquens* who could captivate his hearers and influence their wills. The Germans make a similar distinction between *Wohlredenheit* and *Beredsamkeit*.

quence, for the sake, ultimately, of persuading to voluntary action. Eloquence presupposes the address to the intellect, to the imagination, and to the passions, but differs from prose and poetry in its ultimate aim ; in making each and all of the above named faculties subordinate to that of voluntary action. It is, in its nature, intermediate between prose and poetry, and unites the perspicuity, the definiteness, the logical argument of the former, with the vividness, exuberance, and imaginative spirit of the latter. It combines these qualities in one harmonious whole, as means to a higher end. The definition of eloquence is therefore the following : " Such an exhibition, in connected discourse, of the orator's thoughts, as is adapted to determine the human will by means of a suitably proportioned, a symmetrical appeal to the understanding and the reason on the one hand, and to the imagination and the feeling on the other." There may be eloquence, it is true, in a dialogue, as well as in a connected oration, but the latter is the more usually selected as the form for appeals to the will, and is the better fitted for such a rapid and vigorous flow of sentiment as is essential to the deepest impression on the voluntary power. It is necessary to specify, that the thoughts are exhibited in *discourse* ; thereby we may avoid the objection which Quintilian makes to Cicero's statement, that eloquence is the art of persuading ; for men may be persuaded by other means than by speech, by other means than by eloquence. It is also necessary to state that the understanding and reason must be addressed by the orator in fitting proportion to the other powers ; thereby we avoid another of Quintilian's objections to Cicero's definition : for if eloquence be the mere art of persuading, then the seducer appealing to the weak passions of his victim may be eloquent, and thus the noblest of all arts may be degraded to a level with the mere tricks of a debauchee. Eloquence has often been associated, if not confounded, with dishonest artifice, with the power of beguiling and over-persuading ; but according to the definition given above, there can be no perfect eloquence which does not contain a well proportioned appeal to the judgment and conscience of man. It is also better to define eloquence as that which is *adapted* to persuade the will, than as that which does in fact accomplish this purpose. Quintilian says, that if eloquence be as Cicero denominates it, the art of persuading, then its character is determined by the event, and if the speech be not actually successful in moving the will, it is not an eloquent speech. But the success of an appeal may be prevented by adventitious circumstances, and

the consequences which result from it cannot change its intrinsic rhetorical character.

‡ 4. *Relation of the several kinds of Eloquence to the several kinds of Poetry.*

In lyric poetry the subjective element is conspicuous, and involves the objective within itself. In dramatic poetry the objective element is predominant, and the subjective is merged into it. In epic poetry, the subjective and the objective are both noticeable; past events are rehearsed as if present, and the author is conspicuous in relating them. The lyric poet uses the language of feeling; his own emotion is expressed in view of an object, but the object is noticed only through the emotion. The dramatic poet, on the other hand, describes a series of past acts as though they were performed at present, and does not himself appear in the description; the reader is not reminded of the man whose drama he is perusing, but is absorbed in the facts which are dramatically represented. The epic poet takes an intermediate position in regard to the other two. He brings the past into our ideal presence, but he also *appears* to bring it. Himself is prominent as well as the object which he describes.

Now the orator, in order to move the will of his hearers or readers, must exhibit vividly his own feelings, and in this disclosure of excited emotion he resembles the lyric poet. Still, eloquence demands that the affections be only coordinate with the other susceptibilities of the soul, and in this respect differs from lyric poetry, which requires the affections to be predominant. Again, in order to induce his hearers to act, the orator must often appeal to the past. If he would excite a nation to deeds of heroism, he must bring into fresh remembrance the exploits of olden time, and present to the sons a glowing portraiture of the honor of their fathers. This vivid description of past scenes is the particular, in which eloquence resembles epic poetry. But the resemblance is not complete, for the orator's description is regulated by its subserviency to excite an emulous spirit among his hearers, while the poet's verses are free, and are designed merely to gratify the taste.

There is, also, one particular in which eloquence resembles dramatic poetry. The speaker acts on the hearers, and the hearers act on the speaker. He communicates to them his thoughts and feelings, and excites them to the same purposes which him-

self has formed. They hear his communications, and think, feel, will in correspondency with him. They doubt; he removes their scruples. They disbelieve; he convinces them. They resist; he overcomes their opposition. Their opinions and feelings are perceived by him; perhaps foreseen, perhaps detected in their countenances. These acts of the hearer have an effect upon the orator, and induce him to adopt a train of remark which he would otherwise omit. Thus the action is reciprocal between the two parties; that of the hearer is more silently but not always less evidently made known than that of the speaker. There is, as it were, a dialogue spoken between the orator and his audience; they determining him what arguments or motives to present, and he determining them what purposes to form. He and they are in a relative situation like that of the persons of a drama, and thus is eloquence in one respect similar to dramatic poetry. A lifeless, ineffective speech results from a want of this almost dramatic interest of the orator in his auditory. He must conduct an internal conversation with them, or he cannot speak to them with the appropriate power.

The ancient eloquence was more obviously and strikingly similar to poetic composition, than is the modern. Their judicial and deliberative orations were designed to produce an immediate effect, to persuade to an immediate act or purpose. This aim at instantaneous efficiency was itself exciting both to speakers and hearers, and led the former to make energetic appeals to the passions of the latter. The judicial and deliberative orations were, therefore, characterized by the display of imagination and warm emotion. The excited feelings of the orator were responded to by the audience, and thus arose a striking resemblance between these orations and dramatic poetry. The external circumstances in which the orations were delivered contributed much to increase this resemblance. The accused had his advocate (*patronus causæ*), and therefore the complainant was answered by an opposing orator, and thus ensued a contest which was often compared by the ancient rhetoricians to a battle, or to a gladiatorial encounter. The attack and the reply, the rejoinder and the surrejoinder possessed in themselves a dramatic interest, and the acquittal or condemnation of the accused was like the catastrophe of the drama. Sometimes also, the relatives of the man on trial presented themselves suddenly, and in the habiliments of deep mourning, before the judges. Sometimes the auditors expressed their gratification or their dissatisfaction with the speaker by tumultuous

noises. They went so far, in many instances, as to remove him by violence from the rostrum. During the first centuries of the christian era, the worshippers in christian temples were accustomed occasionally to make loud demonstrations of the pleasure or disgust with which their preacher affected them. But modern auditories do not make such emphatic expressions of their approbation or their dislike of the person, by whom they are addressed.

But besides the deliberative and the judicial orations of the Greeks and Romans, there was a third kind, the panegyrical. These were sometimes occupied with the praise of the gods, of departed heroes, of the fathers of the republic, and sometimes with important political discussions. After the downfall of republicanism, they were devoted to the adulation of the divinity who presides over some public game, or to the praise of the game itself, or of the regent of the State, or to some other inferior purpose. There were also panegyrical orations delivered in honor of brave citizens who died for their country; there were some too, delivered in honor of private men, and called *orationes funebres*. When the orator endeavored to excite his hearers to an imitation of the men whom he extolled, or to the practice of the virtues which he recommended, his style of address resembled that of the judicial and deliberative orator, and partook therefore of the dramatic element. When he indulged in merely laudatory effusions, his style was akin to that of the lyric poet. When he narrated the exploits of departed worthies, he introduced into his composition some distinctive features of epic poetry.

It is evident that discourses from a christian pulpit are often in some respects analogous to the epic poem; for they often detail the truly poetical scenes of evangelical history. They have also an analogy to the lyric poem; for they often contain the outpourings of excited feeling, and merge the objective element into a subjective form. They have more of the lyrical character than the judicial and deliberative orators of the ancients; for they are pervaded by a deeper and stronger emotion. They have, however, not so much of the lyrical character as many of the panegyrical orations; for they must necessarily have more of a practical object, and aim at a more definite influence on the will. This aim to affect the voluntary principle gives to the sermon a likeness to the deliberative and judicial orations, and accordingly, a resemblance to the dialogue of the drama. Still, its resemblance to the drama is less than has been already ascribed to those orations. For the aim of the sermon is not so often to produce an immediate effect

as a permanent one ; not so often to influence the will at the instant, as to influence the whole character for all time. Hence it is not so exciting, and is not so passionate in its appeals, as those orations which are devoted to a single object, and which are of instantaneous interest. Moreover, the design of the preacher is not to be accomplished by a single discourse ; he feels that he must produce his effect by a long series of sermons. This gives him more of a calm dispassionate air, than the orator can have whose whole success depends upon a single speech. An address from the pulpit, then, being less fervid than a deliberative or judicial oration of the ancients, produces a less obvious excitement among the hearers, and thus secures from them a less perceptible response. It is of course less decidedly analogous to the dialogue, but is not entirely devoid of this feature of dramatic poetry.¹

† 5. *Different degrees of attention paid by the Orator and the Poet, to the Subject-matter and to the Style of their compositions.*

The poet is inspired with the beauties of his subject. Being pleased himself, he expresses his pleasure with a genial freedom. He does not check his inspiration for the purpose of inquiring whether, or how far his readers will be interested in this or that figure of speech, but, if his own tastes are gratified with it, he uses it without hesitation. He writes as if he were independent of his fellow-men, and were actuated by some higher genius. He seems not to be constrained by this genius, but to be enlivened and inspired by it. There is no utilitarianism in his method of composition. Whenever and wherever he finds an object pleasing to the taste, he employs it ; and does not, as a poet, inquire whether the object in its other relations be important or unimportant. It is very true that if a poem be written on a useful theme, the utility of the stanzas is associated in our minds with their beauty, and thus increases the pleasure which we derive from them. It also presents a new motive for the diligent study of the poem, and by our sharpened attention to it as a work of value, we may detect additional and otherwise hidden graces in it as a work of taste. Still the usefulness of the poem was not the chief and apparent design of its author. He regards, first of

¹ It may be needless to state, that Prof. Schott's views of sacred eloquence, and indeed of modern oratory in general, are derived from the tone and spirit of the German pulpit, and from the prevalent style of the orators under European despotisms.

all, the beautiful, or more properly the attractive, and makes every other consideration subordinate to that of taste. Hence the importance of the subject is with him secondary to the agreeableness of the delineation, and his own feelings, rather than those of other men, are the test of its agreeableness.

The orator, on the contrary, is not so independent of his fellow beings. He must persuade them, and therefore adapt his style to them; and many an explanatory or qualifying or amplifying phrase does he introduce, not for his own sake, but for that of his hearers or readers. His style therefore is not so free as the poet's. He designs to interest others in his subject, and hence avoids all those ornaments of language which attract attention to themselves, rather than to the practical aim of the discourse. With him, therefore, the pleasing is secondary to the useful. He does not neglect the tastefulness of description, he knows that the style must be attractive in order to secure a prolonged regard to the thought; but he introduces the beauties of form only as means to an end, and makes pleasure subservient to utility. A figure of speech, remarks Sauer, is with the poet a beautiful flower entwined into a lovely wreath, and exposed to the view of all who seek to be pleased; but with the orator, it is a ring in the chain by which he means to bind all who hear him. The eloquent writer endeavors to make his representations clear and precise, and thus to excite an *intellectual* interest in his mode of imparting truth. He also endeavors to avoid all allusions which may offend the sensibility to right and wrong, and thus to excite a *moral* interest in his writings. He endeavors, in the third place, to gratify the taste, and captivate the imagination and affections, and thus to excite an *aesthetical* interest in his style. All this he does of set purpose, but only so far as the persuasive influence of his discourse requires. He differs, then, from the poet, in making the usefulness of his subject more important than the attractiveness of its form; in making the influence of his words upon his readers a matter of deliberate design, of prominent regard; and in making this influence of his style subservient merely to the practical impression of his leading thoughts.

† 6. *Regard paid by the Orator and the Poet to their personal Character and Relations.*

As the object of the orator is to influence the will, he needs the confidence of his hearers. He cannot easily persuade them to

action, unless they are satisfied with his fitness to be their counsellor and monitor. Hence he must secure their respect for his talents and their trust in his virtue. The practical character of his address allows, and even requires him to pay this regard to his personal relations with his audience. But the poet has no such practical aim; he pours forth his emotions with actual and seeming freedom, and never concerns himself with questions in relation to his personal influence. His object being to gratify the taste, he is less dependent than the orator on the opinions which the community may entertain respecting him, and although he may, as a man, feel some solicitude for his good name, he must as a poet sacrifice this solicitude to the inspirations of his theme. One distinction, then, between eloquence and poetry is, that the one requires an author to shape his composition so as to recommend himself to his readers, as a man of talents and probity; while the other requires him to divest himself, while writing, of all references to the mode of ingratiating himself with the community.

It is necessary that an eloquent *writer* so construct his essay, as to win from those who peruse it a high esteem for his personal qualifications; for when we read a printed page, we instinctively associate the sentences and paragraphs with the character and even the person of their author. We imagine how he looks, speaks, and acts. It is still more necessary that one, who addresses us with the living voice, secure this confidence in his individual merits, especially when he endeavors to influence our will, and above all when he would persuade us to some important course of action. It is no light matter for a man to rise and claim our attention to his words, our belief in his statements, our compliance with his exhortations. He must possess and appear to possess many permanent excellences, or he cannot be entitled to make this demand upon our trains of thought, and upon our voluntary affections. He must appear to be capable of instructing us; else we shall look with distrust upon his reasonings. He must appear to be sincere and pure in his affections; else we shall guard ourselves against all sympathy with him. He must appear to be honest and benevolent in his purposes; else we shall not unite in his plans, nor conform to his solicitations.

But the query arises, how can the orator secure this deference for himself. In the first place, he sometimes finds that such deference is secured before he commences his address. By his whole intellectual and moral character, as it has been developed through-

out his previous life, he has gained the confidence of men so much, as to meet with no obstructions in introducing his own thoughts into their minds, his own purposes into their wills. But in the second place, where he has not already obtained the confidence of those whom he addresses, he may often secure it by the structure of his speech and by the mode of his delivery. Certain forms of expression may attract or repel his hearers; encourage them to yield him their confidence, or to view him with distrust. He is not allowed to introduce irrelevant beauties into his composition, for the sake of concealing the real deformities of his subject. He is not permitted to pay compliments to his hearers, to flatter them, to extol such of their opinions or practices as cannot be praised either justly or appropriately. He is not authorized to take any advantage of the weaknesses, still less of the foibles of his audience, for the purpose of commending a project which he cannot justify by sound argument. All such tricks of oratory are foreign from true eloquence. We have already defined eloquence, as a well proportioned address to the intellect, affections, and will. Therefore, if a project be recommended without an adequate appeal to the reason and judgment, if it be so presented as to enlist only the blind passions in its behalf, then there is no proper proportion in the address, and of course there is no pure eloquence. The nature of an oration requires, that the orator excite the interest of his hearers in himself, only so far as to increase their interest in his theme; that he appear to them, in the first place, worthy of addressing them in general, and, in the second place, worthy of addressing them on the particular truths to which his oration is devoted; that he appear to be a good and worthy organ of a good and worthy subject. He cannot be truly eloquent, unless his whole manner be in fact and in appearance designed for the welfare of man.

He may excite an *intellectual* interest in his character. If he be the master of his subject, and capable of presenting it in lucid diction, he will often manifest a noble confidence in himself, which will gain by sympathy the confidence of others. When he has not penetrated into the depths of his theme, and has obtained no vivid conceptions of it, he will often manifest a self-distrust and a painful misgiving, which will prevent his hearers from relying on his statements. He may also excite a *moral* interest in his character. He may do this by manifesting a keen sensibility to all the motives of virtue, a lively regard to the happiness of the race, a high veneration for justice and religion. His whole

address must be pervaded by a spirit of benevolence and true modesty. He should, indeed, exhibit a proper confidence in the truth and reasonableness of his assertions; but this confidence is radically distinct from vanity and arrogance; it is allied, and of the same nature with a modest estimate of his own worth. He must appear to be conscious of his own weakness as well as his strength; aware of the limits of the human faculties as well as of their real attainments, and penetrated with reverence for his superiors, as well as a fitting regard for his own convictions. He may also excite an *aesthetical* interest in his character. His style of writing and speaking should indicate his love of the beautiful. A good taste is combined, in many important particulars, with the moral disposition, and the tasteful orator is therefore associated in the popular mind with philanthropy and virtue. The oration must often introduce ideas which are grand, sublime or graceful; and if these ideas be presented in an inappropriate style, the hearer is disgusted with the very objects which might have fascinated him, and is repelled from the man with whom he might have been charmed.

It is not pretended, that the theory of eloquence will prescribe minute and specific rules for the orator's awakening a popular interest in himself as a man. It only prescribes, in general, that he educate himself so as to deserve and secure the confidence of his fellow men; that he cultivate his mental faculties so as to merit and therefore receive the intellectual homage of his audience; that he possess and exhibit such a philanthropic and self-denying and truly religious temper as to avoid all suspicion of dishonest artifice; that he obtain a profound and thorough knowledge of the subject which he discusses, and a minute acquaintance with the principles by which his hearers are actuated, so that he may wisely adapt his theme to the susceptibilities of those whom he wishes to influence; that he carefully avoid every expression and every mode of address by which a prejudice may be excited against his opinions, his motives or his projects. Unlettered men, he must remember, will often infer from his hesitating utterance, that he is destitute of ideas; or from his ungainly attitudes, that he has no delicacy of taste. Hence he must avoid not only the actual fault, but also those comparatively trivial appearances, which diminish the confidence of the community in his fitness to control their intellectual and their moral action. When it is said, that the orator should commend himself to his audience, it is by no means to be understood that he should be egotistical or

assuming. Just the opposite. The remarks of Marheinecke,¹ respecting the preacher, are just and important,—“He should strive for nothing more than this, to make his personal character in no way injurious to the cause which he wishes to promote; to divest himself of every thing which can offend the tastes or prejudices of his people, whatever may be the degree of their education; and also, yielding to the noble influences of his theme, to sink himself, where it is possible, entirely out of sight under the magnificence and irresistible power of the truth which he proclaims.”

† 7. *Regard paid by the Orator and the Poet to the Perfection of Man.*

It has been already observed, that man has an instinctive longing after a state of perfection. He cannot rest satisfied with any attainment which he has made, but every degree of excellence suggests to him a still higher degree that lies beyond. The poet has in his mind a perfect ideal, and he presents this in sensible images to his readers. The pastoral and elegiac strains express the feeling of pleasure in the destination of man to a state of uncorrupted excellence, and in the possibility of his making constant advances toward that state. The satirical poem expresses the feeling of dissatisfaction with the remoteness, at which man is actually found from this ideal perfection. The ode breathes forth the inspiration of one who contemplates the excellence of his race, as it is exhibited in the ideal standards of virtue, or in the exploits of particular worthies. When the poet is inspired with the thought of the approximations which are made toward the character of perfect rectitude and worth, or of the sad deviations from that character, or of the conflict between virtue and the outward world, or of the triumph of the one over the other, he pours forth his feelings, sometimes in the form of the tale, sometimes in that of the drama, now in the heroic, and again in the tragic verse. But he is always satisfied with the bare presentation of an ideal. He suggests no methods, and urges no motives for the attainment of this perfect excellence. In this respect he differs from the orator. Eloquence does not linger so long as poetry in the imaginative description of the faultless state; it presents a more exact analysis of the good desired, gives a more definite view of the necessity for struggling to reach it, and of the means and motives for overcoming the hindrances to its attainment. The

¹ *Grundlegung der Homiletik*, S. 80, 81.

poet simply aims at a vivid portraiture of ideal perfection ; the orator strives to connect with this portraiture a realization of the imagined excellence. And eloquence is and does all that it can and should be and do, when it urges man onward in his endeavors to realize the perfectness of his being, to attain a complete harmony with himself and with the world out of himself. It must aim, therefore, at a complete illumination of the mind, at a purifying of the affections, at a proper stimulus of the will. He is not truly eloquent who endeavors to persuade men by any motives, or to any deeds which interfere, in any manner, with their intellectual or moral perfection. If the speeches, which are designed to cajole or delude men, contain some elements of genuine eloquence, they are still destitute of the higher elements ; of the appropriate aim and spirit which impart an ennobling character to every sentence that is uttered. Unless the orator have a lofty ideal of virtue always prominent before his mind, his eloquence must be misapplied, abused, imperfect, impure, and therefore not entitled to the name which is given to it by inconsiderate men.

§ 8. *The place which Eloquence holds among the Arts.*

The term *art* is used, subjectively, to denote the power of producing that, which possesses a unity consisting in the adaptation of means to an end. It is also used, objectively, to denote the compass of the rules which are to be observed, for the production of the object containing this unity. Thus the poetic art is the system of rules for the harmonious and vivid representation, in words, of that which has formed in the poet's mind one beautiful and attractive whole. The art of rhetoric is the system of rules according to which discourses in prose are to be sketched, filled out, and (in the case of oral addresses) delivered for the purpose of instruction or of persuasion. The term *art* is more properly used to designate the subjective idea ; and the objective is better expressed by the phrase, *theory of the art*.

The arts are divided into the useful and the aesthetic. The useful are sometimes termed mechanical ; but this is an unfortunate designation ; for it confines our view to their outward and physical advantages, and does not even imply their higher utility to the inward, the intellectual and moral nature. The distinction between the useful and the aesthetic arts is not, that the former are productive of good, and the latter of no good ; nor that the latter please the taste, and the former impart no gratification.

The aesthetic arts are useful, but their utility is an attendant, not a primary excellence. It is not sought for and labored for, as essential to their very nature. On the other hand the useful arts gratify the taste, but their attractiveness is a subordinate excellence, and constitutes no part of their intrinsic character. The aesthetical arts are divided into the pleasant and the fine. The former are those which gratify the lower external senses, and also those which please us by awakening the consciousness of animal life. Thus the art of entertaining a company by the pleasures of the table, by a variety of social games, by wit and humor of discourse is one of the pleasant arts, giving us an agreeable sense of our physical existence. The fine arts are nobler than these, and gratify the higher, inner tastes. They do not disdain the aid of the merely pleasing arts, but are often united with them and receive a stimulus from them.

There are some of the aesthetical, and especially of the fine arts, which are intimately conjoined with the useful. The pleasing and the attractive elements are employed as means for increasing the utility of that, whose first and chief object is not to promote gratification but to do good. These are called the relatively aesthetic arts, and are thus distinguished from those which are primarily and chiefly designed to impart pleasure, and are therefore termed absolutely aesthetic. The attractiveness of the relatively aesthetic arts is called *adherent*, because it is not their principal or predominant quality. Thus the beauty of a temple is designed to be merely subservient to the worship of God; and if the fitness of the temple for religious exercises be sacrificed to its attractiveness as an object of the fine arts, if its adaptation to spiritual uses be considered secondary to its ornaments, the true idea of the temple is not realized.

Now eloquence is an art; for it is a system of means to an end, forming one united whole. It is an aesthetic art, combining the pleasant with the fine; for it is designed to gratify the inward and the outward tastes. It is a useful art; for it is intended and devised to promote the welfare of society. But its attractiveness is a means to an end. It is adherent, not predominant. It is introduced to increase the utility of that which is otherwise useful. Eloquence, therefore, is a relatively not an absolutely aesthetic art. It combines the pleasant, the free and the profitable, making the two former elements subsidiary to the latter.

§ 9. *The Moral Aspect of Eloquence.*

It is well known, that the ancient Spartans and Cretans forbade the practice of eloquence within their territories. It was condemned by the Spartan laws with especial severity after the time of Lycurgus. It was also frequently discountenanced by the Romans, in the early days of their Republic. It has likewise been opposed by modern writers, particularly by Kant. The great objection to it is, that its moral influence is bad. There would be some reason for this objection, if it were true either, first, that eloquence appeals to the imagination and passions merely, and thus influences the will without reference to the intellectual or moral judgment; or secondly, that it appeals to the imagination and the passions with so much power, as to interfere with the free and candid exercise of the reason and conscience. If eloquence were merely the art of persuading, and had an indiscriminate and unhesitating recourse to any principles whatever, by which persuasion could be effected, then it might often be employed for immoral purposes; and also, when directed to a worthy end, might accomplish it by dishonest means. Kant remarks, that eloquence is injurious even when it persuades men to that which is objectively right, for it even then corrupts the subjective sentiments. It urges men to the proper conduct on other grounds than the intrinsic propriety of that conduct, and secures goodness of action without encouraging goodness of motive. But all these objections emanate from an erroneous view of the nature of eloquence. It does not address the imagination and the feelings exclusively, but coördinately, and in such a degree as to quicken rather than to repress the exercise of the intellectual powers. It aims at an harmonious and a mutually beneficent action of the reason, the conscience, the fancy, and the affections, and it therefore presupposes that the object pursued, and the motives for pursuing it are conformed to the highest standard of morality. Eloquence may, indeed, sometimes accommodate itself to the errors of men, but never so as to sanction those errors. It may appeal to self-love, but never so as to make the regard for self paramount to the regard for others. It is right for men to consult their own interest, and when their moral principle is weak, they may be improved in their character by reflecting on the advantages of virtue. They may be led by their love of self, to secure that holiness which will promote their welfare.

And in proportion to the obtuseness of their religious sensibilities, must be the boldness of our appeal to their desire of the rewards which come from a religious life. It is true that eloquence has sometimes degenerated into the art of deceiving men by speech, into the taking advantage of their humors and caprices for the purpose of persuading to unreasonable acts. It has in fact sometimes been, as Kant describes it, the art of managing an affair of the intellect, as if it were a subject fit only for a play of the fancy. But when we consider that the original motive to eloquence is a desire to promote the perfection of man, and the nature of it is a symmetrical operation upon the mental and the moral susceptibilities, and the end of it is man's entire, his highest, of course his spiritual improvement, then we discover no possible ground for the charge that it blinds the intellect and misleads the affections. From the fact that its aims and tendencies are so high upward, it seems to be peculiarly fitted for the pulpit, although Kant condemns it as especially uncongenial with attempts to secure justice at court, or to promote religion in the church. Indeed the political condition of many European States is such, as to encourage no other form of public eloquence, than that of the sanctuary; they have no deliberative assemblies and no open judicial courts, like those in the ancient republics, and under several modern governments.

† 10. *Christian character of Pulpit Eloquence.*

Every system of truth has some one leading idea. The scheme of doctrine and of duty revealed to us in the New Testament, has for its chief and governing thought, that of *the kingdom of God*. The kingdom of God embraces the earth and the heavens, the present and the future. It embraces the state and the company of those who have received in this life the knowledge, the peculiar spirit and the hopes of the Christian religion, see Matt. 12: 28. 13: 52. Col. 1: 13. 1 Cor. 4: 20. It embraces also the state and company of those who are glorified in the eternal world; see Matt. 5: 3, 10, 12. It is the kingdom of God, because he is its founder and preserver, its beginning and its end. It is the kingdom of heaven, because it has come down to us from heaven, and is perfected there. It is the kingdom of Jesus, because his atonement is the corner-stone on which it is established. The design of the whole Christian dispensation is to educate men for this blessed kingdom. They are to be excited and disciplined and

prepared for it, by means of instruction in sacred truth. But it is not sufficient that man merely know the doctrines of religion. He must also feel the possibility of his union with God. He instinctively aspires after such a union, for he has a natural longing after a universal harmony; but he sees that there must be some propitiating sacrifice before he can be one with the pure divinity. Christ has not only given man the needed instruction, but has also offered the essential sacrifice. He has offered it not for the purpose of making the Deity propitious, but of enabling men to see that he is so; for the purpose of imparting to them a vivid idea of the pure and incorruptible law, of the blending of justice with love; for the purpose of preparing the way and presenting the motives for transgressors to be at peace with their Maker. Nor has he merely given himself as a sacrifice; he has also exhibited an example by which we are enlightened with regard to our duty, and incited to a self-denying and devoted life. In one sense, his work is not finished. He has established a church, and in the church has appointed ministers, whose office it is to prosecute and perfect the system of benevolent action which he has begun. The duty of ministers is to preach that word, of which the kingdom of God is the central idea, and the atonement of Jesus the middle-point. They must be representatives of their Master in their deeds, as well as in their instructions. They must die to sin, as he died for it. They must sacrifice themselves to the service of God, as he made himself an offering for the divine glory. They must renounce every earthly attachment and abandon every pleasure and pursuit, which interfere with their highest usefulness, as their Master yielded up even his life for the cause of benevolence. They must be not only preachers but also priests.

Since the Reformation it has often been asserted, that ministers of the New Testament have no priestly character or office. The Catholics have so degraded the ministry by literal views of the Christian priesthood, that Protestants have denied the reality of such a priesthood altogether. Marheinecke, however, contends that the Christian minister may rightly be called a *priest*, and history proves that by refusing him that appellation, he has been often exposed to a loss of spirituality and true dignity. It is indeed true, as Loeffler has remarked, that Christ never expressly designates himself a priest, but rather compares himself to the victim, which the priest offers in sacrifice; see Matt. 26: 28. Mark 14: 24. Luke 22: 20; see also 1 Cor. 5: 6—8, where he is called

the paschal lamb. But does he not also declare in Matt. 20: 29, John 6: 51, that he offered the sacrifice, and gave himself as a *λύτρον*? Is he not represented in Eph. 5: 2, as the performer of the oblation, and is he not styled throughout the Epistle to the Hebrews the true, perfect, eternal high priest? Does not the apostle Paul also denominate himself a priest in Rom. 15: 16, meaning that he was instrumental in converting souls to God and thus presenting them as sacrifices unto him? Does he not testify in 2 Cor. 4: 10, that he constantly exposes himself to death for the sake of the Gospel, and in Gal. 6: 14, that he is crucified to the world? See also Gal. 5: 24. Does he not speak in Phil. 2: 17, of his voluntary sacrifice of his own life in discharging his duty to his brethren, in presenting their faith as an offering to Jehovah, and in performing the duties of the Christian priesthood? It is indeed true, that private Christians are represented in 1 Pet. 2: 5, as invested with the priestly office. Still they are not thus honored, in the same degree with the constituted minister of the word. They give themselves as an offering to their Maker, they strive to present their neighbors likewise as an acceptable sacrifice to heaven, they live to some extent retired from the circles of fashion; but the consistent preacher devotes his whole time to direct efforts for the welfare of others, and consecrates himself in a peculiar manner to a life of self-denial. He walks emphatically as a pilgrim and stranger on the earth, and does not participate, as others do, in the pleasures of society. He may sympathize indeed with the innocent joys of others, but he must not exhibit the same festive spirit which is indulged by the laity. He should not appear morose, nor offensively peculiar, but he must avoid some modes of dress, some expressions of sentiment, some kinds of relaxation which are allowed to private Christians. He must preserve, so far as enlightened reason recommends, a professional peculiarity, and should seem to be, as well as really be, absorbed in a higher than earthly mission.

Nor is it simply in the measure of his consecration to God, and in the number of his efforts to make his fellow-men meet offerings to heaven, that he possesses more of a priestly character than belongs to laymen. He is also distinguished from them by his duties in the sanctuary. The office of a prophet or preacher was separated, under the Jewish economy, from the office of a priest or conductor of the services of the temple. But under the Christian dispensation, the duty of leading in the public worship of God is conjoined with that of proclaiming truth. The evangelical

pastor, whose words are instrumental in making many of his hearers an acceptable sacrifice unto Heaven, is also doubly a priest when he offers up the united prayers of his congregation, when he presents their children at the baptismal altar as an oblation to God, and when he dedicates his whole church to their Saviour in the sacrament of the bread and wine. He is not indeed a priest in the original and more proper sense, that of offering an outward propitiatory sacrifice to an offended Deity; but in the sense of offering his own heart and life, of offering, instrumentally, the souls and the influence of his hearers to God, in the sense of crucifying himself to the world, of sacrificing his earthly interests and pleasures for the divine glory, in the sense of conducting the services of public religious worship, he should habitually regard himself as set apart to the priesthood. Unless he do consider himself as thus anointed, he will be inclined to conform improperly to the usages of the world, and will be in danger of losing his rightful authority over the minds of laymen. The Protestant clergy have often undermined their influence by accommodating themselves to the standard of general society, and refusing not only to assert, but also to feel the true sacredness of their office.

The preceding train of remark suggests the leading idea of pulpit eloquence. It must consist in the preaching of Christian truth, especially in unfolding the influences of Christ's atonement. It is not *pulpit eloquence* if it be employed on mere philosophy, or ethics, or any theme which is not distinctively connected with evangelical doctrine. It must also unite with the clear statement of principles, the exhibition of a warm and earnest piety. It must explain not so much biblical truth in general, as the distinctive faith of the Christian scheme. It must urge not to the possession of a mere intellectual faith, but to the union of this with self-denying love. This union must not only be taught by the preacher's words; it must also be illustrated in his style of uttering those words. He should exhibit in his tones, gestures and whole mein the particular temper which he recommends. His sermon cannot be disjoined from his life; therefore, all his deeds must be a befitting commentary upon his teachings, and his daily example must add an eloquence to his pulpit addresses. It must be an example not merely of ethical, but also of evangelical virtue, of that benevolence which is inseparable from trust in the Redeemer. Unless he conjoin a Christian character with distinctively,

Christian discourses, he may be a secular orator, but he has not the true eloquence of the pulpit.

§ 11. *Moral and Evangelical Preaching.*

Since the prevalence of the Critical Philosophy, it has been fashionable to discourse from the pulpit on moral duties rather than on the Christian faith. That is indeed a useless faith, which is not a motive to the discharge of duty; but on the other hand, that is a transient and superficial virtue, which does not emanate from religious principle. A wise preacher, then, will endeavor so to communicate the truths of the Gospel as to show their influence on the moral life, and so to describe the practical virtues as to illustrate their indebtedness to the Christian faith. Schuderoff speaks of a *homiletic realism*, the prominent aim of which is to enforce the performance of our duty, but still it insists on religious feeling as an incentive to the virtue enjoined; and also of a *homiletic idealism*, the chief design of which is to inculcate faith in Christ and love to him, but still it urges the manifestation of these inward exercises in outward moral obedience. The former shows God in the life, the latter develops the life in God. Not every minister is qualified to preach in either one of these modes, with the same success as in the other; nor is every audience equally prepared for both methods of discourse. One preacher, therefore, is inclined to select as his uniform style, that which is most congenial with his own tastes or the wishes of his people. But he should intermingle the two modes, and thus harmonize the doctrines and the duties of religion. He should not allow the realism nor the idealism to be uniformly predominant; but should sometimes present an abstract truth in the foreground, as casting a radiance upon duty, and at other times should give a prominence to morals, as resulting from correct doctrine. By this interchange of modes, he imparts a freshness and vivacity to the entire course of his ministrations, and avoids the one-sided, incomplete, monotonous character, which so often deprives the pulpit of its interest and usefulness.

§ 12. *Conformity to the Scriptural Manner of Teaching.*

It has been already remarked, that the minister is called to carry forward the work which our Saviour began on the earth. He is to carry it forward in the true spirit of his Master, and with es-

pecial reference to the mental, moral and religious character of his contemporaries. Now the intellectual and the spiritual necessities of the present time, differ from those in the time of the inspired penmen. Consequently, the style of address for the modern pulpit, must be in some respects unlike that of the first preachers. Many passages of the Bible are of local and temporary application. Not only may we refuse to make them a pattern which is to be literally copied, but we may also introduce a new mode of address, which has no exact resemblance to any specific model in the Scriptures but is accommodated to our local and temporary peculiarities. Unless we be allowed to deviate thus from the biblical manner, we shall lose so much of our mental freedom that eloquence will be impossible. For example, when Jesus says of the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, that it cannot be forgiven, he alludes, first, to a class of men who saw his miracles, but still did not acknowledge the divine influence in their production, and secondly, to the views prevalent in his day with regard to the demoniacal operations to which his miracles were ascribed. His words, then, are not exactly applicable to those, who have not the above named views of the action of demons, nor the above named ocular evidence of his miraculous power. When Paul inveighs against the practice of requiring all Christians to obey the Jewish ceremonial law, and all heathen converts to be circumcised, and when in Col. 2: 18 he condemns those converts from the Essenes who rendered divine homage to the angels, he cannot be specifically imitated by his successors in the ministry, for they have no occasion for reiterating such reproofs. On the other hand, they are called to refute errors which the biblical writers had no necessity for canvassing, and to frown upon crimes which were not committed, and of course not rebuked in the days of the apostles. We have the same reason for discountenancing the now prevalent sin of neglecting the Lord's supper, which Paul had for reprimanding those abuses of the feasts of charity which occurred in his time. It is indeed to be borne in mind, that the Bible has given us general principles, which apply to our own as well as to every other period. It has prescribed universal rules, in which all our specific regulations are involved, and has issued certain interdicts, which enclose all the peculiar remonstrances that are needed for our times. The Bible is, in its essential features, a model for the whole world and for every age, but in some of its details it was precisely adapted to the men for whom it was originally written, and can-

not be minutely imitated by men, whose character, position and necessities are different from those of the ancient orientals. The character, too, of the biblical writers authorized them to adopt a method of address which we cannot make our own without irreverence and presumption. It may, however, be propounded as a rule, that the style of pulpit eloquence, as well as the substance of it, should be distinctively Christian; that although the modern preacher may write in a more systematic manner and may prepare himself more elaborately for his discourses than the sacred penmen chose to do, still he should make frequent use of their phraseology, and should present their doctrines in the form which was originally given them, so far as that form is congruous with the uninspired character of modern writing, and with the necessities of the present age. The votary of any science will prefer to express himself, if he can do so with perfect propriety, in the language of those who originated the science; for this language is apt to have an unequalled freshness, vivacity and pertinence.

† 13. *The design of a Sermon.*

It seems to be an opinion of many, that the object of *all* sermons is barely to impart instruction; the opinion of many more, that this is the sole object of *some* sermons. Now it is true, that a discourse from the pulpit must communicate knowledge; still it does not attain its legitimate end when it is merely didactic. It must present truth to the mind, but more; it must also recommend this truth to the heart; it must induce men not only to love it but likewise to act in obedience to it. The school is designed for instruction, the church for moral improvement. Pedagogues and professors teach; pulpit-orators persuade to the voluntary practice of the religion which is taught. The grand design of a sermon is to edify the hearers. Our Saviour compares a true Christian to a wise man building his house upon a rock, Matt. 7: 24—27; he speaks of his church as builded upon a rock, Matt. 16: 18; Paul describes the friends of Jesus as God's building, 1 Cor. 3, 9—17; and as the temple of the Holy Ghost, 1 Cor. 6: 19; as the temple of the living God, 2 Cor. 6: 16; as a holy temple and as a habitation of God, Eph. 2: 21, 22. He speaks of Christ as the foundation of this temple, 1 Cor. 3: 10 seq. Now it is evident that mere knowledge does not constitute man a fit habitation for the Holy Ghost; it is knowledge conjoined with love and obedience; it is faith, hope, charity, but the greatest of

these is charity. Edification, then, consists in the improvement of the whole man; in his intellectual, but more especially his moral advancement. To edify the soul is not merely to lay the foundations of a good character, not merely to raise the superstructure, but to improve the spiritual being in every excellence. The prophesying spoken of in the New Testament, was altogether distinct from simple teaching; see Acts 2: 17, 18. 1 Cor. 11: 4. 13: 9. 12: 28, 29. It was an impassioned religious address, and the design of it was to build up the intellect, heart and will, to the stature of a perfect man; especially to animate and strengthen the Christian virtues; see 1 Cor. xiv. If, then, the design of a sermon be not merely to impart instruction, but also to vivify the religious principle, it follows that a sermon is one-sided, ill-proportioned, imperfect if it do not exhibit the Christian faith in its union with Christian love, if it do not incline the heart to cherish the truth which is believed by the intellect, if it do not unite with the prayers and praises of the sanctuary to produce one effect, the symmetrical and harmonious development of the whole Christian character.

§ 14. *Eloquence essential to a Sermon.*

If the object of a preacher were merely to instruct, then he might adopt the style of simple prose. In the didactic parts of his discourse he does employ this style; but as in other parts he aims to influence the feelings and the will, he must also have recourse to the language of poetry and of eloquence. The advocates of the Philosophy of Identity have advanced the idea, that religion is in its nature the same with poetry and the fine arts in general, and that the only fit style of expressing religious truth is the poetic. Sauer has asserted, that all religious communications in the church should be made in song, rather than in speech. But although religion is, in some respects, identical with the fine arts, especially with poetry, it is in other respects essentially different from them. First, like them it springs from feeling, from a desire of harmony with one's self: but the union which is aimed at in religion is one of the intellect, affections and will; whereas the union aimed at in the poetic and other fine arts, is merely one of the imagination and the feelings. Secondly, the religious man is, during his devotional exercises, the subject of a kind of inspiration, like that of the poet and artist; but the enthusiasm of the former is regulated by the judgment and reason more than

that of the latter. Thirdly, religion resembles the fine arts in the fact that it looks above the sensuous world for its appropriate objects ; but it looks higher than to the favorite sphere of those arts. It looks to that which is purely spiritual, whereas they are satisfied with mere refinements and ideal combinations of objects of sense. It looks also to that which is real, whereas poetry and the other fine arts are satisfied with what is imaginary. Religion is pervaded and governed by the truth ; the poetic and similar arts, by the principles of taste. Hence religion, differing thus from poetic feeling, cannot be expressed in the language of simple poetry ; in other words, this is not the distinctive and proper style of a sermon. Still, it is one element of that style. Religion exercises all the faculties of the soul. Originating from a desire of harmony with one's self and with God, it suggests at once certain definite ideas of truth, and thus it employs the reason. These truths are made more obvious and vivid by a connection with objects of sense, and they become connected with such objects by the imagination. When thus bodied forth they exert a lively influence upon the affections, and through the affections upon the will. In this way all the faculties, the intellect, imagination, feelings and will are interested in religious action ; and we have already seen that the language of all those principles united is that of eloquence. The intellect employs simple prose. The imagination and the affections employ poetry. The will employs simple prose and poetry in a certain combination, for a certain end, and forms a new style, that of eloquence. This must be the style of a sermon ; for the sermon teaches ; it also invests its teachings in an attractive garb ; it likewise rouses the affections ; and with the aid of the intellectual, the imaginative and the pathetic, it appeals to the will, and persuades it to act in harmony with the laws of the universe. Thus it addresses the whole soul for the purpose of securing its voluntary union with God. It cannot, therefore, employ any other form of address, than that which aims to persuade the will by means of a symmetrical appeal to all the spiritual faculties. This form of address, is eloquence, as already defined. The preacher is under the influence of religious feeling, and has a religious motive ; therefore he cannot be satisfied with the style of the mere prose writer, or of the mere poet. He must be more animated than the former, and must have a more definite aim than the latter. If his sole object were to teach theology, he might be satisfied with the simple prose. As, however, his object is to interest the feelings in theological truth, he

must combine with the prosaic element the poetic also. And further, as his ultimate design is to make the will harmonious with this truth, he must resort to a form of speech still higher and more comprehensive than that of poetry, to eloquence. If he intended simply to effect a change in the will, he need not be eloquent; but he must persuade to voluntary action by means of an impassioned interest in religious truth; and the definition of eloquence is the art of moving the will by an excitement of the feelings and the imagination in view of the objects of the intellect. To secure faith alone, or love alone, or works alone does not necessarily demand eloquence; but to secure the true faith, combined with the right love and thus leading to good works, requires the highest kind of eloquence; that of the pulpit. It has been already stated, that the sermon must be written in the spirit of the Bible, and this is the spirit of eloquence; in the style of the Bible also, so far as this style is congruous with our character and circumstances, and this is the style of eloquence, not indeed of scholastic, artificial, labored, but of simple, natural, artless, and so much the more effective eloquence. The sermon must be written in the benevolent temper of a practical Christian, and we know it to be an ancient adage, *pectus est, quod disertum facit*. It is said by Töllner, that a sermon must not be rhetorical but instructive and edifying. Now any address, that is religiously edifying must in its very nature be eloquent; for it must build up the soul in faith, love and obedience. Töllner and others regard eloquence as designed merely to play upon the feelings, and as distinct from poetical effusions in the bare fact of its having a smaller degree of ornament than they. But if eloquence be the art of employing all the faculties of the soul for the purpose of exciting right volitions and cherishing holy principles, then it is, in kind as well as degree, different from poetry, and has a far nobler object than mere passionate excitement; then it is more appropriate to a sermon than to any other kind of composition; it constitutes the very element of a pulpit discourse; and not only must the highest standard of eloquence be that of the preacher, but also there can be no proper and true preaching which is devoid of real eloquence, and even the most exalted form of it.

§ 15. *The Popular Style of Sacred Eloquence.*

The ancient Romans applied the term *popularitas* to that mode of conduct which was designed to please the people, (see Tacit-

tus Ann. 3, 69), and denominated a man *homo popularis* who, either in fact or in pretence, labored for the pleasure or the benefit of the community, (see Cic. de off. 1, 25. Liv. 6, 20). Accordingly, that style of address was termed *popularis*, which was accommodated to the tastes and capabilities of the mass of men, (see Cic. de off. 2, 10).

A sermon is sometimes called *popular* in the etymological sense, when it is adapted to the lower classes of society. These classes exercise their imagination more than their reason; they attend to the outward more than the inward; they regard phenomena more than the causes or laws of them; they are occupied with particular examples more than with general principles. Hence a sermon addressed to them must be figurative in its style, and its metaphors must be taken from external objects. It must avoid abstractions and generalizations; it must individualize, and give more prominence to the facts than to the reasons for them. The uneducated classes are characterized by strength of feeling, natural as well as religious; and therefore a sermon addressed to them must be highly animated. Their feeling is not delicate and refined; and hence they are not much affected by nicety of words or chasteness of imagery. They require indeed beauties of style, but not such as are particularly modest. They demand vivid conceptions, bold epithets, a strikingly imaginative character both of thought and language. They emphatically require a style of distinctive *eloquence*. He who preaches to them must draw his analogies from the tangible objects with which they are familiar, and must make frequent reference to the histories, and the parables of the inspired volume. He speaks under some disadvantages from which the ancient orators were free. They harangued the multitude on themes which were felt to be of more immediate importance than the preacher's; which were better understood, and were combined with a more frequent consideration of visible and tangible objects. But the preacher need not be discouraged; for although he is occupied with spiritual truths he also addresses spiritual beings, men who have by nature certain religious longings, and who are predisposed to be interested in the welfare of their immortal part. He must make a greater effort, however, than was made by the ancient orators, to arrest and preserve the attention of the multitude, to accommodate and recommend his statements to their peculiar tastes.

But not only is the term *popular* applied to that species of eloquence which is intended for the lower classes; it is also appro-

priated to the eloquence which is designed for the middling, and even for the educated portion of society. There is an order of men who have too much cultivation to belong to the populace, and too little to be classed among the learned, who require a style of preaching less imaginative than the common people, and less refined than the literary circles. It is a mistake, however, to imagine, that even the most intelligent congregations are edified by strictly learned discourses. They do not come into the sanctuary as students but as men; they seek not so much the reasonings of a logician as the persuasives of a religious monitor; they are not to be addressed as mere intellectual inquirers but rather as Christian worshippers. There is a popular style of eloquence for learned audiences; it is the style of general edification; of appeal to the whole nature, to the humanity rather than to the scholarship of the hearers, to their moral sensibilities no less than to their mental powers. The popular characteristic of the pulpit eloquence for learned assemblies is its *universality*; its fitness to man as man, to Christians as Christians, to the same susceptibilities which are recognized in all, even the humblest members of the human family. An address which is devoid of this popular element, this adaptation to the unsophisticated, unperverted principles of our common nature, is not an eloquent sermon, nor indeed any sermon at all. Popularity is essential to eloquence, especially to that of the pulpit; for the themes of the pulpit are Christian, and all that is Christian is well suited to the susceptibilities of man as man.

† 16. *Simplicity of Pulpit Eloquence.*

That work of art is called *simple*, which does not suggest to him who examines it any suspicion of the labor which has been expended in its production. It seems to have been produced without pains taking, without a rigid application of rules. It appears to be as it is, because it could not have been otherwise. The seeming ease and naturalness of its construction make a way for it at once to the heart. A discourse is *simple*, when its propositions are so stated and proved as to ingratiate themselves at once into the belief; instead of being encumbered with such a parade of argument, as to occupy the mind with logical forms rather than the main and substantial truth. It is simple, when its arrangement is such as to disclose the whole subject easily to the view, instead of being disfigured with artificial divisions and sub-

divisions concealing the doctrine which is parcelled out thus unnecessarily. It is simple, when its sentences are formed as if they could not have been written in any other way, and its ornaments appear to spring spontaneously from the theme; and this noble simplicity is wanting when the style swells into pompous periods, and the metaphors seem not to have presented themselves of their own accord, but to have been sought out with care. A sermon which glides along in this simple course, enters at once into the hearer's mind. It is, in the etymological sense of the term, popular. It is not true, as Dahl asserts, that simplicity and popularity are convertible terms; neither is it true, as Prof. G. Schlegel supposes, that a discourse cannot be simple without being popular, but may be popular without being simple. The reverse is the fact. Popularity includes more than simplicity. The former implies, while the latter does not, a nice consultation of the peculiar wants of the people addressed; an accurate adjustment of the sentiment and style to the mental characteristics of an audience in some respects inferior to the speaker himself. A sermon may be simple while it is not popular, but cannot be suited to the common sensibility of the race without appearing easy, natural, free from the signs of preparatory toil. Schlegel has also asserted, that simplicity is ever calm and unimpassioned; whereas the outpouring of fresh, spontaneous emotion is the best method of avoiding those cumbersome, labored and unnatural constructions which are peculiar to the frigid writer. As the simple style insinuates itself at once into the heart, it is better adapted than any other to the purposes of eloquence. It is peculiarly congenial with sacred eloquence; for the spirit, the very nature of the Christian scheme is fitted to raise the sacred orator above all puerile affectation and love of display, and to make his style, like that of the earliest records of his faith, artless and therefore winning.

† 17. *The Design, and the various Departments of Rhetoric.*

In its more general acceptance, Rhetoric is the system of rules according to which either a prosaic or an eloquent discourse is adapted to its end. In its more limited meaning, it is the theory of eloquence, or the system of rules according to which an oration should be written and orally delivered. In this narrow signification, it includes secular rhetoric, and sacred, or homiletics. It is true that eloquence was practised before the principles of rhet-

ric were recorded ; and in ancient Greece and Rome it had even passed the state of its perfection, ere its rules were reduced to system. This only proves, that the spirit of those republics had vanished before rhetoricians appeared. It does not prove, that the science is productive of no advantage. The design of this science is not to create those qualities which are needful to an orator, but rather to describe them ; to show, that a good physical organization, a cultivated taste, excitability of temperament, liveliness of fancy, rapidity in rising from particular to general ideas, in descending from generals to particulars, and in discovering the resemblance, the dissimilarities and the reciprocal influences of related conceptions ; that a deep interest in the present state of man, and in his progress toward a perfect ideal ; that pure virtue and even a Christian spirit are the necessary elements of an orator, especially of one who speaks on sacred themes. The design of rhetoric is to induce a man to inquire, ere he devote himself to the practice of eloquence, whether he possess the acuteness, the versatility, the power of easy expression, and all the other mental and moral qualities which are essential to his success ; to induce him to cultivate those parts of his constitution that are most immediately serviceable to him, to stimulate those that have lain dormant, to correct those that have run wild, ever to keep in view the great object to which eloquence aspires, and ever to observe the rules which are prescribed for the attainment of that object. The design of rhetoric is further, to free the orator from the observance of artificial prescriptions, from all slavery to forms, from all forced compliance with the customs of society, from all unmanly imitation of models ; to bring him back from the constraints of art to the freedom and ease of nature.

As no one can affect the minds of others without understanding their constitution, so rhetoric involves an exhibition of the laws of psychology. As an orator must make all his appeals in harmony with the principles of moral obligation, so rhetoric involves a statement of ethical science. As no man is able to convince another without complying with the rules of the reasoning power, or please another, without obeying the canons of taste, so rhetoric includes a delineation of the principles of logic, and likewise of aesthetics. As the oration is orally delivered, so rhetoric must add to its other departments the principles of elocution. Rhetorical science, then, is a branch of practical philosophy ; and homiletics, as it prescribes the rules for Christian edification, is also a branch of philosophical and of practical theology.

An oration, being a work of art, has a unity in itself; it has some leading idea. This is called its theme. The first duty of the orator is to find his theme, the subject matter of his oration. Hence the first part of rhetoric is *inventio*, εὑρεσις. The next duty of the orator is, so to arrange his thoughts as to make them correspond with the nature of his theme and with the end which he aims to promote. Hence the second part of rhetoric is the *dispositio*, collocatio, τάξις. In expressing his ideas, the orator adopts a certain form of language accommodated to the genius of his subject, or to the peculiarities of his own mind. This form of language is called his style. The third duty of the orator, then, is his selection of words and phrases; and the third part of rhetoric is *elocutio*, *pronunciatio*, λέξις, ἐμμηρέα. The oral method of address being peculiarly appropriate to eloquence, the fourth part of rhetoric is devoted to the corporeal expression of ideas, and is called *pronunciatio*, *actio*, προφορά, ὑπόκρσις. The ancient rhetoricians added a fifth department, the *memoria*, *ars memoriae*, μνήμη; the art of calling to mind the various divisions of the discourse by associating them with certain images of the fancy, or certain rooms in a building, etc., *imagines* and *loci*. As our rhetoricians, however, prescribe that an oration be committed to memory previously to its being delivered, they dispense with this fifth department.

ARTICLE III.

CRITIQUE ON STRAUSS'S LIFE OF JESUS.

By Rev. H. B. Hackett, Professor of Biblical Literature in Newton Theological Institution.

Wissenschaftliche Kritik der Evangelischen Geschichte. Ein Compendium der gesammten Evangelienkritik mit Berücksichtigung der neusten Erscheinungen bearbeitet von Dr. A. Ebrard. 1842. pp. 1112.

NO PORTION of the Bible, not excepting now even the Pentateuch, which had been so long the battle-field of the German critics, excites so much interest at the present moment in Germany as the four Gospels. This is owing to the new direction which the course of biblical criticism has taken in that country,

since the appearance of Strauss's work on the Life of Jesus in 1835. This work,¹ it is well known, has produced a sensation in the German theological world, unequalled by anything which has occurred since the publication of the Wolfenbüttel Fragments by Lessing, in 1778. It has passed rapidly through repeated editions, has been printed, how many times we are unable to say in an abridged and less critical form for uneducated readers, has been translated into other languages and has given rise to a controversy which, after the lapse now of these ten years nearly, is still kept up with undiminished vigor.²

Of the degree of positive influence which this work of Strauss has exerted, of the actual impression which it has made on the public mind, it is not easy to form a definite opinion. We should certainly err, however, were we to regard the attention merely which it has awakened as any very exact criterion of the favor, with which its doctrines have been received, or as indicating to any very great extent an increase of the infidelity of Germany over and above that which previously existed. In the first place, it should be remembered, that at the time when Strauss came forward with his new theory for the explanation of the gospel history, the old type of rationalism, that which flourished particularly from the beginning of the present century until 1817, which is represented in exegesis by Paulus, and in dogmatics by Wegscheider, had lost very much its scientific interest with the public, and had thus left the ground open for some new development of the rationalistic principle. Under these circumstances Strauss appeared; and of those who embraced his sentiments, the great majority consisted not of those who now went over from the Christian camp to unbelief for the first time, but of such as had already taken this step, and on this occasion merely exchanged one form of religious skepticism for another. In the second place, Strauss's notoriety has proceeded, after all, much more from the opposition which his views have encountered, than from any de-

¹ Strauss has also published in dogmatic theology a work entitled, *Die christliche Glaubenslehre*, etc., or as Kratander (*Zeugniss für die christliche Wahrheit*, S. 2) with a significant peronomasia terms it *Glaubens-Lexik.* This has attracted much less attention. Add to this and his *Das Leben Jesu*, one other volume—his *Streitschriften* or *Controversial Writings*, and you have then a complete apparatus for the study of Straussism in its original sources.

² A summary view of the Straussian literature, that is, of the principal writings which have appeared in the course of this discussion, the names of their authors, their object, style and merit of their performances, etc. may be found in *Rheinwald's Allgemeines Repertorium*, Bd. 21, 23, 24, 31, 43.

monstration of numbers or strength which his supporters have made in his behalf. Those who have taken part against him exceed by scores those who have attempted to do battle for him.¹ Zeal for the truth of God is not yet wholly extinct in the land of the Reformers; and this zeal, wherever it exists, cannot but display itself whenever any danger, be it real or apparent, seems to threaten the interests of Christianity. "We bar the doors carefully, not merely when we expect a *formidable* attack, but when we have *treasure* in the house." It is truly gratifying to see the proof which this controversy has elicited, that Germany has still so many who continue faithful to the truth, and who can bring to the defence of it an ability and learning equal to the crisis. Again, the civil proceedings, in which Strauss has been involved, have given him a publicity which his writings alone would not have procured him. At the time of the publication of his *Life of Jesus*, he was occupying the place of Repetent in the theological seminary at Tübingen, and at the same time delivering lectures on philosophy in the university. He was immediately called on by the superintendents of public instruction to show, if he could, how the views advanced in this book were to be reconciled with his position as a professed Christian teacher. Failing to make this out to the satisfaction of his judges, he was removed from his office, and thus became at once, in the estimation of many, a martyr to the rights of free inquiry.² He was elected, after this, in

¹ It is allowed on all hands, that Strauss has not been able to establish any distinct school of his own. Some individuals have adopted parts of his system, but by this eclecticism itself they declare virtually that as a whole they regard it as inconsistent and untenable. Among those who have written either extended reviews of Strauss in the journals devoted to literature and theology, or separate treatises, are mentioned the names of Strudel, Klaiber, Vaihinger, Hoffmann, Kern, Ullmann, Müller, Paulus, Osiander, Bretschneider, Schweitzer, Schellmeyer, Tholuck, Gelpke, Harless, Kottmeier, Krabbe, Neander, Sack, Lange, Grulich, Theile, Eschenmayer, Heller, Wilke, etc. etc. Some of these names will be recognized as among those of the staunchest defenders of rationalism. The truth is, the critical principles propounded by Strauss are so universally destructive in their nature, that men not only of evangelical faith in the Gospel, but faith of any kind in the history of the past or human testimony in general, find themselves at variance with him.

² The ministers of the Prussian government were disposed at first to prohibit the publication of his work in Prussia. But the question was submitted to Neander, and he gave his advice against it. He replied that the doctrine of Strauss was certainly subversive of Christianity and the church; but that the book was yet written without offensive levity, and with scientific earnestness—that the only proper weapons to be used against it were counter argument and discussion, and that as a matter of policy also it should be given over for its

1839, with much opposition and after loud protestation from various quarters, to the professorship of dogmatics and church history in the university of Zürich in Switzerland. But the people of the canton, indignant at the outrage thus offered to their religious feelings, soon rose *en masse* and compelled him to resign his office and withdraw from the country. The excitement and controversy attending these transactions drew on him necessarily universal attention, and rendered him famous throughout Europe. Finally, there are already no slight indications, that the influence of Strauss is waning, and that the impression which he seemed to produce at first, has given way to a more sober estimate of his work considered as an intellectual production, as well as to a conviction of the utter falsity of the critical principles so called, on which it is written. In such a country as Germany, where the learned class is so numerous, there are always many who take no very active interest in the theological results which such controversies are designed to establish, who yet make it a matter of honor to see to it, that literary justice is dealt out to the parties. They constitute a sort of court of science, into which these questions are brought, and where, all polemic feelings being put aside as much as possible, they are decided with reference solely to the skill, ability and general fairness of argument, with which the combatants have maintained their cause.¹ The judgment thus

fate to the public conscience and reason, since a different course would only confer on it a still further factitious celebrity. This advice prevailed; and Neander immediately set himself at work to do his part towards vindicating the safety of such counsel. As the fruit of this effort he soon produced his great work, *Das Leben Jesu Christi in seinem geschichtlichen Zusammenhange und seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, which in the frequency of its republication has kept pace with that of Strauss itself, notwithstanding the accidental eclat of the latter, and has done more unquestionably towards counteracting its pernicious tendency than any other single production. See a generous testimony to its merits, as well as a beautiful tribute to the character of Neander in general, from an opponent in the *Hallische Jahrbücher* for April 1839. On the question of the censorship, Hengstenberg took a different view in his *Kirchenzeitung*, and censured the decision of Neander with great severity. The character of seriousness, it is proper to add, which Neander accords to Strauss's work, must be understood in the spirit of the maxim *a potiori nomen fit*. There are certainly passages in it, which would not be out of place in the pages of Voltaire or Paine, and which contrast strongly enough with the generally earnest tone with which he affects to write. Tholuck has animadverted upon some of these passages in his *Glaubwürdigkeit d. evang. Gesch.* pp. 41, 42. Allusion will be made again to this topic in the sequel.

¹ The disposition of the German public in such matters is well illustrated by the discussion which Bretschneider's *Probabilia* (de Evang. et Epist. Joannis

given has always great influence in determining the authority and ultimate fate of the views which are the subject of dispute. We feel ourselves borne out now by our means of information in saying, that the scientific public in Germany have decided on the contest between Strauss and his opposers, and have given no doubtful verdict in favor of the latter.¹ This may be inferred, among other proofs, with sufficient certainty from the present tone of the leading critical journals, from the well known character for talents and scholarship of many of those who have signalized themselves on this occasion in defence of Christian truth, and particularly from the style of discussion as regards Strauss individually, which the later publications relative to him have assumed. A politic controversialist does not venture, whatever may be his own private sentiments, to treat an opponent before the public in a manner very much at variance with the general estimation, in which he is held. The bearing which he exhibits towards him will be conformed very much to what is supposed to be the public consequence of the personage, with whom he has to do. Dr. David Friedrich Strauss, on this principle, has ceased certainly to be a very formidable character. His name, whatever terror it may have awakened once, is now pronounced without fear. As the smoke of the battle has cleared up, his dimensions have revealed themselves more clearly to the view of his countrymen; they have verified his humanity, and now treat him just like any other mortal who, though he may have shown some acuteness and said some just things in a very good style in opposition to unwise apologists for the truth, is yet suspected of having gone sadly astray from religion and common sense; that is, they give

apostolici, indole et origine), excited some years ago concerning the authenticity of John's Gospel. He took ground against it on account of the difference of contents and coloring which it exhibits as compared with the synoptical Gospels; and his personal authority, as well as the speciousness of his reasoning, procured for a time some currency to his view. But a host of combatants soon rose up on the other side, and maintained the genuineness of John with such evident superiority of learning and argument, that out of deference to public opinion, Bretschneider was obliged to acknowledge himself beaten, and to take back his assertions. His explanation of this procedure (*Dogmat. v. 1. p. 252*) that he foresaw this result, and merely threw out his doubts to provoke inquiry and to establish the Gospel of John on a firmer foundation, may be taken for what it is worth.

¹ The article on *Strauss*, in the *Conversations-Lexikon der Gegenwart*, 1840, may be considered as a fair summing up of the judgment of the critical public in the premises referred to. In a work of that national character, an article of a palpably partizan character would not be expected to find place.

him full credit for his shrewdness—they admit him to be in the right when he is not wrong—they refute him with argument as well as they can whenever he makes himself pretension to argument;—and as for the rest, who can blame them or find fault with their logic, if they are unable to deal with impiety, absurdity and nonsense otherwise than as such?

It is in this general style now intimated, that Dr. Ebrard has taken up the questions at issue between Strauss and his opposers in the work named at the head of this article; and in so doing has reflected, in common with other similar writings which have lately appeared, the present feeling of an extensive portion at least of Germany in respect to this controversy.¹ It does not comport with our object to characterize this able production at much length. It occupies an intermediate position between a regular commentary on the Gospels, on the one hand, and a connected biography of the Saviour on the other. It has this in common with the former, that it discusses the same general topics, such as the plan of the different evangelists, their genuineness, the consistency of their several accounts with each other, which claim the attention of an interpreter; but, it differs from a commentary, inasmuch as it does not profess to give a detailed exposition of the Gospels or of any extended portions of them in continuous order. It resembles, again, a biographical sketch of the Saviour in its attempt to arrange the materials of the evangelical history in their supposed chronological connection, but makes no endeavor, like the *Lives of Christ* which we have, for instance from Hess and Neander, to throw over this naked outline the fulness of representation and freshness of coloring which an expansion of the hints and simple statements of the evangelists render so easy to a master of the art of historical composition. The work has professedly a polemic aim against Strauss,² and more particu-

¹ The work of Professor Wieseler, *Chronologische Synopsis der Evangelisten*, etc., which is said to be on a plan very similar to that of Dr. Ebrard, the writer has not seen. It is reviewed in very commendatory terms in a recent number of Tholuck's *Litterarischer Anzeiger*. It is rumored that both these authors have received, since the publication of their works, important academic promotions.

² It seems that since Strauss wrote his book, German infidelity has run a new stadium, leaving him who was just now its foremost standard-bearer so far in the rear, that his swifter competitors speak of him as being at present in the same ranks with Hengstenberg and Tholuck. Strauss does not say and does not mean, in the ordinary sense of the expression, that the Gospels are a forgery; but these new lights of infidelity affirm this without reserve. Bruno

larly against that part of his book which professes to compare the different accounts of the Evangelists with one another, and out of the alleged inconsistencies and contradictions to be found in them, to construct an argument in support of his hypothesis of their mythic origin. As a work of critical science, as a general help to the thorough study of the Gospels, it is certainly one of the most useful books of the kind which we have ever seen. But it is especially valuable as presenting to us a critique on Strauss's *Life of Jesus* as a literary and scientific work, and thus enabling us to judge of it precisely in those respects, in which it has arrogated to itself the greatest merit. We propose, therefore, in the sequel of the present Article, to avail ourselves of some of the materials here offered for forming such a judgment,¹ and at the same time to present, so far as it may be necessary for the accomplishment of this particular object, a brief account of the leading notions of Strauss's monstrous hypothesis.

This writer, who has attained so much distinction, was born at Ludwigsburg in Würtemberg, in 1808. He pursued his early studies chiefly at Tübingen, officiated for a short time as vicar to a country curate, and then went, in 1831, to Berlin, where he heard lectures from Schleiermacher. Hegel had died a short time before this, but had left his philosophy in the zenith of its glory, to which Strauss now attached himself, and on which, after his return to Tübingen, he lectured with great applause at the university. At the age of twenty-seven he published his *Life of Jesus*, and thus brought his name for the first time prominently before the public. In this work he has applied the principles of Hegelianism to the interpretation of Scripture, and claims it as his great merit that he was the first to extend the domain of this philosophy to matters of religion. As this system is variously expounded by its teachers, it is not surprising, that some of them,

Bauer is the most noted representative of this school. They find but little favor anywhere, so that even de Wette, who has a great talent for finding out the humor of the public says, in one of his last works, that his readers will not expect him to take notice of the objections of such a man as B. Bauer. Dr. Ebrard has devoted some attention, in his work, to this development, as also to the similar one of Gefrörer—hence the title, *Gesammte Evangelienkritik*—but has confined himself mainly to a more respectable antagonist—Strauss.

¹ The materials here used, furnished by Ebrard, are chiefly those contained in the extract at the close of the Article. The other statements made, which are of such a nature as to seem to require documentary justification, have been derived from the sources, either named or intimated, in the progress of the discussion.

as Marheinecke, Rosenkrantz and others who claim to be its true representatives, and to maintain its consistency with revelation, should refuse to acknowledge Strauss as a disciple of this school. As an adherent now of the Hegelian philosophy, according to his exposition of it,¹ it is impossible for him to admit the idea of Christianity as a historical religion, and he must discover consequently some mode of explaining its records, their origin and the contents of them, which is consistent with his philosophy. Here lies the *πρώτον ψεύδος* of his scheme. The question of the genuineness of the Gospels is prejudged before he comes to their examination. It is impossible that any amount of evidence for them should establish their truth against the *a priori* decisions of his philosophy. This philosophy, as expressed in a word, is undisguised pantheism. Here is the norm, to which all must be brought, the *lapis Lydius* which is to try everything. On this principle it becomes with Strauss a philosophical absurdity to suppose that the Gospels are genuine productions, and contain a record of actual occurrences and veritable doctrines as these terms are generally understood; for from such an admission what would follow? Aye—there would be then a personal God—he would be omnipotent and could work a miracle—the soul is immortal, and will live on in the world to come—every individual is accountable for himself, and must look to the consequences of his destiny—doctrines of course which pantheism denies, and which it must view as the brand-marks of spuriousness in any book which professes to teach them. Straussism now proposes to itself the somewhat difficult task of adhering to its philosophy and yet maintaining a show of respect for the Scriptures. It would not venture on the avowal of an open hostility to the word of God.

From this step indeed the rationalism of Germany under all the forms of its manifestation has studiously held itself back.² It has

¹ On the relation of Strauss to the Hegelian school of philosophy, see Hagenbach's *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, p. 304, 1840. Comp. also Pelt's *Theologische Encyclopædie*, § 70. 4, b. 1843.

² It is a singular phenomenon, that the deism of England, on the contrary, which is the same development under another name, has, generally speaking, discarded at the outset and avowedly, the authority of the Bible, and has built its system of religion, so far as it has had any beyond a mere negation of the idea of revelation, professedly on natural grounds. It would be interesting to inquire into the reasons of so different a proceeding. One explanation which has been assigned for it is, that the deists of England have mostly been laymen, disconnected with the church and ecclesiastical establishments, whereas those who have promoted the same movement in Germany have generally been professional theologians.

always aimed at the same object, and that has been to blot out from the Bible all evidences of a supernatural revelation, and to reduce its teachings to a level with those of nature; but it has labored to accomplish this result without acknowledging any inconsistencies between it and a certain reception of the Bible as a source of religious instruction.¹ The methods which it has employed for this purpose have been various, and have been changed from time to time, as their insufficiency and absurdity have become apparent. The one which has been on the whole most prevalent, and which has held possession of the field longest is that of a forced interpretation.² On meeting with a miracle or the appearance of a miracle in the Bible, it was explained away as a natural occurrence, either because the sacred writers themselves, it was alleged, really intended to relate it as such, and no other view is authorized by a just construction of their language, (thus in the account of the man healed at the pool of Bethesda, John never thought of relating anything more, it was said, than a case of ordinary cure by bathing), or when the desired result could not be reached in this way, because we are to consider the writers as merely stating their own impressions in regard to the matter, while it belongs to us as interpreters to distinguish between their opinion of an event and the event itself. What these arts were found inadequate to accomplish, it was left to the principle of accommodation, so called, to consummate. The Jews—so the rationalists argued—were looking merely for a temporal king in the Messiah; and Jesus, who was a good man and sincerely desired the moral reformation of his countrymen, took advantage of this idea—(most palpably false, by the way—for what more per-

¹ This remark forms no exception to what was said of Bauer in a preceding note. Infidelity and rationalism are not convertible terms. Every species of the latter is a species of the former, but not the reverse.

² This style of exegesis reached its culminating point in Paulus's Commentary on the Gospels. One example of it will suffice;—it is from his remarks on the miracle of the fish and the *stater* in Matt. 17: 24—27. According to Paulus, nothing was further from the intention of the Evangelist than to relate a miracle. Peter was simply to open the mouth of the fish for the purpose of removing the hook, and then carry it to the market, where he would obtain a *stater* from the sale of it; or, as an improvement upon this, in a later edition of his work, Peter was to open his own mouth on the spot (*αἰτρου!*) in order to cry the fish for sale, etc. It is but little more than a quarter of a century since this mode of treating the Scriptures had the sanction of the leading rationalistic critics of Germany. It is now universally discarded even by them, and is unheard of in their lecture-rooms, except as the illustration of an obsolete absurdity.

fect contrast can be imagined than that which exists between the Saviour as he was and professed to be, and that which the worldly Jews expected of the Messiah),—gave himself out as the Son of God, as the head of a new universal kingdom, as the Judge of the world, and so on, simply in order to procure a more ready reception of his instructions, and to accomplish with better effect the benevolent object of his mission. In this way the Bible seemed to retain in some sort its authority and truth, and yet was robbed of everything which could be construed into evidence of its divinity or of the supernatural character of the dispensations whose history it contains. But this mode of interpretation lost at length its novelty. It violated too many principles of language and common sense to maintain its ground against the stricter views of philology which had begun to prevail; and the spirit of rationalistic criticism transformed itself next from the contents of the sacred writings to the sacred writings themselves. The critics of this school became suddenly endued with a wonderful sagacity for deciding on the genuineness of ancient compositions, for distinguishing by means of certain internal indications of style, idiom and thought, together with a certain inward, undefinable sense of their own, between such parts of these compositions as were true, and such as were false; they could place their hands, with infallible certainty, upon the entire book, in the sacred volume—upon the chapter here and there, or upon the verse which was to be rejected as an interpolation and as unworthy of its reputed divine origin. Before such a process, those parts of the Bible which contained anything offensive to the rationalistic sense, which affirmed, for instance, the reality of miracles, prophetic inspiration and the like, rapidly disappeared; and yet the effort which was thus in fact overturning the foundations of Christianity and all revealed religion, claimed to be nothing more than an assertion of the rights of a just and scientific criticism. But the arbitrary nature of such judgments could not fail to be perceived. They were capable of being exposed, and were exposed; so that rationalism began again to be pressed with the difficulties of its position both as attempting to maintain a mode of attack on the Scriptures which it could not justify at the bar of science, and as seeking to conceal its design by an artifice too shallow to answer any purpose of deception. All these expedients having been exhausted, one might have supposed, that rationalism would be compelled now either to desist from the warfare, or carry it on henceforth without reserve or subterfuge, with

an open assumption of the ground which it really occupied, but which it was so unwilling to avow. To this issue it seemed for a time as if it must come; but at this juncture Strauss presents himself with his mythic scheme, and opens the way for at least one other experiment of the kind which had been so often attempted.

The term *myth*, which has been so much used in modern criticism,¹ is variously explained. The definition of it, which Strauss adopts as regards the Gospels, is that of a *religious idea clothed in a historical form*. This historical form may be, in itself considered, a pure fiction, having no foundation whatever in any actual occurrences, but arising solely from the tendency of the human mind to give to spiritual truths an outward representation, or it may be founded upon certain historical circumstances as a point of departure, which have been gradually enlarged and modified in conformity with the ideas which have sought to express themselves by means of them. The former is the idea of the myth in its purity and universality; and it is this sense of it which Weisse² has adopted as the foundation of his attempt to get rid of the facts of the evangelical history. Strauss, on the contrary, employs it in the other sense. He admits that there was such a person as Christ—a Jewish Rabbi—(that is his language) who lived and taught in Palestine at the period which is usually assigned to him—that he collected a circle of disciples whom he impressed with so high an idea of his wisdom and goodness, that they considered him as the Messiah, and thus at length awakened in his own mind an ambition, hitherto foreign to him, of being received in that character. This is the sum of all the historical truth which he allows to be contained in the Gospels. The rest is the result of a disposition on the part of the followers of Christ, which began to manifest itself soon after his death, to glorify their deceased Master in every possible way, and especially by ascribing to him those traits of life and character which the Jews supposed from the Old Testament would be exhibited by the Messiah.

¹ The term is one which plays an important part in all the more recent writers on Greek and Roman mythology. The views of the principal of them—as Heyne, Voss, Buttmann, Creuzer, Hermann, Welcker—as they lie scattered through their numerous writings, are brought together and stated in a summary form by K. O. Müller; *Prolegomena zu einer wissenschaftlichen Mythologie*, S. 317 sq. His own theory also is developed in the above work.

² *Die Evangelische Geschichte, kritisch u. philosophisch bearbeitet von Ch. Hermann Weisse*, Leipzig, 1838.—Dr. Ebrard has made the consideration of this form of the mythic system a topic of separate remark in his work, so far as its difference from that of Strauss seemed to require it.

The Gospels, in a word, are, with the exception of the slight historical basis just mentioned, the product of a mere mental effort to realize and embody the rational Messianic idea which prevailed among the Jews so universally at the time of the birth of Christ. The Old Testament, as already intimated, is regarded as the soil, out of which these ideas, which have been rendered thus objective in Christ, are said to have sprung. Thus the temptation of the Saviour, which the evangelists relate, is resolved into a fiction, having its origin in the belief, that good men, as illustrated in the history of Job, are objects of the special hatred and persecution of Satan; and hence this must have been true also of the Messiah. The account of the miraculous multiplication of the loaves and fishes is merely an imitation of the Mosaic account of the manna in Ex. 6: 16; and the transfiguration on Tabor has its type in what is related as having befallen Moses on mount Sinai. The visit of the Magi from the East is said to have been suggested by the prophecy of Balaam in Numb. 24: 17, that a Star should arise out of Jacob, and by the representation in Is. lx. and Ps. lxxii., that distant nations and kings should bring presents of gold, spices and other costly treasure as a tribute to the Messiah. The flight of the holy family into Egypt was intended to correspond to the flight of Moses into Midian, the murder of the children of Bethlehem to that of the children of the Israelites by Pharaoh, the appearance of Jesus at the age of twelve years in the temple, to the somewhat similar narratives respecting Samuel, Solomon, Daniel, (1 K. 3: 23 seq. 1 Sam. iii. Dan. 4: 5 seq.) etc. etc. These are examples of the manner, in which the histories of the Gospels are said to have been formed, or more properly speaking, to have formed themselves. They are the work, not of any single individual or of any fraudulent design, but of a gradual and spontaneous aggregation about the person of Jesus of the various types and analogies which the Jews supposed would be realized in the Messiah. The commonly received opinion respecting the time of the composition and the authorship of the Gospels would be fatal of course to this theory; and this opinion accordingly is without ceremony set aside, and the ground assumed, that the Gospels were written about the middle of the second century after Christ, not by persons who stood in a sufficiently near relation to him to be able to report what they wrote on the authority of their own knowledge and observation, but by individuals whose names are unknown, who put down in good faith as their own belief and that of their contemporaries these mythic

fictions then current, which had gradually sprung up and wrought themselves into a historical form in the manner which has been described. The Gospel of Luke, however, and the Acts are referred by Strauss to a somewhat earlier origin, and the epistles of Paul also, with the exception of particular passages, are allowed to be genuine.¹ His main argument for justifying his assertion, that the Gospels originated at so late a period, is derived from what he represents as their internal condition. Of this he gives his own account; and were there nothing to object to it as regards either the soundness of the critical principles on which he has proceeded in this examination or the accuracy and truth of his statements, it might seem indeed, that we have here no slight obstacle to a literal reception of the *Memoirs of the Evangelists*. He undertakes to make out, that they offend perpetually against the chronology, history, social customs and institutions of the period, to which they profess to relate, and furthermore that they are full of discrepancies and contradictions as compared with each other, which no art of interpreters and harmonists can possibly reconcile. On this basis he builds his conclusion—the Gospels could not have proceeded from writers who had any personal connection with the transactions and scenes which they relate, but they must have been composed at a period when time had already obscured the original accounts and left room for those intermixtures of the marvellous and incoherent, which they everywhere exhibit, and which mark the mythic creations of every age and people. It is generally acknowledged that Strauss has stated the apparent discrepancies between the Gospels with unusual force and effect; and it is on the ability displayed here, that his pretensions as a writer and critic mainly rest.

It will be perceived at once from the preceding sketch, that the work of replying to Strauss must consist principally in a vindication of the Gospels against the charges which he has preferred against them. The other parts of his hypothesis fall at once, when

¹ His views respecting John's Gospel have been vacillating. In the first edition of his work he declares himself fully convinced, that it is not genuine; but in the third edition, after reading the arguments of Neander and de Wette in defence of it, he retracts this opinion so far as to say, that though not yet decided for it, he could no longer as before decide against it. But in the fourth edition of his work, published in 1841, we find, that he has taken back this concession and returned to his first denial. To admit the genuineness of John, even in a qualified sense, and at the same time to pretend to hold the views of Strauss, would seem to be a contradiction in terms.

deprived of this support. If the claims of the Gospels be established and they are shown to be from the hands of the personal followers of Christ, or of their associates, there remains then no interval for the mythic process of which Strauss speaks, and the very idea of it, sufficiently absurd even were we to concede to him the entire interval for which he contends, is seen to be at once the merest dream that ever entered the head of a philosopher. It is with this vindication, as involving obviously the gist of the whole subject, that Dr. Ebrard has occupied himself mainly in the present work. Those more general objections, consequently, which lie against the views of Strauss, he has had less occasion to urge fully, than some other writers who have pursued a different plan. These will be found given at greater length, particularly by Tholuck in the introductory part of his *Credibility of the Evangelical History*,¹ by Ullmann in his work entitled *Historical or Mythic*,² and by Julius Müller in his articles in the well known theological Journal, *Studies and Criticisms*,³ published at Heidelberg. As illustrating the manner, in which this part of the discussion has been conducted, it will not be out of place to mention here some of the leading positions which have been taken against Strauss under this more general view of the subject. We have space only to enumerate them without much expansion.

First, it is affirmed that on Strauss's principles all history loses its certainty, and becomes a mere phantom, an illusion. No biography was ever written of any individual, no history of any kingdom or nation, which may not be resolved into a set of myths as easily as the account of the Saviour contained in the Gospels.⁴ All confidence in the past is destroyed; all distinction between the ideal and actual is annihilated, and men can be certain of nothing which has taken place at any period remote at all from their own time, whatever may be the testimony by which it is supported. Second, the theory of Strauss leaves the origin of the Christian church, the rise and spread of Christianity in the world, an un-

¹ Die Glaubwürdigkeit der evangelischen Geschichte, zugleich eine Kritik des Lebens Jesu von Strauss, von Dr. A. Tholuck, 1838.

² Historisch oder Mythisch? Beiträge zur Beantwortung der gegenwärtigen Lebensfrage der Theologie, von Dr. C. Ullmann, 1838.

³ Studien und Kritiken, 1836.

⁴ Luther's Leben nach Dr. Caspar, is an ironical attempt of this nature to draw a parallel between Luther and Paul. In design and style of execution it is similar to Whateley's Historical Doubts relative to Napoleon Buonaparte—the difference being that this is intended to meet one form of skepticism, and that, another.

solved enigma—an event without any adequate cause or conceivable explanation. It involves the absurdity of a creation out of nothing. It can be shown that Christians existed already in great numbers in every part of the Roman empire at the close of the first century—that they were bound together by the most intimate communion of sentiment and opinion—that they held their principles with such firmness, that no violence of persecution, no blandishments of wealth and power, no terrors of martyrdom could move them from their faith; and yet Strauss tells us, that the idea of this Messiah, whose name they bore and for whom they sacrificed and suffered so much, did not fully develop itself till half a century later than this! Third, the character which the Gospels attribute to the Saviour, is entirely unlike that which the Jews as a people expected that the Messiah would assume. It is not easy in fact to see how the image of him, which they had pictured out to themselves under the influence of their national pride and egotism, could have been more decidedly contradicted than in the person and history of Jesus as presented to us by the evangelists. The idea of such a character as that of Jesus as portrayed in the Gospels, was entirely beyond and above the conceptions of the Jews, and so far from being produced by a desire to realize their Messianic hopes, arrayed against itself their strongest prejudices and passions, and from that hour to this has been an object of their most determined rejection and hatred. Fourth, the supposition of Strauss assumes a definiteness and unity in the expectations of the Jews respecting the Messiah, which did not exist. The bulk of the people, as we find it stated also in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, believed that he would be a descendant of David and a native of Bethlehem; but according to the conceptions of the Rabbins, as founded on Dan. 7: 21, he was to be a celestial spirit, who would descend at once from heaven to earth, in order to establish his kingdom—traces of which opinion present themselves in the Gospel of John and in Paul. Some supposed that his dominion would be temporary, others, eternal; some, that he would convert and bless the heathen, others, that he would destroy them; some, that he would restore to life the dead of all mankind, others, that he would raise the Jews only; and so on many other points, their views were in like manner entirely vague and unsettled. Fifth, the anticipations of the Jews respecting the Messiah, whatever they may have been, could have had no influence on the heathen; and yet the great majority of those, who had embraced Christianity before the middle of the se-

cond century, consisted of converts from heathenism. The forming principle, consequently, to which Strauss attributes so much efficacy in the production of the Gospels, was here entirely wanting. To suppose that these histories could have been constructed out of an idea which *really* occupied the minds of men, would seem to be sufficiently absurd; but what are we to think of it, when by far the greater part of those who are said to have been the unconscious instruments of working out this mythical development, had not even this idea itself! Sixth, he attributes to the early Christians a procedure just the opposite of that which they actually adopted. He assumes that they had already in their minds a distinct image of the Messiah, as derived from the symbols and prophecies of the Old Testament, and that they then framed a history for it in accordance with these predictions; whereas it is notorious, both from intimations of the New Testament itself and from other sources, that they were inclined to just the opposite course—that is, having the facts first given—the history itself presented to them—to interpret the prophecies on the principle that their meaning is likely to be best explained by their fulfilment. They no doubt carried this principle so far, as to put often a forced interpretation on Scripture, in order to increase the testimony of prophecy to the truth of Christianity; but that only shows how impossible it would have been, under such circumstances, that the Gospels should have been produced in the manner that Strauss represents. Seventh, all history proves that nothing which can be pretended to be in the remotest degree analogous to what is supposed here, has ever taken place, except in the most barbarous times and after the lapse of an almost interminable series of years; and yet Strauss would persuade us that Christianity from being a mere fiction established itself in the minds of men as a historical verity, in the incredibly short period of little more than a century after the death of its Founder, and that too in the most enlightened age of Greek and Roman civilization! Finally, his system is affirmed to be full of self-contradictions and to contain in itself the elements of its own refutation. He denies, for instance, the genuineness of the evangelists in general, but receives them as trust-worthy witnesses whenever they assert anything which he can employ as an argument for impeaching their own credit. He professes to regard the contents of our Gospels as the result of a process of symbolization, so simple and natural, that it was carried on by a thousand minds at once, without consciousness or design; and yet when he comes to the actual details, he is obliged to assume a degree

of reflection and study in adjusting the character of Christ to its supposed mental type, utterly irreconcilable with the idea of any such spontaneous operation.¹ He allows that Luke probably wrote his Gospel in the first age of Christianity; and, as every one knows, this Evangelist opens his history with the announcement (Luke 1: 1—3), that many had already preceded him in writing on the same subject.² Even his history, therefore, was not the first which had been composed. Written accounts of the life of Christ were already in existence and well known.³ They must have made their appearance, consequently, almost immediately after the crucifixion of Jesus. There could have been no interval of any duration between that event and their composition. This is justly regarded as decisive of the whole question. It is thus proved, that written documents relating to the Founder of Christianity have existed from the very first, and that there has never been any such traditional period in the church, as Strauss pretends, and as is necessary to the support of his hypothesis, during which men were dependent for their knowledge concerning Christ upon uncertain oral accounts, which were transmitted from one to another. This history had already been written out by various hands and scattered far and wide, before the mythic

¹ Here is an instance of it which Ebrard notices. The narrative of the scene of Jesus in the temple at the age of twelve years, is said to have arisen in the following manner—*ex uno disce omnes*: 'It was perceived in the case of the Old Testament heroes (1 Kings 3: 23 seq. Susanna 45 seq.,—the distinction between canonical and apocryphal books, Strauss ignores) that the spirit which impelled them manifested itself in their twelfth year; and hence it was thought (not by any body in particular of course—*dachte man*!) that the spirit could not have been concealed longer than this in the case of Jesus; and as Samuel and Daniel had given proofs, at that age, of their future destination as seers and rulers, so Jesus must also have exhibited himself, at that period of life, in the part which he was afterwards to act (!) as the Son of God and the teacher of mankind.' Such an artificial combination of different traits from the histories of the Old Testament, such a studied selection of particulars and circumstances for the purpose of investing the character of Christ with greater majesty and glory, is conceivable only in connection with a wilful and designed fabrication. What becomes then of the pure mythic formations, of which Strauss has so much to say!

² It is worthy of remark too, that Luke does not mean to intimate by reference to this fact, as some have supposed, that these accounts were inaccurate and worthless, and that he wrote, therefore, in order to give more authentic information. His design is merely apologetic;—since so many others, he means to say, had ventured to write upon a subject of such difficulty and magnitude, it would not be considered as presumption in him to make a similar attempt.

³ Papias, it is expressly mentioned, an immediate disciple of the apostles, had a written Gospel in his hands.

period, to which Strauss would refer the formation of our Gospels, had arrived. Had any such tendency to exaggeration as he supposes discovered itself then, those histories would have served as an effectual check upon it, and preserved the great body of Christians at least, from lending an ear to fictions, which they saw to be unsustained by their written testimonies.¹

It may appear singular, that the work of Strauss should have excited so much surprise, when the idea, on which it is founded, instead of being advanced now for the first time, had long been familiar to the minds of a certain class of German critics. Semler was the first perhaps, who distinctly proposed it, and we find it actually applied by him to the histories of Samson and Esther. After this it was adopted without reserve by such writers as Eichhorn, Kayser, Gabler, Ammon, Berthold, Sieffert and others, in particular passages both of the Old and the New Testaments, that is to say, whenever they met with narratives and representations, which in their more obvious, historical sense, implied a supernatural interposition, and from which they could not easily remove the appearance of this, either by impeaching the integrity of the text or by explaining away its meaning by a forced interpretation. In this manner and by such critics, the mythic principle had been gradually extended to numerous portions of the Old Testament and to various facts in the history of the Saviour, as his supernatural birth, his resurrection, ascension, and still other events of the like miraculous character. Strauss's book contains in fact very little in its actual details, which has not been anticipated by preceding writers. His peculiarity consists merely in this, that he has given to this mode of interpretation a degree of unity and completeness, which it had not yet received. He was the first to open his mind to the conception that the means which had been employed to do away with certain parts of revelation, might be employed with equal effect to do away with the whole of it. Others who had gone before him in the same career stopped short of the issue, to which their principles were leading them;—he took up the work where they left it and urged it through with unflinching constancy.²

¹ The history of what befel the apocryphal Gospels, so called, will occur to the reader as confirming this remark.

² Strauss is to be regarded as a legitimate product of the rationalistic style of criticism which has been so much in vogue in Germany for the last half century or somewhat longer. He has at length brought its tendencies to their extreme result and illustrated them on a scale which now amazes even many of

It will sound strangely to our readers to be told after this, that Strauss still pretends to hold fast to the truth of Christianity and would deem it a serious breach of charity for any one to question the sincerity of his faith in its records. The explanation of this mystery may be given in few words. According to his philosophy, the truth of the facts of Christianity is not necessary to the truth of Christianity itself. Christianity is an idea, entirely independent of the history so called, in which it has accidentally clothed itself; and if a person holds merely to this idea, whatever it may be, he holds to all which is true and all which was ever intended to be taught as true in the Christian writings; and is entitled to the name of a believer. Thus, one of the great truths asserted in Christianity, as he affirms, is the reality of the divine and human in man, that is, in every man—for pantheism makes us all of course—entire and several—parts of the deity;—and this truth, after having so long struggled to bring itself to the distinct consciousness of mankind, has at length attained its fullest development and recognition in the person of Jesus Christ. That is, the human mind has employed him—it being a matter of indifference to the truth itself, whether there ever was such a person or not—as the representative of this idea;¹ and if any one receives this idea, he receives all which the Gospel teaches respecting the divinity of Christ and the miraculous works attesting this character, which he is said to have performed. So also of various other truths, which find their symbolization in the history which the Evangelists have related. Indeed, since these truths have been embodied, so to speak, in a more impressive manner and with greater purity in the Gospels, than in any other similar mode of representation, Christianity is to be considered as the most perfect religious dispensation which has yet appeared, and as marking the highest progress which the human race have hitherto made, in the apprehension of moral and spiritual truth.

This mode of viewing the Scriptures creates obviously a necessity for some method of interpretation, conformed to it. Here Strauss's system has to encumber itself with a new mass of absurd-

those who have long labored zealously at the same vocation, but without a full consciousness of their position. This topic is well treated by Amand Saintes in his *Histoire critique du Rationalisme en Allemagne, depuis son origine jusqu'à nos jours*, p. 183 sq.

¹ Hence the inappropriateness of the title of his work—*Life of Jesus*—has with reason been objected to Strauss by his opponents; for it is not a *Life* which it contains, but a detailed argument to show that there never could have been any such thing as the title assumes.

eties. All the ordinary, established laws of language are disregarded, and a set of hermeneutical rules introduced as loose and visionary, as any which were ever applied to the Bible by a Hermaas, Origen or Swedenborg. The literal or historical sense must be discarded. There is always a deeper meaning for the initiated, than that which lies upon the surface. While the ordinary reader attaches himself to the outward form, the philosopher penetrates to the spirit.¹ That which is related as fact being understood as symbol, this symbol will be explained of course as denoting any idea which the fancy of the interpreter may choose to connect with it. In this way Hegelianism with a mock reverence for the word of God, may adduce its Scripture warrant for all its dogmas and blasphemies;—the Bible is converted into a perfect *quodlibet ex quolibet*,² and there is not a philosopher who

¹ It may be well enough for common people to remain connected with a church; but Strauss affirms (II. S. 616) that philosophers should be exempted from that obligation (Church-membership, in Germany, it will be recollected, is a matter of birth-right—Jews and anabaptists excepted). A waggish opponent thinks, that it would have to depend probably upon an academic examination to determine whether a man was philosopher enough to justify this secession, and that it would become, therefore, practically rather a queer business.

² Clausen (Hermeneutik des neuen Testaments, etc. S. 336) characterizes the hermeneutical system of Strauss thus: "If we compare the results of the mythic treatment of the Scriptures with those of the allegorizing mode, we shall find that they are in many respects entirely the same, yet with one fundamental difference. Both agree, for instance, in the principle that the dignity and divinity of the Scriptures demand a departure from the historical sense. In the language of Strauss himself (Ausg. 2. S. 2) "either the divine cannot have taken place in this manner or that which has taken place in this manner cannot be divine." In order, therefore, not to be obliged to give up the absolute truth of the contents of the Bible, it is necessary, as the only course left, to abandon their historical truth. Thus, the two systems agree in reference to their general method, and in many of the details also of such an exposition of the text. But in respect to the principle on which they are based, there is an important difference. The allegorical theory of interpretation takes for granted, that the objective truth, that which was intended to be conveyed, is identical with that presented in the written Word. Where a collision is affirmed to exist between the two, it can be regarded, as apparent only and resulting from an illusory view of the letter of the text. To remove this, will be the work consequently of the interpreter; and hence, when the allegorizer relinquishes the historical sense, he does it only in order to penetrate more deeply into the interior of the Word and draw out thence the meaning which is said to have been designed by the Holy Spirit, the author of the Scriptures.—The mythical style of interpretation, on the contrary, is founded professedly on a strict distinction between the representation of things as given in the Scriptures, and the real import of them, as ascertained by an enlightened philosophy, without respect to the intention of the writer."

has lived from Confucius to Schelling, who might not with equal propriety plead its authority for his wisdom or his ravings.

We have not space to pursue further these topics. It only remains for us now to endeavor to assist the reader in forming some general conception of the manner, in which Strauss has developed his internal argument, as it is termed, against the genuineness of the Gospels. The nature and object of this have been already stated. It professes to be founded on a comparison of the Gospels with each other, and with other writings, Jewish as well as Greek and Roman, which illustrate the same period of history. Out of this comparison he undertakes to show, that the Evangelists abound in the most palpable inconsistencies and self-contradictions, and that they are utterly at variance also with other unimpeachable historical authorities. In this way, he would impose on the Gospels a character, corresponding to that of the origin while he imputes to them—he would make them out to be the productions of men who lived at a remote period from that of the scenes and events which they describe and which exhibit proof, in this contradictory form of their narratives, of the vague, uncertain manner in which they were handed down for so long a time from one generation to another.

That the ground over which this part of the work conducts us, is free from difficulty, no one who has studied the Gospels critically, will pretend to deny. Strauss is not the first who has made this discovery. The apparent discrepancies between the Gospels were noticed by the earliest Christian writers, and received from them the attention which, as Christian apologists, they were bound to give to them. Augustine has left us a treatise—*De Consensu Evangelistarum*—on this very subject. Similar works were composed by Eusebius and Ambrose.¹ The same ground has been traversed by a thousand writers since their time; and as often as a new commentary has been written on the Gospels with any pretensions to critical merit, it has repeated and explained these difficulties. It has been said with probable truth, that in Strauss's whole work there are not perhaps twenty of these discrepancies between the Evangelists, as they are called, which have not been pointed out by previous writers, and for which a solution has not been proposed. It has been shown, that a portion of them, as urged by objectors, consist entirely of misstatements which need only to be placed in a correct light, in order to

¹ The title of Eusebius's work is *περὶ τῆς τῶν εὐαγγελίων διαφορίας*; that of Ambrose, *Concordia evangelii Matthæi et Lucæ*.

have their groundlessness perceived—that some of them rest upon the ignorance of critics themselves in regard to language or a deficiency of information in some other branch of antiquity—that some of them which for a time appeared to be incapable of explanation, have been since cleared up by more extended research and the advancement of science—that many of them result merely from the fragmentary form, in which the Evangelists have related their history, and that in those cases in which they seem to differ from each other, it may reasonably be resolved into the imperfections of our own knowledge, and that in those cases again, in which they disagree with other writers, they are entitled, considered merely as historians, and all question of their inspiration apart, to as much credit, as Josephus or Philo or Tacitus or any one else, whose authority has been so confidently arrayed against them.¹

But all this avails nothing for Strauss. Things remain for him as they have been from the beginning—criticism has made no progress since the days of Porphyry;² Chubb, Morgan, Reimarus³ and such like, are the only men of true discernment, while the rest of the world have been deceived by superficial appearances, and need still to have their errors and credulity, corrected and exposed. This task has been so often undertaken, yet without success, that one would think that some special fitness for it

¹ It will not escape recollection, that there is a positive as well as a negative side to this subject. An irrefragable argument for the credibility of the Evangelists may be derived from their incidental coincidences, as compared with each other, and their remarkable fidelity to the chronological, social, civil, and geographical relations of their age and country. Our English theological literature can boast one work relating to this subject, which has not its superior in any language,—we mean Lardner's *Credibility of the Gospel History*. It is the arsenal, from which the Germans themselves have drawn their best weapons in the present warfare.

² This heathen philosopher wrote a work in the third century, entitled—*κατὰ ἑρμηνείαν λόγος*. The arguments on which he principally insists here, are the *contradictions* which he affirmed to exist in the Scriptures of the Christians, and the *allegorizing mode of interpretation*, to which a portion of them were addicted.

³ It was supposed for a long time by many, that the Wolfenbüttel Fragments were the production of the poet Lessing, and that his pretence of having found them in the library at Wolfenbüttel was a mere fiction. This opinion of their authorship has been proved at length to be incorrect. It is now known, that the writer of them was H. S. Reimarus, a pastor and professor at Hamburg, who died in 1781. His positions, though savoring of a skepticism unparalleled for that period, were very moderate compared with those of Strauss, and are not irreconcilable with a conviction of the truth of the sacred records.

would be necessary, in order to warrant now a renewal of the attempt, with any prospect of a better result. Mere elegance of style, dexterity in stating the points of an objection with force, hardihood of assertion, unbounded egotism, contempt for the opinions and cold-blooded indifference to the dearest hopes of mankind, would not seem to be sufficient qualifications for undertaking this labor anew. Surely, some new discoveries have been made which are to take the world by surprise. Recesses of science have been explored, hitherto unsealed to mortal eyes. Our champion must have brought to his work stores of erudition, before which the learning of all Christian scholars sinks away into insignificance and contempt. We are now assuredly about to hear the testimony of witnesses against the Gospels, who have never yet spoken, and whom it has been reserved to the indefatigable Dr. Strauss, in the illimitable excursions of his far reaching scholarship, to discover for the first time, and to bring forward, on this occasion of the re-hearing of this so often adjudicated question.

How far these expectations are realized by the actual result, might be shown by following Dr. Ebrard in his detailed exposure of some of the objections which Strauss has urged against the history of the Saviour. But we have the means of satisfying the curiosity of our readers on this point in another way. In the first part of his treatise, Dr. Ebrard makes a thorough business of examining and refuting the objections of Strauss, in connection with the particular passages in the Gospels, on which they are founded. He then at the commencement of his second part presents a summary view of the critical principles which are assumed as the foundation of these objections, and with the soundness or unsoundness of which they must stand or fall. At the same time he gives us a clue to the literary pretensions of our critic, and reveals some secrets of book-making, which are adapted to put us on our guard against first appearances. From this statement as drawn out by our author, any one can judge both how really formidable is this famous attack which Strauss has made on Christianity, and how far authorized he is, by any superiority of knowledge and learning, to look down with scorn upon the host of Christian scholars whom he has treated with so much contempt. Dr. Ebrard presents this critique—such it virtually is—on Strauss's *Life of Jesus*, under the head of a *Receipt* for enabling any one who chooses, to produce a similar book, and thus to emulate this great author, in the renown which he has won. We

shall conclude the present Article, therefore, by copying out for our readers this receipt with some considerable fulness. Here it is.

RECEIPT

For writing a Life of Jesus like that of Dr. David Fr. Strauss.

(a) Before you begin, go to an antiquarian book-store and buy a copy of LIGHTFOOT and WETSTEIN, for the sake of their Rabbinic learning ; and then fetch from some public library the second part of Havercamp's JOSEPHUS, and opening it at the Register, set it on the table before you.

(b) You are now to task yourself for an introduction. Let it be something written in your finest style, in which you will have much to say about science, Origen and his allegorical interpretation and various other matters, with some flourishes at last respecting your subject, how deeply affecting, how beautiful and grand it is, though as to historical reality you will not presume to claim a great deal for it.

(c) You enter next on the work itself, and must commence with special care. There are four histories before you, from which you are to draw your materials. You have nothing to do here with the question, whether these books are biographies or compositions of some other kind, whether everything is narrated in the exact order of its occurrence or not, whether all the writers had the same plan or a different one, etc. But you assume without mooting the question at all, that these four histories are so many chronological biographies, written entirely on the same plan, for the same object and in the same manner. This of course you will not be so simple as to say expressly ; but if two of the books happen not to agree at any time, you will proceed just as if that which you do not say, were a point taken for granted beyond all dispute. Your readers will be none the wiser for it. Comp. Str. B. I. p. 285, 294, 407, 500, 574, 650, 718, 733, 738.

(d) You take up now the contradictions of your four sources. If these are trivial and lie merely in a different mode of representation, you then pretend that as for yourself, you attach no great importance to them, but at the same time you take care to bring them all forward and to put them in as imposing an attitude as possible. To illustrate this, suppose for example, you were writing a life of Farel. In one of your sources it is said, Farel was a reformer from Frankfort, and met with Calvin at Geneva ; but in another of them, Calvin came to Geneva, where he saw Farel

and Viret, and still in a third, Farel visited Viret, in whose room was a French traveller, Calvin. Here you reason thus: According to A, Calvin is already in Geneva, and Farel finds him there, while according to B and C, Calvin finds Farel; according to C, it is Farel who calls upon Viret, while according to B, it is Calvin who makes the visit to Farel and Viret; according to C, the meeting of Farel and Calvin is an accidental one, while according to B, Calvin appears to have sought the interview by design; according to C, the meeting takes place in Viret's room; according to B, it has entirely the appearance, as if it took place in a room which Viret and Farel occupy together. *Comp. Str.* † 109, 135, and indeed §§ 17—143.

(e) If the contradictions are really great, and such as to indicate to an unprejudiced person, that the events which two of the sources relate are entirely different from those related in the two others, you are then, either silently to assume the identity of the two accounts, or to seek to render this plausible by urging the points of similarity. In this way you can show off a rich stock of contradictions. Thus, for example, A says: "Cajus, on a certain occasion, met a carriage full of country people who were riding home from a church service. Just at that moment an old beggar woman passed by and asked them—they were singing merrily at the time—for a present, but received none. Cajus took out his purse and gave her a few groschen. Grateful for his kindness, she kissed his hand and prayed that God would bless him and his family." B says: "The wife and children of Cajus had gone on a certain occasion to visit an aged aunt. Cajus could scarcely wait for their return. Towards evening he went out on the way to meet them, and the carriage soon appeared. The children, when they saw their father, shouted with joy; and on coming nearer, he perceives that their aged relative herself sat with them within. He sprang upon the door-step of the carriage, and, full of joy, kissed her hand." You put on now a conscientious mien, and discourse after this wise: "On account of the differences here, the harmonists have attempted to explain the two accounts as referring to different transactions. But who does not see the violence of this assumption? Both times, we have a Cajus who goes out to walk; both times, a carriage full of people who both times sing and shout; both times, Cajus meets with the carriage; both times, a family is mentioned; both times, an aged woman figures in the scene; both times, the hand is kissed. That the two narrators wished, therefore, to relate one and the

same occurrence, admits of no question. It is quite another matter, whether in the manner in which they relate it, they do not contradict themselves. According to A, it was a carriage full of people, who have no particular connection with Cajus—peasants, it would seem; according to B, they are his children; according to B, the carriage has a door-step—it was a coach, therefore; according to A, it appears as if it was a common wagon; according to A, the carriage is returning from church-service, according to B, from a visit. According to A, the woman is a beggar woman and receives from Cajus an alms; B not only knows nothing of any alms, but makes the beggar woman his aunt. According to A, it is the woman who kisses his hand, and indeed, as would seem, upon the ground, by the side of the wagon; according to B, it is he who kisses her hand and in the carriage itself. He who does not perceive now, that we have to do here with two secondary, distorted accounts of some legendary event, does not know what distorted or legendary means. Comp. Str. § 89, 101, B. II. p. 96 and elsewhere.

(f) Nay, even if the *time* in one authority is *expressly* different from that in the other, still you must assume the identity of the two events; and now your contradictions will become as plentiful, as you can wish. For example, A says: "Cajus travelled to Rome in his thirtieth year, and saw St. Peter's church," and B says: "Cajus travelled in his fortieth year to Erfurt and visited the great clock." Here you find the first contradiction in this, that according to A, Cajus travels to Rome, according to B, to Erfurt—the second in this, that according to A, he sees St. Peter's church, according to B, the great clock—the third is this, that A and B contradict themselves in reference to the period of life when Cajus is said to have made the journey in question. Comp. Str. B. II. 505 and elsewhere.

(g) If you find any event related only by A and B, but not by D and C, you are not to inquire whether A and B may have had special grounds for mentioning it, which the others had not, but you say at once—"C and D *know nothing* of this event or circumstance." Comp. ex. gr. Str. B. I. p. 428, 536, 677, 686, 727, 744; II. p. 20, 49, 123, and other places.

(h) When three writers who are independent of each other, relate an event, it must be strange indeed, if one of them does not describe it more minutely, the others, less so. This circumstance now you must turn to account, and always find a "climax," in the different versions of the story. Thus, for example, A says:

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"Cajus came into the forest, and found a wounded stag and healed it." B says: "Cajus went out to walk, and as he came to the borders of a forest, he saw a stag lying there, wounded by a thorn, which he extracted;" C says: "Cajus went into a forest to walk, and heard a groaning; he went in the direction of the noise and saw, etc." Evidently a "climax," you must now exclaim! The locality is designated by A only as a forest; by B as the border of the forest, and the wound is said to have been occasioned by a thorn. C, finally, has resolved the accidental finding of the animal into a hearing of its groans, and a gradual approach to the spot." Comp. Str. B. II. p. 143 and elsewhere.

(i) In certain cases, you can avail yourself also of another artifice. Suppose, A related a circumstance *m*, and B related the same circumstance, but added at the same time attendant circumstances *n*, *o*, *p*, not mentioned in the account of A, which are of such a nature, however, that the circumstance *m* occurring, they must necessarily *eo ipso* have taken place along with it. Here now you are not to say: "If the statement of A, that *m* occurred, be true, then the statement of B, that *n*, *o*, *p* also (as necessary consequences of *m*) occurred, must likewise be true;" but you say just the reverse;" "B has merely *conjectured* the attendant occurrence of *n*, *o*, *p*." For example: A says: "The tree fell to the ground;" B says: "The tree fell to the ground; its branches were broken to pieces, and much of the fruit hanging upon them, being loosened by the shock, fell off." You say now thus: "B adds to the general fact the breaking of the branches and the falling off of the fruit as accompanying circumstances. We need not hesitate long upon the question, whence did he know this. If the tree fell, he said to himself, nothing is more likely than that some of its branches were broken, and much of the fruit shaken off." Comp. Str. B. II. p. 490.

(k) Having found now a sufficient number of contradictions between the different accounts of the narrators, you pass next to the *internal difficulties* which lie in each individual history, or in the *subjective event* itself, to which the history relates. Here you enter on a field, from which you can gather ample spoils. Every event is either simple and related only in its most general traits, or it is described fully with an enumeration of all its circumstances. If the former be the case, you then say: "This plain, unadorned representation is perfectly agreeable to the spirit of the primitive, legendary age, in which the story had its origin;" but if the latter be the case, you say: "The minuteness with which

the narrator has dressed out the event in all its circumstantial drapery, shows most clearly, that the exaggerating power of tradition has been at work here." Comp. Str. B. I. p. 383, 395 b., 450, 567, 635, 728. IL 24 f, 36 f, and other places. Proceed in this way, and you will never find yourself at a loss. You can turn anything into a myth, whether stated by your narrator in one form or another. Say what he will, it is myth, and myth must remain.

(l) A bold and impudent falsification of the facts, you will occasionally find very useful. By mere assertion or the gratuitous introduction of some trait unknown to your author, you can make the particulars of a statement appear entirely contradictory to each other. You need have no fear of such a step, as if it might be hazardous; scores of readers will believe you the sooner for so dashing a manoeuvre. Thus, for example, it is said, "Cajus was a faithful father, and devoted much time and labor to the education and instruction of his children;" and, in another passage, it is related, that a son of Cajus, now grown up, met with a man who had previously been his teacher. You have only now to pervert the first passage, so as to make it affirm expressly, that Cajus gave himself all the instruction to his children, which they ever received, and then you can ask, "how could his son meet with a teacher of his, when he never had any teacher except his own father?"

(m) Another little stratagem, to which you can resort, is that of constantly putting the question, what was the *object*, when a thing is so plain as to be evident of itself. If Cajus makes a deep and respectful bow to an aged man who meets him, you must ask: "What was the object of that bow? Was it intended merely to please and gratify the old man? But how can it be supposed, that the compliment of a stranger would afford an old man so much pleasure? Or did Cajus perform that act, in order to express his views respecting the reverence which is due to old age in general? A very good object, certainly, but there was no spectator present to profit by the example, and he would have done better at all events to have inculcated that principle publicly in a Compendium of Morals. Or will any one say, that it was to this particular individual that he wished to make such a demonstration of his sentiments? This, again, is not without its difficulty. The act being merely a silent one, might have been misunderstood; and he would have been surer of his object, to have explained it in express terms. And besides, what interest could he have in forcing upon a stranger, in so hasty a manner, an expres-

sion of his views upon a moral subject of this nature?" Comp. Str. B. I p. 221, 261, 290, 556, 562, etc.

(n) It will be found that in the whole course of a history certain particular circumstances occur repeatedly, though in every separate passage where they are mentioned, they are sufficiently explained. The causes which occasion their recurrence, are always either specified or intimated. In such cases, you must make it a point to take these circumstances out of their connection, and to represent them as proceeding from a studied design of the writer, consequently as a pure invention on his part. If, for example, one of your sources relates in a certain place, that Cajus returning from a walk sat down to table, and again, in two other passages that he went out, on two different occasions, before dinner—induced indeed every time so to do by special reasons—you must then say: "It appears to have been a standing rule with Cajus, to walk or go out before dinner. Who does not see in this the design of the writer to distinguish Cajus from other men, since he represents him as going out for exercise in the forenoon, while the general practice is to do this in the afternoon. Comp. Str. B. II. p. 585, where John's outrunning Peter is said to be one of a series of incidents, introduced for the purpose of conferring a superiority upon John over Peter. For other similar manoeuvres of Strauss, see the author's work, Theil. I. § 78, 4.

(o) If you find that any difficult point has not been satisfactorily explained hitherto by any commentator, you need not ask, whether it can be thus explained; but you select two from the entire number of the different explanations offered, which distinctly contradict each other, and both of which are untenable. You now reason thus: "*This* explanation is impossible; *that* also is impossible. The matter therefore is inexplicable. Comp. Str. B. I p. 226 f.

(p) But it is time to remind you of your learning. You have no conception what an effect it has now-a-days to see a mass of citations in a book under the text. "Ah —, I understand that"—you say — "but where shall I obtain this learning. I have not read either Josephus, or to confess the truth, a great deal of anything else. My dear friend, that makes no difference. The exegetical Manuals of Paulus, De Wette, Olshausen, and some antiquated commentaries and monographs you have already studied somewhat; Wetstein and Lightfoot lie before you; you own Wiener's Bible-Dictionary; and luckily, Havercamp's Josephus has several capital Registers. You need not suppose it necessary to

have read everything which you quote. Heaven forbid! Wherever you find citations—in Winer, in Paulus or elsewhere—copy them off without misgiving,—they are lawful plunder. Only think what a learned man the world will take you to be! How must such a hope fire your soul! But it may not be amiss to be a little particular in my instructions here. — You begin with Paulus. Here you labor at one point. You must amuse your reader with examples of his style of forced interpretation, and show at great length, how very *unnatural* his natural explanations are. Olshausen, you approach in a different way. He is not, confessedly, free from faults. His greatness consists not so much in the acuteness of his harmonistic talent, as in depth of Christian feeling and in his power of developing the spiritual fullness of the divine Word. In this respect his name marks an era in criticism. As a reformer of the shallow, insipid exegesis which rationalism had brought into vogue, he stands by the side of Schleiermacher and Neander, who produced a similar revolution in dogmatics and church history. His merits, however, you must overlook and attack him upon his weak side. You must hunt up as many instances as possible of his unsuccessful attempts to harmonize the evangelists, and point at them the shafts of your keenest ridicule and satire.—In Lightfoot, you must seek bravely for Rabbinic passages, whenever and wherever you can.—In Josephus, whenever the name of a city or any single political event comes in your way, you must scan the Register, and happy will you feel yourself to be, if Josephus does not mention this name or event. You then trumpet it forth in triumph as a proof, that Josephus "*knew nothing* of it." Whether the name or event was important enough to be mentioned by him, you need not trouble yourself to ask; nor, as to the plan of Josephus, of which you are ignorant, need you make any inquiry. You take it for granted, that Josephus *must record every thing*; what does not stand in the Register of Josephus, did not exist—it is something which never took place.

(g) Finally, you are to read through also the *apocryphal Gospels*; do not be alarmed—it will not cost you much time. The most ridiculous distortions and caricatures of the life of Jesus, which you find there, you will sedulously collect and present them as parallel to the simplest biblical narrations. You can safely assume, that the majority of your readers have not read these apocryphal compositions in full; and so will not perceive, as they otherwise would, the utter irrelevancy of these pretended

parallelisms. Thus, for example, if a person reads in one book—"Cajus was very old, and when he went abroad, two of his sons were accustomed to lead him,"—and in another book—"Cajus was over a thousand years old, and was so weak, that he could not move a limb, but his sons took him upon their shoulders and bore him about, and his beard grew to be more than forty ells long"—every one sees that the first is a sober statement, but the second, an absurd tale. You must place them both, however, as parallel to each other thus: "Cajus is said according to A, to have become very old; we find precisely the same in the apocryphal book B, where we find even the number of his years mentioned as one thousand, and the length of his beard as forty ells long. Both accounts agree also in respect to the great bodily weakness which the old man suffered at this advanced period, since according to A, he was led by his sons, while in B, this legendary incident is already magnified into his being carried by his sons. One might attempt, indeed, to reconcile this by saying, that he was at first led, and afterwards, as his weakness increased, that he was carried; but it is manifest, that we have before us merely a mythic picture in both accounts. *Comp. Str. B. I. p. 226 f.*

And such stuff,¹ can it be supposed, that my readers will receive with patience? My dear friend, should you apply this mode of proceeding to any ordinary history, containing nothing of a miraculous nature, no one indeed would believe what you say—nay, the world would consider you as absolutely mad. But if you apply it to a section of the Bible, to a supernatural history, you may be sure of a legion of admirers, who will stand ready to catch up your words and echo them with thoughtless applause. Observe well, it is against the miracles alone that the skepticism in this case is directed. These, some men would at all hazards discredit and cancel from the records of truth; and any procedure which is designed to explain the sources of the evangelical history as unhistorical, they applaud as an exhibition of the greatest mental acuteness, whereas, were it applied to any other writing, they would undoubtedly pronounce it uncritical and nonsensical.

One word more, I beg to add, in conclusion. In some persons there is still left a spark of that weakness which is called reverence for the Bible. So long as this weakness exists, it will stand in your way, counteracting the impression which your investiga-

¹ A milder term here would not answer. The word in the German is "Zeug" and not "Stoff."

tions are intended to produce. Seek, therefore, on every possible occasion, to weaken and destroy it. The practised eye will not fail to discern such opportunities. Such passages, for instance, as Matt. 17: 24—27. 21: 10. etc., you will not suffer to pass unimproved for this purpose. In particular, I would remind you, that the cross on Golgotha is the place where the Saviour of men was mocked eighteen hundred years ago, and where it will be specially seemly to renew that derision, if any one has a disposition for it at the present day. Go thou now and do in like manner. "I will give thee the whole world, if thou wilt fall down and worship me. And your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall become as gods." *Probatum est.*

ARTICLE IV.

PRINCIPLES OF LATIN LEXICOGRAPHY.

Translated by Professor T. D. Woolsey, Yale College.

[The first part of the Latin dictionary of Wilhelm Freund, of Breslau appeared in 1834, and contained the letters A—C. The second part was published in two numbers, in 1836, and 1844, and went from D to K. The fourth part, (R—Z) was published in 1836, and the third part has been announced as about to appear in 1844. We believe that this lexicon will take a very high rank, probably before any other Latin, and certainly before any Greek one in existence. The preface, containing the author's views of lexicography and an account of his method, has a bearing by no means confined to the Latin or to any particular set of languages, and is, we think, calculated to be useful to all whose labors are directed to lexicography as well as to scholars in general. A translation of this preface is now laid before the reader.—Tr.]

BETWEEN the first publication of the Latin lexicons of Forcellini, Gesner, and Scheller, and the appearance of the present work, more than fifty years have elapsed; and during just this interval, classical philology has met with so thorough a transformation that for this very reason the attempt to bring out a dictionary of the Latin tongue, which shall better correspond with the altered standpoint of the philological sciences, requires no excuse. Still it is

the duty of the author to make known what is the problem he has proposed to himself, and by what means he has tried to solve it: to do this as completely as possible is the aim of the ensuing lines. In order, however, to take the necessary survey where the vastness of the subject almost precludes its being surveyed, it is advisable to arrange it under particular rubrics; and therefore in what follows we shall treat, (1) of the idea and elements of Latin Lexicography, (2) of the compass of the present dictionary, (3) of the method of handling the several articles, (4) of the arrangement of the articles, (5) of the signs and technical terms employed in the work, and (6) of the aids in composing it.

I. Of the idea and elements of Latin Lexicography.

§ 1. If Lexicography in general is that science whose task it is to set forth the nature of every single word of a language through all the periods of its existence, it is the task of Latin lexicography in particular to set forth the nature of every single word of the Latin language, as it makes itself known in all the periods of the existence of that language; or more succinctly expressed, it is the object of Latin lexicography to give the history of every single word of the Latin language. It is, therefore, a purely objective science, and although by its aid the understanding of works written in Latin is promoted, still it does not acknowledge this to be its end, but like every objective science it is its own end.

§ 2. The history of a word consists in unfolding its outer nature, that is, its form, class, syntactical connections and the like, together with its inner nature or meaning. But since in Latin, just as in all cultivated languages, every word has not a particular form peculiar to itself, but belongs to a distinct class of words, whose forms it adopts; and since the doctrine of the forms of classes of words and their alterations is the subject matter of grammar, it is not required of lexicography to make known all the forms of each particular word in its various relations and connections; on the contrary, it needs merely to designate the class to which a word belongs, and only then when a word has assumed a form peculiar to itself to mark this as an exception. When the lexicographer adds *ae* to the word *mensa*, this is nothing but a convenient abbreviation which grammar renders intelligible to all, and by means of which the enumeration of all the inflections of this word becomes unnecessary. On the other hand, as the form *capis* of the word *capio* deviates from the regular form of

kindred words, the lexicon must necessarily give notice of that fact, because otherwise the external history of the word *capio* will be incomplete. This is the *grammatical element of lexicography*.

‡ 3. The greatest number of words in Latin, as in every cultivated language, is derived from others termed radical or ground-words. It is the duty, therefore, of the external history of words, in the case of every word which is not underived, to indicate the root from which it springs. This is the *etymological element of lexicography*.

‡ 4. The internal history of a word consists, as has been mentioned, in the exhibition of its meaning. This is the *exegetical element of lexicography*. Inasmuch as every word has its own distinct and peculiar meaning, to make this known is the peculiar and distinct province of lexicography, and grammar invades the field of its sister science, whenever, besides giving an account of the forms and connections of classes of words, she treats also of the meanings of single words, which exert no influence upon their grammatical relations,—a mode of proceeding which many Latin grammars adopt in regard to the meanings of the pronouns, prepositions and conjunctions.

‡ 5. In Latin, as in other languages, many words have in their meanings so much resemblance to one another, that a superficial examination can hardly distinguish them. It is the duty, therefore, of the internal history of words to hold up the meaning of such words over against one another; to compare and to distinguish them. This is the *synonymous element of lexicography*.

‡ 6. Only a very few words, forms of words and meanings were alike in use through all the periods of the life of the Latin language; most of them had a much shorter duration; many did not even outlive a single period. The history of a word there—as far as extant materials allow—must let us know to what time a word, a form or a meaning belongs. This I name the *special-historical, or chronological element of lexicography*.

‡ 7. In like manner, there are but a few words of the Latin language—and those containing the most general notions—which were equally in use in all kinds of style. The history of words, therefore, must inform us to what kind of composition a word, a form or a meaning belongs; whether to prose or poetry, to the higher prose of the orator, or the lower of the people, or to the language of art, as a technical term of religion, of oeconomy, of rhetoric, of philosophy, and so on. I call this the *rhetorical element of lexicography*.

‡ 8. Finally, the Latin, like every polished dialect, has certain favorite words which it willingly and often uses ; and again a number of words, of which it makes use but seldom, or perhaps only once. It is incumbent then on the historian of words, under each word to notice its frequent or rare occurrence. I name this the *statistical element of lexicography*.

II. *Of the extent of the present Lexicon.*

‡ 1. As Latin lexicography has to do with the history of all the words of the Latin language, and as the number of words in this language varies according as we consider it to be in a narrower sense the dialect of the Romans, or in a wider sense, that both of the Romans and of the learned afterwards, in the middle ages, it becomes necessary to say, in which of these spheres the present lexicon has chosen to move. We confine ourselves, then, to Latin as the national language of the Romans, and accordingly give the history of all those words which occur in the written remains of the Romans, from the earliest times to the fall of the West-Roman empire. Within this period, the work of every Latin writer, whether he was a born Roman or not, a heathen or a Christian, will be held to belong to the Latin literature, and will receive attention in proportion as the modes of expression current in it have any peculiar bearing upon the history of words.

‡ 2. But in the materials furnished by the writings of the ancient Romans to the lexicographer, a separation of the greatest importance for the trustworthiness of the history of words must be made between such as lie before our eyes in the extant works of the Latin classics, and those of whose existence at one time we are informed by the old grammarians and lexicographers. In the case of the former, our own inspection, our own judgment is allowed to us ; the others we must take on credit and authority. We have, therefore, in the present work represented to the eye by capitals, those words and forms, for the knowledge of which we are indebted only to old grammarians and glossators ; and which are, as it were, the isolated remains of an ancient world of words. For example :

“ABAMBULANTES abscedentes.” Festus, p. 22.

Apollo,-inis (earlier APELLO, as hemo for homo. Festus, p. 19.

‡ 3. The case is the same with words and forms found only in inscriptions, since for the most part we know neither the person

making use of them, nor the time when they were used. These also are, therefore, designated by capital letters. For example,

ARCHIBVCVLVS. (BVCOL.) -i, *m*, an upper priest of Bacchus. Inscr. Orell. No. 2235, 2351, 2352. [*ἀρχι-βουκόλος*.]

Apollo, -inis, (. . . APOLONES = Apollini, in a very old inscription, VICESIMA PARTI APOLONES. DEDERI i. e. vicesimam partem Apollini dedere. Inscr. Orell. No. 1433, etc.).

§ 4. The limits of the lexicon, again, are to be determined not merely with respect to time, but also with respect to the origin of the words which it contains. The Latin language, as is well known, like that of every nation which has had intercourse with other nations, has not kept itself free from foreign words. The question now arises whether Latin lexicography ought to embrace words adopted into Latin from other languages, or whether it should confine itself to its own unmixed stores. The latter procedure we have seen used in German; so that peculiar dictionaries have been composed for words borrowed from abroad. Is this advisable also for the Latin? It is right that the decision here should not rest upon considerations of convenience, and of what is customary; but simply and solely upon the more or less scientific character of the two courses. The adoption of a foreign word into a language, assumes of course the real or supposed want of a corresponding native word denoting the same idea. Now the foreign word, in taking upon itself the function of a fully synonymous but not existing native word, and in representing a peculiar notion, ceases, as far as actual use is concerned, to be foreign, although at its origin it was really such. But the duty of general Latin lexicography, with which we are alone concerned, unlike that of special etymological lexicography, requires it to give the sum total of Latin words, considered as conveying the notions of persons speaking this language, and not considered as indigenous expressions of ideas; whence it follows, that a place on the list of Latin words cannot be refused to such as are borrowed from foreign tongues and by means of written Latin characters had full citizenship conceded to them.

§ 5. On the other hand, from the circumstance that one language needs to borrow from another, arises the necessity of making a distinction between those words which a nation finds in its own language adequate to the expression of its thoughts, and those which it is forced to invite out of foreign parts. This distinction is made in the present work by crosses prefixed to all words which originally were not of the Latin stock. In doing

this the author has deemed the following discriminations to be important.

A. *Words borrowed from the Greek.* And as such we understand only those which passed over, after the Latin had separated itself etymologically from its sister language, and had taken an independent place. For those which, on account of the relationship of the two dialects, have the same or a similar sound, ought not to be regarded as the property of the Greek but as the common possession of both languages. Hence in this dictionary, *ab, alius, ager, ago, fero*, etc. are represented as only etymologically allied with ἀπό, ἄλλος, ἀγρός, ἄγω, φέρω, etc.; but *aegoceros, aliptes, blitum, ceruchi, chelys*, etc. as borrowed from the Greek. But of this latter class a number of words have become mongrels, or in grammatical phrase *voces hibridae*, through a purely Latin termination, or through composition with a purely Latin word; for this reason a discrimination is necessary, which is effected in the lexicon, in the case of Greek words unchanged in form, or no more essentially varied than with *vs* put for *os*, *a* for *η* or *ης*, etc., by prefixing a † to them, and placing the sign = before the original word printed in Greek letters. Hybrid forms, on the contrary, while they retain the † are denoted by [] including the original word. For example:

† aenigma, -atis, *n.* = αἴνιγμα, etc.

† aliptes or alipta, -ae, *m.* = ἀλείπτῃς, etc.

† apologatio, -onis, *f.* [from ἀπόλογος, with the Lat. ending -atio.]

† chamae-tortus, -a, -um, *adj.* [vox hibrida from χαμαί and tortus.]

Remark 1. The attention paid to Greek literature among the Romans, from the Augustan age onward, led to the use, in the Latin written style, of a considerable number of Greek terms of art, sometimes in Greek and sometimes in Latin characters. - It is clear that lexicography can take notices only of those words of this sort, which are written in Latin letters. Now it is known that later transcribers gave a Latin dress to many words in the classics which were at first written in Greek, and hence in different editions of the classics, according to the manuscripts which are followed, the same word now appears in the letters of the one language and now of the other. Such cases bring the lexicographer into perplexity, and he finds the difficulty of having one consistent rule the greater, owing to the fact that in all probability some writers had no one rule of their own, just as we Germans, in spite of the many and earnest remonstrances of purists, have not yet ceased to write foreign terms of art at one time in German

and at another in Latin letters. Thus in Celsus (5, 28. No. 2), *cacoethes* appears by the side of *καχώθες* (ib. *bis*), whilst in editions of Pliny, even the Greek plural *καχώθη* is never written otherwise than in Latin characters; and indeed in the manuscripts and editions of this latter author the practice of using Roman letters prevails even in cases where the annexed words, "Graece vocant," render the Latin use of the word doubtful. And in like manner we find in Quintilian, who generally writes Greek technical terms in Greek letters, *κακοζήλον* (8. 3, 56) and *κακοζήλια* (8. 6, 73), but *cacozelia* (2. 3, 9). Modern editors of Latin authors seem to follow the rule that in the earlier writers except Pliny, as Cicero, Varro, Quintilian, Celsus, Donatus, etc. Greek letters are to be preferred; but Latin, on the contrary, in such as Servius, Priscian, Isidore, and the like; and in truth this is a convenient principle in a subject so fluctuating as this, and so important for the criticism of the text. But whether it will guide us safely in every case, and even against the authority of the best manuscripts, has as yet not been decided, and needs to be put to a careful proof.

Remark 2. When the lexicographer refers latinized words to their Greek source, he not unfrequently meets with Greek words which are sought for in vain in collections of extant Greek words, owing probably to their not being preserved in the extant literature of that language. The precious stone *Borsycites*, for example, mentioned by Pliny, (37, 11, 73) as all will admit, is of Greek extraction; but where is the corresponding original word to be found? The case is the same with *botryitis*, *botryon*, *brabyia*, (*ae.*) *brya*, *brochon*, *bucardia*, *cacsapon*, *cachla*, *catastema*, together with many others; and here rich gleanings for Greek lexicography may be expected. In the present dictionary, such not extant Greek words are only then supposed, when there is no serious doubt concerning the way of writing them. On the other hand, words like *brochon* must remain without the original word, and are indicated to be of Greek origin only by a cross.

B. *Words borrowed from other languages*: the Celtic, Gallic, Iberian, Hebrew, Persian, etc. To these, two crosses are prefixed: for the most part it cannot be said what was the form or the way of writing the original word; and therefore our usual rule in such cases is to annex in brackets merely the language from which the foreign word is borrowed. For example:

†† *caudosoccus*, -i, *m.* [Gallic word], etc.

†† *ballux* (*bal.*), -ucis, *f.* [Spanish word], etc.

†† bascauda, -ae, *f.* [British word], etc.

†† Bagous, -i, and Bagoas, -ae, *m.* *Βαγῶς* and *Βαγῶας* [Persian word], etc.

But, on the contrary,

†† burdo, -onis, *m.* = בִּרְדָּא

†† camelus, -i, *m.* κάμηλος = כַּמֶּלֶךְ

‡ 6. Foreign names which have been carried over together with foreign historical data into the Latin literature, although there expressed in Latin letters, yet properly cannot be held to be incorporated into that language, because their reception, being occasioned merely by the historical narratives where they occur, is only an external one; and in all languages, like hieroglyphics, they must preserve the same form. Yet so far as such words are (so to speak) the carriers of knowledge derived by the Romans from abroad, they ought not, as we have seen above, to be shut out from Latin lexicography. Only the etymological element has no claim upon them, and therefore their original words are immediately annexed without any sign. As for example:

Aeolus, -i, *m.* Αἰόλος, (1) the god of the winds, etc.

Aaron, *m.* אַהֲרֹן, brother of Moses, etc.

Remark. From what was just now said it follows, that the Latin lexicography of such foreign names must look only at the relations given by Latin authors, even when these accounts are at open variance with those of original authors, as is, for instance, frequently the case in the departments of mythology, geography, and history. Compare Aeaea, Calypso, etc.

III. *Of the Method of handling the several Articles.*

‡ 1. Every article of a Latin lexicon forms a monography of that Latin word to which it is devoted; and therefore according to I. ‡ 2, it must trace the history of the inner and outer nature of that word through the whole period of its existence in the Latin language. Now according to I. §§ 2—8, whatever appertains to such a history may be reduced to seven elements; we have therefore to show, in this place, how the present lexicon, in giving the history of each single article, has had respect to each of these elements.

A.) *Grammatical element.* In conformity with the limits drawn above (I. ‡ 2), an account as complete as possible of extant anomalies has been inserted in a parenthesis to accompany what is said of the grammatical formation, construction, etc. For example, *capiō, cepi, captum*, 3. (antiquated form of the exact future *capso*),

Plaut. Bacch. 4. 4, 61. *capsit*, id. Pseud. 4. 3, 6; Attius in Nonius Marcell. 483, 12; comp. Festus, p. 44. *capsimus*, Plaut. Rud. 2, 1, 15. CAPSIS, according to Cic. Or. 45, 154, erroneously taken by him to be contracted out of *cape si bis*; comp. Quintil. Inst. 1, 5, 66 Spalding. — Old way of writing the perf. CEPET = *cepi* as, EXEMET, DEDET, etc.; Columna Rostrata.), etc.

Arbor, -oris (poetic secondary form, *arbos*, like *labos*, *colos*, *honos*, etc. Lucret. 1, 774; 6, 787, etc. Also the accus. ARBOSEM, Fest. p. 13. Comp. Schneider, Gram. etc.)

Avis, -is, *f.* (abl. sing. both *avi* and *ave*; comp. Varro, de Ling. Lat. 8, 37, 120; Priscian, p. 765 Putsch, Rhemn. Palaem.* p. 1374. 16; Schneid. Gram. 2. 227, in the religious use more frequently *avi* . . .; but in Varro L. L. 7. 5. 99 *ave* is a gloss. See Spengel on the passage), etc.

Ad, praep. with the accus. (on account of the hard pronunciation of *d* sometimes written *at*. See *at*. Old form *ar*, as in *arveho*, arbiter, for *adveho*, *adbiter* from *arbitere* = *adbitere*. So *ar me advenias*, Plaut. Truc. 2, 2, 17. and in inscriptions *arfuerunt*, *arfuisse*. Comp. Prisc. p. 699. Putsch, etc.), and so on. Here the difficulty not uncommonly presents itself that a word which must be taken as the basis of an article, occurs in several forms. In such cases prevalent usage alone can decide, and accordingly many words have another ground-form given to them [in the present work] than they have hitherto had in the lexicons. Thus, for example, more and better authorities are found for the neuter form *baculum*, -i, than for the received masculine *baculus*; which requires us to shape the article in the lexicon as follows:

Baculum, -i, *n.* (*baculus*, -i, *m.* very seldom), etc.

In like manner *biga*, the singular, which came into vogue after the Augustan age, has been put behind the plural form, *bigae*; and so in many other cases.

Often, too, linguistic analogy is brought into conflict with historical dates. Here, in obedience to the excellent remarks in the eighth book of Varro's *Lingua Latina*, the historical takes precedence; because it is the duty of the author of monographs to insert only real matters of fact into his sketches. For this reason it is, that no adjective, *bicorniger*, -era, -erum,—which nowhere occurs—has been admitted into the lexicon, but only *Bicorniger*, -eri, *n.* [a title of Bacchus.] And if hereafter a catalogue of extant supines shall be made with critical accuracy, a lexicon will be

* Q. Rhemnius Fannius Palaemon, a grammarian who flourished under Claudius.—TR.

obliged to separate all such forms known to exist, from merely hypothetical ones.

B. *Etymological element.* This has a very easy and an extremely difficult side. To tell whence words like *accipio*, *concipio*, *excipio*, etc. come—what can be easier? But scientific etymology seeks also to discover the origin of words like *capio* itself; and this, as is well known, is the problem, to the solution of which a body of the ablest linguists in our days have devoted all their energies and their acuteness; which many believe themselves to have solved, whilst others deride it as the arena for the useless play of empty combinations. Hazardous as it still is, in the violent contest of two parties to try to keep a strict neutrality, yet the author of the present lexicon, who can neither speak insincerely against his convictions, nor meanly avoid declaring his opinion where it is looked for, feels obliged here openly to avow that he can share neither in the sweet faith of the former party, nor in the cold contempt of the latter. He cherishes firm trust in the amazing power of the human mind to penetrate even into the secret laboratory where words were formed, seeing it has succeeded in unveiling the mystery of the formation of worlds. He follows, therefore, the progress of these zealous efforts in every line [which they indite] with love and with a joyous feeling of high and simple delight; and refuses not to bestow upon the unwearied investigators this strengthening hope, that they are but a small remove from the very topmost point toward which they aspire. But he cannot suppress his apprehension that what seemed, when seen from afar the summit, will prove but the boundary line of a lower region, beyond which new chains of mountains tower in their vastness to the heavens; and for this reason he is afraid as yet to join in the triumphal jubilee. Indeed the question of the origin of the Latin language is beginning at this moment to be far more involved than many are willing to believe: Germanism is opposing the Sanscrit with powerful weapons, and urges its claims to be the origin of Latin. The author feels, therefore, that he would be called over hasty if he allowed the Sanscrit or the German element to have the predominance in his work.

There is, however, a mode of treating etymology in a lexicon, which leaves the controversy just mentioned out of sight, and yet does justice to the demand of the higher comparison of languages. We see this pursued by Gesenius in the Latin revision of his excellent Hebrew lexicon; where, for instance, it is said under *קָדַר* " (1) *ferre* (Praeter veterum Semitarum linguam haec radix late

regnat in linguis Indogerm.; v. Sanscr. *bhri* ferre; pers. *bār* onus; Armen. *bier-il* ferre; Gr. *φέρω, βάρος, βαρὺς*; Lat. *fero, porto*; Goth. *bair-an*; Angl. to *bear*, trans. to *burden*; Germ. ant. *bären*, etc.)” In this way, the question whether *fero* is derived immediately from *bhri* or from *bären* can be omitted altogether in a Latin dictionary, and yet under the article *fero* the connection be made known between this word and roots in cognate languages. But after all I cannot decide to travel this road, which previous labors have already rendered quite smooth and level. For in my opinion, such a comparative method passes beyond the bounds of a lexicon designed for a single language, and belongs exclusively and solely to comparative or universal lexicography. For, if every special lexicon is to institute this comparison of roots, the same parenthesis which is attached to the Hebrew root *כָּרַח* must be repeated in the Greek, Latin, Gothic, English or German lexicon; so that all that is peculiar to the single lexicon will be taken away. Just as little as we would expect of the Latin grammar to place the Sanscrit *asmi* by the side of *semi*, or the Gothic and old high German declensions by the side of the Latin, notwithstanding the insight into the grammatical structure would be helped in this way; just so little, in my judgment, ought it to be made the duty of the Latin lexicon to accompany every Latin word with all the equivalent words in other languages that can be collected together. The very interesting nature of such combinations, and the novelty of the truly wonderful discoveries to which they have led, seem in this matter to have produced in many a want of due regard for the laws of scientific and well defined lexicography; so that the strong impression of the *special* threatens almost wholly to disappear under the influence of such generalizations. To this very swallowing up of the special by the general, is it no doubt to be ascribed, that the soil itself, where the Latin reached its bloom, has been hitherto so little explored; although this soil acted powerfully upon the earliest condition of the foreign plant, and in many cases altered it so that it can no longer be recognized. Besides, many of the modern etymologists start in their comparisons with the form which a Latin word had at the Ciceronian period: the smaller number, who like a more rational course, go back to the times of Ennius and Pacuvius; having recourse likewise, perhaps, to the oldest forms of many words preserved by the grammarians. But even to hold these oldest forms to be the original ones, as they existed at the separation of the Latin from its parent stock, will, I think, be a hazardous position, till it

can be shown, that the Latin remained so unaltered from that epoch of separation down to the time to which appertain single forms yet extant,—that is, through at least five hundred years,—that the original forms are adequately represented to us by these yet extant ones. This difficulty, and many like it, (among which that of finding the laws for the union and change of sounds in Latin, is, in truth, not the least,) must be set aside, before the materials used in instituting the comparative process shall be well enough fitted for that purpose.

C. Exegetical element. This, as being the main element of lexicography (comp. I § 4), must meet with especial attention. But as the exhibition of the meanings of a word must take various shapes according to the nature of the word itself, it is impossible to develop, to their whole extent, the fundamental principles of this branch: the single articles must testify for themselves. A few words, therefore, relating to the chief rules which have served to guide us, must suffice.

First of all it has been laid down as a settled principle, that among several significations of a word, that which is obtained by its etymology may be assumed as the original one. Simple and obvious as this maxim is, it has nevertheless been followed with little strictness in Latin lexicons hitherto. And this is owing to two causes. In the first place, they have usually had the pedagogical object in view of facilitating the study of the classics; and they therefore gave precedence to the most current significations which are rarely the earliest. In the second place, because, for the most part, they had to do only with the usages of speech in the most read, and best known classics, they have paid almost no attention to the oldest fragments of the Latin tongue; to the *Leges Regiae*, the fragments of the twelve tables, the remains of Ennius, Pacuvius, Cato, and so on down to those of Attius and Sisenna; and extremely little to the latinity of Plautus, Terence, Lucretius and Varro; and for this reason just those passages lay out of their sight in which most of the words still preserved their primitive sense. The more to be regretted this fault was, the more earnestly has the author striven to furnish a cure for it. He therefore made it his first aim to introduce into the circle of lexical materials all the critically certain remains of old latinity from the *Leges Regiae*, the fragments of the twelve tables, and the broken inscriptions on the *Columna rostrata* down to Lucretius and Varro; and to assign to these, as the oldest, the first place in the lexicon. In this way three advantages are gain-

ed. In the first place, the history of words has thus its earliest period removed backwards; then many words disclose their primitive meaning by this process; and thirdly, many peculiarities of the later style are here recognized in their nascent state, so that what formerly was regarded as innovation on the part of Virgil or Ovid, now appears to be only borrowed from Ennius, Naevius or Lucretius.

It happens, however, not unfrequently in Latin lexicography, that no examples are extant of that signification which etymology shows to be the primitive one. In such a case this meaning, being indispensable for the etymological understanding of the others, is put down indeed, but it is expressly distinguished from the others by another mode of printing, as not known to have been in actual use.

The second principle laid down, and one about the correctness of which there exists no doubt, is that in the order of meanings the proper meaning, as the original one, must precede the tropical as being derived. But besides this, it has been deemed necessary to bring subdivisions into the notion of the tropical; which in its wide extent seemed not fitted to draw a line between significations with sufficient clearness. An example will make this obvious. The substantive *arena* changes its sense in the four following passages: (1) *Magnus congestus arenæ*, Lucr. 6, 724. (2) *Missum in arenam aprum jaculis desuper petiit*, Suet. Tib. 72. (3) *Vectio Prisco, quantum plurimum potuero, præstabo, præsertim in arena mea, hoc est, apud Centumviros*, Plin. Ep. 6, 12, 2. (4) *Quid facies, Oenone? Quid arenæ semina mandas?* Ov. Her. 5, 115. In the first passage it is *actual sand*, in the second the *amphitheatre*, in the third *the sphere of one's calling*, in the fourth a proverbial expression for something *unfruitful*, etc. If we should divide the meanings between the literal and tropical, as these terms have been hitherto applied in the lexicons, we should have one literal and three tropical meanings, somewhat as follows: (1) lit. sand. (2) trop., (a) the amphitheatre; (b) the sphere of one's calling; (c) proverb. for something unfruitful. But in the first place the meaning, sphere of one's calling or place of contest, is obviously borrowed from that of the amphitheatre, and therefore not coördinate with it but subordinate and consequently forming a trope within a trope; and in the second place, the derived notion *amphitheatre*, has quite another relation to the simple one *sand*, from that of one's *sphere* to *amphitheatre*. In the former case, the general notion *sand* is individualized into a defi-

nite sandy place or sand-path, etc., but not taken out of the class of concretes; whilst in the latter the concrete notion of *amphitheatre* is spiritualized into the abstract notion of a place of contest, or exercise, sphere of avocations, etc.

This last distinction between individualizing a general notion, and spiritualizing a physical, seemed of too much weight to the author to be left out of sight in the exegetical management of the articles in the dictionary; and he has, therefore, given to the signification arising in the former way the name of metonymic; to the latter that of tropical. In this way the first three senses of *arena* take the following order: (1) lit. sand; (2) metonym. the place of contest in the amphitheatre bestrewed with sand. Therefore (b) tropic. every place of contest, place of exhibiting any kind of activity, place of exercise, etc. And so, for example, *arbor = navis* is a metonymy while *calor = amor* is a trope; because in the former the physical meaning is only individualized, while in the latter it passes into an abstract and spiritual one. In the case of *arena* it still remains to specify the place which its proverbial use should occupy in a lexical arrangement of meanings. My opinion is that, in judging of proverbial expressions, lexicography and rhetoric must follow different rules. The latter of these arts, as it weighs the sense of the whole expression, can only class such forms of speech with those which are tropical and not literal. Lexicography, on the other hand, which has to do, not with the sense of a whole expression, but only with that of a single word, finds nothing in the word used proverbially, which removes it from the sphere of the literal. Thus, to adhere to the example given above, the word *arena* in the proverbial phrase—*arenae semina mandare*—has received no signification originally foreign, such as it contains in the words, *Vectio Prisco praestabo in arena mea*. These two words cannot denote *my sand*; but *arenae semina mandere*, means always to commit seed to the sand. It must remain, as has been said, an indifferent thing for the judgment passed by the lexicon on the word *arena*, if the whole thought, through its application to something not of the nature of husbandry, has received an unliteral sense. For this reason, in the present lexicon, the proverbial is arranged not under the tropical but under the literal sense.

It seemed necessary, moreover, if the various derived meanings were to be characterized, to specify the auxiliary notions, through the accession of which to the original meanings, these derived significations arose. This side of exegetical lexicography

deserves the greater attention, since without it the changeful play of meanings back and forth must often remain an enigmatical occurrence. We have, therefore, specially noticed the departments of the subjective and objective, general and special, of space, time and number, of purpose, of definite aim, of a pregnant and a hostile sense, etc., whenever they modify the original meaning of the word; and if the genetic connection between the original and the modified sense was not quite obvious, we have made it clear by pointing out the intermediate notion, which formed their bond of union. Sometimes, also, it seemed of use for taking a view of the ramified meanings of a word, to give a summary and condensed statement of the principal ones at the beginning of the article, and to treat the rest as the special part of the explanation. This has been done particularly in the case of the particles, whose meanings are so very numerous. As regards the interpretation, strictly so called, of the Latin word in its various divisions and subdivisions, the aim has been to represent the notion in the original, by expressions completely answering to it and making it known in all its parts. This very endeavor has often made it necessary to transgress the usual law of lexicography, by which every Latin word must be turned into a German one. I am afraid that this law is not so much dictated by scientific lexicography, as by the pedagogical apprehension, that the scholar will be brought into perplexities by the want of a single correspondent term. Every linguist knows that, besides the general notions which are common to all nations, such as father, mother, brother and the like, there are but few words which in all languages move in just the same sphere. The locality, the public and domestic life, the state of scientific refinement, the religion and many similar causes attach notions to words, which are often entirely wanting to those, by which they are commonly translated in other languages; while these latter words again fill another circle, from which the former are far removed. He, therefore, who is sparing of his words in the translations of the lexicon, runs the risk of expressing a thought of his own, instead of the foreign notion which he wishes to reproduce. The word *canere*, for instance, is translated in the lexicons by *singen* [to sing], and the scholar has certainly thus obtained a word to which he can adhere in reading Latin. But our *singen* by no means exhausts the senses of the Latin *canere*. For the Roman *frogs* were as little used to *singing* as German ones; the Roman *tibia* no more sung than our *flute*. The signal for retreat was as little sung in the Roman army as

in our own ; and yet in all these cases *canere* is used by the Romans. What good then does even the pupil get from his definition *singen*? not to say that the scientific endeavor to comprehend the notion which the Romans united with their word in this way comes to nought. In translating the Latin particles, an interpreter who is sparing of his words, can at the best produce scarcely the most remote perception of their meaning in the mind of his reader. Hence while I have, as in duty bound, avoided accumulating useless explanations in the German part of the articles of the lexicon, I have, notwithstanding, not scrupled to sacrifice brevity to clearness and intelligibleness where a single German word failed of exhausting the sense of the Latin. The same wish to give the notion of the Latin words exegetically in their full comprehension, has been the reason why those articles which are concerned with Roman antiquities,—taking this term in its widest sense, and including art also,—have more space devoted to them than has been customary hitherto. That I have embraced art within this range will not be disapproved of by those who are really acquainted with the ancient classics. In regard to passages cited from Latin authors, as supports of the definitions, the principle has been, in the first place, to arrange them,—with the exception of the *locus classicus*, which ought to be put first,—in the order of age, that the imitations in later authors may clearly appear to be such ; in the second place, in the case of prose words and meanings, to arrange proof-passages from the poets behind those from prose-writers ; but in the case of purely poetic words and significations to take the opposite course ; in the third place, to abstain as far as possible from quoting writings decidedly not genuine ;—among which, however, I by no means reckon the fourth oration against Catiline, and the Orator of Tacitus ; but if it was necessary to make citations from them, to assign to such passages the very last place.

In order to make more clear the origin of many significations, the author has thought it best to compare the usage in other languages. It is evident of itself that on account of the great influence of the Greek upon the Roman literature, the usages of that language ought to be brought into the comparison, wherever they had influence ; indeed in many cases even whole passages out of Greek authors might be named, from which the corresponding Latin ones are either literal translations, or at least borrowed as it regards the thought. The German language also, the French and the English, have been called upon for aid, when they furnished

the desired analogies. But although all these languages supply materials in sufficient quantity for such comparisons, yet by their means, the Lexicographer can only make it appear, that the nations which sustained literary relations with the Romans had the same usages of speech, and followed the same analogies; and by this process those usages of speech are not thoroughly explained as to their origin. For if, for example, we point to the English word *city* in illustrating the use of the Latin *civitas* for *urbs*, we do not show that any other people has developed in the same way as the Romans, the notion of a city as a *place* from that of a *community*, because the English *city* is only a repetition of the Latin *civitas*. We need therefore for our lexical comparisons, besides those languages which are of the same stock with the Latin, another also which had no connection with it either etymological or literary; in order that, if we discover the same analogies in both, the process manifested in unfolding the same notion and in assigning to it similar relations may appear to belong to the human mind generally, and not to be restricted to a definite class of languages. For this purpose no language, lying so near the usual circle of studies, as the Hebrew, offered itself. And accordingly the author has always made use of it, where it afforded the desired analogies; for example, in the case of *Calendæ*, as the Roman *proclamation-day*, of the Hebrew קָרָא בְּקָרָא; in that of the phrase *in capita* (for every man) of the Hebrew לְכָל־שִׁלְלָה (for every scull); in that of the syntactic connection of the verb *cavere*, of the construction of the Hebrew הִשָּׁמֵר, which is perfectly similar, even down to the unusual *cavere cum aliquo*. Sometimes even the right explanation of expressions hitherto misunderstood, resulted from this comparison; for example, *bidens* can no longer be allowed to mean a sacrificial victim with two long front teeth,¹ but one which has two entire rows of teeth; for which the parallel is found in the Hebrew שְׁנֵי־שָׁנִים, dual of שֵׁן tooth, [denoting the two rows of teeth].—Moreover, the Hebrew stands as near to the Latin as the Greek, though on another side, I mean in relation to the Latinity of the fathers. In this regard, it was no less a duty to bring the Hebrew into comparison, than the Greek in regard to the Latinity of Ennius and Pacuvius; for not unfrequently the meanings of words in patristic Latin are complete copies of Hebrew words. Compare *bene dicere* = בָּרַךְ, (Lexicon, benedico, No. 2.) Even traces of rabbinical idjotisms are not wanting. Com-

¹ The author has the support of Festus for this explanation, besides that of the Hebrew analogy.

pare *cidaris* as the high-priest's head-dress with the rabbin. כִּדְרִית, etc.

D. *Synonymous Element*. Here far less can be brought under particular rules than in the exegetical part. The aim has been to make known clearly and intelligibly the points in which notions connected together on the one side differ on the other; and if the ancients have made just discriminations in this respect,—as is well known to be the case in the philosophical and rhetorical works of Cicero, and with special frequency in the *Tusculan Questions* and the work *De Inventione*—these, as *loci classici*, have been added to the German explanation of the author. In many instances, however, the synonymous connection of one word with others is attributable to the usual vague mode of turning it into German; and has disappeared before the precise and full explanation of the *one* notion which we have assigned to the word. (Comp. what was said under the last head). Often, also, it appeared by means of the special historical element of lexicography, (comp. E.) that the distinction between two words of kindred sense is a purely historical one; that the one word was used alone at one period, and the other at another, to mark the same idea. In such cases we have noticed this fact, instead of drawing distinctions between synonyms.

E. *Special-historical or Chronological Element*. According to I. § 6, the space of time must be made known, within which a word or a signification was in use. In general this is manifest by examples from the classics, without further remark; but the exegetical element makes it necessary to distribute these examples under the various meanings; and hence passages chronologically connected must not unfrequently be disjoined from one another. Hence it happens that it becomes difficult to take a chronological survey of the article; and important to insert a short notice for this special end. With this object in view, we have arranged the body of Latin writings *first* into the following main periods. 1. Ante-classical, from the oldest fragments to Lucretius and Varro. 2. Classical, from Cicero and Caesar to Tacitus, Suetonius, and the younger Pliny inclusive. 3. Post-classical, from that time to the fifth century of our era. The classical Latinity again is divided into (a) Ciceronian, (b) Augustan, (c) post-Augustan. The post-classical Latinity, however, notwithstanding the length of its age, has not been subdivided into periods determined by the progress of decay. Only in order to repair this deficiency in some degree we have given the title of Late Latin to the language of

the fourth and fifth centuries, as contrasted with the less irregular and barbarous post-classical style, taken in a narrower sense. According to these divisions, every word, and if different meanings of a word belong to different ages, each single meaning has appended to it either the general remark—in *all periods*—or the special,—*ante-classical—Ciceronian—Augustan—post-Augustan—post-classical—late-Latin*;—and as it very often happens that words and significations current through one age, have sunk into disuse in the next, and then at the end of this period have come back into life, (comp. Hor. A. P. 60 seq., 70 seq.), it is hence readily understood, why we have also made such remarks as *ante* and *post-classical—ante-classical* and *post-Augustan*—and the like.

In order, however, to determine with accuracy the life-time of a word or meaning, it is necessary to say whether a writer uses it of himself, or whether it belongs to an earlier author. There are frequent mistakes in the best lexicons as it regards this point. That which Cicero quotes in his writings from the old poems of Ennius, Pacuvius, Attius, etc. (and all know that the number of these quotations is quite considerable)—that also which is found among Cicero's letters, from the pens of Caelius, Plancus, Brutus and Cassius, Pompey and others,—all this has been ascribed to Cicero himself; and ascribed too sometimes, even when Cicero in the passage where the word occurs, brands the expression as bad and unusual. For example, *bimaritus* passes for a Ciceronian word, although in the place of his writings where it is found, (pro Planc. 12, 30) he says to Laterensis, the accuser of Plancus, "Jacis adulteria, quae nemo, non modo nomine, sed ne suspitione quidem, possit agnoscere: bimaritum appellas, ut verba etiam fingas, non solum crimina." The author has taken pains to assign the true originator in every case; and where his name is not known at least, to describe him in general as "Auct. apud," etc. "old poet cited by," etc.

Sometimes it is impossible to decide whether a passage, placed by one writer to the account of another, is actually in the words of the latter or merely represents his thought. Take for examples the words ascribed by Cicero, in his orations to the opposite party; the discussions of learned men in Gallius, and the numerous statements of suits at law in Quintilian, etc. In such cases it has been thought advisable to impute to the author himself the words cited by him.

F. *Rhetorical element.* The specification of the kind of composition ought not, any more than the preceding element, to be left

to be gathered from the citations. We have therefore everywhere attached such remarks as *in prose and poetry—only in prose-poetical—in the poets or in the higher kinds of prose—peculiar to the comic style—or to the epistolary style*; and these appendages are omitted, only when the meaning of itself presupposes universal employment of the word in all kinds of writing.

The *termini technici*, however, deserve very especial notice. No where does the purely practical tendency of the Roman mind show itself in so clear a light, as when we look at the great number of terms of art, which are found in the best productions of Roman literature, as well in poetry as in prose. The provinces of religion, and public life, of the tribunal, of the camp, and of oeconomy, cross with their lines all the other relations of life, and carry along with them also the expressions which they employ. The technical terms, *arbiter*, *arguere*, *ascriptus*, *assignare*, *addicere*, *ad-dictus*, *asserere*, *vicem peragere*, and the like, occur in the best poets. Hence many Latin words take a circular path in the historical progress of their meanings. From common every-day life they pass over into a definite practical sphere; and after almost losing their identity by means of the secondary notions attached to them, are taken up again by common life and employed in quite other than their original import. The word *arbiter*, e.g. denotes etymologically¹ (*arbitere-adire*) an eye-witness. Together with this signification, which was in use through all periods and in all kinds of style, it obtained in the language of the law, even as early as the twelve tables, that of an *umpire*; from this legal sphere the poetry of the Augustan age adopted it in the sense of a *commander* or *master* and imparted it in this sense to the post-Augustan prose.²

If we would draw an exact line between the kinds of style, we must let it be known of a writer, who has attempted both prose and verse, from which division of his works a citation is taken. Sometimes this is told by the name of the work itself, as when we quote Cic. *Arat.* [frag. of transt. of Aratus.] Where this is not the case, the name of the author has the word *poeta* following it; as Varro *poeta*, Cicero *poeta*, Columella *poeta*.

G. *Statistic element.* It is plain that, until a Latin concordance exists, the facts relating to the rare or frequent occurrence of a word or a signification cannot be expressed by numerical signs.

¹ [ar = ad, and bitere or betere = ire, cognate with βαιρω. Comp. ἀμφο-βητέων.—TR.]

² See the genetic connection of these meanings in the lexicon under *arbiter*.

It must suffice if the remarks—*very frequent—frequent—rare—very rare*—and the like, proximately express the amount of use of a word. Only in the case of the ἀπαξ εἰρημένα, so called, it is of importance to be precise. A separate sign has therefore been chosen for them—the star, *—which is applied to mark three gradations. (1) * prefixed to an article, shows that the word so marked is only once used. (2) * prefixed to a meaning, shows that the word occurs only once in this meaning. (3) * before an author's name shows that he has used the word only once.

Those words resemble ἀπαξ εἰρημένα, which, though occurring more than once, are found in but one writer. These also should be pointed out by a peculiar sign. But the author, finding this path wholly untravelled, has been the first to pursue it; he therefore did not venture to pronounce in all cases with decided confidence, and, wherever he thought himself right, preferred to satisfy the demand upon him by the remark—*only in such an author*—leaving the rest to the future advances and extension of this difficult branch of lexicography. Like other kinds of statistics, this element in regard to words can reach a degree of certainty and credibility only by continued improvement and correction.

‡ 2. Lexicography, owing to its historic nature, only allows us to give the results, which have been obtained by the researches we have pursued; and prevents us from showing the way itself in which we have reached our conclusions. Hence our views, especially if differing from the prevailing ones, are bereft of their supports; and the mind of the reader often feels a suspicion of the correctness of what is asserted. The author of the present dictionary, therefore, in order to render an account of the path which his lexical inquiries have followed, until they reached the results given in the work itself, has sketched the plan, if God shall grant him health, after the printing of the fourth volume of the dictionary shall have been completed, of issuing, as a sequel to the lexicon and commentary upon it, a work with the title of “*Lexicalische Scholica*, [lexical scholia] a specimen of which accompanies this preface, as an appendix. But here and there, in the lexicon itself, must single positions be supported by at least a few words, because they would be unintelligible, if destitute of all explanation. See, for example, the articles *assentior*, *assuesco*, *assimulo*.¹

¹ To prevent all possible misapprehension, let me here remark, that the notice relating to *assimulo*, in Jahn's Jahrbücher, (Vol. VII. No. 2. p. 234) was borrowed in an abridged form from the present lexicon.

[The author here refers, (1) to his observations under *assentior*, where he

IV. *Of the Arrangement of the Articles.*

‡ 1. As every article of a Latin lexicon (according to No. III. ‡ 1) is the monography of a Latin word, and every word forms an independent whole, it follows that the single articles of a Latin lexicon bear no inward relation to one another, and hence that the mode of their arrangement in the dictionary, as a collection of these monographies, is purely arbitrary.

Remark. It is sometimes asserted that the articles devoted to derived words in the lexicon, ought to stand by good right under those of their roots. This error rests on a confusion of notions. It is true, indeed, that every word, which is not primitive, stands originally in connection with its primitive; and that its nature, without a knowledge of this primitive, can be but imperfectly comprehended. And hence the etymology of every derived word is given in a lexicon, just as a biography begins with telling who were the ancestors of its subject. But this connection subsists only at the origin of the word. With the moment when it forms a part of language, the bond is severed; it unfolds the nature received from the primitive in an independent way. It preserves its independent being as long as it exists, and performs its part as the sign of an idea, on the same footing with its root, not *under* but *by the side of* the root; as the independent son, in the sphere of his activity is no longer a *son*, but a *man*, like his father. The same relation which the subject-matter of the one science bears to that of the other, that same relation do these objects compared bear to one another. Hence the single articles of a lexicon, as monographies of independent words, are themselves not subject to one another, but independent.

‡ 2. It is, however, desirable, for the easier consultation of the separate articles, that they should not be thrown together without a plan, but be arranged according to some principle, which may serve as a guide in finding what we seek. Now there are a number of such principles. A lexicon may be conceived of, which

shows that the deponent or middle form was alone in use so early as Varro's time, and accounts for this fact from the meaning of the word; (2) to his defence of the construction of *assuesco* with an ablative, against some remarks of Wunder; (3) to his doctrine in regard to the spelling of *assimulo*, rather than *assimilo*, that Latin euphony required *u* and *i*, when on the two sides of *l*, to take the forms *ilis* or *ulus*. The few exceptions, *mutilus*, *nubilus*, *pumilus*, *rutilus*, are, he thinks, owing to the first *u*. Hence difficultly, but *difficilis* from *facul-tas*, *similis* from *simul*, but *simulo*, *dis-as-simulo*.—Tr.]

shall arrange its articles according to the several parts of speech, with subordinate divisions furnished by the different changes of form and of construction. Another might classify them by the significations, as the well known vocabularies in modern grammars bring their words under separate heads, like those "relating to God and divine things," those relating to "human bodies," etc.; a third might select the national extraction of the words as its guiding principle. (See II § 4.) Nor could any objection, in a scientific respect, be brought against either of these methods; for the very reason that the classification of the words is indifferent to science, and left by it to the free choice of the lexicographer.

† 3. Among possible principles, three have for centuries been more particularly applied in practice; the *purely alphabetical*, that which is *partly alphabetical and partly genealogical*, and that which is *partly alphabetical and partly etymological*. The first places all the words after one another in an alphabetical row, determined by the initial letters of each word; the second assigns such an order to the roots, but musters derivatives and compounds behind their primitives; while the third places roots and compounds in the order of the alphabet, but bids derivatives follow their roots. The first method aims singly and alone at convenience in finding the articles. The two others sacrifice a part of this convenience to scientific objects; the genealogical, endeavoring to bring into view together the whole family-circle of Latin words; and the etymological, stopping short of this at the derivations.

As to the last named method, which is well known to be pursued in Gesner's Thesaurus, we may ask why, in bringing the articles together, we should pay such especial attention to the etymological element of lexicography, which is neither the only nor the most important one. If the objects of lexicography can be attained after sacrificing a share of convenience, then every other element has as good a claim as the etymological to give law to classification. For, acceptable as it may be to the linguist, if you take one element into view, to be able to survey all the derivatives from a word, it may be equally so, in respect to another element, to see all the deponent verbs, or all the supines, or all the nouns of the fourth declension brought together; and no less so, in relation to a third element, to have a union in the same place of all the technical terms of the language, of religion, war, or oeconomy, all purely poetical expressions, and the like. Thus the grammatical and the rhetorical modes of arrangement have as much to say for themselves as the etymological; so that an ex-

clusive regard to the latter must appear partial and one-sided. Better reasons seem to exist in favor of the genealogical method. For, as no element of lexicography can present a rival claim to it, because the genealogy of words lies quite out of that sphere, he who makes it the rule of his arrangement is not guilty of partiality, and makes amends for the inconvenience of searching for a word twice, by giving a survey of families of words,—a thing of great interest to a philologist. But here arises another question; if the genealogy of words, as we have regarded it hitherto, lies out of the circle of lexicography, why should this science arrange its materials to suit the purposes of a science foreign to it. Is the reason that this foreign science has no other field to occupy? In this very fact now lies the fault. Scientific genealogy of words is needed, but hitherto has not been formed into a separate department of the general science of language and therefore lexicography must do its duties. Now every one readily perceives that this is not the right way to satisfy the demands of science. In time there must, and will without doubt, be formed a genealogy of words which shall take its place, as a science by the side of lexicography; and which, by means of tables exhibiting the relationship of words belonging to the same family in their various degrees of descent, shall make that clear on inspection, of which only an imperfect idea can be formed by putting words together in the lexicon. The author has made for himself a number of such genealogies; and will perhaps hereafter append one or two of them, accompanied with remarks to his Scholia. The family of *CAPIO* numbers a hundred and twenty words and over. If we allow to each of these on the average one page of the dictionary,—and *capiō* alone fills four, *accipio* two, and the other compounds of the first degree, *con-ex-in-prae-sus-cipio* take up almost as much room—the whole family, when brought together, will spread itself over a space of more than a hundred and twenty pages: how can it be possible in such a case to take a survey of the family genealogy. But further; a genealogical table makes it plain at the first view, where a form has been passed over in the degrees of descent, or is wanting in the monuments of the language which have come down to us. Of the words growing out of the union of *CAPIO* with *DIS*, for example, one of the second degree *discepto* and two of the third *disceptatio* and *disceptor* are extant; but the immediate descendant in the second degree *dis-cipio* is not known to have existed. And so of the union of *CAPIO* with *AVIS*,—the word in the fourth degree *aucupatorius*

is extant, but not its progenitor in the third *aucupator*. A survey like this, the lexicon can in no way afford, because it can neither leave an empty space for the word which is lacking, nor insert that word, any more than others which do not exist, for the sake of its derivative.

‡ 3. Since, therefore, the *etymological* principle in arranging the articles of a lexicon, appeared to the author to be partial, and the *genealogical* to lie beyond the science of lexicography, he has, in his dictionary, pursued the purely alphabetical arrangement.

‡ 4. But we have had to deviate, in the following instances, from the order thus prescribed to the articles.

A. The grammatical element requires, (1) that all the secondary forms of a word should not be separately handled, but be arranged under the main form. Thus, e. g. *aevitas* under *aetas*; *balneae*, *balneum* and *balinæa* under *balneum*; *cors* and *chors* under *cohors*; *coda*, *colis*, *plastrum*, etc. under *cauda*, *caulis*, *plastrum*, etc.; and this, even when the form which deviates from the other had a peculiar meaning attached to it at single periods of the language; as *codex* under *caudex*; in which instances, moreover, the appropriate form must, as is clear of itself, accompany each separate meaning; (2) that derived adverbs should go along with their adjectives, even when the root-vowel is changed; as *bene* with *bonus*; and (3) that participles used in an adjective sense, under the appellation of participial-adjectives (in abbreviation *Pa.*), and printed in italics, should be taken up just after their verbs; whilst, on the contrary, pure participles are not specially considered.

B. The exegetical element requires that adjectives, derived from proper names, should be inserted under their primitives, and in the same article with them; because they would, for the most part, be unintelligible without the whole of the historical information which accompanies the proper names; and to repeat that information would be inadmissible.

Remark. All such words are likewise put down in the alphabetical series, and reference is there made to the place where they are treated of.

V. Of the Signs and technical Terms employed in the Lexicon.

‡ 1. This chapter treats of the methods adopted in the external getting-up of the present work. The aim has been clearness in every particular and convenient survey of the whole, even at the expense of room. In the first place, to the words heading the

articles, we have assigned, according to their different rank in the lexicon, either the ordinary Roman or capital letters, or Italics. (See II. § 2, and IV. § 4. Rem. 3.) The proper German translation, again, of the Latin word is pointed out to the eye, in order to distinguish it from the other German explanations by a larger German type [called the Schwabacher schrift]; the rule has been observed, in the longer articles with many meanings, in order that the eye may the more easily be arrested by the signs of subdivision, I. II., A. B., 1, 2, etc., to commence a paragraph with those signs whenever the article fills a whole column. It has been said already, that † denotes words of Greek origin; †† foreign words not of Greek origin; and * ἀναξ σημήνεια. (See II. § 5, A, and B. III. § 1. C.). We add that [] accompany parentheses relating to etymology, and () those of other kinds. The sign of a hand adds a notice at the close of an article; and ~ prevents the necessity of repeating the word in the article devoted to it. For example, under *abduco*: ~ *legiones*, ~ *senatum*, instead of *abducere legiones*, *abducere senatum*, etc.

Compound words at the head of an article, are divided into their parts by a hyphen; and the etymology of that part is given, which, in the composition, has not lost its original form. The alterations in prepositions, however, are not so noticed, because a full account of them is given at the close of the articles on the prepositions themselves.

In quoting Quintilian, together with the book and chapter the paragraph is referred to; but not in the case of other authors (Cicero, Sallust, Livy, etc.), unless the chapter was of too great an extent; the endeavor being always to render the consultation of the passage as easy as possible. The name of an editor placed after a citation (e. g. *Caes. B. G. 2, 3 Herz. Hor., Ep. 2, 1. 20 Schmid*), calls attention to his exegetical remarks. Quotation-marks, accompanying a passage adduced, show that it is a *locus classicus* for the statement which it supports; as are citations from Pliny, in the case of objects of natural history; citations from Varro, Columella, Palladius, etc., in matters pertaining to rural economy.

The correction of the press demands most especial care, and without such care a lexicon so extensive, and consisting of such various elements must be the prey of all conceivable misformations. This duty, the difficulty of which only persons practically acquainted with the subject can estimate, has been performed by the candidate Meinhardt, in Leipzig, with a conscientious pains-

taking, which calls for the most grateful acknowledgement. From the beginning to the end of the volume, not a single sheet has even been set up, until this gentleman had carefully revised the manuscript, communicated to the author any doubts which struck him in regard to the correctness of the copy, and had those doubts removed. If, however, notwithstanding this almost anxious carefulness, all errors of the press have not been avoided; this must find its excuse in human liability to error, from which not even the utmost vigilance can escape. What kind of shape the lexicon would have received in the hands of a less cautious corrector, the last edition of Passow's lexicon shows in a very unfortunate example.

VI. *Of the Aids in preparing the Lexicon.*

§ 1. The Latin authors themselves are naturally the surest and richest mine for the lexicon. But as it would have been utterly impossible to examine, for lexicographical purposes, all the Latin authors, from Livius Andronicus and Ennius down to Jerome and Augustin, in unbroken series, with equal thoroughness, and, so to speak, at one heat; the author has made it his first object to examine the first or ante-classical period (see III. § 1. E); and hopes, with the help of Providence, gradually to press onwards. For the Latinity of this period he had prepared six separate special-lexicons, whose contents were, (1) Earliest Latinity down to Plautus; (2) Latinity of Plautus, to the exclusion of works falsely attributed to him (see III. § 1. C.); (3) Latinity of Terence; (4) Latinity of Lucretius; (5) poetic fragments from the age of Plautus to that of Cicero; (6) Latinity of the prose-writers before Cicero (Cato—*res rustica*; Varro—*res rustica*; and Ling. Lat., Fragments.) From these special-lexicons, the most important passages (if the reading was to be relied upon) have been transferred to the pages of the present work. And in regard to the text it was necessary to use a severe judgment. Every one knows how lamentable the condition of the Fragments of the ante-classical writers, gleaned from the grammarians, yet is; and with how much unsteadiness conjectural criticism staggers about, hither and thither, on this so very slippery soil. But the lexicon needs, more than anything else, to refer to passages critically established; otherwise no sure result can be obtained, either as to the form or the sense of words; hence the author has preferred to leave a statement in the lexicon entirely without support from writers of the ante-classical period, rather than to rely upon what was, in a critical respect, suspicious.

Happily, in our days, this important part of Latin philology is beginning to draw the attention of the learned. Lindemann's *Corpus of Latin Grammarians*, who are, it is well known, the chief source for the ante-classical fragments,¹ is actively pursuing its course, so courageously begun: valuable collections, of a special kind, as Meyer's *Fragments of the Orators*, Neukirch's *Fabula Togata*, Krauser's *Fragments of the Old Historians*, are clearing up particular difficulties; and perhaps the author may have the pleasure, in future parts of this work, by the aid of Lindemann's edition of Nonius, of quoting a number of useful passages, which he must now pass by, as wholly unintelligible.

But if the Latinity of the above mentioned period demanded the greater share of attention, still the periods succeeding it received that degree of notice which the harmonious union of the whole indispensably called for. The results of many years' reading, for the purposes of lexicography, have been put together, in order to make the picture of the classical and post classical usage, if not a striking likeness, at least a resemblance to the original.

It hardly needs to be mentioned, that in using the classics, the author has adopted for his basis the existing critical editions. But as there neither is nor can be a critical edition, the correctness of whose readings may not here and there be doubted, the author has felt that he might follow his own subjective judgment; and accordingly, though he has usually adhered to one editor as giving the best text, he has, when it seemed to him necessary, gone over to the reading of another. In such cases, that edition is mentioned by name, in which the reasons for the adopted readings are unfolded.

† 2. Besides the classics, the Latin lexicons, both general and special, have been consulted, as well as those works which enter into some separate department of lexicography. The very acceptable materials, which were here found already collected, have been critically sifted and arranged in their proper places, and contribute a very great share to the completeness of the information contained in this work. On this occasion I feel constrained to mention, with sincere gratitude, a special-lexicon which is in the press while I write, and to which it gives me real pleasure to direct the attention of the learned public. This is a *Lexicon Quin-*

¹ I take this occasion to remark, that the oldest Latin monuments, such as the *Leges Regiæ*, the fragments of the Twelve Tables, the Inscriptions on the *Columna Rostrata* and on the Tombs of the Scipios, the Song of the *Fratres Arvales*, the *Senatus Consultum de Bacchanalibus*, etc., will be printed, as accompanying documents, at the end of the 4th volume.

tilianeum, composed by Prof. Edw. Bonnell of Berlin. The highly honored author has had the unusual complaisance of allowing all the proof-sheets of his very valuable work to be transmitted to me for my use. Although when the first sheets reached me, the printing of my book had already advanced to the middle of the letter B (about to the 35th sheet), yet the small inequality in the plan of my work, thereby occasioned, seemed to me to be as nothing when weighed against the important gain which would accrue from the use of so thorough a work; and accordingly from the article *bibo* onward, I transferred to my manuscript, from this lexicon, whatever seemed suitable for the more general nature of my own dictionary. Those who can estimate the high importance of Quintilian's diction, in settling the usages of speech during the post-Augustan period, will feel bound to unite with me in the heartiest thanks to the learned author for his noble disinterestedness.

Breslau, Jan. 8, 1834.

WILHELM FREUND.

[The preface is followed by three specimens of what Freund calls his "lexicalische scholia." The first is written on the words *abear*, *abeare*, *alvearium*, and shows that while the former was not used at all, the second only now and then occurs in writings of the post-Augustan period, and that the third was in good and general use. Freund also maintains that the endings *-ar* and *-are* of the same word, and alike in good use, are scarcely to be found; and yet again, that the ending *-alis* is especially appropriated to objects of religion, and *-arius* to those of common life. *-ar* seems to have arisen out of *-al*, when an ending of derivatives, owing to a previous *l* in the word.

In the second he maintains, that in Cic. Orat. 47. 158, when the orator says, "*una praepositio est abs;*" etc., the reading ought to be "*est AF;*" which form was (Cicero would then say) still in use in keeping accounts, and was regarded by him as the original one.

In the third he shows that *u* of the fourth declension makes *us* in the genitive; that the manuscripts are quite in favor of this form, and that the supposed genitive in *u* is to be ascribed to the use, among physicians, of such half-compounds as *cornububuki*, *cornucervini*, like *olusatri* for *oleris atri*, *sil-Gallici* for *silis Gallici*.]

ARTICLE V.

THE DOCTRINE RESPECTING ANGELS.

Translated from the Theological Lectures of Dr. A. D. C. Twisten, Professor of Theology in the Frederic William University at Berlin, by Rev. Henry Boynton Smith of West Amesbury, Mass. [Concluded from Vol. I. No. 4. p. 793.]

§ 4. *The employments of Angels.*

IN conformity, now, with their nature and their states, both classes of angels, the good and the evil, have certain spheres of action, which it is especially important for us to consider, since they thus come into connection with ourselves.

We will first treat of the employments of the holy angels. Without doubt, their efficiency is by no means confined to their operations in this world; but their other spheres of action are not definitely revealed to us. They are indeed said to look into the plan of redemption (1 Pet. 1: 12); to wonder at the divine wisdom in the execution of this plan (Eph. 3: 10); to rejoice at its success (Luke 15: 7, 10); and to fight against the evil spirits, who are its enemies (Rev. 12: 7); but such general statements hardly give us a clear insight into their precise mode of action in these respects. We may learn, however, from them as much as this, that the glory of God, which is the chief end of the world, and especially of free and rational beings, is likewise their aim; and a similar idea is expressed in the passages where they are described as praising and worshipping God, (e. g. Psalm 103: 20. 148: 2).

These last descriptions may suggest to us a distinction between the angelic employments and those of men; the former having for their object the direct expression or exhibition of inward emotions, the latter having more the character of what we call work or labor. The importance of this distinction is clearly brought out in Schleiermacher's System of Christian Morals. By work or labor is to be understood a kind of action which is but a means to an end, which has its end not in itself but out of itself; when a man labors, his object is not the mere labor but something different from it; he operates upon foreign and heterogeneous materials for another purpose than that of merely working: hence, in itself considered, labor affords no enjoyment; one would willingly be exempted from it, if the end could be reached without

it. But that kind of action which has for its object the direct exhibition of inward emotions—which includes all art and all forms of worship—has its end in itself, its only purpose is to give expression to what is already in the mind, to give to our thoughts and emotions an adequate external representation; and this is done in consequence of a powerful inward impulse, the mere expression of which is an immediate and high gratification. In respect to men, it will generally hold true, that their life has been toil and labor; in a future life, when our work is done, we hope to enter into rest (Heb. 4: 16), where we shall no more hunger nor thirst, where the sun shall not light on us nor any heat, where God shall wipe away all tears from our eyes, and where we shall sound a new song to his praise (Rev. 7: 16, 17. 14: 1—3). Yet even here God sometimes vouchsafes a foretaste of that bliss which we shall there share with the elect angels;¹ but it is with us only transient, enjoyed in those moments when we are elevated above the painful consciousness of our own imperfection and sinfulness, are filled with adoration of the divine grace, and feel as if we had only one desire and one duty—that of pouring out the fulness of our emotions and thoughts, in words and deeds of thankfulness and praise. These states, which with us are only transient, may be considered as permanent with the angels, since they are beings who are not still striving after, but who actually possess a perfection corresponding with their nature. Again, in respect to the actions of men, we can distinguish a two-fold relation, by which they are conditioned, on the one hand a relation to nature, on the other hand to one another; and both these are requisite to give us the materials, the instruments, the arena, the motives and the occasions of our actions. Of these two it is only the second, the relation to one another, which the Bible authorizes us to consider as belonging to the angels. For, while we do not find that any relation they may bear to nature is stated as a necessary condition of their action, yet we do find hints of a certain order and subordination existing amongst them, which imply the existence of an organized community, and which by the so called Dionysius the Areopagite, and since his time, has been expanded into the notion of a heavenly hierarchy.² The

¹ Baier, de Ang. § 33. not. a, says that this state non in otio consistit, sed *ἐνέργειαν* quandam importat, but an *ἐνέργεια* of a character wholly different from the *νότος καὶ μόχθος* of the present life.

² Comp. *Petav. de theol. dogm. tom. III. de ang. Lib. II., especially cap. II. and following.*

Evangelical (Lutheran) theologians, have not rejected this view, so far as it is accordant with Scripture ; while they have carefully reduced to their true worth or rather worthlessness all those fictions respecting the angelic hierarchy which were invented by an arbitrary and poetical fancy.¹

In respect to this world, the holy angels are exhibited as the ministers of divine providence for the protection of the heirs of salvation (Heb. 1: 14), and for the punishment of the ungodly (Gen. 19: 13). Though they may have important offices to perform in respect to us, yet we should never permit ourselves to look to them for aid, rather than to Him whom angels serve, as does all that is in the world. The evangelical church has, therefore, rightfully declared it unchristian and unscriptural to offer to the angels religious reverence or prayer, (Rev. 19: 10. 22: 9. Col. 2: 18); nor does she admit the distinction, of which the Scriptures know nothing, that the Roman Catholic theologians make between *λατρεία* and *δουλαία*. Since the angels are only our fellow-servants, (*σύνδουλοι*, Rev. 19: 10. 22: 9,) we cannot recognize any such alleged intermediate idea, between what belongs to God and what to the creature, as is necessary to be assumed in the *doulia* paid to angels. And experience proves that this is an insult to the honor that should be showed to God alone ; it is or it becomes idolatry. Not that we deny that there is a kind of reverence, which should be paid to our fellow-creatures, in proportion to their degrees of moral perfectness, or to the authority and station they possess. This has been called a *cultus non religiosus*, sive *civilis sive moralis* ; and Augustine (de Civit. Dei, X. 1.), although not in accordance with the usage of language, discriminated it by the word *δουλαία*, from the worship of God, the *λατρεία*, the *cultus religiosus*. That angels might in like manner be honored, as we honor wise and pious men, we would not be understood to deny. But angel-worship (the *cultus reli-*

¹ *Quenstedt*, De ang. Sect. II. qu. 8. thesis ; "we concede that there is a certain order and distinction among the good angels, but we reject as uncertain and false such statements as these ; that there are just nine orders or choirs of angels, and that these are divided into three classes or ternions, which are called the hierarchical classes, and that these classes are distinguished in dignity, grades and offices—as that, for example, the first or highest has an immediate knowledge of divine things, and teaches the second, and the second the third ; that the first rules over the second, and the second over the third ; and likewise that the highest class assists but does not serve, but the middle and lowest serve, etc ; concerning which matters from the times of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, scholastics and Pontificals have much philosophized."

gious) is to be entirely rejected. And it is a perversion of the distinction that Augustine makes, when the word that he used to fix the contrast between this two-fold mode of reverence, is made to bear an intermediate signification that can only serve to destroy the distinction. For in truth there can as little be an intermediate between the cultus religiosus and non religiosus, as between God and the creature.

As to the question—what are the services in which God employs the angels—some theologians enumerate so many, that there would seem to be hardly any condition of life or any religious or moral object, in which we should not be justified in anticipating and expecting angelic assistance.¹ In corroboration of such statements, passages of the Bible are indeed adduced. But where these are not to be interpreted as figurative descriptions of divine providence (e. g. Ps. 34: 8. 91: 11, 12), they are by no means, generally speaking, of universal application. They refer rather to special cases of extraordinary divine interposition; to the principal eras in which God has made a revelation to man (e. g. the giving of the law, Gal. 3: 19; the advent of Christ or his departure from the world, Luke i. ii. xxiv. Acts 1: 10; his return to judgment, Matt 24: 30, 31); or to those persons who were the chief instruments in promulgating God's revelation (e. g. prophets or apostles, Dan. 6: 22. Acts 12: 7). As a general rule, then, there is no reason, in addition to the two-fold dependence of things upon God and upon the finite causes that belong to the visible world, to assume a third kind of dependence, a dependence upon the world of spirits. Some divines, indeed, if we may judge from scattered intimations,² have held the opinion that the beneficent powers of nature are under angelic protection, or that angels work

¹ Comp. *Erasmus Schmid* upon Heb. 1: 14, in his *Opus Sacrum Posthumum*, 1652; and *Baier*, *Compend. de Ang.* § 35—40. According to the latter, "the ministry of the angels is partly expended upon individual believers, and partly upon the ecclesiastical body; they minister to the former when they protect the germs of life and the years of infancy; the adults they serve in every honorable function, and are present with the dying. In reference to the ecclesiastical state, they assist in the ministry of the word; they prevent the introduction of idolatry into the church; they are present in the sacred assemblies. Further, they aid the body politic, by preventing the bonds of the State from being broken; by assisting and defending the magistrate and other officers; by warding off dangers and troubling unjust foes. And in fine they are of much use in domestic matters, by bringing about the marriages of godly people; by guarding household affairs; by protecting those nearest and dearest to the family, children," etc.

² When *Erasmus Schmid*, as cited in the preceding note, among other things thus discourses: "There is no doubt but that as intensely as evil angels strive

in them; but when they have attempted to state this as a matter of doctrine, it has uniformly been repelled;¹ and it can hardly be justified by Scripture.

Still less importance can be attached to the notion of special guardian angels, to whom God has committed the weal of nations, communities or individuals. What advantage, then, may we derive or expect from their tutelage? Is it not enough to have the protection of the omnipresent God, the care of an omniscient and all-loving Father? Can we or need we perfect or enhance our union with Him through Christ and his Holy Spirit, by means of other spirits more closely united to him? The passage in Acts 12: 15 is, at the best, only a weak support for this notion; and the opinion of the Christians then assembled in the house of Mary, is refuted by the narrative itself. The words of Christ (Matt. 18: 10), do indeed bear witness that, as the conversion even of the sinner causes joy in heaven (Luke 15: 7), so is likewise the least in the kingdom of heaven an object of affectionate interest to the highest of the angels who behold the face of God; but from these words it cannot, with certainty, be inferred that to any individual angel is committed the special care of such a little child. But, on the other hand, we are not warranted in absolutely denying it; we know too little of the functions God has assigned to the an-

to injure man's prosperity, with as much intensity, yea, with much greater, do the good angels repel the attempted evil, and likewise fight against the evil angels themselves. And as the evil angels try to inflict upon men typhonic whirlwinds, hail-storms, tortures, diseases, the plague, and other evils of that kind; so, on the other hand, do the good angels help to years of fruitfulness (*εὐεργεσιαν*), tranquil air, moderate breezes, beneficent rains, take care of the salubrity of the air, and point out remedies for diseases. And as, in John 5: 4, it is said of the pool called Bethesda, at Jerusalem, that an angel went down, at a certain season, and troubled the water; there is, therefore, no doubt that, by command of God, the ministry of angels extends to warm springs, metallic mines, and such like. But how few there are that know these things?" And such views could hardly be maintained, unless the very powers of nature are considered as the workings of angels; or the latter (in conformity with our third canon, vide Bibl. Sacra, Vol. I. p. 774) are conceived of as working through and in the same way with the powers of nature.—In the above passage, Schmid leads us to another view of the offices committed to the good angels,—that is, that they directly oppose the evil spirits, and prevent them from doing injury. And if this be so, it is conceivable how we seldom or never become aware of the attempts of evil spirits against us. But where shall we stop, when we begin to hunt out causes to account for effects, and effects to account for causes—both of which are equally beyond the bounds of our experience?

¹ Such as *Hutter's* copious refutation of the notion, that the motions of the planets are to be ascribed to angels, as 'intelligentiis motricibus orbium coelestium;' loc. de creat. qu. vii.

gels, in general or in particular. Our theologians have therefore expressed themselves rather problematically than decisively upon this point, and are not entirely agreed in their statements. For, while some of them think it to be certain that every man is guarded by angels, but are doubtful whether by one tutelary angel in particular; others think the last to be probable, yet without denying that, in certain cases, a number of angels may be sent to a man's assistance. But it is much more important for us than the determination of this question, to be careful lest such representations of aid from angels keep us back from giving our whole trust to Him, who, above all things, demands an undivided heart; or from conscientiously making use of all the powers and means, which God has assigned to us in this world.

As it is, now, the object of the holy angels to glorify God, so on the contrary, the evil spirits, in all their doings, have self for their object. Although we are not able to state, definitely, what are the ways in which they promise to themselves gratification of their self-love, their pride and their ambition, we yet know as much as this, that only such motives impel them to action, and prescribe to them their aim. In respect to ourselves, moreover, while the holy angels are the willing ministers of God in promoting our salvation, the evil spirits are intent upon drawing us away from God and plunging us into ruin. For even if we regard it as their special purpose to bring us into subjection to themselves, this itself is our destruction. And since it is impossible for them, by the use of their own powers, or by such an application of the agencies which God alone can create, as is conformed to the nature and destination of their powers, to produce anything which can have permanent existence; they consequently exercise their might and satisfy their desires in a continual work of destruction.¹ And in this they have but too well succeeded. The devil has made himself to be the god and prince of this world (John 12: 31. 2 Cor. 4: 4); he has established a kingdom of darkness, of which he is the head, whose members are the other evil spirits subordinated to him, whose arena is our earth, whose instruments are the men that have given themselves over to his authority. For even the evil spirits form an organized community, not indeed based upon love nor upon the voluntary recognition of a higher law, which annuls

¹ Thus far can what is related in Matt. 8: 28—34, of the demons who did not know what else to do with the swine in which they had asked permission to take up their abode, excepting to plunge them into the sea, be found to be characteristic of the mode of action of evil spirits in general.

or subjects self-will, but based upon force and fear, and upon their common opposition to God and his kingdom. And in this community the selfishness which fills all their souls, may, to a certain degree, find its advantage in being strengthened by the coöperation of numbers; and that, too, without any one of the body ceasing to make himself the centre of all his efforts, or to believe himself impeded and injured by every other one. Thus each member of the community will envy and hate every other one as a rival and a foe.

The devil is usually conceived of as a being who, before his fall, had a high rank, if not the highest, in the angelic orders; and who fell together with the whole body of angels that was under his authority; or, after his fall, enticed them to follow him."¹ But since this conception has no direct warrant from Scripture, one might be led to see in it a deduction from or an allusion to an opinion that was perhaps only dimly conceived, that an organized society of evil spirits had something in its very idea inconsistent with supreme evil and selfishness, and on this account was only to be derived from their earlier condition, was to be considered only as the remains or effect of their primitive relations. True, however, as it is, that no upright and enduring association can be conceived of among those that are only evil; because such a fellowship presupposes that the strife of individual interests is harmonized, either subjectively by love, or objectively by subordination to a higher law; yet an external and limited union, as experience teaches, may, to a degree, promote the interests of selfishness itself. But the general rule, that a kingdom divided against itself cannot stand (Matt. 12: 25, 26), must hold good in respect of the realm of evil spirits.

Everything in this world that is opposed to the divine holiness and goodness, all sin and death, evil and misery, is connected with this kingdom of darkness, and is referred to the agency of the devil. This agency reaches its highest grade in bodily and spiritual possessions (*obsessio corporalis et spiritualis*); the former manifests itself in those disturbed states of the mind and that perverted use of the bodily organs, which are well known from the

¹ Comp. *Thomas Aquinas*, Summ. I. qu. 63. art. 7—"Since the sin of the angel must have proceeded from freedom of will, it is agreeable to reason, that the chief angel among the sinners should have been chief among all angels;" and in art. 8—"The sin of the first angel was, to the others, the cause of their sinning; not indeed compelling, but inducing, in the way of persuasion." *Hol-laz*, *De Angelis malis*, qu. 26—"It is probable that the evil angels fell under some leader or chief."

biblical narratives; the latter shows itself in such a fearful predominance of evil, that all holiness and goodness are voluntarily renounced, and the man abandons himself wholly to the power of the devil, as did Judas when he betrayed his Master (John 13: 27). In reference to the kingdom of Christ, the agency of the devil is especially shown in Antichrist, (1 John 2: 18. 2 Thess. 2: 4 seq. Rev. xii. seq.) In many other ways are Christians exhorted to contend against him and his fatal influences, (1 Pet. 5: 8. Ephes. 5: 11 seq.) For although the Son of God was manifested that he might destroy the works of the devil (1 John 3: 8), and though he is actually said to have broken this power (John 12: 31); yet this can only be understood to mean, that through Him victory is certain to us, and that that wicked one cannot touch him that is begotten of God, (1 John 5: 18); but the position that all agency or influence of the devil has thus come to an end, is by no means the doctrine of the Scriptures.

But how are we to define this agency? How important this question is; and how necessary in answering it to rely only upon the express declarations of the Bible; and how dangerous it is, instead of holding fast to what can be strictly proved, to look upon what is only not impossible as being credible;¹ of all this, the

¹ Even a *Buddhist*, (Institt. L. II. cp. II. § 30) could defend the vulgar belief in witches in such wise as the following! "Since spirit is an immaterial substance, endowed with intellect and will, and also with the power of moving bodies and performing various operations, *there is nothing at all to prevent us from supposing*, that spirits of this kind can manifest themselves to men in some way, can appear to them in a bodily form, speak with them, make compacts, promise, and out of favor to them perform what were otherwise beyond human powers. I do not indeed assert that all magicians enter into an explicit compact with a malign spirit, *but yet I do not see what hinders*, two spiritual substances, of whom the one that is invisible may manifest himself to the other in some way, of being somehow able to declare mutual consent, and to make mutual promises. It is indeed foolish and absurd to enter into compacts with spirits of this sort, with whom men can have no righteous fellowship; it is foolish to trust to their agreements and promises; yea, it is impious to desire the aid of malign spirits; *but all these things do not prevent* the possibility of men's making compacts with spirits manifesting themselves in a certain way, and using their assistance." He does indeed find it necessary to go on and show that what is not impossible has sometimes occurred, and for that purpose he appeals to the Egyptian sorcerers (Exod. 7: 12), to the prohibition in Deut. 18: 10, to the familiar spirit of the witch of Endor (1 Sam. 28: 7), to the slave at Philippi (Acts 16: 16), to the signs of the false prophets (Deut. 13: 1. Matt. 24: 24), and to the accusations of the Pharisees (Matt. 9: 34. 12: 24). But he does not seem to have remembered, that it is nowhere taught that such arts were obtained by means of a compact concluded with the devil, or how this was done; but that,

church has had most sad experience, in the frightful consequences of the superstitious belief, that men could personally come into contact and compact with the devil, and thus become possessed of his supernatural powers. It excites horror to reckon up the number of sacrifices that have fallen in the seventeenth century alone, to a theory like that contained in Debrío's *Disquisitiones Magicae*.¹ All honor, therefore, to a Friederich Spee, who among the Catholics opposed that terrible superficiality with which the accusations of witchcraft were conducted; and to a Balthasar Becker and a Thomasius, among the Protestants, who fought against the superstition on which the trials were based! And although the argument against this superstition, especially in Becker's work,² was not always conducted on the most tenable grounds, nor with a careful limitation to what was decidedly false and exceptionable, yet should we never forget the thankfulness due to those who have dissipated so hurtful, and we may say, so disgraceful an error. But after the old demonological notions were undermined, and room made for a more unprejudiced judgment of these subjects, a judgment that should not, without necessity, undervalue the principles of an intelligible philosophy of physical causes, it could not long fail, but that the doubts raised against the continuance of satanic agency, and especially of diabolic possessions, should likewise be applied to the narratives of Holy Scripture. Among the German theologians, it was espe-

on the contrary, a veil is thrown over these manifestations, which the Bible has not lifted up, and probably would not have us remove; and that it is better to acknowledge our ignorance, than to fill out the gaps with the possibilities of an arbitrary fancy, or of mere prejudice.

¹ Extracts from this, as well as from Friedrich Spee's *Cautio Criminalis*, s. de processibus contra sages ab magistratus Germaniae, are given by *Semler*, in the third volume of his instructive *Extracts from Church History*, p. 417 seq.

² *Becker*, in his "Enchanted World," denied to the devil all operations upon the world of sense. For this position he relied in part upon the Cartesian notion of spirit, as a substantia cogitans, which, according to the system of Occasionalism, could only act upon bodies through God's intervention, which in this case unquestionably could not be assumed. He likewise, from the passages in 2 Pet. 2: 4, and Jude 6 (referred to above, Bib. Sacra, Vol. I. p. 793) made the inference, that the evil spirits incarcerated in Tartarus could not possibly act upon the world. But he allowed himself to make a most violent interpretation of all the passages of Scripture that appeared to attribute to them such an agency. Comp. *Brucker's Histor. crit. Philosophiae*, tom. IV. P. II. p. 712 seq. *Walch's Religionsstreit ausserhalb der Luth. Kirche*, Th. III. p. 930 seq.

cially Semler, not uninfluenced by new abuses,¹ who effected the introduction of the view, which since his time has been widely diffused, that the demoniacs of the New Testament were only persons suffering under peculiar maladies, as frenzy, convulsions, and epilepsy; and that such disordered states in ancient times, and especially by the superstition of the contemporaries of Jesus, were explained by the supposition of demoniacal possessions. And indeed when we perceive that all the symptoms manifested in these demoniacs, as well as the names usually given to them in the New Testament, are not essentially different from those which we unhesitatingly attribute to disordered states of the body or the soul, when occurring in other authors or in our own experience; we might find it difficult, when they are mentioned in the Holy Scriptures, to determine to assume wholly different causes to account for the same effects. But the question would still remain, whether we are not restrained from doing this by the way in which not only the people and the demoniacs, and not only the Evangelists, but also our Saviour himself speaks respecting them. We might perhaps assume that this was only a way of speaking about them, of which one might make use without intending to allude to or participate in the notions from which the phrases were originally derived, if the name demoniacs (*δαμονιζόμενοι*) occurred in as isolated a manner as, for example, the name lunatics (*σαλμαζόμενοι*); but this is inconsistent with the repeated and emphatic way in which the demons themselves (*δαμονίαι*), and their connection with the sufferers, with Christ and with their own chief (Luke 11: 15), are spoken of in the New Testament. And we might perhaps adopt the theory that Jesus only accommodated his language to the prevalent views of the people, although aware of their utter groundlessness, in order perhaps to heal the diseases more certainly, without giving any offence to the people, or in order not to expend the time and powers, which should be dedicated to their religious instruction, in the correction of mere physiological errors, which had no strict connection with

¹ By the experiences of one Lohman, said to be possessed, published by G. Møller, which gave occasion to Semler to write his "*Abfertigung der neuen Geister und alten Irrthümer in der Lohmannischen Begeisterung zu Kemberg*," 1760. After this followed his famous dissertation, *De daemoneis quorum in evang. sit mentio*, 1760, and the defence of it in his "*Umständliche Untersuchung der dämonischen Leute*," 1762. By Semler, too, the work of the Englishman, Farmer, on the Demoniacs of the New Testament (translated by v. Cölln), was introduced to the German public, as also a new translation of Becker's "*Enchanted World*."

his appointed work, if the question were about a very harmless opinion in physics, wholly foreign to religious considerations, and liable to no perverted application. But this view cannot be maintained in respect to a superstition which, as all admit, is anything but harmless, and which our Saviour would, on prudential grounds, have had less reason to spare, since he was certain of the applause of the school of the Sadducees, if he attacked it. In other matters, through mere fear of giving offence, even where the interests of true religion might seem to be threatened, (for example, in respect to the observance of the Sabbath!), we do not find him so forbearing towards errors and prejudices; but of the demons he discourses to his disciples as he does to the people (Matt. 17: 21), and expressly connects the power which he and they exercise over them, with his Messianic functions, (Matt. 12: 28, 29. Luke 10: 17—19). Accordingly, we cannot believe that those views were absolutely false and opposed to the true religion; for then we should be compelled to ascribe to Jesus an error in religious matters. The times, and the people in the midst of whom Jesus lived and discoursed, may have had a determining influence upon the form and drapery of expression; but some essential truths must have lain at the foundation. Are we then, it may be objected, compelled to give up all the results of that more free and unembarrassed observation of nature and of physical effects and changes, which the scientific spirit and culture of our times are said to have produced, and which are to be considered as on the whole a real gain, although some of its fruits seem to many to be objectionable? But why this? Do, then, these two propositions logically exclude one another, viz., that such phenomena were diseases—and that in them was also manifested a satanic influence, as Göthe says, “a part of that power which is ever willing evil, yet ever creating good?”¹ Is it irrational to regard disease in general, or certain species of it, although on the one hand to be considered as something natural and proceeding according to well known physical laws, yet, on

¹ Mephistopheles in Göthe's *Faust*—Whether what is here in an abstract way called a *part of a certain power*, be not, perhaps, in the notion of demons personified in a popular way, and whether the mode in which our Saviour spoke of them be not an example of that merely formal accommodation, which we may attribute to Jesus, and which was occasioned by his speaking to men in such a stage of culture that the abstract expression was strange and unintelligible, while the personification was natural;—this is a question worthy of discussion, and it may serve as an example of the difference we have alluded to between the drapery of the expression, and the truth lying at the foundation.

the other hand, as an effect of that evil principle which has brought even into nature the seeds of disorder and destruction, in consequence of which we see the very powers of physical life conflicting with and grating against one another? This view would be most readily suggested wherever, and in proportion as, the natural causes are hidden from us; or where nature seems to be under the dominion of an overwhelming power which drives it, as it were, out of its regular course; and where the soul seems to be violently hurried away to words, deeds and thoughts, that correspond with another (be it real or fancied), and not with its own personality. It is now chiefly such cases as these, that are referred to demoniacal influences, and in healing them Christ is recognized as the Conqueror of the devil and his works. But this does not prevent us from also considering them as natural occurrences, in the same sense as sickness, although unnatural, can be and is called natural.

The Scriptures appear to confirm this view.. It has been justly remarked that not only does the expression, "to have a devil," mean the same as to rave, to be crazy (Matt. 11: 18. John 7: 20. 10: 20); but that it is also said of one from whom the devils have departed, that he had become rational, was in his right mind (Mark 5: 15. Luke 8: 35); that, as the demoniacs are included among the sick, and their deliverance from the demon is described as a healing (Matt. 6: 24. Acts 10: 38); so, likewise, a spirit of infirmity is ascribed to a woman who was merely bowed down, and the word of the Lord, Be loosed from thine infirmity! is exhibited as a loosing of the bonds with which Satan had bound her (Luke 13: 11—16). It was not an error to conclude from this that demoniacs were sick people; only, on the other hand, it should not have been forgotten, that according to Scripture, there must have existed a connection of the disease, or at least of certain kinds of disease, with the realm of darkness to which the demons belong.

And this is true not merely in respect to possessions, but wherever any impediment or disturbance, any evil or suffering, is derived from the agency of the devil, this could no more annul the action of natural causes, than would the consciousness of connection of such evils with natural causes, which in many cases must have been very clear, exclude a reference to satanic agency. When Paul writes to the Thessalonian Christians (1 Thes. 2: 18), that he had twice wished to come to them, but had been hindered by Satan, we can hardly think of anything different

from what is meant by the entirely corresponding words in the epistle to the Romans (15: 22), where he does not allude to Satan; that is, natural hindrances in which he recognizes the agency of a power opposed to the kingdom of God. The messenger of Satan who buffeted Paul (2 Cor. 12: 7), is manifestly the same with the thorn in the flesh, whatever this may have been; and when the prince of this world is said to come against Jesus (John 14: 30), this must be the same with the assault made by the priests and pharisees, which Jesus, in order to manifest his love and obedience to the Father, will not avoid. The same likewise holds good of the agency of the devil in moral matters. John lets us very clearly know (John 12: 6), whence came the thought which the devil put into the mind of Judas; and even after the devil had entered into him, it was he himself who did what he did (John 13: 27). When Satan filled the heart of Ananias (Acts 5: 3), it was only by means of his own evil lust that the entrance was effected (James 1: 14); and hence the apostle warns the married people in Corinth (1 Cor. 7: 5), to prevent the beginnings of incontinent desires, for only through these desires could the devil tempt them. And although he reminds us that we have to wrestle not merely against flesh and blood (Eph. 6: 12), yet the spiritual weapons which he recommends to us against the arts and wiles of Satan, are only such as are needed to withstand those enticements to lust, fear, doubt and unbelief which proceed from flesh and blood. And it is such a contest as this to which James refers when he exhorts us (James 4: 7), to resist the devil and he will flee from you! The temptations of the devil are not to be distinguished from the natural internal and external incitements and occasions to sin; the fellowship of Satan is none other than that which arises from the desire to do his lusts, and like him to give one's self up to hatred and a lie (John 8: 44); the power of the devil over our will is that which we concede to him when we make ourselves his ministers; the evil which Satan effects through us is our own voluntary transgression. In short, the agency of the devil and of the evil spirits should never be represented in such a way as would annul the physical and moral laws, in accordance with which we must consider sin and evil as the workings of nature and of freedom. Satanic influences are manifested in and through the same physical and moral evils which we recognize as resulting from the sin of man and its consequences, or from those operations of nature which with all their anomalies still reveal the highest conformity to law; and these again point us to

a deeper and more general ruin into which a part of the world of spirits was plunged, previous to the fall of man. The devil is the enemy who while men sleep, in darkness sows the tares (Matt. 13: 25 seq.); no one is witness of his perverse work; when we wonder to see tares growing among the wheat, it is the Lord that tells us who has sowed the seed; the tares germinate, grow, bear fruit like any other seed; if we did not find that they impeded the growth of the grain or mingled noxious elements with it, we could scarcely imagine that they had a different origin; and then, too, the Lord must at the harvest send his angels to separate the tares from the wheat, since it might easily happen that we should root out the one with the other, or should let the noxious weeds grow rank that we might spare the good seed. Without figure: *the devil's agency in the world exists under the condition, that he (directly or indirectly) enters into the series of the causes here at work, so that he acts by means of these causes or in the same mode with them;*¹ and when we state, that he has been any-where at work, this proposition refers rather to the prime source of the action, than to its specific mode and characteristics. For example, that blinding of the mind, by which the unbelieving are hindered from seeing the light of the glorious Gospel of Christ (2 Cor. 4: 4), is, morally and psychologically considered, just the same thing, whether it be referred to the god of this world or not; only, by being thus referred, it is brought into connection with a wider realm of ruin and corruption.

We have no experience of an immediate, direct, or, if we may so say, original entering of the devil into the series of causes that are visibly at work around us. There are only three cases in which the Scripture refers to such a direct agency; the temptation of our first parents,² the temptation of our Saviour, and the last conflict of the kingdom of God with the realm of darkness (Rev. 12: 9—17. 20: 1—3, 7—10). The second and third of these as is well known, are of doubtful interpretation, whether we take them literally, symbolically, or as parables. The first case, although in its details not without some obscurity, has left behind it moral and physical effects which are a matter of daily experience. These effects do not consist in powers or beings in their very na-

¹ See the canons 3—5 laid down above—Bibl. Sacra, Vol. I. pp. 774, 5.

² According to my view, in the sense of the New Testament, it can hardly be doubted (Rev. 12: 9), who is meant by the Serpent that tempted Eve (1 Tim. 2: 14).

ture evil and corrupt, which the devil has produced as by a creative act; but in the corruption of rational beings whom God created good and for good, and who were therefore free, and hence had the possibility of sinning; and in consequence of their fall, since the ethical and the physical are necessarily connected, there is also a partial corruption of the powers of nature. After this corruption had once forced itself into the world, it must pursue in its propagation and development, in coming to a crisis and in being expelled from the system, a regular course, in accordance with the natural and moral laws by which the world is governed. Yet we refer it back as a whole and in the details of its manifestation, to the agency of Satan; not only because his first and direct action is propagated in it, but also because the devil incontestably continues to look upon it as his work, and sees in it the bond or snare by which we are held captive to his will (2 Tim. 2: 26), and which would have made us the subjects of his kingdom had not a stronger hand broken them. Whether these bonds in some cases, as, for example, where evil absorbs the whole man which many think to have been the case with Judas, might not draw the captive into an immediate proximity with Satan as is expressed by the definition of spiritual possession which De Wette¹ gives (*propinquior substantiae diaboli ad animam impii adessentia et efficax ad quaevis flagitia propellens ἐνέργεια*), is a question which we dare not decide. The conception is so horrible, that we cannot accede to it without more decisive declarations than the Scripture contains; and it would not change any of the principles which we have above developed.

The definition of bodily possessions which the same author gives is one with which we can still less agree—*ipsius satanae non tantum κατ' ἐνέργειαν sed et κατ' οὐσίαν in corpore humano inhabitatio*. The demons (*δαίμονια*) that dwell in the possessed are not Satan himself; and as to the position, that the former really, in their very substance, dwell in the human body, even if we were inclined to give a literal interpretation to the passages of Scripture that refer to it, yet the mode in which we are to conceive of such a possession would ever remain very problematical in consequence of the difficulty in defining the relations of spiritual beings to space; of showing how their not being restricted by space (*illocalitas*), is consistent with attributing to them an existence in some particular place, (some *πῶς*).²

¹ Dogmatik der Luther. Kirche, § 48.

² Vide Bibl. S. Vol. 1. p. 770.

In the investigation of these topics we shall be satisfied if we have in any degree succeeded in reconciling the assurance of Scripture, that evil spirits are at work in bringing about the ruin and corruption of man, with our convictions of the permanency and regularity of the laws of nature, both physical and moral, and with our duty so to present the doctrine that it shall not run the hazard of superstitious perversion. Other questions, which might arise, can only be fully considered in connection with the doctrine of the fall and depravity of the human race.

§ 5. *Objections to the Existence of Angels considered.*

According to our proposed plan,¹ we have occupied ourselves with definitions and statements respecting the nature, the states and the employment of good and evil spirits, as these were developed, on the basis of Holy Scripture and under the influence of certain leading ideas, in our older doctrinal systems; and we have also made some modifications in these statements in reference to points which in the present state of scientific culture, demand a more careful attention than our forefathers bestowed upon them. But we have reserved for discussion the important questions,—what general worth and authority are to be attributed to the views thus defined? In what relation do they stand to religious experience, to what has been called the Christian consciousness, to our faith as Christians? Are we to assume that angels and devils in the assigned sense actually exist? In proceeding to discuss this point, we would premise, that the question does not involve every single statement that has been made, so much as the conception that lies at the foundation of all of them. In respect of individual statements, our systems of theology have always shown themselves to be flexible. For example, although the angels are, strictly speaking, generally regarded as purely spiritual and bodiless beings, yet some of our divines have not hesitated to depart from this view, in the interest of certain philosophical systems (as that of Leibnitz), which maintained that the existence of a finite spirit was inconceivable without a body, be it very fine or etherial, attached to it. Hence objections raised against single positions cannot be held as decisive in respect to the whole doctrine. And it is neither necessary nor advisable to decide beforehand either what features may be abandoned with-

¹ Bibl. Sacra, Vol. I. p. 769.

out prejudice to the doctrine, or what must in any case be retained.

It is the judgment of De Wette, that the whole doctrine has been falsely drawn within the sphere of Christian doctrinal theology; that it had its origin in pious longings and symbolical fancies, enriched by mythological metaphysics from foreign (not Jewish) sources; that the question whether we can be so convinced of the truth of this doctrine as to make it an object of faith is to be decided by an investigation of the nature of the soul and of the spiritual world; and that the result of such an investigation is, that the doctrine respecting the holy angels has only a problematical value, and that the doctrine respecting the evil angels is to be wholly repudiated.

Among the points here brought forward on which we are to base our judgment, there is one to which more weight is generally attributed, than we can concede to it; we mean that the Jewish Angelology had in part a foreign origin. The fact itself especially as De Wette has expressed it, that the Jewish conceptions of the spiritual world were very much *enriched* from foreign sources, is not to be denied. But this would be of importance only in a doctrinal system, that proposed to exhibit solely the Jewish articles of faith; to such a system no element could be said to be essential which was not originally contained in the revelation given to Moses, or organically derived from it, but which had been attached to it in an external manner from a foreign scheme. But if Christianity be something more than a mere development of Judaism; if its destination in part was to unite in itself in a new and peculiar manner whatever had been previously prepared in all the different spheres of religious life; then it cannot be brought as an objection to a doctrine held by Christ and the apostles, that God had preliminarily committed to another than the Jewish people the office of producing to some extent a reception of this truth.

On the other hand, if we define Christian Doctrinal Theology to be an exhibition of the facts of Christian experience or consciousness in the form of reflection or of distinct conceptions, then the doctrine respecting angels would not come within its province, if to the angels themselves no importance could be attributed either for Christian experience or reflection, if they were for the former a matter of entire indifference, and if we could not form any definite conceptions concerning them in connection with the Christian scheme, and if the utmost they can claim is, to be con-

sidered as figurative, symbolical or mythical existences. Whether this be so, we will first inquire in respect to the good angels, and then in respect to the devil and the evil spirits. In regard to the other point,—whether we can be so far convinced of the truth of this doctrine as to make it a matter of faith (so far as this question can be distinguished from the above), we must take the position, that we cannot make it dependent upon merely philosophical principles. The essential, philosophical basis of the Angelology we have represented to be the idea of spirit and of the spiritual or “*intelligible*” world. If this idea, now, would not lead us any further than to give us a probability that such beings as angels might exist, yet the doctrine of Christ and the apostles is perfectly adequate to transform the probability into fact, the problematical judgment into a positive assertion; which is no more than what observation and credible testimony do in other departments of science. If on philosophical grounds we find a purely spiritual being to be conceivable, then the assertion of Him who testifieth only what He hath seen (John 3: 11, 32), must convince us of the actual existence of such beings. This position, however, depends on the authority which is conceded to the declarations of Holy Scripture, and will therefore be a dividing line between rationalists and supernaturalists.

Supposing, now, that the Bible said nothing about angels (using the word here in the restricted sense of good angels); it could hardly be maintained that in our religious experience or consciousness there is anything which necessarily leads us to the assumption of their existence. For what facts, of inward or outward experience, are there, that would be the occasion of our assuming a third kind of causes, in addition, on the one hand, to natural causes, and on the other to the divine causality? We might, indeed, conceive, that when the intellect was immature and the fancy predominant, there might be felt an impulse or necessity to give a high coloring to the idea of the divine glory by a figurative representation of angels hovering around him; or to embody the doctrine that all things depend upon God, which we comprise in our ideas of providence and of a government of the world, in the representation of ministering spirits. But when the powers of reflection were more developed, there would be found no difficulty in grasping this dependence of all things upon God in a direct manner, without the use of figurative language; and then the angels, far from helping us to bring this truth directly before the mind, might rather become an impediment to our thoughts,

which, in rising above the finite, at once seek the infinite. What was intended to be merely the drapery of the divine majesty might easily appear to have a too independent existence, when judged by the intellect rather than the fancy. And consequently our intellects, left to themselves, would find no sufficient grounds for representing the angels as actually existing beings; or to adopt the view that they existed, if we found it current.

But now, the Holy Scripture speaks of angels, of the appearing of angels, of the deeds of angels. Can this be interpreted in the way we have hinted at? that is, can we say that in the Bible the angels are a mere picturing forth and embodiment of the glory or providence of God? There are, unquestionably, some passages in which this interpretation would be sufficient (e. g. John 1: 52. Rev. 6: 11, 12.) And if this could be carried through the whole Bible, then the doctrine respecting angels would necessarily make a chapter in a book on biblical symbolism or rhetoric, instead of appearing in a system of doctrinal theology. But there are other passages, not only in the Old, but also in the New Testament, historical as well as didactic (e. g. John 20: 12. Acts 12: 7. 27: 23, 24. Matt. 22: 30. Luke 15: 10. Eph. 1: 10, 21, and many others), with which this theory is utterly inconsistent. In view of the positive statements contained in such passages, nothing can prevent us from coming to the result, that they are intended to assert that angels actually exist and act and have an important connection with the kingdom of God, excepting the hypotheses and artifices of a violent and arbitrary system of interpretation, which is entirely at variance with an honest faith in the higher knowledge of Christ and the apostles, and with our natural regard for truth; or, unless they are set aside by begging the question in some such way as this, that all passages which speak of angels are therefore to be understood as mythical and figurative.¹ But why such hypotheses and arts, why this violence and arbitrariness, which undermine all the laws of exegesis, if the conception of angels be

¹ When Schleiermacher (*Glaubenslehre*, § 42 of the second edition) declares, that Christ and the apostles might have said everything they did say about the angels without having an actual conviction of their own that such beings existed, just as we can speak of fays and spectres, without explaining what our own views are as to their reality, he gives a standard of judgment which I readily adopt. I ask, then, whether any one would find it possible, in such passages as Acts 12: 7. Eph. 1: [3?] 10, I will not say to substitute directly fays and elfs for the word angels, but, by any change he may please to make, to set aside the absolute contradiction that would arise from mixing up such fabulous or problematical notions, with the evident intention of the writers to relate an actual fact or announce a truth?

not in itself contradictory, and, when rightly applied, has in it nothing objectionable or hurtful?

It is, perhaps, said—there is nothing in the doctrine contradictory or hurtful, but also nothing that has any value in connection with Christian experience; and therefore nothing that should induce us to decide rather for than against the existence of angels. The question respecting their existence has then, for us Christians, no greater interest than questions about the existence of any other species of beings, which we give over to the researches of other sciences, but do not reserve for our systems of doctrinal theology.

One might, indeed, be a pious Christian without having come to any definite conclusions about the nature and the existence of angels. But yet such questions are by no means a matter of indifference in connection with religious experience; and this position, according to the canon that the Bible contains nothing superfluous, must hold good of every scriptural doctrine and idea. In an especial manner does the conception of angelic agency enlarge our ideas of the kingdom of God, of which we are a part. It vivifies our consciousness that we are the citizens of two worlds, not only of the visible but also of the invisible, that we belong to a fellowship of higher spirits (Heb. 12: 22), who take an interest in our welfare (Luke 15: 10), who are united with us under one head (Eph. 1: 10). Thus we shall be more mindful that our conversation is in heaven (Phil. 3: 20), and that we should live as those who are to be equal with the angels (Luke 20: 36). Consequently we judge, that although the doctrine respecting the holy angels be not directly deducible from the facts of religious experience, yet, that when we accept it on the testimony of Holy Scripture, it is by no means a matter of indifference for our experience; and although it may not be reckoned among the fundamental articles of the Christian faith, yet that its right to a place in a system of Christian doctrine is not to be disputed.

We must come to very similar results in regard to the doctrine respecting the devil and the evil spirits. If we were restricted to the results and facts of our religious experience or consciousness, we could hardly show any real necessity for assuming the existence of the devil and his angels; but if we believe the declarations of Holy Scripture, we may find much in our own experience which goes to confirm, or is connected with, the doctrine. In respect to the matter itself, however, on the one hand it is undeniable that the grounds for believing in the existence of the devil are much more decisive than those in favor of the existence of the

holy angels. In respect to the latter, we find nothing in our experience which could lead us to presuppose any other spiritual source of our emotions than God himself; but in regard to the devil we may find something of this kind in us, and that is, sin itself, so far as this reveals itself to us not merely as something subjective, accidentally clinging to us, but as something objective, as a power ruling over us. The Bible, too, speaks of the devil, his work and his kingdom, much more frequently, much more distinctly, much more directly, than of the holy angels; it brings what it says about them into much closer connection with Christ, his work and his kingdom; and it allows much less opportunity for the notion of a designed or unconscious accommodation to traditional opinions or modes of speech.¹ But in spite of all this, on the other hand, the opposition, on the part of recent theologians, to the doctrine respecting the devil, has been much more violent. It is maintained, that the very idea is philosophically untenable; and that a belief in his real existence is inconsistent with other doctrinal positions which belong to the substance of the Christian faith. De Wette, even while he declares the idea of holy angels to be only a matter of probability, maintains that the conception of a purely spiritual and at the same time sinful being, is contradictory, and that it should be entirely discarded. If he be right in this, if the idea of fallen angels be absolutely contradictory, if it cannot be brought into harmony and connection with indubitable truths; then, indeed, we might be forced to explain away the positions of Christ and the apostles as well as we could, and to banish the whole discussion from our doctrinal systems into a Biblical Mythology or Symbolism.

¹ Almost every page of the New Testament confirms this statement. Schleiermacher (*Glaubenslehre* § 57 of the first, and § 45 of the second edition), and after him v. Cölln (*Bibl. Theologie* II. p. 73), raise an objection to which I cannot concede any great weight—that Christ did not reveal anything new or original in the way of rectifying or perfecting the current notions upon this subject, although, if he had believed in the existence of angels at all, he would have done so, since the popular views about them could not be perfectly true, and might easily have been amended; and therefore, because Christ did not amend them, he did not believe in the doctrine. To say nothing of the want of logic in such an inference—how infrequently do we find, in the New Testament, that turn of expression in the Sermon on the Mount: “Ye have heard—but I say unto you.” Can a man be in earnest in laying down the rule, that Christ and the apostles believed in nothing to which they did not add something new and original? If so, then it would follow, that Christ and his apostles were not really convinced of the truth of the doctrines of creation and providence, of God’s power and wisdom, of the resurrection and judgment, and even of the doctrine respecting the Messiah and his kingdom.

Schleiermacher¹ has stated as distinctly as any one the grounds on which it is held that the conception of the actual existence of such a being as the devil is wholly untenable. We will go through with them in the order in which he has advanced them. (1) No motives can be conceived that would occasion the fall of an angel but such as take for granted that he is already a fallen being, e. g. pride and envy. This objection has no weight with one who believes in an entire freedom of the will, a "*transcendental*" freedom, as the Germans call it. A truly free act cannot be understood by the principle, that what is contained in the effect must have already existed in the cause; it does not take for granted that the moral nature is so constituted that it may not be changed; but a free act of the will is the beginning of a series of effects, it originates them, and it may give a new moral character to the nature of the being. (2) It is inconceivable that a being should always persist in sinning who is endowed with the highest degree of knowledge. In order to avoid the objection drawn from our own experience, that intellect is different from virtue and that vice is something more than folly, he adds: that sin produces a transient pleasure only when all its consequences are not clearly seen, but that one who perfectly knows that all contest against God must be utterly abortive, would never involve himself in it, since it would be the same thing as voluntarily and consciously determining to be and to remain ever miserable. This position would be undeniable in respect to true and perfect wisdom, but such wisdom exists only in union with virtue and piety; and we are not warranted in saying that the fallen angels were originally endowed with this wisdom, but only with the power of attaining unto it. But a being that revolts from God either loses or attains not full insight into the fact, that happiness is to be found only in his Creator, and that it is a vain undertaking to seek it out of Him and in one's self, or to deify himself. Luther therefore rightly said, that in and by the fall, the devil lost the best of understandings.—But, continues Schleiermacher, (3) Such a loss of understanding is inconceivable as a consequence of an error of the will, and is incongruous with the great danger we ascribe to the hostility of the devil. The last would certainly hold good, if it was asserted that Satan had entirely lost his understanding; but as we have above said, an evil spirit, like a bad man, may be very acute and cunning in all things pertaining to his own purposes and interests, and still fail of having

¹ Glaubenslehre, § 55 of the first, and § 44 of the second edition.

a right and true understanding ; for this exists only where all things are seen in their true relations to God and his will. In reference, however, to the connection between an error of the will and the blinding of the understanding, this can hardly admit of doubt as a general truth. The question whether it was only one error which produced a sudden darkening of the mind, or a connected series of errors that brought about a gradually accumulating blindness, is irrelevant in respect to the main point. We have previously expounded the philosophical basis of the views of our church in considering angels as existing in what we have called the "*intelligible*" or spiritual world ; and Schleiermacher's objection rests upon the assumption that angels are subject, like ourselves, to the conditions of time and of progress. (4) It is said to be inconceivable that some angels should have fallen and others not ; and Schleiermacher asks how this could have been the case if they all were originally created alike. The basis of this objection is that same denial of the true nature of freedom (of *transcendental* freedom), which we have already noticed. Whoever takes the position that a being does good or evil, not merely because he is already good or evil, but because he has a free will ; that one may become good or evil by a voluntary act, by means of a good or evil will, feels not the force of this difficulty.—In essentially the same way as we replied to the second objection would we meet the next question which is suggested, (5) how the devil, already oppressed by great evils and expecting still greater, could hope to relieve the feeling of his misery by continued opposition to God, why he would not rather remain in a state of entire inactivity ? If Satan had the knowledge of an angel of light, he would indeed give up his opposition, he would not even be content with a state of inactivity, but would act like an angel of light ; but just because he does not so will and act, therefore he has not the same kind or degree of knowledge. He may not indeed cherish the confident hope, but yet he may imagine the possibility of a result, by which he might maintain his power in his own kingdom, or at least for a long time prevent what at last will be unavoidable, and perhaps in the meantime he may hope in some way to avenge himself on God, whom he regards only as his mighty foe, or may have in mind many other objects which he may fancy to be attainable.—(6) In regard to the objection against a kingdom, an organized community of evil spirits, we refer to what has been already advanced. Only we would add, that when Schleiermacher asserts that in proportion as the em-

pire of holiness is extended in the world and becomes firmly established in the minds and hearts of men, in the same proportion will the counter-workings of evil be dispersed and dissipated, until the devil and his angels will no longer be thought of; we cannot see how this corresponds with the scriptural representation, that along with the progress of the kingdom of God there will be an increasing opposition on the part of its foes, which will rise to its highest intensity before the re-appearance of Christ.

In returning now to our main discussion as to the actual existence of the devil, we remark, that everything depends upon the conception we form upon the nature and the ground of evil. The idea of an evil being must assuredly seem contradictory, to one who seeks the ground of evil either in matter—for the devil is immaterial; or in the sensuous nature—for he is conceived of as without a body; or in the notion of a finite nature as being necessarily subject to ignorance, weakness and imperfection—for although we do not represent the devil as infinite, yet he is endowed with a high degree of moral and intellectual power; or in the law of progress and development—for we think of the devil as a being at once and forever and entirely sinful;—in short, if evil be a mere negation, have no positive existence, then is the devil a mere abstraction, a mere nonentity. But he that conceives sin to be something more than a lower stage of development in goodness, than a mere abstract conception of one condition of becoming righteous; as something more than imperfection or unequal development of our powers and our knowledge; he that acknowledges a deeper ground for it than the union of the spirit with the body and so with matter and nature; he that finds its origin even in the soul, the spiritual part, in the choice which freedom makes; he that sees, that in relation to freedom of choice, great powers and knowledge are merely the means and instruments of which freedom makes use in its different acts, and do not necessarily produce the determinations of the will, and that the impulses of selfishness are a more dangerous temptation than the seductions of sensuality; in short, whoever regards sin as we shall find that it must in truth be regarded according to the testimony of Christian experience; for him there is no reason to deny the conceivability of the existence of Satan. And under this point of view, the idea that one forms of the devil may be looked upon as an exponent of his idea of sin.¹

¹ In this sense, Erhard, in the first volume of the Philosophical Journal of Niethammer, wrote his "*Apology of the Devil*;" not that he cared so much

Since a deep consciousness of sinfulness is one necessary element or condition of Christian experience, it might from this be inferred, that the assumption or denial of the existence of the devil is anything but a matter of indifference. Those religions which represent the antagonism between good and evil as absolute and primitive, always come to the result, that together with God there exists another being, evil in his very nature, as independent and uncreated as God himself; and when the distinction between good and evil is looked upon as something merely relative, subjective, a difference only in degree, then will every representation be avoided, which is even remotely allied to the above dualistic view. But the Christian conception is different from both of these. It does not make the antagonism between good and evil to be one which originally existed in the very constitution of the universe—for then were a restitution impossible; nor does it look upon it as a difference in degree alone, and still less as something merely subjective—for to what purpose then the plan of redemption? Then had Christ died in vain; or the true Saviour would be the philosopher who made the fortunate discovery that we had been giving ourselves so much trouble and care about a mere semblance or figment. Christianity does not teach the existence of a being sinful in his primitive nature, but of an evil power which originated from the perversion of freedom, and which demands a severe contest in order to be subdued, a contest which cannot be undertaken or terminated without higher aid. And when we consider the depth of the corruption and disorder which do not merely infect this and that emotion and volition, but have laid hold of the very roots of our whole being; and the extent of the ruin, since it does not embrace man alone, but seems to have penetrated into nature itself; and the relation of this corruption to ourselves, since we feel it to be in some respects foreign to our true nature, and never cease to long after the lost Paradise,

about Satan, but in order to bring to a decision the question that must arise in connection with the idea of the devil—whether sin be in its nature something positive or negative. This treatise is besides worthy of being read in another respect, because it contends against the opinion that the idea of the existence of such a being as Satan is contradictory and impossible. As Erhard there sketches an outline of the practical maxims on which Satan acts, (the devil's moral system), so there might be made out a delineation of his theoretical principles, so to speak of the devil's philosophy, as the fundamental principle of diabolical action; under the former head would be, in religious phraseology, the aim to make himself to be God; so his theoretical position could not be any other than that he himself is God. (Comp. 2 Thess. 2: 4).

even when entangled by evil, we are ever going further from it ; if we consider these points, in all their weight, we might not indeed be led to the conclusion, that from them alone the personal existence of the devil could with certainty be inferred ; but when, in addition to this, revelation teaches, that there is a prince of this world and a kingdom of darkness, which Christ came to destroy (1 John 3: 8)—and that we are called upon to wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, (Eph. 6: 12) ; this scriptural doctrine is so intimately connected with the results of our own experience, and accords so well with the whole economy of redemption, that we cannot see why violence should be done to all such passages of the Bible, and the doctrine expelled from it, cost what it may. To this it is perhaps replied, that the doctrine is in opposition to other well-known principles, and that it threatens to disturb and undermine morality and religion. It may be said, that it undermines our firm faith in the omnipotence and universal agency of God ; that it destroys our conviction of the perfect regularity and connection of natural causes ; that it is detrimental to our moral judgment, since it gives man an excuse for ascribing his own sin and guilt to another being ; that it thus stands in the way of earnest self-examination ; or that it torments us with fears and apprehensions that cannot exist in connection with a joyful trust in God's grace, and the certainty of having been redeemed from the bondage of sin and death.

In reply to these objections we observe, in the first place, that in proportion as we are convinced of the danger, or even of the suspiciousness of this doctrine, in the same proportion will those passages of the Bible in which it is distinctly taught, excite our wonder, and rise in importance. Is it supposable that Christ and the apostles could have *accommodated* their teachings to so hurtful and fatal an illusion ? Had they but kept silence respecting it, they would have been the occasion, not only that those of the circumcision who believed in their teachings should persist in the alarming error, but also that the Gentiles, who until now were almost strangers to this doctrine, should receive, together with the Christian faith, a superstition which, it is alleged, paralyzes its most essential benefits. Can it be believed that they were so wanting in foresight and knowledge, that they did not remark the contradiction, if it really exist, of such views with the doctrines they most earnestly enforced ; or that they had so little courage and skill in teaching, that they could not lay the axe quick and

sharp to the root of the tree which bore such poisonous fruit, and cast it into the fire? Could they have foolishly believed that this was reserved for the devil and his angels themselves; instead of perceiving that the question concerned only the wood and straw of a popular superstition, by which the temple of the pure worship of God was disfigured, and even brought near to its ruin, and which was introduced not by Moses and the prophets, but by importation from foreign sources?

Even from this view of the case we may, in the second place, draw the inference, that the alleged contradictions and dangers should not be attributed to the doctrine itself, but only to a perversion and misunderstanding of it. But against such abuse we might be insured by the simple consideration, that the relation in which the agency of Satan stands, both to God and to ourselves, cannot be different in kind from that of a man who is wholly abandoned to sin, and who pursues corrupt purposes with great energy and skill. For the devil is also a mere created being, in every respect dependent upon God. He has no power but what he receives from God, he cannot accomplish anything but what God permits. God in his providence and sovereignty rules over his acts, prescribes to them bounds and a goal, conducts them in conformity with the divine purposes, and has from eternity so ordered all things, that the kingdom of light must at last attain the victory. In short, the same views, which give us composure and trust in considering the evil and sin which men effect, should produce a like result when we think of the agency of the devil. If man's sinful deeds do not disturb our confidence in God's power and love, why should we be terrified at the evil acts of Satan? Only the sin which we freely choose or do not repel can injure, really injure our souls and endanger our salvation. If the devil should smite us with disease like Job, what matters it, so long as we preserve patience and faith? If he should tempt us with evil thoughts as he did Christ, what injury could it do us, as long as we repelled them by the word of God? And what difference can it make whether the disease come from the devil or from the infection of a sick person, whether the evil thoughts come from Satan or from a corrupt man? If the love of God and Christ dwell in us as in Paul (Rom. 8: 35—39), how will the devil be able to separate us therefrom? If we really stand on the firm basis of the Gospel, armed with the shield of faith, the helmet of salvation and the sword of the Spirit (Eph. 6: 14—17), how can we lose ground even before our great enemy? Or what in fact

is perfectly analogous, if the fellowship with sin and death by which we were united with our race before our regeneration, is superseded by our being adopted into fellowship with Christ, so that we ought never to allow our joyful consciousness of redemption and justification to be disturbed, even by the contest from which we are never exempt against the remains and after effects of our original sin, why should this consciousness be disturbed, when we think of those powers of darkness from which we have been saved and transferred into the kingdom of the Son of God? Although the darkness has not wholly passed away, although a constant warfare is necessary, yet this warfare is not different from that which we wage against the world, and we should be of good cheer because we know Him who has conquered the world and the prince of the world, (John 16: 33. 12: 31).

Besides this, we must call to mind the statements which have been made respecting the mode of action of angels in general, and especially of the devil and the evil spirits. Their mode of action does not annul the natural or moral laws, but is in analogy and harmony with them. There is no contradiction between the propositions, that a phenomenon may be explained as connected with the mechanism of physiological and psychological causes, (if we may use this most decisive expression and speak of the mechanism of living bodies), and that it may also be derived from diabolical agency. We may consider the same evils as in one point of view to be referred to the devil, and in another as originating with and conditioned by physical and ethical laws. These statements rest upon the position that the workings of Satan are not to be conceived of as isolated, accidental, coming in here and there in an arbitrary and lawless manner, but that they are to be regarded as the coherent consequences of an apostasy and of the disorder thence ensuing, which, though begun in the spiritual world, has also been communicated to the visible world. And even as bodily disease, although really at war with the whole organism of the system, has yet its regular course dependent upon the organization of the body, so the disorder which proceeds from the devil must shape and develop itself according to the natural and moral laws which prevail in the world, and is of such a nature that it can be removed and healed. With this view we must indeed renounce the argument for the existence and agency of the devil which is derived from our experience of the inexplicable intrusion of sinful thoughts and desires into our minds; but on the other hand, we do not incur the hazard, in consequence of res-

ting on such like proofs, of having them endangered or refuted by greater severity in self-examination and reflection; and thus at last of seeing the whole doctrine of the devil metamorphosed into a figure of speech; of having the devil himself become as it were but the ever-retreating boundary stone upon the confines of that obscure region of the soul into which clear perception and sound judgment have not yet penetrated.¹ What is most important in this connection is, that we avoid the superstition which believes itself justified by the notion of satanic agency in overleaping the sequence of natural causes, or in not at all inquiring what were possible or necessary according to the laws of nature; and that we set ourselves against that moral superficiality, which, in referring a sinful inclination to the devil, believes itself exempted from the trouble of searching out the latent springs and seeds of evil in one's self, of endeavoring to prevent its beginnings or of earnestly opposing its progress. If we hold fast what has been already remarked that the devil effects an entrance into man's soul only by means of man's own evil lusts, that there is no moral working of the devil upon us except through our own evil wills, that there is no fellowship with him excepting what we ourselves enter into with him, and that when we are tempted by the devil, it is always our own guilt and sin; and on the other hand, if we remember, that the devil inevitably flees from us when we oppose sin, that Christ has redeemed us from his bondage, and that although we must fight, yet that we may be certain of victory through faith in the Redeemer:—then we cannot see how it is possible that the doctrine respecting the devil can have a benumbing or dispiriting effect upon our moral and religious feelings and actions.

But another objection may be brought forward. If by referring evil and sin to the agency of the devil, we do not change anything in our way of examining or judging about the natural causes and enticements to sin, why is it necessary to suppose that he has any agency at all? For manifestly we explain nothing by it, and it is therefore entirely superfluous.

This objection were pertinent if we looked upon the doctrine respecting the devil as an hypothesis for explaining the origin of sin and evil. Then, in order to prove it, we should not have relied solely upon Scripture, but should have been obliged to deduce it directly from the facts of our own experience and conscious-

¹ Comp. Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* § 56.

ness. We readily grant that the question respecting the origin of evil is not solved, but only put back one stage further, by the doctrine of the devil. But to what purpose then the latter doctrine? It is a disclosure made by revelation of a fact that belongs to another world, and which consequently were otherwise inaccessible to our experience or reflection. And the fact is this—that each individual man does not stand alone in his sin, that he is implicated in the general sinfulness of the whole race; and, in like manner, that the human race does not stand alone in its sinfulness, but that its fall is connected with a more general and direr apostasy, in which a large part of the world of spirits is involved, and into which they drew the family of man.

But is not this fact a matter of entire indifference for us? Has it any value or significance in connection with our religious experience?

We have already seen that this doctrine is not a matter of indifference in respect to our general views of the nature, depth and extent of the corruption in which we are involved, and we now add, that it is still less a matter of indifference in view of our relation to sin and its urgent and special enticements. Will not the recollection that our personal sin is connected with a kingdom of darkness which is opposed to the kingdom of God and which aims at our utter ruin; that we have to contend with an enemy, whose fearfulness we may not dare despise, even when he uses means to get possession of us that at first sight seem harmless and in their immediate results unimportant; will it not be thought that every deviation from the path of the divine precepts, every yielding to impure lust and desire, is a snare which we put around ourselves with the possibility that it will drag us down into the abyss of diabolical evil and misery; will not this impart an earnestness, force and constancy to our abhorrence of evil and opposition to it, to our watchfulness against every temptation, such as could hardly be produced by any other representation?¹ And on the other hand, what can so strongly excite our longing for and joy in redemption, what can so enhance our love to Christ and our thankfulness to divine grace, what could be so effectual a motive to seek the aid of the Holy Spirit and to apply with fidelity and constancy all the means and appointments of the Christian scheme of redemption, as a consciousness of the danger with which the devil threatens us, from which

¹ Comp. 1 Peter 5: 8.

Christ has partly set us free, and from which we shall be entirely redeemed only through His aid?²

Yet it cannot be maintained that no person can have a deep and earnest consciousness of his guilt and sinfulness, that no one can with his whole heart feel the need of redemption and divine assistance without thinking of and believing in the devil. On this account this doctrine is not to be regarded as one of those which are absolutely essential to Christian experience, and is not to be treated as a fundamental doctrine. For myself, considering the present state of things in our own land, that many even pious and believing Christians share in the general dislike of this truth, I would not wholly disapprove of the course of one who should avoid presenting it, so far as this can be done without detriment to Scripture, if he believed that it would endanger the great end of Christian edification without bringing a gain proportionate to the disadvantage that he might fear would arise. In any case, it is far more important to make the power of sin in our own hearts deeply felt, than to picture forth the authority and sin of the devil in strong colors. Nor is this the way of the Bible; and thus far, there is ground for the position that it speaks of the devil and his works rather by the way and occasionally, than expressly and designedly. We even see that John in his Gospel does not mention the possessed, which are so often spoken of by the other evangelists; most probably out of regard to the readers and the circumstances for whom and among whom his Gospel was especially written. And in this respect we also cannot follow a better guide, than that highest rule of faith and doctrine which our church recognizes the Bible to be, with which our Confessions of faith are entirely accordant. But if any one reject the whole doctrine, then I do not see how he can justify himself in retaining the biblical expressions even for liturgical use, or in sacred poetry, that poetry, I mean, which is intended to express the actual feelings and experience of a Christian congregation.

When a doctrine is so strongly contested, as is the one we have been considering, it may conduce to the clearness of our convictions, if we compare the results to which we have come with those of other investigators in the same field; it being presupposed, that the premises are not so entirely different, that

² This is granted by Schleiermacher, so far as he in the conception of the devil finds a recognition of the truth, that man can obtain protection against evil only from the Spirit of God himself; because sin exercises over man a power which cannot be reached and vanquished by his own will, or understood by his own intellect. (*Glaubenslehre* § 58.)

that there cannot be any adjustment or reconciliation between them, for then would a comparison be empty and fruitless. And since we have made the question of the existence of the devil wholly dependent upon the declarations of Holy Scripture, without being able to go into an examination of particular passages, it may be of additional importance to compare our results with the positions of those theologians who have made it their special object to take all the passages of the Bible that refer to the doctrine, and develop their meaning with the greatest possible degree of historical impartiality and truth. Among such theologians v. Cölln, too early deceased, takes a very honorable rank. With all the difference of our theological views, I yet regard his Biblical Theology as an admirable legacy for every one who wishes to attain a thorough knowledge of the biblical basis of our faith. How stands, then, his view of the biblical doctrine respecting the devil and his kingdom in comparison with our own?

According to v. Cölln, Jesus was not convinced of the reality of demoniacal influences. It was otherwise in respect to Satan; but even Satan was not supposed by Jesus to be a distinct personal being, with definite traits and attributes of character, but only the personification of the general notion of a hostile power of evil.¹ Thus, too, it was with the apostle John; for him, Satan had only a general symbolical importance, but he did not think of him as a real personal being; he was only a sign or figure of the ungodly principle which is opposed to the ends of God's kingdom.² In the same way, Paul intends only to represent, in a sensible form, the principle of evil; he speaks of it, not in abstract phrases, but in a concrete manner, as Satan.³

Abstracting, now, from all which is unessential or of but secondary importance (to which belongs v. Cölln's view, that the evil principle for which the apostles used the word Satan as a symbol, is nothing but our earthly desires, or our vain sensual lusts), this theologian agrees with us in the view, that the idea of an evil power, hostile to the kingdom of God, lies at the basis of what Christ and the apostles have said respecting Satan. And according to our own views, this is the chief thing, although we should recollect that there must be something in the idea itself which led Jesus and the apostles to understand and represent it⁴ in the pre-

¹ Von Cölln's *Biblische Theologie*, Th. II p. 73.

² The same, p. 234.

³ The same, p. 237.

⁴ If, for example, evil be nothing but a transitory manifestation of the fluctuations that necessarily result from the conflict between the sensual and rational

cise concrete way they did; and this, too, although this designation of the evil principle as Satan be nothing more than a mere personification. But here comes up the very point of contest, as to the personal existence of the devil and his angels.

In regard to this, there are two extreme opinions, both opposed to the doctrine of the church. The one is, that which v. Cölln maintains, that the doctrine rests upon a mere personification, and is therefore only the product of a mode of exhibiting and understanding the notion of an evil principle, corresponding with the culture of the times. The other extreme view would be, if it was conceived that in Satan evil itself had become personal, had come, if we may use the phrase, to a consciousness of itself, that in him evil was concentrated into a self-conscious personality; as, according to some physiological views, disease is not merely the cause of the deposit or discharge of peccant matter (*materia peccans*), but sometimes attains an independent existence in malignant ulcers, or in some unnatural forms of organization, which may have the semblance of health, but are wholly opposed to it. It is not to be denied that some such conception of it must have been in the minds of many who supposed they were talking about the devil in a very orthodox way; but it is not the doctrine of the church. According to the true view, the general evil power has indeed become a matter of conscious experience, and in this sense has attained to personality; but only in beings who were originally created good and for good, but who have voluntarily given themselves up to sin, or have let themselves become subject to this evil power. Von Cölln, and every body else, will concede the truth of the last statement in its application to the human race. The difference of the doctrine of the church is then only this, that it asserts that higher spirits have fallen, have fallen deeper than man, have fallen so deep that they exhibit in themselves personified evil itself. If the possibility of this (as we believe we have proved) cannot be denied, why will we rather force a personification into the words of Jesus and the apostles, than take the natural sense of the expressions as the true opinion of those that uttered them?

nature (those two factors of our moral life), this mode of representing it would be inconceivable even as a symbolical one. Take the two propositions—Ananias has a diabolical thought—and, a diabolical thought has got hold of Ananias (Acts 5:3); only the second of these can be understood as meaning to give a figurative representation of the notion that it was put into him by a personal evil spirit distinct from himself, even though one might have a fancy very much inclined to personifications.

ARTICLE VI.

CONDITION OF THEOLOGY IN HOLLAND, ESPECIALLY IN THE REFORMED CHURCH.*

By B. B. Edwards, Professor at Andover.

EVERY attentive observer of the religious state of Central and Northern Europe, must be struck with the radical differences which distinguish the theology of Holland from that of Germany. At first view, these differences seem to be unaccountable. The two nations have the same origin; they speak dialects of the same original tongue; they are near neighbors, separated in part only by a river; both have fought the battles of Protestantism, and have, alike, a precious martyrology; both look back with gratitude to the same restorers of learning, the Erasmuses and Reuchlins of the sixteenth century; the students of both countries have been distinguished for laborious industry and accurate investigation; eminent classical and oriental scholars adorn the annals of both; yet how unlike, in many respects, have been, and still are, the theological characteristics of Germany and Holland.

In Germany, the discussion has often turned on the question between Christianity and absolute skepticism. A party, within the church, have attempted to destroy, not only the church system, but Christianity, and even religion itself. This party has not been weak or small. It has had bold, able, and energetic leaders, unable or unwilling to build up theology and the church, but keen in detecting defects, vigilant in seizing on the favorable moment to overthrow an established truth, adroit in imposing their sophisms on the susceptible hearts of the young. Their system is that of negations; their weapons are sarcasm and jeers; they would not reform Christianity, but abolish it, as ill adapted to the times, obsolete, like the ritual system of the Old Testament.

Again, the diversity of views among those who call themselves orthodox, and who may be regarded as real friends of the church, is almost infinitely greater in Germany than in Holland. Not taking into the account the Roman Catholics, and small sects like the Swedenborgians, what wide and diversified modes of thinking

¹ The greater portion of the following article is translated or condensed from a paper by Dr. Ullmann of Heidelberg, in the "Studien u. Kritiken," 3d No., 1844, and from the "Kirchliche Statistik," by Dr. Julius Wiggers of Rostock, Vol. II. 1843, pp. 253—298. A few of the first pages are original.

prevail! It is sometimes said that the old rationalism is dead or dying; but it is not so. It still has unwearied and learned champions; it is strongly rooted in a large mass of educated mind. There are still those who make human reason the ground and criterion of religious truth, though they do not consider the Kantian philosophy the basis, but rather rely upon the Hegelian or some other system.

In a general point of view, the German theologians may be divided into three parties, the followers of Hegel, those of Schleiermacher, and the old orthodox party. Yet these are mingled with each other to such an extent, that it is difficult to determine the position of many individuals. It is well known that the Hegelian party include men of decided orthodox views, as well as those of the wildest rationalism. The nomenclature, which has been adopted from the French Convention, but partially designates the actual divisions which exist.

The individuals who were strongly affected by Schleiermacher, and who adopt his views more or less, have little bond of union among themselves. Some of them decidedly incline to the old Lutheran symbols; others are vacillating between orthodoxy and rationalism. In the writings of some, a loose criticism abounds; in others, an historical faith is firmly vindicated.

Even those theologians who take their position, with great decision, on the Church doctrines, are not altogether harmonious. The orthodoxy of some is more exclusive than that of others. Some lean to what is common in the several Protestant Confessions; others adhere tenaciously to the identical words of their peculiar creed; with some, the understanding is predominant; the faith of others has a strong mystical element; a portion fiercely contend for the union of church and State; another part are ready to deny, altogether, the right of the State to interfere in ecclesiastical matters. In short, an exact classification of German theologians seems to be out of the question.

It follows, necessarily, from the above statements, that there is a boundless mental activity in Germany. Society, in certain aspects of it, is stirred to its foundations. Intellectual tranquillity is a condition but little known. Discussion provokes discussion, controversy succeeds controversy, while the common ground, on which theologians in former days stood, has become very narrow. In Holland, on the contrary, the intellectual world has never been thoroughly aroused. The changes, that have occurred, have been, for the most part, gradual and silent. Adherence to the ancient

standards has been the motto in science and literature, as well as in theology. The multiform disputes, which have rent in sunder the theologians on the other side of the Rhine, if known, have been regarded with indifference or contempt.

Now why this marked difference between the two nations? What causes have produced so wide a diversity? Without attempting to answer this question fully, we may hint at two or three considerations which have had a decided influence.

The intellect of Holland has had, in some important respects, a far wider scope for development than that of Germany. Holland has enjoyed a greater degree of civil freedom than perhaps any continental country. It has often been the asylum of the exiled republican, as well as of the persecuted Protestant. Political and Christian liberty owes it a great debt. The intellect of the country has here had free vent. The mind, that might have been plunging into the mysteries of the divine decrees, or of the absolute reason, has been strenuously occupied in resisting Spanish or French aggression. But in Germany, with the exception of a brief interval after the battle of Jena, there has been no such outlet. The political press is an insignificant affair. A severe censorship has restrained every liberal tendency. Dungeons and immense standing armies have been ready to crush the first uttered aspiration in favor of liberty. Of course, the mind, shut out from this great field, has turned, with convulsive ardor, to theology and abstract science. The more narrow the arena for discussion, the wilder the movement within that arena. The despotisms of Germany are accountable for no small share of the infidelity that has given a bad eminence to the country. Paulus and Wegscheider and Strauss are the natural growth of an irresponsible monarchy. The mind will assert its freedom in some direction; coerced on one point, it will violently break out on another.

Again, Holland had, for many years, a wide and prosperous foreign commerce. Much of the intellectual activity of the people flowed in the channels of trade. Commercial, not mental, wealth, became the object of eager enterprise. On the other hand, the greater part of Germany is shut out from commercial activity. No large rivers or bays intersect her principalities. An important branch of her enterprise has centered at the Leipsic fair; her merchants are dealers in books. She has lived within herself.

Again, Holland is one country, compact, homogeneous, acknowledging one sovereign, with common ancestral recollections, with peculiar and strongly marked features of character. The stu-

dent at Gröningen does not differ much from his brother at Leyden. A close family resemblance is everywhere manifest. But Germany is a labyrinth of States and kingdoms, in some respects, indeed, subject to a central power, but too weak and insulated to figure on the field of politics, if opportunities were allowed; yet willing and able to meet anywhere in intellectual conflict. In other words, the numerous political divisions of Germany are a source of active mental rivalry. Bavaria enters the lists against Saxony; Dresden provokes Munich; the university of Göttingen is the foster-child of its government; while Prussia strenuously endeavors to make Berlin outshine, not only its German competitors, but all European universities. This unceasing rivalry among fifteen or twenty great literary establishments, is a principal cause of the activity of the German mind, and of the great diversities of opinion which prevail. Each university must have its literary organ and its distinguishing peculiarities. Each, by its adventurous theories, or its sound opinions in science and literature, must be an honor to the government which maintains it.

We may mention the predominant religious creeds, as another cause of the different condition of theology in the two countries. Holland is Calvinistic, Germany is Lutheran. In the tenets of the Genevan reformer, there is more logical exactness, more scientific discrimination, and consequently more permanent elements, than in the formulas of Luther and Melancthon. On some important points, the Saxon reformers hesitated and retracted. This wavering tendency somewhat characterizes their Symbols. The door is left open for doubt, discussion and change. Calvin's theory, on the contrary, as it has been finely said,¹ is symbolized by the two great natural objects on which he daily looked. It has the steadfastness and rugged form of the Alps, and the transparency of the Lake of Geneva. This decided, unyielding theory has had, doubtless, great effects on the Dutch character. It has imparted its own fixedness to its disciples.

Again, some of the eminent philologists of Holland have chosen to hold little intercourse with their German cousins. Wyttenbach was a most strenuous adversary of the Kantian metaphysics. Van Heusde studied them, as he informs us, but found no rest to his spirit till he had wholly escaped from their influence. This disinclination to German learning, is seen also in the department of philology, as the latter, in the German mode of handling it,

¹ The late Rev. J. Henry Bancroft.

would bear some decided traces of the former. The same thing would necessarily hold good of theology and religion. Non-intercourse in one field of labor would hardly tend to an active sympathy in another. The Holland theologian, witnessing the lamentable effects of the boundless skepticism, that has characterized much of the theology of Germany, binds closer to his heart the beloved and venerable words of his Symbols.

Another cause of the difference in question may be found in the practical character of the inhabitants of Holland. The Dutch are a sensible, sober, cautious people, with little inclination for metaphysical and mystical extravagance. The Germans are strongly inclined to search for the abstruse, the profound, the most secret causes and relations of things. In this inward, ideal world, they often become estranged, to their own detriment, from the world of fact. Hence, while the Germans, like a gifted, aspiring, intellectual youth, have been constantly absorbed in the attempt to reach the highest ideals in Christian knowledge and the religious life, running from system to system, examining an immense amount of intellectual productions with all their wonderful phenomena, without accomplishing thereby anything really perceptible or tenable for the benefit of the outward life,—the Dutch, in this respect more like Englishmen, and in the manner of safe and quiet men, have put up a strong and comfortable house, not being very careful to ascertain whether the foundation is laid in the profoundest depth, but rather anxious to possess a dwelling sufficiently firm and well-contrived,—a defence against the storms of life. Thus, both for the foundation and completion of the ecclesiastical polity, the Dutch have firmly adhered to a theology which has been tried by long use. They have not thrown anything away, without repeatedly and anxiously inquiring whether it might not still be useful; they have not readily received anything, though ever so splendid and imposing, of whose worth and stability they had not ocular proof; more particularly they have not abandoned that ground which had been found by the experience of centuries and the personal observation of innumerable believers, to be the only tenable one. For these reasons, they have opposed, more or less exclusively, the great movements of German theology, so far as these have originated in philosophy, regarding philosophical investigations themselves as mere experiments. On the other hand, as a natural result, their own theology would be more employed in the investigation and culture of known truths, and of facts which have come down from former

times. Avoiding everything revolutionary, this theology would assume the character of a quiet, moderate progress, a kind of historical continuity. With this is naturally associated the fact, that the Dutch have prosecuted with special zeal and success, not so much systematic divinity in its speculative tendencies, as historical and exegetical theology. For them, as good Protestants, the investigation and exposition of the Scriptures would be the central point of divinity;—a field which supplies, in one aspect, the charms of philological inquiry, and in the other, by its results, the best and richest materials for popular use.

In these general characteristics,—the quiet adherence to the Christian foundation, the calm, devout handling of that which has come down from former times, the predominant interest in exegetical study and the thorough attachment to the practical,—all the Holland theologians of name agree; so far, taken as a whole, they stand on common ground. Some of them are indeed inclined, without forming any special party, to make wider investigations within this common field, either in the historical department, like the two fundamental ecclesiastical investigators of Holland, Kist and Royaards,¹ or in the exegetical and practical, like the excellent Van Hengel, or in the entire circuit of scientific theology, like the worthy Clarisse. Yet within this common territory, we may distinguish some very definitely marked movements, which are similar, indeed, to the opposing tendencies of German theology, but which differ from them by peculiar modifications.

Leaving out of view such as have adopted no definite party organization, like the individuals just named, or such as have no scientific importance, the theological world in Holland may be distinguished into three classes or tendencies. Like a connected chain, they are so far joined together that each later movement is conditioned on the earlier; yet they are not related to each other like the wider evolutions of one and the same principle, but like opposing principles which are held together only by a very broad and general Christian basis. The first movement or tendency has no very sharply defined characteristic, but in the course of time, has been unfolded, as it were, out of itself, unobserved; the second is very strongly marked and is sternly opposed to the first; while the third, in its attempts to effect a reconciliation between the other two, has come into conflict with both.

I. By a fundamental law of the State, dated Aug. 24, 1815,

¹ Editor of the instructive "*Archives for Netherlands Church History.*"

freedom of opinion and worship, equality in civil and political rights and equal access to all offices and honors, were granted to all religious sects. Still the reformed, or Calvinistic church, in accordance with the decisions of the synod of Dort, is the religion of the government. It is the faith of the majority of the people. It has in fact the character of a State religion, and it is the only one which is taught in the higher State institutions and in the theological faculties of the universities. It consists almost wholly of those who speak the Dutch language. It includes, however, twenty Walloon or French Churches, four English and two Scotch Presbyterian churches, and one German church.

For centuries, the people of Holland held fast to their ancient faith at the cost of the blood of many martyrs. At length, however, by manifold influences from abroad, by the effects of English deism, French materialism, and German rationalism, in connection with the political revolutions which affected every department of the religious community, by the usual results of a prosperous commerce and the influx of wealth, the ancient orthodoxy had been decidedly weakened. At the end of the last century, the flame of piety, though still burning, had lost much of its original warmth and brightness. The quiet and unimpassioned national temperament, indeed, prevented that wide departure from the truth, which would seek to array itself against the Symbols, or involve the church in heated controversies. The change was altogether gradual. It was not the darkness of entire unbelief. The people still retained their church-going habits and a reverence for sacred usages. Even the sermons, in their close adherence to the letter of the Bible, contributed to maintain the connection with the orthodox creeds. Under these superficial forms, not a little living piety was concealed. In the upper classes, the decline of religion and orthodoxy was more marked. Many discontinued attendance upon public worship; others exhibited a merely cold compliance with the outward forms. Such, however, did not sink down to the low level of German rationalism. The sermons did not degenerate into mere dry, moral essays. The theology might be described as a lax supranaturalism, mingled in individuals with rationalistic sympathies and tendencies. It was a kind of rational orthodoxy. Its course, in some respects, was like that of the earlier Leipsic and Tübingen schools (Storr, Ernesti, Morus). Its studies were specially exegetical, critical and apologetical, in contrast with a negative rationalism, or philosophical modes of inquiry. It regarded Christianity as a set of

ethical rules, as a summary of articles of faith, or as an expansion of the knowledge of divine things which we gain by reason. Every thorough explanation of the Scriptures, in order to show their agreement with the doctrines of the church, was decried as mysticism. In sermons, the doctrines of native depravity, regeneration, the necessity of the influences of the Holy Spirit, when not denied or passed by, were not placed in the fore-ground, while the dignity and worth of human nature were brought out in strong relief.

At the same time, the ministry of the Reformed church, with all their interest in exegetical theology, did not strive for a profound scientific acquaintance with the contents of the Bible, in order to show, in particulars, its indwelling truth and necessity; but they satisfied themselves with a learned examination and a careful exposition of single passages. So, also, in consequence of the narrowness of its principle of interpretation, it failed to place any special value on a fuller development of the meaning of the Scripture, in its bearing on the doctrines of the church. Rather has it always been inclined to discover in such a development that which disturbs and corrupts Christianity. Still, on the contrary, it did not come out against such a mode of inquiry with sharp criticism and polemic zeal; but preferred, in its peculiarly moderate and forbearing manner, to pass by or round anything which appeared to be antiquated, or to soften the roughness with which it seemed to come into conflict with apostolic authority.

A natural consequence of this latitudinarian mode of interpreting the church Symbols, was a doctrinal amalgamation with the other Confessions, especially with that of the Evangelical church. Under the name of *verdraagsamkeit*, a habit of toleration was introduced, which did not recognize any of the differences and limits of particular evangelical communions, while it laid its own church doctrines, as an offering, on the altar of a general Christianity. The Reformed Church harmonized so closely with its old opponents, the Remonstrants, that the latter seemed to differ from the former only by the want of all symbolical books, catechisms, and church formularies. Preachers of the Reformed church exercised their office in the churches of the Remonstrants, while the latter appeared in the pulpits of the Reformed congregations. The same brotherly intercourse was also held with Mennonites and Lutherans. The inquiry was even loudly made, whether all the different evangelical parties in Holland might not be merged in a single church. With this tendency to make all articles of faith

general and indefinite, were connected changes, which were introduced at the commencement of the present century, by the church authorities, in relation to public worship and the constitution of the church, and which began with the introduction of evangelical hymns. There had been used previously, in public worship, only a version of the Psalms, sufficiently prosaic, to which twelve other church hymns were added, namely, the Songs of Mary, Simeon, Zacharias, etc. At the instance of the Synod of North Holland, in 1796, all the provincial synods appointed a Commission from their number to prepare an evangelical hymn-book for the use of the churches. This was everywhere introduced in Jan. 1807, and was received in general with great approbation. Only in some villages of Friesland, and in the city of Vliessingen, was opposition publicly aroused; this was put down by church censure. Those who, in the silence of the return of the prince of Orange, in 1813, expected the removal of the hymn-book, were disappointed by the statement, which followed in the name of the prince, and which decidedly approved of the hymns. The contents of these hymns were by no means in opposition to the doctrines of the church; but that to which the adherents of the ancient church took exception, was the novelty and strangeness of any collection of hymns. Afterwards, the General Synod introduced other changes. Several ordinances followed for the abolition of some liturgical regulations, which related to the baptismal and eucharistic festivals. The public confirmation of newly admitted members of the church, a religious service on the last day of the year, and a festival in honor of the Reformation, were introduced. There was also a mitigation of church censures, in respect to the immoralities of the laity. The most important change, however, and which was effected by the synod of 1816, respected the regulation, which candidates for the ministry were required to sign at their examination, and which required a strict and unchangeable subscription to the Belgic Confession, the Heidelberg Catechism, and the Articles of the Synod of Dort. This was altered into the following indefinite and ambiguous formula: "We, the undersigned, admitted by the provincial church authorities of * * * * to the Christian ministry in the Netherlands Reformed Church, hereby sincerely affirm, that we will carefully consult the interests of Christianity in general and of the Netherlands Reformed communion in particular; that we sincerely adopt and heartily believe the doctrines which, *in accordance with the holy word of God*, are contained in the Symbols of the Netherlands Re-

formed church; that we will zealously teach and practise the same, and will devote ourselves, with all earnestness, to the promotion of religious knowledge, Christian morals, order and unity; while, by this subscription, made with our own hands, we engage to submit to all superiors and to the decisions of the lawful church authorities, in case our conduct may be found to be contrary to any part of this declaration and of this promise." It was this innovation especially on which the opposition of the strictly orthodox, which had been ripening in secret, grounded its complaint, that the Netherlands Church had apostatized from its ancient faith, and on account of which, it demanded a return to the old church doctrines.

We may here remark, in passing, that the literary organ of this school, i. e. of the majority of the Dutch church, is the "Theological Contributions", which, after the manner of the English journals, supplies very instructive articles on new theological works. "So far as the spirit of this journal is concerned," says an intelligent writer, "it rests on the grammatico-historical exposition of the New Testament, and takes unwearied pains to build on the basis of a rational supranaturalism. Of the German works which it now and then notices, those of Bretschneider, Winer, and Fritzsche receive special commendation." The boast of this journal, as well as of the school to which it belongs, is exegesis. In this department, it would seek to reestablish the old fame of Holland.

II. While this indifference to the doctrines of the church was increasing, while the church itself, silently or openly, was departing from its creed on many points, and while practical religion was losing all its fervor, a new school sprung up with determined energy, at once assuming the exclusive character of a party. Its true origin is undoubtedly to be traced to the necessities of the times, or rather to the wants of the soul. The individuals, who first gave an impulse to this movement were William Bilderdyk¹ and his two scholars, the converted Portuguese Jew, Isaac da Costa of Amsterdam, a lawyer and also a poet, and Abraham Cappadose, a physician at the Hague. The two last named, particularly, exhibited in their various writings, with great emphasis and in all its strictness, the doctrine of election which was

¹ The modern poetic literature of Holland lost its master in Bilderdyk. He died in 1831. The depth and copiousness of his talents, his mastery of the language, the warmth of his conceptions, the riches of his invention—are qualities, some one of which may be found in this or that living poet; they are united in the degree in which they were found in Bilderdyk, in no one." *Sup. Cons. Lxx. XXXII. 1840.*

sinking into oblivion, and contended for the abstract predestination, maintained by the Synod of Dort. The educated part of the community was first affected by their writings and lectures. The movement then rapidly extended among the body of the people. The views of the party were first publicly preached in Ulrum, an insignificant village. They then spread into the provinces, particularly Gröningen, Drenthe, North Brabant and Holland. Among its earnest advocates were five preachers, De Cock, Scholte, Brummel Kamp, Van Rhee and Meerburg. The opposition assumed a definite shape, when De Cock and Scholte, in 1833, arrayed themselves against an ordinance, by setting aside the church hymns as Siren songs, and by complaining that the whole church had apostatized from the truth. On the thirteenth of Oct. 1834, a separation from the Reformed church was publicly effected. The new community, numbering, as its adherents reported, 80,000 persons, was organized under the name of the "true reformed church"; another account represents the communicants as only 4000, and these, almost without exception, from the lower and uneducated classes. In 1838, a church was organized by Scholte in Utrecht, under the name of the "Christian separate church." Other churches were soon established elsewhere. They adopted the Belgic Confession, the Heidelberg Catechism and the canons of the Synod of Dort as the expression of their faith. The ministers, elders and deacons were chosen by the church. The ordination of a minister was preceded by an examination, when he was required to subscribe the symbolical books, "since they agree in all things with the word of God." Such members of the church as had the gift of expounding the Scriptures, might preach, with the consent of the officers of the church. The laws in relation to marriage, the watch over the moral conduct, and household religious instruction, bore the stamp of great strictness.

These decided movements could not, of course, escape the animadversion of the national church or of the civil government. The National Synod separated the true reformers from their communion, laid the doctrines under a kind of interdict, deposed the preachers, who had openly espoused the party, and ordered the schismatics to vacate the church edifices which they held, as these were the property of the national church. The government confirmed these decisions, and ordered the military to lend their assistance in executing them when it was necessary. In two places, detachments of curiassiers were stationed to exclude

the dissenters from the church. This precaution gave a character and consequence to the new doctrines, in the view of their supporters, and even of those, who were before indifferent, which they had not possessed. Instead of public worship in the sanctuary, numerous private meetings were held in the fields, in the woods, in barns, where the pastor addressed and animated his persecuted flock. The laws now interposed their authority. The meetings of the "true reformers" were broken up, on the ground of a statute which was in force when the French had possession of the country, and which forbade the assembling of more than twenty persons for a religious purpose, without the sanction of the government. This persecution was directed particularly against the preacher Scholte. In spite of his own defence and of able influential friends, he was punished with fine and imprisonment.

Already, numerous petitions had been presented to the king, in which the adherents of the new movement, appealing to the express words of the fundamental law, "freedom of religious opinion is granted to all," and "the public exercise of any form of religious belief cannot be impeded, except where the peace of society is disturbed," prayed for the right and freedom of enjoying these privileges. After the first sentence of the civil tribunal, and before the court to which the defendants had appealed had decided the case, the king, on the 13th of Dec. 1835, published a cabinet rescript, in which he expressed the great pain which the new schism had occasioned him, authoritatively required the dissenters to return into the bosom of the church, and refused their request to be authorized to maintain public worship so long as they did not submit the regulation of the same to his approval. Immediately the court of appeal at the Hague affirmed the judgment of the lower court, and, by a circular of the war minister, different detachments of the army received orders to render instant and efficient aid to the local authorities in carrying out the measures which had been decided upon against the "true reformers." Since the latter were not all frightened by these movements, but rather proceeded in their meetings as before, resort was again had to the courts. On one occasion, when Scholte and seven of his accused friends, left the court-house at Utrecht, they were attacked by an infuriated multitude. The house in which Scholte took refuge was assailed, and in spite of the presence of a company of soldiers, the doors and windows were broken in, and further excesses were with difficulty prevented. All such things,

however, only increased the courage and spirit of the "true reformers," who now began to regard themselves as martyrs to the pure faith. Their number increased, distinguished men defended them, and the government were made to feel that they could not violently suppress them.

The following observations upon the nature of this movement are made by Dr. Ullmann: "As we are here concerned only with that which is properly theological, we will advert simply to the germ of this movement, not to the rind that is partly sour and unfit to be eaten, and in which, besides, some things are found which do not at all belong to it. The essential, theological point, however, the object after which the party is striving, is to reëstablish in its entire compass, in its full strength, the old Dort orthodoxy. On the way to this object, they have sometimes proceeded in an excited and tumultuous manner, and have not always used philosophical means; still, this rather concerns the partial development and church usage; and on this point alone has it been laid hold of by the highest ecclesiastical and political authorities of Holland, since these authorities, altogether unwilling to place difficulties in the path of the orthodox on account of their creed, have labored merely to promote the unity and quiet of the church. We are far from regarding this theological movement as something merely fantastic, or an affected prejudice in favor of what is old, or mere obstinacy, or at all as hypocrisy; we rather find it, under the relations just specified, and in an entirely natural form, in men that have spiritual and deep-felt necessities; and we recognize its objective justification through the entire ecclesiastical and theological history of Holland. We see that what the party in question strives after is only a simple thing. These men, in whom theology is not merely the learning which has been wont hitherto to be so predominant, search for religion, and in this religion not that which in its main features is *theistic*, moral and abstract, but what is individual and living, that which tends to seize strongly and permanently upon the inmost feelings of man. They decidedly elevate above everything else those fundamental doctrines of Christianity, which, current in the church from the beginning, have formed especially the doctrinal basis of the evangelical, the reformed churches. Thus, as laymen, they have engaged, not in a critical, analytical process; they have rather followed the necessities of their own hearts; above all else, they have longed for something to quiet a troubled conscience, for the certainty of the forgiveness of sins, and of expiation; and these

they have found in a manner perfectly satisfying in the old church doctrine of the vicarious atonement of the Son of God. A theology, which would in the first place still investigate, and which might possibly lead to a solution of difficulties, or to mere negations; a theology always occupied with that which is *about to be*, subjected to the fluctuations of the spirit of the age, was to them a nullity, an abhorrence. They would have a firm creed and current once for all, a theology, that, arising from the church, should serve only and alone to uphold the doctrine of the church; they did not content themselves with the belief of the last ten years in divine revelation, held with tolerable uniformity, but they summoned all men to reëstablish a sharply defined church orthodoxy. Hence they strenuously urged the Dort Confession, which had not been given up in the church of Holland, and they believed that the church could retain safe and unimpaired her sacred treasures of faith, only by binding all her servants strongly on this Confession. Now we cannot refuse to justify this feeling. The church doctrine has certainly the right, acknowledged in the church, of being taught and vindicated; a reaction against the earlier state of things, threatening mischief by its theological *indifferentism* and lukewarmness, might be salutary; it was good also to remember what treasures of faith and of thought are contained in the doctrines of the church, and which, accordingly, should not be neglected, or be cast overboard unnoticed. The party were far from wishing to bring back church orthodoxy as a mere external thing, as a mere law. Its genuine representatives, especially its original authors, who took no part in the subsequent schism, lived in fact, with their whole heart and soul, in the doctrines of the church, and endeavored, partly by means of spirited and persuasive writings, again to bring near and implant in the bosoms of their contemporaries the contents of the church creed.

Yet, notwithstanding all these things, this party has labored and still labors under defects that cannot be mistaken. In addition to a course of conduct objectionable in several respects, which it, as a party, has carried out, the following things cannot be denied: It is a very narrow limit in which to confine the thinking and life of the Christian. Not only Christian faith, but the form in which it is presented, is, with the adherents of this movement, made ready once for all; and as, on the one hand, its adherents misapprehend what is human, temporary and imperfect in the expression of the symbols of which the men of the 16th and 17th centuries were the authors, so, on the other hand,

they mistake the demand of our times, which is to exhibit the articles of faith, in themselves unchangeable, in a form which springs from our own hearts and corresponds to our necessities; on the position of this party the principle of freedom and progress is lost;—a principle which not only lies at the foundation of the evangelical church, but which dwells unalienably in Christianity; a principle, without which a fresh and happy development of theology is inconceivable. Consequently, with all the zeal of this party for the church, they neglect, at the same time, that power—a sound culture of theology—without which the duration of a truly living church, especially an evangelical one, is not possible. This is shown in the fact, that in the Journals, successively originated by them, “*The Voices of the Netherlands*,” “*The Olive Branch*,” and “*The Reformation*,” the practical and the edifying widely predominate, while that which is properly scientific is altogether subordinate, yea in a measure, it plays a melancholy part. But if the evangelical church must be always so constituted, that a sound Christian theology and its free movement will have, throughout its entire organization, the adequate room and a corresponding interest, then a movement, which either neglects this scientific development, or hinders its vigorous action, can never be considered, whatever good it may do elsewhere, as the pure expression of the evangelical and Protestant principle and spirit.”

III. Since in the way just described, one of these parties, with all its zeal for theological learning, is deficient in a fresh religious and Christian life, as well as in doctrinal precision, while the other party, with its burning zeal for the church and the faith of the fathers, is lacking in free and fundamental views of science, the necessity occurred of a third party, to stand between the other two, whose proper office would be to combine, and bring into a higher unity, the spirit of inquiry belonging to one of the parties, and the inward, living piety of the other, and so avoid the defects of both. Thus, while at the same time, the elements of the modern German theology coöperated to excite and direct inquiry, and under the influence of the spirit which had been awakened by Professor Van Heusde, the active Christian Platonist,¹ there arose what has been commonly called the Grö-

¹ Philip Van Heusde was born at Rotterdam in 1778, studied under Wyttenbach at Leyden, and was appointed Professor of Ancient History, Eloquence and Greek Literature at the university of Utrecht, in 1803. He died, while on a journey, at Geneva, on the 23th of July, 1839. He was an enthusiastic stu-

ningen School. Its object was an attempt to effect a reconciliation between the other two parties ; still it does not anxiously seek to accord with the methods of thinking adopted by them, or to bring together, mechanically, a third party from the elements of the other two ; but it rests on a principle of its own, and proceeds with the fresh energy of a living development. This movement does not exhibit the fleeting indefiniteness of the old rational supranaturalism, nor the exclusive party character of the opposing orthodox school. At the same time, as it is occupied especially with the department of science, we may well name it a school, though one of its representatives protests against this appellation, because a sharply defined, sectarian mode of thinking cannot be affirmed of it. Its organ is the "Truth in Love," (*Waarheid in Liefde*). Its fundamental principle is, that the Christian life is the life of communion with God, as this life was exhibited in its untroubled purity and creative fulness in Christ, the God-man, and from him,—enlightening, sanctifying, redeeming,—spreads over the entire circle of humanity, for the edification of the people of God. Its position is that of Christian science, so far as it vindicates freedom of discussion and the use of criticism, while both these are employed on the fundamental basis, not merely of a religious, but of a specifically Christian sentiment.

The more exact distinctions, however, between the Gröningen theology and the opposing schools are these. It differs from the older supranaturalism particularly in the fact, that without neglecting exegesis, it, at the same time, makes use of a philosophical method, i. e. it seeks for the internal grounds of the Christian truths ; it treats Christianity more in its completeness, as a new principle of the entire life of man, than as a mere rule or doctrine. Accordingly, it does not find the central point of Christianity in rules or doctrines, but in the person of Christ,¹ in the person of the God-man, fully revealing the Divinity, and thus redeeming and atoning. From this central point, it seeks to represent Christianity as a living, organic whole, and by this mode of representation, it does not confine itself merely to the Scriptures, though in no manner does it put them into the back-ground ; but, placing it-

dent of Plato. Among his writings are, *Specimen Criticum in Platonem, Initia Philosophiæ Platoniciæ, Scholæ Socraticæ*, 4 vols., *Characterismi Principum Philosophorum Veterum*, and *Schola Polybiana*. His life has been published by his nephew, J. A. C. Rovers, Utrecht, 1841.

¹ To put doctrines in the place of the person of our Lord, was, according to the Gröningen school, an invention of neology, at the close of the eighteenth century.

self on a more general historical position, it includes, at the same time, the whole developed history of the church, in order to show how, in this history, the living influences, proceeding from Christ, have been proved and confirmed; and how, thereby, many things have been made clear to us, which we should not so fully understand by the representations of the Gospel, which rather presents germs and suggestions.

With the recent, high-toned orthodoxy, the Gröningen school has come, as it seems, into more earnest conflict than with the older, more quiet school. It stands in special opposition to the former from the fact, that though it recognizes, in a higher degree, the importance of history for the Christian faith and theological science, yet it can regard no point in the historical development as fixing a standard for all future times. On the other hand, it maintains, that every period, awakened to its spiritual wants, will always start anew the problem how it shall take up, in its *own* manner, the substance of the Christian faith (its integrity being unimpaired), and how it shall, in a corresponding manner, express its *own* stages of growth. Accordingly, it does not bind our mode of comprehending the faith to the formulas of church Confessions. In opposition to symbolism, it adopts the principle of freedom, of which it makes actual use in relation to several modes of representation adopted by the church. Still, it is to be remarked, that the Gröningen school by no means assume a negative or hostile attitude towards the church doctrines on essential points, but on the basis of Christian theism, it recognizes everything which we regard as fundamental in the church doctrines, namely, the godhead of Christ, native depravity, the positive character of sin, the need of the atonement, the effecting of redemption and expiation through Christ, regeneration by the Holy Spirit, the church and its means of grace, the Christian eschatology, with the exception, so far as it is known to us, of only a single important point—the doctrine of satisfaction—which it actively opposes in the form adopted by the church.

If we now briefly recapitulate, it will appear, that in Holland, at the close of the last century, and in the first two *decenniums* of the present, theology was in a quiet state, still relying on the ancient faith, but yet in silence deviating from it more or less consciously; the theologian was Christian in his motives, and at the furthest remove from aught unchurchlike in his feelings; but still a mere learned interest predominated, while he was wanting in

fresh, living, spiritual activity.¹ On the other hand, since the second decennium of the present century, a decidedly *regressive* party has arisen, animated by great energy of religious feeling and regard for antiquity, very zealous for the faith of the fathers, yet looking, in a manner quite exclusive, only to the stability and absolute unity of the church—not to evangelical freedom, and that growth of science which rests upon it. But in the course of the third decennium, both parties, but particularly the last, are met by a living, *progressive* movement, striving for a new development, which is to rest on a Christian basis, mingling the interests of the church and science, treating the doctrines, which lie at the foundation of the Christian life, with spirit and learning; while, by means of the evangelical freedom which it has strenuously defended, it seeks to clothe these doctrines in new, higher, and more vital forms. A clear, practical understanding is characteristic of the first party; a warm, excited imagination, fervent feeling, and a will energetic and even violent, are predominant in the second party; the third strives for an harmonious union of thought and feeling, for a theology that can satisfy the entire man. In accordance with its leading principle, the orthodox party stands on the position of Calvinistic *Particularism*, while the two other parties represent the Christian *Universality*, with the exception, that the specific peculiarity of Christianity is brought out by the Gröningen school more prominently, while it also connects the attainment of salvation more definitely to the person and redeeming work of Christ. The only contest, of a very decided type, that has occurred, was between the *regressive* and the *progressive* parties, in relation to the binding nature of the doctrines contained in the Symbols of the Netherlands church. Between the older Holland theology and the modern Gröningen school, there is, properly, no opposition, but only a difference, and a difference of that nature as will again form, in various degrees, a transition from the one to the other.

The preceding sketches will make the positions which we advanced at the head of this article, obvious to all, viz. That the entire condition of theology in Holland is incomparably more simple than that of the German theology. "The three parties, that have been characterized, stand on *Christian* ground; all acknowl-

¹ These are the words of Ullmann. That they express a somewhat too favorable view of the state of piety and orthodoxy, in the Dutch Reformed Church, there can be no doubt. The best authorities agree in representing that a sad degeneracy, both in religious feeling and opinion, had been long going on.

edge in Christianity, both historically and doctrinally, objective truth, and a divine revelation ; all, in the last resort, would draw their Christian knowledge from the Scriptures ; they desire an evangelical church in its purity and primitive character ;¹ they would have it independent, and as a source of living, moral energy for the present times. The difference between them is, consequently, rather general than specific ; it lies rather in the *how* than in the *what* ; it has reference more to the means, by which the end should be reached, than to the end itself. This simpler, and, with all its differences, more homogeneous condition of things is very well adapted to establish not only for the combatants generally, a more quiet and a safer position, but to give to the leaders of the movement a more definite consciousness of the nature of the reformation that is sought. If these relations are in fact such as have been indicated, the new school, while in contrast with the old, it possesses a fresher life and in a measure new materials, and while in contrast with the strict orthodox party, it represents and employs the principle of a free, scientific development, it may very well, without presumption, cherish the feeling that it has a reformatory mission, because it has the necessary marks,—viz. its being grounded in the Gospel and in the essential doctrines of the church, joined with a more active progress, the holding on to the old and everlasting foundations, and the manifest inclination to use the elements of culture which exist in the present time.”

We subjoin a few facts in relation to the condition and modes of worship of the Reformed church.² The whole number of churches in the Reformed communion is 1229, of preachers 1449, with a population of 1,608,000. South Holland contains the largest number of souls belonging to this communion, viz. 322,000 ; Brabant, the smallest, 44,000. The three universities, Leyden, Utrecht, and Gröningen, contained in 1840, 1399 students, or one

¹ These assertions are to be taken with some abatement in relation to a considerable part at least of the first party, or the national church.

² There are in Holland 32,000 Mennonites, 5000 Remonstrants (Arminians), 66,000 Lutherans, 2000 members of smaller Protestant sects, 878,000 Roman Catholics, of whom three or four thousand are Jansenists, and 51,000 Jews, divided into one hundred and eighteen societies. Most of the Catholics are in the two provinces of Brabant and Holland. The Lutherans are divided into two parties, the smaller numbering a population of 12,000. The Lutherans are favored with more privileges than are conceded to any other class of dissenters. The Remonstrants have no creed whatever. Their preachers are educated at the Athenaeum at Amsterdam. Their number is diminishing. In 1809, they had thirty-four churches ; now they number but twenty. They have exhibited strong tendencies towards Polish unitarianism.

student to 1626 of the population. About one half of the whole number were at Leyden. One third were studying theology; one third, law; four fifteenths, medicine and surgery; and one fifteenth, philology, philosophy and mathematics.

Public worship in the national church is here, as it is everywhere, an image of the character of the nation. No bell sounds to call the worshippers to the house of God. There are bells, indeed, but they are not rung for this purpose, even among the Catholic communities, at least where they are in the minority of the population. There is preaching twice on the Sabbath in the country, and still oftener in the city; in the forenoon from a text selected by the preacher; in the afternoon from the Heidelberg catechism. Four times a year the Lord's Supper is celebrated. On the Sunday before (in the cities a sermon is preached on one of the secular days), a preparatory exercise or examination is held. On the afternoon of the communion Sabbath, a remembrance, so-called, or a thanksgiving service is held. Baptism is administered before the whole church only on Sunday; in the larger churches every Sabbath, in the smaller on the first Sabbath in every month. In addition to the three great festivals, Good Friday and Ascension day are observed with religious services. Public worship commonly begins, where there are organs, (for their use has not been prohibited in the Reformed church, and they are found in many country congregations), with a voluntary on the organ. Then the reader recites a chapter of the Bible, selected by the preacher. All the passages which are read in the churches, and all the texts of sermons, must be taken from the authorized version—the State Bible of 1637. The preacher immediately upon his entrance into the church ascends the pulpit, awaits the reading of the chapter, and at its close makes a short prayer. He then gives out a psalm or hymn, from the psalm-book newly edited in 1773, or from the hymn-book introduced in 1807. After the singing, which is commonly monotonous and very imperfectly performed, there commonly follows an address, or some prefatory remarks, in relation to special events, or to the general circumstances of the times, and which point to the contents of the sermon. The preacher then offers a prayer, which, on account of its usual length, is called the great prayer. It is not framed according to any prescribed form, but the matter is left entirely to the preacher, who adapts it to the theme to be discussed. Then follows the singing of a short psalm or hymn,

which is succeeded by the reading of the text and the sermon. This still retains, in many places, the old analytical divisions, first, the explanation of the text and context, word for word, exegetically; secondly, the exposition, in which the truths contained or implied in the text, are developed; and thirdly, the application. Still, in recent times, a greater freedom has prevailed. In accordance with the example of the eminent pulpit orator, Van der Palm, the synthetical mode of composing sermons has come into use, which often departs both from the letter and spirit of the Scriptures, thus abandoning the old method, without substituting anything better in its place. The sermons are generally long, and weary by their repetitions. It is customary to expound, for the afternoon service, whole books of the Bible in connection. This is called the biblical exercise. The sermon is succeeded by an extempore prayer, a hymn or a psalm, and the apostolic benediction, the organ playing while the assembly depart. Hence it will be seen that great liberty is allowed to the preachers in respect to the use of the liturgical and church formularies. The first liturgy was an extract from the Latin of Johann Von Lasco; the same was introduced in 1566, as the Heidelberg Catechism, amended in accordance with the Liturgy of the Palatinate, and in this form, it has come down to the present time. It consists of a number of church and family prayers, of several formularies for the baptism of children and adults, for the Lord's Supper, the excommunication of unworthy members of the church, the restoration of penitents, the ordination of ministers, elders and deacons, and for use in sickness. These formularies, of which only those relating to baptism and the Lord's Supper are now used, are commonly appended to the Psalm-book.

The celebration of the Lord's Supper is very similar to that in the Scottish church. The preacher sits at the centre of a long, white covered table, surrounded by the communicants of all conditions, even the king himself among his subjects. The preacher breaks the bread with the words, "The bread, which we break, is the communion of the body of Christ;" then he presents it, with the words, "Take, eat," to the two guests sitting at his side, and to the two opposite, partakes himself, and then hands it to those sitting near. When all have eaten, he takes the cup, with the words, "The cup of blessing, wherewith we bless, is the communion of the blood of Christ, take, drink ye all of it," and presents it to the guests at his side. The Supper is celebrated quarterly. Previously, the pastor and one or two elders, visit the

members of the church at their houses, in order to invite them to the ordinance. Then follows a preparatory service on the Sabbath, or in the week before the communion. In order to hold private religious meetings, the permission of the pastor is necessary. They are much less frequent than formerly. Attendance on public worship and upon the Supper is very general. Some members of the church, after public service, follow the preacher to his house, in order to hear further explanations of the topics brought forward in the sermon. The Sabbath is observed with great stillness; the hum of business is hushed; all shops, offices, etc. are closed. In no country, perhaps, is the ministerial office held in so great consideration as in Holland, though the income of the clergy is very small, while it has no perquisites or immunities. The title of the preacher is *Domine*.

ARTICLE VII.

THE RESURRECTION AND ASCENSION OF OUR LORD.

By E. Robinson, Prof. in Union Theol. Sem., New York.

THE great fact of the resurrection of our Lord from the dead, by which "he was declared to be the Son of God with power,"¹ and in which "God fulfilled unto the children the promise made unto their fathers,"² stands out everywhere prominently on the pages of the New Testament, as one of the cardinal doctrines of the Christian's faith, and the earnest of his own future resurrection. The burden of Paul's preaching was, "that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures; and that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day according to the Scriptures."³ The apostle goes on likewise strongly to affirm, that "if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God; because we have testified of God, that he raised up Christ; whom he raised not up, if so be that the dead rise not."⁴

Yet with all this certainty as to the great fact itself, it is no less true, that in respect to the circumstances connected with this important event, difficulties are presented to the mind even

¹ Rom. 1: 2. ² Acts 13: 32, 33. ³ 1 Cor. 15: 3, 4. ⁴ 1 Cor. 15: 14, 15.

of the sincere inquirer, by the different manner in which the four Evangelists have placed these circumstances on record. Not that the facts recorded by them are in a single instance inconsistent with each other; but the main difficulty lies in harmonizing the four accounts in such a way as to bring out a full and complete order and sequence of the events, so natural and consistent as to commend itself to the understanding of all. To do this in any good degree there must be introduced something of hypothesis. Certain things must be assumed as links, to connect facts otherwise isolated. Now there is of course, just here, room for difference of taste and of judgment, as also some scope for fancy; and it has therefore come to pass, that while few, if any, honest minds have ever been driven into unbelief by these alleged difficulties, yet on the other hand hardly any two interpreters have ever followed precisely the same track in harmonizing the four narratives of the sacred writers. It is also true, that more of these apparent difficulties are found in this short section of the Gospel history, than in almost all the rest.

One fruitful source of apparent or alleged difficulty in the case before us, is the proneness of the reader to take it for granted, that each evangelist would naturally present an account of all the circumstances accompanying and following our Lord's resurrection. On the supposition of such an intent, there would indeed be obstacles next to insurmountable in the way of harmonizing the various narratives; to say nothing of the entire incompatibility of such a view with any and every idea of inspiration on the part of the sacred penmen. For this reason, apparently, it has been a favorite position with the opposers of inspiration and of Christianity in general, thus to represent the Evangelists as following different and uncertain traditions, and each as having given all that he knew; and then to press the difficulties and discrepancies arising from this hypothesis, as sufficient not only to disprove inspiration, but also to overthrow the credibility of the Gospel history.¹ Yet to perceive that this position is wholly untenable, there is necessary only a very slight inspection of the sacred pages. As the writers of the Gospels, acting under the guidance of the Spirit of God, have not seen fit to record *all* the deeds and sayings of our Lord, but each has selected those appropriate for the specific object he had in view;—as, too, the first three Evangelists have given us, for the most part, only the acts and discourses of Jesus in Galilee, and speak solely of one visit

¹ De Wette's *Handbuch passim*. Strauss's *Leben Jesu*.

to Jerusalem on occasion of his last Passover; while John describes chiefly his visits and teaching at or near the Holy city;—so in their narratives of the scenes of the resurrection each writer follows his own *eclectic* method, and records what appertained to his own particular purpose or experience. Thus Matthew speaks only of a single appearance of our Lord at Jerusalem, namely, that to the women, which is not referred to by either of the other evangelists; while he mentions but one in Galilee. Mark enumerates three other appearances at Jerusalem; but says nothing of Galilee; although he records the charge of the angel, that the disciples should repair thither. Luke also speaks of three appearances (one of them different) at Jerusalem; but he too has not a word of Galilee. John again has likewise three appearances at Jerusalem (one of them still different); and describes another interview with the disciples on the shores of the Lake of Tiberias. And what perhaps is still more remarkable, only Mark and Luke make any allusion whatever to the fact of our Lord's ascension. Amid all this diversity of presentation, there is obviously no room for the idea of an intended completeness.

It is the purpose of the present Article, not to discuss every cavil which the acuteness of unbelief may raise in regard to this portion of the Gospel History; but rather to suggest and elucidate what seems to me to be the natural order of the events, and to dwell only upon those difficulties which present themselves to the mind of the sincere inquirer after truth. These, I am persuaded, arise to us from the brevity of the sacred writers; who, in their narration of facts, have not seen fit to introduce all the minor connecting circumstances, without which we, at this distance of time, are unable to gain a complete and connected view of the whole ground. Had we all these facts, there is no reason why we should not rest assured, that this part of the sacred history would prove to be as exact, as consistent, and as complete, as any and every other portion of the Word of God.

In perusing the following pages, the reader will find it advantageous to have before him a Greek Harmony of the four Gospels; or at least to make constant reference to his Greek Testament.

† 1. *The Time of the Resurrection.*

Matt. 28: 1, 2. Mark 16: 1, 2, 9. Luke 24: 1. John 20: 1.

That the resurrection of our Lord took place before full day-light, on the first day of the week, follows from the unanimous testi-

mony of the Evangelists respecting the visit of the women to the sepulchre. But the exact time at which he rose is nowhere specified. According to the Jewish mode of reckoning, the Sabbath ended and the next day began at sunset; so that had the resurrection occurred even before midnight, it would still have been upon the first day of the week, and the third day after our Lord's burial. The earthquake had taken place and the stone had been rolled away before the arrival of the women; and so far as the immediate narrative is concerned, there is nothing to show that all this might not have happened some hours earlier. Yet the words of Mark in another place render it certain, that there could have been no great interval between these events and the arrival of the women; since he affirms in v. 9, that Jesus "had risen *ἄνωγ', early*, the first day of the week;" while in v. 2, he states that the women went out *λίαν ἄνωγ', "very early."* A like inference may be drawn from the fact, that the affrighted guards first went to inform the chief priests of these events, when the women returned to the city (Matt. 28: 11); for it is hardly to be supposed, that after having been thus terrified by the earthquake and the appearance of an angel, they would have waited any very long time before sending information to their employers.—The body of Jesus had therefore probably lain in the tomb not less than about thirty-six hours.

The scene of the actual resurrection, the Holy Spirit has not seen fit to disclose. The circumstances of that awful moment, so fraught with importance to angels and to men, remain to us shrouded in darkness. The sacred writers have narrated only what they saw after the sepulchre was empty. We know only that without the tomb "there was a great earthquake; for the angel of the Lord descended from heaven, and came and rolled back the stone from the door, and sat upon it; his countenance was like lightning, and his raiment white as snow." But what had passed within the tomb? When Jesus called Lazarus forth out of his sepulchre, "he that was dead came forth, bound hand and foot with grave-clothes; and his face was bound about with a napkin."¹ But when our Lord himself arose, no voice of power thus called him forth, bound hand and foot. In the dark recesses of the sepulchre, through almighty power, his spirit revived, unseen and unknown to every mortal eye. Angels ministered unto him, and opened before him the door of the tomb. Here was no struggle, no agony, no confused haste; but, on the contrary, "the linen clothes lying, and the napkin that was about his head, not lying

¹ John 11: 44.

with the linen clothes, but wrapped together in a place by itself,"¹ all testify of peace, deliberation, and composure. Who furnished the risen Lord with raiment? for his own garments had been parted, by lot, among the soldiers. Who staunched the wound in his side, that was probably intended to pierce his heart? Faith answers these, and all such questions without difficulty: To that omnipotence which raised him from the dead, to the angels who thus attended upon him in the resurrection, it would be a light thing indeed to minister to these physical wants. More we cannot know.

§ 2. *The Visit of the Women to the Sepulchre.*

Matt. 28: 1—8. Mark 16: 1—8. Luke 24: 1—11. John 20: 1, 2.

The first notices we have of our Lord's resurrection, are connected with the visit of the women to the sepulchre, on the morning of the first day of the week. According to Luke, the women who had stood by the cross, went home and rested during the sabbath (23: 56); and Mark adds that after the sabbath was ended, that is, after sun-set, and during the evening, they prepared spices in order to go and embalm our Lord's body. They were either not aware of the previous embalming by Joseph and Nicodemus; or else they also wished to testify their respect and affection to their Lord, by completing, more perfectly, what before had been done in haste; John 19: 40—42.

It is in just this portion of the history, which relates to the visit of the women to the tomb and the appearance of Jesus to them, that most of the alleged difficulties and discrepancies in this part of the Gospel narratives are found. We will therefore take up the chief of them in their order.

1. *The Time.* All the Evangelists agree in saying that the women went out *very early* to the sepulchre. Matthew's expression is: *τῇ ἐπιφωσκούσῃ* sc. *ἡμέρῃ*, *as the day was dawning*. Mark's words are: *λίαν πρῶτ*, *very early*; which indeed are less definite, but are appropriate to denote the same point of time; see v. 9, and also *πρῶτ ἔρρυχον λίαν*, Mark 1: 35. Luke has the more poetic term: *ὄρθρου βαθύτος*, *deep morning*, i. e. early dawn. John's language is likewise definite: *πρῶτ, σκοτίας ἐν οὐσῃ*, *early, while it was yet dark*. All these expressions go to fix the time at what we call *early dawn*, or *early twilight*; after the break of day, but while the light is yet struggling with darkness.²

¹ John 20: 6, 7.

² So the Homeric *προσδύπλος ἡώς* Il. Ὀ. 1. αλ. See Eustath. ad Hom. ed.

Thus far there is no difficulty ; and none would ever arise, had not Mark added the phrase *ἀνατείλαντος τοῦ ἡλίου*, which, according to every law of the Aorist, must be translated : *the sun being risen* ; or, as the English version has it, *at the rising of the sun*. These words seem, at first, to be at direct variance both with the *λίαν πρωί* of Mark himself, and with the language of the other Evangelists. The ways in which interpreters have attempted to harmonize this apparent discrepancy, are chiefly the three following.

(1) "The *very early* of Mark and the other evangelists refers to the time when the women set off from their home ; the *sun-rising*, to the time of their arrival at the tomb." So West, Benson, and others. This would include a longer interval of time than could well have been occupied in going from the city to the sepulchre, unless they loitered by the way ; which is not likely. Besides, the language of Luke and John, and most naturally that of Matthew, seems to refer the "early dawn" to the arrival of the women at the place. In Mark, likewise, the two phrases, *λίαν πρωί* and *ἀνατείλαντος τ. ἡλ.* both qualify the clause *ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ μνημεῖον*, one just as much as the other ; and it seems, therefore, philologically impossible to refer them to different points of time.

(2) "*Cod. D. s. Bezae* reads here *ἀνατέλλοντος*. *Cod. K. s. Colb.* with several cursive Mss., and also Gregory of Nyssa, insert *ἔτι* before *ἀνατείλαντος*. By adopting one of these readings, the seeming inconsistency is removed." So Newcome. But the whole weight of authority is the other way ; and no editor of the New Testament has ever ventured to adopt either of these readings. Both are regarded by Griesbach and other editors as obviously mere expedients to get rid of the difficulty. But they do not even do this. The insertion of *ἔτι* is incompatible with the Aorist form of the verb ; while the present *ἀνατέλλοντος*, so far as it marks only the rising of the sun above the horizon, is itself just as inconsistent with the preceding *λίαν πρωί*. It matters very little here, whether the sun was in the act of rising, or already just risen.

(3) "The idea of sunrise is a relative one. The sun is already risen, when as yet it is not visible in the heavens ; for the morn-

Lips. II. p. 181 : ἰστέον δὲ ὡς προκύπτελος ἡὼς ἢ ἔχουσά τι καὶ νυκτέρου ἔτι σκότους, εἰ καὶ τὸ χρυσοθαῖς προκυτὼν αὐτῇ ἐξ ἡλιακῶν ἀκτίνων ἐμφαίνεται, i. e. "having still something of nocturnal darkness, although the golden saffron from the sun's rays is also visible."—This meaning of *ὑψὺς βαθεὺς* and *πρωί* is also elegantly illustrated by Plato, *Protagor.* 310. A : τῆς παμφέδουσας νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι βαθεὺς ὑψθρου, πρωὶ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν, — διατρέψωμεν ὥς ἂν ἡὼς γίνηται.

ing dawn proceeds from it." So Hengstenberg, J. D. Michaelis, etc.—In this bold and unillustrated form it may not be easy to see at once the full force of the above remark; and yet it seems to me to contain the germ of the true solution. I proceed, therefore, to give here some illustrations, which, so far as I know, have not been elsewhere brought forward.

We may premise, that since Mark himself first specifies the point of time by *λίαν πρωί*, a phrase sufficiently definite in itself and supported by all the other evangelists, we must conclude that when he adds: *ἀνατείλαντος τοῦ ἡλίου*, he did not mean to contradict himself, but used this latter phrase in a broader and less definite sense. As the sun is the source of light and of the day, and as his earliest rays produce the contrast between darkness and light, between night and dawn, so the term *sunrising* might easily come in popular language, by a metonymy of cause for effect, to be put for all that earlier interval, when his rays, still struggling with darkness, do nevertheless usher in the day.

Accordingly we find such a popular usage prevailing among the Hebrews; and several instances of it occur in the Old Testament. Thus in Judg. 9, 33 the message of Zebul to Abimelech, after directing him to lie in wait with his people in the field during the night, goes on as follows: "and it shall be, in the morning, as soon as the sun is up (Heb. בִּקְרֹאֵי הַיּוֹם), thou shalt rise early and set upon the city;" Sept. καὶ ἔσται τοπρὼτ ἅμα τῷ ἀνατεῖλαι τὸν ἥλιον κ. τ. λ. Here we have the very same use of the Aorist, and the same juxta-position of *πρωί* and ἅμα τῷ ἀνατεῖλαι τὸν ἥλιον, and yet we cannot for a moment suppose that Abimelech with his ambuscade was to wait until the sun actually appeared above the horizon, before he made his onset. So the Psalmist (104: 22), speaking of the young lions that by night roar after their prey, goes on to say: "The sun ariseth, they gather themselves together, and lay them down in their dens;" Sept. ἀνέτειλεν ὁ ἥλιος κ. τ. λ. still in the Aorist. But wild animals do not wait for the actual appearance of the sun ere they shrink away to their lairs; the break of day, the dawning light, is the signal for their retreat. See also Sept. 2 K. 3: 22. 2 Sam. 23: 4. In all these passages the language is entirely parallel to that of Mark; and they serve fully to illustrate the principle, that the *rising of the sun* is here used in a popular sense as equivalent to the *rising of the day* or early dawn.¹

¹ This use of the Aorist in the Sept. shows also that in Mark 16: 2 the correct reading is *ἀνατείλαντος*, not *ἀνατέλλαντος*.

II. *The Number of the Women.* Matthew mentions Mary Magdalene and the other Mary; v. 1. Mark enumerates Mary Magdalene, Mary the mother of James, and Salome; v. 1. Luke has Mary Magdalene, Joanna, Mary the mother of James, and others with them; v. 10. John speaks of Mary Magdalene alone, and says nothing of any other. The first three Evangelists accord then in respect to the two Marys, but no further; while John differs from them all. Is there here a real discrepancy?

We may at once answer, No; because according to the sound canon of Le Clerc:¹ "*Qui plura narrat, pauciora complectitur; qui pauciora memorat, plura non negat.*" Because John, in narrating circumstances with which he was personally connected, sees fit to mention only Mary Magdalene, it does not at all follow that others were not present. Because Matthew, perhaps for like reasons, speaks only of the two Marys, he by no means excludes the presence of others. Indeed, the very words which John puts into the mouth of Mary Magdalene (*οὐκ οἶδμεν* v. 2), presuppose the fact, that others had gone with her to the sepulchre. That there was something in respect to Mary Magdalene, which gave her a peculiar prominence in these transactions, may be inferred from the fact, that not only John mentions her alone, but likewise all the other Evangelists name her first, as if holding the most conspicuous place.

The instance here under consideration is parallel to that of the demoniacs of Gadara, and the blind men at Jericho; where, in both cases, Matthew speaks of two persons, while Mark and Luke mention only one.² Something peculiar in the station or character of one of the persons, rendered him in each case more prominent, and led the two latter Evangelists to speak of him particularly. But there, as here, their language is not exclusive; nor is there in it anything that contradicts the statements of Matthew.

A familiar illustration will place this matter in a clear light. In the year 1824, Lafayette, the early friend of Washington, revisited the United States. He was everywhere received with joyous welcome; and his progress through the country resembled a public triumph. Cities and States and the Congress of the nation vied with each other in the honors and pageants showered upon the nation's guest. Historians will record these events as a noble

¹ Harm. p. 525. Can. XII. fin.

² Matt. 8: 23. Mark 5: 2. Luke 8: 27. — Matt. 20: 30. Mark 10: 46. Luke 18: 35.

incident in the life of a public man. But should other writers, entering more fully into detail, narrate this visit as made not by Lafayette alone, but by Lafayette and his son; and that both shared in the honors and hospitalities so lavishly proffered; would there be here any contradiction between the statements of the two classes of writers? Or should still another class relate the same general facts as having occurred in respect to *three* persons, Lafayette, his son, and his secretary: would there even then arise any contradiction? Most assuredly no one would ever think of bringing such a charge. So true it is: "Qui plura narrat, pauciora complectitur; qui pauciora memorat, plura non negat."

III. *The arrival at the Sepulchre.* According to Mark, Luke, and John, the women on reaching the sepulchre find the great stone, with which it had been closed, already rolled away. Matthew, on the other hand, after narrating that the women went out to see the sepulchre, proceeds to mention the earthquake, the descent of the angel, his rolling away the stone and sitting upon it, and the terror of the watch, as if all these things took place in the presence of the women. Such at least is the usual force of ἴδον. The angel too (in v. 5) addresses the women, as if still sitting upon the stone he had rolled away.

The apparent discrepancy, if any, here arises simply from Matthew's brevity in omitting to state in full what his own narrative presupposes. According to v. 6, Christ was already risen; and therefore the earthquake and its accompaniments must have taken place at an earlier point of time, to which the sacred writer returns back in his narration. And although Matthew does not represent the women as entering the sepulchre, yet in v. 8, he speaks of them as going out of it, ἐξελθοῦσαι; so that of course their interview with the angel took place, not outside of the sepulchre, but in it, as narrated by the other evangelists. When therefore the angel says to them in v. 6, "Come, see the place where the Lord lay," this is not said without the tomb to induce them to enter, as Strauss avers; but within the sepulchre, just as in Mark v. 6.

IV. *The Vision of Angels in the Sepulchre.* Of this John says nothing. Matthew and Mark speak of one angel; Luke of two. Mark says he was sitting; Luke speaks of them as standing (ἐνίστησαν). This difference in respect to numbers is parallel to the case of the women, which we have just considered; and requires therefore no further illustration. The other alleged difficulty as to the position of the angels, also vanishes, when we take

the *ἐπισημαίω* of Luke in its appropriate and acknowledged usage: *they suddenly appeared, were suddenly present*, without reference to its etymology. So well established is this usage, that Passow gives as one definition of *ἐπισημαίω*, *hervorkommen, herbeykommen, plötzlich erscheinen*, i. e. *to come forth, to come near, to appear suddenly*.¹

There is likewise some diversity in the language addressed to the women by the angels. In Matthew and Mark, the prominent object is the charge to the disciples to depart into Galilee. In Luke this is not referred to; but the women are reminded of our Lord's own previous declaration, that he would rise again on the third day. Neither of the evangelists here professes to report *all* that was said by the angels; and of course there is no room for contradiction.

† 3. *The return of the Women to the city, and the first appearance of our Lord.*

Matt. 28: 7—10. Mark 16: 8. Luke 24: 9—11. John 20: 1, 2.

John, speaking of Mary Magdalene alone, says that having seen that the stone was taken away from the sepulchre, she went in haste (ran) to tell Peter and John. He says nothing of her having seen the angels, nor of her having entered the sepulchre at all. The other Evangelists, speaking of the women generally, relate that they entered the tomb, saw the angels, and then returned into the city. On their way Jesus meets them. They recognize him; fall at and embrace his feet; and receive his charge to the disciples.—Was Mary Magdalene now with the other women? Or did she enter the city by another way? Or had she left the sepulchre before the rest?

It is evident that Mary Magdalene was not with the other women when Jesus thus met them. Her language to Peter and John forbids the supposition, that she had already seen the Lord: "They have taken away the Lord out of the sepulchre, and we know not where they have laid him." She therefore must have entered the city by another path and gate; or else have left the sepulchre before the rest; or possibly both these positions may be true. She bore her tidings expressly to Peter and John, who would seem to have lodged by themselves in a different quar-

¹ See also Reiske Indic. Opp. Demosth. art. *ἐπισημαίω*. Sturz Lex. Xenoph. ib.

ter of the city ;¹ while the other women went apparently to the rest of the disciples. But this supposition of a different route is essential, only in connection with the view, that she left the tomb with the other women. That, however, she actually departed from the sepulchre before her companions, would seem most probable ; inasmuch as she speaks to Peter and John only of the absence of the Lord's body ; says nothing in this connection of a vision of angels ; and when, after returning again to the tomb she sees the angels, it is evidently for the first time ; and she repeats to them as the cause of her grief her complaint as to the disappearance of the body ; John 20: 12, 13. She may have turned back from the tomb without entering it at all, so soon as she saw that it was open ; inferring from the removal of the stone, that the sepulchre had been rifled. Or, she may first have entered with the rest, when, according to Luke, "they found not the body of the Lord Jesus," and "were much perplexed thereabout," before the angels became visible to them. The latter supposition seems best to meet the exigencies of the case.

As the other women went to tell his disciples, behold, Jesus met them, saying, All hail. And they came, and held him by the feet, and worshipped him. Then Jesus said unto them, Be not afraid ; go, tell my brethren, that they go into Galilee, and there shall they see me." The women had left the sepulchre "with fear and great joy" after the declaration of the angels that Christ was risen ; or, as Mark has it, "they trembled and were amazed." Jesus meets them with words of gentleness to quiet their terrors : "Be not afraid." He permits them to approach, and embrace his feet, and testify their joy and homage. He reiterates to them the message of the angels to his "brethren," the eleven disciples ; see v. 16.

This appearance and interview is narrated only by Matthew ; none of the other evangelists give any hint of it. Matthew here stops short. Mark simply relates that the women fled from the tomb ; "neither said they anything to any one, for they were afraid." This of course can only mean, that they spoke of what they had thus seen to no one while on their way to the city ; for the very charge of the angels, which they went to fulfil, was, that

¹ "Neque apostoli summo mane ejus die quo Christus e sepulcro vivus prodit, uno eodemque loco congregati, sed per dissitas urbis Hierosolymae regiones dispersi et in plurium amicorum hospitia divisi erant. Hinc Maria Magdalena solis Joanni atque Petro narrabat, quae apud sepulcrum ipsa observaverat, etc." Griesbach *de Fontibus etc.* Opuscc. Academ. 2. p. 243 sq.

they should "go their way and tell his disciples;" v. 7. Luke narrates more fully, that "they returned from the sepulchre, and told all these things (*ταῦτα πάντα*) unto the eleven, and to all the rest.—And their words seemed to them as idle tales, and they believed them not." We may perhaps see in this language one reason why the other evangelists have omitted to mention this appearance of our Lord. The disciples *disbelieved the report of the women*, that they had seen Jesus. In like manner they afterwards disbelieved the report of Mary Magdalene to the same effect; Mark 16: 11. They were ready, it would seem, to admit the testimony of the women to the absence of the body, and to the vision of angels; but not to the resurrection of Jesus and his appearance to them; Luke 24: 21—24. And afterwards, when the eleven had become convinced by the testimony of their own senses, those first two appearances to the women became of less importance and were less regarded. Hence the silence of three evangelists as to the one; of two as to the other; and of Paul as to both; 1 Cor. 15: 5, 5.

† 4. *Peter and John visit the Sepulchre. Jesus appears to Mary Magdalene.* /

John 20: 3—18. Luke 24: 12. Mark 16: 9—11.

The full account of these two events is given solely by John. Matthew has not a word of either; Luke merely mentions, in general, that Peter, on the report of the women, went to the sepulchre; while Mark speaks only of our Lord's appearance to Mary Magdalene, which he seems to represent as his *first* appearance.

According to John's account, Peter and the beloved disciple, excited by the tidings of Mary Magdalene that the Lord's body had been taken away, hasten to the sepulchre. They run; John outruns Peter, comes first to the tomb, and stooping down, sees the grave-clothes lying, but he does not enter. The other women are no longer at the tomb; nor have the disciples met them on the way. Peter now comes up; he enters the tomb, and sees the grave-clothes lying, and the napkin that was about his head not lying with the rest, but wrapped together in a place by itself. John too now enters the sepulchre; "and he saw, and believed."

What was it that John thus believed? The mere report of Mary Magdalene, that the body had been removed? So much he must have believed when he stooped down and looked into the

sepulchre. For this, there was no need that he should enter the tomb. His belief must have been of something more and greater. The grave-clothes lying orderly in their place, and the napkin folded together by itself, made it evident that the sepulchre had not been rifled nor the body stolen by violent hands; for these garments and spices would have been of more value to thieves, than merely a naked corpse; at least, they would not have taken the trouble thus to fold them together. The same circumstances showed also that the body had not been removed by friends; for they would not thus have left the grave-clothes behind. All these considerations produce in the mind of John the germ of a belief that Jesus was risen from the dead. He believed (*ἐπίστευεν*) *because* he saw; "*for* (*γὰρ*) as yet they knew not the Scripture" (v. 9). He now began more fully to recall and understand our Lord's repeated declaration, that he was to rise again on the third day;¹ a declaration on which the Jews had already acted in setting a watch.² In this way, the difficulty which is sometimes urged of an apparent want of connection between verses 8 and 9, disappears; and the word *ἐπίστευεν* is left in the signification of a religious belief, usual to it in John's Gospel.³ In this chapter it refers more particularly to a belief in our Lord's resurrection; as here in v. 8, and also vs. 25, 27, 29. To understand it in v. 8 simply of a belief in the tidings of Mary Magdalene, without some definite adjunct to show that it is to be thus limited, would be a departure from the customary usage of the word by John.⁴

The two disciples went their way, "wondering in themselves at what was come to pass." Mary Magdalene who had followed them back to the sepulchre, remained before it weeping. While she thus wept, she too, like John, stooped down and looked in, "and seeth two angels, in white, sitting, the one at the head and the other at the feet, where the body of Jesus had lain." To their inquiry why she wept, her reply was the same report which she had before borne to the two disciples: "Because they have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid him," v. 13. Of the angels we learn nothing further. The whole character of this representation seems to show clearly, that Mary had not before seen the angels; and also that she had not before been told, that Jesus was risen. We must otherwise regard her as having

¹ Matt. 16: 21. 17: 23. Luke 9: 22. 24: 6, 7 al.

² Matt. 28: 63 sq.

³ See John 3: 15, 16 sq. 10: 26. 19: 35 al. *sæpe*.

⁴ The same view is adopted by Lucke, in the second edition of his Commentary on John, II. p. 671 sq.

been in a most unaccountably obtuse and unbelieving frame of mind; the very contrary of which seems to have been the fact. If also she had before informed the two disciples of a vision of angels and of Christ's resurrection; it is difficult to see, why John should omit to mention this circumstance, so important and so personal to himself.¹

After replying to the angels, Mary turns herself about, and sees a person standing near, whom, from his being present there, she takes to be the keeper of the garden. He too inquires, why she weeps. Her reply is the same as before; except that she, not unnaturally, supposes him to have been engaged in removing the body, which she desires to recover. He simply utters in reply, in well known tones, the name, Mary! and the whole truth flashes upon her soul; doubt is dispelled, and faith triumphs. She exclaims: "Rabboni!" as much as to say, "My dearest Master!" and apparently, like the other women,² falls at his feet in order to embrace and worship him. This Jesus forbids her to do, in these remarkable words: "Touch me not (*μὴ μου ἅπτου*); for I am not yet ascended to my Father. But go to my brethren, and say unto them, I ascend unto my Father and your Father, and to my God and your God;" v. 17.

It is difficult, at first view, to see why our Lord should here forbid Mary Magdalene to touch him, when he had just before permitted the other women to hold him by the feet; and when also, the same evening, he tells his disciples to "handle and see" for themselves, at the same time showing them his hands and his feet. Interpreters have attempted to solve the difficulty in various ways; the chief of which are the four following.

1. Chrysostom and Augustine here take *ἅπτου* figuratively, like *Lat. mente contrectare*, and thus obtain the sense: "Regard not this my earthly manifestation, for I am yet to be glorified in heaven." This is not, in itself, inappropriate; and is followed by Calvin, Beza, Grotius, and others. But this tropical use of *ἅπτεσθαι* is exceedingly harsh and without example in Greek; nor is the subsequent *οὕτω ἀναβέβηκα* compatible with such an explanation.

2. Others suppose Mary to be uncertain, whether what she sees is a real body or a mere phantasm; and she wishes to touch Jesus in order to decide this point. This Jesus forbids, asserting that

¹ How difficult such a supposition is, and how artificial the arguments to sustain it, may be seen in Hengstenberg's attempt; *Evang. Kirchenzeitung*, 1841, No. 63.

² *Matt. 28: 9.*

he is yet in his earthly body, which will be changed, at his ascension, into a glorified body. So Pfaff, and J. D. Michaelis, before A. D. 1782.¹ But this hypothesis does not touch the difficulty above stated; for, on this supposition, we cannot see why our Lord should not have given the same prohibition in the case of the other women and the disciples. Besides, such an unwillingness to be touched, could only have increased, in Mary's mind, the suspicion, that what she saw was a mere phantasm.

3. A common view is, that our Lord intended to prevent Mary from delaying and wasting the time in embracing him; he wished her to hasten to the disciples and make known the joyful tidings; q. d. "Delay not now; for I am not yet ascended; but go to my brethren," etc. So Peter Martyr, Mosheim, Doddridge, Tittmann, and others. But it is not easy to see, why such very great haste was necessary in the case of Mary Magdalene, more than in that of the other women who were charged with a similar message to the disciples. If this, too, were the meaning, we should rather expect the present: *οὐκ ἔτι ἀναβάντος*, for *I do not yet ascend*, etc. Further, the signification here assigned to *ἀνέσθαι*, viz. *to cling to, to delay*, cannot be supported by proof.

4. There remains another explanation, which depends upon the peculiar character of Mary Magdalene. She had been distinguished for her devotedness to our Lord and to his teaching during his ministry; she had stood by his cross along with his mother and the beloved disciple,² from whose lips she had doubtless heard a report of those last discourses, so full of tenderness and pathos, which Jesus held with the twelve the same night in which he was betrayed; she was now among the first to visit his sepulchre, and was weeping bitterly because his body was no longer to be found. When, therefore, Jesus thus speaks to her, and she recognizes him as her Lord and Master, now risen from the dead, in joyful surprise and triumphant faith she recurs to those promises of return contained in his last discourse,³ and beholds in him the ascended Saviour, the already glorified Redeemer, who thus returns from heaven to fulfil his promise made to his disciples. This impression Jesus directly counteracts: "Touch me not," embrace me not under such misapprehension; "for I am not yet ascended to my Father." In the spirit of his same last discourse, he speaks of the disciples as his brethren, and calls God his Fa-

¹ Begräbniss—und Auferstehungsgesch. p. 172.

² John 19: 25—27.

³ John 14: 18, 28, 29. 16: 16, 19, 20, 22, 28.

ther and their Father.¹ This interpretation, which I hold to be the correct one, is also followed in general by Kypke, Herder, J. D. Michaelis, Krinöl, Tholuck, Neander,² and others.—It is indeed objected, that in order to give to ἀνέσθαι this sense of *embracing*, it ought to be followed by the words γονάτω μου, or ποδοῦ μου. But this seems rather hypercritical. Our Lord does not tell Mary not to *embrace* his knees, or his feet; but as he perceives her purpose to do this, he forbids her to *touch* him at all. The above view brings out a sense so appropriate, and is comparatively so unobjectionable, that there remains no occasion for any conjectural change of the text,—a dangerous expedient to which Lücke has had recourse in his second edition.

There remains to be considered the circumstance, that Mark, in v. 9, seems to represent this appearance of Jesus at the sepulchre to Mary Magdalene, as his first appearance: "Now, being risen early the first of the week, he appeared *first* (πρῶτον) to Mary Magdalene." In attempting to harmonize this with Matthew's account of our Lord's appearance to the other women on their return from the sepulchre, three methods have been adopted.

1. In order to make out, that the appearance to Mary Magdalene was actually the first, it has been assumed, that the other women, after returning into the city to deliver the message of the angels to the disciples, went out again a second time to the sepulchre, when Peter and John and Mary Magdalene had already departed from it; and that they were now on their second return to the city when Jesus met them. So Le Clerc, Benson, Doddridge, Lardner, Newcome, and many others. The objection to this view is its complexity, in a matter where the language of Matthew is so very direct and explicit: "And they departed *quickly* from the sepulchre, and did *run* to bring his disciples word; [and as they went to tell his disciples,] and lo! Jesus met them." There seems here no possibility of avoiding the inference, that the interview took place on their way to the city, after they *first* left the sepulchre; even if the words in brackets be omitted, as is the case in some manuscripts.

2. Griesbach, with the like intent, supposes that the women, after leaving the sepulchre to return to the disciples, had a long distance to go in order to find some of them; inasmuch as they had all been scattered on the death of their Lord, and were lodging in different parts of the city or perhaps in Bethany.³ In this way he

¹ John 15: 12—16.

² Leben Jesu, 3te Ausg. p. 715.

³ *De Fontibus*, etc., Opusc. Acad. II. p. 251.

finds time for Jesus to appear first to Mary Magdalene, and afterwards to meet the rest while yet on their way to some of the more distant disciples.—This solution is still more artificial and less probable than the preceding; and has been followed, I believe, by no other interpreter.

3. It is said that the appearance to Mary Magdalene, and that to the other women, are in fact one and the same; that what John and Mark relate of Mary Magdalene in particular, Matthew, in his brief and general way, attributes to all the women.¹ So Luke, it may be said, apparently narrates (v. 12) that Peter ran to the sepulchre in consequence of the report of all the women; while John says that Peter and himself went thither in consequence of the tidings brought by Mary Magdalene alone.—To this view there would perhaps be less objection, were the circumstances in the two cases similar. But they are not; and are indeed so diverse, as to render it quite evident that they belong to different occasions. In the one case our Lord appears to the women as they are returning to the city: he permits them to embrace his feet; and sends a message to the disciples to go into Galilee. In the other, he appears to Mary Magdalene alone at the sepulchre; forbids her to touch him; and his message to the disciples is, that he is to ascend to his Father and their Father.

4. More to the purpose is the view which regards *πρῶτον* in Mark v. 9, as put not absolutely, but relatively.² That is to say, Mark narrates three and only three appearances of our Lord; of these three that to Mary Magdalene takes place *first*, *πρῶτον*, and that to the assembled disciples the same evening occurs *last* (*ὑστερον*) v. 14. Now in any series or succession of events where *πρῶτον* and *ὑστερον* are employed, whatever may be the number of intervening terms, *πρῶτον* marks the first of the series, and *ὑστερον* the last of the same series, and no other. So here in Mark, *ὑστερον* is put with the third appearance narrated; but had four been mentioned, *ὑστερον* could not have stood with the third, but must have been used with the fourth or last; and so in every case.³ Hence as *ὑστερον* is here put relatively, and therefore does not exclude the subsequent appearances of our Lord to Thomas and in Galilee; so too *πρῶτον* stands relatively, and does not exclude the previous appearance to the other women. A similar example occurs in 1 Cor. 15: 5—8, where Paul enumerates those to whom

¹ De Wette, Handb. zu Matt. p. 271. Olshausen, Comm. II, p. 557. 3te Ausg.

² Hengstenberg, Evang. Kircheng. 1841, No. 64.

³ See for this use of *ὑστερον*, Matt. 21: 37. 22: 27. 26: 63.

the Lord showed himself after his resurrection, viz. to Peter, to the twelve, to five hundred brethren, to James, to all the apostles, and last of all (ἰσχυρόν πάντων) to Paul also. Now had Paul written here, as with strict propriety he might have done, "he was seen first of Cephas" ὡφθῆναι πρῶτον Κηφᾶ, assuredly no one would ever have understood him as intending to assert that the appearance to Peter was the first absolutely; that is, as implying that Jesus was seen of Peter before he appeared to Mary Magdalene and the other women. In like manner when John declares (21: 14) that Jesus showed himself to his disciples by the lake of Galilee for the *third* time after he was risen from the dead; this is said relatively to the two previous appearances to the assembled apostles; and does by no means exclude the four still earlier appearances, viz. to Peter, to the two at Emmaus, to Mary Magdalene, and to the other women,—one of which John himself relates in full.

In this way the whole difficulty in the case before us disappears; and the complex and cumbrous machinery of earlier commentators becomes superfluous.

After her interview with Jesus, Mary Magdalene returns to the city, and tells the disciples that she had seen the Lord and that he had spoken these things unto her. According to Mark (vs. 10, 11), the disciples were "mourning and weeping;" and when they heard that Jesus was alive and had been seen of her, they believed not.¹

† 5. *Jesus appears to two disciples on the way to Emmaus. Also to Peter.*

Luke 24: 13—35. Mark 16: 12, 13. 1 Cor. 15: 5.

This appearance on the way to Emmaus is related in full only by Luke. Mark merely notes the fact; while the other two Evangelists and Paul (1 Cor. 15: 5) make no mention of it.

On the afternoon of the same day on which our Lord arose, two of his disciples, one of them named Cleopas,² were on their way on foot to a village called Emmaus, sixty stadia or seven

¹ See the remarks above, p. 172, 173.

² Luke 24: 18. The name Κλεόπας is probably contracted for Κλεόπαρος, like Ἀντίπας for Ἀντίπαρος. This is therefore a different person from *Cleopas*, Κλέπας, John 19: 25, elsewhere called *Alpheus*, Ἀλφαῖος, Mark 3: 18 coll. 15: 40; these two names being only different modes of pronouncing the Heb. קְלֵפָּא.

and a half Roman miles distant from Jerusalem,—a walk of some two or two and a half hours. They had heard and credited the tidings brought by the women, and also by Peter and John, that the sepulchre was open and empty; and that the women had also seen a vision of angels, who said that Jesus was alive. They had most probably likewise heard the reports of Mary Magdalene and the other women, that Jesus himself had appeared to them; but these they did not regard and do not mention them (v. 24); because they, like the other disciples, had looked upon them “as idle tales, and they believed them not;” v. 11. As they went, they were sad, and talked together of all these things which had happened. After some time, Jesus himself drew near and went with them. But they knew him not. Mark says he was in another form (*ἐν ἑτέρῃ μορφῇ*); Luke affirms that “their eyes were holden, that they should not know him;” v. 16. Was there in this anything miraculous? The “another form” of Mark, Doddridge explains by “a different habit from what he ordinarily wore.” His garments, of course, were not his former ones; and this was probably one reason why Mary Magdalene had before taken him for the keeper of the garden.¹ It may be, too, that these two disciples had not been intimately acquainted with the Lord. He had arrived at Jerusalem only six days before his crucifixion; and these might possibly have been recent converts, who had not before seen him. To such, the changes of garments and the unexpectedness of the meeting would render a recognition more difficult; nor could it be regarded as surprising, that under such circumstances they should not know him. Still, all this is hypothesis; and the averment of Luke, that “their eyes were holden,” and the manner of our Lord’s parting from them afterwards, seem more naturally to imply that the idea of a supernatural agency, affecting not Jesus himself, but the eyes or minds of the two disciples, was in the mind of the sacred writer.

Jesus inquires the cause of their sadness; chides them for their slowness of heart to believe what the prophets had spoken; and then proceeds to expound unto them “in all the Scriptures, the things concerning himself.” They feel the power of his words; and their hearts burn within them. By this time they drew nigh to the village whither they went; it was toward evening and the day was far spent. Their journey was ended; and Jesus was about to depart from them. In accordance with oriental hospi-

¹ See also John 21: 4.

talities they constrained him to remain with them. He consents; and as he sat at meat with them, he took bread, and blessed, and brake, and gave unto them. At this time, and in connection with this act, their eyes were opened; they knew him; and he vanished away from them (*ἀπαρτος ἐγένετο ἀπ' αὐτῶν*). Here too the question is raised, whether the language necessarily implies anything miraculous? Our English translators have rendered this passage in the margin, "he ceased to be seen of them;" and have referred to Luke 4: 30 and John 8: 59, as illustrating this idea. They might also have referred to Acts 8: 39. Still, the language is doubtless such as the sacred writers would most naturally have employed in order directly to express the idea of supernatural agency.¹

Full of wonder and joy, the two disciples set off the same hour and return to Jerusalem.² They find the eleven and other disciples assembled; and as they enter, they are met with the joyful exclamation: "The Lord is risen indeed, and hath appeared unto Simon;" v. 34. They then rehearse what had happened to themselves; but, according to Mark, the rest believed them not. As in the case of the women, so here, there would seem to have been something in the position or character of these two disciples, which led the others to give less credit to their testimony, than to that of Peter, one of the leading apostles.

This appearance to Peter is mentioned by no other Evangelist; and we know nothing of the particular time, nor of the attending circumstances. It would seem to have taken place either not long before, or else shortly after, that to the two disciples. It had not happened when they left Jerusalem for Emmaus; or at least they had not heard of it. It had occurred when they returned; and that long enough before to have been fully reported to all the disciples and believed by them. It may perhaps have happened about the time when the two disciples set off, or shortly afterwards.

¹ So *ἀπαρτος ἐγένετο*, of angels, 2 Macc. 3: 34.

² This circumstance has some bearing upon the question as to the situation of Emmaus. However plausible may be the conjecture that the original reading in Luke 24: 13 may have been *ἐκάρδι ἐξήκοντα*, one hundred and sixty stadia, which would nearly coincide with the position of the city Emmaus or Nicopolis; and although Cod. K, N, do actually so read *a pr. manu*; yet the distance of six hours is too great for the two disciples to have returned the same evening in season for the events recorded. We must therefore abide by the usual reading; supported, as it is, by Jos. B. J. VII. 6. 6. See Bibl. Res. in Pal. III. p. 66.

Paul in enumerating those by whom the Lord was seen after his resurrection (1 Cor. 15: 5), mentions Peter first; passing over the appearances to the women, and also that to the two disciples; probably because they did not belong among the apostles.

† 6. *Jesus appears to the Apostles in the absence of Thomas; and afterwards when Thomas is present.*

Mark 16: 14—18. Luke 24: 36—48. John 20: 19—29. 1 Cor. 15: 5.

The narrative of our Lord's first appearance to the apostles is most fully given by Luke; John adds a few circumstances; and Mark as well as Luke, has preserved the first charge thus privately given to the apostles, to preach the Gospel in all the world, —a charge afterwards repeated in a more public and solemn manner on the mountain in Galilee. When Paul says the Lord appeared to *the twelve*, he obviously employs this number as being the usual designation of the apostles; and very probably includes both the occasions narrated in this section. Mark and Luke speak in like manner of *the eleven*; and yet we know from John, that Thomas was not at first among them; so that of course only *ten* were actually present.

According to Mark, the disciples were at their evening meal; which implies a not very late hour. John says the doors were shut (*κεκλεισμένων*), for fear of the Jews. While the two who had returned from Emmaus were still recounting what had happened unto them, Jesus himself "came and stood (*ἦλθε καὶ ἔστη*) in the midst of them, and saith unto them, Peace be unto you!" The question here again is raised, whether this entrance of our Lord was miraculous? That it might have been so, there is no reason to doubt. He who in the days of his flesh walked upon the waters, and before whose angel the iron gate of the prison opened of its own accord so that Peter might pass out;¹ he who was himself just risen from the dead; might well in some miraculous way present himself to his followers in spite of bolts and bars. But does the language here necessarily imply a miracle? The doors indeed were shut; but the word used does not of itself signify that they were bolted or fastened. The object no doubt was, to prevent access to spies from the Jews; or also to guard themselves from the danger of being arrested; and both these objects might perhaps have been as effectually accomplished by

¹ Acts 12: 10.

a watch at or before the door. Nor do the words used of our Lord strictly indicate anything miraculous. We do not find here a form of ἐπιόρημι, the word commonly employed to express the sudden appearance of angels;¹ but, "he *came* and stood (ἦλθε καὶ ἔστη) in the midst of them;" implying *per se* nothing more than the ordinary mode of approach. There is in fact nothing in the whole account to suggest a miracle, except the remark of John respecting the doors; and as this circumstance is not mentioned either by Mark or Luke, it may be doubtful, whether we are necessarily compelled by the language to regard the mode of our Lord's entrance as miraculous.

The disciples had disbelieved the reports of most of those who said they had seen the Lord; and now they could hardly believe their own eyes. They were terrified and affrighted; and supposed that they had seen a spirit. The Lord reassures them; shows them his hands and his feet in order to convince them that it is he himself; and while they yet believed not for joy, he called for food and did eat before them. He upbraided them with their unbelief in respect to his resurrection. Then too he opened their minds, that they might understand the Scriptures; showing them that Christ was thus to suffer and to rise from the dead the third day. He goes on to speak of them as appointed to preach the gospel, not to Jews alone but to all the world; and as a symbol of this great commission, and of the power which they should shortly receive from on high, "he breathed on them and said, Receive ye the Holy Ghost." There was in this emblem a recognition and reiteration of the gracious promise before made;² which was to be abundantly fulfilled on the day of Pentecost.

At this interview Thomas was not present. On his return the other disciples relate to him the circumstances. But Thomas now disbelieved the others; as they before had disbelieved the women. His reply was, "except I shall see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe." Our Lord had compassion upon his perverseness. Eight days afterwards, when the disciples were again assembled and Thomas with them, our Lord came as before, and stood in the midst, and said, Peace be unto you! He permits to Thomas the test he had demanded; and charges him to be not faithless, but believing. Thomas, convinced and abashed, exclaims in the fulness of faith and joy, My

¹ See above, pp. 170, 171.

² John 14, 26. 16, 7 sq.

Lord and my God ! recognizing and acknowledging thereby the divine nature thus manifested in the flesh. The reply of our Lord to Thomas is strikingly impressive and condemnatory of his want of faith : " Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed ; blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed ! " He and the other disciples, who were to be the heralds of the Lord's resurrection to the world as the foundation of the hope of the Gospel, refused to believe except upon the evidence of their own senses ; while all who after them have borne the Christian name, have believed this great fact of the Gospel solely upon their testimony. God has overruled their unbelief for good, in making it a powerful argument for the truth of their testimony in behalf of this great fact, which they themselves were so slow to believe. Blessed, indeed, are they who have received their testimony.

§ 7. *Our Lord's Appearance in Galilee.*

John 21: 1—24. Matt. 28: 16—23. 1 Cor. 15: 6.

It appears from the narrative of Matthew, that while the disciples were yet in Jerusalem, our Lord had appointed a time, when he would meet them in Galilee, upon a certain mountain.¹ They therefore left Jerusalem after the passover, probably soon after the interview at which Thomas was present ; and returned to Galilee, their home. While waiting for the appointed time, they engaged in their usual occupation of fishermen. On a certain day, as John relates, towards evening, seven of them being together, including Peter, Thomas, and the sons of Zebedee, they put out upon the lake with their nets in a fishing-boat ; but during the whole night they caught nothing. At early dawn Jesus stood upon the shore, from which they were not far off, and directed them to cast the net upon the right side of the boat. " They cast therefore, and now they were not able to draw it for the multitude of the fishes." Recognizing in this miracle their risen Lord, they pressed around him. Peter with his characteristic ardour, threw himself into the water in order to reach him the sooner. At their Lord's command they prepared a meal from the fish they had thus taken. " Jesus then cometh and taketh bread, and giveth them, and fish likewise." This was his third appearance to the eleven ; or rather to a large number of them together. It was on this occasion, and after their meal, that our

¹ See Matt. 26: 32.

Lord put to Peter the touching and thrice repeated question, "Lovest thou me?"

At length the set time arrived; and the eleven disciples went away into the mountain "where Jesus had appointed them." It would seem most probable, that this time and place had been appointed of our Lord for a solemn and more public interview, not only with the eleven, whom he had already met, but with all his disciples in Galilee; and that therefore it was on this same occasion, when, according to Paul, "he was seen of above five hundred brethren at once."¹ That the interview was not confined to the eleven alone, would seem evident from the fact that "some doubted;" for this could hardly be supposed true of any of the eleven, after what had already happened to them in Jerusalem and Galilee, and after having been appointed to meet their risen Lord at this very time and place. The appearance of the five hundred must at any rate be referred to Galilee; for even after our Lord's ascension, the number of the names in Jerusalem were together only about an hundred and twenty.² I do not hesitate, therefore, to hold with Flatt, Olshausen, Hengstenberg and others, that the appearances thus described by Matthew and Paul, were identical. It was a great and solemn occasion. Our Lord had directed that the eleven and all his disciples in Galilee should thus be convened upon the mountain. It was the closing scene of his ministry in Galilee. Here his life had been spent. Here most of his mighty works had been done and his discourses held. Here his followers were as yet most numerous. He therefore here takes leave on earth of those among whom he had lived and laboured longest; and repeats to all his disciples in public the solemn charge, which he had already given in private to the apostles: "Go ye therefore and teach all nations;—and lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world." It was doubtless his last interview with his disciples in that region,—his last great act in Galilee.

†8. *Our Lord's further Appearances at Jerusalem, and his Ascension.*

¹ 1 Cor. 15: 7. Acts 1: 3—12. Luke 24: 49—53. Mark 16: 19, 20.

Luke relates, in Acts 1: 3, that Jesus showed himself alive to the apostles, "after his passion, by many infallible proofs, being seen of them forty days, and speaking of the things pertaining to the kingdom of God." This would seem to imply interviews and com-

¹ 1 Cor. 15: 6.

² Acts 1: 15.

munications, as to which we have little more than this very general notice. One of these may have been the appearance to James, mentioned by Paul alone (1 Cor. 15: 7), as subsequent to that to the five hundred brethren. It may be referred with most probability to Jerusalem, after the return of the apostles from Galilee. That this return took place by the Lord's direction, there can be no doubt; although none of the Evangelists have given us the slightest hint as to any such direction. Indeed, it is this very brevity,—this omission to place on record the minor details which might serve to connect the great facts and events of our Lord's last forty days on earth,—that has occasioned all the doubt and difficulty with which this portion of the written history of these events has been encompassed.—The James here intended was probably our Lord's brother; who was of high consideration in the church, and is often, in the later books, simply so named without any special designation.¹ At the time when Paul wrote, the other James, "the brother of John," as he is called, was already dead.²

After thus appearing to James, our Lord, according to Paul, was seen "of all the apostles." This, too, was apparently an appointed meeting; and was doubtless the same of which Luke speaks, as occurring in Jerusalem immediately preceding the ascension. It was, of course, the Lord's last interview with his apostles. He repeats to them the promise of the baptism with the Holy Spirit as soon to take place; and charges them not to depart from Jerusalem until this should be accomplished.³ Strange as it may appear, the twelve, in this last solemn moment, put to him the question, "Lord, wilt thou at this time restore the kingdom to Israel?" How, indeed, were they to believe! Their gross and darkened minds, not yet enlightened by the baptism of the Spirit, clung still to the idea of a temporal Prince and Saviour, who should deliver his people, not from their sins, but from the galling yoke of Roman dominion. Our Lord deals gently with their ignorance and want of faith: "It is not for you to know the times and seasons;—but ye shall receive the power of the Holy Ghost coming upon you; and ye shall be witnesses unto me—unto the uttermost part of the earth."

During this discourse, or in immediate connection with it, our Lord leads them out *as far as to* Bethany (*ὡς εἰς Βηθανίαν*); and lifting up his hands he blessed them; Luke 24: 50. This act of blessing must be understood, by all the laws of language, as hav-

¹ See Acts 12: 17. 15: 13. 21: 18. Gal. 2: 9, 12 al.

² Acts 12: 1.

³ To this interview belongs also Luke 24: 44.

ing taken place at or near Bethany. The connecting particle is *καί* not *δέ*, as in the beginning of the same verse. "And it came to pass, *while* he blessed them, he was parted from them, and carried up into heaven." Our Lord's ascension, then, took place at or near Bethany. Indeed, the sacred writer could hardly have found words to express this fact more definitely and fully; and a doubt on this point could never have suggested itself to the mind of any reader, but for the language of the same writer, in Acts 1: 12, where he relates that after the ascension the disciples "returned unto Jerusalem from the mount called Olivet." Luke obviously did not mean to contradict himself; and the most that this expression can be made to imply, is, that from Bethany, where their Lord had ascended, which lies on the eastern slope of the Mount of Olives, a mile or more below the summit of the ridge, the disciples returned to Jerusalem by a path across the mount. Yet from this remark in Acts arose, probably early in the fourth century, the legend which fixed the place of the ascension on the reputed summit of the Mount of Olives. If that was indeed the true spot, then our Lord ascended from it in full view of all the inhabitants of Jerusalem; a circumstance not hinted at by the Evangelist, nor at all in accordance with the life and character of the Saviour.¹

As these disciples stood gazing and wondering, while a cloud received their Lord out of their sight, two angels stood by them in white apparel, announcing unto them, that this same Jesus, who was thus taken up from them into heaven, shall again so come, in like manner as they had seen him go into heaven. With this annunciation closes the written history of our Lord's resurrection and ascension.

§ 9. Results.

Having thus completed the discussion relative to the sequence of events, and the proper mode of harmonizing the accounts given by the four Evangelists of our Lord's resurrection, his ascension, and the accompanying circumstances, it may be worth while here to present a summary view of these events and circumstances, in the order resulting from the preceding considerations.

At early dawn on the first day of the week, the women who had attended on Jesus, viz. Mary Magdalene, Mary the mother of James, Joanna, Salome, and others, went out with spices to

¹ For a full discussion of this topic, in reply to the objections of Mr. Newman, see an article by the writer, in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1843, No. I. p. 176 sq.

the sepulchre in order further to embalm the Lord's body. They inquire among themselves, who should remove for them the stone which closed the sepulchre. On their arrival they find the stone already taken away; for there had been an earthquake, and an angel had descended and rolled away the stone and sat upon it, so that the keepers became as dead men for terror. The Lord had risen. The women, knowing nothing of all this, are amazed; they enter the tomb, and find not the body of the Lord, and are greatly perplexed. At this time Mary Magdalene, impressed with the idea that the body had been stolen away, leaves the sepulchre and the other women, and runs to the city to tell Peter and John. The rest remain in the tomb; and immediately two angels appear, who announce unto them that Jesus was risen from the dead, and give them a charge in his name for the apostles. They go out quickly from the sepulchre and proceed in haste to the city to make this known to the disciples. On the way Jesus meets them, permits them to embrace his feet, and renews the same charge to the apostles. The women relate these things to the disciples; but their words seem to them as idle tales; and they believed them not.

Meantime Peter and John had run to the sepulchre; and entering in had found it empty; but the orderly arrangement of the grave-clothes and of the napkin convinced John that the body had not been removed either by violence or by friends; and the germ of a belief arises in his mind, that the Lord had risen. The two returned to the city. Mary Magdalene, who had again followed them to the sepulchre, remained standing and weeping before it; and looking in she saw two angels sitting. Turning around, she sees Jesus; who gives to her also a solemn charge for his disciples.

The further sequence of events, consisting chiefly of our Lord's appearances, presents comparatively little difficulty. The various manifestations which the Saviour made of himself to his disciples and others, as recorded by the Evangelists and Paul, may accordingly be arranged and enumerated as follows:

1. To the women returning from the sepulchre. Reported only by Matthew.
2. To Mary Magdalene, at the sepulchre. By John and Mark.
3. To Peter, perhaps early in the afternoon. By Luke and Paul.
4. To the two disciples going to Emmaus, towards evening. By Luke and Mark.
5. To the Apostles (except Thomas) assembled at evening.

By Mark, Luke, John and Paul.—These five appearances all took place at or near Jerusalem, upon the first day of the week, the same day on which our Lord arose.

6. To the Apostles, Thomas being present; eight days afterwards at Jerusalem. Only by John.

7. To seven of the Apostles on the shore of the Lake of Tiberias. Only by John.

8. To the eleven and to five hundred other brethren, on a mountain in Galilee. By Matthew and Paul.

9. To James, probably at Jerusalem. Only by Paul.

10. To the eleven at Jerusalem, immediately before the ascension. By Luke in Acts, and by Paul.

NOTE. Besides the usual Harmonies and Commentaries, the following works are of some importance, and have been consulted.

J. D. MICHAELIS, *Erklärung der Begräbniss—und Auferstehungsgeschichte Christi*. Halle 1783.

J. J. GRIESBACH, *Inquiritur in fontes unde Evangelistae suas de resurrectione Domini narrationes hauserint*. Opuscc. Acad. ed. Gabler, II. p. 241.

——, *Locorum N. T. ad ascensum Christi in coelum spectantium Sylloge*. Opuscc. II. p. 471.

J. C. VELTHUSEN, *Historia Resurrectionis Christi ex diversis Commentariis contexta*. In Velthusen's *Commentationes Theol.* T. IV. p. 77.

G. F. SEILER, *Jesum corpore pariter atque anima in coelum assumptum esse an argumentis possit probari fide dignis*. In Velthusen's *Comment. Theol.* VI. p. 503.

A. NEANDER, *Das Leben Jesu Christi*, 3te Ausg. Berlin 1839.

K. HASE, *Das Leben Jesu*, 3te Ausg. Leipz. 1840.

E. W. HENGSTENBERG, *Die angeblichen Widersprüche in den Berichten über die Auferstehung Jesu und die Erscheinungen des Auferstandenen*. Evangelische Kirchenzeitung, Berlin 1841, No. 62—66. Col. 489—523.

J. I. DORDES, *Dissertatio Theologica de Jesu in vitam reditu*. Traj. ad Rhenum 1841. 8vo.

ARTICLE VIII.

SELECT NOTICES AND INTELLIGENCE.

Works on Biblical Interpretation, Hebrew Grammar, etc.—The fifth and concluding part of the second volume of De Wette's Exegetical Manual of the New Testament, Leipsic 1844, embraces the epistles to Timothy, Titus and the Hebrews. The author intimates, that some time will elapse before the remaining volume, on the epistles of James, Peter and Jude, and on the Apocalypse, will appear. In respect to the authorship of the epistle to the Hebrews, De Wette says, "Of all the conjectures in regard to the author of the epistle, that of Bleek, approved by Luther, which makes Apollos the writer, is certainly the most probable, since of the first Christian teachers known to us, he alone appears to have united in himself the principal characteristics of our author, viz. a Pauline turn of thought, and an Alexandrian acquaintance with the Scriptures, Acts 18: 24. The proof in favor of the wisdom of Apollos from 1 Cor. 1: 17 seq. is uncertain. But all probability fails for the position, that Apollos stood in such a relation to the Palestine Jews as is presupposed in our epistle." The time in which the epistle was written, De Wette concludes to have been in that short interval between the death of James, 62 or 63 A. D., and the Jewish war, 67 A. D. The author highly commends Bleek's Commentary on the epistle, as exhibiting comprehensive and fundamental learning, unwearied industry, a pure love of truth, and solid theological sentiment. "The Commentary of Dr. Tholuck," says De Wette, "has its undeniable excellences, and splendid is the learning, which the author often unfolds. But it might almost seem as if he did this, only to follow out his own favorite thoughts, not to satisfy the reader, whom, while he overwhelms here with a rich abundance, there lets him suffer want and remain destitute of aid in relation to the greatest difficulties of the epistle."

De Wette, as might be expected, decides against the Pauline origin of the three Pastoral Epistles. If a doubt had ever been lisped against their genuineness, it would assuredly come to the ears of this veteran doubter. If the current in Germany seems to be setting in against the Pauline authorship, De Wette would certainly be among the first to throw himself on the tide. Vacillation is with him one of the tests of critical acumen. The difficulties of a subject are always staring him in the face. His mind is one of that peculiar stamp which never allows itself to rest on the arguments in favor of a position, if ingenuity can possibly start a doubt. In this respect, he differs much from Schleiermacher, in whose school

he has sometimes been placed. That great man, it is true, abandoned some doctrines without any sufficient reason. But on others, and those pertaining to the essence of Christianity, his mind was perfectly at rest.

The reasons adduced by De Wette against the genuineness of the epistles to Timothy and Titus appear to us to be very insufficient. One of them is the difference of words and phrases. The writer uses words not found in Paul's genuine epistles, or employs words in another sense. He writes *ἐπιφάνεια* instead of *παρουσία*, *διδασκότης* instead of *κύριος*, *ὁγιής* and *ὁγιάντων* in the sense of true doctrine, as well as in antithesis to *ρascis*, etc. But must the free spirit of the apostle be restricted to a uniform style? May he not have the privilege, common to all profane writers, of employing a term one year, which he will disuse in the following? May not a letter to an individual require a terminology somewhat different from that to a church? Would not Paul suggest topics to such a man as Timothy, which would demand new terms, and which he would not allude to in a letter to the Ephesians? Might not a peculiar phraseology be necessary in describing the character of the Cretans, or the duties to which Titus might be called? And might not the office of an evangelist, travelling in various cities and regions, impose upon Paul the necessity of introducing new subjects and new phraseology, which would not be the case if he were writing to a company of Christians with a fixed abode?

It has long seemed to us that the Germans are sadly ignorant of some of the most common facts in literary history. Much of their skepticism arises from overlooking these. Because a writer employs one style when he is twenty-five years of age, he must be confined to the same, verbatim et literatim, till he is seventy. Because he has a favorite turn of expression now, it must remain so forever. If he says, at the beginning of a letter, "May grace and peace be multiplied to you," it will destroy his identity, should he begin another epistle with "grace, mercy and peace be with you." The two expressions never could have come from the same writer. But all such assertions are opposed to numberless facts. How unlike is Burke's style in his *Essay on the Sublime* from that in the *Letters on a Regicide Peace*. The style of Mr. Bentham's early works, says Sir James Mackintosh, was clear, free, spirited and often seasonably eloquent. Afterwards his style became harsh, obscure and repulsive. Yet according to the German mode of reasoning, "The Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation" could not have proceeded from the same man who wrote "A Defence of Usury."

Another argument of De Wette seems to have as little solid foundation. The frequent recommendations of good works in the three epistles seem to be almost in contradiction to the doctrine of grace as presented in

Paul's genuine epistles. Yet what are the 12th chapter of the epistle to the Romans, and the 5th and 6th in that to the Ephesians, but recommendations of good works? On the other hand, good works are always put in their appropriate place throughout the Pastoral epistles. They are never represented as the ground of justification. It is by God's mercy that we are saved through the washing of regeneration. Besides, these Pastoral epistles are in a great measure personal, or they concern usages and outward forms. They do not profess to discuss the scheme of redemption. They would not be strictly Pastoral epistles if they did.

A New edition of Ewald's Hebrew Grammar has recently appeared. This distinguished scholar commenced the series of his publications in 1823, by his "*Komposition der Genesis*," written when he was but twenty years old. His studies have embraced, not only the usual course pursued at the German universities, but a personal examination of oriental Mss. at Paris, Rome, Berlin, England, etc. His lectures include Hebrew Grammar, Literature and Exegesis, also Arabic, Aramaean, Persian and Sanscrit Grammar. He was professor in the university of Göttingen from 1827 to 1837. Since 1838, he has been a professor in the university of Tübingen in the kingdom of Würtemberg. In his Hebrew and Arabic Grammars, he has adopted the historico-genetic method, pursued by Grimm in his German Grammar and Bopp in the Sanscrit, endeavoring to show how particular grammatical forms originated by the hardening, softening and altering of single sounds or letters, and to point out the laws which the language in the process of its formation followed, and thus assign to each, as far as possible, its original forms. The plan, which the author pursues, is thus stated in one of his prefaces: "The judicious reader will easily perceive that none of the views of former grammarians have been retained, except those which have been proved true after a free and independent investigation, and that nothing which appears new has been added, except what was ascertained by the same investigation, to be founded in the spirit of the language. In order to obtain a vivid apprehension and representation of the language in its true form, I have always investigated it by means of itself without knowing the opinion of former grammarians or assuming their correctness, and therefore it was necessarily indifferent to me, as to the results of my investigations, whether any fact had been observed before or not; I sought nothing old or new."

A very long and able review of Ewald's Hebrew Grammar may be found in Jahn's *Leipziger Jahrbücher*, Vol. XX, 1837. The writer is Redtlob, now, we believe, a teacher at a gymnasium in Hamburg. He takes up the grammar in general and in particular, in its principles and details,

and handles it with great acumen and great severity. Among the charges, which he prefers against Ewald, are a want of a logical method, want of exact definition, disuse of the old nomenclature, when it is in every respect unobjectionable, unintelligibility, unwillingness to acknowledge any excellence in preceding writers on Hebrew Grammar, etc. "It is certainly not to be denied," says Redslob, "that Hebrew Grammar has made in late years very decided advances, and no one will deny that the "Critical Grammar," may have contributed greatly to this, but that it has altered the condition of the thing can by no means be maintained; especially would it better become the author, if he would leave others to give him the compliment, rather than proclaim it himself." Ewald's Grammar was published in 1827. But Hupfeld's researches respecting the sounds of the letters date in 1825. His treatise, *De Emendanda Lexicographiæ Semitiæ*, was published in 1827. Besides, the Critical Grammar, as Ewald himself acknowledges, found an increasing number of reviewers; these could not have obtained their knowledge of Hebrew from the Critical Grammar.

Redslob's review is well worth a perusal by all Hebrew scholars. Yet it is, in some respects, hypercritical, while it does not acknowledge the distinguished merits of Ewald. No candid judge will refuse him the praise of great acuteness, and rich and profound learning. Many of his remarks are as valuable as they are original. Dr Nordheimer's Grammar owes some of its excellencies to Ewald. His talents do not fit him to prepare elementary works. He writes for advanced students, and even they must sometimes search in vain for the meaning of his sentences.

Ewald's latest work, which has come to hand, the "History of the Children of Israel," (*Geschichte des Volkes Israel bis Christus*), is to be included in three volumes. The first only is yet published. He speaks of this work as, in a sense, a continuation of his labors on the poetical and prophetic portions of the Old Testament. He wishes to exhibit in connection a complete view of Jewish antiquity, drawn from his previous studies of the Scriptures, and from other quarters. He first considers the sources of this history under three divisions—the Pentateuch and Joshua, —Judges, Ruth, the books of Samuel and Kings,—Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah and Esther. He then describes the country, in itself, in its relations to other countries, and its various inhabitants. He then takes up the history of the ancestors of the twelve tribes, and closes with an account of the residence in Egypt.

A fifth improved edition of Wiener's New Testament Grammar has lately appeared; also a third improved and enlarged edition of Wahl's New Testament Lexicon, in 525 pages, 4to. A third edition of Bretschneider's New Testament Lexicon was published in 1840.—The fol-

lowing works have just appeared in Germany,—the 10th volume of Neander's History of the Christian Church; the 3d volume of Henry's Life of John Calvin; the 3d volume of Ritter's History of Christian Philosophy, or the 7th of the entire work; the third enlarged edition of Tholuck's Exposition of the Sermon on the Mount; the first part of G. A. Meier's Historical Development of the Doctrine of the Trinity; the second volume of the "Symbolik" of all Christian churches, containing the Symbols of the Roman Catholic Church, by Prof. Edward Köllner of Göttingen; a Commentary on the Epistle of Paul to the Romans by Prof. Erasmus Nielsen of Copenhagen, translated from the Danish by A. Michelsen of Lubeck; "Of the Day of the Lord," with special reference to the treatise of Liebetrut, "Der Tag des Herrn u. seine Feier," by Prof. W. Rücker, etc.

Classical Literature. The 3d and 4th fasciculi of Vol. V. of the new Paris edition of Stephens's Thesaurus of the Greek language, C. B. Hase and G. and L. Dindorf, editors, have been published. They extend to the word *Μυρίων*. Passow's Lexicon, "newly edited and conformed to the present time," by Rost and Palm, is printed as far as *Ἐξομα*. The 5th edition of the original work has lately been published. The cost in this country of Pape's Greek Lexicon, reviewed in the last No. of this Journal, is about six dollars. It is contained in two volumes of about 1350 pages each, with an additional volume of 424 pages, containing the proper names, with an outline of the mode of their formation.—H. L. Ahrens has published two volumes on the Dialects of the Greek Language. The last relates to the Doric dialect. A reviewer, Curtius of Dresden, in the "Zeitschrift für die Alterthumswissenschaft," for July, 1844, remarks, "Cautious, fundamental research characterizes the book throughout. In an exact use of the sources, Ahrens is a master. His work fully accomplishes his design, of giving us precise and accurate information respecting the Doric dialect." "We should name the work, *historico-antiquarian*; that of Giese (a posthumous work on the Aeolic Dialect) *linguistic*; the latter takes his departure from the Sanscrit; the former calls in its aid here and there; Giese's object is the knowledge of the Greek language; Ahren's (like a true disciple of Müller), is the relations of the different branches of the language."—Kiepert of Berlin, with the coöperation of Prof. Karl Ritter, has published a "Topographico-historical Atlas of Greece and of the Hellenic Colonies." Great advances have been made within a few years in the topographical knowledge of Greece and its islands, by means of the labors of the French engineers, the surveys of the coasts by the English marine, the thorough researches in archaeology, geography, philology and natural history, by fundamental special histories and monographies,

and by the reports of a great number of intelligent travellers. The results of these diversified studies are embraced in the Atlas of Mr. Kiepert. The historico-geographical materials are distributed into twenty-four charts or maps. They contain plans of Greece and its dependencies at various periods from B. C. 1000 to the time of the Roman conquest, views of the principal divisions, islands, cities, ruins, battles, etc. Ritter, whose testimony is of course decisive, speaks of the work in the highest terms.

Prof. Lobeck of Königsberg has lately published a work of nearly 600 pages, entitled, "*Pathologie Sermonis Graeci Prolegomena.*" He has also published small monographs on the following topics: On nouns of the first declension ending in *α*; pure; Greek nouns whose characteristic is a labial; Greek nouns whose characteristic is a guttural, and *De Verbis quintae declinationis*. Of his edition of Phrynichus, published in 1820, it has been said, "that it is, perhaps, the most fundamental work which the philology of the 19th century has to show." Among his scholars are some of the most eminent classical teachers in Germany. Friedemann, Spohn and Spitzner were his pupils at Wittenberg. He has been at Königsberg since 1814, and is sixty three-years old.

From the English press have lately appeared, a "*Lexicon to Æschylus,*" containing a Critical Explanation of the more difficult passages in the seven tragedies, by William Linwood, of Christ Church, Oxford; a translation by John Leitch, of K. O. Müller's Introduction to a scientific system of Mythology; Varronianus, a Critical and Historical Introduction to the philological study of the Latin Language, by J. W. Donaldson, head master of the royal school at Bury St. Edmunds; Vol. I. of Dr. William Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, assisted by about thirty scholars in Great Britain and Germany, to consist of three vols.; Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, in one octavo vol. of 1100 pages, illustrated by nearly 500 engravings on wood; Lectures on the History of Rome from the first Punic war to the Death of Constantine, by B. G. Niebuhr, translated by Leonard Schmitz in two vols. 8vo., with a portrait of Niebuhr; and a new English translation of the last edition of Zumpt's Latin Grammar, to come out under the auspices of the author.

We adverted, in the last No. of this Review, p. 800, to Prof. Smith's translation of Crusius's Homeric Lexicon. The title is as follows: "*A Complete Greek and English Lexicon of the Poems of Homer and the Homeridae. From the German of G. Ch. Crusius, translated with corrections and additions, by Henry Smith, professor of languages in Marietta College.*" Hartford, Conn., H. Huntington, 1844, pp. 542. Crusius is

subrector of the Lyceum at Hanover, and is thus associated with Grotefend, Kühner and other eminent classical scholars. Previously to the publication of this volume, he had been known as the editor of a valuable edition of the *Odyssey*. A second edition of the *Homeric Lexicon*, published in 1841, gave him the opportunity to revise it thoroughly and make important improvements. Special attention has been paid to the explanation of the difficult passages. Copious references are made to the grammars of Rost, Thiersch, Kühner and Buttmann. The translator has incorporated some important additions, partly furnished by an extended review of the second edition of the original, in Jahn's *Jahrbücher*, for March, 1843. We have examined a number of the principal articles with much satisfaction. The translator has performed his task with skill and judgment, the sense of the German being given in good idiomatic English. If the student does not find that fulness of antiquarian and other information in regard to some words which he might expect in a special lexicon, he must recollect that much increase of the size of the volume would place it beyond the reach of many who need it. The work is an invaluable addition to our means for understanding the great poet. We may add that Crusius has published *Special Lexicons* of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, Caesar, Curtius, Sallust, Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, and of Greek Proper Names.

The publication of this Lexicon is of the more value, as there is a reviving interest in this country in the study of Homer. Mr. Owen's edition of the *Odyssey* has just appeared in a handsome form, and will, doubtless, awaken fresh attention to that delightful poem. It has been hitherto but little studied in our schools, partly from the want of a convenient edition, as well as of a good lexicon. Prof. Felton is also preparing a new edition of the *Iliad*, the notes to be much enlarged.

We are informed, that the lamented Dr. Grant, who died in Mosul in April, 1844, left a work partially prepared for publication, consisting of "*Graphic Sketches of his Journeys in the Koordish Mountains*," subsequent to his visit to the United States. Even general information in respect to a region so interesting and so little known, must be valuable. E.

CORRESPONDENCE.

A friend in Germany, under date of Sept. 4, 1844, communicates the following information, which will be read with interest.—EWS.

"In the department of lower criticism may be mentioned: *Codex Ephraemi Syri rescriptus, sive Fragmenta Novi Testamenti e codice*

Græco Parisiensi celeberrimo quinti ut videtur post Chr. sæculi eruit atque edidit Constantin. Tischendorf. Leipsic 1843. 4to. pp. 385. (18 Thlr.), which the Halle Literatur Zeitung characterizes as "a monument of German diligence, perseverance and capacity." On the disputed letters in 1 Tim. 3: 16, he comes to the same conclusion with Wetstein and Griesbach, in opposition to Woide, Weber and Patriccius.

"In the department of introduction, Guericke's new work entitled: *Historische Kritische Einleitung ins Neue Testament* (Leipsic 1843. pp. 564, Pr. 2 Thlr. 7½ Sgr.), is attracting some attention. Since the recent attacks of Strauss and his followers upon the historical credibility of the Gospels, the genuineness of many of the New Testament epistles and even of the patristic writings on which they are defended, this branch of theological science has assumed a new degree of importance. De Wette's Introduction, although it has lately reached its fourth edition and enjoys the widest circulation of any, in addition to its errors in doctrine, is defective in historical accuracy. A work combining profound criticism with evangelical views is a great desideratum. Guericke is orthodox in sentiment, but his *Symbolik* and church history are written in a dull, heavy style. In the present work there is some improvement in this respect, without, it is to be feared, the acuteness and vigor so much demanded in the desperate struggle now going on in Germany. The journals are not exactly agreed upon its merits. The Berlin Literarischen Zeitung pronounces it profoundly critical and a vigorous attack upon the recent hypercriticism. A review in Tholuck's journal, however, thinks that he errs in attaching too little importance to the objections of opponents, and intimates that the great work is yet to be done. Still he admits that it displays erudition, diligence and seriousness, and will be of use to young theologians."

"Exegesis has received some contributions in the publication of the lectures and exegetical writings of Baumgarten-Crusius, lately deceased. They are entitled: 1. *Theologische Auslegung der Johanneischen Schriften. Das Evangelium. Erste Abtheilung* (Jena, 1843. Pr. 2 Thlr. 15 Sgr.). 2. *Commentar über das Evangelium der Matthäus.* (1844. Pr. 1 Thlr. 8 Sgr.). 3. *Comm. über den Brief Pauli an die Römer.* (The 2d part of the Comm. on Matth. and also the Comm. upon Mark, Luke and Galatians are in the press). The author is regarded as a less finished, consecutive and orthodox commentator, especially in respect to miracles, than Lücke, but full of spirit, wholly given to his subject and sometimes carried away with it. Although fond of speculation and leaning rather to the figurative than literal mode of interpretation, he firmly held to the historical credibility of the evangelists. In his opinion and reasoning upon this point, no small part of the value of this fragment upon John, which there

is little reason to hope will ever be continued, consists. Strauss admits that if the Gospel of John can be proved to be genuine, the whole of his "Life of Jesus" will have been written in vain. In the present Introduction there are three chapters. I. On the authenticity of the book of John. II. The plan and aim of the Evangelist. III. The doctrine of the Logos. In the first chapter, the author arrives at the following conclusions: (1) From the middle of the second century, a doctrine and history of Christ was in existence, the same with that in the four Gospels. (2) The author was certainly an apostle. (3) The supposition that this author was John has the probability most in its favor. (4) It is impossible to suppose that the fourth Gospel is a deliberate falsification; it evidently has an authentic foundation of doctrine and history. (5) If we distinguish between this foundation and the work itself, it must at least be confessed that they perfectly agree. (6) Such a distinction is neither necessary nor justifiable.

"In philosophy the most important work, which has recently appeared, is Rosenkranz's long expected life of Hegel (Pr. 3 Thlr). Schleiermacher's life has not yet appeared. Perhaps in this connection I ought to mention Gabler's defence of the Hegelian philosophy, one part of which has been out several months. Hegelism is now attacked on all sides. Its defenders must fight *pro aris et focis*. The author of the present work, which can only be recommended to those who would gain a more particular acquaintance with the Hegelian philosophy than most will find profitable, is, as he himself says, the oldest of Hegel's scholars and may be regarded as a kind of successor. The work is entitled: *Die Hegelische Philosophie. Beiträge zu ihrer richtigeren Beurtheilung. Das absolute und die Grundfrage aller Philosophie bei Hegel in Unterscheide von der Fassung Anderer Philosophen.* Berlin 1843. 8vo. pp. 227. (1 Rthl. 7½ Sgr.).

"In practical theology, by far the most important work is a little volume by the orthodox Dr. Strauss of Berlin, on justification by faith—rich in thought and nervous, concise and idiomatic in expression. It is entitled: *Sola.* Predigten ueber die Rechtfertigung durch den Glauben. (Berlin 1844. 12mo. pp. 306. Pr. 1 Rthl. 7½ Sgr.). In order to make prominent the thought that justification by faith is the only way of salvation, he has prefixed this rather singular title with the following explanation in his dedication to the king: "The ancestor of your majesty, Joachim II, commanded the ambassadors he sent to the religious conference in Worms in 1540, either to bring back with them the little word *Sola* or else never to return themselves."

Another friend, a native of Germany and resident at Leipsic, has sent us the following valuable table.

STATISTICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIES.

When found- ed.	Place.	No. of Students.			When found- ed.	Place.	No. of Students.		
		1831.	1836.	1841.			1831.	1836.	1841.
1150	Bologna	600	410	560	1477	Tübingen	600	700	740
1189	Montpellier	730	730	780	1486	Grätz	360	400	510
1206	Paris	5680	7260	7000	1499	Alcala	360	310	370
1222	Salamanca	460	400	500	1504	Seville	840	620	800
1224	Naples	1400	1420	1550	1525	Marburg	260	260	290
1228	Padua	450	1300	1500	1531	Granada	835	820	810
1233	Toulouse	1190	1280	1300	1532	St. Jago	1050	1000	1100
1248	Rome	600	700	680	1544	Königsberg	350	370	400
1249	Oxford	5000	5154	5200	1548	Jena	600	500	470
1279	Cambridge	5380	5467	5530	1552	Oriola	130	90	130
1300	Lyons	70	70	80	1564	Besançon	76	70	70
1307	Perugia	200	210	210	1575	Leyden	800	770	620
1308	Coimbra			1900	1580	Oviedo	420	430	450
1337	Sienna	900	245	260	1581	Olmütz	55	105	200
1338	Pisa	510	545	580	1582	Würzburg ren'd			
1346	Valladolid	1280	1200	1300	1591	Dublin	1250	1310	1350
1348	Prague	1400	1430	1460	1581	Edinburgh	2020	2050	2200
1354	St. Guescar	550	535	550	1607	Gießen	220	210	430
1361	Pavia	1300	1460	1590	1614	Gröningen	300	265	280
1365	Vienna	2400	2500	2700	1621	Strassburg	815	850	880
1368	Geneva	210	220	330	1632	Dorpat	500	540	595
1385	Heidelberg	900	600	660	1634	Utrecht	580	490	520
1403	Würzburg	400	510	450	1665	Kiel	380	300	390
1409	Aix	115	120	120	1668	Lund	600	650	650
1409	Leipsic	1000	980	950	1672	Innsbruck	400	400	500
1410	Valencia	1600	1410	1600	1694	Halle	640	650	700
1411	St. Andrews	180	185	200	1702	Breslau	700	800	700
1412	Turin	1200		1300	1705	Moscow	850	970	1360
1412	Rostock	100	90	115	1717	Cervera	570	570	600
1426	Louvain				1725	Dijon	410	420	450
1431	Poitiers	206	220	250	1734	Göttingen	1260	1100	700
1433	Caen	270	280	295	1742	Erlangen	260	350	310
1433	Florence	170	200	220	1764	Cagliari	240	240	260
1441	Bordeaux	105	115	120	1766	Sassari	225	230	240
1445	Catania	500	500	600	1784	Lemberg	800	880	1060
1447	Palermo	600	600	735	1800	Montauban	360	370	400
1456	Greifswalde	200	220	250	1800	Ronen	65	70	85
1457	Freiburg	300	350	300	1801	Rennes	260	280	315
1458	Glasgow	1500	1500	1600	1803	Kasan	130	150	190
1460	Basel	130	110	140	1803	Charkow	290	300	330
1465	Pesth	1690	1800	1900	1803	Wilna	400	500	610
1471	Aberdeen	460	480	510	1810	Berlin	1630	1800	2090
1474	Toledo	250	205	260	1806	Lausanne	200	200	230
1474	Saragossa	1110	800	1100	1811	Christiania	600	655	710
1475	Copenhagen	1100	1200	1260	1812	Genoa	450	500	610
1476	Upsala	1160	1300	1450	1816	Liege	350	360	350

When found- ed.	Place.	No. of Students.			When found- ed.	Place.	No. of Students.		
		1831.	1836.	1841.			1831.	1836.	1841.
1816	Ghent	220	280	340	1828	London	430	610	960
1816	Warsaw	600	260	400	1828	Helsingfors	570	395	440
1817	Cracow	200	300	300	1830	Kiew		160	300
1818	Bonn	690	700	630	1833	Zürich		185	200
1819	St. Petersburg	1000	1120	1300	1834	Berne		150	200
1823	Corfu	300	300	300	1835	Louvain renew'd		300	660
1824	Camerino	100	200	210	1837	Brussels			60
1824	Macerata	80	250	320	1838	Athens			180
1824	Fermo	100	200	235	1838	Messina			60
1824	Ferrara	60	120	200	1838	Malta			200
1826	Munich	500	1260	1350					

It may be stated that several of the universities, in addition to Würzburg and Louvain, have been suspended for longer or shorter periods. At some of the universities, the actual residents are considerably less than the numbers in the table.

SPANISH UNIVERSITIES, 1842.

Barcelona	648	Santiago	1120
Cervera	130	Seville	1200
St. Guesca	272	Toledo	205
Madrid	877	Valencia	2707
Onate	149	Valladolid	1163
Oviedo	398	Vittoria	77
Salamanca	587	Saragossa	770

According to the calculation of Mr. Calinich of Dresden, there are at the common schools in Germany 62,250 teachers, and 6,000,000 scholars; at the high schools, lyceums, etc. 4,250 teachers, and 75,000 scholars; at the universities, 1400 teachers, and 18,000 students; at the teachers' seminaries, 500 teachers, and 6000 pupils; at the mechanics' schools, 2000 teachers, and 40,000 scholars; at 36 theological seminaries, 70 deaf and dumb asylums, 21 blind asylums, several academies of the fine arts, military academies, orphan houses, etc., 5000 teachers, and 461,000 pupils; making in all 75,400 teachers, and 6,600,000 scholars. Calinich estimates the whole cost at 22,900,000 rix dollars, or 15,500,000 for the common schools; 2,500,000 for the high-schools; 1,500,000 for the universities; 400,000 for the teachers' seminaries; and the remainder for the other institutions. According to this computation, one sixth of the population of Germany are connected with the schools, at a cost of about half a rix dollar annually to each inhabitant.

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NO. VI

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ARTICLE I.

REFORMERS BEFORE THE REFORMATION.

BRETHREN OF THE LIFE IN COMMON; AN ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF THE INSTITUTION, AND ITS INFLUENCE UPON LITERATURE AND RELIGION.¹

Barnes.
By B. Sears, D. D. President of Newton Theological Institution.

LIKE all institutions of a solid character and of a permanent influence upon society, that of the Brethren of the Life in Common, was called into being by the wants of the age and of the country in which it originated. So helpless was the condition of multitudes of individuals in the middle ages, and so destitute of life the scholastic theology, the religion, or rather the superstitions of the church, that associations for mutual relief, and for spiritual edification among the people were certainly altogether natural, if not absolutely necessary. The communities of the Beguins, Beghards and Lollards, which were the first essays to satisfy those necessities, had originally so many defects, and had, moreover, so far degenerated in their character since their establishment, that they either went to decay of themselves, or were suppressed by authority. And yet both the physical and the moral causes which, in that age of political disorder and of ecclesiastical corruption, had awakened a desire for such fraternities, continued in their unabated strength. Nowhere did the civil disorders, and, at

¹ The substance of this Article is taken from the work of Ullmann entitled *Reformatoren vor der Reformation*, Vol. II. pp. 62—201. The work itself has been reviewed in a former number.

the same time, the means of establishing charitable foundations, exist to a greater extent than in the north of Holland, particularly in the self-protected, but flourishing cities of Deventer, Kampen and Zwoll; and it is in these very places that we see the institutions of which we are to treat, under the generous support of wealthy Dutch merchants, spring into existence and flourish. An additional circumstance which gave these establishments importance and power, was that they supplied a third necessity of the times, which proved ultimately to be of more account than mere physical want and stood side by side in importance with the demand for the religion of the heart, I mean the necessity for a more unsophisticated and sound intellectual culture. The service done to humanity in the schools founded by this Christian fraternity is now beginning to be acknowledged by all those who are acquainted with their influence upon the learning and intelligence of the succeeding age, and upon the moral and religious condition of the people at large, preparing them for the reformation of Luther and Zuingle.

The founder of the institution of the Life in Common was *Gerard Groot*, a man of ardent piety, and popular eloquence, who felt a special interest in the education of the young. He was not a man of great literary attainments; his Latin style was not very classical; he probably did not understand Greek or Hebrew at all, and his reading appears to have been limited chiefly to the Scriptures, to writers on canonical law, and to the fathers of the church, particularly Augustine and Bernard. Still he held an honorable place among his contemporaries as a theologian, and, what was most important of all, he was a zealous promoter of sound, and useful knowledge. He might have been a more learned man, might have written Latin in the style of a Poggius, and have possessed the philological treasures and the wit of an Erasmus, and yet not have been so great a benefactor to his age and of posterity,¹ as he actually was in consequence of originating the great enterprise of popular education. Though the institution subsequently outgrew the plan of the founder, and under such men as Agricola, Alexander Hegius and Johan Wessel, exceeded what Gerard ever designed or distinctly conceived, still to him belongs the honor of having originated measures which proved to be an unspeakably great public blessing, particularly to Germany and Holland.

¹ Thomas à Kempis said of him: *Nam totam hanc patriam nostram vita, verbo, moribus et doctrina illuminavit et accendit.*

Gerard Groot was born in 1340 at Deventer, where his father, Werner Groot, held the office of burgomaster. He had a slender constitution, but good talents, and was therefore destined to a literary profession. After his preparatory studies were ended, he resorted to the university of Paris, then the most distinguished in Europe, where he remained from 1355 to 1368. Philosophy and dialectics he is supposed to have studied under the nominalist Buridan, known to all the world by his celebrated dilemma of the ass between two bundles of straw. He pursued theology, his chief study, in the Sorbonne, for many centuries the most renowned seat of that science. His most intimate friend at Paris was Henry Eger, twelve years older than himself, afterwards known as an author. He is also mentioned as Gerard's confessor. In his eighteenth year, young Groot returned home as master of arts, but was soon led, by his thirst for knowledge, to resort to Cologne, where he prosecuted his studies still further and became teacher in the university.

Belonging as he did to a family of rank, he received several benefices; he was made canon of Utrecht and also of Aix La Chapelle. Surrounded with the smiles of fortune, he appeared as one entering upon the ordinary career of a worldly minded prelate. He attended public entertainments, enjoyed the luxuries of the table; wore a splendid robe and a girdle ornamented with silver and an outer garment of the richest fur. With his natural endowments and learning and fortune, he was a man after the spirit of the times. But soon a more serious and earnest state of mind ensued. Even while he was at Cologne, during a public amusement at which he was present, a man, who perceived what he was capable of becoming, accosted him with these words, which were not without effect: "What have you to do here, with these vain amusements? You must cease to be a man of this sort." Still greater effect had the faithful admonitions of Eger upon him, who had, in the meantime, become prior in a monastery near Arnheim. Meeting him one day in Utrecht, he seriously remonstrated with him, turning his attention away from the vanity of earthly things to the pursuit of the chief good. Eger struck the right chord in the heart of his young friend, and the latter resolved on the spot to change his course of life, and, in humble reliance upon God, to renounce the world, and to devote himself to something worthier of his spiritual nature.

From that moment Gerard became a different man. He gave up his ecclesiastical revenues and his paternal estate, burnt his

books of magic on which he had expended much money, abandoned his pleasures, and retired to the monastery of his friend where he spent three years in religious meditation and in the study of the Scriptures. But his eloquence and energy of character fitted him rather for active than contemplative life, and, as he trembled at the responsibilities of the office of priest, and the care of souls, he was made deacon, by virtue of which office he was authorized merely to preach. Thus, at the urgent request of the monks of his order, the Carthusians, he went forth with a noble enthusiasm, publicly to persuade men to a religious life. Having obtained permission of the bishop of Utrecht to preach throughout his whole diocese, he was seen, as were once Peter of Bruys, Henry of Lausanne, and others, travelling from place to place and eloquently discoursing with the people and urging them to repentance and reformation of life. His preaching, eagerly listened to by all ranks of society, sunk deep into the hearts of many. It was not merely the richness and flow of his eloquence that moved the people. They saw before them a man, who, without office and without reward, spake out the language of his own heart, from a depth of conviction and an earnestness of love which left a peculiar impression. As discreet as he was ardent, he sought to avail himself in his discourses of every mood of feeling which he could see depicted in the countenances of his hearers. He would sometimes throw a searching glance over the whole audience, and then address himself directly to that state of mind which he found to prevail. It was of essential service to him that he abandoned the current method of preaching in Latin, and adopted the popular dialect, the low German. Hence at Deventer, Kampen, Zwoll, Utrecht, Leyden, Delft, Gouda, and Amsterdam where he first preached in the native language, the people assembled in such crowds, often without taking food and to the neglect of pressing business, that the churches would not contain them, and the preacher was obliged to hold his services in the open air. When he found a favorable opportunity, he preached almost continually, often twice a day, and sometimes three hours long. The jealousy of the clergy was at length aroused and the zeal of the preacher was checked by the authority of the bishop. This circumstance gave a new turn to Groot's activity, and conducted him immediately to that larger sphere of usefulness for which Providence had designed him.

Another cause had already operated towards producing this result. Gerard had recently made a journey, which had a power-

ful influence upon his character, and was decisive in giving a new direction to his life. In company with Cele, rector of the school at Zwoll, and another intimate friend, he visited, in 1378, the cloister of Grünthal, near the battle-ground of Waterloo, in order to make the acquaintance of the celebrated mystic Ruysbroek, whom he had long known from his writings. Delighted with the simplicity and fraternal deportment of the inmates of the cloister, and still more with the venerable and serene character of the philosophic prior, he remained several successive days to enjoy intercourse with the pious sage, and converse with him respecting the Scriptures and the inner life, from all which a deep and permanent impression was made upon his mind. He afterwards wrote to the brethren at Grünthal, that he had never so tenderly loved, nor so much respected any mortal as he did their prior. The life in common of the regular canons of this cloister and the fraternal spirit which prevailed there, by presenting a beautiful example of Christian union and sympathy, equally affected the heart and influenced the subsequent life of the distinguished visitor. With all these facts before us, we might anticipate the remark of Thomas à Kempis, that Gerard, struck with the simplicity and Christian spirit of Ruysbroek and his brethren, resolved to found an institution on a similar plan.

Gerard continued his journey from Grünthal to Paris, where he purchased, at no trifling expense, a large number of books adapted to the instruction of the young. On returning to Deventer, he directed his attention principally to the religious education of young men. He had long been accustomed to hold free intercourse with such, and Binterink, of Zutphen, a pious young clergyman, who had frequently accompanied him in his preaching circuits, and Florentius, a youth of great abilities and good attainments, were already numbered among his most familiar friends. In Deventer there was a flourishing school, and the young men belonging to it, particularly those who were studying for the ministry, put themselves, in part, under Gerard's direction. He guided and aided them in their studies, read valuable authors with them, gave to the indigent a seat at his own table, and furnished them facilities for earning something towards their support.

Copying books finally became one of their most important occupations. Gerard's love of the Scriptures and of the writings of the fathers led him to desire a collection of the early Christian literature. He was, as he himself said, avaricious and over-ava-

ricious of good books. In employing the young men to copy valuable theological works, he had a three-fold object in view, the multiplication and circulation of copies, the pecuniary aid of those employed, and their literary and religious training which he designed to connect with their occupation. The circle of students and young friends around him was gradually enlarged till at length they formed a regular association, and a beginning was made in copying and distributing Bibles and religious tracts which continued until superseded by the art of printing.

The circumstance which occasioned a regular organization was the following. One of the young men, Florentius, of whom mention has already been made, then vicar at Deventer, said one day to Gerard, "Dear teacher, what harm would it do, were I and my associates, employed in copying, to put together our weekly earnings and live in common?" "In common?" replied Gerard, "that the mendicant friars would never suffer; they would oppose it with all their power." "What if we were to make the trial?" said Florentius, "perhaps God would give us success." "Very well," replied Gerard, "make a beginning; I will defend and protect you against opposition." This was the germ of a union, which afterwards became widely extended and assumed great public importance.

The community which took its origin in these circumstances had a certain resemblance to the philosophical and ascetic associations of the ancient pagans and Jews, but was freer, less secret, and more practical. It was not wholly unlike the monastic institutions, but it was a system of less constraint, and was animated by a purer and nobler spirit. The practice of these brethren, and the aims of their organization were designed to be conformed, so far as the circumstances and character of the age would allow, to the apostolic model as described in the second chapter of Acts. The association bore the names of *Fratres Bonae Voluntatis*, *Fratres Collationarii*, *Gregoriani* and *Hieronymiani*, as well as that of Brethren of the Life in Common. Their means of subsistence were procured partly by manual labor, and partly from the munificence of friends. Only in cases of extreme distress would they beg from door to door. Their property was held in common, and ordinarily each one, on becoming a member, gave whatever he possessed to the fraternity, though at first no strict rule appears to have existed in respect to this matter. Everything was left to be regulated as far as possible by love, and the

voluntary principle was preferred to authority. With the common property thus brought together, and with the donations of the rich, the *houses*, or separate establishments of the society were erected, in which a particular number of members resided, subject to a certain order in dress, food and mode of life, not separated, however, from the world in a monastic manner, but maintaining a constant intercourse with it, and enjoying a general freedom in striking contrast with the principle of obedience to authority, which prevailed in the cloisters. The leading object of the union was to produce, exemplify and promote a practical Christian life. This object they endeavored first to attain among themselves by their social order, manner of life, intercourse and Christian character, which they sought to perfect by religious fellowship and sympathy, by mutual confession and admonition, and by public instruction and worship. They exerted an influence upon society by copying and circulating the Scriptures and other religious books, by giving religious instruction to the people, and especially by reviving and improving the education of the young. In this last respect they formed an era in the history of general culture. Schools had, indeed, been previously established in the principal cities of Holland; at Gravesande in 1322; at Leyden in 1324; in Rotterdam in 1328; in Schiedam in 1336; in Delft in 1342; in Hoorn in 1358; in Haarlem in 1389; and in Alkmaar in 1390. But these schools were not purely literary in their objects; they were rather mercantile speculations. The right to establish schools was farmed by the cities, a circumstance which rendered the charge for tuition so high that none but the wealthy could enjoy their advantages. Besides this, their literary character was very indifferent. The instruction given by the monks in the cloister schools was no better; it was too much limited to mechanical forms; and being imparted by uncultivated and superstitious teachers, it often stood directly in the way of intellectual culture.

The Brethren of the Life in Common, on the contrary, taught gratuitously often, and thereby rendered instruction in reading and writing accessible to all, to the rich and the poor alike; and, what is more important, they imparted new life, and a more genuine and elevated character to school instruction.

The age of Gerard was not, strictly speaking, an age of ignorance; but it was prolific in false, abstruse and useless speculations. It was therefore a great merit to do anything which should withdraw the minds of men from those unprofitable pursuits. As

in the time of Socrates there existed a necessity for bringing contemplative men back to themselves and philosophy from heaven to earth, so among the contemporaries of Gerard nothing was more necessary than that some one should arise to open to the philosophic spirit of the age a new channel, that of a modest, sound and practical wisdom. From this point of view must the efforts of Gerard and his disciples be contemplated in order justly to estimate the limited compass of their studies. It is certainly a defect in a system of education to exclude geometry, arithmetic, rhetoric, logic, grammar and lyric poetry. But such an omission appears in a more favorable light, when it is recollected that he was seeking the cure of a particular disease which infected the public mind, that he proceeded on the fundamental principle that "everything is injurious, which does not either promote virtue or reclaim from vice." Hence, agreeably to this strict rule of utility, many studies in themselves liberal, and, for us of the present age, necessary, were regarded by him as needlessly consuming time, because they were not directly of a moral or religious tendency. Whatever tended merely to make a show, or to nourish and strengthen the passions was discouraged. To this class belonged the disputatious arts of the dialectician, the ambitious seeking for academic honors, the pursuit of those studies which held out the promise of great distinction and emolument, and, finally, useless and pretended mystic sciences such as astrology and magic. The Bible was made the foundation of the new system of education, to which were added select portions of the Christian fathers and the most useful of the pagan moralists.¹ These works were selected with special reference to promoting self-knowledge morality and true piety. "The Gospels," said Gerard, "are to be the root and mirror of thy studies, because they contain the life of Christ; then the lives and the pious sayings of the Fathers (of which Gerard himself, at the request of his friends, had made several collections); next the epistles of Paul and the Acts of the Apostles; and lastly the devotional works of Bernard, Anselm, Augustin and others." The writings of Solomon were placed after those already mentioned. From the order of study here laid down by Gerard, we learn that Christian productions took the precedence of pagan, and the animated, and stimulating form of instruction

¹ The writings most studied were the Bible, particularly the Gospels, the *Meditationes* of St. Bernard, the *Monologium* of Anselm of Canterbury, extracts from Eusebius, Cyril and Chrysostom of the Greek Fathers; Augustine and Bede of the Latin; and of the classical authors, Plato, Seneca and Virgil.

that of the doctrinal and the preceptive. The life of Christ is placed at the head, and the biographies of the saints are, for psychological reasons, made to precede the writings of Paul. By this limited, but energetic system of moral training, in which a living germ of practical wisdom and piety is first of all planted in the soul a new era was introduced in popular education; and soon in Holland, Gelders, Brabant, Friesland, Westphalia and even in Saxony Houses of the Brethren were established and their salutary influence widely felt.

Gerard did not set himself in opposition either to the scholastic theology or to the papacy. His friend and patron, William of Salvarvilla, could write to the pope, "Gerard is thoroughly orthodox, zealous for the unity of the church, and a powerful opponent of the heretics." He himself said to his bishop, "always and everywhere I humbly submit myself to the authority of the holy Roman church." He was strict in observing all the ordinances of the ecclesiastical power. But in spite of all this, in the very bosom of the scholastic theology and of the hierarchy, he prepared the way by a noiseless activity, for throwing off the shackles of both. The germs of a reformation were contained in his principles. By conceiving of the church and the priesthood in such a spiritual way, he was led to seek them in their purity, and vitality, and to attempt to give them a character worthy of their origin. He insisted with great earnestness on the use of the *Scriptures*, and on their wide circulation. He was a close biblical student himself and always urged others to become such. Christ as represented in the Gospels, he incessantly set forth as the foundation of the church and of the Christian life. The primitive, apostolical church was always present to his mind as a model. There he found a pure piety and a glowing zeal such as was not to be found in his own age. According to that primitive pattern, therefore, if not in all things, certainly in all the more essential, he desired to see the church remodeled. He was especially concerned for the restoration of the priesthood to a spiritual character, and contended earnestly against its prevailing corruption. The priest, he maintained, should not strive for ecclesiastical or literary honors; but should aim at humility, at a victory over all selfishness and a life pleasing to God alone.

Gerard had also intended to establish a cloister for regular canons for the purpose of exhibiting a higher and purer model of Christian life, but death prevented him. He died as he had lived. The plague then raging in Deventer had seized one of

his friends. As Gerard possessed some medical knowledge, he hastened to the relief of the sufferer and caught the infection. He was not in the least terrified, but said with composure, "Behold, the Lord calls me away, the moment of my departure is at hand; Augustin and Bernard are knocking at the door." To his younger brethren who gathered weeping around his bed, he addressed these, his last words: "Trust in God, my dear friends, and be not afraid of the men of the world. Be firm; for man cannot frustrate what God has determined to accomplish.—Florentius, my beloved disciple, on whom the spirit of the Lord rests, will be your father and rector. Listen to him as you have done to me; for I know not any one whom I can so well trust, whom you can so safely love and honor as being your father." Thus he fell asleep in his native city, on the 20th of August 1384 at the age of 44. He was buried, amid the universal lamentations of the people, in St. Mary's, the church in which his living voice had so often resounded.

Among the productions of Gerard none are more interesting to us than his moral sayings recorded by his biographer, Thomas à Kempis. These furnish conclusive evidence that Gerard constitutes an important link in the succession of the mystical school of piety. Himself excited and influenced by Ruysbroek, he transmitted the same spirit through his favorite disciple, Florentius, and he, in turn, communicated it to Thomas à Kempis. The latter had never seen Gerard; for he could not have been more than four years old, when Gerard died; but no one can fail to recognize, in the moral sayings already referred to, the school from which the Imitation of Christ proceeded. Every one who examines the writings of that circle of men, must perceive that Thomas à Kempis is only one member in the series, that he was formed and attained to the most perfect maturity under the traditional influence, which descended from Ruysbroek and Gerard Groot.

Florentius Radewin, and the more perfect development of the system under him.

The individuals, who succeeded Gerard either as heads of the institution or as chief centres of influence, followed the direction which he had given, improving the system and enlarging the sphere of its operations and thereby giving it increasing importance. The immediate successor of Groot was Florentius Radewin, the

second pillar of the Life in Common, and, as it respects the perfection of the system, a more important individual than Gerard himself.

Florentius was born about the year 1350, and was the son of a respectable and wealthy citizen of Leerdam, in the south of Holland. He was educated at the university of Prague, then very flourishing and much frequented by the young men of the Low Countries. On his return home, he heard the discourses of Gerard, who happened at that very time to be on one of his preaching excursions through the diocese of Utrecht. He was deeply impressed and permanently affected by the remarkable spirit of piety which pervaded those discourses. Soon he became personally connected with Gerard, and finally the warmest friendship was contracted between them. Being of an active and energetic character, he eagerly sought to communicate to others the fire which glowed in his own bosom. He therefore gathered around him a circle of studious young men, who were inclined to devote themselves entirely to a simple, pious, and apostolical life, and, without any formal promise of obedience, to adopt him as their guide. Florentius renounced his place as canon in Utrecht, and went to Deventer, where, in accordance with Gerard's wishes, he was ordained as priest. He was the first of the fraternity who received such ordination. Gerard said on that occasion, "Only this once have I procured ordination for any one, and he, I hope, will prove a worthy priest."

Florentius was less learned than Gerard; and never indulged in subtle speculations which hold no connection with personal piety. But he had all the qualities of a practical man,—an untiring activity, great tact in controlling men, and unusual affability, and, at the same time, a character that inspired awe. One of his friends said of him, "There is no man whom I so much love and at the same time so much fear as Florentius." When he felt constrained to give reproof, no one resisted or apologized for himself. In the severities of a religious life he equalled and even exceeded Gerard. He despised all adulation. As he one day received a letter full of commendation, he threw it down with these words, "Has the man nothing else to write about? If not, it were better to be silent." No employment was too mean for him, not even the duties of the kitchen, to which, according to the example set by Gerard, all the brethren attended in turn. His care for the poor and the suffering was incessant; he often sent them food from his own table, and even gave away the delicacies which he had re-

ceived as presents from his friends. Not less was his concern for the young; he cultivated their friendship, gave them religious advice and consolation, furnished them with books and materials for copying, and in every way promoted their piety and favored their studies. Thomas à Kempis, who had experienced, in his youth, many such kindnesses from Florentius, says in his biography of him, "If all others were to be silent, I could not be so, respecting the benevolent character of Florentius, of which I have received so many proofs myself." The counsels of so wise and good a man were much sought. Said one, "whenever I have followed the advice of Florentius, I have received benefit from it, but injury whenever I have preferred my own way." Sometimes there stood at his door so many persons who came to consult him, that he could scarcely find his way out, or reserve sufficient time for his private devotions and other engagements; but he never dismissed one without either complying with his request, or setting a more convenient time to converse with him. Like Gerard, he gave to his brethren a collection of religious maxims or moral sayings. But we must refrain from giving any examples.

Such was the character of the man to whom Gerard entrusted the supervision of the young fraternity. Let us now see how Florentius carried out the designs of Gerard. Two years after the death of his master, in the year 1386, he consummated the devout wish of his departed friend. In conjunction with other disciples of Gerard, he sketched the plan of a *cloister of Regular Canons*, which was to be the soul and centre of the other inferior associations, whether male or female, of the general society. William, Duke of Gelders, favored the undertaking; wealthy men supported it by giving it landed estates; and the same bishop of Utrecht, who once prohibited the preaching of Gerard, now signified his approbation of the design. Thus originated at Windesheim, a few miles south of Zwoll, a cloister of regular canons in connection with the Brethren of the Life in Common. This was soon followed by others, especially that of St. Agnes, near Zwoll, in which Thomas à Kempis long resided. These establishments for regular canons stood in immediate connection with the Houses of the Brethren. From the latter various individuals passed to the former, while others received ordination and entered upon the public duties of the Christian ministry. The Brethren were also on friendly terms with the better monastic orders, such for example as the Carthusian, Cistercian and Benedictine. In this manner the institution founded by Gerard was developed under a two-

fold form. The regular canons, who were more secluded, and more restricted to a monastic life, formed the heart of the system, the ordinary brethren of the Life in Common, partly priests and partly laymen, constituted the larger, freer and more active portion of the society, being extensively employed among the people, and either residing together in the Houses of the Brethren, or abroad, when engaged as clergymen or as teachers of youth.

The Cloisters seem not to have accomplished all that Gerard and Florentius anticipated. At first the Brethren at Windesheim were very zealous and active, particularly in making manuscript copies of the Bible, and in comparing and criticising the various texts. But with the gradual prosperity and increasing wealth of the establishment, their zeal began to abate, and they finally sunk to the ordinary level of monastic institutions.

The Houses of the Brethren, on the contrary, were in the highest degree successful in fostering and propagating both piety and learning. Here the activity of Florentius was particularly vigorous and effective. In Deventer were established, by his agency, with the aid of the city council, several houses. Of these the most important was the *Rich House*, (het rijke Fraterhuis), called also the House of Florentius. About the same time, followed many other similar Houses in the larger towns of Holland and of Lower Germany.

Thus had Florentius, during his rectorship, accomplished very much in enlarging and completing the arrangements of the institution over which he presided. But he was now near the end of his career. He had, perhaps from his excessive severities, long suffered in his health; but at this time he was seized with a mortal illness, and after appointing a bosom friend, Aemilius van Buren, his successor, and giving his dying counsel to the Brethren, saying among other things, "Abide in humility and simplicity of heart, and Christ will abide in you," he expired in the year 1400, sixteen years after Gerard's death, at the age of about fifty. When his body was deposited in the church of St. Lebuin, one of the citizens of Deventer remarked, "whether St. Lebuin was a holy man or not I do not know,—I suppose he was; but I know full well that Florentius was a holy man of God."

It will be in place here to enter into a more detailed account of the institution planted by the hand of Gerard, and nurtured into vigor by the care of Florentius. The entire establishment was an association closely united by internal bonds, and yet so free that each individual could have a spontaneous development

and enjoy his natural liberty, according to the apostolic model. This end was secured by placing the union not so much on the ground of compacts and formal rules, as on the spirit by which all the members were animated. The disorders, incidental to such liberty, were restrained not by authority but by an extraordinary attention to the cultivation of charity. While great results were possible, so long as such a state of things should exist, a failure would be sure to follow, as soon as the spirit of the original founders and members should degenerate in their successors.

Entrance into the fraternity, originally at least, was not attended with a vow binding for life, neither was the conduct of members regulated, as in the cloisters, by minute laws and precepts, but by example and usage.¹ By this means two important points were gained; first, as the continued connection with the society always remained voluntary, the members were always warmly attached to it; and secondly, as the union of all the branches of the general society as well as of all of the members of each body was free and unconstrained, ample room was left for all that variety of form which nature always requires. The different Houses had their own different customs and traditionary forms; and in each of the Houses a certain freedom was allowed for every individual to act in his own way.

Still a substantial union, both external and internal, was steadily aimed at. The Houses always stood in communication with each other; and besides this, general meetings of the rectors were regularly held. The heads of all the Houses met annually, the Dutch and the German separately, to deliberate and decide upon matters of common concern. The rector of the principal House at Deventer was the natural superior, at least, of all the Dutch fraternities. The arrangement, however, was not of the nature of a hierarchy, but was patriarchal. He was regarded as the father of the whole society, and was so styled. This patriarchal feature of the institution explains the mode of appointing the rector at Deventer, which was not by election, but by designation from the last incumbent, a circumstance which invested the office with the greater solemnity and authority.

The organization of a House of the Brethren was ordinarily as follows. About twenty brethren lived together with a common purse and a common table. They were divided into three classes, priests, clerks and laymen. The number of priests was at first very small, because the whole society inherited the scruples

¹ *Secundum laudabiles consuetudines domus antiquae.*

of Gerard and trembled at the awful responsibilities of the priestly office. At a later period, a larger number received ordination, some entering upon the public ministry and receiving office and therefore dissolving their external connection with the Houses, others remaining in that connection and exercising their clerical functions among the Brethren. There were commonly four, sometimes a larger number of priests in one House, and about twice as many clerks; the remainder consisted of persons in their novitiate, or those who had taken up only a temporary residence with the Brethren. Admission into the order, which was never granted except after earnest and frequent solicitation, inasmuch as the Brethren kept themselves at the furthest remove from the proselyting spirit of the mendicant friars—was always preceded by a probationary residence of one year. During that period the probationers were kept under strict supervision; and it was expected of them not to visit their friends in the interval, lest they should thereby become entangled again with secular affairs. Their property also was ordinarily applied to the use of the fraternity. One of the sayings of Florentius was, "Wo to the man who, while living in the community, seeks his own, or says of anything, it is mine." Those who, at the close of the year, wished to become permanent members, were admitted as clerks, and their condition corresponded to that of monks, except that no vows for life were required of them. Each one retained the right of withdrawing at pleasure with the understanding, however, that on so doing, he was to pay a stipulated sum to the fraternity. In dress and manner of living there was less constraint than in cloisters. The ordinary dress was a grey mantle, coat and pantaloons without ornament, together with a grey cap, whence they were called *cucullati*. Those who were upon probation had the hair shorn from the crown of the head. The mode of life in each House was very regular, particular hours being set apart for devotion, writing and manual labor. During the time of sitting at table some book was read, each of the Brethren in turn officiating as reader. One individual was appointed at each time to notice and correct any irregularities, and was called *corrector errorum in mensa*. Though certain offices were established for the sake of order, there was a general equality, like that which exists in families. Over each house presided a rector, prior, or praepositus, elected by the brethren; the other offices were those of vice-rector, steward, scriptarius, who superintended the business of copying manuscripts, the librarius, the magister novitiorum, the

infirmarius, the hospitarius, and a few mechanics. But in these matters, as might be expected, there was no exact uniformity.

After the same manner, there were formed female societies of the Life in Common. Even Gerard had founded, in a separate house, totally disconnected from the other establishments, a female community, the members of which were to lead, in retirement, a life of devotion and industry. Sewing and weaving and the instruction of the youth of their own sex, constituted their chief employment. John Binterink founded a new convent for females, a little out of the city of Deventer, and presided over both the old and the new establishments for a period of twenty-six years. When he commenced these labors there were sixteen sisters connected with the association; at the time of his death there were one hundred and fifty. Such houses were rapidly multiplied, as was the case with those of the Beguins at an earlier period; and they were soon regularly organized after the manner of the *Beginasia*. A superintendent, or Martha, presided over each house; a sub-Martha was stationed at her side. In Utrecht resided the superior, or the Martha, who had the supervision of all the houses in that country, and who visited them all at least once a year. Besides this office which related more particularly to the external deportment of the members, and the general order of the establishment, there belonged to each house a priest, who exercised the functions of a spiritual guide. Community of goods prevailed more in the houses of the females than in those of the males. One of the chief benefits resulting from these female associations; was that through them the religious spirit of the general body found a readier entrance into private families. But as there was otherwise nothing very peculiar in their influence, we will return to the institutions of the Brethren.

The labor of the Brethren was judiciously distributed. Such mechanical arts as were needed were practised by those who were skilled in them. Among the regulations for the houses in Wesel, of which there were three, are found directions for tailors, barbers, bakers, cooks, gardeners, butlers, as well as for teachers, copyists, bookbinders, librarians and readers. In the house at Rostock the brethren employed in common manual labor were divided into *laymen* and *mechanics*. Notwithstanding these divisions of labor, a certain equality was restored, inasmuch as the clerical and literary members took part, as far as was practicable in the menial services, and those of lower employments, in turn,

participated in almost every labor of the clerical members. To such an extent did the spirit of the family prevail over that of caste. The employment most common to all, was that of copying books. The zeal which Gerard, from religious motives, manifested for this branch of labor was inherited by Florentius and imparted by him to the entire fraternity. Florentius himself was not a skilful copyist; but he encouraged his brethren to practise the art, and gave such aid as he could by polishing and ruling the parchment, selecting passages and correcting the copy. Particular hours were set apart each day for copying, especially for the benefit of the poor. The more elegant copyists, such as Thomas à Kempis, prepared beautiful copies of the Bible and of favorite theological works, which were deposited in the libraries of the Brethren. Others were occupied with copying useful books to be given away to indigent young persons, or religious tracts to be distributed gratuitously among the people.¹

The occupations of the brethren depended in great measure on the circumstances and character of the different houses. In some houses a practical tendency prevailed; in others intellectual activity, and some were scarcely anything more than mere industrial establishments. Much, too, depended on the pecuniary condition of the houses; for while many of them were very poor, others were rich and even sumptuous. The house at Hildesheim, was a sort of ecclesiastical warehouse, where missals, mass-weeds, surplices and the like were furnished. In the convent of St. Mary's near Beverwijk, the brethren traded in parchments, honey, wax and salt fish. The brethren at Hattem, on account of their poverty, practised at first nothing but husbandry and weaving; after becoming more prosperous, they were also engaged in literary employments, and finally established a school which was not without repute. There was a similar diversity in the cloisters of the regular canons. The celebrated cloister of Agnesberg or Mount St. Agnis near Zwoll, where Thomas à Kempis lived, was originally very poor. Others, as that near Hoorn, called the jewel of Westfriesland, were very rich.

The largest number of these establishments, however, retained the character which their founders designed, and were of that middling class, which were not obliged to resort wholly to manual labor, nor, on the other hand, were allured to a life of ease and

¹ Has not the origin of tract distribution generally been referred to too late a period?

luxury. Their chief aim was to promote religion among the common people, and education among the youth.

For the spiritual improvement of the people two kinds of religious service were established, preaching, and what were called *collations*, or a religious meeting that bears the same relation to public preaching that a little refreshment does to a regular meal.

Upon the prevailing mode of preaching, Gerard and his institution exerted the happiest influence. As early as the time of Charlemagne the priests were often desired to preach in a language that the people could understand, but, for the most part, to no purpose. Only a few individuals, as the Dominican monk, John of Vicenza about the year 1250, and the Franciscan, Berthold of Ratisbon, who died in 1272, distinguished themselves from others by preaching practically and in the native language. But Groot gave a general impulse in favor of such preaching, and, in his day, a large number of preachers, undoubtedly excited by him, made the pulpit a place of commanding moral power, in Holland. So Wernbold at Utrecht, Henrici at Amersford, Gonde at Zwoll, Aurifaber at Haarlem, Dou at Amsterdam, and Paulus at Medenblik, men who, though they did not belong to the Brethren of the Life in Common, labored heartily in their spirit. Binterink and Gronde were among the most celebrated preachers of the fraternity. The manner of preaching among the Brethren was animated and popular. They spoke from inward impulses, and therefore with simplicity and with power. They animated their discourses by a liberal use of striking examples, and gave them form and authority by weighty sentiments and remarks drawn from the writings of the more pious and able of the church fathers. Their long discourses, which in some instances extended to six hours, probably have had some influence in the formation of that practice, still peculiar to the Dutch preachers, of delivering sermons of an almost interminable length.

The *collations* were less public and less formal than the ordinary church services. They were, at first, most common in the houses of the brethren, and were generally holden in the afternoon of the Sabbath and of festival days. A passage of Scripture, commonly from the Gospels, was read, explained and applied to practical life. Sometimes the speaker proposed questions to his audience. Such services, which were often held also among the common people, and also in the popular dialect excited a great and wide-spread interest, so that many legacies were left to the Brethren on the condition that, on festival days, such meet-

ings should be held for the benefit of the common people. Similar instructions were given on proper occasions in more private circles in social life.

But the most important service by far done to the public by the Brethren, was that of educating the young. By that means they succeeded in forming a new generation. In this work also their activity varied according to the occasion. In many cases, they had no separate schools of their own, but entered into a voluntary connection with existing schools, aiding the pupils by providing them with books, by holding literary and religious intercourse with them, and by procuring for them employment or support. In other instances they opened schools themselves, and gave instruction in reading, writing, music, in Latin both oral and written, and in religion, and most of all in biblical history. In other schools still, they sometimes had a participation by taking the charge of particular classes without any further connection. So it was in the celebrated school at Deventer, which was founded before Gerard's time. After the institution of the Life in Common, this school and the Brethren spontaneously entered into coöperation with each other. The rectors of the school were generally friendly to the order, many of the pupils either were supported by it, or recommended to wealthy and benevolent individuals, who furnished them both board and rooms. These pupils commonly participated both in the labors and in the religious exercises of the Brethren. At the time of Florentius, John Boheme was rector of the school at Deventer, and being a great admirer of the former, and an almost constant attendant on his preaching, he was predisposed to favor in every possible way those who were recommended by him. Thomas à Kempis says, in his life of Gronde, "When I came to Deventer to study, I also visited Windesheim, where I found among the canons my brother, John à Kempis. At his suggestion I went to see Florentius whose name was already widely known. He procured for me a gratuitous support in the family of a much respected and pious matron, and gave me books, as he was accustomed to do to others." By such a coöperation of the Brethren, the school at Deventer became very flourishing. Wherever the brethren had a house, there a large number of scholars was sure to be found, sometimes even a multitude, as at their school at Herzogenbush, where there were, at times, no less than twelve hundred pupils; and at Gröningen where there were nearly as many. The reason why their schools were so much frequented was, in part at

least, that the indigent were aided in their support by the Brethren, and though tuition was not universally free, it was generally so to poor students. In Herzogenbush the pupils, besides their division into some school classes, were distinguished as *divites*, *mediocres* and *pauperes*, the first of which are supposed to pay full tuition; the second, half of it; and the third nothing at all. Over the door of the House of the Brethren in that place was written the following distich:

Interea gratis docui quos pressit egestas,
Et mercede, quibus aors satis ampla fuit.

Where so large a number of pupils were collected, the office of teacher could be made permanent. This circumstance in the schools of the Brethren introduced an important change, and did much towards checking the wandering habits of the school-teachers of that age. The personal connection between teacher and pupil became intimate, influential and lasting. Whole cities even where such schools were established, received a new and remarkable intellectual stamp. In Amersford, for example, a knowledge of the Latin, about the middle of the sixteenth century, is said to have been so general, that the common mechanics could understand and speak Latin. The more intelligent merchants understood Greek, the maidens sung Latin hymns, and a tolerably correct Latin could be heard in the streets. This picture may be a little too highly colored, but it is certain that the Brethren made great and successful efforts to restore and propagate a purer Latinity.

In the schools, as in the church, the tendency of these efficient labors of the Brethren was to Reformation. Their earnest, active, disinterested efforts for the education of the young, was a novel thing. It was apparent that they were designing to raise up a new generation of men. Still more obvious was this in their method of instruction. They cast away at once from their textbooks all the scholastic nonsense, and abandoned what was entangled and useless for what was sound and practical; and the barbarism of the middle ages for the simplicity and purity of the ancients. The *Mammotrectus*, the *Gemma Gemmarum*, the *Doctrinale Alexandri de Villa Dei*, and other school books, which the papal church protected as sacredly as it did its doctrines, were unceremoniously thrust aside by the Brethren, and the works of the ancients substituted in their place. Alexander Hegius and John Sintius in the school at Deventer have deservedly secured

to themselves an imperishable name for the boldness and decision with which they conducted their pupils back to a knowledge of antiquity.

The foregoing account embraces what is most essential in the organization of the Brethren of the Life in Common. In what follows we have to consider its further development under two particular forms. At the very beginning, the Brethren, as if by natural instinct, resorted to *the use of the native language in giving religious instruction*. But from this period forth, it became with them a subject of definite consideration, and a settled principle of action. Not only did they hereby acquire a great power in their discourses over the minds of the people, but they also prepared the way for introducing with more effect the Bible and other religious books into the popular language. This is one of the two forms of activity above indicated. The other is the collection of the traditional doctrines relating to practical religion and the moral teachings of the leading men of the fraternity into a living, connected and complete form, so as to make a deep and lasting impression on the public mind. The former work was accomplished under the auspices of Gerard Zerbolt. The latter was effected with a success almost unparalleled by Thomas à Kempis. Both of these agencies, whether designed to be so or not, tended to prepare both the intellect and the hearts of the people for the preaching of Luther. To these two individuals, therefore, we must direct our attention.

Zerbolt, and the use of the Native Language in Religious Instruction.

As a contemporary of Florentius, though about seventeen years younger, Gerard Zerbolt distinguished himself among the Brethren at Deventer. He was born at Zütphen about the year 1367, and is therefore often called Gerard of Zütphen. After going through his elementary studies at other schools, he came to that of Deventer, in which he was principally educated, and entered into the most intimate connection with Florentius and the Brethren. Even when a boy, he manifested an extraordinary eagerness for study. He hung upon the lips of his teachers, and when the hour of instruction was ended, always regretted that it was so short. This thirst for knowledge was never abated, and was modified only by taking a particular direction after his entrance into the fraternity. He was incessantly employed in reading, studying, and copying the Bible and other religious books, allow-

ing nothing but his devotions and his meals to interrupt him. He was wholly indifferent to other matters, rarely could tell after dinner, what he had eaten, and injudiciously neglected his health even when ill. But he was by no means unskilled in secular business; he was well versed in law, and was possessed of such a sound judgment that he was often consulted by Florentius and employed by him in legal transactions. Called away once on such a case, as he was returning to Deventer, he was seized with an illness at Windesheim which proved fatal. Aemilius van Buren, in the unreserved manner of the Brethren, said to him, "it seems to me brother, that you are near your end;" "so it appears to me also," was the reply; and soon he expired in the year 1398, the thirty-first of his age and about two years before Florentius. Excessive study and a want of due regard to his health, may have hastened his premature death. In his life he was equally remarkable for his zeal in collecting books, and for his bold efforts in behalf of the Bible.

Gerard Groot, a great lover and diligent collector of good books, had left his library to the house of the Brethren at Deventer. Florentius and Gronde, who were appointed librarians, had greatly increased the collection. But no one equalled Zerbolt in this respect after he was made librarian. His attachment to valuable authors was almost unbounded. He was accustomed to say, "such works do more by way of preaching and instructing than it is possible for us to express." A beautiful manuscript was more attractive to him than a feast. He therefore kept the copyists constantly employed, collected books from every quarter, and preserved them with the greatest care. And yet as zealous a librarian as he was, he never forgot, that men were not made for books, but books for men; and consequently took pleasure in lending from his choice collection to the clerks of distant houses, that they also might be instructed and benefited. Men of a purely practical character might easily regard such a zeal for books as excessive and injurious. So it was in fact. As one of the Brethren was upon his dying bed, Florentius asked him, in what respect he thought the institution might be improved. The dying man replied among other things: "We have too many books; the most important ought to be selected, and the rest sold and the money given to the poor." Florentius, more intelligent and more sound in his views, honored the good intention of the brother, but did not follow his advice. The impulse which Zerbolt gave in favor of copying manuscripts and of collecting good libraries

was perpetuated among the Brethren; and it must be confessed, that in an age when the art of printing was unknown, it was of the utmost importance in two respects, first because both teacher and pupil found only in the libraries of the Brethren the kind of books that were needed for their intellectual culture, and secondly, because through their untiring industry alone, could such a novelty as religious tracts in the native language be furnished for the common people in numbers sufficient to produce general effect.

This brings us to the second important agency of Zerbolt, that which related to the use of the Bible and other religious books in the vernacular tongue. On this subject in particular, did he employ all his talents and eloquence in writing for the public. It is certainly very extraordinary that in such an age, about one hundred and thirty years before Luther published his theses, this distinguished young man should speak out so fully and so powerfully on this point, as to create a general demand, which was never fully satisfied till Luther published his version of the Scriptures. We are to place the merits of Zerbolt the higher from the fact, that among his contemporaries even such men as Gerson should call in question the expediency of giving the Bible to the common people in their own language.

The treatise which Zerbolt wrote *De Utilitate Lectionis Sacramum Literarum in Lingua Vulgari*, and which was designed for the learned and therefore written in very good Latin, pleads energetically, with a practical good sense and an earnestness free from all fanaticism, for the right and the duty of all laymen to learn for themselves the will of God directly from the Scriptures. He maintained that there was in the Bible a plain and simple sense intelligible to all, to the substantial comprehension of which no profound investigations or long trains of reasoning were necessary, but that, on the contrary, the meaning shines forth by its own light without the necessity of much labor or controversy. But he conceded that there are other truths in the Bible more profound and obscure, which must be earnestly studied and reflected upon in order to be understood. The one is milk for babes, the other strong meat for men. Simple and uneducated people, children in knowledge, may not only without injury or danger, but with great profit, as the best of the Fathers have maintained, read for themselves in a language which they understand those parts of the Scripture, which set forth a simple and practical Christianity. Obscure parts of the Bible, and different theological writers they

cannot understand ; these it is better for them to let alone. These views he supports in the following manner. "The Scriptures are not given for any one class in particular, but they contain instruction for persons of every class. Sometimes they enjoin general precepts equally applicable to all, but more frequently, they address their instructions to particular classes of individuals. At one time they speak to the beginner in religious knowledge, at another to those more advanced. Now they teach the way of life to the perfect, now to every variety of moral condition. Consequently they are designed for persons of every class, in order that men, estranged as they are from themselves, and ignorant of their true character, may learn their condition from the mirror of God's word. What rational person will venture to say that laymen commit sin, when they make that use of the Bible for which God gave it, namely to learn their sinfulness and heartily repent and reform? Why should they not receive the divine law as well as other more general blessings from God, since the law of God and the Holy Scriptures occupy the highest place among the blessings of Heaven? The people cannot justly be excluded from this blessing, and the divine consolations by which the soul receives its life and nourishment." The Bible, he continues in effect, is designed to give support to the law of nature, so that man may already learn what is left in obscurity there. Immersed as the common people are in worldly affairs, they need to have the dust removed which has beclouded the mental eye, and, at particular seasons to suspend their business, and turn their attention inward upon themselves and view their character and wants by the light of God's word. It is required of them even by law, that at certain times they go to church to hear the gospel ; but why preach to them from the Bible, if they ought to be ignorant of it? But if they can be benefited by oral teaching, why can they not read in books the same that is read or preached to them from the pulpit? They surely learn and retain little from what they hear in discourses fifteen minutes long, and that in an unknown tongue. If they are allowed without censure to read worldly productions, which are often corrupt and seductive, it is absurd to prohibit them from reading the Scriptures, by which the love of God, and a longing for their heavenly home is enkindled. Jerome, Augustine, Gregory and Chrysostom always exhorted the people to study the Scriptures, which they would never have done, had they regarded the practice as injurious or unlawful. That the people should read the word of God in their own language is suf-

ficiently proved by the nature of the case. The whole Bible was originally in the language of the people to whom it was given. If it is unlawful for the people at large to read the Bible in their native language, why did the prophets and the apostles write the several books of it in the language of the people rather than in a foreign language? From the earliest times the church has given translations of the Scriptures into different languages. The Jews had the Bible in Hebrew, the Chaldeans in Chaldee, the Greeks in Greek, the Arabians in Arabic, the Syrians in Syriac, the Goths in Gothic. The Romans, the Egyptians, the Indians, the Russians, the Sclavonians, the Gauls and all nations have the Scriptures in their own language. If, then, they are read in nearly all languages under heaven, why should they not be read in German also? He urged similar considerations in favor of employing the German, instead of the Latin language, in the prayers and hymns of the church. These sentiments and a corresponding practice among the Brethren not only gave depth and interest to those religious services which were the vehicle of a spiritual Christianity, but they tended to deliver the nation from the yoke of Roman laws, language and customs, which cramped the development of the national spirit. When the Germans heard German preaching, read a German Bible, had a German theology, and prayed and sung in German, they were internally severed from Rome; but it was reserved for Luther, to complete the work and bring the inward sentiment to a decisive outward act.

Thomas à Kempis, and the practical Religion of the Brethren in its most flourishing state.

There were in the community of the Brethren two theological elements, the one practical, the other doctrinal; the one designed more for Christians in general, the other for the smaller circle of reflecting and philosophic minds. These might be united in one man, or they might be so far separated, that one individual might give a preponderance to the former and carry it to the highest degree of perfection, and another to the latter. Such a separation actually took place. The two most distinguished men of the fraternity, who were born and bred in its spirit, Thomas à Kempis and Johan Wessel were the purest representatives of these two elements, the former preceding in point of time, as was natural perhaps, and setting forth ascetic Christianity in its noblest and most winning form, the other unfolding in the clearest and most per-

fect manner in that age the system of Christian doctrines. From the nature of the case, the theologian would more readily come in collision with the authority of the church than the ascetic. But while the one was breaking through the incrustation which had been formed over society, the other was preparing a warm germinal principle in the heart of the people, which would supply new life and energy when the incubus of antiquated formalism should be thrown aside. To form Thomas for this great work assigned him by Providence everything conspired, natural constitution and temperament, early domestic training, education in the schools, the whole tenor of his life and the moral condition of the age.

The character of his mind, in its original stamp, was evidently predisposed to a quiet, contemplative, introverted life. There breathes in all his writings a peculiar spirit of satisfaction and repose, and there beats gently a pulse of inward joy, cheerfulness and delight. We feel, as we read, that the writer moves only in this inner spiritual circle, but in this is perfectly happy. The cell, narrow indeed, but cheered by the love of God and of Christ, is to him a paradise, which he would exchange only for heaven. The duties of subjection, of prayer and other acts of devotion are to his taste the choicest delicacies. The renunciation of self, and devotedness to the interests of others, are the very elements of his life. Whatever he enjoins upon others, he himself performs with the greatest pleasure and enthusiasm.

Thomas Hamerken (*Malleolus*) was born in the year 1380, in the small but pleasant village of Kempen, situated in the vale of the Rhine not far from Cologne. Hence his name Thomas von Kempen, or Thomas à Kempis. His parents were of humble birth and lived in moderate circumstances, of which he made no secret, but like Luther, often referred to his low origin with the utmost simplicity and freedom. His father, who was an ordinary mechanic, gave him an example of industry and perseverance; his mother, who was distinguished for the fervor of her piety, early instilled into his susceptible mind the sentiment of a warm and devout love for divine things. Thomas undoubtedly gave signs of good talents very early, else the thought of giving him an education could hardly have been entertained, for, being poor, he was entirely dependent on the benevolence of others. The Brethren of the Life in Common were accustomed to aid precisely this class of boys. Consequently, in his thirteenth year he resorted to Deventer, the place of the most flourishing establishment of the Brethren. The relation of this house to the school of Deven-

ter has been already described. At first Thomas appears not to have been connected with the fraternity; but afterwards, at the suggestion of his brother John, then canon at Windesheim, to have presented himself to Florentius. The latter both won the ardent affection of Thomas and inspired respect for himself. Florentius also supplied him with books, and procured for him a home with a pious matron, somewhat as Luther was provided with one, when he was in similar circumstances, at Eisenach. The advantages of the friendship of Florentius were numerous and great. Thomas himself mentions a circumstance which well illustrates this remark. Boheme, then rector of the school at Deventer, though a rigid master, was a friend of Florentius. As the boy came one day to the rector to pay his tuition fee, and to redeem the book which he had given as security, the rector asked him, who had supplied him with the money? When he was informed that it came from Florentius, he returned it with these words, "Carry it back; on his account the debt shall be cancelled." Thomas took part in the religious devotions of the Brethren, and soon yielded himself up entirely to a manner of life with which he was so much charmed. Not long after, he was formally received into the house of the Brethren, in which, at that time, there were about twenty clerks, three laymen, a steward, a cook and a tailor. His associate, and most intimate friend was Arnold van Schoonhoven, a youth of ardent piety, with whom he occupied the same room and bed. The warmth of this young man's religious affections and the cordiality of his acts of devotion, kindled a similar ardor in the susceptible heart of Thomas. "I saw myself," said the latter, in the biography of his friend, "inflamed for devotion by his zeal; and often wished I might have but for a few moments such grace as he seemed constantly to enjoy."

By the side of this youthful example of piety, stood the more imposing and authoritative example of Florentius, whom Thomas venerated and loved beyond any other mortal. He was accustomed to carry to his revered master and friend all his mental anxieties and to receive those directions which allayed his fears and which conducted him to a state of serenity and joy. This tender relation between the genial boy and the mature man extended itself to the minutest matters. Florentius was frequently so indisposed that he could not eat at the common table. In such cases, he took his meals at a small table in another apartment, and Thomas enjoyed the distinction, at such times, to be his company and to wait upon him. "I, though unworthy," says he, in

his life of Florentius, "was often invited by him to prepare his table, and brought to him the little which he needed and attended to his wants with the utmost pleasure." So deep an impression did the character, example, and conversation of Florentius make upon the affectionate youth, that he ever after retained the image in his mind and stamped it distinctly upon all his writings.

In the work entitled, "*The Valley of Lilies*," à Kempis says, "Examples teach better than words." This was true in his own case. He had a longing heart, which eagerly selected and appropriated whatever was excellent in others, and was intent only on its own highest improvement. Thus he saw the whole fraternity, and his friends in the best light, and was benefited by things which might have left but slight traces upon less susceptible and less generous minds. Take the following as a striking example. "One day," he remarks, "in the winter season, Henry Brune was sitting by the fire and warming his hands; in the mean time, he turned his face to the wall, and offered silent prayer. On perceiving this, I was deeply affected, and ever afterwards loved him the more." However insignificant the circumstance might be in itself, and however idealized it may have been in the mind of the young observer, the main point retains all its importance, namely, that his heart was a rich and generous soil into which no good seed could be accidentally cast without springing up.

After Thomas had thus passed seven years at Deventer, Florentius, on a certain festival day, when he perceived that the young man had betrayed much religious emotion, called him aside and addressed him thus: "My dear son Thomas, the time has arrived when it is necessary for you to decide on your course of life; you are now at the Pythagorean point where two ways diverge. You see the vexations and the perils of the world, its short-lived joys and its regrets. You know that we must all die and render to God and to Christ an account of our life. Wo to them who cannot do it with a good conscience! What good would it do one, if he should gain the whole world and yet ruin his soul? Attend, then, to your salvation. But, as you have often heard, there are two ways which lead to salvation, the one that of an active, the other that of a contemplative life. The former is pursued by those who worthily serve Christ by good works, the latter, which is more acceptable to God, is followed by those who with Mary sit at the feet of Jesus. Whichever of the two you shall choose,

you will pursue it with more safety and benefit in a cloister than in the world which lieth in wickedness.—If you should ask, what place I could recommend, I would say that for those who have been educated here, one of the two cloisters of regular canons recently founded by our community, would be the best." This suggestion decided the future career of Thomas. On the following day he took a letter of recommendation, and resorted to the convent of St. Agnes.

This cloister was situated in the vicinity of Zwoll, on a slight elevation, a healthy and pleasant spot, along which flowed the river Vechte. It was established without great pecuniary resources, and was at this time, weak, and without any kind of distinction. But that circumstance was of no account with Thomas. He was kindly received, and regarded the place as a retreat which the hand of Providence had provided for him. Here he spent all the remainder of his long life, during which he gained a great name in the world, and thus gave distinction to the small cloister to which he belonged.

He was not precipitate in his final decision, but passed five years in his novitiate, and did not take the monastic habit till the sixth year, nor the vow till the year following. But with him the decision, once formed, was irrevocable. As he was priest, his chief employment in the cloister was religious instruction. Besides this, he copied valuable books, and composed numerous works of his own. He was a distinguished copyist, and always manifested delight in beautiful manuscripts. An elegant copy of the Bible in four volumes, a missal and select works of St. Bernard, all executed by his hand, were preserved in the cloister. His own work, the *Imitation of Christ*, he copied several times.

Of a life thus quietly spent in retirement little can be said that is adapted to enliven biography by way of incident. It passed like a smooth silvery stream, from whose surface was reflected a cloudless sky. Quiet industry, lonely meditation, and secret devotion filled up the successive days of his life. In consequence of his peaceful state of mind, and regular habits, he lived to an advanced age. He died July 1471, at the age of ninety-one, or ninety-two.

In his work on *Spiritual Exercises*, he enjoined "during the whole course of life, the union of humility and Christian cheerfulness." In another work he describes the man of God as "of a placid countenance, calm and agreeable in his address, prudent and orderly in his deportment, and always diffusing among

others peace and happiness." In these few sketches, he has drawn his own portrait. All who knew him, testify that, through his whole life, he manifested love to God and man, that he cheerfully endured every suffering, and that he was indulgent to the faults and weaknesses of his brethren. In his personal habits, he was neat, temperate, chaste, contented and cheerful. His chief effort was to maintain an undisturbed repose and peace of mind. Hence he was reluctant to intermeddle with worldly affairs, avoided intercourse with the great, and was silent when the conversation turned upon such subjects, lest his passions should be aroused, and the charm of sweet contemplation be broken. But he was far from being taciturn, his disposition for friendship was always strong, though with him the love of God was its only permanent bond. When God and divine things were the subject of discourse, he was in his natural element, and was exhaustless in his resources, and highly eloquent. Many persons came from a great distance in order to hear him.

In acts of devotion, public and private, he was diligent and earnest; in singing particularly, it has been observed of him, that he always stood erect, never leaning on anything for support; that his face was often directed heavenwards, and appeared as if transfigured, and that his whole body seemed spontaneously to follow the direction of his soul. Once a monk said to him, that he "seemed to relish a psalm as he would a salmon." "I do indeed," replied he, "but I nauseate it, when I see men singing listlessly."

In his personal appearance, he was small of stature, but well proportioned; his countenance was fresh and its expression animated, though his complexion was a little dark; his eyes were piercing and so strong, even in old age, that he never made use of glasses. Under an old likeness of him which Franciscus Tolensis saw, stood these characteristic words: *In omnibus requiem quæsi, sed non inveni, nisi in abditis recessibus et libellulis.*

From the foregoing account, it will appear, that only a part of our nature is represented in Thomas à Kempis. That part, however, is an essential one; and the embodiment and exhibition of it, in his works, most perfect. The unity of character, which we observe in him, is the more complete, as there was nothing in the course of his life to disturb the natural bias of his mind. With the wide world he had little to do. Literature was to him a secondary pursuit, a means simply to a religious end. He was not, strictly speaking, a scholar, nor did he cultivate directly even the

art of persuasion. The aim of his whole life was directed to one single object, namely, to attain for himself, and to bring others to attain to the religious end of his being. Everything else was postponed to this. The love of God and the inward repose resulting from it, and the happiness of uninterrupted communion with him, were constantly before him as the sole object of desire. And that object he reached as few others have done. To thousands he has been not so much a publisher of that heavenly peace as a magnet, drawing them to it.

At this point of our narrative, it will be suitable to say a word concerning his writings. A theological system is not to be sought in such a writer as Thomas à Kempis. He was not a speculative thinker. It was not the force of logic, but the simplicity and strength of moral feeling that gave him his perfect unity and consistency of character. His writings, therefore, exhibit no philosophic generalizations, no statement and illustration of broad principles, but an inexhaustible treasure of sententious sayings, an oriental fertility in proverbs, in which the same material of practical wisdom and piety is wrought into an endless variety of forms. In the piety of Thomas we discover two ingredients, the one essential, the other more accidental, namely Christianity and monasticism. The latter would naturally limit the popularity of his writings to a particular age, the former preserves them from oblivion, and gives them the freshness of perpetual youth.

Those of his writings which are most tinged with the monastic hue, are his sermons delivered in the cloister, his *Disciplina Claustralium* and *Dialogus Novitiorum*, together with his letters and poems. His biographies of distinguished members of the community may also be reckoned as belonging to this class, inasmuch as they were designed to be attractive portraiture of the ascetic life.¹ The works in which a spiritual Christianity predominates over the monastic element are the *Imitation of Christ*,²

¹ He wrote full biographies of Gerard and Florentius, and sketches of the lives of the best of the disciples of Florentius, namely, Gronde, Binterink, Berner, Brune, Zerbolt, van Buren, Viana, Schoonhoven, and of Cacabus, the pious cook in the House of Florentius. These are found in the edition of 1560, Volume III. pp. 3—142; in the edition of 1728 at the beginning of the last volume. As Thomas was intimately acquainted with these individuals, his account of their lives is very truthful and graphic. The reader imagines that he sees the men living and moving before him, and feels at home among the Brethren of the Life in Common. The life of Florentius is the most attractive and is the fullest of those little individual traits which are the charm of Biography.

² Ullmann, who has given in an appendix the result of an elaborate inquiry

Soliloquies of the Soul, the *Garden of Roses*, the *Valley of Lilies*, the treatise on the *Three Tabernacles*, and a few other minor essays.

Among these, the *Imitation of Christ* justly holds the highest rank. Next in merit is the *Garden of Roses*, which is still more sententious in its character.

The moral and religious views of Thomas à Kempis, cannot be said to have originated wholly in his own mind. The mystical theology is very much a matter of experience; and this experience was partly one's own and partly transmitted from generation to generation. Thomas draws largely from the stream of tradition which had flowed down through the Brethren of the Life in Common. Side by side with his own, he introduces the experiences, maxims and examples of other members of the community, who had lived before him. He did, indeed, by a process of assimilation make them all perfectly his own. They all bear the marks of his own peculiar genius. It is his heart that beats in every sentiment.

Though Thomas was himself but little versed in classical literature, his disciples, Lange, Spiegelberg, Liber, and, most of all, Agricola and Hegius, contributed much to the revival of ancient learning in Holland and Germany. While he was friendly to all pure knowledge, he found his chief delight in practical wisdom of a religious nature. His leading course of thought is this. We all naturally seek for something to make us happy; but we can never find it in the things of the world. The world has nothing substantial; everything in it is transient, and all its pleasures are attended with sorrows. There is here no true satisfaction, but disappointment, change, misery and death. We cannot find in the society of others what we need. They are frail, changeable, and deceitful. The chief good cannot be found in them. Nor is there anything in ourselves on which we can rely for happiness. We are full of weaknesses and of sin, and are either sunken in sensuality or lifted up with pride and self-sufficiency. God alone can satisfy the wants and the longings of the human soul. Union with him is the only sure felicity, a union effected not by an act of ours, but by the grace of God. Grace is the love of God imparting itself to men, giving them true freedom, and power to do what is right. By imitating Christ, Thomas did not mean the

respecting the author of the *Imitation of Christ*, thinks there is no longer room to doubt that it was written by Thomas à Kempis. While the external evidence is said to be in his favor, the internal is pronounced irresistible.

watching and imitating of his example in particular things, but the complete formation of Christ within us. Hence the peculiar manner in which he treats that subject in his chief work.

Although he was a good Catholic, the hierarchy had no significance with him. His inward spiritual life led him to place no high estimate on any external magnificence and show. It is a remarkable fact that in all his writings, he never alludes to the pope but once or twice, and then to show that neither he nor his leaden bulls are anything but dust and ashes.¹

Decline and Fall of the Community.

Early efforts were made by the jealous mendicant friars whose influence over the common people and over the young was very much weakened, to crush the institution which had supplanted them. They maintained that there were only two lawful modes of life, the secular and the monastic; that the Brethren were a *genus tertium*, neither the one nor the other, and consequently were living in violation of the canonical law. Zerbolt wrote an elaborate defence, which it is not necessary to notice particularly here. A more violent assault was made by Matthew Grabow, once a member of the community at Gröningen. He brought an accusation before the council of Constance, in which he aimed at nothing less than the destruction of the order. But Gerson, chancellor of the University of Paris, the most influential man of the times, and Peter D'Ailly, of Cambray, and twelve other distinguished theologians, espoused the cause of the party assailed and the accuser of the Brethren was condemned. No danger henceforth was to be feared from without, and a period of great prosperity ensued.

In order to form a correct general estimate of the success of the fraternity, it will be necessary to distinguish the different periods of its history. Its flourishing period extended from the beginning of the fifteenth century to the beginning of the sixteenth. During that time, it sent out its fresh religious influence, and gave a strong impulse to the public mind, and raised the education of the young to a new and proud distinction. A reforming council,

¹ Sapiens est ille, qui spernit millia mille.

Omnis sunt nulla, Rex, Papa, et plumbea bulla.

Cunctorum finis, mors, vermis, fovea, cinis.—*Hortul. Rosar.* IV. 3.

Comp. Vallis lilior. XXV. 3. Nemo unius diei certitudinem vivendi habet, nec impetrare potest a Papa, bullam nunquam moriendi.

and even popes and cardinals favored its interests. The people flocked from all quarters to its places of worship, and the youth to its schools. Within the same interval of time, particularly between 1425 and 1451, most of the Houses of the Brethren were established. In the Netherlands, we find the fraternity settled not only at Deventer, Zwoll and Windesheim, but at Amersford, Hoom, Delft, Hattem, Herzogenbush, Gröningen, Gouda, Harderwijk, Utrecht, Brussels, Antwerp, Louvain, Ghent, Grammont, Nimeguin, and Doesburg. Beyond the borders of the Netherlands, there were Houses at Emmerich, Munster, Cologne, Nieder Wesel, Osnabrück, Hildesheim, Herford, Rostock and Culm. Indeed, they were found up the Rhine as far as Swabia, and in the interior of Germany as far as Merseburg.

In the course of the sixteenth century, there was a very observable decline. The last House established by the Brethren was that in Cambray in the year 1506, which continued however only till 1554. In so celebrated a place as Zwoll there were only three students in 1679. The last member of the establishment at Rostock, Arsenius, died in 1575. Only a very few Houses, as that at Munster, were in existence, at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

The institution could retire from the scene of action with honor; it had accomplished its end. The causes of its decay were not assaults from without, but the altered circumstances of the times. The age of improvement which the Brethren in part, at least led on, had outstripped them. Other mightier agencies were in successful operation, and theirs were no longer necessary, nor would these, in fact, have been any longer adequate to the exigencies of society, in that age. They belonged rather to a preparatory dispensation. They were like the morning star, which fades away, when the sun appears.

The Brethren had always used great diligence in copying books. But the art of printing now rendered such labor useless, and the more so from the circumstance that at the very beginning, it was applied to the same object, to multiplying copies of the Scriptures, of other religious works and of useful school books. As soon as the presses of Gutenberg, Faust, and Schöffer were in successful operation at Mayence and Eltville, the Brethren at Marienthal in the vicinity, began to turn their attention to the art, and established a press, at the latest, in 1474, and perhaps as early as 1468. Their example was followed by the Houses at Herzogenbusch, Gouda, Louvain, Rostock, and by the cloister Hem near Schoon-

hoven. The well known Parisian printer, Jodocus Badius, called Ascensius from his native place Asche, near Brussels, who published excellent editions of the ancient classics, was educated in one of the schools of the Brethren. But the rapid progress in printing soon made in all the countries of Europe, rendered the labors of the Brethren, in this respect, comparatively unimportant.

The second cause of prosperity to the institution was its strong and commanding position in respect to education. It had established schools where none were existing before, had done away the monastic mode of instruction and substituted a better, and had actually reared in its own bosom and sent out many excellent teachers. But in this work, also, it was now outdone. The best of its students, such as Hegius, Van den Busche, and Dringenberg, established independent schools, in which a more liberal course of study was pursued, and, consequently, the rush of students was now to the latter instead of the schools of the Brethren. Besides, a new impulse in favor of ancient learning had been given from another quarter, from Italy, which stood in more immediate contact with Germany, and henceforth the latter country took the precedence of Holland, so much so that Dringenberg, Agricola and Erasmus, the most distinguished of the Dutch scholars settled in Germany, where the universities were beginning greatly to excel the schools founded by the Brethren.

The third cause of the celebrity of this order, the use of the native language in religious instruction, had become very common, and especially, at the opening Reformation, it ceased to be a distinguishing mark of those who had done so much to introduce it. Most of all did the Reformation itself, in its whole extent, overshadow the feeble efforts of the Brethren. All these circumstances tended to bring the institution of the Life in Common to its termination, and to dismiss the Brethren from the field, the expiration of their term of service having arrived.

If now we review the facts which have come before us in this narrative, we shall perceive that the fraternity, formed by Gerard, stood in intimate connection with the course of important events in the progress of religion. Like everything truly excellent and great, it had its origin in the remote past, and looked forward prophetically to the distant future. In its intention, and, to no small extent, in its spirit also, it was formed after the model of the apostolic church at Jerusalem; and in an age of darkness it was the first gleam of that twilight which preceded the Reformation. In some re-

pects, though in very different degrees, it resembled the associations of the Pythagoreans and the Essenes, the mother church at Jerusalem, and the nobler monastic institutions, especially that of the earlier Benedictines. In later times, the Pietists, and the Moravians, and in the present age, societies for circulating the Scriptures and for promoting Christian knowledge among the people and education among the youth, and, in fine, all our benevolent institutions remind us more or less vividly of the Brethren of the Life in Common.

The most striking analogy by far exists between the Pietists and the Brethren. The former aimed at reviving vital religion in the Lutheran church, without assailing the stiff theology of the orthodox. As they were viewed with suspicion by the church, and often violently opposed, a necessity arose for forming—very much after the manner of modern voluntary associations—little fraternities, in order to act with more effect in promoting piety, and to secure mutual protection and support. So the Brethren also still adhered to the Catholic church, and, without controverting the scholastic theology, gave their attention to matters, in their view, more important—to the cultivation of spirituality in religion. Both the Pietists and the Brethren, aimed at the religion of the heart; both were averse to idle speculation, and were devoted to practical piety; both had recourse directly to the common people and to the youth; both sought to produce in all the persons under their influence, separation from the world, deep repentance for sin, and an ardent personal piety; both held private and social meetings for religious edification in the free exercises of which laymen participated; both made free use of religious tracts in propagating their sentiments; both had a centre of operations, Deventer and Halle, with which all the other establishments were closely connected; both aimed at making all the inmates feel as if they were members of the same family, and under the influence of this sentiment the young received their entire course of intellectual and religious training; both were extensively engaged, in the manner which two such different periods required, in the publication of the Scriptures and other religious and valuable books; both had a powerful reforming influence upon the schools, and upon the general character of the age.

re. ius.	Him. acc. to Roediger.	Anc. Ethiopic.	Mod. Ethiopic.
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HIMYARITIC IN S

• وشاما • قسب زرب

مارنا .. عیقنا .. بازان .. دوون

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هزران ۰۰ عار ۰۰ ازی ازبیا

خب .. آب .. وشي .. مرن

با انطخ و صمی و زنوم هنر اود

حب و مشرق حب و منخر حب

۱۳۸۱ ۴۳۸ ۲۸۱۰۰ ۱۸۸۰۰
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شقا وديخ حمام

ARTICLE II.

THE HIMYARITIC LANGUAGE.

FORSTER'S PRETENDED DISCOVERY OF A KEY TO THE HIMYARITIC INSCRIPTIONS.

By Edward E. Salisbury, Professor in Yale College.

ARAB historians and geographers inform us of an alphabetical character anciently in use in Yemen, which they call the Himyaritic, from the name of an ancient dynasty of southern Arabia. The first European who sought to verify this information by the discovery of existing monuments, was Carsten Niebuhr. His inquiries, however, though not altogether fruitless, brought no inscription to light. Forty years later, about the year 1810, Seetzen, following a hint of Niebuhr, had the good fortune to discover several inscriptions. But he made no attempt to decipher them, and the copies of some of them which he published in the *Fundgruben des Orients*, remained an unexplored mine.¹ About a quarter of a century after this, in the year 1834, the number of discovered inscriptions was greatly increased by researches, in connection with the coast-survey of the British along the southern shores of the Arabian peninsula; and the attention of some of the most distinguished philologists of Germany began to be directed to finding a key to the unknown character, which was now regarded as undoubtedly the Himyaritic of the Arab authors. In 1837 Roediger of Halle published some observations, preparatory to a deciphering of the inscriptions, in the *Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*.² Next appeared an essay by Gesenius in the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* for July, 1841, which first gave results of deciphering, in certain readings. This was followed in the same year by a pamphlet from Roediger, entitled *Versuch über die Himjaritischen Schriftmonumente*; and in 1842 Roediger published a Himyaritic alphabet, with an *Excurs über die Himjaritischen Inschriften*, proposing interpretations of his own, as an appendix to a German translation of the travels of the first British discoverer of the inscriptions, Capt. Wellsted.³

¹ S. Fundgrub. d. Orients. II. 282. ² S. Z. für d. K. d. Morgenl. I. 339.

³ J. R. Wellsted's Reisen in Arabien. Deutsche Bearbeitung—von Dr. E. Rüdiger. Halle, 1842, 2 Bdd.

It is not our present design to discuss the merits of these German works. We propose to examine the ground taken by a British author, the Rev. Charles Forster, who has lately astonished his countrymen with an interpretation, quite original, of one of the longest inscriptions as yet found, which is not without plausibility, to a superficial observer, and has therefore deluded many, who either have not been competent, or have not taken the trouble, to investigate the matter. It forms the subject of an appendix to *The Historical Geography of Arabia* by the same author.⁴ The President of the Royal Geographical Society, Mr. Murchison, in his last annual address, speaks of "the discovery which Mr. Forster has made of the key to the unknown language in which the inscriptions found in Hadramaut and other parts of southern Arabia, are written," as a thing unquestionable; and a late number of the *London Quarterly Review* glories much in the privilege exclusively reserved, as it pretends, to British scholarship, to interpret these inscriptions, as well as to British enterprise to discover them. But if on examination, it appears, that Mr. Forster's claim to this discovery is unfounded, it will be allowed, that the sooner it is placed in its true light, and those are disabused who have been taken in by it, the better.⁵

The foundation of Mr. Forster's whole scheme is the supposition, that the inscription in question is identical with a certain fragment of Arabic poetry, published by Albert Schultens, from a Leyden-manuscript, in his *Monumenta Vetustiora Arabiæ*, which was found, as he says, "in Arabia Felice, super marmoribus arcium dirutarum in tractu littoris Hadramyteni propè emporium Aden."⁶ From this statement of Schultens Forster took the hint which he has so perseveringly followed out. It occurred to him that here might be an Arabic translation of a long inscription,

⁴ Published in London, 1844.

⁵ This critique was prepared and read before "The Philological Society," in New-Haven, in December, before it was known to the writer that Mr. Forster's attempt with the Himyaritic had been already exposed. It is proper to state the fact, because since that time an article, published in the *Eclectic Magazine*, from the *Dublin University Magazine*, has come to hand, which is in some points exceedingly similar to what is here written. The two criticisms have been made, however, entirely independently of one another, except that we have adopted a single suggestion of the Dublin reviewer, to be noticed in its place. We take this opportunity to commend to our reader the article in the *Eclectic*, which presents some views of Forster's pretensions, not here touched upon.

⁶ S. Monn. Vetust. Arabiæ ex manuscriptis codd. excerpit et ed. Alb. Schultens. Lugd. Batav. 1740, p. 67.

found by Wellsted engraved upon a rock on the coast of Yemen, which is called in the language of the country *حصن ضراب*, or *Raven-castle*, about 250 miles eastward of Aden; and he proceeded to confirm this conjecture, in the manner which is to be considered. Having verified it to his own satisfaction, and made out his Himyaritic alphabet, accordingly, Mr. Forster was led to seek additional support to his hypothesis, from a comparison of Wellsted's account of the locality of the Hissn Ghuráb inscription with the circumstances of place detailed in a narrative which accompanies the Arabic lines, in the manuscript from which Schulstens published them.

We will therefore begin by inquiring whether the localities indicated in these two narratives are coincident with each other. Not having the English edition of Wellsted's Travels, at hand, we translate from the German of Roediger, as follows: "On the morning of the 6th of May, 1834, we anchored in a little narrow channel, bordered on one side by a small low island of rock, on the other by a high black cliff, to which last our sailors gave the name of Hissn Ghuráb. As we had observed some ruins at the top of this cliff, I went soon after we came to land, to explore them. In order to avoid the current which set along the islands, and made violent breakers against the perpendicular side of the cliff, towards the sea, we sailed into a small bay on the north-east side, where the water was more quiet. Hissn Ghuráb is about 500 feet high; It must have been formerly an island, although it is now connected with the mainland by a low isthmus of sand, which has been blown together by the strong south-west winds, and is evidently of later formation. We clambered, therefore, over the ruins which had fallen from these towers and at length discovered traces of a path hewn, in order to facilitate the ascent, in zig-zag, along the face of the hill. Above, and below, the rock was cut down perpendicular, so that the latter formed a sort of terrace, upon which, however, even in the wider places, scarcely two men could go abreast. But our toil was richly rewarded by the discovery of some inscriptions on the smooth surface of the rock on our right, when we were about two-thirds of the way to the summit. The characters are $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches long and executed with much care and regularity. As we pursued our way from here, further towards the summit, we saw almost as many houses as below, walls and other defensive works at irregular distances, scattered over the flanks of the hill, and upon the edge

of the declivity a four-sided tower of massive construction, which once probably served both for a watch-tower and beacon, and can still be discerned many miles at sea. When I had explored all parts of the hill, I was forced to regard it as having been made both by nature and art, a place of extraordinary strength. While nature had left only one side of it accessible, this point had been so strongly fortified by art, that it must have been impossible for the most daring courage and the highest adroitness to scale it. But even apart from this advantage, . . . this place must have been invaluable on account of its natural insular character, since it formed a place of refuge difficult to be reached, and a safe store-house of commerce; and at all events, the two harbors, which are secure with any wind, must have been of much importance for commerce, especially as there is a deficiency of protected havens elsewhere on this coast. I will only, further, direct attention to the striking agreement of the position of these havens of Hissn Ghurâb, as it results from our measurement, with that of the haven of Cana Kanim (*Karî*) which is, according to Arrian, 250 miles from Arabia Felix, or the present Aden."⁷ The narrative, in Arabic, of the Leyden manuscript is translated by Forster, thus: "And in that region are two castles, of the castles of Ad. And when Muawiyeh sent Abderrahman, the son of Al Hakem, into Yemen, as viceroy, he arrived, on the shore of Aden, (i. e. in a progress along the southern coast,) at two castles, of the castles of Ad. In that sea are treasures hidden and gold, for the space of a hundred parasangs (360 miles) along the shore of Aden, as far as to the neighborhood of Kesuin. He saw, also, the quality of the soil, whose saltness made the palms most fruitful. And he saw a castle built upon a rock, and two ports; and upon the ascent of the height, a great rock, partly washed away, on which was engraved a song." (Here follow in the Ms. the Arabic lines which Schultens published.)⁸ The corroboration of the theory proposed, to be derived from this passage, compared with Wellsted's narrative, is indicated in the following paragraph of Forster's work: "The first of the two castles, according to the official report of Abderrahman, was found seated upon the summit of a rocky headland, beneath which lay two ports; while the inscription was discovered on the steep ascent of the height between the castle and its harbors, carved upon the side of a great rain-worn rock. In every particular, this account tallies with Mr. Wellsted's description of the castle and inscriptions

⁷ S. Wellsted's *Reisen in Arabien*, II. 322—326.

⁸ S. *Hist. Geogr. of Arabia*, II. 450.

of Hissn Ghurâb—its “lofty black-looking cliff”—its “square tower, of massive masonry, on the verge of the precipice,”—“the circumstance of its possessing two harbors”—together with the discovery of some inscriptions, on the smooth face of the rock to the right (parts of which had been washed away by the rains) about one third the ascent from the top:” a group of corresponding features, which could thus be brought together by two so wholly unconnected painters of the same localities, only from their belonging to one and the same scene.”⁹

But the reader will be surprised to learn, that the coincidences here pointed out with so much confidence rest upon a mistranslation of the manuscript referred to. That this may be clearly seen, we will give what we suppose to be the correct translation which we are confident in saying, does not admit of a question, as to all the important points; and, in order that others may judge for themselves, and that the manner in which Forster has dealt with the passage, may be better understood, we will also introduce the original Arabic which, happily for us, though unfortunately for him, he has published. We read then: “And in it (i. e. Yemen) are the two castles of the castles of Ad; and after that Muawiyeh had sent Abdurrahman Ibn Al Hakem to Yemen as viceroy, it reached his ears (i. e. of the viceroy) that on the coast of Aden were two castles of the castles of Ad, and that in its sea was treasure; and he coveted it, and went, with a train of one hundred horsemen, to the coast of Aden, to the vicinity of the two castles; and he saw the country around consisting of tracts of salt-marsh in which were pits such as one digs to hide treasure in; and he saw a castle built of blocks of stone, and (plaster?), and over one of its gates was a great block upon which was written in characters half obliterated, as follows.” The original is:

وبها القصران من قصور عاد ولما بعث معوية عبد الرحمن
بن الحكم الى اليمن وليا بلغه ان بساحل عدن قصران من
قصور عاد وان في بحرهما كنزا فطمع فيه وذهب في مائة
فارس الى ساحل عدن الى قرب القصرين فرأى ما حولها
من الارض سباخا بها ابار الابار ورأى قصرا مبنا بالصخر
والكلين وعلى بعض انوابه صخرة عظيمة ينضأ مكتوب
عليها — شعر.

⁹ S. Histor. Geogr. of Arabia, II. 453.

Such is the exact reading of the manuscript. Some corrections are indeed absolutely necessary, where the hand of a careless copyist is betrayed. No one at all conversant with the Arabic will hesitate to read, in the second line, بلغه for بلغه, and in the fifth line ابوابه for ابوابه, and عظيمة for عظيمة.¹⁰ The correction الكلس = *calc*, for الكلين in the fourth line may be questioned. These are the only alterations involved in our translation. We observe, then, with reference to the pretended coincidence with Wellsted's narrative: (1) That there is not the slightest allusion here to "a rocky headland," or even to the castle's being situated upon a rock. Mr. Forster has mistaken بالصخر which informs us of what the castle was built, for an indication of its position; (2) That nothing is said about "two ports." Forster reads, instead of الكلان, الكلين from كلاء, which means *navium statio*. Gol. The oblique case الكلائين must, however, in his view, be the proper reading; yet this is not the only change required, to justify Forster's translation. The article must be cut off, for قصرا with which he couples the word rendered "two ports" is indefinite, and there has been no intimation of any two ports in what goes before. Indeed, Forster's rendering: "a castle and two ports," instead of: "a castle and the two ports," neglects the article. But if we connect the word الكلين with الصخر, it should have the article, as it must then indicate something of the material of which the castle was built; and we may suppose the reading الكلين to have originated, by a very easy slip of the pen, from الكلس, signifying *lime*, as is suggested by the reviewer of Forster in the Dublin University Magazine. To this is to be added, that the structure of the sentence seems, most naturally, to connect والصخر والكلين rather than with قصرا.

(3) That the clause "for the space of a hundred parasangs"

¹⁰ Mr. Dozy, assistant librarian of the Leyden University who transcribed for Mr. Forster this text with its accompanying Arabic stanzas, and some other passages, from the Ms. 512: كتاب آثار البلاد etc. says: "I have transcribed all the vowels and diacritical points, as they occur in the manuscript, though a great number of them are decidedly errors."

in Forster's version, designed, as we cannot avoid believing, to remove the difficulty of identifying a castle on the coast of Aden with Hissn Ghuráb which lies 250 miles distant from that port, is made out by a correction of the text, wholly supererogatory, and bringing with it the application of a wrong sense to a common Arabic particle. The word *فارس* is altered to *فراسخ* and *في* is rendered: "for the space of," a signification not admissible.¹¹ (4) That the inscription spoken of in the Arabic manuscript was not found upon the face of a rock, on the ascent of an eminence, but on one of the gates of a ruined castle. If *انرابه* were a correct reading, the words *على بعض انرابه* could not signify "upon the ascent of the height." (5) That the inscription of Hissn Ghuráb is described by Wellsted as in very good preservation; while the characters of which the Arab author speaks, are said to have been "partly obliterated." Forster refers *صخرة عظيمة ينضا* which is nothing less than a tyro's blunder, and so finds allusion here to "a rain-worn rock," whereas it is a *writing*—*مكتوب*—which is represented as partly worn away.

From all this is to be inferred, not that the inscription found by Abdurrahman of which the Arabic lines published by Schultens purport to be either a copy, or a translation,—for which they claim to be, does not appear,—is the same which was discovered by Wellsted at Hissn Ghuráb, but directly the contrary, that the one cannot be identical with the other, so far as the circumstances of locality asserted by the two authorities afford any means of determining.

We will now proceed to notice the incongruities which exist between the two documents, considered by themselves. Here we have, first, to observe that, if we assume Forster's translation of the inscription to represent it correctly, it does not accord entirely with the true sense of its supposed Arabic translation. A correspondence is for the most part made to appear, as might be expected, since Forster sets out with this, as the point to be proved. For the satisfaction of the reader we give a literal version

¹¹ If the reader will turn to Hist. Geogr. of Arabia, II. 449, he will find that Forster admits having made this correction, and justifies it on the *assumption* that the word as it stands, *فارس*, is an "abridgement by the Persian copyist!"

of each stanza of the Arabic, alternately with the same in the pretended original, as rendered by our author :

HIMYARITIC.

"We dwelt living long luxuriously in the Zenanas of this spacious mansion, our condition exempt from misfortune and adversity."

ARABIC.

"Content we ourselves awhile in the court of this castle,
With a life luxurious, not straitened, not poor."

HIMY.

"Rolled in through our channel the sea, swelling against our castle with angry surge; our fountains flowed with murmuring fall above the lofty palms."

ARAB.

"The sea floods in upon us with full tide,
And our rivers flow with water abounding,"—

HIMY.

"Whose Keepers planted dry dates in our valley date-grounds; they sowed the arid rice."

ARAB.

—"Amid tall palm-trees, their keepers
Which bestrew with ripening dates and dry dates, for store."

HIMY.

"We hunted the mountain goats and the young hares, with gins and snares; beguiling we drew forth the fishes."

ARAB.

"And we chase the wild animal of the land with noose and spear,
And sometimes we catch the fish from the depths of the sea."

HIMY.

"We walked with slow proud gait, in needle-worked, many colored silk vestments, in whole silks, in grass-green chequered robes."

ARAB.

"And we parade now in flowing robes of striped silk,
And now of silk and green-dyed wool."

HIMY.

"Over us presided kings far removed from baseness, and stern chastisers of reprobate and wicked men."

ARAB.

"Princes rule over us, who are far from baseness,
Stern towards the people of deceit and treachery."

HIMY.

"They noted down for us according to the doctrine of Heber good judgments written in a book, to be kept; and we proclaimed our belief in miracles, in the resurrection, in the return into the nostrils of the breath of life."

ARAB.

"There are enacted for us laws, after the religion of Hûd,
And we believe in the miracles, and the general assembling for judgment and the resurrection of the dead."

HIMY.

"Made an inroad robbers, and would do us violence; collectively we rode forth, we and our generous youth, with suff, sharp-pointed spears."

ARAB.

"Whenever enemies lie in ambush against our home,
Forth we rush to view, in a body, with smooth, straightened spears."

HIMY.

"Rushing onward proud champions of our families and our wives; fighting valiantly, upon coursers with long necks, dun-colored, iron-grey, and bright bay."

ARAB.

"We guard our children and our women,
Upon dun-colored steeds, steeds with black mane and tail, long-necked, and steeds of clear red hue."

HIMY.

"With our swords still wounding and piercing our adversaries; until charging home we conquered and crushed this refuse of mankind."

ARAB.

"Those who assail us with hostile intent we wound
With our swords, till they turn the back."

But while with due allowance for freedom of translation, the two documents appear, in general, to harmonize together, it is also true, that in two places there is a diversity of sense which cannot be accounted for by the license of a translator. The first of these is in the first stanza, the expression of the Himyaritic: "in the *Zenanas*," (explained by Forster from the Persian, to mean "in the women's apartments,") having to answer to: "in the court," of the Arabic. The word rendered *court* is *عراصة* = "*locus spatiosus in medio habitaculorum*." (Gol.) The Arabic

line alludes evidently to the oriental custom of lounging idly in that part of the castle open to the air, where, as is well known, the coffee-drinking, dice-playing, and story-telling of eastern countries is carried on. Would a translator speak of this, with an original before him, referring to the enjoyment of the pleasures of the Harem? The plea, that the translator failed to understand his original, is inadmissible, because any two documents, the most dissimilar, might by this be proved to correspond to one another, as translation and original; and besides, it is certainly quite as likely that an Arab of the seventh century would know the proper signification of a Persian word, as that this word should have become incorporated into the ancient Himyaritic language. The other case in which the meaning given to the Himyaritic is not justly represented by the Arabic, is the whole of the third stanza. We leave it to the reader to compare for himself; yet it may be well to remark, that Mr. Forster seems to have had in view, here, a Latin version of the Arabic, made by Schultens, rather than the Arabic itself. That version reads: "conservabant (custodes) dactylos maturos et siccos, omne genus," which appears to us not the true signification of the Arabic, as published by Schultens himself, who gives here, the following text:

خلال نخيل باسقات نواطرها || نفت بالقسب المجزع والتمر

Our rendering is equally supported by the Arabic, altered for the sake of the metre, *taoûi*, thus:

خلال نخيل باسقات تواطرها || تنفون بالقسب المجزع
والتمر

But let us come to the more important inquiry, whether Forster has dealt fairly in making out for the inscription a signification which agrees, to so great an extent, with the sense of the Arabic lines supposed to be a translation of it. It may be shown: I. That in many cases he has not properly rendered the word which he finds in the inscription, by his own deciphering; and II. That the characters of most frequent occurrence in the inscription are incorrectly deciphered.¹³

¹³ The metre of the Arabic lines, requires other modifications of the text given by Schultens, who has only partially corrected his Ms.; yet they are not such as affect the sense, as may be seen by comparing our translation with his.

¹⁴ The reader will please to turn to the accompanying Plate, which presents

I. It is important in commencing under this head to observe, that Forster professes to find, that the inscription is written in "pure Arabic words,"¹⁴ — an expression which, if it means anything, signifies that the roots of these words have a signification in pure Arabic from which the meaning of the words themselves may be legitimately derived. (1) Forster makes out of ذل (line 1.) a word signifying "condition;" for no other reason than that اذلال means, as he truly says, *a state, a condition*. But how erroneous is this true statement, on account of its not expressing the whole truth! The root ذل signifies *to be abject, vile, humble*; and the word اذلال, which is a plural form, means "condition" only in a humiliating sense, as in the phrases: دعه على اذلاله = "*leave him to his meanness*," and اذلال الناس = "*the dregs of mankind*." (2) He makes مر (line 1.) to mean: "exempt from misfortune." But the root مر signifies: *to be bitter*, as every one knows. We can understand how Forster might derive the signification: "adverse," or "unfortunate;" but it is inexplicable how he could satisfy himself that "exemption from misfortune" is here signified. He supposes no negation. (3) He renders شصاما (line 1.): "exempt from adversity." This is an instance in which he has written out "the particular form demanded by the sense" in his view, for he says: "in representing the Himyaritic by corresponding words of the Arabic, I have confined myself either to the Arabic roots, or to the particular form of the word demanded by the sense;"¹⁵ and he himself refers شصاما to the root شص. Now شصامآ is a

a fac-simile of the inscription, together with Forster's interlinear Arabic deciphering, as given in his work;—and also the whole Himyaritic alphabet according to his view, in parallel columns with the alphabets of Gesenius and Roediger, and the ancient and modern Ethiopic characters, copied from their writings on the Himyaritic already named. Two words of Forster's Arabic deciphering have been altered in our Plate: نبا for يبا (l. 4) and شرز for سرز (l. 8)—to correspond to what his glossary shows he intended. Some other differences between the Arabic words interlined with the inscription and those of his glossary, not being of any consequence to us, we have left as we found them.

¹⁴ S. Hist. Geogr. of Arabia, II. 349.

¹⁵ S. ibid.

substantive, signifying: "*penury*," connected, then, with ذُل, as Forster makes it, the meaning should be "a condition of penury." The root شَص signifies: *adversis, peculiariter inopiâ anno-næ angusta et afflicta fuit* (vita). (Gol.) (4) He renders سعى (line 5): "to walk," and, being connected with the expression: "with slow, proud gait," it must have been supposed to signify slow, rather than fast motion. But this root is more especially used to denote celerity of progress, and all its subordinate significations are shown in the lexicons to depend upon this, as the radical idea. (5) In his glossary he gives to أَوْ (line 6.) the signification "*imo*." The word is not recognized in his translation. It is certain, that if this meaning is given to it, it would make an irreparable rent in the clause where it occurs; and the inference is not remote, that it was voluntarily left out. Restoring it to its place, we read: "Kings took note of us, averse, yea rather, to base men." Nothing goes before, in Forster's own version, which أَوْ, in the sense of *imo*, can be supposed to confirm and augment; and we know of no rendering which would at once be consistent with the words as deciphered by him, and answer the purpose of an original to the Arabic line regarded as a translation.

Instead of multiplying specific examples of errors in the translation of the Arabic into which Forster resolves the inscription, it will be sufficient, in addition to the preceding enumeration, to mention briefly several classes of errors which are to be met with.

(1) There are cases in which the given signification must be referred to the ground of the analogy of the Arabic root, on the supposition that one and the same radical idea has branched out variously in two different dialects. These are errors, on Forster's principles, since he evidently pretends that the radical idea of every word of the inscription is an idea expressed by its root, as found in pure Arabic, though he would say of some words, that their roots are out of use, or little used in the Arabic. (2) We find not a few instances where the construction adopted by Forster is wholly inadmissible, according to the genius of the Shemitish languages. It is supposed, that a word may be nothing more than a root, and yet convey different shades of meaning appropriate to forms of language,—as is proved by the fact, which is

apparent that in various instances in which he writes a root, merely, in his interlinear deciphering of the inscription, nothing more could be made out from the original character, and yet that he does not render as if the root were without formative letters. It follows from this, that he has not proceeded entirely on the principle, already quoted in his own words, of *confining* himself, in his deciphering, to the Arabic root, or the particular form of the word demanded by the sense.

From all that has been said thus far it is already apparent, that the probability is very slight of an identity between the Himyaritic inscription and the Arabic lines in question, as pretended by Forster; especially considering what it is but justice to ourselves to add, that we have not perceived, that Forster might have done better than he has, in any point which has come under our criticism, in seeking to establish his conjecture. We have now to show:

II. That Forster has incorrectly deciphered about half of the letters of this inscription. In proof of this, we will in the first place, suppose that his division of the words is correct, and take note of certain not very rare cases in which he has gratuitously added to the inscription radical letters, in the roots which he puts down as representing the Himyaritic; or has either altered, omitted or inverted radical letters occurring in the inscription, without the least show of reason, except his own choice to do so. Every case has been carefully passed by, where the radical letter, being supposed to be one of the weak class, (either *و*, or *ي*, or *أ*), may have been lost in the formation of the word, and yet be properly represented in giving the root; and no case of omission is to be regarded, in which the letter omitted may be set aside as a formative. We will also allow him all he can claim as "interchange, or indifferent use, of similar letters." As examples to the point, we notice:

(1) He has doubled the character *H* in the word *IHSI* (line 1.) to make the root *شحن*. It cannot be that this word exemplifies the ancient mode of writing a consonant but once, although its pronunciation is double, for the principle of that orthography requires that the consonant to be doubly enunciated should come between two vowels; whereas in the form supposed to occur here, *شماصا*, a long vowel intervenes, so that the character

H, standing for *ص*, not to speak of its being a *و* in his alpha-

bet, should have been repeated in the inscription, if **شص** is the root. (2) He alters **]]**, which he takes to be a **م**, in the word: **]]HY** (line 2.) to **ن**, in order to make the root **بز** from which he derives this word, in the sense of "fountains." (3) He inverts the first two characters of the word: **]]HY** (line 4.) to make its root **زب**. We do not hesitate to affirm, without entering here into the subject, that Forster's notion of an anagram in the Arabic is entirely groundless. (4) He doubles the character **ف** which he makes to be a **ب** in the word: **ف٢** (line 4.) in order to obtain a root **يب**, though a vowel intervenes between the **ب** and its repetition, in the form supposed to occur in this place, **يباب**, as in example (1). It is also worthy of notice, that the second **ب** here, is considered as absorbed in a following **ك**, after a long vowel. (5) He puts the final character first, and the initial last in the word: **]]H** (line 5.) to obtain for its root, **قر**. (6) He alters the character **H**, which he supposes to be **ح**, to a **ي**, in the word: **KEK٢** (line 5.), so as to obtain the root **وشى**. (7) He omits the third character in the word: **KKKH** (line 6.) leaving three others out of which he makes the root **سطر**,—though he had no reason to regard the omitted character as a formative letter;—or else, on another view of the proceeding in this instance, he has omitted the first character, as a formative, which it might be allowed to be, and has then inverted the two characters next following. But this inversion would be inadmissible. (8) He leaves off the first character in the word: **IAKH** (line 6.) to make the root **نطم**. (9) He doubles the character, which is a **س** in his alphabet, but is supposed to stand for a **ص** in the word **SAIXI** (line 7.) under the same circumstances as in the examples (1) and (4) for the form which he finds here is **قصص**. (10) He adds after the characters **٢A** (line 7.) a letter **ك**, to make out the root **شرك**. We cannot, as he may have done, consider this to be a case of assimilation to a following letter **خ**, which rendered the presence of the

assimilated letter in the inscription unnecessary; for, when we examine Forster's identification of letters, it will appear that the letter which he here makes to be خ is not of the guttural, but of the dental class. (11) He passes over an inconvenient second 7, which he calls a *resh*, in the word: 𐤀𐤍𐤏𐤍 (line 7.) to obtain the root شرق. The final radical also, here, can have been made out only on the supposition of assimilation to a following guttural خ,—the same letter which, as has been said, will be shown not to be a guttural. (12) He throws off the final character of the word: 𐤀𐤍𐤏𐤍 (line 8.) to make out that its root is شرر. (13) He inserts a letter 3, between his ش and his ب, in the word: 𐤀𐤍𐤏𐤍 (line 9.) to make the root شهب. (14) He adds a letter 3 after the characters: 𐤀𐤍 (line 10.) in order to have the root مشن.

Having thus made it evident that Forster has altered, and mutilated as well as added to the inscriptions, at his pleasure, for the sake of referring words to certain roots of which the signification seemed to serve his purpose; we will next consider his neglect of letters, which from their position in the words, as he himself divides them off, and decipheres them, he must have taken to be formatives. He acknowledges that he has not, in general, regarded the formative-letters of the inscription, assigning as his reason, that he was incompetent to "cast the words into the finished mould of Arabian poetry."¹⁶ It would seem, then, as if he really supposed the forms of the inscription to be purely Arabic; for if not, what propriety could there be in pleading, that he was not sufficiently versed in the forms which might be used in poetry, agreeably to the genius of the Arabic language, in excuse for not having presented roots, supposed to be purely Arabic, in the form required by the sense.¹⁷ Accordingly the letters and syllables which Forster has left to be considered as formatives might be tested by the laws of Arabic forms; and the result

¹⁶ S. Hist. Geogr. of Arab. II. 350.

¹⁷ He says indeed: "From particles and prepositions my attention was next directed to prefixes and suffixes, those inherent augmentatives, common to all the Semitic idioms. Here, also, the Hamyaritic of the Hissn Ghorab inscription exhibited the same principles with all its kindred dialects; *m* being the prefix used to convert verbs or participles into substantives, and *an*, or *na* the

would be, the opening of another wide field of argument against his interpretation of the inscription. Passing this, however, we cannot but wonder, that he should have ventured to make any translation from a text presenting grammatical forms which he was generally unable either to identify, or to analyse independently. In venturing to do this, he could not proceed on any other principle, than to model the signification, so far as dependent upon the forms of words, according to his own pleasure; determining, for example, without reference to the text itself, whether a certain word was a verb or an adjective; whether a certain supposed substantive was in the nominative, or the accusative, and whether a supposed verb was in the third person sing. or first person plur., etc. Examples to this point are almost as numerous as the words of the inscription, and need not therefore be specified. What confidence is to be placed in an interpretation on such a plan as this?

Thus far, Mr. Forster's separation of the words from one another has been assumed as correct. It may now be shown, that he adds some letters, and omits others, throughout the whole inscription, from having adopted an erroneous view of the punctuation. He considers the mark (I) as a *vav*, whereas Arab writers expressly inform us, that the Himyaritic words were separated each from its neighbor, by a perpendicular line, while inscriptions in the ancient Ethiopic, to which the Himyaritic is closely allied, as is obvious to the eye, and as Arab tradition certifies, have the very same mark to separate each single word. On these grounds, Gesenius and Roediger have agreed to regard the perpendicular (I) as a mere punctuation.¹⁸ The real use of this mark, of course, occasions its very frequent recurrence; just as frequently, then, has Forster, from not recognizing its true character, added letters to the inscription. He makes a *radical* letter of it in nine instances. It is very often interpreted as a copulative, or as a part of other connecting particles. A misapprehension of the system of punctuation likewise occasioned the leaving out of actual letters, for the characters (•) and (••) are erroneously regarded as stops. Here Mr. Forster has apparently been led astray by

suffix employed to denote the plural number," meaning the first pers. plur. But further than this we find no attempt, in his work, to explain the grammatical forms of the inscription.

¹⁸ S. Zeitschr. für d. K. d. Morgenl. I. 334; and Allgem. Lit., Zeit. 1841. p. 383.

Gesenius, who, after speaking of the acknowledged mark of punctuation, (I) says: "Wozu hier nur noch kommt, dass hinter dem Striche häufig noch ein oder mehrere Punkte stehen, auch wohl der Strich mit mehreren Punkten umgeben ist. Es zeigte sich bald, dass die letztere Weise ein etwas stärkeres Unterscheidungszeichen für minder eng verbundene Worte oder zu Ende eines kleinen Satzes sey, dergleichen auch Aethiopische Codd. haben, aber hier se wenig als in jenen mit Consequenz gehandhabt, wie schon Ludolf klagt, etc." But that the characters referred to are not marks of punctuation, either independently, or subsidiarily, appears from: (1) The improbability of there being so complicated a system of punctuation, as that supposed by Gesenius, in any monumental inscription, especially one like this Himyaritic, in which the mode of writing has every appearance of simplicity,—as, for instance, in the absence of all vowel points, and diacritical marks, and other guides to pronunciation. This has already been urged by Roediger.¹⁹ (2) The absence of all such punctuations in the Ethiopic as our commas, colons, and semicolons. Gesenius quotes the authority of Ludolf inconsiderately, in referring to the Ethiopic writing for a parallel to the complication of punctuation-marks supposed to be discoverable in the Himyaritic. Roediger has used this argument, also, against the opinion of Gesenius.²⁰ (3) The absurdities to which we are reduced by assuming that the characters in question are punctuations, even on the simpler hypothesis of Forster, who regards them not as subsidiary to the perpendicular stroke, but as the only marks of punctuation. They occur either singly, thus: (·) (↯), or in combination, thus: (↯↯); we must, therefore, on Mr. Forster's theory, suppose that they indicate three grades of pause. But this admits of no reasonable application; for we find the single (·) separating what Forster makes to be two distinct clauses, while (↯↯) separates prepositions, inseparable in sense, from their complements; also a noun separated from its verb, by (↯↯) and even by (↯↯); a single (·) in the midst of a word; a verb separated from its direct object by (↯↯); a preposition separated from its complement by (↯); an initiative particle, for ex. *until*, separated from the verb with which it is construed, by (↯); and other similar inconsistencies. (4) The obvious relationship of each of these two characters, (·)

¹⁹ S. his Versuch, etc. Vorwort. XI.²⁰ S. Ibid.

and (·), to a letter of the Shemitish alphabets. The (·) is the original Phœnician *Ain*, (○), which may be traced, with slight modifications, in the coins of the Maccabees, and in the Samaritan, ancient Syriac, and ancient and modern Ethiopic writing, and in certain alphabets purporting to be Himyaritic, which have been found in manuscripts of the Berlin Royal Library, with an explanation of each letter by the corresponding Arabic. The other character (◌◌) is equivalent to the Ethiopic *vav*, ◌ from which, on a comparison with the old Phœnician forms, it appears to be derived.⁸¹ Of the characters thus proved to be letters, which Forster considers as punctuation-marks, (◌) occurs twelve times in the inscription, and (·) no less than sixty times; in so many cases, therefore, have letters been left out. It will be readily perceived, also, that Forster's interpretation must be for the most part erroneous, if only on account of his misconception of the limits of single words, proved by what has been said under this head; for the words of the inscription, as he reads it, are nearly all separated from each other by one or the other of the three supposed punctuations.

The last point to be considered under the head of mistakes in deciphering is, that Forster's identification of a large number of the characters of the inscription, which are actual letters, and are viewed as such by him, has no palaeographical authority. For example: (1) He makes an *ain* of . "It occurred to me" he writes "as a point of the last importance to detect if possible, that vital element of all the Semitic idioms, the *ain*. After some fruitless essays it struck me, from the position of that character in several of the words, that the *ain* might possibly be represented by a  (or a reversed sigma)," and in a note he observes: "Prof. Roediger, misled by the form of this letter, has given it the power of the Greek Σ; this one mistake was fatal to his alphabet."⁸² What, then, does Forster's own conjecture amount to? He was led to call the sign  an *ain*, because he then could, as he fancied, make out words which would serve to establish the identity of the sense of the inscription with that of the pretended Arabic translation of it. We will follow him, for a moment, on his own ground, without insisting upon its untenableness. The first word upon which he thus experimented is at the

⁸¹ S. Gesenius, *Schrift. Linguaeque Phœnic. Monn. Pars I.* 27, and the fourth column of our Plate, which shows in the Himyaritic itself, a *vav* identical with the Ethiopic.

⁸² S. *Hist. Geogr. of A.* II. 333, 339.

beginning of the fifth line of the inscription, where he required a word signifying motion with a stately gait; accordingly, he makes the character **Ⲛ** here, an *ain*, after a letter *sin*, and manages to obtain the root **سعى**, which, as we have seen, imports more especially, *celerity of motion*. The next subject of his experimenting is the second word of the inscription, which must signify *laz*, or the like, to express with a verb *to live*, the idea of an easy, careless life. He makes it **وسع**, the final character being **Ⲛ**, and this word serves his purpose. But the first character of the word thus read is not a *vav*, in the inscription—it is a perpendicular punctuation mark; so that after all he does not obtain the word he requires. These are the only cases of the occurrence of **Ⲛ** specified by Forster as having persuaded him that this character is an *ain*; and we cannot therefore subject his reasoning on this point to any further examination into particulars. It is plain, however, that the sort of evidence upon which Forster here relies is of no worth in comparison with the form of the letter itself, as established in the Shemitish alphabets. The evidence of kindred alphabets, we have seen to point to quite a different character as the *ain* of the Himyaritic; while **Ⲛ** is manifestly equivalent to the Phoenician sibilant **𐤌**, or **𐤎** which appears throughout the entire range of the Shemitish forms of writing, with the same power, only excepting that its grade, as a sibilant, is somewhat varied. (2) He makes a *sin* of **𐤌**, which is shown to be a *kaph*, by its close resemblance to this letter in the ancient Ethiopic, and its analogies in other Shemitish alphabets, extensively, reaching back to the Phoenician. (3) He makes an *aleph* of **𐤀**. For this he pretends no other authority than a *report* of Roediger's deciphering of the first word of the inscription, which was in fact incorrect as to this point. But considered palaeographically, **𐤀** is seen to be a *yod*. The Phoenician itself shows examples in which the fingers of its original *yod* **𐤍**, are reduced from three to one;²² in **𐤀** we see the process of abbreviation continued, so that only a compressed fist remains to indicate the origin of the character. The ancient Ethiopic has the same form of *yod* which we give to the Himyaritic. One of the words in which **𐤀** occurs is that read **𐩇𐩣𐩪** by Forster; and it is deserving of notice, in this connection, that, whether this character is supposed to be an *aleph*, or a *yod*, he

²² S. Schrift. Linguaeque Phoenic. Monn. I. 31.

has chosen to alter it into a *hé*, besides that the *vav* of the word هو is altogether interpolated. We may, therefore, safely decide, that the name of *Húd* does not occur in the inscription. (4) He makes a *kha* of Ⲭ. But that this character is a *tau* is so conclusively shown by the analogy of the whole range of the Shemitish alphabets, that it seems strange, it could have been mistaken. Were it not for this, it might be supposed to be derived from one form of the Phoenician *chet*, Ⲭ, which, has been transferred to *hé* in that alphabet; yet on account of what we are led to believe beforehand, by Arab tradition, respecting the analogy of the Himyaritic to the Ethiopic characters, it is certainly preferable to give the power of *kha* to another character, Ⲫ, which connects itself as well with the Ethiopic *kha*, Ⲫ, as with the proper Phoenician *chet*, while Ⲭ has no affinity with any Ethiopic guttural. (5) He calls Ⲫ a *beth*, whereas another character, Ⲫ, is proved to be *beth*, by its relation to the Phoenician, Ⲫ, in common with the Ethiopic, Ⲫ; and Ⲫ has no affinity with the *beth*, either of the Ethiopic, or of any other Shemitish alphabet. To this may be added, that there is a manifest affinity between Ⲫ of the Himyaritic, and the proper Phoenician *hé*, in the form, Ⲫ or Ⲫ. The coins of the Maccabees, and the Samaritan alphabet exemplify a lengthening of the upper, or middle branch of the original letter, Ⲫ on which principle may be derived from it, the Ethiopic form of *chet*, Ⲫ, in the same manner as Phoen. Ⲫ is derived from Ⲫ. The inverted position of the Himyaritic Ⲫ as compared with the Ethiopic Ⲫ admits of a plausible explanation on the ground of a certain peculiarity in appearance which Arab tradition ascribes to the Himyaritic alphabet, in the appellation المسند i. e. *the sustained*. The application of this term has been much disputed; De Sacy supposed it to denote, that the letters "s'appuyoient et se soutenoient les unes les autres," which does not accord with the aspect of the inscriptions now brought under our observation. Another suggestion was made by Adler, that the term describes an alphabet "*gralis incedens, vel fulcris innixa*;" and this agrees so well with the appearance of several Himyaritic letters, compared with letters of other Shemitish alphabets, that we are disposed to adopt it.²⁴ It

²⁴ S. Adler's *Descriptio codd. quorund. Cufic. Altonae*, 1780, p. 6.

certainly serves to account for the characteristic open part of the letter now in question being turned upwards, so that the prolonged stem becomes a fulcrum,—in which respect this letter, supposing it to be *chet*, differs from its equivalent in the other Shemitish alphabets. Another form of his *beth* is evidently a *hé*. (6) He makes  to be *shin*, and several similar characters, which he unreasonably distinguishes from one another, either *shin*, or *tau* and *tet*. But  is obviously identical with the Ethiopic *aleph*, , nor is it difficult to connect this letter with the Phoenician *aleph*. One form of the Phoenician is  from which, according to Gesenius, comes the ancient Hebrew, of the Maccabee-coins,  the parent of the Samaritan *aleph*, . If now we suppose () to be the characteristic part of , how readily do we discover in the Himyaritic, as well as in the Ethiopic, *aleph*, a further simplification which makes one continued line of the letter, resembling our Z. In this view, the lower part of  must be considered as a pair of stilts by which the letter becomes . (7) He makes a *daleth* of . It has been already intimated that this is the Ethiopic  and that it may be identified with the proper Phoenician *chet*. To establish this identity we have only to suppose a process of abbreviation, reducing the Phoenician *chet* , to an outline , to which was afterwards added from the original model, a horizontal stroke, thus:  and that this last form became  by rapidity of hand. We have thus shown, that eight letters of Mr. Forster's Himyaritic alphabet are not what he makes them to be; of these, the *ain* occurs eight times, in the inscription; the *sin*, fifteen times; the *aleph*, twenty-eight times; the *kha*, sixteen times; the two forms of *beth*, thirty times; the *shin* and *tau*, or *tet*, which are really the same, seventeen times; and the *daleth*, four times;—making one hundred and eighteen letters of the inscription, which are proved to be erroneously deciphered. If to this number we add the number of times that (·) and (··) occur, which Forster does not allow to be any letters, though in fact they are such, as we have seen, we come to the conclusion, that one hundred and ninety of the alphabetical characters are incorrectly read by Forster, or nearly one half the whole inscription, exclusive of the perpendicular punctuation-marks; for it contains only three hundred and ninety-four letters.

With this we leave the reader to judge whether Mr. Forster has

"discovered the key" to the Himyaritic alphabet by the hypothesis, that the inscription of Hissn Ghuráb is the original of the Arabic lines with which he has attempted to identify it. The full extent to which his theory involves errors in palaeography it has not been necessary to our purpose to exhibit. It might be shown, that his alphabet embraces errors besides those here noticed, into which he was led by the supposition which has been proved to be false. Yet we would not imply, that Forster's alphabet of the Himyaritic is wholly erroneous. In some points he has simply followed Roediger, according to his own declaration;³⁵ and in certain others he happens to agree with Gesenius, or Roediger, or with both. So far as these coincide with each other we do not hesitate to say, that he differs from them to his disadvantage; in cases where they disagree, his uncritical judgment can be allowed to have no weight to turn the scale. Most of the instances in which he differs, where they agree, and some in which he differs from both, where they are at variance with each other, have come under consideration in the course of the preceding criticism.

We cannot conclude without alluding to Mr. Forster's pretence of antiquity for the inscription before us. He speaks of it as "perhaps the most ancient monument in the world," and again, as "belonging to the primitive period of the world,"³⁶ and this he does without hinting, so far as we have discovered, any other reason for the bold assertion than that, as he would have it, the name of Aws or Uz, is found in a small inscription engraved upon the rock, below that which we have been considering, and referring to it, according to his opinion;—thus presenting a coincidence with the narrative respecting the discovery by Muawiyeh's viceroy of an inscription on the walls of "a castle of Ad," on the supposition, (which has, however, been proved to be erroneous,) that the inscription said to have been seen by Abdurrahman is the same which Wellsted found at Hissn Ghuráb. This reasoning is to persuade us, it would seem, that we have here "a monument whose antiquity bids defiance to criticism," reaching back to "within 600 years of the flood,"³⁷ in spite of Wellsted's information indicating the present good state of preservation of the characters, though engraved on the exposed face of a sea-bound cliff, and notwithstanding a very natural skepticism with regard to the *historical* accuracy of the Mohammedan genealogy: "Ad, the

³⁵ S. Hist. Geogr. of A. II. 335.

³⁶ S. Ibid. II. 348, 404.

³⁷ S. Ibid. II. 364.

son of Aws, the son of Aram, the son of Shem, the son of Noah." Here is truly a large demand upon our credulity! But the foundation of the whole is a fiction light as air; for the name of Aws does not so much as occur in the small inscription, as is sufficiently proved by the fact, that one of the perpendicular punctuation-marks is taken by Forster as the *middle* element of the word

which he there reads ^أاوس.²⁶ Presuming, however, upon a sufficiency of credulity and blindness in his reader, Forster summons him, upon this, to observe that the name Had cannot be a Mohammedan corruption of the patriarchal name Heber, as some have supposed, inasmuch as we find it in this "monument of the primitive period of the world." The real opinion of the learned respecting this name is, that Mohammed borrowed it from the Jews, among whom traces of it first appear at a comparatively modern period. Now supposing with Forster that it occurs in the inscription of Hissn Ghuráb, though we have seen that this is not the case, would it not be rather an argument for the post-Mohammedan date of the inscription, since to say the least, it is more probable that this name came into use among the Arabs, after the time of Mohammed, than that the inscription in which it is believed to occur, is so ancient as supposed, on the ground just stated? Another application made by Forster of the assumed antiquity of this monument is intimated in the following passages, taken from the Dedication of his work to the Archbishop of Canterbury: "But it is not the antiquity of these monuments which constitutes their true value; it is the precious central truths of revealed religion which they record, and which they have handed down from the first ages of the post-diluvian world, that raise them above all price. Viewed in this aspect they strike at the

²⁶ The language of Forster on the discovery, as he believed, of the name of Aws on the rock of Hissn Ghuráb, cannot fail to excite the merriment of the reader who has fairly examined his scheme. "This latter line" he says "revealed at once the awful antiquity of the whole of these inscriptions, Aws (after the name of their forefather, Aws, or Uz, the grandson of Shem, and great-grandson of Noah) being the primitive patronymic of the famous lost tribe of Ad! It is equally impossible to express or forget the feelings of awful interest, and solemn emotion, with which I now found myself penetrating into the 'cunabula gentium;' conversing, as it were, with the immediate descendants of Shem and Noah, not through the doubtful medium of ancient history, or the dim light of oriental tradition, but in their own records of their own annals, 'graven with an iron pen, and lead, in the rock for ever!'" Hist. Geogr. of Arab. II. 372.

very root of skepticism, and leave not even his own hollow ground beneath the feet of the unbeliever." "We now may know, in their own hand writing, what the earliest post-diluvian men and nations thought and felt and believed, not merely about this life, but about God, about religion, about "miracles, the resurrection and the life to come."²⁹ He refers to the latter half of the seventh line of the inscription, which he reads: "And we proclaimed our belief in miracles, in the resurrection, in the return into the nostrils of the breath of life." But the three points of faith here specified are neither an iota more nor less than the cardinal points of Mohammedan doctrine; and who, not being prepossessed with a certain opinion, would hesitate whether to refer an inscription, found in Arabia, and supposed to contain such a specification of religious belief, to an age subsequent to Mohammed, or to derive from it, on the ground alleged in favor of its primitive antiquity, a "contemporary" evidence "of patriarchal faith, and primeval revelation?"³⁰

For ourselves, we will not venture to express any opinion, as yet, respecting the age of the Himyaritic inscriptions, though we believe that something may be inferred, on this point, from the relation to each other of the Himyaritic and Ethiopic alphabets, even if no date should be discovered in any of the inscriptions.

ARTICLE III.

A SKETCH OF GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.

[On the basis of an Article in the *Halle "Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung,"* October, 1843, Nos. 182, 183, 184.]

By Rev. Henry B. Smith, West Amesbury, Mass.

INTRODUCTION.

[The following Article is rather a paraphrase than a translation of the original. Much matter also from other sources which seemed necessary to the elucidation of some of the positions has been incorporated into it. The paragraphs upon some of the re-

²⁹ S. Hist. Geogr. of Arab. I. Dedic. XI.

³⁰ S. Ibid. ibid. XV.

sults of the Hegelian system, and a general statement of Schelling's new scheme, were condensed from an essay by professor Bachmann of Jena in the "*Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*" of that university for the month of December, 1843. The chief addition, however, is an analysis or summary of Hegel's System from the German *Conversations-Lexikon*," which occupies several pages, and is a free and full paraphrase of the original. A literal rendering, word for word, of a mere abstract of an abstruse German system could only mislead the reader, and give a most unfair view of the system itself.

The present Article does not pretend to be anything more than a very general and cursory view of the subject. The title of the original was "*New Schellingism*," and the body of it will be found to refer to the old and the new schemes of this philosopher. In connection with this it gives a sketch of the leading opinions of the other philosophers, and of the course of philosophical inquiry in Germany. Upon the whole it is perhaps as clear an account as can be found within the same compass. It is chiefly open to objection in its depreciation of Schelling, and the correctness of the author's statement of all of Schelling's views, especially of his later system, would be questioned by the adherents of this remarkable man.

Many are asking, what is 'German Philosophy? And it is easier to ask the question than to answer it. Some seem to imagine it a mere mass of fantastic conceits—and call it mysticism. But a German smiles when he hears the clear-headed Kant called a mystic. Others seem to think it a certain something whose only possible use is to raise a broad laugh on the faces of all sensible men, women and children—a farrago of words and nonsense. A few it may be are looking to German speculations as the means of giving them a higher and more comprehensive system than they have been able elsewhere to find; of solving some of the questions and problems which are forcing themselves upon their minds. Many, the most, regard it with unmingled aversion and distrust. Perhaps it may be found upon a closer examination of the subject that none of these parties and opinions are wholly correct. It may be that German philosophy and mysticism are two entirely distinct things. It may be that there are some things in the German schemes which are intelligible; that though he may be a bold man who would venture to assert that he understands everything that the Germans have taught, yet that he is still bolder who will undertake to say that it is all or chiefly an

unmeaning collection of mere words. Every one is inclined to laugh at the strange sounds of a foreign language, but this is no evidence that the language does not mean something, that it is strange sounds and nothing else. Those again who expect to see the enigmas of life solved, and the difficulties and contradictions of science explained in the German schools, are assuredly going into the very thick of the conflict, to find peace. German philosophy is as yet militant, is not yet triumphant. In some of its later forms it is undeniably opposed to the whole spirit and faith of Christianity. It can hardly be doubted that the tendencies of many individual philosophers, if not of whole schools, are pantheistic, that they give us a universal idea instead of a personal God; and a system of vague philosophical speculations instead of a divine Redeemer. It cannot be doubted that the fiercest assault which Christianity has ever experienced, both in its history and in its doctrines, is that to which it is now exposed in the country of Luther and the Reformation. Many present the alternative—Christianity or philosophy; as one author has expressed it—"Christ or Spinoza." Whether it be necessary to accept the alternative or not; what Christian can doubt that it is not Christianity which will be last abandoned? In Germany itself within the few past years the protest against a pantheistic philosophy has waxed loud, and the revival of an intelligent and earnest love of Christianity is most marked and most auspicious.

To say that this philosophy is false and pantheistic is one thing; to say that it is absurd and ridiculous is quite another thing. With all its apparent strangeness, it may be that it has stronger affinities with some theological and philosophical tendencies of the American mind than we at present dream of. It may be that we shall laugh at its supposed absurdities, and so be indifferent to the real dangers with which it threatens us. Revolutionary democratic opinions, and foul-mouthed blasphemy have sprung into being in the midst of a German pantheistic school. A like democracy and a like infidelity amongst ourselves are fast finding out their connections with certain German speculations. Is it then the part of wisdom for those who first present us with a view of these schemes to seek out only their deformities? Perchance others and the opponents of our faith may also read and see that they are colossal and comprehensive; that they give into their hands, ready forged, some of their strongest weapons of attack.]

THE criticism to which Kant subjected the human mind, in all the spheres of its manifestation, not only introduced a new epoch into the history of philosophy, but it put Germany at the head of modern movements in this science, and made philosophy to be the centre of all sciences. The position began to be maintained, that only what could be justified before the bar of speculation, only what could show its derivation from this original fountain of truth, could lay claim to authority or regard. It was boldly assumed that no law of the State, no precept of morality, no prescript of religion, no fact of science, no work of plastic or oratorical art, could any longer be recognized or adopted without philosophical examination.

But does philosophy now maintain this position? In its further progress it has become split up into the most opposite and irreconcilable parties. When it left the sphere of abstractions and came down to what is concrete, when it entered into the departments of religion and of morality, it called into being the sharpest and most implacable antagonisms, as well among theologians, as against philosophy itself. And in addition to this, the other sciences have made such rapid strides, that the systems of philosophy which have hitherto prevailed are ill at ease in the midst of the rich mass of materials and facts that have been collected; to say nothing as to their being able to direct the researches of investigators in these departments. Who would venture with the principles of Kant's philosophy, or of Fichte's, or even of the maturer school of Hegel, to give a complete and exhaustive view of the organism of the State? Who would be so bold as to imagine that with the categories of Schelling alone he could make out a perfect system of Natural Philosophy, which should bind together all the results that have been attained, and unite them in one central point or principle? Even Herbart, whose whole philosophical scheme is much more intimately allied to the sphere of the natural sciences, has not exerted any essential influence upon them. If we add to this, that the course of investigation and research has been gradually turning itself away from metaphysical speculation to less abstract subjects, that in the fields of the former there remain comparatively few gleaners of the ears of corn that have fallen, and that the reapers have gone to the richer harvest which the positive sciences afford; that even within the schools of philosophy there are many who are consciously or unconsciously tending to what may be called a philosophical or

rational empiricism, to a reconciliation between philosophy and the empirical sciences; then it is clear that the position which metaphysical speculation once assumed, even if it did then actually possess it, can no longer be maintained; that its high pretensions must be abandoned.

It was Schelling in the former period of his philosophical course who gave such prominence and authority to speculation. This was his mission. His late call to be professor of philosophy in Berlin, together with the applause and the opposition he has there encountered, has given a new interest to his views. His system may be looked upon as the chief source of the distractions and confusion that now prevail. It is said that he has been called to his present post in order to reconcile the conflicting parties, to overthrow the system of Hegel, to bring about a new era in which philosophy and theology shall be at peace. But it hardly seems possible that the man who has caused the disturbance can quell it; and it certainly seems remarkable that this philosopher, deeply as he may be penetrated by a sense of his own importance, should have taken upon himself this most difficult office. But our doubts rise to the highest grade now that Schelling has not only promised to respond to all the claims and fulfil the expectations of the present age of the world in speculative matters, but also boasts that he is "in possession of a system of philosophy which will carry human consciousness beyond its present boundaries." Although in the whole course of his career he has not been wanting in the most extraordinary promises which have always far exceeded his powers, yet this last one, "*to carry man's consciousness beyond its limits*" is in itself so preposterous, that, to look for the reconciliation of existing difficulties from a science based on such assumptions can only be compared with the attempt, which has at different times been proposed, to restore the disordered finances of a country by the art of making gold. And the whole undertaking assumes an air of still greater improbability, since it is at the same time declared, that Schelling "does not by any means intend to abandon the philosophical discoveries which he made when he was a young man," that he "does not mean to substitute another system of philosophy for his former one, but *to add to it* a new science, a science which has been hitherto considered an impossibility." Does not this condition, under which this new philosophy, which is to carry man's consciousness beyond its present limits, is to come into existence, include the assumption, that our consciousness, in order to be ca-

pable of undergoing this extension, must first of all let itself be confined within the bounds of Schelling's youthful discoveries?

We have had from different sources some accounts of the new system and teachings of Schelling. His lectures were delivered before large audiences. Professors, students and theologians frequented them. Several adepts took copious notes, some of which have been published. From all that can be learned respecting his new position, as much as this is quite evident, that he has not fulfilled his intentions. Notwithstanding the private coteries and the public parades, his aim has not been reached. In respect to the real value of what he has achieved the most opposite views prevail. From his own pen we have not indeed received any work which may be considered as perfectly defining his new position, and be subjected to a critical examination. Such a work has for years been promised, and for years withheld. But there are still sufficient sources of information in the works already published and in the reports of his lectures. And now that the passions, which were aroused, when he first came to his new post have become somewhat allayed, and matters have begun to take a more quiet course, it may be the fitting time to subject the system of Schelling to examination in respect to the present problems of philosophy, and to see how far it may be expected directly or indirectly to assist in their solution.

In order to place ourselves in the right point of view, it will be necessary to direct our attention to the philosophical views prevalent in the two periods, out of which the two systems of Schelling proceeded, and with which they are both intimately connected.

It is now generally conceded that Schelling did not by any means discover a new principle or law in philosophy. He only attempted to adapt a system which had been previously developed, that of Spinoza, to more modern times, to carry it out and shape it in conformity with the wants of a new period. Schelling's youthful discovery or invention is, in its fundamental principle, no way different from Spinozism; the difference concerns only the mode in which the principle is carried out. The doctrine is that all things inhere, are immanent in the alone-existing, all-penetrating, all-containing, all-maintaining *Substance*. That his theory may elevate men to a high degree of enthusiasm has been sufficiently taught in our own experience. But in spite of this, such a theory, so diametrically opposed to all the principles of the modern world, could not have carried away at least the

highly cultivated minds of the times just past, if there had not been some peculiar characteristics and special wants in those times. It will be necessary to look at this period more closely.

Every one knows that the result of the *Critique* of Kant, in its theoretical department, of his criticism of the Pure Reason, was, that things as they exist in nature were virtually robbed of their essence, of all substance or substantiality, as in the system of Spinoza, they were reduced to mere modifications, to forms of manifestation. That which lies beneath the form, which is the ground of the manifestation, is not an object of real knowledge. Kant did not by this mean to say, as the subjective idealism of Berkeley asserts, that nature is to be reduced to a mere ghost-like existence; he granted, he maintained, that behind or beneath the manifestations or phenomena there was an essence, a nature. What he denied was, that this essence, this nature was something that could be known, that it was a subject of real knowledge. Therefore he wished that his system should be called, the system of *Critical or Transcendental Idealism*. Such was the result of the theoretical or intellectual part of his philosophy. In his system of moral philosophy, what he calls *Practical Reason*, he comes to an exactly opposite result. In the Practical Reason, or moral consciousness of men, he found a real essence or nature, which could be an object of certain knowledge—a thing per se (Ding an sich), as he called it, a something which existed by and for itself, and which we could also absolutely know. This was the categorical imperative, the sense of absolute obligation, the *ought*, of our moral nature, in respect to which no one could have any doubt. Thus his system was made up of two distinct parts, which were sharply distinguished from one another. There was the domain of nature, in which the laws of the understanding prevail; and the domain of freedom where reason holds the sceptre. In the former, the sphere of theoretical knowledge, there is a great gulf between sensible things and what is beyond and above the senses, the supersensuous; "just as if they were two worlds, the first of which had no influence upon the second." In the other sphere, however, there exists practically the absolute necessity of carrying out in the world of sense, and there striving to realize, the ends and aims which are prescribed by the nature of freedom. Consequently—and this is the weighty point to which all speculation must at last have reference—the world of sense stands in regular and lawful connection, in fixed internal union with the supersensuous world, the reflections of our under-

standings with the ideas of our reason, necessity with freedom ; and to find out and explain this connection is the end of all knowledge, and the aim of our moral nature. The difficulties that here arise, recur in all the spheres and departments of spiritual life, wherever mind manifests itself. Whoever would understand the progress and conflicts of man in history and art, in philosophy, morals and religion, must look at them from some central point of view ; whoever would understand the waves on the surface must look at their causes beneath ; whoever would penetrate into the depths of the matter, and become competent to form a thorough acquaintance with it, must be able to grasp these two apparently contradictory elements, to see the struggle between them in all phenomena, and to see that movement and progress depend and are based upon the antagonism between these opposing forces.

In considering this subject, the first point of importance is to endeavor to grasp and comprehend the manifold operations of nature in the principle of their unity, to discern the end or final cause of nature, the purpose for which it exists. In manifold phenomena this is clearly presented in the way of experiment and observation. But since Kant supposed it to be a point entirely proved, that we are not able to have any knowledge of the essential nature of things, what could the whole conception of the final cause of nature, the whole relation between means and ends which there exists, and all the laws of nature, as well the universal as the particular ; what could all these be to him other than a mere scheme or theory of man's understanding, a *focus imaginarius* which we had transferred from our own minds into the external world ? And so we find that the successor of Kant, Fichte, entirely set aside the notion of the thing *per se* (the *Ding an sich*) as having any substantial existence. With Kant only the name had remained. Fichte abolished even that. In nature, in the external world, there remained nothing that was essential. Nothing is essential, has a real, substantial existence excepting what is personal, excepting the *I*, as he expressed himself. Nature thus became a mere stone of stumbling, a mere basis for something else, a something to be presupposed or taken for granted, in order that something else might exist or be shown to exist ; but in itself considered it had no independent value or existence. Besides the *I*, there was nothing that was essential. But with such a system would it not at last become necessary to look at and to speak of this *I* as in itself the absolute substance of all things ? Philosophy demands the absolute ; it cannot rest con-

tented with the relative, the personal, the subjective. And so we find that in the later system of Fichte, the *I*, which formed the central idea of his whole scheme, was declared to be absolute, was understood as the Absolute Substance. Here was the great change from the subjective to the objective, from the personal to the absolute. The advance which Schelling made in philosophy consists now in this, that he substituted another expression for the *I* of Fichte. In reference to their fundamental principles there is only the difference of a word, a name, between Fichte's later system, and Schelling's first theory.¹

The system of Schelling is called the System of Identity, or the Philosophy of the Absolute; it has also received the designation, Philosophy of Nature, because he first and chiefly turned his attention to giving to natural science a more speculative character. He starts with the conception of an *Absolute Substance*, which pervades everything. But we everywhere find antagonisms; the subjective and the objective, the real and the ideal, unity and multiplicity, the infinite and the finite. Schelling asserts that these are not really opposed to one another, that they are to be considered as one, as identical; that they are but the opposite poles of one and the same *Substance*. Hence his system received the name of the System of Identity. In the whole

¹ This remark applies fully only to the first form in which Schelling presented his philosophy. Hegel says that Schelling himself was not aware of the fundamental difference of his own system from that of Fichte, until he (Hegel) pointed it out to him. This statement is made on the authority of Michelet who says that he had it from Hegel himself. There was quite a discussion between Fichte and Schelling as to which of them really first made the transition from the subjective basis of philosophy to the objective. Compare, *Schelling's Exhibition of the True Relation of the Philosophy of Nature to the Improved Doctrine of Fichte*. Also, *Fichte's Life*, by his son. However this question may be decided, there is yet no doubt about the fact that the transition was actually made. Fichte came to the result, that all our knowledge is a merely subjective act, that no one can know or experience anything more than what is passing within the sphere of his own self-consciousness. Whatever is out of this sphere is a subject of knowledge only so far as it comes within this sphere; it is viewed as objective only because it is made objective by ourselves. Schelling says, however, that to *know anything* means the same as to be certain of its actual existence; that by the fact of knowing it we presuppose or take for granted that it actually exists. A knowledge of something which did not exist apart from our knowledge would be only an empty dream, no knowledge at all. That is—knowledge is not all, self-consciousness is not all, there is also that which is independent of knowledge, there is that which actually exists, which exists objectively. There is not only a Subject; there is also an Object.—Comp. Chalybaeus *Entwickelung d. Phil.* pp. 190—194.

of nature he saw the marks and developments of the one universal *Substance*. Thus he gave new life to nature, and new impulse to the attempt to bring the results of experimental research into harmony with philosophical speculation.

Let any one now imagine what impression must have been made upon all minds in place of the shadowy life which Kant allowed to nature, to see again brought into it the pulsations and movements of an absolute, all-pervading *Substance*. This idea that nature is to be considered as a whole by itself, not as something merely accidental, not a mere aggregate without unity, has always been at the basis of all natural science. The scientific investigator expects to find in nature an order and a system of laws, which are something more than a reflex of the laws of his own soul. Kant could not succeed in overcoming, by his theoretical principles, his own great ideas in respect to the organism of nature in reducing it to a mere figment. In the meantime, F. H. Jacobi had insisted with great energy upon the principle of individual life, and, from this point of view, he had again brought forward the deep and clear conception of Leibnitz. The way being thus prepared, Schelling's system, this new form of Spinozism, which brought back a new life into nature, was greeted at its first appearance with the greatest enthusiasm. This was natural and necessary. Schelling himself has given the best clue to it in the following words, "After all finite forms have been torn in pieces, and in the wide world there remains no common principle or bond by which we may consider men or nature as held together, it is only the conception (or vision) of *Absolute Identity*, considered in the most complete and objective way as embracing all seeming opposites, which can again unite them, and which in its highest application to religious truth will forever unite them."


If the fundamental principle, the central idea, had been thus obtained, yet this was not sufficient; it must still be shown how this principle could be carried through and applied to all departments of the world of matter and of mind; the relation of all separate and individual existences to this fundamental idea was still to be exhibited. Schelling was not adapted to this undertaking, it was beyond his powers. He was wanting in severe logical culture. His unfixed fancy hurried him from one object to another, before he had resolved the questions which he propounded in each successive work that he published; he had not sufficient power of endurance to exhaust the problems. Spinoza had already given to his principle a full and logical development. With masterly consecutiveness and plastic repose he had striven to

bring under it all the phenomena of the universe; but since his times, the position of the world had been changed, there was a new phase in its progress. And if this principle were to receive authority and recognition, it was necessary to bring the results of the empirical sciences into harmony with it, both theoretically and practically. The first thing was to define more clearly the meaning of the *Absolute Substance*, for the use of the new system. Spinoza had defined it as consisting of an infinite number of attributes; only two of them, however, he says, come within the sphere of human knowledge, viz. *Extension* and *Thought*. In these two, and in their modifications, he found the means of explaining the phenomena of the world. Not noticing, or not troubled by, what Spinoza might have meant, when he would not limit the attributes of the *Absolute* to thought and extension, Schelling declared that the *Identity* of these two, (Spinoza also regards them as only different forms of knowing *one* and the *same* thing), constitutes the essence of the *Absolute Substance*. But he changed the names of the attributes. Sometimes he called them the *Subjective* and the *Objective*, sometimes the *Real* and the *Ideal*, and again he used other like meaning expressions. Hence come the different definitions which Schelling gives of the absolute substance; as the *Subject-Object*, as the *Indifference of the Subjective and Objective*, as the *Identity of the Real and the Ideal*, etc. The office and problem of philosophy is the mutual penetration and interaction of the *Ideal* and the *Real*.

In order now to bring the phenomena of the world within his system, to *subsume* everything under this Absolute Substance, he constructed out of its two attributes a balance with two arms; upon the one arm he suspended *Nature*, upon the other *History*. With Spinoza, *Thought* reaches as far as *Extension*, the order of things in the sphere of the *Ideal* is the same as in the sphere of the *Real*. But Schelling on the side of nature gives the supremacy to the *Real*, to the comparative exclusion of the other element; on the side of Spirit he gives the supremacy to the *Ideal*; each side puts itself into equipoise. Such a bringing down of the loftiest and most universal conceptions to the lowest and commonest forms and images, which even the world of matter has to offer, would be sufficient to destroy all hope of a systematic carrying out of the scheme.¹

¹ "All distinction or difference in being (Sein), is produced only by a relative preponderance of the Subjectivity or Objectivity of the parts. Let us represent to ourselves being in general under the figure of a line :

More difficult than this, however, was the problem to find out the law by means of which all these finite and individual existences could be derived from this one Absolute Substance. A deeper penetration into the doctrine of Spinoza might have given him the means of doing it. Spinoza takes for his basis the proposition, *ex necessitate divinae naturae infinita infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt), sequi debent*. And from this he makes the conclusion, *deum omnium rerum quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt, esse causam efficientem*. And thus to the alone-existing Substance he attributed an energy according to which it produced all things from eternity, *ex solis suae naturae legibus et a nemine coactus*. This vital point in Spinozism which constitutes the true greatness of the system, was overlooked by Schelling; and therefore as long as he philosophized, he could never find an objective principle of movement, a living, vital energy to infuse into his system. He tried the most manifold forms. Now he imitated the method of Fichte in his Doctrine of Science (*Wissenschaftslehre*); now the desultory and grasshopper style of Jacobi, just skipping over the phenomena; again he proceeded after the pattern of Spinoza, striving to get the true form by a parade of mathematical propositions, and modes of proof; then he took the Platonic fashion of a dialogue as a means of saving himself and his system, and after-



let the part *a*-*C* represent preponderating Subjectivity, the part *C*-*b* the preponderating Objectivity. The whole line *C* will represent the identity of the Subjective and the Objective; and this letter will also stand for the point of Indifference or the equilibrium of both sides. But now the whole of being (*Sein*) is neither at the point *a* pure Subjectivity, nor at the point *b* pure Objectivity, because no being, no actual existence can be predicated of either of these two conceptions taken by itself; but subjectivity and objectivity are everywhere and in everything exhibited and reacted. Let now this same line be divided into an infinite number of parts; in all the parts between *a*-*C* there would be relatively more subjectivity than in those between *C*-*b*. But in every single part of the line, thus divided, we shall at once find again one pole with relative subjectivity, *a* and an opposite with relative objectivity *b*, and between the two another point of indifference *c*, which would again be an expression for a whole—though here a relative whole, while in a former case it was absolute. Thus is represented the possibility or conceivability that the Absolute Substance, or the infinite, has become finite, still retaining its true nature, having the same characteristics. The process of becoming finite consists in a distinguishing of itself from itself, in an inherent activity of the infinite substance within itself, in which it always retains one and the same nature or essence."—Chalybaeus *Hist. Entwickelung* S. 226—227.

wards the aphoristic method; until at last, when none of these means could save him, historical narration and the stamp of authority were resorted to instead of proof and deduction.

Hegel, by a thorough study of the Kantian system and of the ancient philosophers, attained a high degree of logical culture, and was brought to grapple with the great problem of philosophy, as we have above given it. Of the modern systems, previously, to Kant, he seems, so far as we may gather from his writings, to have thoroughly studied only that of Spinoza. He very soon saw the defects of Schelling's philosophizing; as is abundantly proved by the scorn and contempt with which he treats him and his followers in the energetic preface to his "*Phenomenology of the Spirit*." In this, his first larger work, he strives with great energy to gain the only position which could realize the promises of Schelling. He says, the Absolute is not to be regarded as a *Substance* but as a *Subject*; not as sunk into repose, but as living and active. It is endued with life, with the power of motion or development; this power he defines as its "*existence for itself*" (*Fürsichseyn*)—it does not merely exist, but it exists for itself, with a power of self-movement or production. This power it is by means of which the differences in things are produced out of the original substance; the living energy of the Absolute consists in this, that it produces from itself and establishes out of itself the differences, the opposing powers and forces, which exist in the universe; while at the same time it exists in them, and is conscious of being by itself, of retaining its own nature and characteristics, of not being lost or destroyed in the midst of all these developments. Thus its life is manifested in, or is, action; the Absolute is *Spirit*—not *Substance*. His system of philosophy consists, now, in the exhibition of this self-movement, self-development of the Absolute. But in order to do this, it is not enough to get up an enthusiasm for an Absolute Substance, as sudden and evanescent as the explosion of a pistol, nor to talk in high-sounding, prophetic language, nor to make use of old formulas, in the midst of which the system moves, as courtiers observe traditional etiquette. The whole power of severe thought must be applied; and the movement or development of the system is not the work of the system-maker alone, it is the natural and necessary development of the Absolute itself. A necessary constituent of the Absolute is this inherent power of self-movement, this is what is meant by and included in, the phrase, that it exists for itself, (*Fürsichseyn*). And all that the philosopher has to do is, as it

were, to stand by and see the process going on, and not to disturb it by any interference of his own notions and theories.

Hegel supposed that he had now found the position, which would enable him to develop the fundamental principle of philosophy into a complete system, and which made it an object of philosophical knowledge. He had found his principle, and he had found a moving power, a *nîsus*, within it. But there was still wanting the *law* of its movements, the precise mode in which it was to advance. Schelling's pair of scales would not answer the purpose.

Kant and Fichte had looked much deeper than Schelling into the real nature of knowledge. Kant in the second part of his Criticism of the Pure Reason had given a summary of what he calls the Antinomies of the Reason, of the contradictory conclusions and judgments to which by our reasoning powers we may be compelled to come in respect to certain points of speculation. He enumerates these contradictions in respect to four points, and says that by starting from different data we may, by mere reason, prove exactly opposite things about them. They are in substance as follows: we can prove, that the world has a beginning in time and that it is restricted by space; and also that it has no beginning and no restrictions, but is infinite; that every composite substance in the world is made up of simple parts, and that it does not consist of simple parts; that there is causality of freedom as well as of nature, and that there is no freedom; that an absolutely necessary being must be assumed as the cause of the world, and that it need not be assumed. These contradictions Kant says do not belong to the laws of reason itself; but are owing to a wrong application of them: it is not the province of reason to understand the nature and essence of objects, but it is to be employed by the investigation of phenomena. Hegel, now, looked at these *Antinomies* as the necessary contradiction of the human understanding, when it reflects upon objects, and took the ground that this system of contradictions, of apparent opposition, is not confined to the points which Kant enumerates, but extends to the whole sphere of Philosophy; that opposing powers and agencies are everywhere at work, and are necessary in order to progress and life. But this conflict is not all, there is also a law of mediation. These antagonisms exist, but they are to be annulled. These conflicting and opposed principles are to be resolved into a higher unity. They exist for the understanding, but not for the reason. (The essence of these Antinomies, ex-

pressed in an abstract form, Hegel gives in a peculiar terminology, in the phrases, a thing existing of or by itself, (an sich) a thing existing for itself (für sich). Hegel finds these contradictions everywhere, but he also everywhere attempts to resolve them into a higher unity—to mediate between them. His whole system of logic is constructed with a view to this. Kant had discovered in the *Categories* the law of triplicity, and Fichte had made use of it, as a part of the method of philosophical investigations. In Hegel's system everything proceeds by triplicates. There is first a statement expressed in the positive form, then there follows the negation of the position; and then the two contradictory statements are resolved into a higher unity. And so the system proceeds from stage to stage, positive, negative and the union between the positive and the negative. This union becomes in its turn a positive, a negative is set over against it, and this new contradiction is resolved into another and higher unity. Each stage is higher and more comprehensive than the one which preceded it, since it contains the sum of all that has gone before. And this process is continued until the whole sphere of thought is exhausted—until the absolute has gone through all the stadia of its evolutions.

Hegel did not merely adopt the fundamental principle which Schelling had laid down, but he defined it with greater precision. With Schelling, Identity was an undefined term; Hegel, as we have seen, defined the *nature* of Identity. Schelling gives the fact of the identity of opposites; Hegel shows in what the identity consists. Wherever there is identity, he says, there is also difference. What is identical must develop itself into difference. Identity without difference cannot be even conceived, much less actually exist. By these further definitions of the fundamental principle of philosophy Hegel went beyond Schelling; but his advance was yet greater in his development of the principle into a scientific system, for which Schelling had not the logical culture nor the philosophical calmness. At the same time Hegel acknowledged the services of Kant and Fichte in respect to the *method* of philosophical investigation, and applied this method to the *principle* which Schelling had brought out; so that he neglected nothing which his predecessors had achieved. The principles which Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Spinoza had separately dwelt upon, he combined into one system. And he did this not by a mere external aggregation, but he found the central point in which all their views coincided, and presented them as members of one ho-

dy, as distinct parts of one fundamental conception. From the consciousness of having done this proceeded Hegel's peculiar views in respect to the Philosophy of History, and to the position of his own system in relation to all the antecedent systems. He considered his system as the product of the labor of his predecessors, as the result of all that had gone before. He looked upon the whole progress of philosophy as consecutive, so that all the successive systems formed at last only one great, all-comprehensive system. This was *his* system. He had found the centre of unity for them all. All that had gone before came to its culmination in his scheme. His was the Absolute Philosophy. It contained all that was true in all other systems. All other systems led to his.

In his first work of any extent, the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, Hegel plants himself upon this position. He there goes through the various grades and stages of the mind from the lowest form of its manifestations up to the highest, from sensation to philosophy. The power of Hegel's mind is clearly seen in it. To its unobtrusive agency is to be ascribed much of the influence which the Hegelian system afterwards attained, when his method of philosophizing had broken through all barriers, and had been more perfectly carried out. But in this work, he is still struggling with his materials, and hence his mode of expression is harsh and awkward; so that in spite of the energy of his thoughts, the peculiarity of his system of philosophy, of his view of nature and mind, was not exhibited in its full clearness. Even his system of *Logic*, in which his principles were exhibited in their fullest development, failed to win the favor and sympathy of the public. It was in his lectures, especially at Berlin, as professor of Philosophy, that he obtained his greatest influence. He applied his system to all branches of knowledge. He lectured upon the Philosophy of Nature, upon Psychology, upon Art, upon Ethics, upon the History of Philosophy, upon the Philosophy of History, upon the Philosophy of Religion, and showed how his system could give a perfect form to all these sciences, could explain them all, and how it alone was able to achieve such a work. And never perhaps did any system of philosophy exert so wide an influence upon so many branches of science in so short a time. The Absolute Philosophy alone, it was said, was able to explain all other sciences; all other sciences were to be remoulded by it. It was able to explain the whole course of history, the whole progress of art, all the phenomena of the mind, all the facts and doctrines of revela-

tion. It was to give a new form to theology. It was the same thing in the sphere of speculation, which the Christian religion was in the sphere of faith.

Since this is a system of such lofty pretensions, since it professes to be able to include all science and art within its comprehensive principles, and to deduce all things from its fundamental conceptions by a necessary law, it may be a matter of some interest to give a concise analysis of his whole scheme, so as to see the mode in which Hegel attempts to accomplish this end.

The following outline is taken from an article in the German Conversations-Lexikon. It is an abridgment of a few of the sections in Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Though divested of some of the technicalities and terminology of the school, yet it has the inherent defect of all condensed statements, that it is stripped of the illustrations and amplifications contained in the original exposition, and of course is not so intelligible as the work itself. The translator has endeavored by a free paraphrase, and by incorporating additional matter from the original work of Hegel to bring the statements into as intelligible a shape as the nature of the English language will allow. He has, in short, endeavored to render it rather *ad sensum* than *ad verbum*. And though it may not all be perfectly intelligible, and though it may be thought wholly false, yet it is hoped that it will not be found to be a mere mass of absurdities, a mere collection of sounding words.

Hegel begins his view of Logic in the Encyclopaedia, by a preliminary discussion of the different positions and relations of thought, of man as a thinking being, to whatever may be the object of his thoughts, to all that is external and objective. This is what the author of the article in the Lexicon means by saying that the Logic, as it is contained in the Encyclopaedia is enriched by some preliminary views of the position of thought in relation to what is objective. Hegel's Logic, as contained in his separate work upon this subject, is not enriched by such a previous discussion.

Hegel divides the whole of philosophy into three parts, viz., Logic, Natural Philosophy and the Philosophy of the Spirit. These three are but different stadia or degrees of manifestation of one and the same idea. (Hegel defines the word *idea* to be what is true in and of itself, the entire correspondence or union between the notion of a thing and the thing as it really exists, between the conception and the object, the thing in its objective

existence.¹ The definition of *idea* and the definition of *truth* are with him one and the same thing. The idea is the same as what is elsewhere called the *Absolute*.) The first part of philosophy, Logic, is the science of this Absolute Idea, of what is really true, in its abstract character, as it exists in and for itself. Logic is not with Hegel the mere form of thinking, it is thought itself in all its forms and stages, from the simplest notions up to the most concrete and complex. The second part of his system comprises Natural Philosophy. Nature is a manifestation of the same Absolute Idea, but in a different form.² It is the same absolute substance, but existing materially, externally, instead of spiritually. The third part comprises the Philosophy of Spirit. This is the highest stage of the development of the Absolute Substance, or the absolute idea. It has here, so to speak, returned back from the material and external shape which it took in nature, and has become spiritual. As it existed in the realm of nature, being material and external, it was deprived of some of its true characteristics, it was in a foreign land, an estranged condition. But in the realm of spirit it re-assumes its true, its permanent, its real characteristics.

1. Hegel's system of Logic represents to us thought in its abstract form, the connection of all our ultimate ideas and conceptions with one another, arranged in a systematic manner, developed according to a fixed and strict law. His Logic embraces not only what we call logic, but also what we comprehend under metaphysics and ontology. The Absolute Substance or idea with which he starts is viewed throughout the Logic, as existing in a merely abstract form.

2. In the system of Natural Philosophy, the same Absolute Idea is viewed as existing in another form. The essence of nature consists in this, that it is the Absolute Idea existing in an external form; it has left its state of abstract existence, and become a different thing, become palpable, external, material. A necessary result of its existing in this material form is, that it has the appearance of having no permanent existence, that it is composed

¹ Vide Hegel's *Encyclopædie* § 213.

² Hegel ascribes the creation of nature to the free act, and, as he in one place has said, to the "goodness" of the absolute spirit, but yet in such a way as not to annul the pantheism of his system. Conf. Chalybæus, *Entwicklung der Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel*, p. 302. This work of Chalybæus contains the most intelligible view of German Philosophy that has been published. It was originally delivered as a series of lectures before an intelligent audience in Dresden.

of parts which may be separated from one another. We may say of anything in the world that it may exist, or that it may not; that is, it has no necessary existence. It is essential to the very conception of anything external and material, that it should be susceptible of division into separate parts, which have no necessary nor permanent existence. Hence nature, in its existence (*Daseyn*) does not manifest any freedom; there is nothing that can properly be called freedom in nature; we find indeed necessity and chance in the external world, but no freedom. Nature in itself considered, in its essence, in its idea, is indeed divine; but as it actually exists, it does not correspond with its idea. Since now there are eternal and necessary ideas in nature, and yet nature as it actually exists is ever changing, never fully realizing the ideas which are contained in it, it may be described as an enigma which is never solved, as containing a contradiction for which we have not the explanation. We may indeed admire in it the wisdom of God; but when we look at the matter aright, every mental conception, even the poorest of our imaginations, every sportive and chance mood of mind, every word which is uttered by human lips, does in fact contain more decisive ground of belief in the being of God, than any single object of nature. (And for this reason, because mind in any of its manifestations is higher and nobler than matter; because every word that is uttered by a human voice comes from a free moral agent, but in nature there is no freedom.) And even when man in the use of his freedom, of his power of choice, may go on to commit sin, this very state of sin, since only a free moral agent can come into it, is an infinitely higher one than the regular and orderly course of the stars, or the innocent life which the plants lead. Nature is to be looked upon as a system of successive stages, each one of which proceeds by necessity from the one that went before. But it is not true, as is often stated, that each stage is naturally generated from the one that preceded it, by any power which this previous stage has in and of itself to produce another; but it is generated by the Absolute Idea which passes through one stage to another, and is as it were the basis or soul of nature. All the substances we find in nature in a concrete form are made up of a collection of properties and qualities, which seem to be entirely distinct from one another, and are more or less indifferent to one another. (What inherent connection can be shown to exist between the color and the weight of any object?) And the simple substance or essence, which lies at the basis of these qualities which is the subject to which the properties are attached, seems

also to have no necessary connection with the properties themselves. Any accident or external influence may rob any piece of matter of most of its properties, (may change it from hard to soft, from one color to another, from heavy to light, etc.). Here we see the impotence of nature, as compared with mind or spirit. A spiritual being or substance retains its attributes always, remains true to the statements and definitions we may give respecting it; but it is not so with nature. Its forms and states are ever changing, there is in it no power to determine and shape and keep things in full accordance with the idea that lies at their basis. Genera and species run into one another so that it is hardly possible to define their boundaries.

The Absolute Idea is developed in nature in three forms, which constitute three distinct sciences, the science of Mechanics, the science of Physics, and the science of Organized Bodies. 1. *Mechanics*—this includes space and time, matter and motion. The peculiarity of what belongs to this science is, that all its different parts are distinct from one another, are susceptible of division into infinitely small parts, (e. g. one point of space, or time, or matter is distinct from every other, and space, time, and matter may be considered as infinitely divisible). Another peculiarity of this science is that its objects do not exist in any definite form, there is no unity of form. This unity of form, which exists in nature is, so far as this part of nature is concerned as yet only an ideal, something to be looked for elsewhere than in the science of Mechanics.¹ 2. This unity of form is found in the second part of natural science, viz. in the science of *Physics*. The peculiarity, the defining characteristic of this branch of nature is, that the Absolute Idea is here resolved into single and individual bodies or things. Everything that has a definite form belongs to it, and in this consists its distinction from the previous stage. This science comprises all those material bodies, which have definite properties, and which exist distinct and separate from one another—in short all those things which have an individual existence, all "*individualities*."² These are comprehended under the head of Physics. These individual bodies are arranged in three classes.³ The first class comprises those in which the differences of form have no relation to one another, are independent in respect to each other. These are of three kinds; *a.* the comparatively free physical bodies, the light, the bodies which are opposed to

¹ Conf. Hegel's Encyclopædia, 2d Part, Ed. 1842, § 253.

² Ibid. § 272.

³ Conf. Hegel, *ubi supra*, § 273.

or set over against one another, the sun, the planets, the moon, the comets; *b.* the four elements; *c.* the meteorological processes.¹ The second class comprises those in which the individual bodies are in opposition to one another. Under this head are considered, specific gravity, cohesion, sound and caloric.² The third class comprises those in which the individual body, "*the individuality*" has merged in itself all differences of form. Under this class come shape (as distinguished from mere form), the specific properties of bodies, and the chemical processes. 3. The third class of the natural sciences is that of Organized Bodies. The distinguishing characteristic of this sphere of nature is, that in it, while differences of form really exist, they are yet brought into an organized unity, into a unity corresponding with the idea; the organism controls all the separate parts, they are under an organic law.³ All that is organized is not a mere object, but it is a subject also, having in some degree an existence and life of its own, and assimilating foreign things into harmony with its organic structure. To this sphere belong, Geology, Vegetable Nature and Animal Organization.

3. The third part of philosophy is, the Philosophy of Mind or Spirit. The knowledge of Mind or Spirit is the highest and most difficult part of philosophy. The injunction "*Know thyself*" does not signify merely a knowledge of the particular qualities, character, inclinations and weaknesses of the individual, but it refers to the knowledge of what is really true and abiding in man, of what is true in and of itself, of the essential traits of the spirit.⁴

Spirit, mind, has for us as we are placed in the world, or as our minds are developed in the world, nature for its basis; nature comes before spirit. But when we look at spirit in the most general point of view, we see that that must have come before nature, that spirit was first, and then nature. And when we look at nature in its true character, it will be found that it contains a kind of prophecy or anticipation of something more than what is merely material, that is, of what is spiritual; so that we may say, the truth of nature is spirit. The Absolute Idea though first developed in the form of nature, cannot be content with this, but must

¹ Ibid § 274—289.

² Ibid § 290—307.

³ "Every living being," says Cuvier, "forms a whole, a single and compact system, all the parts of which correspond to one another, and by their reciprocal action contribute to and bear upon the same end. No one of these parts can be changed without a change of the others, and therefore every part taken alone points to and gives all the others."

⁴ Conf. Hegel Enceyl. § 377.

manifest itself also as spirit. Here is its fullest manifestation. Nature is left behind. Spirit shows itself to be the Absolute Idea, existing *for itself*—not as in nature, existing for something else besides itself. Thus man, so far as he is a spiritual being, brings all other things into relation with himself, he considers himself in some sort as the centre of them, he has a certain independent existence of his own, he is conscious that as a spiritual being he exists *for himself*. This could not be said of anything material, or of any brute. There is yet another characteristic of spirit, that in it object and subject become one, are identical. A spirit is both an object and a subject, and in this, too, it differs from anything material. Nature is something merely objective, spirit is subjective as well as objective. In nature, the notion which lies at its basis assumes only an objective form, in spirit it becomes also subjective. Hence the essence of spirit is, that its acts always take the form of freedom. All that is done by spirit is free. Hence it *can* abstract itself from all that is external, from all that affects it in the external world, from all sense of existence in any one point of space or moment of time. Hence, too, every spirit has the consciousness of being an individual, existing for itself, having rights and powers of its own. In consequence of this another distinguishing trait of spirit is, that it must manifest itself. Since spirit must manifest or reveal itself, it follows that the world or nature must be looked upon as constituted and established by spirit, that it is a manifestation of the Absolute Spirit.

The highest and complete definition of the Absolute is, that it is spirit. To find this definition and to understand its meaning has been the tendency of all civilization and of all philosophy. All religion and science have pressed upon this point; the history of the world can be understood only by this pressure. The word and the notion of spirit were early found. The substance of the Christian religion is that it reveals God as a Spirit. The office of philosophy is to seek to understand what spirit is.¹

There are three stages in the development of spirit, first as subjective spirit, then as objective spirit, and lastly as absolute spirit.

I. *Subjective Spirit*; by this is meant spirit considered in itself, in its internal relations and characteristics; what is generally embraced under the head of Mental Philosophy, the faculties and powers and states of the human mind. There are here three distinct branches, Anthropology, the Phenomenology of Mind, and

¹ Hegel Encycl. § 384.

Psychology. A. *Anthropology*; here the soul of man is viewed in its connection with nature, in its first and lowest stages of development. Under this head are considered the relation between body and soul, the qualities which the soul has in consequence of its connection with the world, the different races of mankind, the different periods of life, sensation, the state of dreaming, animal magnetism,¹ the natural feeling of distinct personal existence, and habit, which has been well called a second nature. (§ 410 Encycl.) B. The second manifestation of the subjective spirit is included in what Hegel calls the *Phenomenology of Mind*. Here the whole doctrine of human consciousness is discussed. This differs from the previous stage in that spirit is here considered as existing for itself, reflecting upon itself. This is a higher state than that in which it is connected with the natural world. The mind is viewed in all the different stages of its consciousness. The three stages given are, consciousness, self-consciousness and reason. (Encycl. § 413—439.) C. *Psychology*—investigates the powers, the general modes in which spirit acts as such. (§ 440.) Spirit is here viewed as determining itself in itself. The acts considered are proper spiritual acts. That which is truly spiritual is the subject and the centre of unity of all the powers and faculties. There are three stages of development, which spirit here makes, which give a threefold division of Psychology: they are what Hegel calls the *theoretical*, the *practical*, and the *free spirit*. a. By *theoretical spirit* is meant nearly the same as by the word intellect: it includes man as an intellectual being, as a being who *knows*; it is the reason, which knows itself to be reason. The division generally made, of man's mind into so-called powers or faculties, is a mere act of our own understandings to which nothing perfectly corresponding can be found in the mind itself. The mind is represented too much as a mere aggregate, without any internal union, as a sort of collection of powers bound together like a piece of mechanism or like the bones of the body. The lowest form in which spirit manifests itself is that of *feeling*, a merely subjective state, in which the personal emotion absorbs the whole mind, and one does not discriminate in respect to the true nature of what has caused the emotion. From feeling as the lowest, the powers of the mind ascend in the following order, in-

¹ Hegel, while he does not deny some of the facts of Animal Magnetism, represents them as belonging to the lower powers of man's soul. He has written energetically and sarcastically against the claims of Magnetism to a higher degree and kind of knowledge.

tuition (*Anschauung*), the power by which we bring things in distinct vision before the mind (*Vorstellung*), recollection, imagination, memory, and lastly thought. Thought, that which should really be called such, is not our mere notion of a thing, but is the thing itself in its essential characteristics. It is the identity of the subjective and the objective. Thought is the substance of everything. Whatever is thought truly exists; and whatever exists, really exists only so far as it is thought. Thought is free, and thought is universal.¹ It manifests itself in three forms, as understanding, as judgment, and as reason. So far as thought is free, or what we think about is free, so far there is in it an element of the will. And this leads us to the second part of Psychology which is, *b.* what is called the *practical spirit*, or in other words, the *will*. The definition of will is, that it is free. It is called the practical spirit, because it has reference to the deeds and duties of man as a moral being. It manifests itself first of all in the feeling of moral obligation, of right and of duty. But it is not mere feeling, mere private, subjective emotion. We must also look at the rational grounds of things. It is nothing less than an absurdity to endeavor to exclude thought and intellect, from our morality and our religion. (§ 469). Evil, sin, which is considered under the head of will, is defined as the contrast between what we are and what we should be. Our duties come under the head of will; here are considered our natural impulses, inclinations and passions, in their true moral character and bearings. The last part of Psychology is, *c. the free spirit*. This is the union of the two former parts of psychology, of the theoretical with the practical, of the intelligence with the will. The true idea of freedom came into the world with Christianity. Whole regions of the world, Africa and the East, have never had this idea, and do not now have it. The Greeks and the Romans, Plato and Aristotle and even the Stoics had it not. But in Christianity it exists in its true character, viz.—that man as such is of an *infinite* value, since he is the object and end of the love of God; his highest and absolute relation is to God as a spirit; this spirit takes up its abode in him, and so brings him, to the highest freedom.²

¹ This is one of the positions of the Hegelian philosophy which has met with the most opposition. It assumes that everything can be thought, can be understood; and that what cannot be understood has no real existence. And it comes at last to this—that what a Hegelian understands is true as he understands it; and what he does not understand is not true.

² The whole view given of this part of Hegel's system in the original article

II. *Objective Spirit.* By this is meant that the spirit manifests itself in an outward form, in external relations and organizations. It is not mind in itself considered (as above), but mind in its external manifestations,—it is spirit become objective. It produces a world of its own, in which freedom and necessity are woven together. (Encycl. † 385.) We have seen above that the highest form of the subjective spirit was free will. It is this free will manifesting itself in all the relations of life, which is now to be considered. There are three chief ways in which it shows itself, which respectively compose, A) the system of the rights of man or law, B) the system of subjective or private morality or *morals*, C) the system of public morality which is the union of the other two, the realization of right and law in the world, or *Ethics*. (The English language has no definite terms to express the difference between the German *Moralität* and *Sittlichkeit*; but it may be allowed to make some such distinction between the two words, *morals* and *ethics*). In the science of ethics is exhibited the consummation of the objective spirit. The Absolute Substance, which is the basis of all things, here becomes perfectly free. Its highest manifestation is in what we call the spirit of a people. The full spirit of a people is made up of three elements, family, civil society, and the State. The history of each single State is connected with and runs into the history of the world. The same spirit is here manifested, but in a wider sphere, and is called the spirit of the world, that which is contained in universal history. The spirit of any single people is only one stage in the development of this general spirit of the world; one people can only perform one act in the great drama.

III. *The Absolute Spirit.* This is spirit in its absolute and unlimited manifestations, not restricted by the boundaries of nations or of the world. It is the perfect union between the two preceding stages, between the subjective and objective spirit, as we have before considered them. It is spirit in its absolute truth, where the idea and the reality become one. It is the one universal Substance in a perfectly spiritual form. It is the Absolute Idea known and understood. The three stages of its development are A) Art, B) Revealed Religion, C) Philosophy. Philosophy,

in the *Lexicon* is exceedingly confused. The numbers and divisions are in several cases omitted and in some misplaced. All this is manifest at the first glance by comparing it with Hegel's *Encyclopaedia*. Accordingly here and elsewhere much has been taken from the work of Hegel in order to have the representation as correct as possible.

in the system of Hegel, is the highest state to which the consciousness of man can be brought. It is not merely the union of art and religion, but it is this union elevated to the state of self-conscious thought. The true notion of philosophy is, that it is the Absolute Idea which has become conscious of itself. In nature it exists unconsciously, unthought. In spirit it both exists and is the object of thought. It is the truth which knows itself to be the truth. Philosophy differs from logic in this respect, that logic is made up of abstract conceptions, of universal notions, but existing only as vague and barren generalities. Philosophy has the same ideas, the same universal truths; but in a living form as they have been manifested and revealed in the whole realm of nature, and in all the actual manifestations of spirit. It has the same general truths, but it has tested them and found them to hold good and true in their application to the worlds of matter and of mind. But still both in nature and in spirit only these same universal truths were found, which made up the substance of the logic; and so the whole course of development having been gone through with, we are brought back again to the point from which we started; and the result of philosophy is to bring us back again to the truths of logic. Thus is the circle of science completed; the beginning and the end unite.

The acuteness and iron consistency with which Hegel elaborated into his system all the chief problems of philosophy are worthy of admiration. There has probably never been a system which can be compared with it in comprehensiveness; none which displays so much art and skill in binding together all the separate parts. Many of his transitions from one part to another are made with the greatest skill, but they do not always abide the test of severe examination. Several of his disciples, have changed the order of development in some important particulars, and this is fatal to the claims of his system. (Religious men will find themselves repelled by his depreciation of every form of holding truth excepting the philosophical form. Faith is with him a lower stage of development than philosophy. God as a personal being is lost in the notion of the Universal Substance and the Absolute Idea.) The language of Hegel in exhibiting his views is harsh; the construction of his sentences, as all acknowledge, is hard and not seldom incorrect. He uses many terms in new and unusual significations; and he has been at little pains to define his words. The unintelligibility of his writings has often given occasion to his opponents to cite the pro-

verb, the man that does not think clearly will not write clearly. To this his friends and disciples reply, coldness, hardness and weight are properties of a precious stone.

But while this system endeavored to substantiate its claims to universal reception and authority, by applying its principles and laws to all departments of science ; it was this very application which produced the reaction against it. Its pretensions were not found to be realized. Especially was this the case in the domain of theology. Very few theologians embraced it. Many of those who did so were soon carried far away from the positive doctrines of Christianity. And not only was it found inadequate to solve the great problems of religion, of history and of the human mind ; but there was another circumstance which contributed to stay its course. It called men to severe thought. It sharpened their faculties. It made them more observant of themselves ; it brought forward more distinctly the great subjects of speculation. And so in proportion as these questions were weighed, and as the powers of the mind were sharpened and enlarged, it came to be distinctly felt, that a pantheistic scheme was not only irreconcilable with Christianity, but was unable to satisfy the consciousness of the modern world. The world had outgrown such a system. Much as the Pantheism of Hegel differs from and as a philosophical scheme is superior to the ruder forms of this theory in earlier times ; yet in his whole system there is wanting the appreciation of freedom, sympathy with and understanding of human nature, the personal and ethical elements of modern times. In one word, it is the principle of freedom which is neglected by Hegel, and which will be the means of the overthrow of his system. The philosophical system which shall next succeed must acknowledge that the idea of freedom is at the basis of the existence of the world, that by it all is upheld and carried onward, that the end of religion and of religious culture is to kindle and to feed the flame of true freedom in all minds, that the aim of the State is and must be to make every one of its members a free man, having individuality of character ; that the concrete sciences should be only the organs and instruments of freedom, and that art should be the celebration of its apotheosis. This too is the goal which philosophy is to strive to reach. Everywhere there are intimations of it. With greater or less clearness it is felt and expressed in our whole recent literature, in almost all the works on philosophy, theology and history which are daily issuing from the press. We need only the

watch-word which shall loose the bonds of freedom, and call forth its shape in ever blooming youth.

We have thus endeavored to present an outline of the stadia through which philosophy has passed during the last fifty years. We have seen the part which Schelling had in the formation of its system; and in what way Hegel understood and applied the principle which lay at the basis of Schelling's scheme. We have also stated that the view of nature and of spirit which is contained in this principle is unable to satisfy the wants of present times, and that all which philosophy has hitherto achieved is only the porch to the temple of moral freedom which must yet be erected.

How stands it now with Schelling's reappearance upon the stage, in his new appointment as professor at Berlin? We will first look at the circumstances under which he comes, and then see whether the principles of his present philosophy will be likely to satisfy the demands of the age.

The school of Hegel, whose chief centre was at Berlin, have long been of the opinion that the essential principles of philosophy have been already discovered and elucidated, and that all that remains is to apply them to all other departments of science. They supposed that the foundations of their supremacy over the whole realm of mind had been laid; that their system was destined to rule the world. They had become over-confident in consequence of the favor shown them by the Prussian Ministry of State. Now they see themselves suddenly assailed in the very heart of their own land, by a man whom they believed that they had long since overcome. Their very existence is threatened. The enemy within the walls of the metropolis proclaims, as in a manifesto, the last and great catastrophe of philosophy, by which its fate is to be forever decided. The highest authority in the State now extends to him its sympathy and protection as once it did to Hegel. It needs Hegel's school no longer, its work is done, it is to be set aside, to be cut out like a cancer. Therefore this school is embittered. It fights for life or death. It attacks the State. It fears a reaction, a restitution of principles it imagined to have been long since exploded. The minister of State, von Altenstein, unquestionably made a bold misstep when he gave such encouragement to the school of Hegel. This can only be explained on the supposition that he looked only at the glittering and deceptive side of the scheme, at its strict and apparently most scientific method, by which minds were aroused to self-examination and severe thought; at its pretensions to being a most Chris-

tian philosophy, to elevating Christianity from the sphere of mere notions and opinions into the sphere of what it called the triune idea; at its exhibition of the State, and particularly of the Prussian State, as perfectly conformed to the highest ethical conceptions and to the divine will. According to Hegel's principle "*what is actual is also rational*," whatever is, is reasonable, and the Prussian State being actual, was called the perfection of reason. The great defects of the system were veiled. The government did not see that the fruit of this tree of knowledge was deadly. It was waked up from its deception only when the poison began to penetrate into the organism of the State, when teachers of religion came who had no religion, and who concealed from their congregations their real sentiments; when officers of State were produced who were very well acquainted with Hegel's logic, but wholly unacquainted with State matters and averse to all the details of business; and especially when there came young politicians who applied the new philosophy to the State in a somewhat different fashion, who said "that whatever was actual was also reasonable," and if a republic should only actually exist, it would of course be reasonable. And in fact in Hegel's scheme the monarch in a constitutional State is nothing more than the dot over the letter *i*: and the young liberals thought that the dot might as well be left out, &c. Hegel had clothed his ideas in a hard and abstruse form so that few could follow him. He was not unaware of the revolutionary tendencies of his system; but he had reverence for positive institutions. He would not rob men of everything. But some of the logical results of his system became apparent when the "*German Annals*" (*Deutsche Jahrbücher*) at Halle became the organ of some of the perverse and enthusiastic disciples of this school, in which they spoke out without reserve all that they had in their hearts. They did not conceal their design of undermining all that at present was established, so that a *young and new Germany* might be formed on the ruins. L. Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer were the boldest in avowing this tendency in religious matters. They proclaimed open war against Christianity and religion. "Christianity is to *them* only a figure of speech. Religion is contrary to the true nature of man; its mother is the night. The existence of God is a chimera." Societies were formed which repudiated Christianity and religion. Emancipated humanity was to find its joys in sensual lust; it was no longer to be frightened by the ghost of a government or by the dark future. All this reminds us of a declaration of Count Mira-

beau: "Nothing has been done for the revolution, so long as France is not unchristianized." Theology was transformed into Anthropology. The Universities were attacked, for here authority still prevailed. The Prussian government was spared so long as it remained a quiet spectator. But as soon as it began to oppose their revolutionary and blasphemous sentiments, their weapons were turned against it. They accused it of suppressing freedom of mind, of love for a dead orthodoxy, of pietism, of despotism. And in all these accusations Schelling has freely shared, because he was avowedly called to Berlin as the opponent of the Hegelian scheme, which had borne such bitter fruits. (It ought in justice to be stated that it is only a small faction of the Hegelian school which has run to these extremes;¹ and that Hegel himself never would have countenanced them. Whether his system logically leads to these results is a different question. Some of his most logical followers deny that it does. There are conservatives both in church and State who are also Hegelians.)

According to the specimens we have hitherto had, it is the intention of Schelling, in what he now calls the *Positive Philosophy*, not only to give a Philosophy of Revelation, of the Trinity, of the Fall and of Redemption, but also a Somatology and a doctrine of Aeons in the way of the Gnostics, and that too without giving up his system of Absolute Identity and his Natural Philosophy. He intends then not merely to unite what is incompatible, realize what has been held to be impossible, but to carry back philosophy far behind the Reformation to the fantastic doctrines of the Gnostics and the dark labyrinth of scholastic dialectics. In the metropolis of German philosophy the fate of German philosophy is to be decided, and by *him*. It is not then a mere question of the position of philosophy in respect to the Prussian State, but it embraces matters that concern the whole German fatherland, the destiny of philosophy itself, for which there is no legislative metropolis, since often according to the testimony of history great things have proceeded from small cities. In this point of view the opposition which has been raised against Schelling from various quarters is a cheering sign. It has indeed chiefly proceeded from the school of Hegel, and this party seems to know no alternative than, Schelling or Hegel; as though where Schelling is wrong, Hegel must be right, and no third term were conceivable.

Are the principles of Schelling's present system adapted to

¹ Vide *Bibl. Sacra* and *Theol. Rev.* Vol. I. pp. 211, 212.

satisfy the demands of the age? His very first lecture in Berlin, in spite of the great promises which it made, sufficiently told us what was to be expected from the new science which was "to carry human consciousness beyond its present boundaries." No one who was well acquainted with the previous progress of philosophy, could for a moment cherish the hope that Schelling was fitted to realize the promises he so profusely made. To do this he must have been born anew, and gone through a new culture, and then he would not have clung so tenaciously to the discoveries of his youth. He adheres to these. Upon his pair of scales he makes again the division into positive and negative philosophy. Of the latter, the negative philosophy, he has already given the outlines in the noted preface to the German translation of Cousin's *Philosophical Fragments*. In this preface he broke the silence of many years, and spoke with contempt of Hegel's system and pretensions. Commenting upon the mode in which Hegel declares that he has gone beyond and annulled the theory of Spinoza, Schelling says that he had long since done the same. Spinoza maintains, he asserts, that all things proceed from the nature of the Absolute Substance (this Absolute Substance is that which it is absolutely impossible not to think of,¹) with a necessity as inevitable, as from the nature of the triangle it follows that its angles are together equal to two right-angles. We see here that he does not yet understand the real principle of movement in the system of Spinoza, on which account he had before compared it with the statue of Pygmalion which became living only when the fire of love quickened it. His own philosophy, he adds, "in its infinite subject-object includes a principle of necessary progress or movement. And it proceeds thus. The Absolute Subject from the necessity of its nature becomes Object, but from every objective state it issues victorious and returns back again into a higher state, or (using the word in its mathematical sense) a higher power of subjectivity, until after exhausting its whole possibility of becoming objective, it remains the Infinite Subject, victorious over all. This Subject which at last remains is wholly different from

¹ The phraseology of Schelling in respect to this is peculiar. The Absolute Substance is "das nicht Nicht-zu-denkende," literally, is that which "*cannot not-be-thought*," which we are absolutely obliged to think of, if we think at all. That is, there is something which is the ground of all our special thoughts, without which all our notions and ideas have no basis or connection, which is absolutely essential to thinking. If one should try not to think, he would still think of this—it cannot not-be-thought,

the first merely intellectual Subject, since it has ascended from every state of objectivity, to a higher an intenser subjectivity, and at the same time has drawn into itself, has made its own all that actually exists." Here is the one arm of the lever, and it forms his negative philosophy. The other arm, the positive philosophy, that is, the construction of history according to his views, is to go through a similar process of the same elements or powers, only in another sense. The outlines of this positive philosophy we already have in the published works of Schelling, especially in his System of Transcendental Idealism, his Lectures upon Academic Studies, his work on Philosophy and Religion, and in the essay upon Human Freedom, to which his book against Jacobi, the "Denkmal," may be taken as a supplement. We think then that we are warranted in saying that Schelling has not only not given a new science which transcends all previous systems and "the present bounds of human thought," but that he has not even gone beyond the position of his earlier system.

The utmost which he could, in such a conjuncture, be expected to accomplish was to have given a logical exhibition of his own philosophy. But apart from the consideration, that he does not possess the logical culture and the philosophical calmness which such a task would have demanded, he would have been obliged in order to accomplish this object to go through with that re-casting of his whole scheme, which Hegel had already effected, and to have conceded the merits and consistency of the Hegelian system. For the latter is only the philosophy of Schelling and Spinoza carried out to its logical results; it is the elaboration and development of all that lay concealed in the fundamental principle of this school. It has done more than this; by carrying the principle to its last results it has at the same time laid the foundation for its overthrow. It has given us the principle in a double shape, in its abstract form in the system of logic, and in its concrete form in its application to all the other departments of science. Its inadequacy to solve the problems which the other sciences present gives us the assurance that it must be superseded by another and better system.

Schelling, then, with his new discoveries has at any rate come *post festum*: for the progress of the human mind has already carried it beyond the boundaries of the principle which he looks upon as essential, and as the means of enlarging the domain of thought. In his new researches and studies he may have attained to a broader and deeper insight into the principles

of his own philosophy ; those who were educated in the times in which he first came upon the stage, when his renown was in its fullest bloom ; and those who are still to be made acquainted with the speculative questions and problems which have been agitated during the last fifty years, may find some enjoyment and satisfaction in the new theories of Schelling. But the problems of the present age cannot be solved, the interest of present times cannot be permanently attracted, by the new shape in which his system is to appear. Yet even for the present age his reëappearance upon the stage will not be fruitless ; for the history of the past teaches us what the future demands, what the present ought to accomplish. Our gaze must be directed to the guidance of the unseen hand in history, if we would find the path and the means of our future spiritual progress. The history of the last fifty years—and Schelling's reëappearance will again turn our attention to them—contains the materials out of which the present age is to construct its peculiar system of philosophy. Kant laid the corner-stone, his successors have brought together the quarried blocks of marble. Hail to the men of German science who shall rear the temple of Freedom !

ARTICLE IV.

THE NATURE OF OUR LORD'S RESURRECTION-BODY.

By E. Robinson, Prof. in Union Theol. Seminary, New York.

THE inquiry respecting the nature of our Lord's resurrection-body has at the present day an interest, not only in itself considered, but also from its near relation to several other questions just now before the public mind. The raising up of Jesus is every where spoken of as the "first fruits" of the resurrection from the dead,—as the earnest and pledge and pattern of the future resurrection of the saints.¹ If then we can ascertain the character and circumstances of this great fact in our Lord's history, it may be expected to afford us some aid in obtaining a more clear and defi-

¹ 1 Cor. 15: 12—23. Col. 1: 18.—Rom. 6: 5, 8. 1 Cor. 6: 14. 2 Cor. 4: 14. Phil. 3: 10, 11. 1 Pet. 1: 21.

nite apprehension of the great Scripture doctrine of the general resurrection of the dead.

The inquiry before us as to the nature of the body in which our Lord rose, is very closely connected with the history of his resurrection itself. The answer to our inquiry must depend entirely upon the interpretation we give to those passages of Scripture, which narrate the circumstances under which our Lord rose, was seen for forty days, and then ascended to heaven. The witnesses to these great facts in the history of Jesus, witnesses ordained of God, were his apostles and disciples. Their testimony has been made sure unto us; having been recorded by the pen of inspiration in the sacred books of the New Testament; and being confirmed to us also by the institution and continued existence of the Christian church, which is built upon these same "apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone."¹ It is, however, only to this recorded testimony, that we can appeal for all our knowledge of the manner of our Lord's resurrection and its attendant circumstances. It is only to this testimony,—to the views and opinions and feelings of the apostles and disciples, as made known to us in this record,—that we can go for an answer to the question before us. Neither fanciful speculation nor philosophical theory can here have any place. The simple inquiry is, and can be only, What do the Scriptures teach us as to the views and belief of the apostles and disciples, those witnesses chosen before of God, respecting our Lord's body, as he showed himself to them during forty days after his resurrection?

On this subject three different opinions have prevailed more or less at various times in the church. Some have held that the body of Christ was changed at the resurrection as to its *substance*; so that it was in its *substance* a different and spiritual body. Others have regarded the Lord as having had after the resurrection the *same* body as before, but glorified; or, as the earlier writers express it, changed as to its *qualities* and attributes. The third and larger class have supposed, that the body with which Christ rose from the dead, was the same natural body of flesh and blood, which had been taken down from the cross and laid in the sepulchre.

I. The first of these opinions is near akin to the ancient heresy of the *Docetæ* or Phantasiasts; who held that our Lord's whole life and all his actions, before as well as after his resurrection,

¹ Eph. 2: 18.

were a mere *δῶσις* or phantasm, destitute of all reality. Some of the fathers, who rejected this general view, and held fast to the idea of our Lord's human nature and human body before his crucifixion, were disposed nevertheless to regard him at and after the resurrection as clothed in a body of a subtile and etherial nature, not having any relation to human flesh and blood or to his former body. In support of this view names are found of no less weight than Origen,¹ Clement of Alexandria, and Chrysostom.² In a similar manner Theodoret, and afterwards Ammonius in the fifth century, and Anastasius of Sinai in the sixth, affirm, that Christ ate before his disciples, not because he needed food, but in order to persuade them of the reality and truth of his resurrection; and they appeal for proof to his passing through closed doors, to the manner of his sudden appearance and disappearance, and the like.³ All this, however, may perhaps imply nothing more than the second view treated of below.—The same view is understood to prevail in the Romish church; apparently in such a form as to be akin to the doctrine of transubstantiation.—This whole representation is and can be nothing more nor less than fanciful speculation, an airy nothing. It has not in itself the weight of a feather; and stands in direct contradiction to our Lord's declaration to his disciples, "A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have."⁴

II. The second view requires more consideration, as having been held to a certain extent in all ages of the church, and with some modifications, even at the present day. It ascribes to Christ the *same* body after the resurrection as before, but *glorified*, endued with new qualities and attributes, and no longer subject to the laws of human flesh and blood.⁵ This is the *σῶμα τῆς δόξης* of some among the early Fathers, which they held to be the same in its *substance* as before, but describe it in various places as *ἀθάνατον, ἄφθαρτον, ἀδιάφθορον, αἰώνιον, immortale, impassibile, incorruptibile*. So, in the third century, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Cyp-

¹ ORIGEN, c. Cels. II. 62, ἦν μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν αὐτοῦ, ὥς περ εἰ ἐν μεθορίῳ ἐνὶ τῆς παχύτητος τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ πάθους σώματος καὶ τοῦ γυνήν τοιοῦτον σώματος φαίνεσθαι ψυχὴν.

² CHRYSOST. ad Joh. 21: 10, ἐφαίνετο γὰρ ἄλλη μορφή, ἄλλη φωνή, ἄλλω σχήματι, ἐπέστη πολλοῖς τοῖς ἀποστόλοις καὶ οὐκ ἔγνωρζετο.

³ See DOEDERUS *Dissertat. Theol. de Jesu in Vivam reditu*, p. 137.

⁴ Luke 24: 39.

⁵ Theophylact. ad Joh. 20, σῶμα ἄφθαρτον καὶ θεοῦδότατον καὶ μηκέτι σαρκίνοιοι νόμοις ὑποκείμενον.

rian; the former of whom speaks of Christ's body as "made incorruptible after the resurrection."¹ So too Hilary of Poitiers in the fourth century; Augustine² and Leo the Great in the fifth; and Gregory the Great in the sixth.³ In like manner many of the scholastic writers of the middle ages held to the like view; as did also the earlier Lutheran divines, who, in maintaining the ubiquity of Christ, describe the body of the risen Lord as *gloriosum, idem numero et substantia, sed novis qualitatibus vestitum, sc. impassibilitate, invisibilitate, et illocalitate*.⁴ Similar at the present day apparently is the view of Hahn,⁵ Olshausen,⁶ Hengstenberg,⁷ and others; except that they regard the process of transformation in the Lord's body from human flesh and blood into the glorified state, as having been gradual; commencing at the resurrection and going on by degrees through the forty days, until it was completed in the ascension. The language of some on this subject, as of Hahn, is very indefinite; while that of others, as Olshausen and Hengstenberg, is decided and emphatic.

¹ Haer. 5. 12. 13, *μετὰ τὴν ἀνδρασιον ἀφθαρτοῦ*.

² Augustine's language sometimes seems to favor the third view: e. g. de Agone Christ. 24 or 26. Opp. T. VI. ed. Venet. p. 256, "Nec eos audiamus, qui negant tale corpus Domini resurrexisse, quale positum est in monumento. Si enim tale non fuisset, non ipse dixisset post resurrectionem discipulis, *Palpate et videte, quoniam spiritus ossa et carnem non habet, sicut me videtis habere*. Sacilegam est enim credere Dominum nostrum, cum ipse sit Veritas, in aliquo fuisse mentitum. Nec nos moveat quod clausis ostiis subito eum apparuisse discipulis scriptum est, ut propterea negemus illud fuisse corpus humanum, quia contra naturam hujus corporis videmus esse per clausa ostia intrare, omnia enim possibilia sunt Deo." He then adduces Christ's walking upon the water and his Transfiguration as similar miracles during his lifetime.—But in many other passages, Augustine speaks of our Lord's risen body as exempt from the natural laws of the proper human body. Thus where he is describing the bodies of the saints after the resurrection; de Civitat. Dei XII. 22, Opp. T. VII. ed. Venet. p. 342, "Certe fides Christiana de ipso Salvatore non dubitat, quod etiam post resurrectionem, jam quidem in spirituali carne, sed tamen vera, cibum ac potum cum discipulis sumsit. Non enim potestas, sed egestas edendi ac bibendi talibus corporibus auferatur." This last distinction would seem to have been a favourite one with Augustine, as it occurs several times in his writings.

³ GREGOR. M. Hom. 26 in Evv. "Palpandam carnem Dominus praebuilt, quam clausis januis introduxit. Quae in re duo mira et juxta humanam rationem valde sibi contraria ostendit, dum post resurrectionem suam corpus suum et incorruptibile et tamen palpabile demonstravit."

⁴ See Doodes l. c. p. 138 sq.

⁵ Lehrb. der chr. Glaubens. p. 440.

⁶ Commentar, Bd. II. p. 548. 3te Aug.

⁷ Evangel. Kirchenzeitung, 1841, No. 66, col. 514.

This general view seems not to differ essentially from the preceding one, except in the single point of identity. In both, our Lord's resurrection-body is regarded as possessing like qualities and attributes; but in the former these are connected with a different substance, while in this they are superinduced upon the same substance. That is to say, in the second view our Lord's resurrection-body has a relation to his former human body; while according to the first view it has no such relation. Thus far, unquestionably, the second view is much more in accordance with the testimony of Scripture. But, like the other, it would seem to be founded upon inferences drawn from one class of events and circumstances, without a due consideration of other circumstances and declarations still more clear and express. For example; because Luke relates that, in the Saviour's interview with the disciples going to Emmaus, their eyes were holden so that they should not know him, and he at last vanished out of their sight; and because too Christ is said to have stood in the midst of the disciples the same evening, the doors being shut; it is argued that his body could no longer be identically the same as that in which he was crucified; since it was no longer subject to the same natural laws. But here the fact is overlooked, that our Lord himself directs his disciples to "handle" him and see for themselves that he has still his own human "flesh and bones;" and submits also to the still stronger and more convincing test demanded by Thomas, in order to prove to him and them that what they thus saw and felt was still the very body which had been crucified and laid in the sepulchre. And further, if, in the view of the disciples, the risen body of our Lord could truly of its own nature thus pass through solid doors in spite of bolts and bars, to what end were all the magnificent accessories of the resurrection-hour? Why the earthquake, and the angel descending from heaven to *roll away the stone*? According to this view, the stone could have presented no greater obstacle, than a closed door; and it is difficult to perceive, why the one should have been supernaturally removed more than the other. In respect to the doors, we shall see further on, that the language of John does not, in itself considered, necessarily imply any miraculous interposition.

It is also further argued, that we are forced of necessity to regard the body of the risen Lord as already glorified, in order to find in his resurrection that significance and importance everywhere ascribed to it by the apostles. This argument, however,

as it seems to me, is drawn from a partial apprehension of this great subject. We must return to it in the sequel, and discuss it, as well as some other arguments, more fully, in the form of objections to the remaining view respecting our Lord's resurrection-body.

In respect to the idea of a gradual process of glorification going on in our Lord's risen body for forty days, it is enough perhaps to say, that there exists not the slightest warrant for it in any part of the Scriptures,—not the slightest hint, which, logically or philologically, can be wrested to sustain such a position. It is an airy hypothesis, without foundations, without necessity, without utility; and as unsound in its philosophy, as it is without analogy in the providence and Word of God. It asserts of the body of our Lord, just what our Lord himself took pains to contradict; and what assuredly it never afterwards entered into the hearts of his disciples and apostles to conceive.¹

III. The third view, to which we now turn, regards the body with which Christ rose as being the same natural body of flesh and blood which had been taken down from the cross, and laid in the sepulchre. So taught in the fourth century Ephraem Syrus, Gregory of Nyssa, and Epiphanius;² in the fifth, Cyril of Alexandria,³ Jerome, and others. Jerome is particularly full upon this point; and returns to it in various places.⁴ In modern times, the same view has been strenuously maintained by Calvin⁵ and

¹ How Hengstenberg can affirm, as he does in his usual positive manner, that the reply of our Lord to Mary Magdalene, John 20: 17, contains "the certain proof" (den sichern Beweis) of this view, is more than I can explain. Ev. K. Z. 1841. No. 66. col. 522.

² Epiphanius taught that our Lord's resurrection comprehended ὅλον τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ σὺν τῇ ἐνανθρωπήσει α. τ. λ. Haer. 29.

³ Cyril of Alex. affirmed that Christ as risen was not ὡς πάλιν σῶμα, and denied that his body was πνευματικόν, τοῦτ' ὅτι λεπτομερές τε καὶ ἀσπράδες καὶ ἑρπύων τι παρὰ τὴν σάρκα. ad Joh. 20.

⁴ Hieron. Ep. XXXVIII. ad Pammach. Opp. ed. Martiarray, Tom. IV. ii. 323, "Quo modo veras manus et verum ostendit latus; ita vere comedit cum discipulis; vere ambulavit cum Cleopha; vere lingua loquutus est cum hominibus; vero accubitu discubuit in coena; veris manibus accepit panem, benedixit ac fregit et porrigebat illis. Quod autem ab oculis repente evanuit, virtus Dei est, non umbræ et phantasmatis." See also ib. col. 685; also Index art. *Christus*, last paragraph.

⁵ Calvin, Comment. in Harmon. Evang. ed. Amst. p. 334, in Luc. 24: 39, "Ac si diceret, Visus et tactus probabunt me esse verum hominem qui antehac vobiscum versatus sum; quia carne illa sum indutus quæ crucifixa fuit, et adhuc notas gestat." Also Comm. in Joh. 20: 19, 20. p. 177.

his followers; and more recently has been adopted among the Lutherans by Herder,¹ Neander,² Lücke,³ Tholuck,⁴ and many others.

Olshausen, who adopts the second view treated of above, remarks with not a little *naïveté*, that the view now under consideration "would never have been able to maintain itself for a moment, did not the testimony respecting the appearances of the risen Saviour seem to speak for its correctness."⁵ I cannot but think that this remark concedes the whole matter in question; for, as we have already seen, it is the *testimony* of the sacred writers alone, which can afford us any light. It is not our own experience, it is not science, that can make known to us the nature of our Lord's resurrection-body. It is only the testimony of those who were appointed to be witnesses of his resurrection, to which we can appeal and on which we can rely. What then was the experience of these chosen witnesses? what the impression made upon their minds? and what their testimony?

As these are points on which the whole inquiry turns, I shall be pardoned for presenting the several heads of evidence somewhat in detail.

1. Our Lord, towards the close of his ministry, had at various times foretold his sufferings and death to his disciples; and had declared to them, that he should rise again on the third day.⁶ The same rumour was bruited among the Jews; and led to the setting of a watch at the sepulchre.⁷ The disciples, indeed, understood not this at the time; nor fully, until after the resurrection. But so far as they did or could understand their Lord's declaration, at the time or afterwards, it could only be of the resurrection of the same identical human body that was laid in the sepulchre; just as they had seen Jesus, by the word of his power, call forth the young man at Nain from his bier, and Lazarus from his tomb. These examples were their only standard of comparison. And if on one occasion, as they first beheld Jesus after his resurrec-

¹ "Daher es wundersam und fast unbegreiflich ist, wie die spätere Zeit diese körperliche leibhafte Person, die sich handgreiflich als denselben Jesus von Nazaret zeigte, zu einem geistigen Phantasma habe machen wollen und machen dürfen." Von der Auferstehung u. s. w. III. 8. VI. 10.

² Leben Jesu, p. 710. 3te Ausg.

³ Commentar über Johannes, II. p. 683, 2te Ausg.

⁴ Commentar über Joh. 20: 19.

⁵ Commentar II. p. 549. 3te Ausg.

⁶ Matt. 16: 21. 17: 23. 20: 19. Mark 8: 31. 10: 34. Luke 9: 22. 18: 33. 24: 6, 7.

⁷ Matt. 27: 63.

tion they thought it was a "spirit;" this arose, not from doubt as to the nature of his risen body, but from doubt whether he, or at least his body, was risen at all.

2. The whole history of the descent of the angel and the rolling away of the stone from the door of the sepulchre, presupposes the fact, that the body which thus issued forth was the very same which three days before had been laid in the tomb. So the women understood it, when, after inquiring who should remove the stone, they came and saw that it was taken away, (and entering in found not the body of Jesus). So the angels understood it, when they declared to the women: "He is risen; he is not here; behold the place where they laid him."¹ So Peter and John understood it, when they ran to the sepulchre, and found the body gone and the linen clothes and the napkin lying orderly in their place. Then it was that John "believed." He began to remember the declaration of Jesus, that he should rise again on the third day; and he believed that he was now thus risen in the same body; which body had in this way disappeared from the tomb, and not by theft or violence.

3. After the women were departed from the sepulchre to tell the disciples, Jesus met them; and they came and *held him by the feet*, (*ἐπαύτησαν αὐτοῦ τοὺς πόδας*).² They could have no doubt that the limbs, the body, which they thus touched and embraced, were the very same in which three days before they had seen and known the Lord.

4. When Mary Magdalene first recognized her risen Lord, she passed at once from the extreme of doubt and despair, to that of joy and triumphant faith; she beheld in him not merely her Saviour risen from the tomb, but her already glorified Redeemer, and as such hastened to do him homage and worship.³ This worship and this mode of apprehension Jesus rejected and re-proved, saying unto her, "Touch me not, for I am not yet ascended to my Father."⁴ By thus rejecting the idea of being already in a glorified state, he impliedly affirms the contrary; that is to say, that his body was still flesh and blood, as before.

5. The two disciples on their way to Emmaus, had no other impression as to the person who walked and talked with them, than that it was a human being of flesh and bones like all mankind. Their eyes indeed were holden, that they should not know

¹ Mark 16: 6.

² Matt. 28: 9.

³ See the preceding number of this work, p. 176.

⁴ John 20: 17. See the remarks on this passage No. V. p. 175 seq.

him; and were afterwards opened, so that they knew him; but all this implies a change in their own minds and powers, not in the body of Christ. And if we admit, as the language seems most naturally to imply, that a miraculous agency was exerted in the manner of his leaving them; still this no more evinces a previous change in the nature of his body, than does the analogous miracle of his walking upon the waters of the lake of Galilee.

6. We come now to the first appearance of Jesus to his assembled disciples on the evening after his resurrection; "the doors being shut," as John relates. I have elsewhere assigned the reasons, why, as it seems to me, we are not necessarily compelled by this language to consider the Lord's entrance as involving anything supernatural.¹ That the doors were "shut," does not itself imply that they were fastened; nor is the circumstance mentioned at all by Luke or Mark. The word which expresses our Lord's presence, is not *ἰνέσθη*, the usual one in the case of angels; but in Luke it is *ἴστη* "he stood," and in John still more definitely, *ἦλθε καὶ ἴστη*, "he came and stood;" indicating nothing more than an ordinary mode of approach.—If, however, with Calvin and others, we choose to regard his entrance as a miracle; still nothing more is required than in the similar instance of Peter's deliverance out of prison, where "the iron gate opened of his own accord."² There is not in the language the slightest foundation for the idea, that Jesus entered through the closed doors or solid walls; or that his approach was like that ascribed to angels, and not like that of an ordinary human being.³

On the other hand, the disciples were surprised and astonished by the *unexpectedness* of their Lord's presence among them. They had seen him crucified and laid him in the sepulchre; they had missed his body from the tomb, and had heard the reports of the women that he was risen; but these they had looked upon as "idle tales." And now, when Jesus presented himself before their own eyes, "they were terrified and affrighted, and supposed they had seen a spirit."⁴ They believed not that it was their Lord thus risen from the dead; but thought it was a spirit, a phantasm, to delude them. What course did Jesus take to reäis-

¹ See above, No. V. p. 183.

² Acts 12: 10.

³ The language of Calvin on this point is very strong: "Sic habendum est, Christum non sine miraculo ingressum esse.—Interca tamen verum esse minime concedo quod asserunt Papistae, Christi corpus penetrasse per januas clausas.—Facessant pueriles, istas argutias, quae nihil prorsus habent solidi, et secum trahunt multa deliria." Comm. in Joh. 20: 19. p. 177, ed. Amstel.

⁴ Luke 24: 37.

sure them? "Behold," he says, "my hands and my feet, that it is I myself; handle me, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have. And when he had thus spoken, he showed them his hands and his feet."¹ Here are two things asserted by our Lord, which he obviously intended his disciples should believe; *first*, that what they then saw, was not a spirit or phantasm; but, *secondly*, that it was his own very self, the same identical body of flesh and bones which they had before known. On what evidence did he assert this? He appealed to the testimony of their own senses: "Handle me and see;" and showed them his hands and his feet, which the nail-prints attested to be the same that had hung upon the cross. The position, therefore, which we here take, is impregnable, viz. that by this language and this exhibition it was our Lord's deliberate purpose, to persuade his disciples that he himself was before them in the same identical body which had been crucified and laid in the sepulchre.

Still they were not fully assured. "And while they yet believed not for joy," he called for food; "and he took, and did eat before them."² Here was another act belonging to the nature of the human body; but inconsistent with the idea of a spirit and of a glorified body. Our Lord thus ate before the disciples, in order to remove the last remaining shadow of doubt, that it was he himself in the same human body.—The attempt is sometimes made, to evade the force of this latter evidence, in two ways. Olshausen remarks, that "eating and drinking is here spoken of not as a matter of necessity; since the Saviour's only object was to convince those present of the reality of his body."³ I am unable to see, why this is not first to beg the question, and then to admit the validity of the opposing evidence. Again, it is said that the angels who appeared to Abraham (Gen. c. 18) ate and drank; and yet we can conceive of them only as without corporeal substance, as mere appearances presented to the eye.⁴ But the sacred narrative fully implies, that they came to Abraham as wayfarers; that he ran to meet them and brought water to wash their soiled feet; that he prepared a meal and stood by while they ate according to the forms of oriental hospitality. The men rose up and went on their way on foot towards Sodom; and Abraham went with them. Further, the angels who came to Lot at even-

¹ Luke 24: 39, 40.

² Luke 24: 41—43.

³ Comm. II. p. 550, 3te Aug. See also above p. 295.

⁴ Erscheinungsform; Olshausen, *ibid*.

ing, appear to have been two of the same; they ate and drank and lodged with him; and when Lot was pressed by the crowd without, they put forth their hands and pulled him into the house to them, and shut the door. All these circumstances show conclusively, that in this case the angels manifested themselves in real human forms of flesh and blood; and therefore eating and drinking were natural functions, just as in the case of our Lord. In both cases the exercise of this function proves the nature of the body; nor can we by any good logic first assume the superhuman nature of the body, and then reason as to the fallacy of the function.

7. The other disciples were convinced of the reality of the Lord's resurrection-body at their first interview with him. But Thomas was not present. He disbelieved their testimony, and demanded for himself a test, without which he refused to be convinced: "Except I shall see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe."¹ This was obviously meant to be the strongest possible test as to the reality and identity of the Saviour's human body. It was intended to decide the question, whether he *was* actually risen from the dead, and in the same body of flesh and blood which had been crucified. Our Lord accords to Thomas this his own test, and in the moment of strong conviction and devoted faith, the abashed disciple exclaims: "My Lord and my God!"

8. On the shores of the lake of Galilee, where the Lord again showed himself to his disciples, he took bread and gave to them, and himself obviously partook with them.² Here was further convincing proof of the reality of his human body.

9. The apostle Peter, while discoursing in the house of Cornelius, affirms that God raised up Jesus of Nazareth the third day, "and showed him openly, not to all the people, but unto witnesses chosen before of God, even to us, who did eat and drink with him after he rose from the dead."³ Here the "eating and drinking" are presented as evidence of the reality of the resurrection of our Lord's human body; and they afford indeed the same evidence as in the parallel case of Lazarus, John 12: 2.

10. The disciples, like many other Jews, had expected that the Messiah would appear as a temporal Prince and Deliverer; and especially they had hoped that he would set the nation free

¹ John 20: 25 sq.

² John 21: 12, 13, 15.

³ Acts 10: 41.

from the yoke of Roman bondage. Thus the two on their way to Emmaus declare: "We trusted that it had been he which should have redeemed Israel."¹ And again, just before the ascension, the assembled disciples inquire, "Lord, wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel?"² Must we not consider this language as implying, that they regarded their Lord as possessing after his resurrection the same character and the same body, as before?

11. An argument to the same effect may perhaps be derived from the following considerations. Our Lord was transfigured in the mount before Peter and James and John; they were "eye witnesses of his majesty;" and Moses and Elias in glorified forms appeared talking with him. Jesus charged them to tell no man of this vision, until after he should be risen from the dead.³ Now it is natural to suppose, if our Lord's resurrection-body bore any resemblance to that of his transfiguration, that either Peter or John when speaking of the former would have made some allusion to this remarkable event which took place before their own eyes. To a certain extent their silence in itself might be regarded as implying that no such resemblance could have existed. Here, however, taken thus in connection with all the other evidence, this implication is very greatly strengthened, and adds weight to the other considerations.

Such are the main points of evidence presented in the Scriptures respecting the nature of our Lord's resurrection-body. They seem to me to establish convincingly, and beyond gainsaying, two conclusions; *first*, that the disciples believed the body of their Lord after his resurrection to be the same identical body of human flesh and bones, which they had seen crucified and laid in the sepulchre; and *secondly*, that our Lord himself took special pains to impress this very belief upon their minds. Indeed, few facts or doctrines of the Gospel would seem to lie spread out more clearly upon pages of Holy Writ; or to be sustained by a greater amount of direct and positive testimony.

We may even go further and affirm, that we have here just as much and as strong evidence of the reality of our Lord's human body during these forty days after his resurrection, as we have during any other forty days of his whole life. Yea, more and stronger testimony; because our Lord himself here took special pains to bring forward and enforce this evidence; of which there is elsewhere no like example. And if, even supposing a miracle in

¹ Luke 24: 21.² Acts 1: 6.³ Matt. 17: 2 sq. etc. 2 Peter 1: 16.

both his departure at Emmaus and his entrance among his disciples at Jerusalem, it be averred that this goes to disprove the reality of his human body after his resurrection ; then, much more do his walking upon the waters and his transfiguration on the mount, go to disprove the reality of his incarnation at any and every previous period of his life on earth.

To this general view it has sometimes been objected, that the same is inconsistent with the idea of our Lord's ascension ; inasmuch as it is contrary to the laws of nature to suppose that a human body could thus be taken up into heaven.¹ Hence it is inferred, that since he can have ascended only in a glorified body, he therefore must have risen from the tomb in the same glorified body. But we have the strongest evidence, as above presented, that our Lord, so long as he was on earth, was in his human body ; and the evidence is equally strong that he now dwells in heaven in a glorified body.² When did the change take place ? The Scriptures indeed contain no express declaration upon this point ; but they afford some analogies by which the inquiry may be satisfactorily answered. Elijah while on earth was in a mere human body ; he was translated to heaven, and there exists, as is supposed, in a glorified body.³ Christians here on earth are subject to all the evils of their earthly tabernacle ; yet those alive at our Lord's coming shall not die, but their vile body shall be changed, that it may be fashioned like unto Christ's glorious body.⁴ When are we to regard these changes as taking place ? Paul answers this question in respect to Christians : " We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump ; for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible ; and we shall be changed ;" and this is to take place when the dead being raised, we " shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air ; and so shall we ever be with the Lord."⁵ Here then the change takes place in the bodies of those Christians at the moment of their ascension ; and such was doubtless the case in respect to Elijah. With these facts then, we may return to the case of our Lord ; and on the ground of these strong analogies infer, not only the possibility, but also the more than probability, that his body assumed its glorified form in the act of his ascension.

¹ See Seiler's Programm in Velthusen Commentt. Theol. VI. p. 513.

² Phil. 3: 21. Col. 3: 4. ³ 2 Kings 1: 11. Matt. 17: 2 sq.

⁴ Phil. 3: 21. ⁵ 1 Cor. 15: 51 sq. comp. 1 Thess. 4: 15—17.

Another more imposing objection to the view now under consideration has already been touched upon, and referred to this place.¹ It is said, that we are compelled to regard the body of the risen Lord as already glorified, in order to find in his resurrection that significance and importance everywhere ascribed to it in the New Testament. If Jesus rose again in his mere human body, it is asked, how did his resurrection differ from that of Lazarus? and how could it be everywhere represented as his final triumph over death and the grave, and as the foundation of our faith and hope? Rather it is said, should then the *ascension* be regarded as this triumph and the foundation of our faith; and yet the apostles never speak of this except as a consequence of the resurrection, which is to them the one great and momentous fact.²

In replying to this objection, it might be sufficient to remark, that, so far as it presents any difficulty, it bears the character of a speculative conclusion set over against the clear and express testimony of those who were appointed to be eye-witnesses of the facts. The true method in such cases is, first to make ourselves acquainted with the facts; and then, if difficulties arise in our minds, to find such explanations of the facts as may, if possible, obviate these difficulties. Speculation must yield before facts. But in the way the present objection is brought forward, a contrary course is pursued; speculation is exalted above facts; and these are left to be frittered away before the "oppositions of science falsely so called."³

The objection assumes, that the resurrection, and that only, is everywhere spoken of by the sacred writers as the great and momentous fact, on which alone rest the faith and hopes of believers in respect to their own future reward and glory. But is this truly so? It is no doubt true, that in many instances the sacred writers do thus specify only the resurrection of our Lord. But does it follow that by this term so used they mean to imply nothing more than the naked fact of his rising from the tomb? Or do they also mean to include the glorious concomitants and consequences of that great fact, his ascension to heaven and his exaltation at the right hand of God, thus to be "Head over all things to the church?" The latter I must believe to be the case in most of the instances, if not in all. Thus in Acts 3: 15, 16 and 4: 10, the lame

¹ See above p. 297.

² Olshausen Comm. II. p. 548 sq. 3te Aug. Compare Neander Leben Jesu, p. 727 3te Aug.

³ 1 Tim. 6: 20.

man is said to have been healed by faith in the name of Christ, "whom God raised from the dead;" but it is immediately added in the latter passage, that this is the stone set at nought by the builders "which is become the head of the corner;" obviously implying the exaltation of the Saviour. In Acts 10: 40, 42 and 17: 31, in like manner, the mention of Christ's resurrection is coupled with the fact, that he is "ordained of God to be the Judge of quick and dead." So too in Acts 13: 30, 33, his resurrection is illustrated by a reference to the declaration of the second Psalm, "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee." Paul also speaks of him, in Rom. 1: 4, as "declared to be the Son of God with power, by the resurrection from the dead;" which according to all analogy must include also the idea of his exaltation; since it was only in this state that his power was manifested. In the striking passage by the same apostle in 1 Cor. c. 15, where he dwells upon Christ's resurrection as the pledge and earnest of that of the saints, he goes on in vs. 23—25 to speak of him as reigning "till he hath put all things under his feet;" thus clearly showing that he meant more than the naked fact of the Lord's resuscitation to life, and nothing less than his exaltation at the right hand of God. I might go on to multiply citations of a like kind; but it is sufficient to refer to them in the margin.¹

If in this way it appears from the very passages in which the resurrection alone is mentioned, that the term is thus often used by synecdoche to express also the exaltation and glory which followed our Lord's resurrection; still more clearly is this shown by another class of passages, in which sometimes both the resurrection and exaltation are specified, and sometimes only the latter. Thus Peter, in his discourse after the outpouring of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost (Acts 2: 32—36), speaks of Jesus, "whom God hath raised up," as being "by the right hand of God exalted," and so "made both Lord and Christ;" and it was the same Lord thus exalted, who had shed forth those sacred influences and gifts which the disciples had just received. The same connection of the two ideas occurs also, directly or indirectly, in Acts 5: 30, 31. Eph. 1: 20. 1 Thesa. 1: 10. 1 Pet. 1: 3, 4. 21: 3, 21, 22. Again, where the exaltation alone is specified, the idea of the resurrection is nevertheless included or implied; as Phil. 2: 8, 9, "He became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross; wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name

¹ Acts 3: 26. 4: 33. Rom. 4: 24, 25. 8: 11. 1 Cor. 6: 14. 2 Cor. 4: 14 coll. 10 seq. Phil. 3: 10. Col. 1: 18 coll. 16: 2, 12. 2 Tim. 2: 8 coll. 11 seq.

which is above every name."¹ This mode of statement is particularly prominent in the Epistle to the Hebrews; as Heb. 2: 9, 10, "We see Jesus—for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honour." Also Heb. 4: 14. 7: 25, 26. 8: 1. The assumption of the objector, therefore, that our Lord's resurrection only is everywhere spoken of as the foundation of the believer's hope, turns out to be unfounded; the ascension and exaltation of Christ being, if less frequently, yet not less prominently, everywhere brought into view.

Again, the objection assumes, that, if the resurrection of our Lord was merely the resuscitation of his former human body, there was nothing to distinguish it in character or importance from that of Lazarus; and that thus all force is taken away from the language of Paul in Rom. 6: 9: "Knowing that Christ, being raised from the dead, dieth no more; death hath no more dominion over him." Was there then no difference in the two cases? Lazarus was raised to be a witness of the divine power of Christ on earth; Christ himself was raised that he might thus vanquish death and be exalted at the right hand of God. In the former case the whole object of the miracle was accomplished in the act itself, and Lazarus afterwards lived and died like any other mortal. In the latter, the resurrection of Jesus was but the beginning of an immortal state of power and majesty; and his abode of forty days on earth was, so to speak, simply a momentary transition-state between the grave and glory. In judging of Paul's language above cited, it must also be borne in mind, that the Apostle wrote at least five and twenty years after the resurrection and ascension of our Lord; and would therefore naturally have before his mind, not Jesus still on earth, but the Lord of glory and immortality in heaven, over whom death of course could have no more dominion. Or, even admitting that the Apostle did also include in his own mind the forty days on earth; is it necessary, when he thus declares that death had lost his power over Jesus, to suppose that this was caused by some change of corporeal organization? Might it not have been simply dependent on the will of God? When our Lord said of John: "If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee, the saying went abroad among the brethren that John should not die."² But did any of them suppose, that for this end any change had taken place, or would take place, in his physical organization? Did they not refer it directly and solely to the will of their Lord and Master?

¹ Comp. Phil. 3: 20, 21.

² John 21: 22, 23.

What difference is there then in the two cases? And why may we not assume, on the strength of this analogy, that Paul, in thus affirming as to Christ the further impotence of death, intended nothing more than to refer it solely to the divine will and purpose?

In regard to the general tenor of the preceding objection to the view under consideration, that it essentially detracts from the significance and importance of the great fact of our Lord's resurrection, it seems to me that it belongs not to us to sit in judgment upon the wisdom of the divine counsels; and then, because of the darkness of our own minds, to call in question what we cannot comprehend. It is enough for us to know the facts,—those facts which forced conviction upon the minds of the unwilling disciples; and which they have recorded with all the simplicity of their own belief, under the guidance of the Spirit of truth. Those simple facts we have endeavored to bring out and place in a clear light. In a calm review of them, may we not, to some extent at least, mark and comprehend the wisdom of God in the adaptation of the means to the end? What was the object of our Lord's sojourn of forty days on earth? He indeed held converse with his disciples; he gave them their commission to preach the gospel; but they were not endued with power from on high until after his ascension. His abode on earth was not necessary simply for that purpose in respect to them; any more than in the case of Paul. What then was the object? May we not find a satisfactory answer in considerations like the following. May we not regard it as in accordance with the divine plan and wisdom, that full and complete evidence of the great fact of Christ's resurrection and exaltation, his triumph over death and the grave,—evidence adapted to the constitution and feeble capacities of the human mind and to human experience,—should exist and be presented, first to his disciples, and through them to the world? Was not such evidence necessary, in order that men might believe on him as Lord and Christ; and so become assured of his power to save all who come unto him, and to bestow upon them a like reward of bliss and glory? What then was this appropriate evidence? The eleven apostles, who were appointed to be witnesses, were slow to believe. They had disbelieved the testimony of the women, and of the disciples returning from Emmaus. Suppose no further evidence of Christ's resurrection had ever been given; would the apostles have believed that he was risen? Would the world now have any valid ground

of belief? But the Lord afforded further proof. He presented himself to the eyes of his amazed disciples; and they thought it was a spirit. Suppose the Lord had left them in this belief; should we now have any good evidence of his resurrection? He did not thus leave them; but appealed to the evidence of their own senses,—to the visible, tangible, palpable evidence before them,—that it was he himself in his own body of flesh and bones. Here was evidence which they could not gainsay nor resist; and yet they doubted until he ate before them. The same evidence in a more striking and convincing form, was repeated to them in the presence of Thomas. They believed, that it was their Lord indeed, who was thus risen in his own body from the dead; and they beheld him afterwards ascend to his heavenly glory. Not a doubt remained upon their minds; and they, the appointed witnesses, have so recorded their own convictions, that no one who reads can doubt the truth and conscientiousness of their testimony. Would they, or could they, according to the constitution of the human mind, have received the same unwavering convictions, and borne the same convincing testimony, had our Lord not presented himself to them in his own human body? In other words, would the chain of evidence, in any other way, have been as full and complete?—If these remarks are well founded, we see at once a momentous and sufficient object and motive, why the Saviour should have remained on earth for forty days in his human body. And this being shown, the objection raised against the significancy of this mode of our Lord's resurrection, falls to the ground.

It may be said, and it sometimes is said, that Paul brings forward his own vision of the glorified Saviour as evidence of the Lord's resurrection;¹ and that therefore we must regard this species of proof as being in itself just as valid and convincing as any other. This statement seems to me to overlook the facts of the case. The other apostles testify to their having seen and, at the behest of their Lord, handled his real and veritable body of flesh and bones, as raised again from the dead, after they had seen him crucified and laid in the tomb. Paul testifies that several years afterwards he saw the glorified Redeemer, who gave him an express commission to be an apostle to the Gentiles. This vision was to him a confirmation of the testimony of the witnesses to the Lord's resurrection; and he presents it to others in the

¹ 1 Cor. 15: 8.

same light. Paul was not and does not claim to have been, a witness of our Lord's resurrection; Matthias had long before been selected for that office. Indeed, had we only the isolated evidence afforded by Paul's vision, what valid ground should we have for believing that Christ rose at all from the tomb? Paul did not see the body laid in the sepulchre; he did not see nor know the Lord during his forty days on earth; he saw him only in glory. Did his testimony stand alone, an isolated vision unsupported by the array of other and stronger evidence, I see not wherein it would much differ in kind from the alleged evidence of the Korân.

The resurrection of our Lord is often brought forward by the sacred writers as the pledge and pattern of the future resurrection of the saints to glory.¹ On this ground an objection is sometimes taken to that view, which we have been considering. The saints, it is said, are everywhere represented as being raised at once in their glorified bodies; and if this be so, then our Lord, their pattern, must also have been so raised from the dead. If this objection have any force, it applies obviously and directly to the fact of the Lord's forty days' manifestation upon earth; and only indirectly or not at all to the nature of his resurrection-body. The Saviour, when he rose, had a mission to fulfil on earth; he rose in his human body, fulfilled this mission, and assumed a glorified body in his ascension to heaven. The saints have no such future mission upon earth; the moment of their resurrection and ascension is one and the same; and in this moment their bodies also are to be glorified. The promise and their hope is, not that they shall rise in the same manner in all respects as the Lord rose; but that as he was raised up and entered into his glory, so they too shall rise and enter into the same glory.

With the main subject of this discussion is closely connected another inquiry, which has of late been again brought into notice, viz. Whether our Lord ascended more than once into heaven? Such an opinion was maintained in the beginning of the last century by W. Whiston, the Socinian;² was repeated doubtfully by Kaiser of Erlangen five and twenty years ago;³ and has recently been advanced, as if wholly new, by Kinkel, a private teacher at

¹ See espec. 1 Cor. c. 15.

² *Sermons and Essays*, Lond. 1709, p. 156 sq. Replied to by J. SCHMID, *Diss. Theol. Whistoni, multiplicam Christi in coelos ascensionem propugnanti, opposita*. Lips. 1712.

³ *Monogrammata theol. Christ. dogmat.* Erlang. 1819, p. 147.

the University of Bonn, in an article in the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*,¹ translated and published in the *Bibliotheca Sacra and Theological Review* for Feb. 1844.² This whole hypothesis of repeated ascensions, as stated by Kinkel, rests on two propositions; *first*, "that the notices which the New Testament furnishes on the ascension of Christ, in respect to the time, place, and circumstances are wholly inconsistent with each other;" and *secondly*, "that Christ's glorification, and consequently the ascension, must have taken place immediately after the resurrection."³ If the discussions of the present Article, and of that in the last Number of this work, upon the resurrection and ascension of Christ, are worth anything, both these propositions are shown to be without foundation; and of course the hypothesis of several ascensions built upon them, falls of itself. And further, the very language of Peter in Acts 1: 22, necessarily implies that there was but a single ascension: "Beginning from the baptism of John, UNTO THAT SAME DAY THAT HE WAS TAKEN UP FROM US, must one be ordained to be a witness with us of his resurrection." That *same day* is but a single day; or, if not, what day is meant?—It is also somewhat remarkable that Kinkel, if he wrote in sober earnest, should have omitted all notice of our Lord's appearance to the women, who embrace his feet; and also of his appearance to the assembled disciples, both in the absence and presence of Thomas, when Jesus gives them convincing proofs of the reality of his human body. It is easy to maintain any and every opinion or theory, if we may thus leave out of view all opposing evidence.

My task is ended. But there is one inference from this whole discussion, so solemn and momentous, that I cannot forbear to present it, and to press it upon the attention of the reader. I would not charge this inference upon those pure and holy men in every age, who may have held a different view; for they did not carry out in their own minds the consequences of their speculations. I have already stated the two conclusions which follow irresistibly from the facts recorded by the chosen witnesses of our Lord's resurrection; *first*, that the disciples believed the body of their Lord after his resurrection to be the same identical

¹ Theol. Stud. u. Krit. 1841. Heft 3.

² The only reply I have seen to the article of Kinkel is by the Pastor Koerner in the *Biblischen Studien von Geistlichen des Königr. Sachsens*, 1str. Jahrg. 1842, p. 161 sq.

³ *Biblioth. Sacra and Theol. Review*, Feb. 1844, p. 155, 162.

body of flesh and bones, which they had seen crucified and laid in the sepulchre ; and *secondly*, that our Lord himself took special pains to impress this very belief upon their minds.¹ No candid inquirer can call in question the completeness of the evidence on these two points. If then our Lord was not thus in his human body, it follows that he took special pains to deceive his disciples, and that they were actually deceived. This then is the tremendous result ;—I shudder while I write ;—our holy and blessed Redeemer was a deceiver ; the holy apostles were false witnesses of God ; and our holy religion, the sacred fabric of Christianity, with all its blessed and wide-spread influences, is the most stupendous delusion the world ever saw. From such a consummation may God deliver us !

ARTICLE V.

SOUTH'S SERMONS.

Sermons preached upon several occasions. By Robert South, D.D. Prebendary of Westminster, and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. A New Edition, in Four Volumes.—Philadelphia: 1844.

By Leonard Withington, Newbury, Mass.

THERE cannot be a greater proof of the triumph of genius over all its obstacles than the republication of these Sermons, in this country, one century and more than three quarters of another after their delivery ; this bitter, this sarcastic, this snarly churchman, who never spared his foes and was dreaded even by his friends, here appears in this land of the Puritans, with all his abominations on his head. We, Dissenters, have every reason to hate him ; and the heart sometimes influences the taste ; and makes us slow to admire the abilities which we find it impossible to love. But Dryden has remarked, that, "if a poem have genius it will force its own reception in the world. For there's a sweetness in good verse which tickles while it hurts ; and no man can be heartily angry with him, who pleases him against his

¹ See p. 304 above.

will."¹ Dr. South has forced us to dig up this buried scourge with which he has so unmercifully lashed our fathers.

The truth is, the charm of mental raciness is eternal; independent of all times and factions, and this charm South had almost to perfection. We cannot think he made the most of himself. He seems to have been born for better things than ever he accomplished. He has been charged with approaching the buffoon; he is supposed to have introduced into the pulpit the cant phrases of a licentious court; he certainly wasted much of his strength on temporary topics; he was ill-natured, morose and severe; but with all his faults, we consider him as one of the first names in English Literature. He had one excellence of surpassing worth. He was not a formalist; not a conventional man. However bitter, however bad; he was in earnest and dipped his pen in the centre of his heart.

Of all writings, it must be confessed, (though it is a mortifying truth) sermons are the most dull—certainly the least readable. We consider it as the hardest task, in the whole compass of literature, to produce a living sermon. One reason is, that a written and a spoken style are so very different that it is hard to unite them. The animation; the pathos,—the awakened interrogation; the verbosity; the interjections, which please in extemporaneous delivery when prompted by the occasion, are apt to be inflated when they appear fixed in print and sanctioned by the press. Then the preacher is bound down by a cumbrous load of formalities. Some would bind him to a technical orthodoxy; some impose on him laws of an artificial decorum. Whatever may be his native character, or the turn of his genius, he must never make the least approach to the playful or the humorous. *That* would be profane. The theological student is often rocked in the cradle of restraint. He writes and speaks with the ghost of criticism staring him in the face and frightening away every spark of nature. He is put into cramping irons in his intellectual infancy; and the little foot of a Chinese lady is not further from the fulness of nature than is the progeny of an overhewn mind from the simplicity of feeling and the energy of truth. Thus our sermons become a collection of proprieties. The individual is lost in the mould. We avoid eccentricities and fall into stupidity.

As South was remarkable for his wit and sarcasm; and as his style, though always fertile enough to command attention, has

¹ Preface to *Absalom and Achitophel*.

been comic enough to provoke censure, his example may be an occasion to say a few words on the lawfulness of making the pulpit the place for *sacred satire*.

Now the opponents of this practice hold, that religion is too sacred a theme to be recommended by such means; as we heard a venerable professor once say, "*it is all wrong*," and the authority of Cowper was of course brought in to confirm the sentiment.

'Tis pitiful
To court a grin, when you should woo a soul,
To break a jest when pity would inspire
Pathetic exhortation; and t'address
The skittish fancy with facetious tales,
When sent with God's commission to the heart!
So did not Paul. Direct me to a quip,
Or merry-turn in all he ever wrote,
And I consent you take it for your text,
Your only one till aides and benches fail.

These remarks are supported by much reason and sanctioned by high authority. It is certain that few men have wit; it is also clear that there is a wit which, united with levity, is out of its place not only in the pulpit but in every decorous assembly.¹ But if the meaning of these remarks is—to cramp the individual—whatever be his mental turn under laws imposed by the artificial lords of criticism—we must modestly enter our protest. We are pretty sure whatever may be the intentions of these grave gentlemen, their words have been misunderstood.

In the first place, it cannot be doubted that a sense of the ridiculous is one of the donations of our Heavenly Father, and why he should bestow this gift in vain we never yet could understand. There must be something very peculiar in religion, if it discards a faculty so deeply ingrained in our nature and such a shining proof of the wisdom of God. In the other departments of moral agency, we see and acknowledge its use. Go to the bar, the market, the halls of legislation, the private circle, we find a powerful application of this most powerful propensity; and it always may be used on the side of truth and virtue. It was the very aim of Addison and has always been accounted his praise that he united the long dis severed powers of humor and wisdom in the cause of virtue. Now religion and morality stand on the same ground. They need, they demand all the powers which nature has im-

¹ Hear Cicero.—After distinguishing wit into three kinds, he shows what the orator should choose and what reject.—See the *De Oratore*, Lib. II. § 62.

parted to man, in order to embellish their beauties and to support their rights. To this we must add that the infidel will always endeavour to enlist the power of wit and ridicule on his side. He will touch by these instruments an important string in human nature. He will claim an eternal alliance between these finer developments and his own opinion. Shall we leave him to this advantage-ground? John Wesley thought, that the Devil should not have all the good music there was in the world; and we would vindicate the laws of God; and contend for those ministering powers, which, in their legitimate application, may "give ardor to virtue and confidence to truth."

"Thus was beauty sent from Heaven,
The lovely mistress of truth and good
In this dark world; for truth and good are one,
And beauty dwells in them and they in her,
With like participation; wherefore then
O sons of Earth! would ye dissolve the tie?"

In the second place, there are certain errors in the moral world so supremely ridiculous that they hardly merit a sober argument against them. A man might as well drag up a forty-two pounder to overthrow a *lodge in a garden of cucumbers*. By bringing a grave syllogism against a supreme absurdity, we make it more respectable than it can be by its native merits. The best thing you can do is to knock it over by ridicule. Thus when the Papists allege their foolish miracles, the wit of Swift is a much more proper weapon to overthrow them, than the dialectics of Aristotle. Tillemont tells us very gravely, that the wood of the true cross found by St. Helena, permits itself to be multiplied; and the milk of the Virgin has been in some ages, of great account in healing the maladies of man. To all this, we oppose the words of My Lord Peter, who swore that his father had an old sign-post which yielded wood enough to make sixteen large ships of war, besides a cow, which gave milk sufficient to fill three thousand churches. Surely, such ineffable nonsense merits nothing better. It should be remembered also, that some opinions are so ridiculous that they provoke the severest minds to ridicule. John Gilpin, riding on his horse with the bottles at his side, and his hat and wig flying away, is not more laughable than some grave doctrines in theology, which have commanded the assent of thousands, and have been handed down by a hoary antiquity. Nay, even the gravest minds are compelled to feel this principle. We hardly know a man more uniformly solemn than John Knox.

His temperament was grave; and he lived in persecuting times, with the prison and the stake always before him; his very love-letters are curious specimens of the most solemn gravity. Yet John Knox when he was aboard the French galleys, and they were pestering him with a little wooden image of the virgin, his patience was exhausted, he threw it into the river and said, *Lat our Ladie now save herself: sche is lycht enoughe, but hir leirn to twyme*. Such is the power of ridicule; it refuted the Papists and taught even John Knox, for once in his life, to grin horribly a ghastly smile.

Perhaps no science is further from satire than metaphysics; and few minds were more uniformly severe and sober than was our illustrious Edwards. He appears to have paid little attention to the fine writers; and we do not remember that once in his voluminous writings he ever quotes Shakspeare, Milton, Pope, or gave the least indication that he knew such men ever existed. He had a powerful fancy, it is true; yet it was always chained down to the subtleties of metaphysics, and the solemnities of religion. If he ever read Swift or South, he probably regarded them as miserable buffoons, laughing at the expense of conscience and of truth. Yet this very Edwards was once allured to offer us a piece of wit which would have been no disgrace to Swift himself. When he viewed the doctrine of the Arminians, respecting the power of the will over its own motives, as impossible and ridiculous, he thus expressed it. The parallel is complete, and the argument (according to the conceded terminology of that day) unanswerable. But mark the scorching ridicule; the sardonic grin on features seldom guilty of such a sin. "If some learned philosopher, who had been abroad, in giving an account of the various observations he had made in his travels, should say—He had been in *Terra del Fuego*, and there had seen an animal, which he calls by a certain name, that begat and brought forth itself, and yet had a sire and dam distinct from itself; that it had an appetite, and was hungry before it had a being, that his master who led and governed him at his pleasure, was always governed by him and driven by him where he pleased; that when he moved he always took a step before the first step; that he went with his head first, and yet always went tail foremost and this, though he had neither head nor tail;—it would be no impudence at all, to tell such a traveller, though a learned man, that he himself had no notion or idea of such an animal, as he gave an account of, and never had nor would have."

In the third place, ridicule is of immense power in promoting the cause of truth. It is not indeed the test of truth; though we have often thought that truth is made ridiculous by false satire, just as Christ was made absurd by the purple rags, the thorny crown and the reed of straw which his enemies put upon him, and which were as extraneous to his person as their reproaches were to his character. But as truth has two qualities, its rectitude and its beauty; so error has two qualities, its falsehood and its deformity; logic showing the one, and satire the other. If you exclude the latter power, you do not occupy the whole ground; you do not exert all the given strength to overthrow it. At least this is true, of the minds whose gift it is to sway mankind by the power which, though few possess, all can feel. What would Brougham be without his sarcasm? What would Luther have done in the Reformation, if he had left untouched this powerful string? Even Whitefield had his smiles as well as his tears; and while mankind dread to be ridiculous, while the absurd deformity of error is one of the legitimate motives which should lead us to avoid it, we must not cramp the peculiarities of nature by the impositions of art. We must remember that every man received his diploma in God Almighty's seminary before he took an academic degree;¹ that there are some gifts of nature which it is dangerous even to *improve*; and that the very thorns on the mental bush, are connected with its flowers and often guard them from decadence and destruction.

In the last place, we are not so sure that satire is allied to levity, as we are, that it is sanctioned in the solemn pages of the Bible itself. The Bible is a free book, which luckily before its publication, never passed the ordeal of modern criticism. Even inspiration itself did not crush the impulses of nature; nor was the soul of the prophet lost in the great Spirit which moved him. Cowper, we are aware, is often quoted against us. But we are willing to take Mr. Poet at his word, and hold him to his own dilemma. *So did not Paul*. But what was it that Paul did not do? It is true he was serious in a serious cause; but that seriousness never kept him from jingling with words, or adopting the most biting sarcasm whenever it served his turn. Did he not tell the Corinthians that if they must have their petty lawsuits, they might as well set the greatest simpletons in the church to adjust them? Does he not add, explicitly that he speaks ironically?² Did he not tell the Galatians, when pestered with those

¹ Domina natura est, says Cicero.

² Ἰδοὺ ἐντρονίζω.

of the circumcision, that he wished those cutters would cut themselves off, instead of troubling the church? Did he not caution the Philippians to beware of the concision, a word which does not translate the original, but which is both a satire and a sarcasm in itself? If we pass to the Old Testament, the matter is still more clear; and ancient wit as well as wisdom, sparkles on every page. Where was there a more laughable satire on idolatry, than is found in the forty-fourth chapter of Isaiah? Indeed South himself seems to have caught his fire from the Scripture; and the man and the prophet play their coruscations with a congenial light. "*A man hews him down a tree in the wood, and part of it he burns*, in the 16th verse, and in the 17th verse, *with the residue thereof he maketh a Lord*. With one part he furnishes his chimney, and the other his chapel. A strange thing that the fire must first consume this part, and then burn incense to that. As if there were more divinity in one end of a stick than in the other." *Sermon II* We will remind then all who are too grave for satire, that they have also a wisdom too high for God.

But it will be said perhaps by a sturdy disputant that religion is a peculiar subject; that the awful importance of its doctrines rejects those aids which even truth itself may admit in a lighter cause. We are far from urging that wit and ridicule should always be employed. We know that they are dangerous weapons in unskillful hands. We fully accord with Swift in his advice to a young clergyman. "I cannot forbear warning you," says this powerful authority, "in the most earnest manner against endeavoring at wit in your sermons; because by the strictest computation, it is very near a million to one that you have none; and because too many of your calling have consequently made themselves everlastingly ridiculous by attempting it. I remember several young men in this town who could never leave the pulpit under half a dozen conceits; and this faculty adhered to these gentlemen a longer or shorter time, exactly in proportion to their several degrees of dulness; accordingly, I am told that some of them retain it to this day. I heartily wish the brood at an end."

"Endeavoring at wit" is always bad; and equally true is it that the pulpit is the place seldom for wit and never for levity. All that we contend for is, that we must leave the mind to the exercise of its spontaneous powers and that no weapon, which may powerfully and lawfully defeat the foes of Christianity, should ever be rejected. Leave the streamlet to flow in all its

bubbings and windings. What would Latimer, South, Daniel Burgess, Toplady, Rowland Hill, Beecher have been, had they avoided all that criticism could censure or pursued all that decorum might approve ?¹

Dr. South is one of those whom a conventional opinion has kept from his proper place. The world has been very unjust to Swift and him ; both of them unlovely men we confess ; but certainly their genius stands on its own merits and ought not to suffer by the contiguous character. To Swift most of the critics, since Lord Orrery and his cousin Swift, his immediate editors, seem disposed to be very unjust ; Johnson, Scott, the Edinburgh Reviewers depreciate him ; Johnson even affects to doubt whether the Tale of the Tub was written by him. " It exhibits," says the great critic, " a richness of mind, a copiousness of images, and a vivacity of diction, such as he afterward never possessed or never exerted. It is of a mode so distinct and peculiar that it must be considered by itself ; what is true of that is not true of anything else which he has written."—*Lives of the Poets*, Vol. II. p. 199. Absurd ! There never was an anonymous production which bore such marks of identity. It may be more rich in allusion than his other works, as it evidently was written with great labor ; but it has all the impress of the hand of its sarcastic but indelicate author ; and though Swift has an arrogance, a coarseness, an indelicacy which is apt to make his readers his enemies, yet surely his invention, his strength, his originality, his matchless power of seizing the most absurd side of an object, of exaggerating without losing sight of truth and of forcing laughter while so sober himself, place him in the front rank of satirical writers, and give him a claim to a kind of humor in which he had none to precede him and will be likely to have none to follow him. He stands sullenly scowling alone.

South had some of the characteristics of Swift and injustice has been done him in the same way. Both of them were con-

¹ If it be necessary to produce authority, we have the following from Cicero. " Est autem, ut ad illud tertium veniam, est plane oratoris movere risum ; vel quod ipsa hilaritas benevolentiam conciliat ei, per quem excitata est : vel quod admirantur omnes acumen, uno saepe in verbo positum, maxime respondentis, nonnumquam etiam lacescentis ; vel quod frangit adversarium, quod impedit, quod elevat, quod deterret, quod refutat : vel quod ipsum oratorem, politum esse hominem significat, quod eruditum, quod urbanum, maximeque quod tristitiam ac severitatem mitigat, et relaxat, odiosasque res saepe, quas argumentis dilui non facile est, joco risuque dissolvit.—*De Oratore*, Lib. II. sect. 58.

verts from an opposite party, were men of genius, had immense powers of sarcasm and ridicule, were terrible to their enemies and suspected by their friends, were not promoted according to their fancied merits, suffered their resentment to boil over in sullen censures and the murmurings of discontent; were morose, censorious, misanthropical and severe; hence all parties but one, cordially detested them; and that one party did not cordially receive them. Hence the influence of their personal character has affected the estimation of their works. However, it must be conceded that Swift's enormous indelicacies must ever prevent his works from finding their intellectual level. But whenever, owing to the changes of society, South's terrible lash shall cease to be dreaded, we shall begin to feel his eloquence though we may never perfectly approve his character.

We have already alluded to South's sincerity; all his periods being an outburst from the heart. He was no cautious and conventional writer, like Blair, walking among the eggs which scholastic criticism had placed in his path, at equal distances; and careful so to step as not to break one of them. If his heart had been one with which our best feelings could sympathize, he would have been the most eloquent writer that ever lived. Every reader must have melted and the whole world would have followed him. But alas! it was not so. His most beautiful impulses, impressed on the most natural yet energetic language, are the ejections of the volcano, throwing out sparks and cinders and rolling the burning lava down its sides. It is nature but it is fiery nature; it is truth but sometimes truth with an infernal aspect. He resembles those actors, on the stage, who are only at home in *Macbeth* and *Richard the Third*. He convulses us, but touches none of the soothing strings in our composition. His wit is never playful and—

Where his frown of hatred darkly fell,
Hope withering fled and Mercy sighed farewell.

He not only kills his victims but, as the Levite did, in the Bible, he cuts the carcass into parts and strews the bleeding fragments through the land. When a Puritan crosses his way—But let us hear him—

“Let us now according to the same consider also the way of praying, so much used and applauded by such, as have renounced the communion and liturgy of our church; and it is but reason, that they should bring in something better in the room of what they so disdain-

fully cast off. But, on the contrary, are not all their prayers exactly after the *heathenish* and Pharisaical copy? always notable for these two things length and tautology? Two whole hours for one prayer, at a fast, used to be reckoned but a moderate dose; and that, for the most part fraught with such irreverent, blasphemous expressions, that, to repeat them would profane the place which I am speaking in; and indeed they seldom *carried on the work of such a day* (as the phrase was) but they left the church in need of a new consecration. Add to this, the incoherence and confusion, the endless repetitions and the insufferable nonsense, that never failed to hold out, even with their outmost prolixity; so that in all their *long fasts* from first to last, from *seven* in the morning to *seven* in the evening (which was their measure) the pulpit was always the emptiest thing in the church: and I never knew such a *fast* kept by them, but their hearers had cause to begin a *thanksgiving*, as soon as they had done. And, the truth is, when I consider, the matter of their prayers, so full of ramble and inconsequence, and in every respect so very like the language of a dream; and compare it, with their carriage of themselves in prayer, with their eyes for the most part, shut, and their arms stretched out, in a yawning posture, a man that should hear any of them pray might, by a very pardonable error, be induced to think, that he was all the time hearing one *talk in his sleep*: besides the strange virtue, which their prayers had to procure sleep in others too. So that he who should be present at all their long cant, would show a greater ability in *watching* than even they could pretend to in *praying*, if he could forbear sleeping, having so strong a provocation to it. In a word, such were their prayers, both for matter and expression, that could any one truly and exactly write them out, it would be the shrewdest and most effectual way of writing against them, that could possibly be thought of."—*Sermon II. on Eccles. 5: 2. Vol. II.*

Again—"What says David in Psalm 77: 13. *Thy way O God is in the sanctuary.* It is no doubt but that holy person continued a strict and most pious communication with God, during his wanderings upon the mounts and in the wilderness; but still he found in himself, that he had not those kindly, warm meltings upon his heart, those rapturous and ravishing transports of affection, that he used to have in the fixed and solemn place of God's worship. See the first two verses of the 63d Psalm, entitled a *Psalm of David, when he was in the wilderness of Judah.* How emphatically and divinely does every word proclaim the truth that I have been speaking of! *O God, says he, thou art my God, early will I seek thee. My soul thirsteth for thee, my flesh longeth for thee in a dry and thirsty land where no water is, to see thy power and thy glory so as I have seen them in the sanctuary.* Much different was his wish from that of our non-conforming zealots now-a-days, which expresses itself in another kind of dialect, as *when shall I enjoy God as I used to do at a conventicle? When shall I meet with those blessed breathings, those heavenly hummings and hawings that I used to hear at a private meeting and at the end of a table.*"—Sermon preached at the consecration of a chapel, Vol. I. p. 360, 361.

South may be remarked as the first author that reduced the English language to a Ciceronean rhythmus, a sounding period supported by a happy condensation of meaning. We should always recollect the age in which he wrote. The dedication to his third sermon is dated May 25, 1660. Charles II. was just restored. Paradise Lost was not yet written. English prose was in the state in which it is exhibited in the political tracts of the great poet; in the ornamented and over-finical style of Jeremy Taylor.¹ What a leap now do we find from these rude specimens of strength and irregularity to the sounding flow exhibited in the noble paragraphs of South. Majestic without bombast, regular without constraint, measured like Johnson without his uniformity, melodious but not empty; and graceful, though possessing immense strength. Indeed in his happiest efforts he carried our diction to its highest perfection. Nothing can surpass it. The following paragraph seems to us surpassingly energetic.

"Reputation is power; and consequently to despise is to weaken. For where there is contempt, there can be no awe; and where there is no awe there will be no subjection; and if there is no subjection, it is impossible without the help of the former distinction of a politic capacity, to imagine how a prince can be a governor. He that makes his prince despised and undervalued, blows a trumpet in men's breasts, beats him out of his subject's hearts, and fights him out of their affections; and after this, he may easily strip him of his other garrisons, having already dispossessed him of his strongest, by dismantling him of his honor and seizing his reputation."—*Sermon on Titus II. ult. Vol. I.*

There are few writers from whom you may select so many pithy aphorisms. As the following: "A corrupt governor is nothing else but reigning sin." "In such a world as this, it is hard to maintain the truth but still harder to be maintained by it." "The Puritans had as little reason to father their *prayers* as their *practices* on the divine Spirit." "Thy superfluities must give place to thy neighbor's great convenience; thy convenience must veil to thy neighbor's necessity: And lastly thy very necessities

¹ To Jeremy Taylor we never could vote for the wreath of renown which traditional criticism seems disposed to award him. If it be the definition of a good style that it is like the crystal of a watch attracting attention, not to itself, but to what is beneath it, it is certain that Taylor's style is not a good one. It is like figures on stained glass always diverting our attention and often misleading the fancy. It is profusion; but a profusion of weeds as well as flowers. South, without naming him, speaks of him with contempt.

must yield to thy neighbor's extremity." Examples might be multiplied.

The following passage is as solemn as it is forcible. It is from the discourse on denying Christ,—third Sermon in Vol. I.

"Christ's denying us is otherwise expressed in Luke 13: 27, *I know you not*. To *know* in Scripture language is to approve; and so, not to know, is to reject and condemn. Now, who knows how many woes are crowded into this one sentence, *I will deny him*. It is (to say no more) a compendious expression of hell, an eternity of torments compressed in a word; it is condemnation itself, and what is most of all, it is condemnation from the mouth of the Saviour. O the inexpressible horror that will seize upon a poor sinner when he shall stand arraigned at the bar of divine justice! When he shall look about and see his accuser, his Judge and his witnesses, all of them his remorseless adversaries: the law impleading, mercy and the Gospel upbraiding him, the devil his grand accuser, drawing up his indictment; numbering his sins with the greatest exactness, and aggravating them with the cruelest bitterness; and conscience, like a thousand witnesses, attesting every article, flying in his face, and rending his very heart. And then after all, Christ, from whom only mercy could be expected, owning the accusation. It will be hell enough to hear the sentence; the promulgation of the punishment, will be part of the punishment and anticipate the execution. If Peter was so abashed when Christ gave him a look after his denial; if there be so much dread in his looks when he stood as a prisoner, how much greater will it be when he sits as a judge? If it was so fearful when he looked his denier into repentance, what will it be when he shall look him into destruction? Believe it, when he shall hear an accusation from an advocate, our eternal doom from our intercessor, it will convince us that a denial of Christ is something more than a few transitory words: what trembling, what outcries, what astonishment will there be upon the pronouncing this sentence! Every word will come upon the sinner like an arrow, striking through his reins; like thunder that is heard and consumes at the same instant. Yea, it will be a denial with scorn, with taunting exprobrations; and to be miserable without commiseration is the height of misery. He that falls below pity, can fall no lower. Could I give you a lively representation of guilt and horror on this hand, and paint out eternal wrath and decipher eternal vengeance on the other, then might I show the condition of a sinner hearing himself denied by Christ: and for those whom Christ has denied, it will be in vain to appeal to the Father, unless he imagine, that those whom mercy has condemned, justice will absolve."

His affluence of mind, his power of assembling illustrations and images from all the stores of learning and all the regions of nature, was a quality he partook with many of the great writers of his age—Taylor, Barrow, Baxter, Stillingfleet, Dryden and Sir

Thomas Brown. It was an agitating age, great principles were at stake, and the human mind was in a ferment; and we have often thought that the general fertility of so many writers must have been owing to some common cause. Wit in that age had a meaning different from the modern use of the word. "Wit" says Dryden, "is a spaniel which beats over the ground, starts all resemblance and combines them to adorn and enforce the writer's sentiments." In this sense, South was a wit. His teeming mind pours out its profusion of leaves, never to conceal, but always to adorn and enrich the fruit, which bends the branches of his mental tree. His profusion is the profusion of nature; his similitudes come without labor, and are used without constraint. This consummate naturalness is the charm. They are the very images and pictures of his mind in its spontaneous operation. He wears his decorated robes, rich but not gaudy, as an Indian princess wears her cymar and her feathers, in the shades of her spicy forests. To quote examples would be endless. To find a similitude to illustrate the purposes of God in the apparent contingency of human events would not be easy. But the elastic mind of South is never at a loss.

"Let it suffice us in general to acknowledge and adore the vast compass of God's omniscience: that it is a light shining into every dark corner, ripping up all secrets and steadfastly grasping the greatest and most slippery uncertainties. As when we see the sun shine upon a river, though the waves of it move and roll this way and that way by the wind, yet for all their unsettledness, the sun strikes them with a direct and certain beam."—*Sermon VIII. Vol. I.*

Again—

"The Episcopal dignity, added to a good-preaching faculty, is like the erecting of a stately fountain upon a spring, which still for all that, remains as much a spring as it was before, and flows as plentifully, only it flows with the circumstance of greater state and magnificence."—*Sermon V. Vol. I.*

Again, on human merit—

"As apt as we are to flatter ourselves, and to think and speak big on this subject, yet in truth by all we do or can do, we do but *return* God something of his own. Much like the rivers which come rolling with a mighty noise, and pour themselves into the sea, and yet as high as they swell and loud as they roar, they only restore the sea her own waters; that which flows into her in one place, having been drawn from her in another. In a word, can the earth repay the heavens for their influences and the clouds for that verdure and fertility

which they bestow upon it? or can dirt and dunghills requite the sun and the light for shining upon them? No certainly; and yet what poor shadows and faint representations are these of that infinitely greater inability, even of the noblest of God's creatures to present him with anything which they were not first beholden to him for. It is clear therefore that, since man, in all his duties and services, never had anything of his own to set up with, but has trafficked all along upon a borrowed stock, the fourth and last condition required to make his performances meritorious utterly fails him."—*Serm. I. Vol. III. on Job 22:2, Can a man be profitable to God?*

In philosophical and classical allusions he is equally fertile as in those taken from nature, as in the following, by no means obvious. He is showing how true pleasure derives its existence from its conformity to our relish.

"For as those who discourse of atoms affirm that there are atoms of all forms, some round, some triangular, some square, and the like; all which are continually in motion and never settle till they fall into a fit circumscription or place of the same figure: So there are the like great diversities of mind and objects; whence it is, that this object striking upon a mind thus or thus disposed, flies off and rebounds without making any impression; but the same luckily happening upon another of a disposition as it were framed for it, is presently caught at and greedily clasped into the nearest unions and embraces."—*Sermon I. Vol. I.*

But we will not multiply examples. Though the great distinction of South has generally been regarded as sarcasm and ridicule, yet the same exuberance marks his other combinations. Nor are his terrible invectives confined to the republicans; they sometimes fall on his own party. Like other renegades, he was over zealous, and was not therefore promoted as he thought he merited; hence his political friends come in for a large share of his scorching fires. The 9th sermon in the first volume, On the Wisdom of the World, is one of the keenest satires on the corrupt politics of the restoration that can be imagined. The Shaftsbuys and the Buckinghamhs of the day must have withered under it. The 10th is scarcely inferior. In short, South was as honest a man as it was possible for one to be, so proud and arrogant; so misanthropic and sectarian. He could see the sun; but he always saw it through green spectacles.

This leads to another remark which involves one of his greatest excellences. For our peculiar selves we must say that no sight is more interesting to us, than an honest mind, heaving up a load of prejudices; emitting the reluctant light, like lightning

through a cloud; and telling the truth in spite of itself. We once heard a gentleman remark, that the *Life of Watts* by Johnson was a disgrace to its author. It struck us precisely different. It delights us to see the sour old tory and churchman compelled in spite of his teeth to grumble out his notes of approbation to a genius whom all his prejudices compelled him to hate. Something like this is exhibited in South. On the surface of his character, it was his disposition to see nothing good in the motives or sound in the reasoning of an adversary. He gives no measure to his disdain when he tramples on a foe. There is a curious advertisement at the end of the volume in our edition, put in by the bookseller but which must have been written by South himself, in which his indignation and contempt boil over against Sherlock. Even this trifle marks the man.

"Newly printed for *Randall Taylor*—*Animadversions upon Dr. Sherlock's Book, entitled, A vindication of the Holy and ever Blessed Trinity*, etc. together with a more necessary vindication of that sacred and prime article of the Christian faith, from his new notions and false explications of it. Humbly dedicated to his admirers and to himself the chief of them. By a Divine of the church of England." Just as if Sherlock was not a divine of that church. What an exquisite specimen! And yet no man ever felt the pressure of a difficulty more than South, or knew better how to register the weight of an objection. Let our readers peruse his sermon *On Mysteries in Religion*—Serm. VI. Vol. III. It is strong reasoning opposed to objections strongly stated. If he walks in a smoke of prejudices he carries a powerful lantern in his hands to dissipate them. Indeed we wish that some of the other Calvinists of the day had possessed some portion of his reluctant impartiality. The chief impediment to the pleasure with which we read the writings of Owen, Goodwin and Calvin himself—is—their impervious dogmatism. Every objection seems to have been *barked out*¹ by some spiritual dog and to have been inspired by Satan himself. However, after the days of Bayle and Hobbes, theological speculation assumed another aspect. The skeptical objections of the one, taught her to fortify her passes; the opposing dogmatism of the other made her ashamed of her own.

There is another interest which sometimes attends works of supereminent genius of which South is a strong example. When a racy mind has a peculiar character, is tinctured with violent

¹ *Canes* and *latrant* are frequent expressions in Calvin.

prejudices and pours out its personal opinions in vehement expressions, such a man derives a new force from our curiosity—we want to know what such a man will say on various subjects; and the match that lights him into flame amuses us. It is the same interest which attends a marked character in a drama. Such a man is always acting a part in human life; and we smile to see his perpetual consistency with himself on all occasions. This is not always the proof of genius; but it is the effervescence of strong character. No body cares what Virgil thinks on politics and religion; we are charmed with his poetry and are reckless of his opinions. But the earnest South, the morose Swift, the surly Johnson—we are amused to see them always support their parts.

We are somewhat suspicious that our personal impressions may be peculiar; and that the public sentiment will hardly respond to us in the high estimation we have given to an author so bitterly inimical to all our institutions. We are not blind to his faults. He certainly lacks unction; his overflowing gall would certainly better become the bar or the parliament than the pulpit. His jests are sometimes coarse, though always powerful; and he did not always know the art which Horace insinuates that he himself learned so lately—*inurbanum lepido seponere dicto*. Here we must remember his age. Compare him with the other writers of Charles's day. Compare him even with our own Davies. Addison himself was a writer of female scrupulosity in his own age; though now it is impossible to read the Spectator, in a promiscuous company.

He had other faults. He aimed too much to say striking things. He deals out his aphorisms with too constant a profusion; and his antitheses return too often. In such a pungent style, the mind longs for some periods of simplicity and repose. Though his fancy predominated, he was not a weak reasoner; nor had he the sweep of Hooker or the acuteness of Clark or Edwards. As a biblical critic he was inferior to Tillotson; and his piety perhaps (though it is not for us to judge him) was a theory in his head rather than a fire in his heart.

He has been called a semi-Calvinist and a semi-buffoon. This is much too severe. We see no proofs of his defective Calvinism; on the contrary original sin, irresistible grace, the perseverance of the saints, he pushes to their highest conclusions. In the decrees of God, he is a supra-lapsarian.¹ His mind is everywhere the

¹ "Those that suspend the purposes of God, and the resolves of an eternal

singular compound of scorn to the Puritans with deepest reverence for their sentiments. He not only loves orthodoxy, but he hates all heretics. He pours his vengeance on Tillotson for speaking respectfully of the *Fratres Poloni*; the Arminians of Holland he suspects of something worse; and even the learned Grotius cannot escape his sharp rebukes. Surely this man is no semi-Calvinist. And as to his buffoonry, we confess, for our personal selves (though the confession perhaps may injure our reputation for refinement), should such a buffoon rise again in society, we would walk forty miles to hear him. Anything—O anything but this conventional insipidity; this *pious* decorum which shocks no taste and touches no heart!

But this powerful champion, this bitter polemic, whose arguments were so strong and whose sarcasms were so scorching and whose tread shook the ground as he passed along, is now at rest. His enemies are at rest with him; and their personal opposition has ceased to agitate the world. They none of them murdered each other's character, nor destroyed each other's influence. We can now see the faults of Tillotson without regarding him as a *knave in lawn sleeves*; and we can enjoy the powers of South without beholding Puritanism as dead at his feet. They all of them now stand before the tribunal of a new generation. We strew the flowers on the graves which deserved them and pluck the thorn from the heart which it agonized. So it was with them and so it will be with us. Yet a little while and the mouldering earth will be heaped on our pert loquacity; and these venerable doctors who now agitate the little world around them by their limited wisdom, may rest assured that the progress of truth will be much more certain than the establishment of their several systems. The writer of this review had never much ambition to be a polemic; but when he stands on the tomb of the past and sees the piles of paper that have been wasted in this holy warfare; the strength that has been exerted and is now forgotten;

mind upon the actions of the creature and make God first wait and expect what the creature will do, and then frame his decrees and counsels accordingly, forget that He is the *First Cause* of all things, and discourse most unphilosophically, absurdly and unsuitably to the nature of an infinite Being; whose influence in every motion must set the first wheel a-going. He must still be the *First Agent*, and what he does he must will and intend to do, before he does it, and what he wills and intends once, he willed and intended from eternity; it being grossly contrary to the first notions we have of the infinite perfections of the Divine Nature, to state or suppose any new immanent act in God."—*Sermon on Prov. 16: 33. Vol. I.*

and finds that even the charm of their best writers is independent of their sectional purposes, he confesses, that he has been reluctantly forced to this mortifying conclusion, *that great men as often instruct us by their negative example as by their most brilliant precepts, or their most confident conclusions.*

ARTICLE VI.

LIFE OF JOHN CALVIN.¹

By R. D. C. Robbins, Librarian Theological Seminary, Andover, Mass.

Reasons for writing a Life of Calvin.

No apology is deemed necessary for making the Life of John Calvin, the great Reformer, a topic of discussion in this Journal. He is acknowledged, even by those who dislike him most, to have been a man of no ordinary endowments, and familiarity with the feelings and conduct of the great and the good is always profitable. Their lives benefit us not so much by reminding us, that we in our humble sphere "may make our lives sublime," as by assimilating us to themselves. They attract us upward. By ac-

¹ The work which has been most relied upon in the preparation of this Article is, *Das Leben Johann Calvins des grossen Reformators*; von Paul Henry, Prediger an der Französisch-Friedrichstädtischen Kirche zu Berlin. The first volume was published in 1835, the second in 1838. The third volume, issued during the last year, has not yet been received. The work shows diligent research into the original sources, discrimination in the choice of materials, and good religious feeling in the author. There are 554 letters of Calvin in the Library at Geneva which have never been published. Many of these from the domestic and personal nature of the contents, are especially valuable as throwing new light upon some of the most interesting traits in the character of the great Reformer, and may be considered as the best picture of the every day life of the man, in connection with his friends and associates, which can be found. Mr. Henry had free access to all of these and many other letters which have been collected in different parts of Germany, as well as to manuscript sermons and other writings contained in the Geneva Library. We have made free use of the materials found in Mr. Henry's Work whenever we have thought them to our purpose, and shall not during the course of this Article deem it necessary to refer in every case, to the page from which we have taken, or make any other acknowledgement than this general statement of our great obligation to that work. Other works consulted will be referred to in the course of the discussion.

companying them in their contests for the truth, we gain strength and courage to resist the foes by which we are beset, whether from without or from within. Are they conscientious and truth-loving like John Calvin, by sympathy with them we are made more careful not to violate our convictions of right, and more anxious to exclude as a base and hurtful thing all that is wrong in our actions, thoughts and feelings.

The time at which Calvin appeared, also gives special interest to his life, both with the Christian and the scholar. The greatest number of illustrious monarchs who ever reigned at one time, were then at the head of affairs in Europe. Henry VIII of England, second only to Francis I in personal accomplishments, was thought worthy of the title of "defender of the faith" or "Arch-heretic" according as he favored or opposed the Catholics. Francis I, a friend and patron of learning was crowned king of France in 1515, and died the same year with Henry VIII (1547). His rival, Charles I of Spain, V. of Germany, who was chosen emperor in 1519, when Calvin was ten years old, swayed for a time the destinies of half of Europe, opposed Luther, held Francis I captive in Spain, shut up the Pope in the castle of St. Angelo plundered Rome, fought successfully against Solymán the Magnificent, and when he died,

"left a name at which the world grew pale,
To point a moral and adorn a tale."

Pope Leo X. died when Calvin was young, but his works did not follow him. His influence was felt in many ways throughout Christendom, when Calvin came upon the stage of public action. The encouragement of learning, which has distinguished him above all the occupants of the papal throne for nearly twenty centuries, the establishment of seminaries of instruction, exertions for the recovery and publication of ancient works, munificence to professors of every branch of science, literature and art, even though they might be laboring directly for the aggrandizement of Rome, contributed not a little to the preparation of the way for the reformation in religion.

In Germany the Reformation had been several years in progress before Calvin commenced his labors, and although it had penetrated into France, its good effects were confined in a considerable degree to the country of Luther. The Reformed Church established in Switzerland by Zuingli, was little known beyond that country. The Swiss, hemmed in by their own mountains,

did not seem anxious to disseminate their peculiar views in other lands, and but for John Calvin, centuries might have glided away ere the little leaven that was at work there, had pervaded the surrounding countries. The first great battle of the Reformation had been fought, but a new leader and a new mode of attack were necessary. Princes and nobles and the educated were to be called, and some one was needed to take the guidance, who would be able to stand before kings and to reason with the thoughtful man; some one who could meet the student in his retirement and guide him by a strong hand. Luther's call was to pull down, to demolish, another must build up. The German Reformer by dwelling upon one article of the Christian scheme in opposition to the abuses of Rome, was well fitted to rouse attention, to influence the masses, but he left them without any sure guide. To his sorrow he found at Münster, that he had conjured up a spirit which would not down at his bidding. He had not made the *whole* Bible the only foundation of faith and practice. T X

There seems to be special propriety in inviting the attention of both the clergy and laity among us to the contemplation of the character of the great Reformer at the present time. There has been of late years not only in the Episcopal branch of the Reformed Church, but even among the lineal descendants of the Puritans and Huguenots, a growing disregard for one to whom more than to any other uninspired man, we owe the freedom and manliness of thought, the thorough and systematic views of Christian doctrine, the absence of slavish subserviency to forms, superstitious rites and church authority, which we claim as our inheritance and our chief joy. Too often even among our New England Christians has *Calvinist* been a term of reproach; it has been used to characterize those who defend the hardest doctrines of the Bible in the rudest manner, and protrude the sharpest angles and the roughest corners of the Christian system, until it should seem that religion was not intended for man or angel, so opposed is it to all our kindlier feelings and native impulses.

It has been somewhat common for those, who are in general less prejudiced, to consider Calvin as destitute of all the gentler qualities of soul which win our esteem. Some may have felt a kind of reverence for him as a logician, as a reasoner, as a defender of the truth in perilous times, but they have not dreamed that he was a person whom they could love. He has not been thought of as a companion by the domestic hearth, or in the social circle.

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The view, which many of us have taken of his character, has been a partial one. We have known him as the antagonist of Servetus, as the castigator of the Anabaptists and the inculcator of the doctrine of reprobation, but we have not known him as the devoted friend, the much loved companion, the protector of the oppressed, the retiring and timid student. His conduct has not always been traced back to moving causes. It has not been perceived that some of his worst faults are the result of the undue prominence of a good quality, such as a strong and conscientious love of truth. It is the design of the present inquiry to give, as far as we are able in the space allotted us, a view of the life and character of this great and good man, and if any are thus induced to look with more reverence, affection and gratitude upon him, our labor will not have been in vain.

Parentage and Early Life of Calvin.

At the beginning of the 16th century there lived at the small village, Le Pont l'Evêque, in the province of Picardy towards the north of France, a poor but honest old man, who gained his living by making vessels in which the surrounding peasants stored the produce of their vineyards. A large family circle¹ had clustered about him in the same village. One of his sons, Gerhard Cauvin or Calvin was *Procureur Fiscal* and secretary of the bishopric of Noyon, an ancient and celebrated village not far distant. This man though rigid in his religious principles, was possessed of a good judgment and skill in the management of whatever business he undertook. He was respected by all about him, and much loved by all the nobility of Noyon, especially by the family of Monmor the most distinguished in the province. He had married Anna Franc from Cambray, whose family was respectable, though possessed of but a moderate share of this world's treasures. She, as well as her husband, was scrupulously religious according to the principles and rites of the Romish church.

The second son of these worthy people, named John Calvin, (Latin Calvinus, and hence his common designation, John Calvin,) was born the 10th of July, 1509, the same year that Henry VIII was crowned king of England, and one year after Luther, then twenty-five years old, was established as preacher and pro-

¹ Many of these people afterwards changed their name to show their hatred of the great Reformer, and attachment to the Catholic church.—Henry, *Leben d. J. Calvins*, Bd. I. S. 24.

fessor of theology at Wittenberg. This child was baptized in the church of St. Godebert,¹ and early exhibited the effects of his careful training and a natural susceptibility to religious impressions. It is related that he was accustomed when a mere child to pray in the open air, and his vivid feeling of the presence of God in after life is traced to this practice. He also exhibited great horror of vice, and censured the faults of his companions with severity.² These indications of the disposition of the child influenced his father to destine him at an early age to the study of theology.³ In the epistle prefatory to Calvin's Commentary upon the Psalms, we have an expression of the feeling of the man as he looked back upon his childhood and traced the dealings of God with him. He exults, and praises God that he who exalted David from the fold of his flock, had counted himself, also of humble origin, worthy of the high office of preaching the Gospel.⁴

Calvin's early days were passed with the children of the noble family of Mommor. Mindful of this favor, he subsequently dedicated his first work, the Commentary upon Seneca, as the "firstlings of his fruit" to one of these early associates, Claude Hangeest, abbot of St. Eloi. He received the same discipline and instruction as these children, and is said to have excelled all his fellow pupils in acuteness of mind and power of memory.⁵ The germs of his future greatness were discovered and cherished by his noble patrons.

Of his personal appearance when young, little can be said. The wood-cuts of him prefixed to the oldest editions of his works, exhibit noble and very characteristic lineaments of countenance,

¹ Drelincourt's *Défense de Calvin*, p. 158. The same author also says, that John Calvin was born at the place where now stands the house of the Stag, and that he was reported to have been one of the singing boys of the choir. Desmay and Levasseur give similar accounts from the archives of Noyon. See Henry, *das Leben J. Calvins*, Bd. I. S. 31, and also *Beitrag* 2.

² See *Vies de Calvin et Bèze*, p. 6, and Beza's *Life of Calvin* (Opp. Omn. Tom. I.), where the biographer says that he received this account of him from credible witnesses among the Catholics, after Calvin had become distinguished.

³ *Theologiæ me pater tenellum adhuc puerum destinaverat*, Opp. Omn. Tom. III. p. 2.

⁴ *Sicuti ille [David] à caulis ovium ad summam imperii dignitatem evectus est, ita me Deus ab obscuro tenuibusque principiiis extractum, hoc tam honorifico munere dignatus est, ut Evangelii præco essem ac minister.*—Opera, Tom. III. p. 2.

⁵ Beza says: *Calvinus aequales acumine ingenii ac tenacis memoriæ beneficio superavit.*—Cal. Vita, Opp. Omn. Tom. I.

but they bear the marks of toil, struggling and pain, forming a very striking contrast to the round, full, happy face of Martin Luther. But Calvin must have been more comely in appearance earlier in life, than these portraits would seem to indicate. "His father, it is said, was well formed and his mother was called beautiful," and some of his features even when old, though marred by time and suffering, were fine. Beza has, perhaps, given the best description of his personal appearance: "He was in stature of medium size, and of a dark and pale complexion; his bright and expressive eyes indicated the penetration and activity of his mind even until his last days. In his dress he was neat but plain, in accordance with the simplicity of his character."¹ In some of the editions of his works, printed while he was alive, he is represented with a small cap on his head, and a pointed beard, having his eyes directed upward and with the motto: *Prompte et sincere*, beneath.

As Gerhard Calvin had devoted his son to the church, and his means of preparing him for his station were not abundant, he procured for him, when twelve years of age (1521), a small benefice, the chapel La Gesine, in the cathedral of his native city Noyon. His father also sent him, at his own expense, with the young Mommors to Paris, to receive instruction at the College de la Marche. Here he was under the care of M. Cordier, Regent of the college, a man illustrious for his learning and piety, who afterwards renounced popery, went to Geneva as a teacher in the gymnasium, and died there at the age of eighty-five, the same year with Calvin, his pupil. It was under this instructor, that Calvin laid the foundation, which afterwards enabled him to excel his own countrymen, if he did not equal the Italian scholars of the age, in the elegance and ease of his Latin style. From the College de la Marche, he was transferred to the college of Montaigu, where his preceptor, a learned Spaniard, taught him the scholastic philosophy. The uncommon endowments of the youth here also exhibited themselves. His mind was so active and his diligence so great, that he soon surpassed his fellow pupils, and was advanced from the course of languages to that of dialectics and the higher branches of education.²

We have but slight hints of the developments of the young scholar during the years of his course preparatory to the university, 1525—1527. It is the more to be regretted in consequence

¹ Vita Cal., Opp. Omn. Tom. I.

² Beza's Vita Cal.

of the troubled and confused condition both of the church and State at that time. The war between the emperor and Francis I. was raging at the beginning of 1525. Francis was taken prisoner at the battle of Pavia, Feb. 24, in which ten thousand men, including many of the nobility of France were slain. The next year the emperor turned his arms against the pope (Clement VII.), in order to punish him for absolving Francis from his obligation to observe the treaty of Madrid, by which he was released from captivity, and also for uniting in a league with Francis and some of the Italian princes against himself. The result of this war, the plundering of the Vatican, St. Peter's, the houses of the pope's ministers, and in fine the whole city of Rome in a more barbarous manner by the subjects of a Christian monarch than it had ever before been by Hun, Vandal or Goth, the imprisonment of the pope and the attempt to compel him to purchase his liberty by a large sum of money, filled all Christendom with horror. It would be pleasant to know the impression made by such events as these upon the thoughtful youth of sixteen, as he looked out from his retirement upon the confusion and wrong which everywhere met the view. 'But, says Mr. Henry, not even the letters that he wrote home, in which his youthful anger at these events, was certainly poured out, have been preserved.' It is still more to be regretted, that we know no more of the studies, the social enjoyments, and the mental struggles, by which the youth was gradually fitted for the important station which he was afterwards to occupy, but the waves of time have rolled over the record of these things and left few traces visible.

In his eighteenth year (1527) Calvin received the rectory of Martville. This was given him contrary to rule, since he had received no ordination except that of the tonsure,¹ and indeed no evidence can be found that any other ordination was ever conferred upon him.² He soon after, instead of this living, "received," says Desmay, a Catholic and Sorbonnist, "the parochial benefice of Pont l'Evêque, where his grandfather dwelt and his father was baptized. Thus was the flock given in charge to the wolf."³ He was presented to this place by Messire Claude Han-

¹ This first part of the ceremony of ordination in the Romish Church, may be received after the age of *seven* years. It seems to have been not unfrequently followed by ecclesiastical preferment as a special favor, though not according to the Canons. Compare Roscoe's *Life of Leo X.* Vol. I. 12 sq. For the ceremony of the Tonsure see Hurd's *Rites and Ceremonies*, p. 232.

² See Bayle, *Art. Calvin*, also Beza, *Vita Cal.*

³ Quoted by Henry, *Das Leben d. Cal.* Bd. I. S. 34.

gest, abbot of St. Eloi. This promotion seems to have awakened in him a youthful vanity, for he says: "A single disputation made me rector." His want of ordination did not prevent him from preaching several times to the people of the village Pont l'Evêque.

In reviewing the few notices, which are all that now remain of the early life of Calvin, and comparing his training and developments with those of Luther, we are impressed with the evidence of the guiding hand of God in preparing both of them for the respective parts they were to take, in rescuing the Christian world from the power and influence of the Romish hierarchy. It has been said that neither of them was fitted by nature to be a reformer. Calvin complained often that he was "by nature of a timid,¹ soft and shrinking mind," and a lover of seclusion; and Luther was melancholy and ascetic in his temperament. Yet they had qualities which, with the discipline they received, seemed to peculiarly fit them each for his own station. Luther, naturally of a more imaginative turn, and inclined to enthusiasm, was best qualified to influence the masses, the lower ranks of society; while the repose and earnestness of mind which Calvin ever exhibited, enabled him to reach the thoughtful and cultivated man.

Luther was "born poor and brought up poor, one of the poorest of men." He was a man of the people. Until he was noticed by his patroness, he was obliged to beg, singing under the windows of the rich for "alms and bread." Hardship and stern necessity were his; even the air he breathed, he was compelled to struggle for. In the school of suffering, resistance, and privation he learned to say and to feel too, that: 'Were there as many devils in Worms as roof-tiles, he would on.' Calvin's early associations were with the educated and refined. He was cradled in the lap of nobility. He knew no distinction between himself and the best blood in the province. Hence in his subsequent life, we see him stand by the side of princes, and counsel kings, with a dignity befitting the servant of the Most High. There is in him none of that cringing and fawning before royalty, or insult, and contumely towards the rich and noble when addressing the common people, which was too prevalent among the early reformers. The court of Margaret of Navarre, or the more polished one of Ferrara were honored by Calvin's

¹ In preface to the Psalms he says: *Ego qui natura timido, molli et pusillo animo me esse fateor*; and often during his life, and on his death-bed, repeats the same thing.

presence, while Luther's favorite resort was the "Black Eagle" tavern, where much of his "table talk" was taken down by eager listeners.

Calvin as Student at Law—Change in religious views, etc.
1528—1532.

The preferments which Calvin had received, did not blind his eyes to the errors of the Catholic church. It does not, however, certainly appear whether his growing dissatisfaction with it was the primary cause of the change made in his course of study when he was about eighteen years old. He says that his father, who perhaps foresaw the troubles which impended over the church, coveted for him the opulence and distinction, which was acquired by the practice of law, and transferred him from the study of philosophy to jurisprudence.¹ But it seems altogether probable that the father did not make this change without observing a disrelish in the son to the course which he had marked out for him. Be this as it may, however, it is certain from Calvin's subsequent life, that his university years were not spent in vain. He made good use of his legal studies, especially when called to aid in forming a new State, and was by them made worthy of the appellation of "Legislator of the Reformation."

It must have been at some time near the commencement of his university life, that Calvin first became acquainted with the Bible.² He had not yet learned Greek or Hebrew, and this Bible was probably the Latin translation of Faber Stapulensis, or the manuscript French translation of his kinsman Robert Olivetan,³ made in 1520.⁴ From this man, with whom Calvin now formed an acquaintance, he also received much religious instruction and perhaps his first decided interest in the pure doctrines of the Gospel was awakened through Olivetan's instrumentality.

¹ Cum videret legum scientiam passim augere suos cultores opibus, spes illa repente eum impulit ad mutandum consilium.—*Pr. ad Ps.*

² It seems to have been no unusual thing at that time, for even those devoted to religion to be unacquainted with this book. Luther first saw a Latin Bible in the Augustinian Cloister at Erfurth, when he was twenty years old, and this it seems was seldom shown even to visitors. Luther himself says: "The Bible was a book but rarely found in the hands of the religious, who knew much more of St. Thomas than of St. Paul."—*Audin's Life of Luther*, p. 13, 26.

³ A native of one of the valleys of Piedmont.

⁴ See Browning's *Hist. of the Huguenots*, p. 6.

Of the precise period of the conversion of Calvin, we are not informed, but it must have been during the first or second year of his residence at the university. No friend in warning was struck dead at his side, as in the case of Luther; no voice from heaven directed him, "to the cloister!" No sudden impulse from within or influence from without caused him suddenly to break off and denounce his literary studies, and to devote himself exclusively to meditation and prayer. The spirit of the age had changed since Luther first appeared. Thirty years of such mental activity as characterized the beginning of the 16th century, with the labors of men like Luther and Zuingli, had weakened the hold of the church upon the confidence of sincere worshippers. Besides, Calvin's whole previous life and discipline would lead us to expect, that a radical change of purpose would be effected in him in a manner very different from that of the German reformer. In Calvin we should expect it to be the result, under God, of sober, serious, dispassionate thought; of meditation during the night watches, amidst books and studies, upon the character and relations of the Creator and his creature man. His strong, abiding sense of the right and wrong of human conduct, would thus be brought into action and lead to correspondent emotions. Notwithstanding this, he himself recognizes a sudden change of views, produced through the agency of the Most High God. He says, that when he was so strongly addicted to the superstitions of the papacy, that he could not easily extricate himself from so deep a mire, God overcame him by a sudden conversion.¹ A passage quoted by Henry from his French works, shows the struggles which he had with himself in breaking away from a reliance upon the ceremonies of the Catholic church: "When I had performed all these [ceremonies], although I experienced some satisfaction, yet I was always far from absolute tranquillity of conscience; for as often as I descended into myself, or raised my mind to thee, extreme horror seized upon me, which no purifications, no expiations could appease. And the more closely I scrutinized myself, the more cruel were the goadings of conscience which I endured, so that I could not be undisturbed except by forgetting myself."²

¹ Deus tamen arcano Providentiæ suæ freno cursum meum alio tandem reflexit. Ac primo cum superstitionibus Papatus magis pertinaciter addictus essem quam ut facile esset e tam profundo luto me extrahi, animum meum, *subito conversione ad docilitatem subegit*.—Pref. to Psalms, Opp. Omn. Tom. III.

² P. 194. Gen. 1611.

A marked difference between the internal change of Calvin and Luther seems to be that, Calvin was converted from popery and Luther to it, so that he was obliged afterwards to throw off the shackles which it had put upon him. Calvin was prepared after a few struggles to rely with unshaken confidence and unchanging certainty upon the atonement of Christ, whilst Luther took vows upon him, fasted and agonized in prayer until, having completely exhausted his physical nature, he fell sick. When in this condition, a monk pitying his low estate told him that he had a remedy for his afflictions, "faith."¹ Luther was electrified at the word, his burden fell from his shoulders, and he went on like Bunyan's pilgrim toward the heavenly city. In ways so different did these two men commence the work which they were to perform, in a manner and by means as different as those by which they had been called to it.

Calvin's law-studies were first pursued at Orleans, under the direction of Peter de Stella, president of the Parliament at Paris, and the most acute jurist in France.² The character which he sustained at Orleans is evinced by the fact, that he was considered rather as teacher than pupil; and in the absence of the professors he often took their place in the lecture-room, and acquitted himself with so much ability, that when he left Orleans the faculty unanimously and gratuitously offered him a doctor's degree. Beza gives further testimonials of Calvin's diligence at this time, from his friends and fellow lodgers, still living when he wrote; 'He was accustomed after a frugal supper to pursue his studies until midnight, and after a few hours of sleep, while yet in bed in the morning, he resumed the subject which had engaged his attention during the previous day; and thus by reflecting upon and classifying what he had learned, he increased his power of acquisition, strengthened his memory, and laid the foundation for his future erudition, as well as sowed the seeds of physical disease, which subsequently caused him much suffering, and shortened his life.'

After leaving Orleans, Calvin pursued his studies at Bourges, under Andrew Alciati, an Italian lawyer, whose talents had given an enviable reputation to the university established there. He also formed an acquaintance with another distinguished man at Bourges, Melchior Wolmar,³ a German and a native of Roth-

¹ Audin's *Life of Luther*, p. 20.

² *Le plus aigu Jurisconsulte de France.*

³ The sole preceptor from childhood to mature age of the celebrated Beza, the biographer of Calvin.—Calvin and the Swiss Ref. p. 322.

weil in Suabia, but at that time professor of Greek, in the University of Bourges. From him Calvin learned the Greek language, and received much aid in establishing his yet unsettled religious principles. Similar literary tastes as well as religious feeling, contributed to the formation of a pleasant and lasting friendship between them. An extract from the dedication to him of the Commentary on 2 Corinthians, dated 1546, will show the value which Calvin placed upon his friendly assistance and encouragement: "I recollect how ready you were to give me aid; and as often as the opportunity was presented to show your love, you exerted yourself to improve me. But I especially remember now the early time when my father sent me to study law at Bourges, and I learned the Greek language under your guidance.—And it was not your fault that I did not make greater proficiency; you would have given me your guiding hand through the whole course, if the death of my father had not called me away."

Notwithstanding the progress made by Calvin in his legal studies, it seems that his best thoughts and hours were not devoted to them even when he was at Orleans. Direct preparation for his great work, and indeed its actual performance was already commenced. Beza says of him during this time, "There were already some men at Orleans who knew the truth, e. g. F. Daniel an advocate, and Nicolas Chemin,¹ but this was as nothing, until Calvin, yet very young, but already chosen as a special instrument for the work of the Lord, came there to study law. By the grace of God he devoted the best of his hours to theology, and in a short time so united wisdom with zeal for the kingdom of God, that he advanced it astonishingly in many families, not with formal language, which he always avoided, but with so great depth and so much dignity of speech, that even at that time no man could hear him without astonishment.—When at Bourges also Calvin strengthened all the faithful who were found in the city, and preached in the cloisters around. Among others the Seigneur of the little town Lignieres, who with his wife was accustomed to hear him, said of him: "This man teaches us at least something entirely new."²

Of his course whilst at the University he himself says, in the

¹ The friend to whom the first letter written by Calvin was directed. Many letters to the Daniel mentioned here yet remain.

² Beza, *Hist. Cal. Lib. l. p. 9, 16.*

preface to the Psalms:¹ "So soon as a desire for true holiness was awakened in me, I so longed for advancement, that I pursued my other studies with indifference, although I did not entirely lay them aside. Before a year had passed all those who loved the pure doctrine were accustomed to come to learn of me, as yet but poorly instructed in it. Naturally timid, I always loved meditation and retirement, and especially desired some quiet retreat in order to pursue my studies without interruption, but all my hiding places became like public schools."

While Calvin was at Orleans or Bourges in 1530, the universities were consulted with reference to the divorce of Henry VIII. It shows in what consideration he was held even then, that although not much more than twenty-one years old, his opinion was asked upon the question, and his answer given in a letter which is yet preserved.²

The Death of his Father.

Mr. Henry supposes that Gerhard Calvin died very soon after his son commenced the study of law, and quotes in proof of it the earliest writing which remains of the young Calvin. It is a letter dated 6th of May, 1528, (when he was about nineteen years of age,) at Noyon, where he had gone from Paris or Orleans, and is interesting not only as a youthful production, but as exhibiting traits of character which are so conspicuous in his subsequent correspondence, especially strong attachment to his friends, and conscientiousness: "The promise which I made you at my departure, to be with you again soon, has kept me a long time in suspense; for as I was thinking of returning to you, the sickness of my father caused me to delay. But when the physician gave encouragement that he would soon recover, I saw nothing else in the delay, but that my desire to see you, which was before very strong, was much increased by the interval of a few days. In the meantime day after day has passed until there is no long-

¹ Opp. Omn. Vol. III. Epist. at the beginning: *Nec dum elapsus erat annus quum omnes purioris doctrinae cupidi ad me novitium adhuc et tyronem discendi causa ventitabant, etc.*

² See Burnet's Hist. of the Ref. and Calvin's Epist. Ed. Lusanne, 1576, Epist. 384. It is true that Schroeckh (*Kirchenges. u. d. Reformation* S. 537) and some others suppose, that this letter was written later, but without giving any satisfactory reasons. All the circumstances favor the supposition that it was written when the university, where he resided, was consulted. Compare Henry, *das Leben u. s. a. S. 6.*

er any hope of his recovery, and the danger of death is certain. Whatever the event may be I shall see you again. Have you yet enrolled your name among the professors of literature? See to it that your diffidence do not make you negligent. Farewell dear Chemin, my friend, dearer to me than my life."¹

Beza, and other biographers place his father's death three years later, while he was a student at Bourges, and a passage in the dedication of his Commentary upon 2 Corinthians to Melchior Wolmar, where he speaks of being called away from Bourges by the death of his father, seems to indicate that the earlier biographer is correct, and accordingly that his father probably recovered from the sickness spoken of in the letter to Chemin.² We should be glad to know something of the feeling of the son at the loss of such a father, but we are left entirely to our own conclusions from the general characteristics of the Reformer. It cannot be doubted, we think, that he felt deeply the loss of one to whom he owed so much, since he ever shows so strong a feeling of gratitude to others who bestowed favors upon him. There is good reason to believe that both of his parents died, (no notice of the death of his mother has been found), as they had lived, good Catholics; and it is natural to suppose, that the son was restrained by regard for them from openly seceding from the church while they lived. At least, as we shall see, he did not long conceal his sentiments, after the interruption of his University course, as we suppose, by his father's death.³

The Reformation in France before 1530.

X The date of the commencement of Calvin's influence as a Reformer is placed at 1530—1532. In order to a just view of his character, it is necessary to give a brief sketch of the progress of the Reformation in France until that time. No country seems to have been so well prepared for the introduction of the tenets of the Reformers as France. It is indeed probable, that the doctrines of the Gospel had been cherished with a considerable degree of purity, in the valleys of Piedmont, from the earliest ages of the Christian church. The Reformation which commenced in Germany and Switzerland found here, very soon, a considerable number of adherents; yet nowhere has it been obliged to struggle against so violent opposition, and endure such cruel persecu-

¹ Mss. in the Genevan Library.

² Opp. Omn. Tom. VII. p. 217.

³ See Calvin and the Swiss Reform. p. 323.

tion. State policy, court intrigue, political parties and ambitious projects have in France more than elsewhere shaped its destinies.¹ Nowhere but at the French court could the decree of Merindole have been pronounced, and in no other country but France or Spain could its execution have been sanctioned.

Francis I. by his liberal policy in the beginning of his reign, attracted about him many scholars from foreign countries, especially from Germany. Intercourse with such men as William Budaeus, William Cop, and Peter Stella, and correspondence with Erasmus and others of similar character, induced him to look at first without much distrust upon the influence, which was exerted by learned foreigners in his dominions, in favor of the new views of religion. The sect afterwards known as Reformers and Huguenots, first made their appearance, in France, in the village of Meaux, within thirty miles of Paris.² J. le Fevre d'Étapes,³ tutor to the sons of the king, Arnaud and Gerhard Roussel of Picardy, and especially William Farel of Dauphiny, then teacher in the college le Morin at Paris, instructed some of the people of this village in the principles of the Gospel, as early as in 1521.⁴ Their bishop, the learned Briçonet, is said to have favored their proceedings at first, although afterwards, when persecution arose, he disavowed all sympathy with their doctrines. Here, soon after, the first reformed church was collected and one John (or Peter) Leclerc, a native of this village and by trade a wool-carder, was made their pastor. In a short time the congregation at Meaux amounted to three or four hundred persons. But their number made them known; and the clergy becoming alarmed, an edict was published against the heretics, through their influence, in 1523, and the congregation was broken up and dispersed.

¹ Schroeckh, *Kirchengesch. seit des Reform.* Bd. II. S. 208 sq.

² Du Pin, *Nouvelle Bibliothèque des Auteurs Ecclesiastique*, Tom. XIII. p. 173.

³ Le Fevre, Faber Stapulensis, was persecuted by the Sorbonne because, after a long struggle against them, he had introduced an improved method of studying philosophy and mathematics, and had proscribed scholasticism and thus brought their instructions into disrepute. He was also distinguished as a biblical student. He published a Commentary on Paul's Epistles in 1512, and upon the Gospels in 1522. In 1523 his Translation of the Gospels appeared at Paris, and in 1530 a translation of the whole Bible at Antwerp—Henry's *Leben d. J. Cal.* Bd. I. S. 17.

⁴ About this time, according to Browning's *History of the Huguenots*, p. 6, Melancthon and Bucer visited France; he does not however give his authority for the fact.

In consequence of this persecution, Farel retired to Neufchatel and Geneva, where he prepared the way for Calvin's arrival a few years later. Leclerc having written a letter against indulgences in which he represented the pope as Antichrist, was seized, and after being beaten with rods and branded with a hot iron, was banished, and shortly after burned at the stake. Le Fevre retired to Nerac in the territory of the queen of Navarre.¹ Gerhard Roussel, after returning from a visit to Luther, remained in the service of the same queen. Many were driven from France in consequence of these violent proceedings.

When Francis returned from his captivity in Spain in 1526, he found that the Lutheran heresy had spread throughout France; and it was hinted to him that God's vengeance was even then visiting the country in consequence of it. He forthwith encouraged civil prosecution against all those who were guilty of preaching this heresy. The influence of the dutchess d'Estampe, who secretly favored the reform, and of the queen of Navarre was more than counterpoised by that of the cardinal de Tournon, archbishop of Lyons, the king's principal adviser. He alone was said to "equal in cruelty a whole Inquisition." In 1528 Dymond Levoy and six others were burned at the stake, and the king

¹ Margaret of Navarre was the only sister of Francis I. The celebrated Jane of Navarre or Jane d'Albret, mother of Henry IV., was her daughter. She was distinguished for the encouragement which she gave to agriculture, commerce, and the arts in her dominions, but more for the protection which she extended to the persecuted protestants. At first, without openly embracing the doctrines of the Reformation, she plead the cause of the Reformers at the court of Francis, and sheltered them in her own little principality of Bearn. But she afterwards avowed her sentiments so publicly, that the constable Montmorenci, did not hesitate to say to the king, that if he would extirpate heresy he "must begin with the queen his sister." But the king had so much confidence in her sisterly affection that he replied, "Do not speak to me upon that matter, she loves me too well to think otherwise than I approve."—Browning's *Hist. of the Huguenots*, p. 6—Margaret wrote a book entitled: 'The Mirror of a sinful Soul,' at which the Sorbonne were greatly offended. She also had a prayer-book prepared for her use, in which all the invocations of the mother of God and the saints, were omitted, (Du Pin, T. 13. p. 174,) and appointed Roussel to the bishopric of Oleron. She possessed considerable poetic talent, and sometimes by the liveliness of her composition, passed the bounds of propriety, although she was remarkably pure in her life. By her exertions for Francis, when a captive in Spain, she acquired an influence which she ever exerted as much as was in her power, to soften and control the cruel disposition of her brother and his counsellors, against the persecuted in his dominions. The king commonly named her: "Sa mignonne."

went bareheaded, and accompanied by a procession of priests and monks, to see the execution.¹

Some of the works of Luther were already considerably known in France. The anathemas of the Sorbonne against them and their author, whom they called one of the worst of heretics, did not prevent their circulation. John Froben a printer at Basil writes to Luther: "Having obtained at the last Frankfort fair a copy of certain treatises written by you, which have been approved by learned men, I immediately put them to press, and sent six hundred copies to France and Spain."² Persecution increased with the increasing spread of the reformed opinions, and many persons before 1530, in addition to those previously mentioned, obtained the crown of life "yet so as by fire."

Calvin at Paris.

The date of several unpublished letters in the Library of Geneva, shows that Calvin was in Paris a considerable time during his university course. These letters exhibit the private character of Calvin so well, that some extracts cannot be uninteresting. One dated Paris, June 24th, 1529, to Francis Daniel, when Calvin was twenty years of age, shows, that he had not then openly renounced the practices of the Catholic church, although they seem not to have had a very strong hold upon him. A sister of Daniel, it appears, was about to take the vow of celibacy at Paris. "After we arrived here a few days since, I was so fatigued with the journey, that I could not for four days set foot out of the house; although I was scarcely able to endure it, I passed the time in the greetings of my friends. Sunday I went to the convent with Cop, who wished to accompany me, so that, as you suggested, I might pass the holyday, on which your sister had permission to make her vows, with the cloister-women. Among them was a daughter of the banker at Orleans, to whom your brother is apprenticed. While he spoke with the abbess of her, I inquired of your sister in reference to her state of mind, whether she took the yoke upon herself with tender feeling, or having stifled feeling was inflexible. I mentioned to her several times, that she could confide in me all the misgivings which she might have. I never saw greater willingness or readiness.—It might be said that she sported with toys, so often did she speak of vows. I did not wish to dissuade

¹ This fact is related on the authority of Browning, *Hist. of Huguenots*, p. 7.

² M'Crie's *Hist. of the Reform. in Italy*, p. 51.

her from her purpose, for I had not gone there with that design, but she told me in few words, that she should not rely too much on her own strength, in order not to promise anything rashly, but entirely on the power of God in whom we are and live."—"As respects myself, I have yet no settled abode, although many have been offered me, and I have been requested by my friends to avail myself of their kindness at my pleasure. The father of Coiffart has offered me his hospitality so cordially, that you would say it was entirely proper for me to join myself as companion to the son. Coiffart himself has also often importuned me to become a fellow-lodger with him. And nothing has been more grateful to me than this good will of a friend, whose companionship, as you yourself know, would be externally so pleasant and profitable. I should have forthwith acceded to his proposal, had I not previously decided to devote myself this year to Damesius, whose school is quite remote from Coiffart's dwelling. All your friends send greetings especially Coiffart, and Vierman with whom I ride. Greet your mother, your wife, your sister Francisca. Farewell."¹

In another letter of Nov 13th, 1529, he expresses his gratitude to Daniel for pecuniary assistance. He devotes himself and all that he possesses to him.—Moreover he will always be ready to ask of him again: *neque enim foeneraris beneficia sed gratuita largiris.*—He expresses his misgivings on account of his demands: *Forte videar oblique pecuniam exigere, sed ne tu oblique mordax, et parum benignus interpres, nisi ut soles, lepide jocularis, etc.*—He asks him to greet Wolmar whom he calls simply Melchior, and shows in what manner he calls in the books he had lent: *Odysseam Homeri quam Sucqueto commodaveram, finges a me desiderari et receptam penes te habebis.*²

In a letter to N. Chemin written the same year, 1529, he exhibits his strong sense of right even in small things. He takes nothing easily, nothing with true French indifference, especially in friendship. He concludes this letter by asking Chemin to greet all his friends except F., "whom," he says, "I have concluded to soften by my silence since I have been unable, either by affectionate entreaty or strong language, to extract anything from him; and what is worst of all, when his brother came here, he did not even send me salutations by him."³

After leaving the university, Calvin again resided for a time at

¹ Mss. of the Genevan Library.

² Henry, B. 41, 42, quoted from the Mss. of the Gen. Lib.

³ Gen. Mss.

Paris. Religious feeling now governed his whole life. He gave up all his previous pursuits for theology and the advancement of the new doctrines. Soon after, he openly renounced the living which had been bestowed upon him, although he might have still retained it, had he chosen to do so.¹ The Lutherans in Paris, for so those who adopted the tenets of the Reform were still called, as the name Huguenot had not yet been applied to them, were accustomed to meet privately and Calvin preached to them. His influence both in private and in his sermons was daily felt more and more by all who loved the truth.² The strong views, which thorough study and the powerful influences of the divine Spirit enabled him to take of Scripture doctrine, were just what was needed to strengthen the faith of those who had hardly yet emerged from the darkness of popish superstition. The power of his own faith and the positive tone of his sermons are indicated by the formula with which his appeals to his audience always closed: "If God be for us who can be against us."

The vigor, perseverance and success with which he applied himself to this his first work, is well exhibited by a contemporary French writer and a Catholic: "In the midst of his books and his studies he was of a nature most active for the advancement of his sect. We have sometimes seen our prisons overflowing with poor misguided people, whom he incessantly exhorted, consoled and confirmed by letters; and messengers were never wanting to whom the doors were open, notwithstanding the watchfulness of the jailors against them. Such were the measures at the outset, by which he gained over, foot by foot, a part of our France. In like manner, after a long time, seeing a disposition to follow him, he determined to take a bolder step³ and send us ministers, called by us preachers (*Predicans*), to exercise his religion in secret even in our city of Paris, where death-fires were kindled against them."⁴ Among other hearers of Calvin at this time at Paris, there was a merchant named Etienne de la Forge who ac-

¹ According to Drelincourt, as quoted by Bayle, *Art. Calvin*, this was not done until 1534.

² The historian Claude Fleury says: *Etant a Paris, il se fit bien tôt connoître a ceux qui avoient secrettement embrassé la reformation, et il eut avec eux d'étroites liaisons qui fortifierent en lui le faneste penchant qu'il avoit pour toutes les nouvelles opinions.*—*Histoire Eccl.* Tom. 27. p. 396.

³ *Franchir le pas.*

⁴ *Pasquier Recherches de la France*, L. VIII. p. 769. Compare Henry Leben u. s. a., Bd. I. Beil. I.

complished much for the Gospel, and afterwards endured a martyr's death and doubtless received a martyr's reward.¹

Commentary upon Seneca De Clementia.

During the first year of Calvin's stay at Paris after leaving the university (1532), he published an edition of Seneca De Clementia with a Commentary. He was induced to do this by the severity of the persecution against the favorers of the Reformation. He hoped by this means to reach the king, who was accustomed to see all the literary productions of his subjects, and to show him and other persecutors the folly of their course. The danger which he incurred, did not prevent him from speaking out boldly and freely in this commentary. Seneca in the original treatise recommends clemency to Nero, including in this term all the virtues which relate to the intercourse of man with man, and points out not only the danger but the futility of the exercise of tyrannical power. Calvin's design was, covertly to compare the king to Nero, and to show, that there was in this treatise of Seneca, instruction profitable for the princes of his own time. He also wished to threaten the king by representing the instability of a tyrant's throne. The republication of an old author was chosen, because a new work in which such sentiments were expressed could not have been issued. This work seemed to be just adapted to Calvin's purpose. Besides, Seneca was a favorite author with him; the earnestness and the strong feeling of justice which was exhibited in this treatise, found a full response in his breast.

The commentary consists mainly of explanations of the facts and ideas in the original, and shows by numerous quotations from ancient authors the extent and thoroughness of Calvin's early studies. It is said by Waterman to be "a specimen of learning and eloquence unrivalled as the production of a young man at the age of twenty-two [twenty-three] years." The boldness of some of his remarks is surprising when we consider the circumstances in which the volume was issued. In the first chapter he says: "It has been said not without reason by Plutarch, that it is difficult to give counsel to those who are seated on thrones; for they think it is not kingly to live according to the dictates of rea-

¹ Calvin says of him in the 4th chap. of his book against the Libertines: *Peu Etienne de la Forge dont la mémoire doit être bénite entre les fidèles comme d'un saint martyr de Christ.*

son, since the greatness of the king consists in unrestrained license. They call it servile to submit to another's direction; therefore they shape their conduct according to their own rule and habit, or rather according to their own desire," etc.¹ In the 26th Book, Calvin says: "Here he [Seneca] shows how dangerous it is for a ruler to allow himself to be governed by cruelty and wrath, since so many avengers may arise; and even if he were perfectly secure from them, cruelty is so abominable and despicable, that on this account alone it is worthy of execration. Finally, how far such a barbarous feeling should be from a prince! The destruction of others is the destruction of his power, the advancement of the happiness of the whole and of individuals establishes and augments his greatness."

The dedication of this book to Claude Hangest (Mommor), abbot of St. Eloi, is dated at Paris, April 4th 1532: "This Commentary accept as the firstlings of my fruits, which of right belong to you, since to you I owe myself with all that I possess, but especially since I was nurtured as a child in your house, and initiated into the same studies with you," etc. Near the beginning of this dedication he says: "I must ask to be excused, since I, a poor man from the people am possessed of but a moderate, rather indeed a small share of learning, and have nothing which could produce much hope of honor. This sense of my unworthiness has kept me until now from publishing anything." Calvin's strong feeling of gratitude and of his own unworthiness, was however connected with a degree of confidence that his work was not without merit: "I am persuaded," he says, "that a really just critic will yield me some small degree of gratitude for this work." But yet his letters show that he was not without the solicitude which young authors are accustomed to feel.

To Francis Daniel, from Paris 1532, he writes: "The Books of Seneca on Clemency are finally printed at my own expense and trouble. Now exertions must be made to collect funds from every quarter to defray the expense of this edition. Further, in order that I may be certain in what estimation I am held, I wish you to write me with what favor or hostility the commentary shall be received. I send you a copy, which keep for yourself."² Another letter to F. Daniel, dated Paris, April 22d, is of a somewhat similar tenor: "Finally the die is cast. My Commentary has been issued, but at my own expense, which has required

¹ See Henry, Bd. I. S. 53.

² *Mss. Archivi Ec. Berpensis.*

more specie than you would believe. Now I am using every exertion to collect in what I have paid out. I have persuaded some professors in this city to notice the book, and a friend in the university of Bourges has been induced to announce it from the pulpit. You also can aid me in this, and will, I doubt not, for old acquaintance sake, especially as it can be done without endangering your own reputation, and perhaps with some public advantage. If you conclude to do me this favor, I will send you a hundred copies, or as many as you think best. In the meantime accept this copy and when you receive it, do not think yourself laid under obligations by it. I wish you to act perfectly freely. Farewell, and write soon."¹

This Commentary was published in his own name translated into Latin, as was very often done at that time, (Calvinus, originally Caulvin) which he afterwards generally retained.² The influence upon the king was as little seen, as upon Nero when the book was originally published. In this same year (1532), Francis united himself in a new league with the pope against the emperor, and there was much said of convening a general council of the church to settle all differences.

A letter from Calvin to Bucer dated Noyon, Sept. 1532, shows that he was already in correspondence with the Strasburg Reformers, and is worthy of quotation in connection with the account of the Treatise on Clemency as indicating Calvin's warm sympathy for those who were persecuted. It concerns a refugee who was accused of being an anabaptist: "If my entreaties, if my tears avail anything, I implore thee, Bucer, aid him in his necessity. To thee he betakes himself in his distress. Thou wilt succor the orphan. Let him not fall into the extremity of misery," etc.

Calvin's flight from Paris—Residence in Angouleme and in Nerac—Return to Paris, 1533, 1534.

A new occasion soon offered itself for Calvin to attempt to exert an influence over the authorities and citizens of the higher ranks in Paris. Nicolas Cop, the rector³ of the Sorbonne, accord-

¹ Mss. Archiv. Ec. Bernensis.

² See Pseudonymie Calvin's, Henry, Das Leben u. s. a. Beil. 3. Seite 29.

³ Mr. Henry says: der neuerwählte Rektor, but I do not find evidence that this was an Inaugural Address. It should rather seem to be the recurrence of an annual exercise.

ing to custom, delivered a public address on the day in which the Catholics celebrate the festival of All-Saints (1st of Nov.). In this oration he spoke with much freedom of the errors of the church, and of the doctrines of the pure Gospel. So open an attack could not be passed unnoticed. The Sorbonne was in commotion, and the Parliament demanded, that the rector should be brought before them to answer for his conduct. It does not certainly appear what agency Calvin had in the preparation of this address.¹ But whether he was the author or only the adviser of Cop, suspicion rested on him. Cop intended at first to appear before the tribunal, but being warned by his friends of the danger, he contrived to escape from his attendants, and went to his native city Basil. They sent forthwith to arrest Calvin. The bloody Morin went to his lodgings at the College Fortet, but he either happened to be absent, or escaped in the garb of a vine-dresser, after having been let down from the window in a basket.² His papers, among which were many letters to his friends, were seized, and thus most of those who had written him were brought into imminent danger, so violent was the hatred against him. But the queen of Navarre interposed in behalf of Calvin and others who favored the reformed doctrines, and thus, for the time, averted the impending storm.

Although this bold attempt of the youthful Reformer resulted so unfavorably, he was not disheartened. The protection of the queen of Navarre gave him new courage. The very success of his persecutors advanced in the end the cause of the reformation; for his unsettled life enabled him to exert a more extensive influence than he otherwise would have done. The seed was sown broad-cast over France and all the attempts of the enemy to root it up were vain.

He first went to Angouleme in Saintonge, where he received a hearty welcome in the house of his friend Louis du Tillet, canon of Angouleme.³ Here at the request of this friend he wrote

¹ Du Pin says: Calvin la composa: Fleury: Cop avec lui de frequentes conversations: Beza: suggessit eam Calvinus, in qua purius et apertius quam antea consuevisset, de Religione disserebatur.

² Beza says: Quo forte domi non repeto. Desmay according to Drelincourt p. 175: Calvin echappé par la fenestre se sauva de le fauxbourg de St. Victor au logis d'un vigneron et changea là dedans ses habits, etc. This account substantially seems to have been current among the people, and is corroborated among others by P. Masson.

³ Frère de Jean Tillet greffier du Parlement de Paris et de Tillet évêque de Meaux.

short Sermons or exhortations,¹ which were read by the curates on the Sabbath, and scattered among the people. Thus they were silently but surely interested in the new doctrines. Du Tillet afterwards fled with Calvin to Switzerland, and later still recognized him at Geneva and brought him forth from the concealment which he so much desired. It seems that Calvin remained some time in Angouleme. One hundred and fifty years after, his residence there was remembered, for a vineyard was then called, "the vineyard of Calvin." While there he resided in the house of Du Tillet, whom he taught the Greek language. He also commenced and, it is said, wrote a great part of, the first edition of the Institutes of the Christian Religion, while in Angouleme.

In compliance with an invitation from queen Margaret, Calvin visited Nerac, her residence. Here he first saw J. le Fevre d'Estaples, who, as mentioned above, had taken refuge in Bearn from the violence of the Sorbonne. This grey-haired old man comprehended at once the character of the youthful guest, and confirmed the queen in her prepossessions in his favor. He foretold, at that time, that he would be a powerful instrument for establishing "the kingdom of God" in France. Not unlike this was the declaration of the old priest to Luther, when he was dangerously ill at Erfurth, that 'he would not die, for God had great things in store for him, and would exalt him, and enable him to console others in turn; for God loveth whom he chasteneth.'²

During Calvin's residence at the Court of Navarre, in 1533, he wrote F. Daniel, giving some account of the troubles of the queen, on account of her attachment to the cause of the Reformation. In her book, entitled *The Mirror of a Sinful Soul*, she had omitted many of the doctrines of the church and substituted for them justification by the blood of Christ. This book excited the indignation of the Sorbonne, and they placed it among the books which were prohibited. But when a complaint was made to the king, they were obliged to retract. Hatred to the book led to the acting of a play at the college of Navarre, in which a queen was introduced as receiving the gospel from a Fury, which destroyed her senses and caused her to perpetrate many foolish and cruel deeds. The leaders in this affair were called to an account, and tried before a civil tribunal.³

¹ Du Pin speaks of them as a volume entitled: *Avis chretiens pour être lûs par les Curez, aux Prones.*

² Audin's *Life of Luther*, Eng. Tr. p. 13.

³ The original letter, which is too long for translation here, may be seen,

Before the close of the year 1533, Calvin returned to Paris. Permission was obtained for him to do this by the queen of Navarre, although she advised him to remain in her own dominions, as it might be difficult to protect him at Paris, where the Sorbonne were on the watch to detect and put down the least risings of heresy. He seemed to have been conducted thither at this time by an all-seeing Providence, to resist an evil which has pressed upon the reformed church to this day. Servetus, who had found himself without adherents in Germany, where he had been laboring to disseminate his heretical (not to say blasphemous) views of the Trinity, "had come hither also." He sent some of the tracts, which he had previously published, to Calvin, and specified a time at which he would hold a public discussion with him. Calvin gladly accepted the challenge, notwithstanding the danger to which it exposed him, in consequence of the personal hatred of the king and the Sorbonne. It should seem, if Calvin and Servetus could have met at this time and held a friendly discussion, that an enmity which ended so disastrously, might have been avoided, or at least mitigated. But Servetus did not venture to oppose himself to such an antagonist, at the time appointed, and henceforth hastened to his dark fate.

The Psychopannychia.

Some time during the year 1534 Calvin published, at Orleans, his work on the Sleep of the Soul.¹ It was intended as a confutation of the belief that the soul, separated from the body, remains dormant from death until the resurrection. This was one of the errors that the Anabaptists had brought from Germany into France. This sect assumed, in the latter country, substantially the garb of simple Christianity, and was, on this account, a great hindrance to the Reformation. For it was easy to confound those who embraced its tenets with the true witnesses of the gospel, and for opposers to represent their senseless fanaticism as the legitimate

Calv. Opp. Omn. Tom. IX. Epist. 1, and a translation in Waterman's Life of Calvin, p. 239 sq.

¹ The full title of this work, in the French ed. is : *Traité par lequel est prouvé que les ames veillent et vivent après qu'elles sont sorties des corps : contre l'erreur de quelques ignorans qui pensent qu'elles dorment jusques au dernier jugement.* Préface de J. Calvin adressée à un sien ami, d'Orleans, 1534. In Latin : *Psychopannychia quo refellitur eorum error qui animas post mortem usque ad ultimum judicium dormire putant.* Paris, 1534.

result of the opposition to the established church. They also did much injury by destroying the unity of effort necessary to make the greatest progress against the abuses and errors of the church. Many of their doctrines were not easily answered by the uneducated mass, and hence the necessity for such men as Luther and Calvin to direct their shafts, not against the great enemy, but against those who professed to fight in the ranks of the reformers.

A summary of the contents of this book may be found in Henry's *Life*, page 63 sq. Even at this early age (twenty-five), the author exhibits the same qualities, "a strong memory, a clear and comprehensive intellect, and varied learning,"¹ as in his later works. The condensed thought, the power of reasoning, and the original tone of the work, are truly surprising. The Scriptures are the foundation of the whole argument, and the confidence with which Calvin appeals to and expounds them and thus confutes his antagonists, with their own assumed weapons, shows the diligence with which he had studied the Bible, not less than his power of comprehending and unfolding the truths contained in it. There is also much severe, cutting irony in the book, against the "sleepers and dreamers," who believe that the soul will sleep at death. But he says that "he will not pour out his anger without measure even against the Anabaptists; but wishes so to fashion his argument, that it will persuade rather than compel, and draw those who are unwilling to be led. His desire is to bring all back peaceably into the right way, rather than to attack them violently."²

Calvin leaves France.

The year 1535 was generally unpropitious for the cause of the reformation. Francis I. threw off all the restraints which the queen of Navarre had placed around him, and came out openly and violently against the reformers. It is true that in England king Henry the VIII., in consequence of the refusal of the pope to sanction his divorcement, had forfeited the honor of "defender of the faith," which he had acquired by his book on the seven sacraments, against Luther, and throwing off all allegiance to the see of Rome, had declared himself head of the church in his dominions.

¹ Waterman's *Life of Calvin*, p. 9.

² Nec contra eos, nisi modice, bilem effudi. * * * Omnes certe in viam reducere magis quam incessere, animus fuit.—Opp. Omn. Tom. VIII. p. 336.

The previous year parliament had also confirmed this assumption. But Calvin did not, as many others, count this a fortunate event. In his Commentary on Amos chap. 7: 13, he says : " Those who, in the beginning, exalted Henry so much, were certainly inconsiderate ; they bestowed on him the highest power over all, and this grieved me very much ; then, a thing more to be lamented, they named him the *chief head of the church* under Christ ; that was going too far." During this year the Anabaptists were suppressed in Germany by the taking of the city of Münster ;¹ but their errors were more widely diffused in the neighboring countries. The league of Smalcald, first made among the Protestants in 1530, was renewed, and the emperor Charles undertook his successful crusade against Barbarossa in Paris.

The persecution which followed the Placards of Jan. 29th, 1535, together with Calvin's desire to find a quiet retreat for study, now influenced him to leave France. Basil, it will be recollected, was the place to which Cop had previously retired. The Reformation began there ten years before, and many circumstances rendered it a desirable place of abode for Calvin at this time. Its retirement was favorable for the accomplishment of an object which he looked forward to with hope, namely, the completion of the first edition of his Institutes. Besides, Calvin always sought retirement and opportunity for study, when duty did not oppose.

Accompanied by his friend Louis du Tillet, he proceeded on his way from Orleans to Basil, through Lorraine. Near Metz they were robbed by a servant, who escaped with one of their horses, and they would have been entirely destitute of the means of proceeding on their journey, but for another servant, who happened to have in his possession ten crowns, which was barely sufficient to enable them to reach Strasburg. Calvin did not meet the German reformers as a stranger. His labors and his spirit had gone before him. From his sympathy with them he lived, from this time, a new life. His great earnestness, his depth of character and conscientiousness, all were appreciated by his fellow laborers in Strasburg. He soon, however, proceeded to Basil, where he first saw S. Grynaeus, who, distinguished both as a theologian and philologist, read lectures upon the Scriptures, and especially upon all the classics. He also formed a firm friendship with Wolfgang Capito, the pioneer of the Reformation at Basil. He lived here in close retirement, and, aided by Capito, applied

¹ Robertson's Charles V. Book v. Works, Vol. IV. p. 281 sq.

himself zealously to the study of the Hebrew language,¹ a knowledge of which he found to be necessary to his highest usefulness.

ARTICLE VII.

REMARKS ON THE AUTHENTICITY AND GENUINENESS OF THE PENTATEUCH.

By B. B. Edwards, Professor at Andover.

It is certainly not the part of wisdom to introduce to the American Public, indiscriminately, the skeptical opinions on morals and religion which prevail in Europe. Some of these opinions will soon perish on the soil that gave them birth. Before they can be confuted, they will cease to exist.² Other opinions are so interwoven with habits of thinking peculiar to the people of continental Europe; they are the product of a state of society, philosophical and religious, so unlike our own, that the attempt, on our part, to controvert, or even to comprehend them, would be a fruitless labor.

But some of the opinions referred to are not indigenous in France or Germany only. They are by no means exotics in English or American soil. Indeed not a few of the most destructive theories that prevail in Germany, were transplanted from England. The German skeptic is the lineal descendant of men who once figured in English literature. Doubts or disbelief in respect to the doctrines of revelation which exist among us, are the spontaneous growth of our own institutions and habits of thought, and have been only reinforced from abroad. It has been obvious, for a number of years, that there has been an increasing tendency in certain quarters to question or reject the divine authority of the Old Testament. This has been manifest in the case of some individuals who have no special regard for German literature, or

¹ In "Calvin and the Swiss Reform." it is said: "He applied himself to the Hebrew and Syriac, in order to the better understanding of the Old Testament." p. 322.

² F. A. Wolf is said to have remarked, that "what comes forward in Germany with *eclat*, may be expected, for the most part, to end, after some ten years, *shabbily*."

who may have even a positive antipathy to it. The origin of their doubts is either within themselves, or it must be ascribed to habits of thinking and acting peculiar to Americans. Foreign skepticism is not specially in fault.

While the Old Testament generally is assailed, the Pentateuch is made the subject of special attack. Moses, it is alleged, is the least trustworthy of the Jewish historians, or rather the genuineness of the Pentateuch is denied altogether, and its authorship, unceremoniously, thrust down to the Babylonish captivity or still later. Many of the miraculous events which it describes, are regarded as no better than Rabbinic fables, or Grecian myths.

It may be well here to inquire, briefly, into some of the grounds of this prevalent skepticism. Why are the Hebrew Scriptures, and the five books of Moses particularly, subjected to these fresh assaults? Some causes may exist which have hitherto been unknown, or comparatively inoperative.

A prominent ground of this skeptical tendency is the injudicious, or incorrect method, which has been pursued by not a few orthodox interpreters of the Old Testament. They have never distinctly seen the relations which exist between the Old Testament and the New. They do not, practically at least, recognize the great truth, that God has communicated his revelations gradually. They have looked for the meridian sun in the faint light of the morning. They seem never to have entered into the spirit of the declarations, that *Christ* brought life and immortality to light, and that the least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than the illustrious forerunner of our Lord. In their view, the patriarchs did not see through a glass darkly, but enjoyed almost the perfect vision of the apostles. A system of types, extending to minute particulars, and to bad men, as well as to good, has been forced into the interpretation of the Old Testament, to the detriment of all sound philology, and often of common sense. Men of eminent learning, in our own days, have found in the Mosaic ritual all varieties of allegory and hidden sense, so that, almost literally, every cord has cried out of the tabernacle, and every pin from its timber has answered. In the predictions of the Old Testament, a speciality, or a minute historical reference has been discovered, alike at variance with the nature of prophecy and the actual events of history. In such circumstances, reasonable men might naturally be deterred, not only from adopting such a method of interpretation, but from placing much confidence in the inspired records themselves. They insensibly learn to question

the authenticity of a document which is susceptible of a hundred warring interpretations. Wearied with the incongruities or absurdities of the annotator, they have become distrustful of that on which he has wasted his pains.

Another source of the skepticism in question, is the supposed incompatibility of some of the discoveries of modern learning with the records of the Pentateuch. The students of natural science confidently affirm the indefinite antiquity of our globe, and describe the wonderful operations which were going on in its bosom ages before man was formed upon its surface. Some of these investigators, it must be confessed, proceed as independently as if the Mosaic records did not exist; or if these ancient documents should chance to cross their track, they brush them aside with as little ceremony as they would the cosmogony of Ovid or the theory of Burnet. On the other hand, some theologians have been unduly sensitive in respect to these conclusions of geology, not remembering that Revelation and true science will never be found, ultimately, at variance, and that the period of their apparent discrepancy is generally short. But instead of waiting for time to unfold the mystery, they have denied or denounced, in their zeal for revelation, the unquestionable facts of science. In these circumstances, a third party interpose and cut the knot which they cannot untie. They discern no difficulty in the case, for the book of Genesis is a common history, a mixture of things credible and incredible, or it is a highly seasoned poetical composition. If a discovery of science conflicts with a statement of Moses, then the latter is set aside as having no more authority than an affirmation of Diodorus or Livy. Thus these apparent conflicts between philology and natural science are inconsiderately made the ground of denying the credibility of the written history.

Another cause, which may be mentioned, is the contradictory views which have been entertained in respect to certain usages, tolerated or regulated in the Pentateuch, but which a more spiritual dispensation has been supposed to abolish. In relation to these usages, opinions diametrically opposite have been defended. According to one party, the customs referred to have the immediate, divine sanction. They are not simply the growth of an early state of society, or of oriental institutions, but they meet necessities which are common to man. They are essential to, or at least are admissible in the most perfect condition of humanity. Another party, by doing violence to the language of the Penta-

teuch, virtually deny the existence of these customs, or endeavor to rid them of their most essential characteristics; affirming that certain usages of modern times are in their own nature and always wrong, they wrest the plainest texts of the Pentateuch from their obvious sense, in order to free the inspired word from the calumny of their opponents. Others, in the mean time, look with equal contempt upon both of these conflicting opinions. Their skepticism is only augmented by this radical diversity of ideas in those who believe in the divine authority of the Pentateuch. They regard the custom which has been proscribed or eulogized, as merely an evidence of a very barbarous state of society, and the regulations of the lawgiver respecting it, as well as the record of the historian, as unauthoritative and uninspired. And it must be acknowledged, that nothing could be better fitted to cherish an unbelieving spirit, than the extreme opinions that have been alluded to. Reasonable men may well hesitate to receive a revelation to which its friends apply the most hostile modes of interpretation. In fact every text distorted, every interpretation far-fetched or unnatural, does something towards subverting the authority of the entire Scriptures, as it becomes a source of doubt and incredulity which extends far beyond itself.

The superficial philanthropy and religion, which find not a little currency in our land, is an additional cause of the skepticism in question. The special design of the New Testament, it is alleged, is to reveal, or render more impressive, the doctrines of the immortality of the soul and the paternal character of God. An unavoidable inference from such an allegation is, that the Deity of the Old Testament is different from, or hostile to, the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. The Mosaic Divinity is a stern tyrant or an inflexible judge, not a Being of overflowing benignity. The theophany on Sinai is the fiction of oriental fancy, portraying the *avatar* of some malignant demon. A view of the Divine character extensively prevails at the present day, which is adverse to the entire spirit of the New Testament, and which virtually leads to the denial of the most explicit declarations made by the Saviour himself. Religion is divested of its commanding features, and is made to meet the necessities of a part of our constitution only. The susceptibilities of fear, and of reverence for law and authority, though as much original properties of man as pity or any other power that has been most abundantly appealed to, are degraded and cast out as worthless.

These superficial views of religion naturally lead to a superfi-

cial philanthropy. The tenderest compassion is felt for the criminal, or rather for the unfortunate individual, overtaken in a fault, while few tears are shed for injured virtue or for society menaced with dissolution. A sacredness is attributed to human life, which has no warrant either in the New Testament or the judgment of a pure-minded philanthropist, and which would annihilate the right or possibility of national or individual self-defence. The reformation of the delinquent, it is confidently alleged, is the only, or the principal object of human laws. The Old Testament and the Pentateuch especially, standing as obstacles in the path of these charitable sentiments, must be set aside. Though the representation that the books of Moses breathe an implacable spirit, is altogether unfounded, yet there is much in them of a rigorous character, and which would be repugnant to the opinions and feelings to which we have alluded. It is unquestionable, that there is a strong tendency, at present, towards an indiscriminate philanthropy, and a religion divested of those stern features which the representations of the New Testament imply, as certainly as those of the Old. Now just so far as this tendency prevails, an influence adverse to the authority of the Pentateuch, is brought into active existence. The question is judged subjectively, in accordance with the feelings and opinions of the objector. A fair estimate is not of course to be anticipated. Yet no topic in the whole compass of literature, demands greater freedom from theological prepossession than one pertaining to the infancy of our race, (fifteen centuries before the gospel was published), to an oriental state of society, and to a pastoral mode of life. What might seem perfectly unreasonable and distasteful to us, might be most befitting to the incipient Hebrew commonwealth, and might, therefore, have come from God.

Again, some of the causes of this skepticism have multiplied themselves. The tendency to doubt has been greatly strengthened by exercise. The rejection of all supernatural agency from the Mosaic narratives, is an effect as well as a cause. Parts of the Christian records had before been violently impugned. Doubts had been thrown upon the authenticity of no inconsiderable portion of the New Testament. In opposition to the best critical authorities, suspicions were cast on various passages. If the first chapter of the Gospel of John, and the Epistle to the Hebrews, are obnoxious to attack, a book composed sixteen hundred years earlier, and consequently supported by much less external testimony, would hardly escape. If parts of the New Testament are seri-

ously menaced, the whole of the Old would seem to totter on its foundations.

For these and other reasons, which might be named, it is proposed to discuss several topics that have relation to the authenticity and genuineness of the Pentateuch. New light is constantly thrown upon the interpretation of this part of the Bible by the studies of eminent scholars and the discoveries of archaeologists and travellers. A somewhat extended range of observation and of reference to authorities may be allowed, from the bearing of such remarks and references on a number of points which may be subsequently considered.

What has been already stated may suggest, not unnaturally, the first topic for consideration.

† 1. *The Importance of Caution in an Inquiry of this Nature.*

Nothing can be more out of place than dogmatic assertion, or that cavalier tone which is sometimes assumed. The subject is of such a character as not to admit of mathematical certainty. After the most laborious inquiries, we are necessarily left in ignorance on some points; while on others, we can only approximate towards the truth.

In the first place, the Pentateuch professes to stand altogether by itself. There is no contemporary literature. Not a fragment of any record besides has floated down the stream of time. The lapse of ages has buried up every other chronicle. Centuries elapsed after the Exodus of Israel, before Hesiod or Homer wrote. The monuments of Egypt are silent on the first twenty centuries of the history in Genesis. We have nothing, therefore, with which to compare the Pentateuch. We are left to judge of its credibility by its own independent testimony.

Again, a state of civil and religious society, manners and customs, useful arts and domestic institutions are delineated or alluded to, with which we have little analogous. The principles of human nature are, indeed, the same. *Man's* heart beats alike under an oriental or a western sky. But the whole external *contour* is widely diverse. Even the development of Asiatic character and morals often seems to us very anomalous. We are tempted to look with perfect incredulity on incidents or narratives, which, to an oriental, have the clearest verisimilitude. We often set up European taste as a standard for Asiatic manners, and wonder at the oddity of patriarchal usages, while an Arab or a

Syrian would look with equal incredulity or contempt upon many things which have become as a second nature to us. From this dissimilarity or contrariety of manners and customs, the inquirer must needs be cautious in coming to his conclusions. He may pronounce that to be a myth or a saga which is veritable history.

Furthermore, it is to be remembered, that the Pentateuch lays claim to Divine inspiration. Moses is the organ of the will of God. The five books profess to be a record of immediate revelations from Heaven. This demands at least an external respect, a show of decency. Even portions of the mythology of Greece and Rome cannot be contemplated with levity. It is in a sense holy ground. If no heavenly voice proceeds from Delphi, yet there is a struggling of the human spirit to pierce the secrets of the future. If there was nothing acceptable to the Deity in the countless sacrifices which were offered on Roman altars, yet the human soul is here revealed in its deepest aspirations. In the immolation of the innocent victim was prefigured the necessity of the shedding of more costly blood. In these misapplied and unauthorized services, some vital doctrines of the Christian system may be faintly shadowed forth. Though embodying a great amount of error or of perverted truth, yet one would not approach this mythology with profane sarcasm. At all events, he would subject it to a careful and conscientious examination.

So in respect to the Mohammedan Bible. It claims to be a revelation from Heaven. These claims ought to be candidly and fairly met. A system of religious imposture is not to be dismissed with a sneer; much less, if, with its absurdities, it contains some acknowledged and fundamental truths. Every principle of literary justice, not to speak of moral obligation, demands that we should carefully examine, rather than dogmatically decide.

Yet how different has been the treatment to which the Pentateuch has often been subjected. It assumes to be a revelation from the true God, and a history of real events. It appears, in the first aspect of it at least, to be plain prose, not poetry, or fable, or allegory. Yet it has often been treated, as though it were, *a priori*, fictitious, as though it bore the marks of falsehood on its face. A respectable uninspired author has been seldom compelled to submit to such manifest injustice. Multitudes of critics, not a few of them Christian ministers, have regarded it as a mixture of truth and falsehood, or as an interpolated document, and have accordingly tried to sift out some facts from the mass of errors. Where patient investigation would be a too painful pro-

cess, an innuendo, a covert sneer, or a bold assertion, have been substituted. Decisions have been pronounced with that categorical assurance, which would not be respectful in relation to a common historian, which would not be authorized, were the writers contemporaries of the men on whom they sit in judgment. Many of those, who have impugned the authority of the Pentateuch, have betrayed a state of mind, which would not well befit a student even of the Korán or Vedas.

‡ 2. *Historical Skepticism less prevalent now than formerly.*

It is an important consideration in its bearings on the question under discussion, that the spirit of extreme literary skepticism, which prevailed a few years since, especially in Germany, is giving place to sounder and more conservative views. The day of unlimited suspicion in respect to ancient authors has passed by. A more enlightened criticism has shown that incredulity may involve as many absurdities as superstition, and that the temper of mind in which such men as Gibbon looked at certain parts of the records of antiquity, was as truly unphilosophical as that of the most unreflecting enthusiast.

In the latter part of the last century, and during the first twenty years of the present, several causes conspired to give an extraordinary growth to this doubting spirit. Some of these are still more or less operative; the influence of others has disappeared. It may be well to advert to some of the more prominent.

One of these causes is itself a consequence of the intellectual and moral condition of Germany. The number of highly educated men in the German States is very large in proportion to the population, much larger than the intellectual wants of the country demand. The government, having in its hands nearly all the places of trust and emolument, looks, of course, to the abler and more promising candidates for public favor. This awakens among the thousands annually emerging from the university life, a spirit of rivalry and a strong desire for notoriety. Attention must be aroused, a name must be created at all events. If the promulgation of correct opinions will not effect the object, paradoxes may. While sound reasoning will fall heavily on the public ear, ingenious, though baseless, hypotheses will be certain to awaken discussion. To attack the credibility of an ancient historian, with great confidence and with a profusion of learning, may procure an appointment, if it does not accomplish its professed object.

Thus the aim often is, to make a sensation, rather than to elicit the truth, to show off one's smartness, more than to comprehend a subject in its various bearings and worthily present it. A prurient love of novelty and innovation is fostered. Well ascertained facts in history will go for nothing, if a doubt or a suspicion can be started. The mind is not suffered to dwell on ten degrees of positive testimony, if two of a negative character can by any possibility be imagined. A habit of skepticism is thus formed, which no amount of evidence can satisfy. How else can we account for an attack on the credibility of such a book as that of the Acts of the Apostles, or a denial of the historical character of the Gospels? In these cases, the fault cannot be in the historian, or in the contemporary witnesses. Germany has been overstocked with students. The reapers outnumbered the sheaves to be gathered. Topics for investigation were sought beyond the limit of lawful inquiry, or where the only result would be to unsettle all faith in human testimony. From this unpractical character of the German mind, and from the crowded condition of certain departments of study, an unrestrained rationalism was inevitable.

Yet there is reason to believe, that this unhealthful state of the intellectual German world has been somewhat meliorated. The physical sciences and the practical arts are exciting a more earnest attention. The orthodox theologians of Germany have been compelled by the pressure of recent events to place a much higher value on the historical evidences of Christianity.

Another cause of this skepticism has been a theory, quite prevalent, not only in Germany, but throughout Christendom, which represents the early state of man as savage; in other words, man came a child in knowledge from the hands of his Maker, and very gradually and with great painstaking acquired a knowledge of the most necessary arts of life. This theory was the cause, in a measure, of the attack on the integrity of the Homeric poems, and of the postponement to a very late period of the discovery of alphabetic writing. It has led to a representation of the patriarchs and early ancestors of the Hebrews, which would elevate them not much above the herdsmen of the Arabian desert. Accordingly, it were not to be expected that written documents, credible historical records should exist in this crude and forming state of society. The declaration of Moses, that he committed certain facts to writing, itself betrays, it is said, an author who lived as late as David, or the Babylonish captivity.

Yet profounder investigations into ancient history and monu-

ments are every year undermining this imposing and wide-spread hypothesis. The arts in Egypt, at the remotest point of time to which we can trace them, were in a style of the highest perfection. Some of the sciences appear to have made no inconsiderable progress in Babylon, anterior to the limits of authentic profane history, corroborating the brief allusions in the book of Genesis. So the Phoenicians were engaged in an extensive commerce, implying much progress in some of the arts, before the Homeric poems were composed. They were the medium, says Böckh, of conveying some of the scientific knowledge of the Chaldeans to the Greeks. The simplicity of manners and habits which prevailed in those early ages, is to be, by no means, assumed as an index of barbarism; it is rather an evidence of the contrary. Were we to trace the principal forms of heathenism as far towards their source as we can, there is every reason to believe that we should find no evidence that the earliest ages were the darkest. Rays of divine light, which might have illuminated the first dwellers in Egypt, Babylon and India, were gradually lost in the deepening gloom.

We may name, as a third cause of the prevalence of this historical unbelief, the habit of transferring the method of interpreting pagan mythology to the Jewish Scriptures. We can hardly open a recent commentary on the Pentateuch, without meeting on almost every page the technical terms which Ottfried Müller and others have sanctioned in relation to Greek mythology. "Sagas and myths," begins one of the latest of these commentators, "everywhere closely linked together in antiquity, form the external limit of the credible history of nations. They magnify the past contests of a nation for independence, narrate the beginnings of one's own people, point out the origin of its customs, portray, often with great copiousness, the family history of ancestors, their services to following generations, and determine their relations to the progenitors of other tribes. In short, everything, which a nation in its activity lays claim to, becomes an object in the circle of myths and sagas." Now this system may answer very well in the interpretation of Indian or Chinese antiquity. Nothing may be more beautiful or coherent than such a theory applied to the early Roman legends. In that case, an historical fact may be embellished with a thousand fabulous ornaments, or a mere conception of the mind may have clothed itself in the form of history. But is it right to transfer this ingenious exegesis to the narratives of Moses? Do not the numerous pagan legends pre-

suppose *one* system which was true, and of which they are, more or less, perversions or anomalous excrescences. And are not the earliest remains of Hebrew antiquity essentially different, in certain marks of trustworthiness, from those of pagan origin? Yet, however diverse the Greek mythology is from the Hebrew patriarchal narratives, one and the same system of interpretation has been employed in both. The cosmogony of Moses and the flood of Noah have been judged by the same principles as have been applied to the theory of the creation sung by Ovid, or to the deluge of Deucalion. The book of Genesis is regarded by many as a poetic account of the origin of the human race.

The only remaining cause of this general skepticism, which we shall mention, is the influence of two celebrated men, Wolf and Niebuhr,—an influence, which, for a time, pervaded more or less every department of literature. Though a considerable interval elapsed between the appearance of Wolf and that of the Roman historian, yet they may here be considered together. The former tried to break down, with his iron mace, the integrity of the *Iliad*; the latter, after demolishing Livy's beautiful fabric in respect to the early history of Rome, attempted to reconstruct it on a more solid basis. "When Wolf came forward," says Tholuck, "with the hypothesis which has made him immortal, many great philologists shook their heads, not only in cautious Holland and stable England, but in volatile France; and a Villosion spoke even of a *literary impiety*; yet in Germany there arose, among the great spirits,—a Herder, a Heyne,—only the envious dispute who was authorized to claim for himself, with greater right than Wolf, the honor of the first discovery."¹ The sensation which Niebuhr's History created, was hardly less. Some apprehended that the author would next apply his searching criticism, with similar results, to the Hebrew records. In addition to extensive and profound learning and great ingenuity, which no one would hesitate to ascribe to these remarkable men, both possessed some of the rare attributes of genius. Erudition or acuteness merely, though unmatched, could never have produced the impression which followed the publication of their writings.²

As a natural result, the eye of an unsparing criticism was immediately turned upon many of the relics of ancient times. Wolf himself cast his penetrating glance upon the Orations of Cicero,

¹ Die Glaubwürdigkeit, p. 119.

² "Bey Niebuhr war Denken, Fühlen und Handeln stets vereinigt."—*Von Savigny*.

and declared in respect to four, "that Cicero could never have written them sleeping or waking."¹ Many inferior men followed in the course marked out by Wolf, some of them carrying the principles of their leader much further than his sound judgment would have conducted him. Discredit or contempt, was heaped upon some of the most valuable remains of antiquity. The father of history was spoken of as a garrulous story-teller, equally pleasing to children and to decrepit age. The genuineness of some of the most undoubted dialogues of Plato was called in question by Schleiermacher and Ast. Socher went still further, and proscribed a large portion of the philosopher's remains. Even Thucydides did not wholly escape this lynx-eyed yet narrow criticism.

In these circumstances, the Hebrew writers and the Penta-teuch particularly would come under special condemnation, because, among other reasons, its professed writer, like Livy, wrote many centuries after the occurrence of some of the principal events which he describes. If suspicions could be cast upon the Gospel of Luke and the first Epistle to Timothy, much less could the earliest Hebrew records be expected to escape the ordeal. Vater, De Wette and others followed on sacred ground, the example which Wolf had set them on classical.

But these days have happily passed, even in Germany. An undistinguishing skepticism is not now considered the fairest evidence of scholarship. Merciless criticism is no longer viewed as the surest test of philological ability. The widest and profoundest investigations are found to be perfectly consistent with an increasing respect for the monuments of antiquity. It is pertinent to our object to advert to a few facts which indicate a return to a sounder and more healthful criticism.

It is difficult to state the exact truth in regard to the opinion which is now entertained of Wolf and his famous theory. That his writings and lectures contributed to modify somewhat, where they did not subvert, the current belief in relation to the Homeric poems, there can be no doubt; yet his influence has long been on the wane. The enthusiasm, with which his hypothesis was once greeted, no longer exists. More than twenty-five years ago, Professor Welcker of Bonn took decided ground against it. At the same period, also, the celebrated Voss wholly dissented, as

¹ Weiske, in the Preface to his Commentary on the Oration for Marcellus, showed the spuriousness of Wolf's production on the same grounds by which Wolf attempted to prove the spuriousness of the Oration!

he informed Welcker in private.¹ Subsequently, came out in direct opposition to Wolf, the "*Historia Homeri*," by Nitzsch of Kiel,—a book distinguished by acuteness, learning and sound judgment. The "*Schul-Zeitung*," of August, 1829, remarks that "*some yet hold fast to Wolf's paradoxes.*" A like opinion, in respect to the decline of the Wolfian hypothesis, has been expressed by Professors Poppo and Klotz. We should not err, perhaps, in affirming that the older philologists, some of them the pupils of Wolf, still adhere to his theory, or to something akin to it. The younger scholars, many of them among the ablest philologists in Germany, have broken away from its bonds, and have adopted, more or less, the views advocated by Nitzsch. Wolf's attack on some of the Orations of Cicero has only contributed more triumphantly to establish their genuineness. The latest investigations have proved that the great critic could "sometimes sleep," as well as the great poet. Stallbaum has triumphantly vindicated the authenticity of a number of Plato's Dialogues against the objections of Schleiermacher and Ast. K. F. Hermann of Göttingen,² speaks with contempt of "the prison walls which the subjective, scheming, hair-splitting acuteness of that dialectician [Schleiermacher] built as a dwelling for Plato's spirit." "Many essential passages of Plato," continues Hermann, "were rejected by Schleiermacher, because he did not know how to employ them in support of his own theory."

Abundant and decisive testimonies may be adduced in regard to the high estimation in which Herodotus is now held. Prof. Ritter, the celebrated geographer, affirms, "That of all the records of ancient times, none are receiving more confirmation from modern researches in geography, archaeology, and kindred studies, than the tenth chapter of Genesis and the writings of old Herodotus." Schaff remarks, "That the accuracy of Herodotus, often assailed, is more and more confirmed by modern investigations."³ Wachler observes, "As the father of geography and history, Herodotus is held in merited and increasing respect; his fidelity and accuracy are confirmed by all the investigations of modern scholars, and defended against the doubts that have been rashly thrown out."⁴ Eichwald, in his *Geography of the Caspian Sea*, a work of high authority, remarks, "It is with reason that we are surprised

¹ *Der Epische Cyclus*, Vorrede, p. 8.

² Review of Stallbaum's edition of the *Phaedrus*, in *Jahn's Jahrbücher*, 1831.

³ *Encyclopædia*, ed. 4th, by Hermann and Schinke, 1837, I. p. 37.

⁴ *Literaturgeschichte*, I. p. 141.

both in respect to Herodotus' fidelity and love of truth, and his extensive geographical knowledge; this was, for the most part, the fruit of personal inquiry. Very remarkable is the exact knowledge which he possessed of the eastern shore of the Caspian, and of the particular tribes dwelling there. It may, perhaps, be assumed, that he had a more precise acquaintance with it, than was possessed by us in the last century, or in some respects even now;"—"a position," says Bähr, the editor of Herodotus, "which will hold equally good, as we are fully convinced, of several other countries, e. g. the interior of Africa."¹ "Credibility and love of truth," says Bähr, "can be ascribed to scarcely any historical writer of Greece in a higher degree than to Herodotus, whom one may rightly name in this respect the father of history." "From several very recent books of travels, especially those of Englishmen, surprising explanations have been obtained of particular parts of the history of Herodotus, and some doubtful or dark places now appear in a true light." "How many things are found even now, after the lapse of thousands of years, just as the father of history saw and described them."²

The credibility of Arrian in the "Expedition of Alexander," has been fully recognized by Droysen, his latest editor. "As an historical writer, by his careful investigation and impartial criticism, he occupies an important place among the Greek historians in general, while of those who have written on Alexander, as Photius already judged, he has, undoubtedly, the first place."³

We might adduce many other testimonies to the same effect in relation to several of the Greek and Roman historians, but it is perhaps unnecessary. Those already referred to show clearly enough, that the tone of confident skepticism, which is now indulged by some in this country in respect to the Hebrew Scriptures has no counterpart in the spirit and method with which the study of classical philology is pursued by the ablest scholars of the present day. This result is not owing to the less profound nature of the investigations. The whole circle of classical litera-

¹ Review of Eichwald's "Alte Geographie des Kaspischen Meeres," by Bähr, in Jahn's Jahrbücher, XXIII. p. 153. "This geography," says Bähr, "has furnished a new and splendid demonstration of the veracity, credibility and fidelity of Herodotus."

² Bähr in Jahn XVI. p. 336, XI. p. 435. Plutarch doubts the authenticity of Herodotus because some of his representations are not sufficiently favorable to the Greeks!

³ Sintenis in Jahn XVI. p. 132.

ture was never so thoroughly understood as it is at the present time.

We may add, that there are some indications of a return, in Germany, to a better temper of mind and a fairer style of criticism in respect to the Old Testament. It was the remark of Gesenius, that the older he grew, the more he was inclined to return in very many cases to the received methods of interpretation; and the later numbers of his *Thesaurus* furnish abundant testimony to the sincerity of his declaration.¹ In his recent writings, he expresses more doubt in relation to the theory, which he once fully adopted, of the late origin of the Pentateuch.

The younger Rosenmüller found occasion, in a number of instances, to renounce the skeptical views, which he advocated in some of his earlier works. Even De Wette, in the last edition of his *Introduction to the Old Testament*, assigns an earlier origin to the Pentateuch than he supported in the former editions. The general current in Germany, among those who deny the Mosaic authorship of the five books, seems to be setting in the same direction. One of the latest and ablest commentators on the book of Job, Prof. Stickel of Göttingen, has vindicated the speeches of Elihu as an integral part of the book of Job—a portion of it which Ewald and others had rejected. The integrity of Zechariah is at length admitted by De Wette, though with evident reluctance.

Every fresh examination of the topography and geography of places described or alluded to in the Pentateuch, shows that the writer had that exact local information which could proceed only from personal observation. "The Old Testament," says Leigh, "is beyond all comparison the most interesting and instructive guide of which a traveller in the East can avail himself."² "Wherever any fact is mentioned in the Bible history," says Wilkinson, "we do not discover anything on the monuments which tends to contradict it."³ These and similar facts have led such unprejudiced historians and writers as Ritter, Heeren, Lee, Schlässer, Laden, Ideler, Wachler and others, to recognize the books of Moses as authentic history. The principal facts of the Pentateuch are acknowledged by Heeren in his "*History of Antiquity*" to be historically established. John Von Müller says of the tenth chapter of Genesis, that "the data are, geographically,

¹ *Bibl. Sac.* May, 1843, p. 375.

² Von Raumer's *Palaestina*, p. 2, where similar testimony from other travellers is quoted.

³ *Anc. Egypt.* 1. 34.

altogether true. From this chapter, universal history ought to begin." "The record of God's miraculous Providence," says Luden, in his *History of Antiquity*, "in regard to the Israelites—the *oldest monument of written history*—did not preserve the people faithful towards God." "We have come to the decided conviction," remarks Leo, "after examining what has been lately written on this subject, that the essential parts of the law, as well as a great portion of the historical accounts, which form the ground-work of the Pentateuch, and cannot be entirely separated from the laws, as they show their import and design, were written by Moses himself, and that the collecting of the whole into one body, if not done by Moses himself, certainly took place soon after his time, perhaps during his life, and under his own eye."¹

§ 3. *Credibility of the Jewish Historians.*

Our next position is, that greater credit is due to the Hebrew writers, when describing matters pertaining to Jewish history, than to Greek and Roman authors who have adverted to or delineated the same events. In the first place, the Jewish historians lived, for the most part, at or near the periods when the events which they describe occurred. Moses was the leading actor in the scenes which he professes to portray. The last four books of the Pentateuch, in a very important sense, are the memoirs of his own life. Ezra, Nehemiah and Daniel were eye-witnesses of the events and matters which they narrate. The prophets are historians of the periods in which they lived. They deserve, therefore, more confidence than foreign writers, who flourished centuries afterwards. We attach authority to Herodotus or Tacitus in proportion to the proximity of their lives to the events which they portray.

Again, the Hebrew writers were members of the community whose actions they record, actual residents in the countries and cities respecting which they give information. Moses was educated in the Egyptian court. He lived many years in the wilderness, and became, doubtless, intimately conversant with the whole Arabian peninsula. He does not take up his geographical notices at hearsay. The objects, which he describes, he did not see with the hasty glance of a traveller, but with the practised eye of a native. So with other biblical writers. The author of the book of Job writes with the sure hand of one who had ocular proof.

¹ Hengstenberg, *Beiträge zur Einl. d. Alte Test. I. Prolegomena*, pp. 28—35, also, *Bibl. Repos.*, April, 1836, pp. 440—448.

The scene of his poem is perfectly familiar to him. Moses does not speak of Egypt in the manner of Pythagoras or Plato, who saw the country only as travellers or temporary residents. Daniel does not write respecting Babylon, in the manner of a Greek historian, who might have accompanied the Expedition of the Younger Cyrus. He professes to have lived, during the greater part of a century, in the metropolis, engaged in an employment which would necessarily lay open to him every source of information. On the other hand, Xenophon and Diodorus Siculus lived hundreds or thousands of miles from scenes and events which they describe. They may have been observing travellers, but they could not narrate the affairs of the Assyrians as they might do those of the Athenians or Sicilians. The journal of a tourist is no adequate substitute for the knowledge which is obtained from half a century's residence in a country or city.

In the third place, some of the principal classical writers were strongly prejudiced against the Jews. The early Greek writers seem to have known or cared little for the descendants of Abraham. The literary community at Athens, though excessively fond of novelties, seem to have been wholly ignorant of the Jews, or else to have held them in profound contempt. We wonder that Herodotus, with his liberal mind, and his passion for extensive researches, did not devote part of a chapter to a land crowded with so many interesting objects as Palestine. We wonder still more that men of the comprehensive views and philosophical liberality of Plato and Aristotle, did not think it worth while to look into the laws and institutions of Moses. The entire silence of such writers argues either total ignorance of what was occurring in Palestine, or a contempt for its inhabitants unworthy of men of their pretensions.

Essentially similar is the impression which we receive from the Roman writers. Cicero throughout his multifarious writings, makes no mention, we believe, of the Jews. The poets allude to them, in a few instances, to point a jeer or round a period. Thus Juvenal:

"The laws of Rome those blinded bigots slight
In superstitious dread of Jewish rite;
To Moses and his mystic volume true," etc.

So remarkable is a paragraph relating to the Jews in the pages of the philosophic Tacitus that we are tempted to give the substance of it. It is found in the fifth book of his History.

"According to some, the Jews, fleeing from the island of Crete, found an abode in the most distant parts of Libya, at the time that Saturn was violently dethroned by Jupiter. A proof is obtained from the name. There is a celebrated mountain in Crete called Ida; the inhabitants are termed *Idaei*, and by a barbarous enlargement of the word, *Judaei*. Others report, that in the reign of Isis, a multitude pouring forth from Egypt, removed into the contiguous territories, under the lead of Hierosolymus and Judas. Most maintain that they are descended from the Ethiopians, who, compelled by fear and hatred of their king, Cepheus, changed their habitation. Others relate that an Assyrian mixed population, being destitute of land, took possession of a part of Egypt, and by and by inhabited Hebrew cities and territories as their own right, and then the neighboring parts of Syria. Others give a distinguished origin to the Jews. The *Solymi*, a people celebrated in the poems of Homer, founded the city Jerusalem, and called it from their own name."

And this is from the calm, careful and reflecting Tacitus, written after the Jewish nation had been in existence almost two thousand years, after the country had become a Roman province, when Rome was filled with Jews, and when, by a few minutes' walk, he could have found the true account of the origin of the Jews from the Antiquities of Josephus, or, perhaps, from that author's own mouth. From these legends related by Tacitus, we learn, that a profound historian might neglect with impunity to obtain accurate information in respect to a people so despicable as the Jews; and we may also see what vague and unsatisfactory stories then prevailed throughout the civilized world in regard to the history of the Hebrews.

These facts show with sufficient clearness, that some of the Greek and Roman writers were altogether ignorant of the true origin and condition of the Hebrews, while others looked upon them with prejudice and contempt. Why then should we prefer these historians as authorities to the Hebrew writers, when the affairs of the Jews are in question? Yet this has been the prevailing habit. Diodorus is put first, Moses second. If Manetho corroborates the lawgiver, well; if not, then the pagan must be set up as the standard. If Daniel's chronology does not agree with that of Abydenus, then the Hebrew is pronounced to be in error, and an additional proof is supposed to be furnished against the authenticity of his prophecies.

§ 4. *Early Origin of Alphabetic Writing.*

It has often been alleged as an argument against the genuineness of the Pentateuch, that alphabetic writing did not exist at the time of Moses, or if it had been discovered, the knowledge of it was very limited, much too limited to admit of the existence and use of such a book as the Pentateuch.

That alphabetic writing, however, did exist at or before the age of Moses, i. e. 1500 B. C., is capable of proof from a great variety of considerations. If each of the following positions does not of itself establish the fact, yet all, taken together, can leave no reasonable doubt on the subject.

1. So far as there is any evidence from tradition, it is in favor of the very early discovery of alphabetic writing.¹ The traditions of all the nations of antiquity coincide in this, that the art of writing belonged to the origin of the human race or to the founders of particular nations. "Several kinds of alphabetical writing were in existence in Asia," says William von Humboldt, "in the earliest times." The Egyptians attribute the discovery of alphabetic writing to Thaaüt; the Chaldeans, to Oannes, Memnon or Hermes; many of the Greeks to Cecrops, who probably came from Egypt; some to Orpheus; others to Linus; Aeschylus assigns it to Prometheus; and Euripides, to Palemedes, the Argive;—all these are witnesses that the discovery reached beyond the commencement of history, so that Pliny remarks, not without reason, *ex quo apparet æternus literarum usus.*

2. It will hold good as a general fact that the most useful arts would be first invented or discovered. Such as are necessary to the support of human life, those which man's inward or outward necessities would first crave, would, in general, be the first that would be originated. Necessity deeply felt is the mother of art. Feelings of joy or sorrow, common to man, and which require for their full expression some outward symbol, or some auxiliary accompaniment, would necessarily lead to the invention of musical instruments. Some of the more important uses of iron would be early found out, because any degree of civilization, or even of comfort, would be hardly conceivable without it. The violent passions, which agitate man, would early lead him to invent armor, defensive and offensive. Journeys or marches would be impossible for any considerable distance without means for crossing deep

¹ Hengstenberg, *Beiträge*, I. p. 425.

rivers and narrow seas. Civilization, in any proper sense of that word, would imply a considerable knowledge of house architecture, if not of such contrivances as chimnies and glass windows, yet some substitute for them.

Now we can conceive of few things more necessary, where there was any degree of refinement, where the sciences were at all cultivated, or where there was any measure of commercial activity, than the art of writing. A patriarch burying a beloved wife among strangers in a strange land, would feel desirous to erect something more than a heap of stones, and to affix something more than a rude portrait or hieroglyphic. He would wish to write her name on the rock forever. Among all nations, particularly the oriental, there is a strong disposition for constructing and handing down genealogical tables and family registers. The practice has its origin in one of the deepest feelings of our nature. Yet this would be hardly possible in the absence of an alphabet. A long list of proper names might be engraven on the memory of a single person. But how could it thus be accurately propagated through a number of centuries? We have abundant proof that the Chaldeans were early engaged in some kind of astronomical calculations. But how could these be carried on without the use of letters or figures? and would this skill in astronomy be any less difficult than the invention of an alphabet? would it not be much further from the wants of common life? Again, we learn from many unquestionable sources that the Phoenicians were, in very early times, engaged in an extensive commerce, embracing at least all the shores and the principal islands of the Mediterranean. Now these marine adventures presuppose a sufficient degree of activity of mind in the Phoenicians to invent an alphabetic system, if they did not before possess one. Besides how extremely difficult, if not impossible, to conduct an extensive system of barter, to transport into distant regions a great variety of goods, as we know the Phoenicians did, to commission agencies or something equivalent to them, and to carry home the proceeds or the exchanged articles, and distribute them to a variety of owners, without any written record whatever, in dependence merely on the memory, or on some rude visible signs. For these purposes, no Mexican painting or Chaldean symbols would be sufficient. The Egyptian hieroglyphics did not render a contemporaneous alphabetic writing unnecessary. For some of the most important purposes of a civilized people, hardly any invention could be more clumsy than the hieroglyphics. How could the deed of a piece of land, the forms and inflections of grammar, thousands of

foreign names and terms and the numerous commercial and statistical details which would be indispensable in a kingdom like Egypt, be expressed by pictures, by the representations of visible objects, however ingenious?

3. The perception of historical truth exists in such close connection with the knowledge and extension of the art of writing, that where the latter is wanting, the former is never found, not even among those nations which have certain elements of it.¹ This is strikingly illustrated by the example of the Arabians before the age of Mohammed. All which we know of their history, says De Sacy, was found in the midst of oral traditions, and showed everywhere that entire lack of chronological order, that mixture of fables and marvels, which characterize the period, when a nation has no other historians than the poets, and no other archives than the memory of succeeding generations. Now the Pentateuch, according to the unanimous opinion of men engaged in the same department of literature—the historians, with whom, to a certain extent, agree the most prejudiced among the theologians,—has a truly historical character. In this respect, it is totally unlike the Arabian traditions referred to. It may be said, indeed, that the Pentateuch was composed at a period much later than Moses, and thus acquired its historical character when the art of writing was generally practised by the Israelites. But according to the theory generally entertained by those who hold to the late origin of the Pentateuch as a whole, there are fragments, portions larger or smaller, which must have been written at or before the time of Moses. Now these fragments have the genuine historical stamp as clearly as the supposed later portions; and in them, also, are references to historical works, like the “Book of the Wars of the Lord,” which have perished.

4. The theory of the early discovery of the art of writing derives strong confirmation from the fact of the very high antiquity of many of the arts in Egypt, and especially of such as are necessary to the art of writing. If arts, requiring great skill and strong powers of invention, were in use at a very early period, then we may suppose that the art of writing, requiring no higher, perhaps less, powers of invention, might have been discovered.

“We have been enabled,” says Sir J. G. Wilkinson, “to fix, with a sufficient degree of precision, the bondage of the Israelites and the arrival of Joseph; and though these events took place at an age when nations are generally supposed to have been in their

¹ Hengstenberg's *Authentic*, I. 409.

infancy, and in a state of barbarism; yet we perceive that the Egyptians had then arrived at as perfect a degree of civilization as at any subsequent period of their history. They had the same arts, the same manners and customs, the same style of architecture, and were in the same advanced state of refinement, as in the reign of Remeses II. The most remote point, to which we can see, opens with a nation possessing all the arts of civilized life already matured. The same customs and inventions that prevailed in the Augustan age of that people after the accession of the eighteenth dynasty, are found in the remote age of Osirtasen I.; and there is no doubt that they were in the same civilized state when Abraham visited the country.¹ Many obelisks, each of a single block of granite, had been hewn and transported twelve miles, from the quarries at the cataracts of Syene, as early at least as the time of Joseph; and the same mechanical skill had already existed even before that period, as is shown from the construction of the pyramids near Memphis, which in the size of the blocks and the style of building, evince a degree of architectural knowledge, perhaps inferior to none possessed at a subsequent period. The wonderful skill the Egyptians evinced in sculpturing or engraving hard stones² is still more surprising than their ability to hew and transport blocks of granite. We wonder at the means employed for cutting hieroglyphics, frequently to the depth of more than two inches, on basalt, or sienite, and other stones of the hardest quality. Their taste, too, was not deficient in originality, while it is universally allowed to have been the parent of much that was afterwards perfected, with such wonderful success, by the ancient Greeks.³

The Egyptians appear to have been acquainted with glass-blowing as early as the reign of Osirtasen I., 1700 B. C. The process is represented in the paintings of Beni Hassan, executed during the reign of that monarch and his immediate successors. A bead, bearing a king's name, who lived 1500 B. C., has been found at Thebes, the specific gravity of which is precisely the same as that of crown glass, now manufactured in England. Glass vases, for holding wine, appear to have been used as early as the Exodus. The colors of some Egyptian opaque glass not

¹ Wilkinson, *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians*, 2d ed. Vol. I. Preface, Vol. III. p. 260.

² "To devise cunning works, to work in gold, and in silver, and in brass, and in cutting of stones, to set them," etc. Ex. 31: 4, 5.

³ Wilkinson, III. 85.

only present the most varied devices on the exterior, but the same hue and the same device pass, in right lines, directly through the substance; so that in whatever part it is broken, or wherever a section may chance to be made of it, the same appearance, the same colors, and the same device, present themselves, without any deviation from the direction of a straight line—a mode of workmanship, which Europeans are still unable to imitate.

“It is not from the Scriptures alone that the skill of the Egyptian goldsmiths may be inferred; the sculptures of Thebes and Beni Hassan afford their additional testimony; and the numerous gold and silver vases, inlaid-work and jewelry, represented in common use, show the great advancement they had already made, at a remote period, in this branch of art. The engraving of gold, the mode of casting it, and inlaying it with stones,¹ were evidently known at the same time; numerous specimens of this kind of work have been found in Egypt.”²

The ornaments in gold, found in that country, consist of rings, bracelets, armlets, necklaces, earrings, and numerous trinkets belonging to the toilet; many of which are of the early times of Osirtasen I. and Thothmes III., the contemporaries of Joseph and of Moses. Gold and silver vases, statues, and other objects of gold and silver, of silver inlaid with gold, and of bronze inlaid with the precious metals, were also common at the same time. Substances of various kinds were overlaid with fine gold leaf, at the earliest periods of which the monuments remain, even in the time of Osirtasen I.³ Silver rings have been found of the age of Thothmes III. The paintings of Thebes frequently represent persons in the act of weighing gold on the purchase of articles in the market. The arch of brick existed as early as the reign of Amunoph I., 1540 B. C. It would appear from the paintings at Beni Hassan, that vaulted buildings were constructed as early as the time of Joseph. Harps of fourteen and lyres of seventeen strings, are found to have been used by the ordinary Egyptian musicians, in the reign of Amosis, about 1500 B. C. “Stone-workers were accustomed,” says Rosellini, “to engrave upon each square block an inscription in hieroglyphics; an impression was made upon the bricks, which besides, very frequently, bore inscriptions; even

¹ “Aaron fashioned it with a graving tool, after he had made it a molten calf.” Ex. 32: 4.

² Wilkinson, III. 223.

³ The ark of acacia wood, made by Moses, was overlaid with pure gold. Ex. 25: 11, 12.

oxen were represented; the steward of the house kept a written register. They probably wrote more in ancient Egypt, and on more ordinary occasions, than among us." "The Egyptians," says the same author, "differ specially from all other people, in that they constantly cover the interior and exterior of their houses, and the walls of all the innumerable apartments of their subterranean burial-places, with images and writing."¹

In the infancy of society, various materials were employed for writing, as stones, bricks, tiles, plates of bronze, lead and other metals, wooden tablets, the leaves and bark of trees, and the shoulder-bones of animals.²

The Egyptians were not less celebrated for their manufacture of paper, than for the delicate texture of their linen. The plant from which it was made, the papyrus, mostly grew in Lower Egypt. "Pliny is greatly in error," says Wilkinson, "when he supposes that the papyrus was not used for making paper before the time of Alexander the Great, since we meet with papyri of the most remote Pharaonic periods; and the same mode of writing on them is shown, from the sculptures, to have been common in the age of Saphis or Cheops, the builder of the great pyramid, more than 2000 years before our era."³

From the facts above quoted, and which might be greatly enlarged, all antecedent improbability in respect to the discovery of the art of writing is taken away. Rather, the contemporaneous existence of an art so necessary is strongly presupposed.⁴

¹ Robbins's Translation of Hengstenberg's *Egypt and the Books of Moses*, p. 89.

² The Korán, which much exceeds the Pentateuch in extent, was first inscribed on the most inconvenient materials. Fragments of it, written in the time of Mohammed, and subsequently incorporated into the work, were written not only on pieces of skin or parchment, but to a greater extent, on leaves of the palm, on white and flat stones, on bones, such as shoulder-blades and ribs.

³ Wilkinson, III. 149, 150.

⁴ The question may possibly be asked, How can the very early existence of the arts in Egypt be asserted so positively? On what grounds can the exact period of the existence of a particular art be assumed? In other words, on what do the hieroglyphical discoveries rest? One answer is, that all who have examined the monuments, in accordance with the method of deciphering the hieroglyphics discovered by Young and Champollion, are substantially agreed. Coincidence of views in men, differing in many respects so widely as is the case with Young, Champollion, Salvolini, Gesenius, Rosellini, Lepsius, Prudhoe, Wilkinson, Letronne, Leemans and many others, is satisfactory proof of the correctness of the results to which they have arrived. Examinations so thorough and long-continued, by men so competent, taken in connection with the almost perfect preservation of many of the paintings and monuments, justify the confi-

not live more than a century, or a century and a half before them?

Again there are two or three allusions in the *Iliad* itself, which, to say the least, are most naturally interpreted by supposing the contemporaneous use of writing. In lines 166—170 of Book VI, it is related, that Bellerophon was sent by the king of Argos to a Lycian king, with a closed tablet, in which the former had traced many deadly signs, *σήματα λυγρά*, that is, had given secret instructions to the Lycian king to destroy the bearer. Did this tablet contain alphabetical characters or mere pictures? The former is certainly the most simple and reasonable interpretation. But if they were hieroglyphics, it would be evident, as Thirlwall remarks,¹ that the want of alphabetic writing, which was so felt, and which had been partially supplied by drawing, would soon be met by adopting the Phœnician characters. If the Greeks had no proper alphabet, still this narrative shows that they were fully prepared for it, as they had the idea of communicating intelligence to a distant place by signs.

Again, we learn from innumerable passages in the Homeric Poems, that the Phœnicians at that time carried on an active commerce with the Greeks. Homer was himself an Asiatic Greek, or a native of an island near the Asiatic shore. As we know that the Phœnicians practised writing before his time, is it conceivable, that the inquisitive Greeks would remain in ignorance of a discovery so useful, or that Homer's universal genius would not obtain a hint of an art from innumerable voyagers and travellers, whom he must have seen, whom he well knew, and who practised an art which was in general use two or three hundred miles from his own home, probably on the same coast?

There are many things in these poems, which, to say the least, it would be nearly impracticable to hand down through successive generations by the memory in its utmost perfection. A catalogue of ships occupies half of the second book of the *Iliad*. Supposing that parts of it are interpolated, yet it is still a catalogue, a lexicon of countries, cities, towns, nearly all the geography and topography of Greece. There are the names of leaders, often with their genealogies, wives, children, and finally a list of more than thirteen hundred ships. To this is to be added all the commanders and allies of Troy, and a geographical summary of their native countries and cities. Could such things be safely trusted

¹ Thirlwall's *Greece*, I. p. 108, Harpers' ed.

to the memory? Is the memory tenacious of long lists of dry names and facts?¹

Again, notwithstanding all which has been ingeniously urged on the opposite side, there is a manifest unity of plan and a higher unity of feeling and action in the Iliad.² If this is the case, then, the Iliad must have come down to us in its most essential parts, as it proceeded from the soul of the author. It is hardly conceivable that a series of later poets could have so entered into the mind of the author as to develop that inward, living germ which the poem certainly possesses. There is a bare possibility that portions of the Paradise Lost were not from the pen of Milton. Yet it would require some degree of hardihood positively to affirm what is directly in face of the unity of the poem. The products of a great genius are not of that loose and uncertain character. The original, organic connection must be destroyed by later interpolating poets. In the case of Homer too, it must be supposed that these later poets were men of equal genius, which would certainly be a most extraordinary phenomenon.

Here then are two poems, containing, after all interpolations are removed, twenty-five or thirty thousand lines, exhibiting a symmetry of parts, a unity of plan more or less developed, and all animated by the spirit of sweet simplicity, genuine nature, and also by the highest sublimity. Is it reasonable to suppose that there were a number of authors? Is it reasonable to imagine, is it not rather incredible, that the author could have transmitted these poems without the aid of writing materials? We may conceive, possibly, that they could be transmitted from the second person or generation to the third, and so on, without such aid. But in the *first* instance, they must have been committed to something more firm than man's treacherous memory. The process of composing a poem of fifteen thousand or of ten thousand lines, according to a regular plan, the various parts more or less cohering together, with thousands of proper names, and all without the aid of writing materials, would seem to involve an impossibility on the very face of it. At all events, it is far less simple and is encompassed with much more formidable difficulties than the old and common theory.³

¹ Hug *Erfindung d. Buchstabenschrift*, p. 90.

² O. Maller rejects the opinion of those, who would separate the Iliad and Odyssey into parts, as *altogether antiquated*.

³ The same course of argument may be applied to the Pentateuch. There are various passages in it, as the exact census Num. ii., and the itinerary, Num. xxxiii., for which the memory would be a very unsafe depository. There

6. We now proceed to show by direct proof that alphabetic writing did exist, and was extensively employed at or before the time of Moses. It will be most satisfactory to state the evidence in the language of those, who, as all will acknowledge, are the best qualified to judge on this subject. Most of the writers, whom we shall quote, are far from entertaining undue respect for the word of God. A number of them are leading rationalists, who deny altogether that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch. Accordingly, their testimony must be regarded as specially valuable, for Moses could not have been the author of the books which are attributed to him, if alphabetic writing was then unknown. With the particular theories of the writers in regard to the country where writing had its origin, the mode of its extension, etc., it is not necessary here to inquire. No apology will be necessary for the introduction of a few facts and allusions, not specially bearing on the main object which we have in view. We begin with Gesenius. The passage is found in an appendix to the last edition of his Hebrew Grammar, published a short time before his death.

"In order to understand the names and forms of the Hebrew letters, recourse must be had to the Phœnician alphabet, the parent of all the alphabets of western Asia and Europe. In this the forms of the twenty-two letters are still pictures, more or less manifest, of sensible objects, the names of which begin with these letters, while the names of the letters denote those objects.

"Accordingly the Phœnician alphabet was developed from a hieroglyphic writing, and in such a manner that the characters no longer denote, as was the case in the hieroglyphics, the represented objects themselves, but solely the initial letters of the same. This transition from hieroglyphic to alphabetic writing, we find very early among the Egyptians, at least 2000 B. C. [500 years before Moses]. The oldest writing of the Egyptians was solely hieroglyphic. But as this did not provide for the necessities, naturally often arising, to express the *sound* of words also, an ingenious expedient was devised of causing a number of pictures to denote merely the initial sound of the word indicated thereby; e. g. the *hand*, *tôt*, was assumed for *t*; the *mouth*, *ro*, for *r*, so the alphabetic writing was originated, which the ancient Egyptians used in constant connection with the hieroglyphic. Along with the

are, also, throughout the book, marks of one controlling mind, unity of plan and design. So far as this concinnity of the different portions can be proved, so far is it shown to be necessary for the author to have possessed writing materials.

latter which was used on the monuments, and which consists of perfect pictures, the Egyptians had still another mode, though less exact, to express objects of common life, in which the pictures were often so abridged as to be indistinct, consisting only of rough elementary strokes.

"In accordance with these historical premises, it is in the highest degree probable, that some Phœnician, connected in very ancient times with the neighboring Egyptians, invented his own alphabet, new and altogether more convenient and practical. Rejecting entirely the hieroglyphics and their innumerable characters, he selected simply twenty-two signs for the twenty-two consonant sounds of his language."

"To determine the time and place of this discovery, facts are wanting, yet that it was made by the Phœnicians in Egypt, in accordance with its Egyptian type or model, somewhere near the time of the reign of the Shepherd kings in Egypt, is a very probable supposition."¹

"It is remarkable that the names of so many letters refer to objects of pastoral life; some seem to be of Egyptian origin, at least *Æt.*"²

The following passages are from Prof. Ewald's latest work.³

"From a consideration of the Semitic languages, it appears that the Asiatic dialects at least, expressed the simplest ideas in respect to the art of writing in the same manner throughout,⁴ while later im-

¹ The Shepherd kings, according to Wilkinson and others, conquered Egypt before Joseph was carried captive there.—Wilkinson, I. 38.

² On another page, Gesenius remarks, "that the high antiquity of the Hebrew pronouns appears from their most extraordinary agreement with the pronouns of the ancient Egyptian language, by far the oldest of which we possess any written memorials." All the separate pronouns in the Egyptian are compounded of the proper germ of the pronoun and a prefixed syllable, *an*, *ant*, *ent*, which must have given it a demonstrative sense, and served to impart to a short word more power and body. The Hebrew pronouns of the first and second persons, have this prefixed syllable, at least *an*. It is not found in the third person, in the biblical Hebrew, yet it is seen in the Talmudic. The essential pronominal forms in both languages correspond, e. g. Egypt. 3d pers. pl. *sen*, to Heb. *hem*, *ken*. The demonstrative prefixed syllable *an*, in (אֵן), has a manifest analogy with אֵן *sen* / etc. "It now appears to be probable, that between the Hebrew and ancient Egyptian, there was not merely the reciprocal reception of words already formed, but a relationship of stem, lying deeper, and as old at least as that with the Indo-Germanic stock." "The correspondencies of the Hebrew with the ancient Egyptian are still more important than with the Coptic."—Gesenius's Heb. Gram. 13th edition. Halle Lit. Zeit. 1839, No. 80, 1841, No. 40.

³ Geschichte des Volkes Israel, 1843, I. p. 68—71.

⁴ Not only כָּתַב, *to write*, with its many derivatives, is common to all the

provements in the art could be easily expressed by each in a different way. This phenomenon is not otherwise explainable than as follows: This existing writing was first used, in its simplest application, by an unknown primitive Semitic people; from them it was received, together with the most necessary designations of the object, by all the Semitic tribes known to us in history,—just as certainly as the fact that the term *Elôah*, for *God*, common to all the Semitic nations, shows that already the primitive people from whom they separated, designated *God* by this name. Following such traces, we may be led to the most surprising truths, beyond the most distant periods of the history of nations.”

“We thus here see how every investigation into the origin of writing among the primitive tribes leads us back to the remotest misty antiquity, to a more exact investigation of which all our present helps are not adequate. Among these tribes, writing is always earlier than we can follow it historically, just as every original art certainly springs from the most direct necessities of life, and may be soonest developed by a people extensively engaged in commerce; its use for the purpose of writing history, or only of fixing laws, lies manifestly very early back. Whatever may have been the primitive Semitic people to whom half of the civilized world are indebted for this inestimable gift, so much cannot be mistaken, that it appears in history as a possession of a Semitic people, *long before the time of Moses*; and that Israel had already, before his time, known and employed it in Egypt, can be assumed without difficulty.”

“The kindred nations may have had not only the art of writing, but an historical literature also, earlier than Israel, since, according to all the traces, Israel was among the smallest and latest of the tribes in the series of the larger and earlier developed brother-nations. In our opinion the notices in respect to Edom, definite and copious as they are given in Gen. xxxvi, bear altogether the marks of having been drawn, by the writer, from older Edomitish sources; then, also, the report in regard to the wisdom of the Edomites must have had some ground. We also call to mind the primitive narration, Gen. xiv (wholly different from all the other notices), where Abraham is spoken of as a “Hebrew,” almost a stranger to the narrator, just as a Canaanitish historian might

Semitic languages (perhaps with the exception of the Aethiopic), but also *כֶּסֶף*, *boot*, and *יָסַף*, *isk*; only the instrument for writing must have been early changed, since *כֶּסֶף* and *יָסַף* stand nearly alone, the Syrians using, instead of it, *כֶּסֶף*, and the Arabians and Ethiopians, together with the later Jews, *skallagos*.

speak of him. The information incidentally preserved Num. 13: 22, in respect to the time of the building of the early founded cities, Hebron in Canaan and Tanis in Egypt, appears altogether like the fragment of a Phoenician work, or of one not Hebrew."

"Thus it appears to us not only as very probable, but rather certain, that the earliest historians of Israel found already in existence a multitude of historical works of the kindred tribes. That the Tyrians possessed historical books, carefully written, with an exact chronology, we know definitely from fragments of the works of Dios and Menander of Ephesus, which they prepared for the Greeks."

"Thus the position is firmly established that from the time of Moses, Hebrew historical writing could have been developed, and was developed."

Our next extract is from Von Lengerke, a professor in the university of Königsberg.¹ "The use of writing and of the easier writing material, that made of skins, is thus presupposed by the oldest tradition, to have been in existence at the time of Moses, and there is no sufficient ground to doubt it." "At all events, it appears to be historically proved from their names, e. g. Kirjath-sepher, *city of the book*, etc., that writing was practised by the inhabitants of Canaan, at a very early time, before the return of the Israelites from Egypt." "That the Israelites appropriated to themselves many arts while in Egypt, e. g. the art of weaving, of fusing and working metals, etc., is undeniable; and probably the like may be concluded of the art of writing, though the discovery of a Semitic alphabet cannot be of Egyptian origin; still the supposition is probable, that the Egyptian hieroglyphic writing was transformed by the Hyksos, (Shepherd kings) into alphabetic writing, and that this discovery then passed over to the other Semitic tribes." "The Tyrians certainly had an historical literature in the Mosaic era; for, though the fragments from Dios and Menander of Ephesus do not relate to a time earlier than that of David and Solomon, still, we may draw the conclusion from the genuinely historical stamp of these notices, that Phoenician historical writers flourished at a far earlier period."

"The conclusion does not appear hasty," says Prof. A. T. Hartmann of Rostock, "that the art of writing for a long time employed by the Babylonians, passed over to the Phoenicians, as soon as the latter felt their need of it. Now if this was the case,

¹ Kenán. *Volks- und Religionsgeschichte Israel's*, 1844, Introduction pp. XXX. XXXI., and p. 374.

the Phoenicians had learned to use this invaluable art, certainly at a period which extends far back of Moses and the residence of the Israelites in Egypt."¹ "Acquaintance with alphabetic writing," says Vater "on the part of Moses and his contemporaries, is not merely possible but more than probable."²

"The inscriptions on the Babylonian bricks," says Boeckh,³ which are written in a character similar to the Phoenician, exhibit a later form than the oldest Phoenician; yet this by no means proves that the Phoenician character did not originate in Babylon; for it certainly often happens that the older form of writing is preserved in a derived alphabet longer than in the original one, as the Italian alphabet and particularly the Latin, show in relation to the Greek."

"The Egyptians on one side," says Prof. Olshausen of Kiel, "the Hebrews and Phoenicians on the other, we find, at a time which extends back of all sure chronology, in possession of an alphabet, which has one and the same extraordinary principle to denote the sound. For this purpose an object was represented or pictured, whose name in the various spoken languages of Egypt or the Semitic tribes, begins with this sound."

"Moses at least was acquainted with the Egyptian writing; he himself could write; from him begin the notices in respect to the practice of the art of writing among the Israelites."⁴

It is unnecessary to multiply these references any further. The argument from this source against the genuineness of the Pentateuch is wholly untenable, and is generally abandoned in Germany. As, however, it has been recently brought forward with considerable confidence, and as the discussion of it might cast light on other topics which may come under consideration, we have thought it worth while to devote some space to it.

§ 5. *Language and Style of the Pentateuch does not prove its later Origin.*

It is confidently affirmed by some in our country, that the Pentateuch must be of comparatively recent origin from the fact that its language and idiom do not differ from those of the professedly later books. Moses, as is affirmed, wrote, six or eight centuries

¹ *Hist. Krit. Forschungen*, 1831, p. 615.

² Vater, quoted by Hengstenberg, *Beiträge* I. p. 424.

³ *Metrolog. Untersuch.* p. 40.

⁴ *Ueber den Ursprung d. Alphabetes*, 1841, pp. 5, 6.

before some of the prophets; there would, therefore, inevitably be many archaisms, or vestiges of antiquity in the former; but as there are not, then it follows that the writer of the Pentateuch must have been coëval or nearly so with the prophets. The similarity or rather identity of style in the two cases, precludes any other hypothesis. We might with as much reason suppose that the Latin of Ennius or of the Twelve Tables would be identical with that of Livy or Tacitus; or that Chaucer and Addison would use the same English vocabulary, as that Moses and Isaiah should be found to differ in style as little as they do. The early origin of the Pentateuch is impossible on this ground alone. We need no other proof that it is not genuine.

It is hardly necessary, perhaps, to undertake to refute this position at length. The opponents of the genuineness of the Pentateuch in Germany have generally and long ago abandoned this ground as untenable. As, however, it is again urged as a decisive objection to the early origin of the five books of Moses, it may be well to devote a few pages to its examination.

In the first place, it is not true that there are no differences between the language of the Pentateuch and that of the later books. The differences are by no means inconsiderable, as the best Hebrew scholars of the present day acknowledge. Ewald, speaking of some fragments of the Pentateuch and Joshua, says "that there are many things in the style as rare as they are antique. Considering the small number of passages, the amount of words elsewhere wholly unknown or not used in prose, is great."¹

The last service which was performed for the cause of sacred learning by Dr. Jahn of Vienna, was an elaborate essay on the Language and Style of the Pentateuch, designed to vindicate its genuineness. His object was to show that there are a multitude of words in the Pentateuch, which never occur, or very rarely, in the later books; while in the later books, there are many words, which are never or but seldom found in the Pentateuch. In his lists, he has omitted most of the *ἀπαξ λεγόμενα*, also those words, which must from the nature of the case be peculiar to the Pentateuch, e. g. proper names of countries, cities and nations; the names of particular diseases, such as the leprosy and its symptoms; the various terms which designate blemishes in men, priests and sacrificial offerings, and those which were employed in the construction of the tabernacle; also the names of those

¹ Geschichte d. Volkes Israel, I. 77.

natural objects which are peculiar to Egypt and the Arabian desert. On the other hand, in the list of words peculiar to the later books, those terms are excluded which the author of the Pentateuch had no occasion to use. After the designations for all these classes of objects were left out, Jahn then made a selection from the most important of the remainder. This enumeration comprises about *four hundred* words and phrases peculiar to the Pentateuch, or but very seldom employed elsewhere, and about *four hundred* words and phrases in the later books which either do not occur at all, or but very rarely, in the Pentateuch. Jahn's list, as Hengstenberg remarks, requires a revision, as Hebrew learning has made great progress in the last twenty-five years. Jahn fell into some mistakes in his interpretation of words, and he confined himself too much to their external form. He should also have omitted the ἀσαφὲς λεγόμενα. Yet, after all allowances are made, the greater portion of the words in his enumeration are perfectly in point. Not a few words and phrases to which he makes no allusion might swell the number.

We here adduce a few terms and forms of speech, some of the more important of which Gesenius and Ewald also refer to as peculiar to the Pentateuch.

The words אַי, *he*, and נַי, *young man*, are of common gender, and used, also, for *she* and *young woman*. The former is found in 195 places, as feminine, in the Pentateuch; neither is found as feminine out of it. "In accordance with the spirit of the language," says Ewald, "and the obviously gradual separation of gender, this is a proof, which cannot be mistaken, in favor of the high antiquity of the Pentateuch." When אַי stands for אַי, the punctators give it the appropriate pointing of this form (אֵי). From this circumstance, it has been suggested as probable, that other original archaisms in the Pentateuch may, in the lapse of ages, have been conformed to later usage.

The Plural of the Demonstrative pronoun הֵם is found eight times in Genesis, Leviticus and Deuteronomy, always with the article; elsewhere this form is found but once (there without the article) in 1 Chron. 20: 8, "manifestly borrowed," says Ewald, "from the Pentateuch." In all other places, הֵם is appended, הֵם־הֵם.

The phrase, הֵם־בְּאֵמֶת, *to be gathered to his people*, is the standing form in the Pentateuch; in the other books it is never found. Instead of it, elsewhere, the phrase, *to sleep with his fathers*, is employed.

The customary designation of *cohabitation*, in the Pentateuch

by *קָנָה*, is found elsewhere only in Ez. 22: 10, where there is a manifest play upon the words in Lev. 20: 11.

Together with the form *לָמַד*, *lamb*, the form *לָמַד* is found in the Pentateuch fourteen times; elsewhere never.

סֵדֶה, *species, kind*, occurs twenty-eight times in the Pentateuch, elsewhere only Ezek. 47: 10, borrowed from Gen. 1: 21.

רִיחַ נִיחֹךְ, *sweet odor*, used of offerings, occurs four times in the Pentateuch, elsewhere only in Ezekiel, where it is manifestly borrowed from the Pentateuch.

רֵעִי, *neighbor*, in Pentateuch eleven times; elsewhere only in Zech. 13: 7, manifestly grounded on the usage in the Pentateuch.

For *לָחַץ*, *to laugh*, of the Pentateuch, the other books use *לָחַץ* with three exceptions. *לָחַץ* is used fifty-two times. The same is true of the exchange of *לָחַץ* for the softer *לָחַץ*. The *ח* is the hardest of the sibilants. "The general process of modification," says Ewald, "is that the harder, rougher sounds become more and more exchanged for those which are softer and weaker." Even in the proper name, *Isaac*, *ח* is used for *ח* in Amos.

עֵזָא is used for *goat* fifty times in the Pentateuch; elsewhere never.

The country on the east of the Jordan, opposite Jericho, has in the Pentateuch the name *עֲרֵבוֹת מוֹאָב*, *plains of Moab*; elsewhere only in Josh. 13: 22, in reference to the narrative in the Pentateuch. In Judg. 11: 12 seq., where there is a somewhat detailed account of the march of Jephthah into this territory, there is no trace of this name; it is called *the land of the Amorites*.

The designation of the Jordan, in the neighborhood of Jericho, by *יַרְדֵּן*, is found only in the Pentateuch and Joshua.

The phrase, *to cover the eye of the earth*, *לְכַסּוֹת עֵינַי הָאֲרֶצַּח*, occurs only in the Pentateuch. It is one evidence of the *sensuous* character of the language of the Pentateuch. In later times, such expressions appear only in poetry. It has a parallel in the expression, "as the ox licketh up the grass of the field," Num. 22: 4.

The verb *קָבַע*, *to hollow out*, occurs only in the Pentateuch. In the remaining books, *קָבַע* is employed, which is also found in the Pentateuch.

נִקְבָּה, *female*, is found twenty-one times in the Pentateuch, elsewhere only in Jer. 31: 22, where there is an evident reference to Num. 6: 30.

הֵנָּה, *here, in this place*, only in the Pentateuch. *הֵנָּה*, in the sense of *times*, literally *beats*, is not found out of the Pentateuch.

In the other books, the equivalent, *מִדְּבָר*, is used, which also appears in the Pentateuch. This peculiarity is not to be regarded as accidental. In ancient times, when visible objects had such preponderance, the connection of the original meaning of a word with its derivatives was so visibly preserved, that every word which signifies *foot* or *step*, might be used, without any addition, in the sense of *times*.

The phrase, *בֶּן בְּעוֹר*, Num. 24: 3, 15, *son of Beor*. The *י* as the outward mark of the construct state, belongs to the infancy of language. It is peculiar to the Pentateuch, except that it is found in Ps. 114: 8, which is an imitation, and in the word *יָרִיחַ*, Ps. 50: 10. 104: 11. Is. 56: 9. Zeph. 2. 14, which is copied literally from Gen. ch. 1: 24.

מִצֵּד is used in Numbers for the later *מִצְדָּה* and *מִצְדָּה*.

The words, *מִצְדָּה*, *mixed multitude*, Num. 11: 4, and *קִלְקַל*, *vile*, *light*, Num. 21: 5, are not found except in the Pentateuch.

מִצְדָּה, *sack*, fifteen times in Genesis, elsewhere never. *מִצְדָּה*, *hurt*, five times in the Pentateuch, not elsewhere. *חֶזֶן*, *breast of animals*, thirteen times, only in the Pentateuch. *מִצְדָּה*, *sickle*, twice in Deuteronomy. *כָּל־יָרֵק* is the later word. *כָּל־יָרֵק*, *every living thing*, only in Gen. and Dent. *חֶזֶן*, *portion, tribute*, three times, in Numbers only. *חֶזֶן*, *number*, only in Ex. and Leviticus. *חֶזֶן*, *to be redundant*, nine times, only in the Pentateuch. *חֶזֶן*, *a tenth part*, twenty-six times, only in the Pentateuch. *חֶזֶן*, *hostile encounter*, seven times, only in the Pentateuch. *חֶזֶן*, *to emit rays*, only in Ex. 34: 29. 30: 35, elsewhere never. *חֶזֶן*, *to brood or hover over*, in Piel, only Gen. 1: 2. Dent. 32: 11. *חֶזֶן*, *rest of the Sabbath*, eleven times in Exod. and Levit., elsewhere never. *חֶזֶן*, *offspring*, only in the Pentateuch. *חֶזֶן*, *effusion*, nine times, only in the Pentateuch. *חֶזֶן*, *great grand-children*, only in Gen., Ex., Num. and Deut. *חֶזֶן*, *foul pollution*, only in the Pentateuch. *חֶזֶן*, *coat of mail*, only in Exodus, later words are *חֶזֶן*, *חֶזֶן*, etc.

There is, however, a remarkable homogeneity in most of the remains which we possess of the Hebrew literature. We cannot separate these remains into different periods, as is done in regard to Roman literature. The distinction of golden and silver ages, which Gesenius makes, does not hold throughout. The language and idiom of the Pentateuch are substantially like the language and style of the later historians and prophets.

Yet this resemblance does not by any means prove the later origin of the Pentateuch. The five books may have been written

in their present form, substantially, by Moses. This may be proved by the following considerations.

1. The affirmation that the genuineness of the Pentateuch is destroyed, because its idiom is the same as that of the other Hebrew books, thus demonstrating, as it is said, its recent authorship, proves too much. It would show that the whole body of Hebrew literature must be contemporaneous. The books of Samuel, as it is agreed on all hands, were written several hundred years before the prophecy of Malachi, yet the Hebrew of the two productions is not essentially different. Now if the identity of the style of the Pentateuch and that of Isaiah demonstrates the late origin of the former, then for the same reason, the writer of Samuel must have been contemporaneous with the last of the prophets. If the presence of a large number of archaisms in the Pentateuch be necessary to show its Mosaic authorship, then the existence of a less number in the books of Samuel is necessary in order to show that it was written before the age of Malachi or Zechariah. There is, confessedly, a great difference in the age of different Psalms. Some, we know, were written by David. Others were composed after the captivity. Yet some of the latter are among the most beautiful and original in the whole compass of Hebrew literature, while the style and idiom are, in all important respects, the same as those of which David was the writer. The Hebrew of the 137th Psalm has as close a resemblance to that of the 18th, as the Hebrew of Isaiah has to that of the Pentateuch. If an interval of several hundred years be allowed—as it is by every one,—to intervene between the authorship in the case of the two Psalms, then the same may be rightfully admitted in respect to Isaiah and the Pentateuch. In other words, what proves too much, proves nothing. A course of argument that would make the Pentateuch, on the ground of style, contemporaneous with Isaiah, would make the authorship of the whole Old Testament identical in point of time, unless we except a few fragments, savoring strongly of Chaldee.

2. The Pentateuch would naturally serve as a model and common source for the writers of the subsequent portions of the Scriptures. It was the law-book, unrepealable, for the Jewish race. Constant reference must have been made to its pages, especially by the priests and the more cultivated part of the nation. They would, either intentionally or insensibly, adopt its idioms and phraseology. It contained the record of the miraculous dispensations of the Almighty towards their favored progenitors.

Deviation from its style might come to be regarded almost as a moral offence. Or, if there were nothing of this superstitious reverence, still it would imperceptibly and deeply affect the entire national literature. And this is found to be actually the fact. References to the law, presuppositions of its various institutes, imitation or copying of its language, reminiscences perfectly spontaneous, of the events recorded in it, are everywhere found in the older historical books, the prophets and Psalms. In four of the earlier prophets, Isaiah (not including chaps. xl—lvi), Micah, Hosea and Amos, there are more than EIGHT HUNDRED traces of the existence of the Pentateuch in its present form.¹ One cannot read even four or five chapters of these prophets, with any degree of attention, without being struck with the great number of allusions to the facts of the Pentateuch. This would often involve, of course, the quotation of the precise language employed in describing those events. There is no fact exactly parallel to this in the whole circle of literature. Luther's German version of the Bible and king James's English version have done much to fix the character of the German and English languages. Not a little of the best literature of the two nations is deeply tinctured with the spirit of these translations, where the exact style and language are not copied. Yet there are many circumstances that counteract this influence, which did not exist in respect to the Pentateuch. They are regarded as mere versions, no one feeling for them the reverence which is entertained for the original. They are not the fountain of civil and national law, as the Pentateuch was to the Jews. The two versions principally affect the religious and devotional literature. The case most analogous to the Pentateuch is the Korân. Its effect on Arabic literature, as will be mentioned below, has been great, for many centuries. Yet, perhaps, it has never had that marked and all-pervading influence which the five books of Moses have exerted on Hebrew literature.

3. The unchangeable character of Hebrew literature would be naturally inferred from the character of the people and the circumstances in which they were placed.

They lived in the midst of nations who spoke the same language, or dialects closely cognate. Their own language was indigenous in Canaan. Their numerous wars were almost exclusively carried on against tribes who used the same or related lan-

¹ See Tuch, *Kommentar über die Genesis*, Vorrede, p. 98.

guages. Of course there would be no room for any intermixtures of foreign speech from this source.

The Hebrews were strictly a religious people, connected together by the strongest ties, forbidden to engage in foreign commerce, taught to look upon the religious usages and many of the common customs of other nations with abhorrence, never inclined to travel abroad, and utterly indisposed, (often in contradiction to the spirit of the Mosaic law,) to admit foreigners into their society. Up to the time of David, they had but little access to the Mediterranean Sea, the coast being lined by their inveterate enemies, the Philistines. They had but one large city. Nearly all the literature originated in Jerusalem. Almost all the writers, of whom mention is made, seem to have lived in the metropolis. There was no rival city, no Italian or Asiatic colony, to use and glory in a different dialect from that of the proud Athenian city. All the tribes were, in an important sense, residents of Jerusalem. Three times in a year, and for days together, a great proportion of the male population mingled together in the most unreserved intercourse,—a circumstance which would strongly tend to preserve the unity and purity of the language. There were scarcely any arts or sciences to corrupt, with their nomenclature, the old forms of the language. No system of philosophy ever crept into the country. None could have been introduced without injuring the religious spirit of the people. With the exception of the priests and Levites, the nation were almost wholly employed in the agricultural or pastoral life,—a condition which, perhaps, least of all, admits of changes in idioms or in the forms of words.

We may add, to these considerations, the unchangeableness which has always characterized oriental life throughout. The same permanence which attaches to manners and customs would of course extend, more or less, to the forms of speech. Progress is the law in the West, stability in the East. The occidental languages are subject to the ceaseless change, which characterizes all other things.¹ The oriental delights to rehearse the same allegories and apothegms, expressed in the same terms, which gratified his earliest progenitors.

The structure itself, of the Semitic dialects, would lead us to the same general conclusion. This is manifest, e. g. in the law

¹ This is entirely consistent with the position of the degeneracy of the Orientals in knowledge and virtue. Manners, customs, languages might be permanent, while acquaintance with the character of God and the perception of human duty were becoming obscure.

of trilaterals, in the relation of compound nouns and derivatives to their roots, and in the perfect regularity with which the forms of the verb are developed.

4. We have, however, in direct opposition to the objection advanced, the perfect analogy of other Semitic languages. The Syriac and Arabic underwent, for many centuries, comparatively little change. The oldest remains of the Syrian, the Peshito version of the New Testament, which was prepared in the second century, agrees throughout, in all essential things, with the Syriac of Barhebraeus, who lived in the thirteenth century, notwithstanding the tendency of the latter, in its language and syntactical forms, to the Arabic. "That no more changes happened to the Syriac," says Hoffmann,¹ "in this long interval of time, is not strange; for as manners, customs, usages, etc., are altered less among orientals than Europeans, so it is with a language; if it makes any progress, it is still more likely to remain long stationary, than to advance. As the Korán has imposed a restricted and fixed character on the Arabic language, so the most ancient monument of Syriac letters—the version of the sacred books—has effected the same in the Syriac language." It should also be recollected, that this permanence in the language was maintained, while the Syrians were under subjection to a foreign power. Of course the language was more liable to corruption than could have been the case with the Hebrew before the Babylonish captivity.

A still stronger proof may be drawn from the Arabic. Professor Kosegarten of Greifswald, one of the most distinguished living orientalists, in a review of Eichhorn's Introduction to the Old Testament, in the *Jena Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, July, 1825, has shown, by a clear and fundamental examination, that the fact of the stability, or continued unchanging character of the Arabic language, can be established by the most unquestionable proofs from the language itself, not only during a period of six hundred years but of a thousand years, yea for fifteen hundred years. The grammatical structure of the Arabic language remains the same in all the writers which fall within these three widely separated periods. Declensions, conjugations, constructions, are the same. The smaller, incidental deviations are no more considerable, by any means, than the difference which appears between the language of the Pentateuch and that of the older Hebrew prophets. No greater difference is to be noted, in a lexical respect, in these Arabic writers, than that which occurs between the Pentateuch, the

¹ Syriac Grammar, p. 15.

books of Samuel and Isaiah. We may hence conclude, that in the Arabic language, during the fifteen hundred years in which we can examine its form, no such changes at all have taken place as appear in the German dialects and in those derived from the Latin, in the course of a few centuries, and which have happened to the Greek language down to its present form in modern Greek.¹ Consequently, the Mosaic writings might have been separated from some other books of the Old Testament by an interval of a thousand years, and at the same time exhibit but few variations in language and idiom.

We are happy to subjoin in further corroboration of the views here presented, some more exact statements in regard to the history of the Arabic, from a friend who has long made that language his particular study.

"You are aware that the oldest specimens of Arabic literature which we possess are not more ancient than the century before Mohammed. These exhibit a highly cultivated language; the syntax is regular, the inflections are richly varied, and the vocabulary is abundant:—they also show a refined musical art. It is evident that this perfection can have been attained only by degrees; it is probably to be ascribed to the rival efforts of lyric bards of different Arab tribes. One result of these poetic efforts seems to have been to make the peculiar expressions of each tribe a part of the authorized language of the other; a common language of literature being thus, to some extent, created, while at the same time dialectical differences distinguished the ordinary spoken language of the tribes. It thus appears, that the Arabic language, prior to Mohammed's time, was already tending to a fixed form for use in literary productions. The Korân, as you well know, was finally written out by order of the Khalif Othman in the dialect of the Koreishites, who were the dominant tribe in Mohammed's day, and that to which he himself belonged; their dialect also, had, it is probable, become the literary standard, by appropriating to itself a larger measure than other tribes of that culture which poetic rivalry put within the reach of all. But it is quite plain, that the promulgation of the Korân rather depressed and restricted literary effort among the Arabs. In style, it is far from being as rich and varied as the productions of the earlier poets; and yet it would have been presumption to think of surpassing it in language, or manner, since the super-excellence of its composition was claimed by Mohammed as an argument for

¹ Hartmann's *Forschungen*, p. 649.

its inspiration. Now came in, also, the influence of the grammarians, who, though they refer to the earlier poets, yet *prove* everything by the Korân; all sorts of pretences are resorted to by them to make out, in every case, that the language of their Sacred Book is without fault. To this is to be added, that all the learning of the Arabs is based in some respect upon the Korân: this book became the First Class Book, so to speak, in all schools. The Arab mind having moved in a sphere so circumscribed, since the promulgation of the Korân, ever turning to that as in prayer the Mohammedan ever faces the Kibleh, it is true that the written Arabic has been very little changed from that time to this. Even the preservation of the ancient pronunciation has been provided for, in the reading of the Korân, by the perpetuation of the rules of early Korân-readers, in a special department of the schools. There would seem to be a strong presumption, that, whenever a body of sacred literature exists, which has been transmitted down from a turning period in the progress of a nation's civilization, and a class of men devoted to its study, the literary language will not deviate from the model of the sacred book. This might be illustrated by the case of the Sanscrit, which until within a few years was even *spoken* by the Brahmans, in its classic form; and which, as written, has changed very little, except in certain works where caprice seems to have driven the fancy mad, since its classic age. May it not also be true, that the *separation* of a written from a spoken language favors the preservation, generally, of the ancient purity of the former?

"The ordinary language of social intercourse, with the Arabs, must have been affected already as soon as it came to be used by foreign nations, upon whom it was forced, or who adopted it with the religion of the Prophet; though in the palmy days of Islamism the Moslem schools would tend to check this foreign influence. But it received still greater modifications in consequence of the less general diffusion of instruction, and the diminished stimulus to learning, and the irruptions of barbarians into Mohammedan countries after the decline of the Khalifate. The peculiarities of the spoken Arabic consist chiefly in the intermixture of foreign words, and in abbreviations of pronunciation, by which some of the more delicate distinctions of grammatical form in the written Arabic are lost. Yet I suppose it to be a fact, that the Korân is equally intelligible to all who speak the Arabic."

It may be added, that the circumstances of the Syrians and Arabians were very different from those of the Hebrews. The

former passed through many stages of cultivation. They appropriated to themselves Greek science, and were compelled to borrow many scientific terms, and thus endanger the purity of their language. The Arabians, too, entered on a career of conquest subjugating the nations from Spain almost to China. How different was the condition of the Hebrews from the days of Joshua to Josiah, and how almost infinitely less exposed to change was the Hebrew language than its sister dialect!

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTES ON BIBLICAL GEOGRAPHY.

By E. Robinson.

THE CITY EPHRAIM, JOHN 11: 54.

AFTER the raising of Lazarus, the Sanhedrim at the instance and counsel of Caiphas, determined to seize Jesus and cause him to be put to death. To avoid their machinations, our Lord withdrew from Jerusalem "unto a country near to the wilderness, into a city called Ephraim, and there abode with his disciples;" John 11: 54. This place has never yet been identified with any modern site; nor has any attempt been made, so far as I know, to ascertain anything more than its general position. The following comparisons and combinations may perhaps throw some light upon the subject.

This city *Ephraim* (*Ἐφραΐμ*, *Ἐφραΐμ*) has been correctly assumed as being the same with the Ephraim or Ephron of 2 Chr. 13: 19, Heb. עֶפְרַיִם in Keri, עֶפְרַיִם in Chethib, Sept. *Ἐφρών*, which place Abijah king of Judah, after his great battle with Jereboam, took from the latter along with Bethel and Jeshanah. It lay therefore not far remote from Bethel. So too Josephus relates, that Vespasian marched from Cesarea to the hill-country, subdued the toparchies of Gophna and Acraba with the small cities (*πόλεις*) Bethel and Ephraim (*Ἐφραΐμ*), and then proceeded to Jerusalem; Jos. B. J. 4.9.9. This also is doubtless the *Ephron* (*Ἐφρών*) of Eusebius and Jerome, which the former places at eight, and the latter (correcting Eusebius) at nearly *twenty* Roman miles north of Jerusalem; Onomast. art. *Ephron*.

There was another similar name in the Old Testament, viz. *Ophrah* in Benjamin, Josh. 18: 23. 1 Sam. 13: 17, Heb. עֶפְרָה, Sept. *Ἐφραθά*. This was apparently the *Aphra* (*Ἀφρά*) of Eusebius and Jerome, situated *five* Roman miles east of Bethel; Onomast. art. *Aphra*.

The question suggests itself: Were perhaps Ophra and Ephron (עֶפְרוֹן עֶפְרָה) merely different forms of the same name, belonging to one and the same place? This would seem not improbable, as both forms have the same general signification, *fawn*, *fawn-like*, from the noun עֶפֶר *fawn*; one receiving simply the feminine ending, and the other taking the very common termination יָן. The same idea is favored, too, by the like analogy in the Hebrew forms for *Shiloh*, viz. שִׁילֹה and שִׁילֹן; this latter being found in the gentile noun שִׁילֹנִי *Shilonite*, and in the Σιλονίς of Josephus; see Gessen. Heb. Lex. art. שִׁילֹה no. 2. So likewise in the forms גִּלֹה *Giloh* and גִּלֹנִי *Gilonite*. Further, the great laxness and variety of manner with which Hebrew names are written in Greek, leaves ample room for such a position. Thus another Ophrah (עֶפְרָה) in Manasseh is written by the LXX, Ἐφφαθά, Judg. 6: 11. 8: 27, 32. 9: 5; and by Josephus Ἐφφάρ, Antiq. 5. 6. 5. Hence for Heb. עֶפְרָה we have Ἐφφαθά and Ἐφφάρ; and for Heb. עֶפְרוֹן we have Ἐφφάρ and Ἐφφαῖ.

If now we admit the probable identity of Ephraim (or Ephron) and Ophra in the Old Testament: and that of Ephraim in the New Testament with both; and follow out this suggestion; we shall find it giving still further confirmation from several circumstances. According to John 11: 54, the place in question was situated near the desert; according to the Old Testament and Josephus it was not far from Bethel; according to Eusebius and Jerome it lay five Roman miles from Bethel in the eastern quarter, and nearly twenty Roman miles (Jerome says "in the twentieth mile") north of Jerusalem. Now, taking all these specifications together, they apply with great exactness to the lofty site of the modern Taiyibeh, two hours northeast of Bethel, and six hours and twenty minutes north-northeast of Jerusalem, (reckoning three Roman miles to the hour,) adjacent to and overlooking the broad tract of desert country lying between it and the valley of the Jordan, and also along the western side of the Dead Sea; a position so remarkable, that one cannot suppose it to have been left unoccupied in ancient times; see Bibl. Res. in Palest. II. p. 121—124. The striking coincidence of all these circumstances would seem to leave little room for doubt, that we have here, in the modern Taiyibeh, the ancient Ephraim to which Jesus thus withdrew.

If we have now succeeded in fixing the position of the city Ephraim, new light is thrown upon the harmony of the Gospels during the six months before the Saviour's passion. According to Matt. 19: 1 and Mark 10: 1, our Lord's last approach to Jerusalem was by way of Perea and Jericho. At Ephraim he could overlook the whole of Perea, as well as all the valley of the Jordan; and nothing would be more natural for him, than to pass over into that region and there preach the Gospel on his way back to Jerusalem for the last time. Here then John harmonizes with

Matthew and Mark; according to whom great multitudes followed Jesus on this journey. To this journey there may likewise be referred Luke 13: 22; as also the following chapters of Luke, to dispose of which a return of our Lord to Galilee has been usually assumed after the preceding feast of Tabernacles. But of such a return not the slightest hint is found in any of the Evangelists.

ARTICLE IX.

SELECT LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Classical and General Literature. A new volume of Prof. Ritter's great geographical work was published in 1844 and forms Vol. 5 of West Asia. It contains the routes of the most recent travellers in Mesopotamia as Grant, Ainsworth and Forbes; examines some points of great interest in biblical geography, as the position of Ur of the Chaldees and Haran, and the river Chebar; and treats at considerable length of the ruins of Babylonia.—The transactions of the Philological and Historical class of the Berlin Academy for 1842, published in 1844, form a quarto volume of nearly 500 pages,—quite a contrast to the meagre volume of the previous year. Among the articles the longest is an attempt at a Topography of the products of the Chinese empire by M. Schott. An essay by Prof. Zumpt on the state of the Philosophical schools at Athens will be read with interest by the students of philosophy and classical antiquities.

The learned French scholar Boissonade published during the last year one hundred and twenty-three fables of Balbus written in the Choliambic or Hipponactean measure and discovered a short time since in the convent of St. Laura on Mt. Athos. A few only of these fables had been known in their perfect state, but the notice of Choliambic verses in the prose of the so-called fables of Aesop had led several learned men to attempt to reconstruct them. A lame attempt of that kind is contained in Berger's book entitled *Babrii fabularum choliambicarum libri tres*, (Munich 1816). Berger gives ninety-three, some of which may be called bad prose made worse. Parts of twenty-two are given, as restored by various scholars, in the Philological Museum. (Cambridge 1832, vol. 1. p. 280). Babrius, who was supposed to belong to or to have lived before the Augustan period, is thrust down to the age of Alexander Severus by Boissonade in consequence of some indications in one of the proems to the fables.

An edition of Strabo of the highest importance for the very corrupt text of that geographer and founded on a careful examination of the manuscripts is now in progress at Berlin. The editor is Dr. Gustav Kramer. One vol. containing a preface and the text of six books has been published.—The *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* of Boeckh has reached the first fasciculus of the Third Volume.—Orelli has published a supplement to his *Select Latin inscriptions*.—The *Anecdota Delphica* of Ernest Curtius, (Berlin 1843), contains inscriptions discovered at Delphi by Otfried Müller, the author and A. Schöll. Müller died immediately after. There are connected with the inscriptions admirable essays on the manumission of slaves in Greece, and on some decrees of the Amphictyonic council.

An edition of Plutarch's *Lives*, important for the text by C. Sintenis, author of an excellent edition of the life of Pericles, has advanced to the third volume. A fourth will easily finish the original text. We hope Sintenis will add a commentary, which he can do better than any man living.

The second volume of the second edition of Matter's *Histoire de l'Ecole d'Alexandrie* appeared in 1844. This edition has been very much altered from the first which came out twenty-three years since. The second volume treats of the sciences pursued at Alexandria, particularly of the mathematics, astronomy and geography.

Works on Hebrew Grammar, Biblical Interpretation, etc. Dr. Gustav Brückner has published a "New Hebrew Reading Book with Notes and a Glossary." The author belongs to the school of Gesenius, and was employed by him in preparing *Indexes*, etc. for the *Thesaurus*. Gesenius bore testimony to his intimate acquaintance with Hebrew, to his exact grammatical knowledge, etc. "Brückner differs from his teacher," says a writer in *Tholuck's Anzeiger*, Sept. 1844, "by a fundamental insight into the religious and theological contents of the Old Testament, Gesenius recognizing in the sacred writings only the products of oriental literature." Dr. B. published, in 1842, a "Practical Help for methodical Exercises in Hebrew Grammar." The New Reading Book embraces three courses, the first designed for exercises in the forms of the grammar, and the other two in the Syntax. The selections from the historical, prophetic and poetical books of the Old Testament, are said to be excellent. The Notes explain some of the more difficult passages.

Dr. Hupfeld of Halle has published a little work "On the Idea and Method of the so-called Biblical Introduction, with an outline of its history and literature." The title of Ewald's new Hebrew grammar, mentioned p. 192 of this Journal, is "Auführliches Lehrbuch der Hebräischen

Sprache des Alten Bundes." In this work the two grammars, before published by the author, are amalgamated. The price is 2½ Rthlr.

The sixth edition of Tholuck's Commentary on John, published in 1844, is thoroughly revised and somewhat enlarged. It has references to the late writings of Neander, Krabbe, and Bauer, the third edition of Lücke's Commentary, De Wette, Ehrhard's Critique on the Evangelical History, &c. Mau on Death as the Wages of Sin, etc.

Semisch, pastor at Trebnitz, and author of a recent and valuable work on Justin Martyr, has been appointed ordinary professor of theology at Greifswald.—The first complete edition of the works of the great Swiss Reformer, Ulric Zuingli, has appeared at Zürich, under the charge of Melchior Schuler and J. Schultess. The first part contains the writings published in German, viz. I. homiletic, didactic and apologetic, 1. relating to the transition in the views of the author from Roman Catholicism to evangelical truth and freedom, 2. relating to baptism and the famous sacramentarian controversy; II. writings of a miscellaneous character, 1. poetical, 2. pedagogical, 3. political, all arranged chronologically. An appendix contains an explanation of the peculiarities in the formation of words and the syntax so far as is necessary to the understanding of Zuingli's writings. The second part embraces the Latin works; I. those of the same nature with the German productions, in similar order; II. exegetical on the Old and New Testaments; III. Letters. Four large Indexes complete the work. We shall embrace an early opportunity to give an account of the life and labors of Zuingli, who was in some respects, the most interesting of the great Reformers, and to whom, amid the splendor that has surrounded Luther's name, full justice has never been accorded.

The long expected work of Julius Müller on Sin was published at Breslau, in 1844, in two vols. 8vo. of 517 and 590 pages. The title is "Die Christliche Lehre von der Sünde." The author is professor at Halle, and brother of the celebrated Ottfried Müller. The work is divided into five Books, which discuss the actual existence of sin, the principal theories which have been propounded in explaining it, the possibility of sin, the extent of sin, and the increase of sin in the development of the individual. These subjects are subdivided into a great number of chapters and sections. The analysis in the table of contents occupies twenty-eight closely printed pages. A mere glance at this will show the scientific and comprehensive character of the discussion.

A new edition of the work of Sartorius, "Die Lehre von der heiligen Liebe oder Grundzüge der evangelisch-kirchlichen Moraltheologie," has just appeared at Stuttgart in two thin volumes. The motto of the work,

quoted from Augustine, is, "Definitio brevis et vera virtutis: ordo est amoris." It has a high reputation among evangelical theologians in Germany.

Since the last No. of this Journal was published, Prof. Stuart's Commentary on the Apocalypse has appeared from the press of Allen, Morrill and Wardwell, in two vols. 8vo. of 504 pages each. The first volume is taken up with matters of an introductory nature, pertaining to the character of the book, its authorship and the time when it was written, nature of its language and idiom, comparison of it with Old Testament prophecies and with contemporary apochryphal writings, history of the interpretation of it, etc. The second volume contains the Commentary and several dissertations on various topics connected with the subject. The design of the Apocalypse, was to encourage and console the church of God, when suffering severe affliction and persecution. The writer, under the guise of lofty poetry and of extended symbolical language, predicts, for the consolation of Christ's servants, first the overthrow of the Jewish persecuting power, second of Pagan Rome, and, third, of a future unknown enemy, under the title of Gog and Magog. After this foe is destroyed, the church will enjoy a long period of the highest prosperity, to be succeeded by the end of the world, the general resurrection and the New Jerusalem, or glorified state. The Commentary will, doubtless, awaken general attention and earnest discussion both in this country and in Great Britain, the more so, as on some fundamental points, it is at variance with the interpretations of the Apocalypse which have had universal currency where the English language is spoken. In Germany, the Apocalypse has received less attention than perhaps any of the larger books of the Bible. The most interesting and able writers are Herder, Eichborn, Ewald, and Lücke. The latter has published only an Introduction.

Crocker and Brewster of Boston have in press: A New Harmony of the Four Gospels in Greek. Printed from the text of Hahn's New Testament. With Explanatory Notes. By E. Robinson, D. D. This is wholly a new work; and the arrangement differs in several important particulars from that of any previous Harmony. Especially is this the case in the portions relating to the interval of time between our Lord's last arrival at Jerusalem and the preceding festival of the Tabernacles; this part being arranged in conformity with the new views arising out of the identification of the city Ephraim, as exhibited in a preceding Article in the present No. of this work.

We are glad to learn that the late edition, (1842), of Winer's Chaldee Grammar has been translated by Prof. Hackett of Newton, and will soon

be printed at the Andover press. The edition of Riggs's Chaldee Manual has been nearly disposed of. Winer's Grammar has the excellencies that would be anticipated from his character as an oriental and biblical scholar.

The American Oriental Society, instituted in Boston, in 1842, have published the two addresses, delivered at the anniversaries of the Society in 1843 and 1844, by the president, Hon. John Pickering, and Prof. Edward E. Salisbury of Yale College. The former contains an able and comprehensive sketch of the field which the Association proposes to cultivate; the latter, an interesting and learned view of Buddhism.

It is hardly necessary, perhaps, to state what may be taken for granted, that the conductors of this Journal do not hold themselves responsible for the truth of every sentiment or opinion advanced in the articles which they may translate, or which may be furnished by contributors or correspondents. It is by no means the only object of a periodical Review to be the medium of communicating accurate information or sound views in relation to a particular subject. An essay may be fitted to awaken attention, to excite the faculties of the reader, and to provoke discussion. Thus in the end, profounder thoughts may be elicited, and a truth or doctrine may be established on a firmer basis than would otherwise be possible. The communication of knowledge is one object; the excitement of the mental and moral faculties is another, perhaps not inferior in importance. It is with such views, that articles like those of Kinkel on our Lord's Ascension, and Lasaulx on the Sacrifice upon Golgotha are admitted. Different views may be entertained in respect to not a few theological and biblical topics, *salva fide et salva ecclesia*. The cause of sacred learning has nothing to fear from freedom of discussion.

ERRATA.—No. V. page 81, line 30, for there read therefore. p. 85, l. 9, for *κακοῦλλον* read *κακοῦλλον*. p. 87, l. 4, vis for bis. p. 87, l. 12, ib. for 16. p. 89, l. 18, sum for semi. p. 89, l. 37, take for like. p. 92, l. 32, mandare for mandere. p. 95, the note should have TR. follow it. p. 96, l. 2, fourth letter π for π. p. 97, l. 20, Coelius for Caelius. p. 97, l. 37, Gellius for Gallius. p. 103, l. 15, balineae for balinaea. p. 104, l. 3, A for Rem. p. 106, l. 7, Krause for Krauser.—No. VI. p. 239, for *غراب ضرب* read *غراب*. p. 240, for *Cana* read *Caua*. p. 242, for *الكلس* read *الكلس*. p. 246, for *فواطرها* read *فواطرها*. p. 248, before the paragraph: *It is supposed that a word, etc.* insert: (3). p. 251, for *inscriptions* read *inscription*. p. 253, for *so wenig* read *so wenig*. p. 254, note 21, for *Schrift* read *Script*. p. 255, n. 23, do. do. p. 256, for *gralis* read *grallis*.

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ARTICLE I.

THE ALLEGED DISCREPANCY BETWEEN JOHN AND THE OTHER EVANGELISTS RESPECTING OUR LORD'S LAST PASSOVER.

By E. Robinson, Prof. in Union Theol. Seminary, New York.

EVER since the earliest centuries of the Christian era, a difference of opinion has existed in the church, as to the point, whether our Lord's last meal with his disciples, on the evening before his crucifixion, was the ordinary paschal supper of the Jews. The question may be stated in other forms; as for example: Did the crucifixion of our Lord follow or precede the Jewish paschal supper? Was the Friday on which Jesus suffered, the fourteenth or the fifteenth day of the month Nisan? But it is obvious, that in all these forms the point at issue is the same; and the solution must in all depend upon the same evidence and arguments.

In the following Article I propose briefly to survey this field of controversy; partly because of the intrinsic importance and difficulties of the subject itself; and partly because, in late years, these difficulties have been brought forward very prominently by some of the commentators of Germany; and have been made the ground, sometimes, of fierce assault upon a single Gospel, and at other times, of systematic efforts against the credibility and authority of all the Evangelists. It will, I trust, be made to appear, that these efforts are all in vain; and that the truth of God stands forever sure. We shall be led to see, I think, that here, as well as elsewhere, the longer such efforts are continued, and the greater the learning and skill with which they are conducted, the more clearly will the grand result be brought out to view, and the strik-

ing truth be more and more developed, that a fundamental characteristic everywhere manifest in the testimony of the four evangelists, is **UNITY IN DIVERSITY**.

As the events of our Lord's Passion were so intimately connected with the celebration of the Passover, it seems proper here to bring together in one view those circumstances relating to that festival, which may serve to illustrate the sacred history, and thus prepare the way for a better understanding of the main point to be discussed.

I. *Time of killing the Paschal Lamb.*

The paschal lamb (or kid, Ex. 12: 5) was to be selected on the tenth day of the first month, Ex. 12: 3. On the fourteenth day of the same month, (called Abib in the Pentateuch, and later Nisan, Deut. 16: 1. Esth. 3: 7,) the lamb thus selected was to be killed, at a point of time designated by the expression *בין הערביים* *between the two evenings*, Ex. 12: 6. Lev. 23: 5. Num. 9: 3, 5; or, as is elsewhere said, *בין הערב קריא וצאת השמש*, *at evening about the going down of the sun*, Deut. 16: 6. The same phrase, *בין הערביים*, *between the two evenings*, is put for the time of the daily evening sacrifice; Ex. 29: 39, 41. Num. 28: 4. The time thus marked was regarded by the Samaritans and Karaites, as being the interval between sunset and deep twilight; and so too Aben Ezra.¹ But the Pharisees and Rabbinites, according to the Mishnah, Pesach. 5. 3, held the first evening to commence with the declining sun (Greek *δελή πρωία*); and the second evening with the setting sun (Greek *δελή ὀψία*). Hence, according to them, the paschal lamb was to be killed in the interval between the ninth and eleventh hour, equivalent to our three and five o'clock, P. M. That this was in fact the practice among the Jews in the time of our Lord, appears from the testimony of Josephus: *Πάσχα καλεῖται, καθ' ἣν θύουσι μὲν ἀπὸ ἑννάτης ὥρας μέχρι ἑνδεκάτης*.² The daily evening sacrifice in the temple was also offered at the ninth hour or three o'clock, P. M. as the same historian testifies.³ Similar was the Greek *δελή*.⁴

The true time then of killing the Passover in our Lord's day,

¹ See Reland de Samar. § 24, in Diss. Miscell. T. II. Trigland. de Karais o. 4. Aben Ezra ad Ex. 12: 6.

² Jos. B. J. 6. 9. 3.

³ Jos. Antiq. 14. 4. 3. Comp. Pesach. 6. 1; also Acts 3: 1 et Wetstein in loc.

⁴ Hesych. *δελή πρωία*, ἡ μετ' ἑρπυρίων ὥρα · *δελή ὀψία*, ἡ περὶ δύουσι ἡλίου. Eustath. ad Od. 17. p. 285, ἡ ὀψία δελή, τὸ περὶ ἡλίου δύουσι · *δελή πρωία*, τὸ εὐθὺς ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ.

was between the ninth and eleventh hour, or towards sunset, near the close of the fourteenth day of Nisan.

II. Time of eating the Passover.

This was to be done the same evening, "And they shall eat the flesh in that night, roast with fire, and unleavened bread, and with bitter herbs shall they eat it;" Ex. 12: 8. The Hebrews in Egypt ate the first Passover, and struck the blood of the victims on their door-posts, on the evening before the last great plague; at midnight the Lord smote all the first-born; and in the morning the people broke up from Rameses on their march towards the Red Sea; viz. "on the fifteenth day of the first month, on the morrow after the passover;" Num. 33: 3.

It hence appears, very definitely, that the paschal lamb was to be slain in the afternoon of the fourteenth day of the month; and was eaten the same evening; that is, on the evening which was reckoned to and began the fifteenth day.

III. Festival of unleavened Bread.

"In the first month, on the *fourteenth* day of the month at even, ye shall eat unleavened bread, until the one and twentieth day of the month at even. Seven days there shall be no leaven found in your houses;" Ex. 12: 17, 18. comp. Deut. 16: 3, 4. "And on the *fifteenth* day of the same month is the feast of unleavened bread unto the Lord; seven days ye must eat unleavened bread;" Lev. 23: 6. comp. Num. 28: 17. From these passages it appears, that the festival of unleavened bread began strictly with the pass-over meal at or after sunset following the fourteenth day, and continued until the end of the twenty-first day.¹

In accordance with these precepts, and with an anxiety to go beyond rather than to fall short of them, the Jews were accustomed, at or before noon on the *fourteenth* day of Nisan, to cease from labor and put away all leaven out of their houses.² On that day, too, towards sunset, the paschal lamb was killed; and was eaten in the evening. Hence in popular usage, this fourteenth day itself, being thus a day of preparation for the festival which properly began at evening, very naturally came to be regarded as belonging to the festival; and is therefore sometimes spoken of in

¹ Comp. Jos. Antiq. 3. 10. 5.

² Lightfoot Opp. ed. Leusd. I. p. 728 sq. Hor. Heb. in Marc. 14: 12.

the New Testament as the "first day of unleavened bread, when they killed the passover;" Mark 14: 12. Luke 22: 7. comp. Matt. 26: 7. That such an usage was common appears also from Josephus; who, having in one place expressly fixed the commencement of this festival on the fifteenth of Nisan, speaks nevertheless in another passage of the fourteenth as the day of that festival, in exact accordance with the Evangelists.¹ In still another place, the same historian mentions the festival of unleavened bread as being celebrated for *eight* days.²

It is hardly necessary to remark, that in consequence of the close mutual relation between the Passover and the festival of unleavened bread, these terms are often used interchangeably (especially in Greek) for the whole festival, including both the paschal-supper and the seven days of unleavened bread.³

IV. *Other Paschal Sacrifices.*

1. "In the first day [fifteenth of Nisan] shall be a holy convocation; ye shall do no manner of servile work. But ye shall offer a sacrifice made by fire, a burnt-offering unto the Lord; two young bullocks, and one ram, and seven lambs of the first year;" also a meat offering, and "one goat for a sin-offering;" "after this manner shall ye offer daily throughout the seven days;" Num. 28: 18—24. All this was in addition to the ordinary daily sacrifices of the temple. "And on the seventh day ye shall have a holy convocation; ye shall do no servile work," v. 25. The first and last days of the festival, therefore, were each a day of rest or a *sabbath*; distinct from the weekly sabbath, except when one of these happened to fall upon this latter.

2. On the morrow after this first day of rest or sabbath, that is, on the sixteenth day of Nisan, the first-fruits of the harvest were offered, together with a lamb as a burnt-offering; Lev. 23: 10—12. This rite is expressly assigned by Josephus, in like manner, to the second day of the festival, the sixteenth of Nisan.⁴ The grain offered was barley; this being the earliest ripe, and its harvest occurring a week or two earlier than that of wheat.⁵ Until this of-

¹ Jos. Antiq. 3. 10. 5.—B. J. 5. 3. 1. comp. Antt. 11. 4. 8.

² Jos. Antt. 2. 15. 1.

³ See Luke 22: 1. John 6: 4. Acts 12: 3, 4, etc. Jos. Antt. 2. 1. 3. comp. B. J. 5. 3. 1.

⁴ Jos. Antt. 3. 10. 5.

⁵ Joseph. l. c. Bibl. Res. in Palest. II. p. 99.

fering was made, no husbandman could begin his harvest; nor might any one eat of the new grain; *Lev.* 23: 14. It was therefore a rite of great importance; and, in the time of our Lord and later, was performed with various formalities. Some of these were the following, according to the *Mishnah*; *Menach.* c. 10. Towards the end of the fifteenth of Nisan, some members of the *Sanhedrim*, appointed for the purpose, went with much ceremony out of Jerusalem over the brook Kidron, and there, in some field not far from the city, selected the portion of barley. During the evening or night following, i. e. early on the sixteenth of Nisan it was cut and brought into the court of the temple; even though that day might be the Sabbath.¹ Here the grain was separated from the ears, ground in a hand-mill, and sifted thirteen times. Of the flour, the tenth part of an ephah was mixed with oil and frankincense for a wave-offering; one handful of which was burnt upon the altar, and the rest eaten by the priests.*

3. There was also another sacrifice connected with the Passover, known among the later Hebrews as the *Khagigah* (חֲגִיגָה); of which there would seem to be traces likewise in the Old Testament. It was a festive thank-offering (תּוֹבֵחַת נֶאֱמָר, *Engl. Vers.* peace-offering), made by private individuals or families, in connection with the Passover, but distinct from the appointed public offerings of the temple. Such voluntary sacrifices or free-will offerings (זִבְחֵי חֶלֶב), differing from those offered in fulfilment of a vow (זִבְחֵי נֶדָר), were provided for in the Mosaic law. After the fat was burned upon the altar (*Lev.* 3: 3, 9, 14), and the priest had taken the breast and right shoulder as his portion (*Lev.* 7: 29—34. 10: 14), the remainder was eaten by the bringer with his family and friends in a festive manner, on the same or the next day; beyond which time none of it might be kept; *Lev.* 7: 16—18. 22: 29, 30. *Dent.* 12: 17, 18, 27. 27: 7. These private sacrifices, or free-will offerings, were often connected with the public festivals, both in honour of the same, and as a matter of convenience; *Num.* 10: 10. *Dent.* 14: 26. 16: 11, 14. *comp.* 1 *Sam.* 1: 3—5, 24, 25. 2: 12—16, 19. They might be eaten in any clean place within the city (*Lev.* 10: 14. *Dent.* 16: 11, 14); but those only might partake of them, as likewise of the Passover, who were themselves ceremonially clean; *Num.* 18: 11, 13. *John* 11: 55. *comp.* *Num.* 9: 10—13. 2 *Chr.* 30: 18. *Joseph. B. J.* 6. 9. 3.

¹ Lightfoot *Hor. Heb.* in *John* 19: 31. *Reland Antt. Sac.* 4. 2. 4. p. 227.

² See *Lev.* 2: 14—16. *Jos. Antt.* 3. 10. 5. Lightfoot *Hor. Heb.* in *Joh.* 19: 31. *Reland Antiqq. Sac.* 4. 3. 8.

Such a voluntary private sacrifice in connection with the Passover, would seem to be implied in Deut. 16: 2; "Thou shalt therefore sacrifice the Passover unto the Lord thy God, even flock and herd (צֶמֶד וּבָקָר), Sept. θύσεις τὸ πάσχα κυρίῳ τῷ Θεῷ σου πρόβατα καὶ βόας. It might indeed be said, that while the "flock" here stands for the paschal lambs, the "herd" is mentioned in allusion to the extraordinary public sacrifices on each of the seven days; Num. 28: 19. Yet other passages in the later Jewish history show that such a limitation is unnecessary and improbable. Thus in 2 Chr. 35: 7—9, Josiah and his princes are said to have given to the people not only nearly forty thousand lambs, but also three thousand eight hundred oxen; which latter especially could not of course have all been for the daily public sacrifices. Indeed, it is expressly said, that when these were offered in sacrifice they "sod them in pots and in caldrons and in pans, and divided them speedily among all the people;" vs. 12, 13. So too thank (peace) offerings are enumerated in connection with Hezekiah's great passover; for which likewise he and his princes gave to the people two thousand bullocks and seventeen thousand sheep; 2 Chr. 30: 22, 24. It was, moreover, the general law, that on this and other great festivals, none should appear before the Lord empty; Ex. 23: 15. Deut. 16: 16. Hence, as being a sacrifice connected with a festival, these voluntary offerings were themselves called, at least by the later Hebrews, חַגְגִּיתָּהּ, *a festival*; a word strictly synonymous with the earlier חַג.¹

Such apparently was the origin and character of the festive *Khagigah* of the later times of the Jewish people, derived in this manner from the festival sacrifices of the Old Testament. Indeed the earlier Rabbins, in commenting on Deut. 16: 2, directly refer the "flock" (צֶמֶד) to the paschal victims, and the "herd" (בָּקָר) to the *Khagigah*.² There existed, however, some difference of opinion as to the particular day of the passover festival, on which the *Khagigah* ought to be offered, whether on the fourteenth or fifteenth of Nisan; but the weight of authority was greatly in favour of the fifteenth day. Still, in certain cases, it was permitted to be offered on the fourteenth day; as, for instance, when the paschal lamb was too small for the number of the family or company, and then the *Khagigah* furnished a fuller meal.³ Yet the later accounts of the mode of celebrating the paschal supper, seem to

¹ See Buxtorf's *Lex.* sub voc.

² Pesach. fol. 70. 2. Lightfoot *Hor. Heb.* ad Joh. 18: 28.

³ Aruch, in חַג. Pesach. fol. 89. 2. Lightfoot l. c.

imply, that a Khagigah was ordinarily connected with that meal. Indeed, mention is made of a "Khagigah of the fourteenth day," so called in distinction from the more important and formal ceremonial Khagigah of the passover festival; which latter was not regularly offered until the fifteenth day, when the paschal supper had already been eaten. The former was then a mere voluntary oblation of thanksgiving, made for the very purpose of enlarging and diversifying the passover meal.¹

V. The Paschal Supper.

In the original institution of the Passover (Ex. c. 12), the lamb, as we have seen, was to be selected on the tenth of Nisan, killed late in the afternoon of the fourteenth, and eaten the same evening after the fifteenth day had begun; the blood having been struck upon the door-posts; vs. 3—7, 22. The flesh was to be eaten roasted, not raw nor sodden, with unleavened bread and bitter herbs; vs. 8, 9. None of it was to remain until the morning, or to be carried out of the house; and not a bone was to be broken; vs. 10, 46. It was to be eaten in haste, apparently standing, with the loins girded as for a journey, the shoes on the feet, and staff in hand; and no one was to go out of the door of the house until the morning; vs. 11, 22.

Some of these particulars would seem to have been intended only for the first Passover in Egypt; and could not well have had place afterwards. Thus when, in later times, crowds went up to Jerusalem to keep this festival, arriving there a day, or two days perhaps, before the fourteenth, and purchasing their lambs of the traders in and around the temple, a previous selection on the tenth was out of question. As too they were strangers in the city, and the lamb was slain in the court of the temple, the smiting of the blood upon the door-posts of other men's houses could hardly have been a matter of custom. Instead also of eating in haste, prepared as for a journey, the Jews in our Saviour's time, and our Lord with his disciples, ate at their leisure, reclining at table in the Roman manner.² So, further, instead of not going out of the house before morning, which the Hebrews in Egypt were forbidden to do for fear of the destroying angel, the later Jews, inas-

¹ See Lightfoot *Ministerium Templi* 13. 4. *ibid.* c. 14. *Reland Antiqq. Sac.* 4. 2. 2.

² *Pesach.* 10. 1. Wetstein in *Matt.* 26: 20. *comp.* *Mark* 14: 18. *Luke* 22: 14. *John* 13: 12.

much as no such reason existed afterwards, disregarded the prohibition; and our Lord and his disciples went out the same evening over the brook Kidron.

That the Jews, in the course of many centuries, had introduced various additional ceremonies along with the eating of the paschal supper, is evident from the manner in which our Lord celebrated it, as narrated by the Evangelists. What all these rites were, we have no specific historical account from any contemporary writer. Yet the precept as to the manner of holding the meal, preserved in the Mishnah and Talmud of Jerusalem,—which were compiled in the third century in the school at Tiberias from the traditional teaching of earlier Rabbins, and have been illustrated and explained by successive Jewish commentators,—although they cannot be depended upon as contemporaneous testimony, do nevertheless serve to throw light upon some of the circumstances connected with the institution of the Lord's supper; and may therefore properly find a place here.¹

According to these authorities, four cups of red wine, usually mingled with one fourth part of water, were drunk during the meal, and served to mark its progress. The first cup being prepared, the master of the family opened the meal with a blessing upon the day and upon the wine, and so the *first* cup was drunk; apparently the same mentioned in Luke 22: 17. All now washed their hands, the master at the same time giving thanks. Then bitter herbs were brought in, dipped in vinegar or salt water; of which they tasted meanwhile, until the proper paschal dishes were served, viz. the unleavened bread and roasted lamb, and further the Kha-gigah of the fourteenth day, and a broth or sauce (רבי) made with spices; Pesach 2. 8. The master of the house now pronounced a blessing over the bitter herbs, and ate of them dipped in the sauce; as did also the rest. After this the second cup was filled; the son inquired of the father the meaning of this celebration; and the latter instructed him as to its significancy, pointing out and explaining in their order the lamb, the bitter herbs, and the unleavened bread, etc. Then was repeated the first part of the Hallel or song of praise, Ps. 113, 114. The *second* cup was now drunk. The master of the family next took two cakes of the unleavened bread; broke one of them in two and laid it upon the other yet unbroken; and pronounced a blessing upon the bread.

¹ See the tract Pesachim c. 10. Lightfoot Minist. Templi c. 13. Hor. Heb. in Matt. 26: 26, 27. Othon. Lex. Rabb. p. 504 sq. Werner de Poculo Benedictionis, in Agolini Thesaur. T. XXX. Wetstein in Matt. l. c.

He then took a piece of the broken bread, wrapped it in bitter herbs, dipped it in the sauce, gave thanks, and ate it. Then followed the blessing upon the Khagigah, of which he ate a morsel; and finally the blessing upon the paschal lamb, of which he ate in like manner. Thereupon began the actual meal, in which they ate this or that as they pleased and at their leisure; partaking of the herbs, of the bread dipped in the sauce, of the flesh of the Khagigah, and lastly of the paschal lamb; after which last they ate nothing more. The eating being thus finished, the master of the family washed his hands and gave thanks for the meal. Next followed the giving of thanks over the *third* cup, called כוס ברכה, *the cup of blessing*, which was now drunk; compare the cup in the Eucharist, and also τὸ ποτήριον τῆς εὐλογίας, 1 Cor. 10: 16. Upon this, the fourth cup having been filled, the remainder of the Hallel, Ps. 115—118, was repeated; and the *fourth* cup was drunk. This was ordinarily the end of the celebration. But the Jews have a tradition, that when the guests were disposed to repeat further the great Hallel, Ps. 120—137, a *fifth* cup might thereupon be added.¹

It is obvious that the first cup spoken of above, corresponds to that mentioned in Luke 22: 17; and that the institution of the Lord's supper probably took place at the close of the proper meal, immediately before the third cup or "cup of blessing," which would seem to have made part of it; comp. 1 Cor. 10: 16.

VI. *Did our Lord, the night in which he was betrayed, eat the Passover with his Disciples?*

If we were to regard only the testimony of the first three Evangelists, not a doubt upon this question could ever arise. Their language upon this point is full, explicit and decisive, to the effect that our Lord's last meal with his disciples, as recorded by them all, was the regular and ordinary paschal supper of the Jews, introducing the festival of unleavened bread, on the evening after the fourteenth day of Nisan. Matthew and Mark narrate first, that the Passover was approaching after two days; then, that the first day of unleavened bread was come, when Jesus sent two of his disciples into the city to make ready the Passover, of which he and his disciples partook the same evening; Matt. 26: 2, 17—20. Mark 14: 1, 12—17. All this points directly and only to the regular lawful passover-meal, as

¹ See Lightfoot Minist. Temp. XIII. 9. Buxtorf Synagog. Jud. c. 18.

celebrated by all the Jews the same evening. Mark's words are : *ὅτε τὸ πάσχα ἔθvor, when THEY killed the passover*, v. 12 ; which, whether the subject of *ἔθvor* be the Jews, or be indefinite, implies at least the regular and ordinary time of killing the paschal lamb. Luke's language is, if possible, still stronger and more definite : " Then came the day of unleavened bread, *ἐν ᾧ ἔθvor θύεσθαι τὸ πάσχα, when the passover must be killed*," i. e. according to law and custom, Luke 22: 7. It was the first day of unleavened bread, the day on which the passover must be killed, of course the fourteenth day of Nisan ;¹ and on that same evening our Lord and his disciples sat down to that same passover-meal, which had thus by his own appointment been prepared for them, and of which Jesus speaks expressly of the passover, v. 15. Philologically considered, there cannot be—and I presume is not and has not been in the minds of the great body of commentators—a shadow of doubt, but that Matthew, Mark, and Luke intended to express, and do express, in the plainest terms, their testimony to the fact, that Jesus regularly partook of the ordinary and legal passover-meal on the evening after the fourteenth of Nisan, at the same time with all the Jews.

If, however, we turn to the Gospel of John, we seek in vain in this Evangelist for any trace of the paschal supper in connection with our Lord. John narrates indeed (c. 13) our Lord's last meal with his disciples ; which the attendant circumstances show to have been the same with that which the other Evangelists describe as the Passover. But on that point John is silent. Does this silence of itself imply, that it was *not* the Passover, and thus contradict the other Evangelists ? To admit this would prove far too much ; for John in like manner says not a word respecting the Lord's supper ; and yet no one doubts the testimony of the other Evangelists as to its institution during this meal. John, as is admitted by all, obviously wrote his Gospel as a supplement to the others. Hence, in speaking of this last meal, he does not mention the previous contention among the disciples, because Luke had sufficiently described it, Luke 22: 24—30 ; but he does narrate in addition the touching act of our Lord in washing his disciples' feet, which evidently arose out of that same contention. John narrates, indeed, like the rest, the pointing out of Judas as the traitor ; but he does it in order to add the further circumstances of his own particular agency in the matter. He omits, it is true, all mention of the Lord's supper, because the other Evangelists had fully described it ; but he gives in full, what they had not preserved, the

¹ See pp. 406, 407 above.

affecting discourses of our Lord held in connection with it, and his pathetic final prayer with his disciples, c. 17. The *silence* of John, therefore, does not in the case before us, imply even the slightest contradiction of the other Evangelists; while all the above circumstances, and the subsequent going out to the Mount of Olives, related also by John, where Jesus was betrayed, serve incontestably to mark this supper in John as identical with the passover-meal of the other Evangelists. They also sufficiently account for the difference between the two reports of the same occasion.

But there are a few expressions in John's Gospel, in connection with this meal and especially with our Lord's Passion, which taken together might, at first view and if we had only John, seem to imply, that on Friday, the day of our Lord's crucifixion, the regular and legal passover had not yet been eaten, but was still to be celebrated on the evening after that day. The following are the passages.

a) John 13: 1 *μετὰ δὲ τῆς ἑσπερῆς τοῦ πάσχα.* This phrase introduces the account of our Lord's last meal; and the form of expression, it is said, shows that this meal took place *before* the passover, and could not therefore itself have been the paschal supper.

b) John 18: 28 "and they themselves [the Jews] went not into the judgment-hall, lest they should be defiled, *ἀλλ' ἵνα φάγωσι τὸ πάσχα* but that they might eat the passover." Taking this last phrase in its ordinary acceptation of the paschal lamb, as in Matt. 26: 17, etc. it hence follows, as is averred, that the Jews were expecting to partake of the paschal supper the ensuing evening; and of course had not eaten it already.

c) John 19: 14 *ἡ δὲ παρασκευὴ τοῦ πάσχα.* This "preparation of the passover," being the day on which Christ suffered, necessarily implies, it is alleged, the day before the passover-meal; which of course was to be eaten that evening.

d) John 19: 31 *ἡ γὰρ μεγάλη ἡ ἡμέρα ἐκείνου τοῦ σαββάτου.* The next day after the crucifixion being the Jewish sabbath, and that sabbath being a "great day," we must infer, it is argued, that the reason of its being thus called "great" was the fact, that it coincided with the first day of the festival or fifteenth of Nisan, and was thus doubly consecrated.

These four are the passages mainly urged. Some other considerations are brought forward as auxiliary.

e) In John 13: 27—30, Jesus says to Judas, after giving him the sop, "that thou doest, do quickly." These words the other dis-

ciples did not comprehend; but supposed, among other things that Jesus had said to him, "Buy that we have need of for the feast." Now as this was spoken apparently near the close of this meal, it follows, as some think, that the passover-meal was yet to come, and could not have been that at which these words were uttered.

f) The same conclusion, it is affirmed, is greatly strengthened by the circumstance, that on the day of the crucifixion the Sanhedrim was convened, sat in judgment upon Jesus, condemned him, and delivered him over to death,—a public judicial act, which according to the Talmudists was unlawful upon the sabbath and upon all great festival days.¹

To all these different considerations we shall again recur in the sequel. It is only from the first four passages of John above cited, that any important difficulty has arisen, or can well arise, as to the question before us. The whole inquiry relates simply to the time of the Passover. According to all the four Evangelists, our Lord was crucified on Friday, the day before the Jewish sabbath; and his last meal with his disciples took place on the preceding evening, the same night in which he was betrayed. The simple question, therefore, at issue is, Did this Friday fall upon the fifteenth day of Nisan, or upon the fourteenth day? Or, in other words, did our Lord on the evening before his crucifixion eat the passover, as is testified by the first three Evangelists; or was the passover still to be eaten on the evening after that day, as John might seem to imply?

It cannot be denied, that if we had only the Gospel of John, we should naturally be led to adopt the latter view; for then there would be no opposing evidence whatever. In like manner, if we had only the Gospel of John, we should know nothing as to the institution of the Lord's supper. But since the testimony of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, as we have already seen,² shows conclusively, that these inspired writers held to the first view, and intended so to record their testimony; we are compelled, either to seek out some mode of reconciling this apparent diversity of statement between John and them; or, to admit, that the discrepancy is irreconcilable. To this last point it has, of late years, been the effort of German neological commentators to bring the discussion of this subject. But the sincere inquirer, who holds the Gospel

¹ See Lightfoot *Hor. Heb. in Matt. 27: 1.* Jahn *Bibl. Archaeol.* III. ii. p. 309. De Wette *Archaeol.* § 218.

² See above, p. 413.

to be the inspired Word of God, will be slow to arrive at or admit any such conclusion, except upon irrefutable evidence. In this case no such evidence exists.

The question before us has been more or less a subject of discussion in the church ever since the earliest centuries; chiefly with a view to harmonize the difficulties. It is only in recent years, that the apparent difference between John and the other Evangelists has been urged to the extreme of attempting to make it irreconcilable.

VII. *Examination of passages in John's Gospel, etc.*

Admitting, as we must, and as we have already seen, that the testimony of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, is too definite and explicit to be in any way set aside or modified, let us examine more closely the passages in John, and thus see whether they may, or may not, without violence and without any strained interpretation, be so understood, as to remove all appearance of discrepancy.

John obviously wrote his Gospel as supplementary to the other three. He had them then before him, and was aware that the other three Evangelists had testified to the fact, that Jesus partook of the passover with his disciples. Did John believe, that their testimony on this point was wrong; and did he mean to correct it? If so, we should naturally expect to find some notice of such a correction along with the mention of the meal itself, which John describes, as well as they. But is this the case? John narrates additional circumstances, which took place at the meal; and he does not indeed say it was the passover. But does he say or imply, that it was *not* the passover? Not at all; although this is what we should naturally expect, if it was his purpose to correct the testimony of the other Evangelists. As, therefore, on the one hand, we have already seen,¹ that there was a sufficient reason why, he did not speak of that meal as the paschal supper; so here, on the other hand, no good reason can be assigned, why, if the testimony of the other Evangelists was wrong, John should not in the same connection have corrected it; as he might have done by a word. Indeed, that was the appropriate and only fitting place for such a correction. And as none is there found, we are authorized to maintain, that it was not John's purpose thus and there to correct, or contradict the testimony of the other Evangelists; and if not

¹ Page 414 above.

there, much less by mere implication in other places and connections.

Let us now examine the passages adduced from John, in the same order as before.

A) John 13: 1 *πρὸ δὲ τῆς ἑορτῆς τοῦ πάσχα*, see p. 415, a. Here something may depend upon the import of *ἑορτή*. The proper and only signification of this word, as of the Hebrew *חג*, is *festival*, not *feast*; that is, it implies both in classic and scriptural usage a yearly day or days of festive commemoration, never a single meal or entertainment. So in Num. 28: 16, 17, where the *paschal supper*, prepared on the fourteenth of Nisan and eaten at evening, is distinguished from the *festival*, Heb. *חג*, Sept. *ἑορτή*, which began on the fifteenth and continued for seven days. See further Luke 2: 41. 22: 1; also the Lexicons and Concordances of the New Testament and Septuagint.

Interpreters differ as to the construction of John 13: 1. Griesbach and Knapp connect it with the following verses; and make the full sentence close at the end of v. 4. So too De Wette and others, who would thus make *πρὸ τῆς ἑορτῆς* qualify the action in v. 4.¹ In favour of this view it is urged, that *εἰδώς* in v. 3 is nothing more than a resumption of *εἰδώς* in v. 1; while the phrase *εἰς τέλος ἠγάπησεν αὐτούς* in v. 1, does not express an action, but only a state of feeling, and therefore logically the mind does not rest upon it, but remains suspended until the action in v. 4. But the sentence thus formed is exceedingly involved and intricate, wholly unlike John's usual manner; and that without any necessity. A glance at the second *εἰδώς* shows that it has no relation to the first, but stands in a connection altogether different; and this De Wette admits. He further admits, that strict grammatical construction requires v. 1 to be made independent; against which he urges only the logical objection above stated. Yet *ἀγαπᾶω* in classic usage signifies not only *to love* as an emotion, but also *to manifest love* in action, to receive or treat with affection.² Hence the words in v. 1, *εἰς τέλος ἠγάπησεν αὐτούς*, imply not merely an emotion, but that Jesus *manifested his love* towards his disciples unto the end, in the touching manner which the Evangelist proceeds to relate. True logic, therefore, as well as strict grammar, requires us to regard v. 1 as an independent sentence, forming a fitting preface to the narrative which follows. As such it has been re-

¹ Exeget. Handb. Joh. 13: 1.

² See Passow Lex. s. voc. Hom. Od. 23. 214; also in N. T. Matt. 19: 19. Luke 6: 32. 2 Cor. 12: 15.

garded by Mill, Wetstein, Bengel, Hahn, Lachmann, Tholuck, and a host of others; and particularly by Lücke and Meyer, who in other respects press the alleged testimony of John as to the Passover.

It follows that the qualifying power of *πρὸ τῆς ἑορτῆς* is restricted to v. 1; and in that verse it may be referred to different clauses.

1. It may qualify *εἰδώς κ. τ. λ.* and then the sense is: "Jesus, knowing before the festival of the Passover that his hour was come," etc. comp. John 12: 23. Matt. 17: 9, 22 sq. 20: 17—19. al. In this way the passage has no bearing whatever upon the present question as to the passover. This view is maintained by Meyer with emphasis.

2. It may qualify the words *εἰς τέλος ἡγάπησεν αὐτούς*. In this case the phrase *πρὸ τῆς ἑορτῆς* is equivalent to *ἐν τῇ προεορτίῳ*, i. e. the time immediately before the festival; which again is viewed in different aspects. (a) It is said, that as *πρόλογος* signifies a part of the discourse itself, *πρόδομος* part of the house, *πρόγλωσσος* part of the tongue, *προνόμιον* part of the hair, *προτείχισμα* part of the wall, etc. etc., so *προεορτίον* is the *forepart* or beginning of the festival itself. Hence the equivalent phrase, *πρὸ τῆς ἑορτῆς*, here marks the time of the paschal-meal, with which the festival was introduced. So Bochart.¹ (b) Others regard *πρὸ τῆς ἑορτῆς* as here referring particularly to the commencement (at evening) of the fifteenth day of Nisan, as the first or opening day of the festival of unleavened bread, distinct from the mere paschal supper; see Num. 28: 16, 17, cited above. The phrase *πρὸ τῆς ἑορτῆς* is in that case equivalent to the Engl. *festival-eve*, and here marks the evening immediately before the *ἑορτή* or festival proper; on which eve, during the supper, our Lord "manifested his love for his disciples unto the end," by the touching symbolical act of washing their feet. So in Philo *προεορτίον* is i. q. *παρασκευή*.² The following remarks of Lücke are to the point: "As John wrote for Greeks and other readers unacquainted with the Jewish mode of reckoning time, and is here directly speaking only of the preparation of the meal and what preceded it,—while the preparation of the passover-meal did actually take place on the fourteenth of Nisan, the true *προεορτίον*,—he therefore could very properly use the expression *πρὸ τῆς ἑορτῆς τοῦ πάσχα* without intending to say that the meal itself was eaten on the fourteenth day. At any rate the word *πρό* is here too indefinite and relative,

¹ Hieroz. lib. II. c. 50. p. 564.

² Philo de Vita contempl. p. 616.

to draw from it the inference, that the meal described was eaten on the evening which followed the thirteenth and began the fourteenth of Nisan."¹

In any case, therefore, this passage does not require us to admit the inference which some have drawn from it.

B) John 18: 28 *ἵνα φάγωσι τὸ πάσχα*, see p. 415 b. This passage is perhaps the strongest of all. To bring out from it, however, the inference that on the day of the crucifixion the paschal supper had not yet been eaten, the expression *φαγεῖν τὸ πάσχα* must be taken in the limited sense: *to eat the paschal supper*; and this, it is affirmed, is the true and only usage of the phrase in the New Testament or elsewhere. This last assertion is correct; for, besides the present instance, the expression *φαγεῖν τὸ πάσχα* occurs only five times in the New Testament, viz. Matt 26: 17. Mark 14: 12, 14. Luke 22: 11, 15; and but once in the Greek version of the Old Testament, 2 Chron. 30: 18; in all which passages the context limits it necessarily to the paschal-supper. But it by no means hence follows, where the phrase is used generally and without the mention of any restrictive circumstances, that there also it must be taken in a like limited sense. The word *πάσχα* at least, is not always so taken.

The primary signification of the Hebrew *פסח* (Sept. *πάσχα*, in Chron. *paséx*) is a *passing over*, a *sparing* from punishment or calamity; as Ex. 12: 27 *וְיָבֹחַ פֶּסַח חַיָּים לַיהוָה* a *sacrifice of passing over (sparing) is this to Jehovah*. Hence it came naturally to denote the *paschal lamb*, slain as a victim in this sacrifice of sparing; Ex. 12: 21. 2 Chr. 30: 15, 17. 35: 1, 5; in N. T. Mark 14: 12. Luke 22: 7. metaph. 1 Cor. 5: 7.—From this it was an easy transition to employ it for the *paschal meal*, at which the lamb was eaten with various accompaniments and rites on the evening after the fourteenth of Nisan; Ex. 12: 48. Num. 9: 4, 5. Josh. 5: 10; and so in N. T. Matt. 26: 18, 19. Mark 14: 16. Luke 22: 8, 13. Heb. 11: 28. Here too belongs the phrase *פסח חַיָּים*, Sept. *φαγεῖν τὸ paséx*, which occurs but once, 2 Chron. 30: 18; and in N. T. *φαγεῖν τὸ πάσχα*, found five times elsewhere, as already cited. — Hence again *τὸ πάσχα* came to signify the *paschal day*, or fourteenth of Nisan, on which the passover was killed, Lev. 23: 5; and we once find the expression *פסח חַיָּים*, Sept. *ἐσθιὴ τοῦ πάσχα*, Ex. 34: 25; comp. further Josh. 5: 11. Num. 33: 3. This sense of *πάσχα* is not found in the New Testament.—As however the seven days of unleavened bread were intimately connected with the *פסח*, the

¹ Lucke Comm. zu John 13: 1.

word came to stand, at least in the later Hebrew usage, for the whole festival of seven days; see Ez. 45: 21. 2 Chron. 35: 18, 19 coll. 17. Indeed, it would seem to have been so used as early as the time of the Pentateuch; see Deut. 16: 2, where the people are commanded to sacrifice the *עֶדְוָה* even *flock and herd* (צֶאֱוָה וְרֶעָוָה); which mode of expression can well refer only to the extraordinary sacrifices of the seven festival days.¹ In the times of the New Testament this usage had become the prevailing one; as indeed is expressly intimated in Luke 22: 1, ἡ ἑορτὴ τῶν ἀζύμων ἡ λεγομένη πάσχα. So too in all the remaining passages where the word is found, Luke 2: 41 coll. 43. Matt. 26: 2. Mark 14: 1. John 2: 13, 23. 6: 11, 55 bis. 12: 1. 13: 1. 18: 39. 19: 14. Acts 12: 4. Among the still later Jews also, the *עֶדְוָה* is spoken of as continuing seven days; Pesach. 9. 5. — From all this it appears, that the word *τὸ πάσχα*, *passover*, is employed in the New Testament in three different and specific acceptations, viz. 1. *The paschal lamb*. 2. *The paschal meal*. 3. *The paschal festival*, comprising the seven days of unleavened bread.

As now there is nothing in the circumstances nor in the context of John 18: 28, to limit the meaning of *τὸ πάσχα* in itself either to the paschal lamb or paschal meal, we certainly are not bound by any intrinsic necessity so to understand it here in the phrase *φάγεῖν τὸ πάσχα*. If, on the other hand, we adopt for it in this place the wider sense of *paschal festival*, two modes of interpretation are admissible.

1. The first mode takes *τὸ πάσχα* in its literal and widest sense of *passover-festival*; but modifies the force of *φάγεῖν*. In this way the phrase *φάγεῖν τὸ πάσχα* may be understood as put in a loose popular usage instead of the common *ποιεῖν τὸ πάσχα*, *to keep or celebrate the passover*. The Hebrew exhibits a like phraseology in respect to this very festival; 2 Chr. 30: 22 וַיֵּאָכְלוּ אֶת-חֶמְדָּתוֹ שִׁבְעָה יָמִים *and they did eat the festival seven days*. So the Seventy at least understood it; as is manifest from their version: καὶ συνετέλεσαν τὴν ἑορτὴν τῶν ἀζύμων ἑπτὰ ἡμέρας, *and they fulfilled (kept) the festival of unleavened bread seven days*.

2. The second mode retains *φάγεῖν* in its literal acceptation; takes *πάσχα* still in its widest signification; but assigns to the latter by metonymy the sense of *paschal sacrifices*, that is, the voluntary peace-offerings and thank-offerings made in the temple during the paschal festival, and more especially on the fifteenth day

¹ See above, p. 410.

of Nisan. These sacrifices, called in later times *Khagigah* (חֲגִיגָה), have already been particularly described.¹ That the word *νάσχα*, in the general sense of *festival*, is susceptible of such a metonymy, is apparent from Hebrew analogies. So, according to modern interpreters, in the same passage 2 Chr. 30: 22, חֲגִיגָה *festival*, by meton. *festive offerings*; where the next clause specifies the kind of sacrifices, viz. peace offerings.² So too חֶג, the common word for festival; e. g. Ps. 118: 27 אֶקְרִינֶה בְּחִבָּתִי bind the sacrifice (*festive offering*) with cords, etc. Ex. 23: 18. Mal. 2: 3. The same metonymy is found likewise in the Talmud, where it is asked: מַה הָיָה פֶּסַח *what is the passover?* and the reply is: שְׁלָמֵי פֶסַח *the peace-offerings of the passover*, that is, the *Khagigah*.³

It is manifest, that both the above methods of interpretation are founded upon fair analogies; and that either of them relieves us from the necessity of referring the phrase in question to the paschal supper, and thus removes the alleged difficulty. The chief priests and other members of the Sanhedrim, on the morning of the first day of the festival, were unwilling to defile themselves by entering beneath the roof of the Gentile procurator; since in this way they would have been debarred from partaking of the sacrificial offerings and banquets, which were customary on that day in the temple and elsewhere; and in which they from their station were entitled and expected to participate.

This view receives some further confirmation from the circumstance, that the defilement which the Jews would thus have contracted by entering the dwelling of a heathen, could only have belonged to that class of impurities from which a person might be cleansed the same day by ablution; the טְבִילַת יוֹם *ablution of a day*, so called by the Talmudists.⁴ If now the *νάσχα* in John 18: 28 was truly the paschal supper, and was not to take place until the evening after the day of the crucifixion, then this defilement of a day could have been no bar to their partaking of it; for at evening they were clean. Their scruple, therefore, in order to be well founded, could have had reference only to the *Khagigah* or paschal sacrifices offered during the same day before evening.⁵

C) John 19: 14 ἡ δὲ παρασκευὴ τοῦ *νάσχα*, see p. 415. c. The force of this passage depends upon the answer given to the following question, viz. Does this *παρασκευὴ* refer, as usual, only to

¹ See above, p. 410.

² See Simonis, Gesenius, and others.

³ Rosh Hashana 5. 1. See Reland Antiqq. Sac. 4. 3. 11.

⁴ See Lev. 15: 5 seq. 17: 15. 22: 6. Num. 19: 7 sq. Maimonid. Pesach. 6. 1. Lightfoot Hor. Heb. in John 18: 28. Winer Realw. II. p. 377.

⁵ See Bynæus de Morte J. C. 3. 1. p. 13.

the Jewish sabbath, which actually occurred the next day? or does it here refer to the festival of the Passover *per se*, as distinct from the sabbath? It is only on the latter supposition, that the language can be made in any way to conflict with the testimony of the other Evangelists:

The Greek word *παρασκευή*, *preparation*, is elsewhere found five times in the New Testament, viz. Matt. 27: 62. Mark 15: 42. Luke 23: 54. John 19: 31, 42. Mark defines it to be the *προσάββατον*, *fore-sabbath*, the day or hours immediately preceding the weekly sabbath and devoted to preparation for that sacred day. No trace of any such observance is found in the Old Testament. Yet the strictness of the law respecting the sabbath, which forbade the kindling of fire and of course the preparation of food on that day. (Ex. 35: 2, 3. comp. 16: 22—27), would very naturally lead to the introduction of such a custom. After the exile the *προσάββατον* is once mentioned in the Apocrypha, Judith 8: 6. In later times, *ἡ παρασκευή* would seem to have become the usual Greek term for this observance, as in the New Testament and in Josephus.¹ Philo calls it *προεόρτιον*.² In the still later Hebrew it bore the specific appellation of *ערב*, *eve*, as being the *ערב* *ערב*, *eve of the sabbath*.³ Primarily and strictly this *παρασκευή* or *eve* would seem to have commenced not earlier than the ninth hour of the preceding day; as is perhaps implied in the decree of Augustus in favour of the Jews, preserved by Josephus: *ἐγγύας τε μὴ ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐν σάββατον ἢ τῇ πρὸ ταύτης παρασκευῇ ἀπὸ ὥρας ἐννάτης*. But in process of time, the same Hebrew word came in popular usage to be the distinctive name for the *day* before the Jewish sabbath, that is, for the sixth day of the week or Friday.⁴ Nor was the use of this Hebrew word for the Greek *παρασκευή* confined to the Jews; for the like Syriac form *ܥܪܒܐ*, is found for *παρασκευή* in the Syriac version of the New Testament; and, in like manner, the corresponding Arabic word, *العربية*, is given in the Camoos as an ancient name for Friday.⁵ We are therefore entitled to infer, that *ἡ παρασκευή*, that is, the *παρασκευή* of the weekly sabbath, became at an early date among Jews, Syrians, and Arabs, a current appellation for the sixth day of the week. This inference is also strengthened by the very peculiar phrase-

¹ Jos. Antt. 16. 6. 2.

² Philo de Vita contempl. p. 616.

³ Buxtorf Lex. p. 1659.

⁴ Jos. Antt. 16. 6. 2.

⁵ Bereshith Rabba, § 11. Buxtorf Lex. p. 1659. Compare the German *Sonabend* for Saturday.

⁶ See Golius p. 1551. Freytag III. p. 130.

ology of Matt. 27: 62; where the Evangelist speaks of the Jewish sabbath as *ἡ ἀναύριον, ἣτις ἐστὶ μετὰ τῆς παρασκευῆς*, the *morrow after the preparation*, that is, the next day after Friday. It is not easy to account for this mode of expression, except upon the supposition, that *ἡ παρασκευή* was already in common use as a specific name for the sixth day; as much so, indeed, as the sabbath for the seventh day.

The reasons which operated to introduce a *προσάββατον*, or preparation for the sabbath, did not exist in the case of the other festivals, on which the preparation of food was not forbidden; Ex. 12: 16. Nevertheless, what had become customary in respect to the sabbath, would naturally be imitated in other cases; and accordingly after the exile we find mention of the *ποροσυμνία*, *eve of the new moon*, Judith 8: 6. In the Talmudists a *passover-eve*, *עֶרֶב פֶּסַח*, is likewise spoken of.¹ But what this could well have been, so long as the passover (paschal supper) was regularly celebrated at Jerusalem, it is difficult to perceive. The *eve* (עֶרֶב) before the passover festival could have included, at most, only the evening and the few hours before sunset at the close of the fourteenth of Nisan; like the primary usage in respect to the *προσάββατον*, as we have just seen. But according to all usage of language both in the Old and New Testament, those hours and that evening were the *Passover itself*, and not its preparation; unless indeed the paschal meal and its accompaniments be called the preparation of the subsequent festival of seven days; which again is contrary to all usage. It would seem most probable, therefore, that this mode of expression did not arise until after the destruction of the temple and the consequent cessation of the regular and legal passover-meal; subsequently to which event the seven days of unleavened bread became of course the main festival, and were introduced by a symbolical paschal supper (*πάσχα μετηνομενικόν*) on the preceding evening. This latter might then easily come to be spoken of as the *eve* of the passover-festival.

But even admitting that a passover-eve (עֶרֶב פֶּסַח) did exist in the time of our Lord; still, the expression could in no legitimate way be so far extended as to include more than a few hours before sunset. It could not have commenced apparently before the ninth hour, when they began to kill the paschal lambs; see p. 406. On the other hand, the Hebrew term *עֶרֶב פֶּסַח*, for which the Greek *παρασκευή* stands in the New Testament, was employed, as we have seen, as a specific name in popular usage for

¹ Buxtorf. *Lex.* p. 1765.

the whole sixth day of the week or Friday, not only by the Jews, but also by the Syrians and Arabs. Hence, when John here says: *ἦν δὲ παρασκευὴ τοῦ πάσχα, ὥρα δὲ ὥστε ἔκτιν*, there is a two-fold difficulty in referring his language to a preparation or eve of the regular passover; *first*, because apparently no such eve or preparation did or could well then exist; and *secondly*, because, it being then the sixth hour or midday, the eve or time of preparation (supposing it to exist) had not yet come, and the language was therefore inapplicable. But if John be understood as here speaking of the weekly *παρασκευὴ* or *προσάββατον*, which was a common name for the whole of Friday, then the mention of the sixth hour was natural and appropriate.

We come then to the conclusion, that if John, like Mark in c. 15: 42, had here defined the phrase in question, he would probably have written on this wise: *ἦν δὲ παρασκευὴ τοῦ πάσχα, ὁ ἔστι προσάββατον τοῦ πάσχα*, that is, the paschal Friday, the day of preparation or *fore-sabbath* which occurred during the paschal festival. In a similar manner Ignatius writes *σάββατον τοῦ πάσχα*, and Socrates *σάββατον τῆς ἑορτῆς*.¹ This interpretation is further supported by the fact, that John, when speaking, in vs. 31, 42, of the self-same day of our Lord's crucifixion, employs *παρασκευὴ* in this its current acceptation, of the weekly preparation. Especially is the mode of expression to be noted in v. 42, *διὰ τὴν παρασκευὴν τῶν Ἰουδαίων*, implying of itself that the weekly *παρασκευὴ* or *προσάββατον*, and no other, was an ordinary and well known public institution of the Jews.

D) John 19: 31 *ἦν γὰρ μεγάλη ἡ ἡμέρα ἐκείνου τοῦ σαββάτου*, see p. 415. d. Here we may ask, Was such a paschal sabbath called "great" solely because the first day of the paschal festival fell upon it? or might it be so called for other reasons? The former part of this question is affirmed by those who maintain the alleged discrepancy between John and the other Evangelists; while of course they do not, because they cannot, deny the latter part. The coincidence of the first festival day with the sabbath, would certainly make the latter a great day; but the sabbath of the passover, even when it fell upon the second day of the festival, would still be a great day. The last day of the festival of Tabernacles is called "that great day;" though in itself not more sacred than the first day; John 7: 37. comp. Lev. 23: 34—36. So *קָרָה קָרָה*, the *calling of assemblies*, Is. 1: 13, is rendered *ἡμέρα μεγάλη* by the Seventy, implying that in their estimation any day

¹ Ignat. Ep. ad Phil. c. 13. Socrat. Hist. Ecc. V. 22.

of solemn convocation was a great day. The sabbath then, upon which the sixteenth of Nisan or second day of the festival fell, might be called "great" for various reasons. *First*, as the sabbath of the great national festival, when all Israel was gathered before the Lord. *Secondly*, as the day when the first-fruits were presented with solemn rites in the temple; a ceremony paramount in its obligations even to the sabbath.¹ *Thirdly*, because on that day they began to reckon the fifty days before the festival of Pentecost, Lev. 23: 15 sq. In all these circumstances there is certainly enough to warrant the epithet "great," as applied to the sabbath on which the sixteenth of Nisan might fall, as compared with other sabbaths.—There exists, therefore, no necessity for supposing, that John by this language meant to describe the sabbath in question as coincident with the fifteenth of Nisan or first paschal day.

The investigation thus far, as it seems to me, presents a fair and natural interpretation of the four main passages adduced from John's Gospel. Nothing has been assumed, and nothing brought forward, except as founded on just inference and safe analogy. The strongest of all these passages is doubtless John 18: 28; and had this not existed, the others probably would never have been relied upon as affording ground for an attempt to overthrow the credibility and authority of one Gospel or of three.—The other considerations above presented have still less force.

E) John 13: 27—30; see p. 415. e. When Jesus said to Judas: "That thou doest, do quickly," some of the disciples thought he meant to say: "Buy what we have need of *εἰς τὴν ἑορτήν* for the festival." Here no discrepancy with the other Evangelists could ever have been alleged, except by referring *ἑορτή* to the paschal meal, which it never signifies.² The disciples thought Judas was to buy the things necessary for the festival on the fifteenth and following days. If now our Lord's words were spoken on the evening preceding and introducing the fifteenth of Nisan, they were appropriate; for it was already quite late to make purchases for the following day. But if they were uttered on the evening preceding and introducing the fourteenth of Nisan, they were not thus appropriate; for then no haste was necessary, since a whole day was yet to intervene before the festival. This passage, therefore, so far as it bears at all upon the question, instead of contra-

¹ See above, p. 406. Lightfoot Hor. Heb. in Joh. 19: 31. Reland Antiq. Sac. 4. 2. 4. p. 227.

² See above, p. 418. A.

vening the testimony of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, goes rather to support it.

F) There remains the objection, that a public judicial act, like that by which Jesus was condemned and executed, was unlawful upon the sabbath and on all great festival days.¹ This consideration has at first view some weight, and has been often and strenuously urged; yet it is counterbalanced by several circumstances which very greatly weaken its force. The execution itself took place under Roman authority; and therefore does not here come into account. And as to the action of the Sanhedrim, even admitting that the prohibitory precepts cited above from the Talmud were already extant and binding in the times of the New Testament,—a position in itself very doubtful,—yet the chief priests and Pharisees and Scribes, who composed the Sanhedrim, are everywhere denounced by our Lord as hypocrites, “who say, and do not; who bind heavy burdens upon others, but themselves touch them not with one of their fingers;” Matt. 23: 1 sq. Such men, in their rage against Jesus, would hardly have been restrained even by their own precepts. They professed likewise, and perhaps some of them believed, that they were doing God service; and regarded the condemnation of Jesus as a work of religious duty, paramount to the obligations of any festival. Yet in fact, the first and holy day of the festival did not demand the same strict observance that was due to the sabbath. On this day they might prepare food; which might not be done upon the sabbath; Ex. 12: 16. comp. Ex. 35: 2, 3. 16: 22sq. On this day too, the morning after the paschal supper, the Jews might return home from Jerusalem, whatever the distance; an extent of travel not permitted on the weekly sabbath; Deut. 16: 6, 7. Further, in the time of our Lord, the practice of the Jews at least, if not their precepts, would seem to have interposed no obstacle to such a judicial transaction. We learn from John 10: 22, 31, that on the festival of Dedication, as Jesus was teaching in the temple, “the Jews took up stones to stone him.” On the day after the crucifixion, which, as all agree, was the sabbath and a “great day,” the Sanhedrim applied to Pilate for a watch; and themselves caused the sepulchre to be sealed, and the watch to be set; Matt. 27: 62sq. A stronger instance still is recorded in John 7: 32, 37, 44, 45. It there appears, that on the last GREAT DAY of the festival of Tabernacles, the Sanhedrim having sent

¹ See above, p. 416. f.

out officers to seize Jesus, "some of them would have taken him, but no man laid hands on him;" so that the officers returned without him to the Sanhedrim, and were in consequence censured by that body. The circumstances show conclusively, that on this last great day of that festival the Sanhedrim were in session and waiting for Jesus to be brought before them as a prisoner. Nor was it merely a casual or packed meeting, but one regularly convened; for Nicodemus was present with them; v. 50. And finally, according to Matt. 26: 3—5, the Sanhedrim, when afterwards consulting to take Jesus and put him to death, decided not to do it on the festival; why? Because it would be unlawful? Not at all; but simply "lest there should be an uproar among the people." Through the treachery of Judas they were enabled to execute their long cherished purpose without danger of a tumult; and the occasion was too opportune not to be gladly seized upon, even on a great festival day.—These considerations seem to me to sweep away the whole force of this objection; on which Scalliger and Casaubon, as also Beza and Calov, laid great stress; and which Lücke has again brought forward and urged with no little parade.

Some other minor considerations, formerly advanced by those who hold that Jesus was crucified before the passover, are examined and refuted by earlier writers; particularly by Bochart.¹ As however these are no longer brought forward by the more recent advocates of that view, it is not necessary to dwell upon them here.

Such then is a general review of the passages and arguments, on the strength of which the alleged discrepancy between John and the other Evangelists in respect to this passover has usually been maintained. After repeated and calm consideration, there rests upon my own mind a clear conviction, that there is nothing in the language of John, nor in the attendant circumstances, which upon fair interpretation requires or permits us to believe, that the beloved disciple either intended to correct, or has in fact corrected or contradicted, the explicit and unquestionable testimony of Matthew, Mark and Luke.

VIII. *Early Historical Testimony.*

On the other hand, some circumstances in the early history of the Christian church seem to favour the idea, that among the

¹ See Bochart, Hieroz. lib. II. c. 50. p. 569 sq.

primitive teachers, those who were most familiar with the writings and views of the apostle John, held to the belief that our Lord did celebrate the regular passover with his disciples on the evening before his crucifixion. The question which we have been discussing, seems to have first arisen in connection with the great passover controversy of the second and following centuries. In those churches which had been mostly gathered from Jewish converts, as in Asia Minor, it would seem to have been a rule to lay aside only so much of Jewish observances as was matter of necessity. They therefore continued to keep the passover on the evening after the fourteenth of Nisan, simultaneously with the Jews; and made this the central point of their celebration of our Lord's passion and resurrection, on whatever day of the week it might occur. But in the churches formed mostly from Gentile converts, like those of the West, a contrary rule apparently prevailed; and they retained only so much of Jewish observances as was absolutely essential. They therefore kept no passover; but celebrated annually the resurrection of our Lord on a Sunday, and observed the preceding Friday as a day of penitence and fasting.

This diversity of Christian practice seems to have been first brought into friendly discussion, when Polycarp of Smyrna, the disciple of John, paid a visit to Anicetus bishop of Rome, in A. D. 162. Polycarp testified, that he had once celebrated the regular Jewish passover with the apostle John; while Anicetus appealed to the fact, that his predecessors had introduced nothing of the kind.¹ Later, about A. D. 170, the subject again came up in Asia Minor. Melito of Sardis wrote apparently in favour of the Jewish-Christian usage; and Apollinaris of Hierapolis in Phrygia, against it.² Yet no interruption of fellowship took place between the churches of the East and West; and Christians from Asia Minor found in Rome a fraternal reception and were welcome to the communion.

But under the Roman bishop Victor, the controversy broke out anew in A. D. 190, between the Romish church on the one side, with which the churches of Alexandria, Tyre, Cesarea, and Jerusalem took part, and the churches of Asia Minor on the other side, of which Polycrates, bishop of Ephesus, was now the leader. Among several other points in the controversy, the main inquiry now was, Whether the yearly passover was to be retained, and the Jewish law followed in respect to the time? The opponents,

¹ See Euseb. H. E. V. 24.

² Euseb. H. E. IV. 26.

or at least Apollinaris, Clement of Alexandria, and Hippolytus, according to the fragments preserved in the *Chronicon Paschale*,¹ affirmed, that "the last meal of Jesus with his disciples was not the passover; since according to John's Gospel Christ partook of it on the thirteenth of Nisan; while on the following day, which was the appointed time for the Jewish passover, he offered up himself as the true sacrifice for mankind, of which the passover was the type." The title or argument of the tract of Apollinaris, was: *Ὅτι ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ ὁ κύριος ἔπαθεν, οὐκ ἔφαγεν τὸ τῆρανον πάσχα*. On the other side, Polycrates wrote an epistle to Victor, preserved by Eusebius,² in which he asserts that the Asiatics celebrated the true and genuine day: and appeals to the testimony and practice of apostles and others, viz. the apostle Philip who died at Hierapolis; the apostle John who taught in Asia Minor and died at Ephesus; the martyr Polycarp and other bishops and teachers; of whom he says:³ "These all kept the day of the passover on the fourteenth, according to the Gospel; deviating in nothing, but following according to the rule of faith." Of his own seven relatives, who also had been bishops, Polycrates says:⁴ "And these my relatives always celebrated the day, when the [Jewish] people put away the leaven." The result of the controversy at this time was, that Victor attempted to break off communion with the Asiatic churches. For this step he was strongly censured by Ignatius bishop of Lyons, in a letter preserved by Eusebius;⁵ and other bishops likewise raised their voices against the rash measure. Through their efforts peace was at length restored; and both parties remained undisturbed in their own modes of observance, until the great council of Nicea in A. D. 325, where this question was finally decided in favour of the West. The few scattering churches, which afterwards continued to keep the passover according to the Jewish time, were accounted heretics, and are known in history as *Quatuordecimani*, or "Fourteenth-day men."⁶

From the preceding narrative it is manifest, that the passages of

¹ Chron. Pasch. I. p. 13, ed Dindorf.

² Euseb. H. E. V. 24.

³ Euseb. I. c. *Οὗτοι πάντες ἐτήρησαν τὴν ἡμέραν τῆς τεσσαρεσκαίδεκτης τοῦ πάσχα κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον· μηδὲν παρεμβαίνοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν κανόνα τῆς πίστεως ἀκολουθοῦντες.*

⁴ Euseb. I. c. *Καὶ πάντοτε τὴν ἡμέραν ἔγχεον οἱ συγγενεῖς μου ὅταν ὁ κύριος ἔφαγε τὴν ἑσφάραν.*

⁵ Euseb. H. E. V. 24.

⁶ See Neander K. G. I. ii. p. 518—524. II. ii. p. 643—645. Gieseler K. G. I. pp. 198, 235.

John's Gospel which we have reviewed above, were already regarded and urged by Apollinaris and the western churches, in the latter part of the second century, as conflicting with the testimony of the first three Evangelists; that is, as implying that our Lord's last meal with his disciples was not the regular paschal supper. On the other hand, it is no less manifest from the language of Polycrates, that the teachers and churches of Asia Minor, among whom John had lived and taught, celebrated the passover on the evening after the fourteenth of Nisan, in agreement, as they held, with the example of John himself and *κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον*, "according to the Gospel." Now whether the writer here meant a single Gospel; or, as is more probable, the whole Gospel history; he evidently alludes to that celebration of the passover, which, according to Matthew, Mark, and Luke, our Lord held with his disciples; for nowhere else does the Gospel history speak of the time or manner of keeping the passover. We are therefore entitled to draw from the language of Polycrates this inference, viz. that he and those before him in Asia Minor, who had been familiar with John and other apostles, had no belief that John's Gospel contained anything respecting the passover, at variance with the testimony of the other Evangelists.

That the contrary opinion should have sprung up and have been urged in the West, among churches composed mainly of Gentile Christians, is not surprising. It went to sustain their favourite view, that the passover was no longer to be observed; and it also accorded generally with their feeling of opposition and hatred against the Jewish people. As a result of the latter feeling, which became more and more intense as time rolled on, it was held to be a shame for the Christian church to regulate itself after the pattern of the unbelieving Jews, who had crucified the Lord; and this suggestion had weight in the Council of Nicea. Even the emperor did not disdain to urge it in his epistle to the churches: *μηδὲν ἰστέω ἡμῖν κοινὸν μετὰ τοῦ ἐχθίστου τῶν Ἰουδαίων ὄχλου*.¹ While therefore the western churches had strong motives to adopt and press the argument to be derived thus speciously from John's Gospel, the Asiatic churches had no like motives for adhering to the testimony of the other Evangelists. The belief and practice of these latter churches could have rested only on tradition; a tradition, too, derived from John himself and his immediate disciples and companions.

On all grounds, then, both of philology and history, the conclu-

¹ Euseb. de Vit. Constantini III. 18

sion remains firm, that the testimony of John in respect to the passover need not be, and is not to be, understood as conflicting with that of the first three Evangelists.

IX. *Other Methods of Conciliation reviewed.*

Among all those who have in every age held the view, that our Lord was crucified before the Jewish passover, the idea seems never to have been entertained; that the apparent diversity of testimony between John and the other Evangelists afforded any ground for questioning the authority or inspiration of either. On the contrary, the endeavour has ever been, until recent times, so to interpret the language of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, or else that of John, as to bring their statements into harmony with each other.

1. The earliest and perhaps most current mode of explanation in the Greek and Latin churches, was that indicated in the extract from the *Chronicon Paschale* above given,¹ viz. that Jesus on the evening after the thirteenth of Nisan celebrated, not the Jewish passover, but a special paschal supper, a *πάσχα ἀληθινόν καὶ ἀντίτυπον*, the antitype of the Jewish passover, in order to institute the Lord's supper in connection with it; and that he himself on the fourteenth of Nisan was offered up for mankind as the true paschal victim. This view is likewise found in the fragments of Peter of Alexandria preserved in the preface of the *Chronicon Paschale*, and in other Greek writers; and has been adopted in modern times by B. Lamy and Toinard, by Calmet and Deyling, and especially by Gude.² The insuperable objection to this view is the clear and decisive testimony of Matthew, Mark, and Luke; which has been already stated and considered.³

2. Another mode of explanation assumes that Jesus did indeed eat the Jewish passover; although not at the same time with the other Jews. To account for this supposed difference of time, several hypotheses have been brought forward; none of which are tenable even *per se*, and much less in opposition to the clear language of the first three Evangelists. They follow here in the order of time.

a) The Jews, it is said, following the calculations of their calen-

¹ Page 430 above.

² See the Harmonies of Lamy and Toinard. Deyling Obs. Sac. I. p. 273. Gude Demonstr. quod Christus in coena sua *σταυρωσάμενος* agnum paschalem non comedit. Lips. 1733, 1742.

³ See above, p. 413 sq.

dar, had deferred the beginning of the passover for one day; while our Lord, according to the letter of the Law, ate the paschal supper on the evening after the true fourteenth day of Nisan. In support of this theory, or rather conjecture, the *ἴδου θύεσθαι* of Luke 22: 7 is particularly urged. So Scaliger and Casaubon.¹

b) The modern Karaites, who are thought by some to be descended from the Sadducees, determine the time of the new-moon by its first appearance; the other Jews, by astronomical calculation. Now this same diversity, it is said, may have prevailed in the time of our Lord; and thus the Sadducees, and Jesus with them, have celebrated the passover that year a day earlier than the rest of the nation. So L. Cappell, and especially Iken.² But here too the whole hypothesis is gathered from the air. The Karaites are not known to have had any connection whatever with the Sadducees; the new-moon was never determined by astronomical calculation so long as the temple stood; and had such been the rule of the Pharisees, then, as the conjunction of the sun and moon necessarily precedes the appearance of the new-moon by a day, the celebration of the Pharisees must have taken place a day first; and not a day later. And why, moreover, should Jesus have kept the passover with the Sadducees rather than with the great majority of his nation?³

c) Jesus may have celebrated such a passover as is kept by the Jews of the present day, a *πάσχα μεμηνορευτικόν*, not a *πάσχα θύσιμον*, that is, consisting of merely a lamb killed in the ordinary manner, with unleavened bread; a voluntary passover, not one prescribed by law. So Grotius, Hammond, and Le Clerc.⁴ But such a mode of celebrating the passover could not exist, and would have been unlawful, especially in Jerusalem itself, so long as the temple was standing; where the victims were always to be killed.

d) Our Lord, it is said by some, foreseeing that the vengeance of his enemies would overtake him before the close of the fourteenth of Nisan, when the regular paschal supper was to be eaten, celebrated it one day earlier in his character of Messiah, as thus

¹ Scaliger, *Emendat. Temporum* 6. p. 531. Casaubon, *Exercit. Antibar.* 16. 13. p. 496 sq.

² Ikenii in *Dissertt. philol. theol.* II. p. 337—471. See also this view stated in Bochart *Hieroz.* II. 50. p. 564. Kuinoel in *Matt.* 26: 17. C.

³ See Bochart l. c. Winer *Bibl. Realw.* II. p. 240.

⁴ Grotius in *Matt.* 26: 18. Hammond and Le Clerc in *Mark* 14: 12.

having power over the law.¹ But of all this there is no trace in the New Testament.

Indeed, this whole theory of an *anticipative* passover, in whatever way explained, is totally irreconcilable with the exact and definite specifications of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, that the day on which our Lord sent his disciples to prepare the passover, was the first day of unleavened bread, the day when it was necessary (*ἐδει*) that the passover should be killed; Matt. 27: 16. Mark 14: 12. Luke 22: 7.²

3. A later hypothesis attempts to remove the difficulty, by assuming that the paschal lamb was legally to be killed and eaten, not at the close of the fourteenth of Nisan, but at its commencement; that is, at the close of the thirteenth day and in the subsequent evening; so that the whole fourteenth day would intervene between the paschal supper and the festival of unleavened bread, which legally began on the fifteenth day. So first Frisch, and after him Rauch.³ But this hypothesis is in direct contradiction to Num. 33: 3, as also to Ex. 12: 6. Lev. 23: 5. Num. 9: 3, 5.⁴ Nor does it even remove the main difficulty; for it does not touch the question respecting John 18: 28; but leaves that passage, the most important of all, to be explained as we have done above.

It is painful thus to dwell upon these shifts of great and learned and often pious minds to escape from a supposed difficulty which in fact does not exist. Still more painful is it, to find professed teachers of the Bible, pressing the alleged difficulty to an extreme, in order to overthrow the authority of that Holy Book; and venturing sometimes upon assertions like that of De Wette, when he affirms that "the important contradiction between John and the other Evangelists remains firm; and all attempts to remove it are false!"⁵ We hold, on the contrary, that the four Evangelists all testify to one and the same simple truth; and that there exists among them no contradiction. The more we have examined, the more has our conviction been strengthened, that the testimony of John, fairly interpreted, here as well as elsewhere, is not only supplementary to, but confirmatory of, that of Matthew, Mark and Luke.

¹ So J. H. Maius de Tempore Pasch. Chr. ultimo, 1712. Seb. Schmid de Paschate p. 398. Kühnol ad Matt. 26: 17. F. Comp. Ideler Chronol. I. p. 521.

² See above, p. 413.

³ Frisch Abhandl. von Osterlamm. Lips. 1758. Rauch in Studien u. Kritiken, 1832. III. p. 537 sq. translated in Bibl. Repos. for 1834. Vol. IV. p. 108 sq. *Contra*, Gabler im Neuesten Theol. Journ. III. p. 433 sq.

⁴ See above, p. 406 sq. Bochart Hieroz. II. 50. p. 560.

⁵ Handb. zu Joh. 13: 1.

X. Literature.

The following are among the more important works, which treat in some detail of the subject of this article. The list, however, is by no means complete; neither is that given by Hase in his *Leben Jesu*, † 124.

J. J. SCALIGER, *Opus de Emendatione Temporum*. fol. Genev. 1609. etc. p. 531.

I. CASAUBON, *De rebus sacris et ecclesiast.* Exercitt. XVI. ad Baron. Prolegom. etc. fol. Lond. 1614. etc. p. 426 sq.

J. CLOPPENBURG, *Ep. de controversia inter Baron. et Casaub. de Agno paschali*; in his *Opp. Theol.* Tom. I. Amst. 1684.

L. CAFFELL, *Enixptous ad amicam se inter et Cloppenb. epist. colationem de ultimo Chr. paschate*, etc. Amst. 1644. Also in *Cloppenb. Opp. Theol.* T. I.

S. BOCHART, *Hieroicoicon*, lib. II. c. 50. p. 560 sq. ed. Leusden. —Comparatively little that is new, has been brought out on either side, since Bochart.

J. FRISCHMUTH, *Diss. utrum agnum paschale Salvator eodem die cum Judæis comederit*, etc. Jena 1673. Also in *Thezaur. Theol.-philol.* T. II. Amst. 1701—2.

D. PETAVIUS, *De anno et die dominicæ Passionis*. In his *Annot. ad Epiph.* Col. 1682.

A. BYNÆUS, *De Morte Jesu Christi, libri III* 4to. Amst. 1691—98.

B. LAMY, *Harmonia seu Concord. quatuor Evangg.* Par. 1689. Also, *Commentarius in Harmon.* 2 Tom. Par. 1699.

— —, *Traité hist. de l'ancienne Pâque des Juifs, où l'on examine à fond la question: si J. C. fit cette Pâque la veille de sa mort.* Par. 1693.

S. LE NAIN TILLEMONT, *Lettre au Lamy sur la dernière Pâque de notre Seigneur*. In his *Mémoires pour servir à l'hist. Ecclesiast.* Tom. II. App.

Also, *Harmonie ou Concorde Evangel. . . suivant la methode et avec les notes de feu M. Toinard*. Par. 1716.

H. WITSIUS, *Diss. an Christus eodem quidem cum Judæis die, sed non eadem, diei parte pascha manducaverit*. In his *Melett.* Leidens. p. 421 sq. Herb. 1717.

J. H. MAIUS, *De tempore Pasch. Chr. ultimo*. Giessen 1712.

A. CALMET, *Diss. de la dernière Pâque J. C.*

S. DEYLING, *De J. C. die emortuali*. In his *Observatt. Sacrae* P. I. Lips. 1735.

G. F. GUDE, *Demonstr. quod Chr. in coena sua στανσις agnum paschale non comederit*, 4to. Lips. 1733. Also: *Ed. 2, ab objectionibus Ikenii vindicata*. Lips. 1742.

C. IKEN, *Diss. de tempore celebratae a Serv. ultimae coenae paschalis*. Brem. 1735. — *Diss. II. qua difficultates contra sententiam ds. adstructam moveri solitae dihuuntur*, P. I II. Brem. 1739. — All these are found also in Iken's *Dissertt. Phil. Theol. Tom. II* ed. Schacht, Traj. Bat. 1749, 1770. *Diss. 9—11.*—Also, *Diss. qua contra Gudum demonstratur, quod Chr. στανσις vere paschalem fuisse*. Brem. 1742. Also in *Dissertt. Phil. Theol. Tom. II* *Diss. 12.*

J. FR. FRISCH, *Abhandlung von Osterlamm und dem letzten Osterlammstage Christi*. Lips. 1768.

J. P. GABLER, *Ueber den Anfang des Passahfestes bei den alten Juden*, in his *Nst. Theol. Journ. B. III*; also in his *Kleimere Schriften B. I—Ueber die Anordnung des letzten Passahmahls Jesu*, in *Nst. Theol. Journ. B. II* *Kl. Schr. B. I—Ob Jesus wirklich das Osterlamm gegessen habe?* Ibid.

C. G. BRETSCHNEIDER, *Probabilia de Evangelio Joannis*. Lips. 1820. p. 102 sq.

L. USTERI, *Comm. crit. in qua Evang. Joannis genuinum esse ex comparatis IV Evv. narrationibus de coena ultima et passione Chr. ostenditur*. Turici 1823.

K. G. W. THEILE, *Ueber die letzte mahlzeit Jesu*. In Winer's *Krit. Journ. B. II* p. 153 sq.—*Noch etwas über d. letzte Mahlz. Jesu*. Ibid. B. V. p. 129 sq.

H. E. GUERIKE, *Versuch einer Vereinigung der evang. Relationen über d. letzte Mahlz. Jesu*. In Winer's *Krit. Journ. B. III* p. 257 sq.

J. H. RAUCH, *Ueber d. letzte Passahmahl u. s. v.* In *Theol. Studien u. Kritiken*, 1832. Heft. 3. p. 537 sq.—English: *On the time of our Lord's last Passover and Crucifixion*. In the *Biblical Repository*, 1834. Vol. IV. p. 108 sq.

M. SCHNECKENBURGER, *Chronologie der Leidenswoche*, in his *Beitr. zur Einleit. in N. T.* Stuttg. 1832.

W. L. DE WETTE, *Bemerkungen zu Stellen des Evang. Johannis*. In *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.* 1834. Heft 4. p. 939 sq.

See also the *Commentaries on John*, by CALVIN, LAMPE, KUINOEL, PAULUS, LÜCKE, THOLUCK, H. A. W. MEYER, DE WETTE, etc. etc.

ARTICLE II

THE AUTHORITY OF GOD.

By Rev. James W. Ward, Abington, Mass.

THE most exciting questions that are ever contested by mankind, have respect to the rights of individuals or communities. If lawsuits arise between neighbors,—if feuds between families or wars between nations, they are, generally, but conflicts for human rights. The numberless political partizans and orators that aim to guide popular opinion, the itinerating lecturers that swarm in almost every town and village, and even the mobs which break out in our cities recklessly wasting property and life, are all contending for the rights of the people in some of their varied relations,—the rights of the poor, the rights of the rich,—the rights of the debtor, the rights of the creditor—the rights of the native born, the rights of the foreigner—the rights of the master, the rights of the slave. In the midst of the smoke and dust of this contention for *human* rights, the rights of *God* have been most unreasonably overlooked or disregarded. It may not therefore be amiss to bring his rights a little more prominently before the public eye.

Among the important rights which God claims to himself, and which reason and Scripture abundantly accord him, is the fundamental right generally expressed by the word "authority." In treating upon this right the first question that arises is, what is meant by the phrase "the authority of God?" Unquestionably this phrase is often employed without any clear and bounded idea of its meaning. A shadowy conception of something connected with the character and government of God floats in the mind, but the thought assumes, in the mind's eye, no distinct form or shape. What then is meant by the phrase "the authority of God?"

To this question it may be replied that the divine authority is not the same thing as the divine power or the omnipotence of God. The word authority is, in common parlance, sometimes used interchangeably with the word power, as when we speak of the authority or power of habit; and hence it happens that the divine power is often confounded in the mind with the divine authority. But the two things are, and ought to be preserved, entirely distinct from each other. A beggar may have great physical power,

much more even than his king, but still have no authority. So God might have power even if he were divested of all authority. His authority is not then synonymous with his power. His power may be used to vindicate his authority and carry it into effect, but it is not the same thing as his authority.

Nor ought authority to be confounded with influence or moral power. A being who possesses authority ought indeed to have influence and generally will have it; still his influence may be lost, at least over many minds, while his authority over even these same minds, remains in all its binding force. Superiority in rank, talents or property often secures extensive influence to their possessors, without imparting to them a single iota of authority. And in a town or city it sometimes happens that a popular orator or an aspiring demagogue wields far more influence than all the civil authorities of the place. Though they are vested with authority and he with none, still he could do vastly more than they to excite or quell a riot. This illustration suggests the true meaning of the word authority. It is, the right to govern; it is, the right to make legal enactments and carry them into execution. The father of a family holds authority over his household. He has a right to give rules to his household and see them executed. The king or emperor holds authority over his subjects. He has a right to give them a code of laws and see it carried into effect. So God holds entire authority over all his moral creatures. He has a right to rule in the armies of heaven above and among the inhabitants of this lower world. This right gives him his dominion over the universe. It constitutes him King of kings and Lord of lords. Divested of it he would no longer hold either a subject or a throne.

Authority always rests upon some basis. The inquiry then may be raised, on what is the divine authority founded; in other words, what is it that gives God the right to rule over his creatures? One being, considered simply as a being, has no natural right to command another being. There must be something which entitles one being to exercise dominion over another. There must be something which entitles God to the throne and allegiance of the universe. What is it? On what is his right to govern his creatures based?

In reply to this inquiry it may be said that the divine authority is not based on the fact that God is the Creator of his moral subjects. There are indeed certain rights which, under certain circumstances, flow from the relation that the Creator sustains to the creature or the former to the thing formed. The builder of a house, for example,

has a right to dispose of it as he thinks best, provided that in so doing, he trenches on none of the rights of his fellow-beings. The potter has a right, under the same provision, to put the vessel that his hands have moulded to whatever use he chooses. And the reason here is obvious,—these inanimate objects have no rights of their own. The house, the vessel has no rights which the builder, or the potter can disregard. It is impossible in the nature of things to do an injury to these inanimate objects by trampling on any rights which they possess, for they are utterly incapable of possessing rights. The case is very different with rational, voluntary and sentient beings. At the very commencement of their existence they come into the possession of rights,—(rights flowing from their constitutional character)—which no other being may disregard and be guiltless. It is right in itself that all rational beings should seek the general good. We admit at once that this is their duty, and if their duty, then surely their privilege, their right. And if it is their right to seek the general good, then no one can guiltlessly contravene this right, or throw an obstacle in their way as they are moving forward in their work of benevolence. This right *must* be held sacred by every other being, it *will* be held sacred by the great Creator of all. The relation which he sustains to creatures as their Creator cannot entitle him to overlook this right and command them to do what would be at variance with the general good. And hence we conclude that his authority or his right to command his creatures does not rest on the fact that he has created them. To illustrate this point still further let us suppose that Satan had power to create rational and moral beings and that he should create them and then claim the right of requiring them to hate God, and love and worship himself,—that is, of requiring them to do what would be a decided injury to themselves and the universe. Could such a claim be sustained? Would it be conceded for a moment by any rational being? Suppose a *man* capable of creating men like himself and that he should do it, and then give them a code of laws evidently at conflict with their own best good and the best good of others, would his laws, in such a case, possess any binding force? Would his subjects, though created by himself, be obligated to obey them? Would he, merely as their creator, have a right to demand their obedience and enforce it? If not, how can the mere fact that God has created moral beings be the ground of his authority? How can it lay the foundation of his right to govern them according to his own good pleasure? By creating voluntary agents he has in-

deed supplied himself with moral subjects, and provided materials over which to exercise authority; but the bare creative act cannot bind a single creature of his hand in allegiance to his government, or support a single pillar of his throne.

Nor is the divine authority founded on the fact that God is the Benefactor of his creatures. Benefactions when conferred for a good end,—from feelings of kindness to the benefited or out of regard to the well-being of all,—do indeed demand a return of *gratitude* and *love*. It is justly expected that the recipient of favors will *honor* and *love* his benefactor. Still, however, I am laid under no obligation to *obey* another because, forsooth, he has done me a kindness or even a long series of kindnesses. Nor has he the right, simply on the ground that he has conferred many favors upon me, to impose on me his commands and require my reason and will to bow to his. Should he ask any service at my hands I *might* see fit to render it, but I should by no means feel that he was entitled, merely on the ground of his having shown me favors, to demand my obedience. He might require me to do something which it would be wrong for me to do. It is not very infrequent for wicked men to confer favors on their fellow-men with the sole intention of thereby securing an influence over them, and then using them in the promotion of their own selfish and criminal purposes. But who would say that in such cases the bestowal of favors engendered the right of command? Parents, too, are the constant benefactors of their children. Their offices of kindness are fresh every hour and repeated every moment. Still the communication of these varied and numberless blessings gives the parent no authority over his children. Of itself, it never would sanction a single requirement of his. If the requirement were wrong in itself, no favors conferred by the parent, however numerous, however great, would give him the right to enforce it. Such favors would indeed augment the guilt of a disobedient child that should wilfully disregard the *reasonable* commands of his parent. But, as all readily admit, they could confer on the parent no right to impose unreasonable commands on his children. Nor would they in fact, unaccompanied by other circumstances and relations, give him any more authority over his own children than over the children of his neighbor, admitting that he had accumulated a load of favors on them. He might be a man of kind feelings and prompt to do favors, but imbecile in judgment, and, therefore, incompetent to guide others aright. And would he then, on the ground that he had shown them favors, be entitled

to command them when utterly unqualified for the task? Is the right to command then based on the relation of benefactor? Is the divine authority built on such a foundation? God is indeed the rich and liberal Benefactor of his creatures. His favors are constantly dispensed with an open and munificent hand. They come down upon us, refreshing as the morning showers, numerous as the dewdrops at eventide. And they may fearfully enhance the guilt of those who wickedly refuse to obey his commands. But they put no sceptre into his hand. They give him no right to sway one over the moral universe. That right is built on another foundation, and, with his present character, it would be his, in all its perfection and all its strength, even had he never conferred a single favor on a single creature of his power. Had all his creatures passed, at the very first moment of their creation, into a state of entire and unchanging revolt, and then, as a just retribution, received ever since at his hand only a tide of woe unmitigated and unremitted, still his right to rule over them would, even then, be as complete as now it is to govern the most joyous seraph that basks in the brightest light of the eternal throne.

On what then is the divine authority founded? Most evidently, on the perfect character of Jehovah,—on his attributes of omniscience, omnipotence and infinite love. These attributes of character, namely, superior knowledge, benevolence and power, always, wherever they are found, confer authority on their possessors. And nothing but superiority in knowledge, goodness and power can possibly confer the least authority on any being. This must be evident to every mind from the very nature of the case. Law does not *create* obligation. It does not *make* one act right and another wrong. Right and wrong exist in the very *nature of things*. And the law only *points out* what is right or wrong. It only *makes known* the path of duty. Right and wrong would exist, even on the supposition that there were no law, or God to give a law. It would still be right for all rational beings to act on the principle of love, and wrong to act counter to that principle. And every rational being who knew that principle would be obligated to regard it in all his conduct. Right and wrong, then, existing in the very nature of things, and law being nothing more nor less than the finger that points them out, or the light that makes them visible, we see at once what must be the elements of a lawgiver's character. He must possess the ability to perceive the path of duty, and the disposition to make it known to others

whose capacity of discovering it is less than his own. In other words, he must possess superior knowledge and goodness. And a perfect lawgiver must, of course, possess omniscience and infinite benevolence. These attributes of character qualify him to hold the place of universal lawgiver. Omniscience can never fail to see the right and the wrong. No matter how involved in darkness and doubt a case may appear when contemplated by a limited vision, in the view of Omniscience the right and the wrong of the case must be as clear as noonday. And in as far as it can be done in consistency with the ends of benevolence, infinite love will always be disposed to point out the path of duty, and put a thread into the hand of the ignorant to guide their erring footsteps through this labyrinth of darkness and doubt. And when the ignorant have once received the rule of duty they are obligated to follow it. It comes from wisdom higher than their own. They can lean on it with more safety than on their own understanding. It points out to them the right course of conduct, and they are therefore just as much obligated to follow it as they are to do right. The law then of infinite wisdom and love is imperatively binding on all inferior orders of being, and for this very reason, that it is the product of superior and perfect intelligence and goodness. And, as they are bound to obey it, so also infinite perfection has a right to give it. Omniscience will necessarily perceive the law or the rule of right action, and infinite love will prompt to its enactment. And it is always right to follow the promptings of benevolence when guided by perfect knowledge. It is right then for God to give law to his rational creatures. And if it is right for him to do it, then he has the right to do it, for every being necessarily possesses the right to do right. God holds then the right to give laws to his creatures,—a right founded on the perfection of his character, on his infinite wisdom and love. And his omnipotence qualifies him to execute the law. And it is always right that a good law should be executed, and executed by him who is best qualified to do it. He ought to execute it and he alone. God then is, on this ground, the proper executor of his laws.

This foundation of authority is abundantly recognized in the various relations of human society. The father of a family has the right to give laws to his household. But why? Evidently because he is supposed better qualified to legislate for the little domestic community than any other one of its members. It is taken for granted that he has more knowledge than his children.

It is taken for granted that he will be more disposed than they to give such rules only as are adapted to the general good of the household. It is taken for granted that he has more ability to execute them well than any one else. And on these grounds the right of government is vested in him. But should any other member of the family point out a better course of conduct than the one which he had prescribed,—a course which the father and the other members of the household saw to be better,—the father, though possessing the *civil* right to make and execute his own family rules, would still be *morally* obligated himself, and so would the rest of the household, to take and pursue the better course. And should the father, in such a case, wilfully attempt to enforce his own laws, that moment his parental authority would be transformed into parental tyranny. He would require those for whose best good he was bound to consult, to do what it would not be best that they should do. And, requiring them thus to do wrong, his authority would cease and with it their obligation to obey him. The same is true in civil governments. The legislative power is supposed to embody the congregated wisdom of the nation. True indeed it is not always so, but so it ought always to be. Those who make laws ought to know better what laws would promote the best welfare of the State than those for whom they are made. And they ought to be good men,—men disposed always to enact such laws and only such as the best good of the people demands. These qualifications alone, namely, superior knowledge and goodness, give them a *moral* right to legislate for their fellow men; and those who do not possess these qualifications have no right,—no moral right to a seat in the halls of legislation. If they are there, they are out of their proper place, and they ought to remain at home and yield their usurped seats to men of superior intelligence and probity. And, to secure a prompt and energetic execution of the laws, the executive power is always the greatest in the State. These examples show on what authority in general and on what the divine authority in particular, is based. It rests on superior knowledge, goodness and power. God is omniscient, and therefore knows by what laws all his creatures, ought, in all cases, to regulate their conduct. He is all benevolent, and will therefore impose such laws on his subjects, and only such, as will tend to the highest good of his kingdom. And he has power to execute his laws with promptness and vigor. It is then his capacity to govern all

things in the best possible manner,—it is the perfection of his character,—which affords the foundation of his authority. A foundation is that which being removed the superstructure falls. Now remove in imagination the fact that God created men, and, his character remaining the same, he would still have the right to govern men and worlds. Remove the fact that he has poured out his favors upon them, and, with his present character, his right to rule them would still remain unimpaired. But remove his perfect character, divest him of that,—suppose him impotent, imbecile, malignant,—and would he then have a right to govern the universe? Would not the reins drop at once from his hands and the throne crumble beneath him and his authority all vanish into air? His right to rule is not then founded on his creative act, it is not founded on his benefactions to his creatures, but on his perfect character. It is this which lays the solid foundations of his throne. It is this which puts into his hand the sceptre of dominion and gives him an unquestionable right to wave it over the universe.

Is it then a fact that the divine authority is universal? Scarcely any one will doubt that it extends over the entire physical creation, embracing every object in the natural world. If the laws of nature are not eternal, then, from the very necessity of the case, the Creator of matter must impress on matter its appropriate laws. It is impossible to conceive of the *existence* of matter without properties. And the properties of matter are but another name for the laws of matter. Necessity then seems to be laid upon God either to impose laws on matter or not create it. Besides, whatever laws he were disposed to give to matter, he could do it no injury, he could contravene none of its rights, for it has no rights. And he would not only be disposed but *competent* to give it such laws as would tend to the highest possible good of all his sentient creatures. Who but he could give a law so perfect as that of attraction, so simple in its nature, and yet so beneficently efficient in its operation, binding as with an invisible chain the whole universe together, and then fastening it to the base of his own moveless throne? Who then can question his right to rule in the world of nature? Some may, indeed many do complain of the particular operation of some of his physical laws. But though in the estimation of such persons there may be too much cold or too much heat, too much rain or too much sunshine, too much sickness or too much poverty to

suit their personal convenience, yet the general laws from which these supposed inconveniences result are seldom, perhaps never condemned. And if the laws are good, then God does right in giving them and has a right to give them; and all the evil of their regular operation must be taken and laid on the heads of those who refuse to conform to them.

The divine authority extends too over the *moral* world embracing in its ample sweep every rational creature in the universe. It is as full as perfect over

"vile man that mourns,
As the rapt seraph that adores and burns."

It is indeed sometimes strangely imagined, that, wherever the authority of God is unacknowledged or resisted, there it is impaired or destroyed. But the denial of a right no more vitiates or annuls that right than the denial of truth converts it into falsehood. Did the refusal of the man who denied the existence of the moons of Jupiter, to look at that planet through the telescope of Galileo, lest perchance he should see the moons with his own eyes and be forced to admit their existence, render their existence any the less a fact? Is a will made void by the mere denial of its validity? Is my title to my property annulled simply because it has been disputed? And is then God's right to reign impaired because it is resisted? Must his title to dominion be surrendered wherever it is denied? His right to reign over a province or a heart is as complete after as before revolt. His title to dominion is as perfect without as within the pale of the church. His authority is as unimpaired in the regions of darkness and despair as in the world of light and glory. It goes out from Zion, the mountain of his holiness and takes an unrelaxing hold of every moral being in the universe. It is wide as immensity, high as heaven, deep as hell and lasting as eternity.

The evidence that the authority of God is thus universal may be found in every man's bosom. We judge of the validity of rights, just as we do of the character of moral conduct,—by reason and conscience. It has been shown that authority or the right to govern rests on certain attributes of character, on superior knowledge, goodness and power; and when these attributes have been proved to belong to any being, conscience or reason just as naturally accords him the right to rule or to point out to those of inferior capacities the course of right action, as it condemns bad and approves of good actions. Let us then interrogate conscience,—

no Delphian priestess but a prophetess divine,—and listen to her safe responses. What sayest thou then, speak out thou arbiter of right and wrong, is it not proper that God should hold the reins of uncontrolled and universal dominion? Is it not right that he should give laws to all his creatures. Does he not know better than they what course they ought to pursue in order to secure the highest amount possible of good? Is he liable to mistake the tendency of any law which he may impose upon his subjects? Does not his omniscience enable him to point out such rules of action as will invariably tend to the best welfare of the universe? And is he not perfect love, and so disposed to give such laws and only such as are adapted to compass the highest good of his kingdom? Is it not best then that he should hold the office of Universal Lawgiver? In condescending to take the office and give laws to creatures, and thus pour the light of heaven on the path of duty, does he not confer a priceless blessing on those who otherwise would see that path but darkly? And is it not a rich favor to them to have the path of duty,—a path which if taken will conduct to perfect bliss,—illuminated with beams of light from the face of Omniscience? And has not Omniscience the right to shed this light on the darkness of created mind? And if, when the way of duty is thus glowing with heavenly light, there be those who refuse to travel it, and who thus take a course adapted to injure themselves and others, and diminish the aggregate of happiness in the universe, shall not every voice cry out against them and demand their punishment? And who but Omniscience can decide what the punishment shall be? Who but he can annex the best penalty to the law? And who can execute the law so wisely, so efficiently as he? Is it not best then; is it not right that he should hold the reins of empire? Say then, thou judge of truth and right in man, say, has not God a right to the throne of the universe? What now is the response of conscience to these interrogations? Do you not hear, in the depth of your own bosom, her voice of distinct and decided affirmation,—“Yes—yes—yes, he has the undoubted right of universal dominion; his is the kingdom and the power and the glory forever.”

But every right implies a corresponding obligation; and if God has the right of universal dominion then all intelligent creatures are obligated to yield unhesitatingly to his authority. There is a difference between yielding to truth and evidence and yielding to authority. In the one case we pursue a specific course, because, by the light of reason, we see clearly that that course will con-

duce to the general good. In the other case we perform an act because God has commanded it. We go on the principle of faith in God, and though our dim vision may not see *how* its performance can issue in good, yet we fully believe that Omniscience does clearly see it, and we therefore go confidently forward in the pathway of obedience. It was this readiness to yield to the divine authority,—this childlike confidence in God which led the patriarch to take the wood and the knife and lay his beloved Isaac upon the altar of burnt-sacrifice. He fully believed that God had power to gather up the ashes of his son, mould them anew into a body and breathe into it the breath of life; and that the promise would yet be fulfilled, “in *Isaac* shall thy seed be called.” It was this which divested the prophet Daniel of all fear of a despotic king’s commandment, and led him to the place of daily prayer, even though to go there was to enter a den of unchained and hungry lions. He knew that it was always safer and better to yield to the authority of God than the laws of man. Give the church at the present day an unshaken disposition to submit, in all cases and under all circumstances, implicitly to the divine authority, and you would clothe her with a beauty, and arm her with a power which would soon make her the admiration of the world. She would hear her divine Master saying to her, “preach the gospel to every creature,” and she would value no sacrifices, stop at no obstacles, be daunted by no dangers till the work was done, and she saw with her own eyes the heathen given to Christ for an inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for a possession. And let the world at large adopt the principle and the practice of unhesitating submission to the divine authority, and it would soon cover the earth with the loveliness of Eden and the joys of paradise. The great majority of mankind are, in all they do,—and even the best men are in a considerable portion of their conduct, influenced by the decisions of prejudice or passion or a darkened understanding. They know very well what the law of God demands, but then they somehow strangely imagine that in their case and in their peculiar situation it will be best for them to disregard it. And they act accordingly, and then, when too late to rectify the evil, ascertain, sometimes even in this life, that their wisdom was but the height of folly. It is not because God has left his commands covered with obscurity, that men generally pursue the ways of evil. It is because they believe that in their peculiar circumstances it is not best for them to obey his commands. And so they

disobey and thus introduce discord, disorder and woe into the world and scatter them far and wide around. Would they but always yield submissively to the leadings of divine wisdom, would ALL but do it, every jar in the great system would cease, every discordant sound would be hushed, every wheel in the machinery of the universe would turn regularly and beautifully in its place, not only working out its results of good but uttering, as it rolled, its sweet and thrilling note of praise to the great Contriver of all, and we should thus hear all around us the fabled harmony of the spheres, and witness all around us scenes "surpassing fable, of accomplished bliss." Is it not then the unquestionable duty of every rational being to act in concert for "a consummation so devoutly to be wished?"

And does not the man who resists the authority of God contract amazing guilt? He does an irreparable injury to himself. He debases his character, he lets an overwhelming flood of anguish in upon his heart. He is endowed with noble capacities and appointed to a noble work. He is fitted to take a part in an angel's employments and enjoyments, and participate in an archangel's destiny. But by resisting the authority of God he disrobes himself of all that is attractive and lovely in his character, he prostitutes to a base and unworthy purpose the noble powers of his being, he assumes the temper,—the iron purpose of wrong,—he engages in the work, he contracts the depravity, and he must share the doom of an archangel fallen. Nor is this all. He does an injury to his fellow men. Like Ishmael he raises his hand against every man. He arrays all his power and influence against the best interests of the universe. He goes out into the world, not to do good, but to trample on the law of love and the rights of his fellow men, to wound the reputation of relatives and friends, to set an example noxious in the extreme to his inferiors and equals and to injure the well being of all whom the fatal miasma of his character or conduct reaches. He passes through life, marking his pathway wherever he goes with tracks of ruin, and scattering around him the seeds of sin to spring up when he is gone and produce the bitter fruits of temporal and eternal woe. The plague spot is in his heart and he communicates the disease to all who behold him. And were it not for the remedial influences of heaven the infection would spread till the whole created universe became one great Lazaretto,—I should say,—one charnel-house of death. Nor is even this all. He pours contempt on the Ruler of the universe. By resisting

the divine authority and transgressing the divine law he proclaims to all in the strong language of action his firm conviction that the law of God is a bad one, that the principles of his administration are hurtful to the well being of creatures, and that the overthrow of his government would afford good reasons for a general jubilee. By doing it he enters the very audience chamber of God and with nerves of iron and a face of triple brass, he says to Him before whom angels bow and arch-angels veil their faces, "You are unworthy to hold the throne, your law bespeaks ignorance or malignity, your government is unwisely and ruinously administered, give to me the sceptre, to me surrender the crown, if not, I will spread rebellion in your empire and tear the diadem from your brow." Such is the expressive and awful language of resistance to the divine authority. And if this is not the consummation of depravity then where is it to be found?

We cannot close this Article without an expression of grateful feeling that a Being perfectly qualified to rule does hold the reins of unlimited empire. The fact that a perfect God reigns affords good grounds of universal rejoicing. In respect to the government of the universe only three suppositions are possible ;—*God* must reign, or some *other* being or beings, or there be *no government*. But would it be best to have *no government*? Would it be best to lift off from the moral universe all the restraints of law and permit every moral being to act out, unbridled all the feelings of his heart? Would it be best to abolish all laws human and divine and leave all hearts to the natural working of every good and evil passion? What would be the consequence of such a universal emancipation of mind from the restraints of law? Would created mind rule itself? That question has been long since settled. Notwithstanding all the controlling influences which the laws of God and man throw around it, its constant tendency even now is, to break loose from this control and follow recklessly the leadings of passion. And were these restraints entirely removed and a full license given throughout the universe to the natural workings of created mind and heart, what would the universe become but one broad Aceldama, a field of terror and anarchy and blood. Thanks, then, to the great Universal Lawgiver that this is not the scene everywhere presented to the eye.

Would it then be best that any *other* being than God should take the government upon his shoulders? Who would under-

take to bear the burden? Who would presume, Phaeton like, to drive the chariot of the sun? Who, to guide the comets through the complicated system of revolving worlds? Who, to govern and keep in harmony the still more complicated system of the moral universe,—liable as every flaming orb of mind there is, to its countless aberrations? But admitting that beings might be found presumptuous enough to undertake the work, (as we know there would be, for all naturally love preëminence,) still who would be willing to entrust them with the government? Who is there to whom you would not shudder to commit it? Would you give the dominion to the arch-apostate? What! take the sceptre from the hands of infinite mercy and love and transfer it to the hands of perfect malignity and rage! The blood flows heavily in upon the heart and curdles there at the mere thought of such a change. The eye of imagination runs downward to the murky throne of the infernal king, glances over his flaming dominions, and then passes upward and throughout creation and beholds it all under the dominion of Satan, transformed into a hell. Would you then entrust the government to man? Why he has been already tried and found incompetent to govern even *himself*. And having been proved unfaithful in that which is his own who shall commit to him that which is another's? Would you then put the reigns of empire into the hands of any of the spirits of heaven, even of the highest arch-angel there? But could he manage well the interests of the universe? Could he rule the world of nature? Could he give laws to the world of mind and heart, and see them wisely executed? And if those laws were broken could he contrive a redemptive scheme? Why, give him the sceptre and evil would soon enter the system, and then go on accumulating,—derangement following derangement and disaster treading on the heels of disaster,—till the whole train of worlds, broken loose from law and dashing onward in wild disorder, and with lightning speed, leaping at length from the appointed track, became one universal wreck. To whom then would you give the government? We have ranged creation through and find no hand competent to wield the sceptre. We gaze on the appalling spectacle which the universe without a ruler or under the guidance of any created mind presents, and we are forced in horror to turn away from it and look upwards for relief to the great Creator; and as we see in his character every conceivable attribute of a perfect Universal Ruler, and see too the reins of government held calmly in his hand, and then

look around and witness everywhere the beneficent results of his wise and benevolent administration, our souls with a full gush of rapturous emotion involuntarily exclaim: "The Lord reigneth, let the earth rejoice, let the multitude of isles be glad thereof."

ARTICLE III.

INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL INFLUENCE OF ROMANISM.

A Dudleian Lecture delivered before the University in Cambridge, May 14, 1845. By Prof. Edwards A. Park, of Andover Theological Seminary.

WHEREFORE BY THEIR FRUITS YE SHALL KNOW THEM.—Matt. 7: 20.

THE character of a religious system may be learned, first, from the relation of its principles to the standard of reason and scripture; secondly, from its influence on the soul of man. The influence of a system may be ascertained by an examination either of its inherent fitnesses or of its actual operations. If we confine our regard to its inward tendencies we may become visionary; our speculations not being verified by facts. If we limit our view to the consequences which have apparently flowed from it, we may become empirical and mistake the appendages of the system for the effects of it. In order to be certain that its real influence is good or evil, we must combine a philosophical inquiry into its adaptations, with an historical inquiry into its consequences; each of these different views serving to illustrate and complete the other. Our survey of Romanism, for example, may be too superficial, if we dwell on the circumstances that have occurred in its train, and pass by the commentary which they receive from the essential fitnesses of the system. Its more skilful advocates will allow that its history is stained with many dark scenes, but they affirm that although conjoined with certain evils as accidents, it has not been united with them as appropriate developments; that it has *happened* to be allied with political despotism, with the Feudal system, with the peculiar tastes of the middle ages, and has been tinctured in this manner with influences which are far from being congenial with its own spirit. We say in reply, that the evils connected with Romanism have been prominent through so many successive ages, in so many different

nations, for so long a time and with such marked uniformity, as to give evidence of emanating from the very nature of the system, rather than from its ephemeral position. Certainly we may know a tree by its fruits, when we have observed these fruits for many seasons, and in various climes. Still, in all our inferences from the event to the cause we feel the more secure when we analyze the cause itself, and find *a priori* that it is intrinsically adapted to work out the same things as effects, which have been noticed as its uniform adjuncts. We may therefore be justified in attempting to show, on the present occasion, that the essential tendencies of Romanism are injurious to the mind and heart of man.

They are injurious to the mind. Our Maker intended to leave the evidences for religion such as not only to try the feelings, but also to sharpen the intellect. He designed to invigorate the reason, as well as discipline the will, by allowing arguments of real weight to exist in favor of what may be proved on the whole to be false, and in opposition to what may be proved on the whole to be true. But the Romish idea of the infallibility of the church is, in itself and its results, at variance with the nature of moral reasoning, and encourages a spirit of dogmatism incompatible with a due regard to the evidence which exists for and against the truth. Catholic¹ theologians have assumed that to their cardinal doctrines nothing can be properly objected, and have deemed it a kind of religious suicide to call in question any

¹ Many object to the term Catholic as applied to the church of Rome, because the term expresses a Christian virtue for which that church is not distinguished. Some refuse to employ the word, because it implies that the Romish church differs from every other in the fact of its being a visible corporation, capable of being extended over the whole world and including under one hierarchy all individuals of all nations. There is no reason, it is said, why the Romish church should monopolize the designation, Catholic, more than the Anglican Church. It is indeed true that names are things, and that a good name is precious in its influence; but when usage has so generally sanctioned the application of this term to the church of Rome, it appears hopeless to attempt a change. There is in itself no sufficient reason why those who believe in three orders of the clergy should assume the title—Episcopalians, in order to distinguish themselves from such as believe that all ordained ministers are bishops. The believers in the parity of the clergy might as well assume the title—evangelical, in order to distinguish themselves from such as exalt the diocesan bishop above the preachers of the word. If the work of giving names to sects were now to be commenced we might invent a more distinctive and expressive vocabulary than has yet been established; but we cannot, at this late day, make an innovation upon the current phraseology without more labor than profit. Still the phraseology is unfortunate. See Whateley on the Errors of Romanism, pp. 359—367.

principle which is essential to the stability of their faith.¹ They compare the evidences for their theology to those for their personal existence and identity. They fear that in canvassing the proofs for an essential dogma, they will lose their implicit faith in it, and have therefore believed without asking for a reason, or have searched for arguments rather than for the truth. Their system appears to have logical props instead of logical grounds; to have been made up first, and afterward confirmed by reasonings which had no influence in its formation. They object to untrammelled inquiry, because it results in diversities of opinion, in skepticism, in pride of intellect. These are indeed evils; but they are avoidable, are at the worst incidental to a positive good, and withal are less to be feared than the inanity and deadness and corruption which come from an unthinking reception of a human creed.

Nor is it merely by discountenancing the investigation of first principles that Romanists have injured the tone of the intellect. They have done the same by checking the instinctive longings of the soul for progress in the science of divine things. "However some men may deride new light," says Dr. Owen, "he will not serve the will of God in his generation, who sees not beyond the line of foregoing ages." The spirit of the Reformation is that of improvement, the principle of the Romanists is that of hyper-conservatism. Their œcumenical councils are supposed to have established the faith of the church; the decisions of these councils are deemed infallible, and no private scholar has a right to impugn them. Now the human mind was not made to be thus stationary. It is wronged when forbidden to examine and reject the errors of past, especially of dark ages. We are but mocked, when we are told that we have powers for research, and may

¹ "The certainty which the church has of the truth of her tenets, is immediate; for she received her doctrines from the mouth of Christ and his apostles, and they are indelibly stamped upon her conscience, or, as Irenæus says, upon her heart, by the power of the Divine Spirit. If she were obliged to ascertain her doctrines first by means of a learned investigation, she would fall into the most absurd contradiction with her own self, and would annihilate herself; for, as it would be the church that seeks for the ground of her doctrines, she would be presupposed to exist, inasmuch as she examines; and at the same time not to exist, inasmuch as she is obliged first to obtain an existence, that is, to learn the truth, which is her proper being, the very thing in which and by which she is. She would seek for her own self, and this can be done only by an insane man. She would resemble the man, who would first determine whether or not he had an existence by an examination of the papers written by himself!"—*Moehler's Symbolik*, §. 378.

exert them, and may use the multiplied helps of modern science in the pursuit of truth, still we must not cross a single boundary which the assembled bishops have prescribed; we may go onward freely, so long as we are hemmed in by the canons and anathemas of Nice and Chalcedon and Florence. It is impossible to proceed with our investigations in a proper spirit, when we feel compelled to end them at precisely the same results which had been attained before we began. The freshness and vivacity and vigor of the soul fade away when it is repressed within any other limits than those of truth; for truth is nature, and never enslaves the mind which it controls; but the restrictions of men upon the progress of thought are artificial, they keep the spirit ill at ease and thus impede its healthy action. We are indeed assured by Romish divines, that the science of theology may be advanced as a tree may increase in size and strength, the trunk and branches remaining the same, the leaves also and the fruit.¹ Nature, however, gives up the growth of the tree to its own laws, and does not cramp it with bandages of iron; but Romanism is so minute in its prescriptions as to intersect the lines of advancement in almost every point, and whatever of expansion it does not prevent it leaves sickly and ill shapen.

Equally injurious to the mental powers is the standard of thought and feeling which is held up in the Papal church. Religion ennobles the intellect by making it familiar with the eternal laws of reason and conscience, but the votaries of Rome exalt the traditions of antiquity above our own perceptions of truth, and degrade the mind by communion with triflers. The Bible, too, gives a spring and vividness to our intellectual nature. It has not laid down its instructions in the form of a condensed, methodical, inspired creed; for it would thus allay the inquisitive spirit, and repress intellectual enterprise. It has scattered its wisdom along its pages with so touching a simplicity as to quicken the mind in its search for still more of that truth which the angels desire to look into. But Romanism has done what the sacred penmen were too far sighted to attempt. She has given us creeds which claim to be inspired, and by thus compressing

¹ See Moehler's *Symbolik*, S. 383-4. "*Imitetur animarum religio rationem corporum; quae licet annorum processu numeros suos evolvant et explicent, eadem tamen, quae erant, permanent. Multum interest inter pueritiae florem et senectutis maturitatem: sed iidem tamen ipsi sunt senes, qui fuerant adolescentes; ut quamvis unius ejusdem hominis status habitusque mutetur, una tamen nihilominus eademque natura, una eademque persona sit.*"—Vincent of Lerins. *Com. c. XXIX.*

her doctrines into a narrow compass, has saved her disciples from the invigorating toil of a study like that of the Bereans. One of her greatest sins against the intellect is, her elevating the digests of her Councils into an infallible standard of truth. She has made them equal to the Bible in authority, and superior in ease of reference, in systematic arrangement, in precise definitions. Hence the New Testament loses its appropriate place in her esteem; it is neither studied by her clergymen as the highest criterion of truth, nor read by her laymen as their familiar guide. The dogmas of the church are condensed into compends which have no freshness or vitality, and the apostles who are stimulating to the intellect, are superseded by the fathers, of whose words we cannot say as of the inspired, 'they are spirit, they are life.' We are bound to speak with reverence of the early Christian authors. We owe them a large debt, chiefly for their testimony to matters of fact, not so much for their opinion on matters of doctrine. We are grateful to them for reducing theology to a system. This work might and would have been done as well perhaps or better by moderns, but it was done by the ancients and we thank them for it. They did a noble work. Not a few of them were great and good divines, and their treatises, mutilated and forged as some parts of them have been, command our admiration. Still the fathers of the church were but men, and were never fitly trained to be authorities for our faith. We suffer a great intellectual loss when we accommodate ourselves to their illogical reasonings, their fantastic speculations, their half Jewish, half heathenish conceits. To revere their Gnostic or Platonic fancies as a standard of thought, is the cause as well as the effect of a vitiated taste and of unreasonable judgments. Romanism has fostered a love for the grotesque more than for the rational, by conforming to apocryphal scriptures and to scholastic digests of the fathers, rather than to the teachings of science or of the apostles. Some of her theories are literally made up of a perverted Aristotelianism, applied to the traditional metaphrase of a few texts of the Bible. Her divines have not consulted the Stagirite in his purity, so much as the commentaries of the schoolmen upon him; nor is it the real meaning of the earlier fathers so often as the glosses made upon them by Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and Peter Lombard, to which modern discoveries of truth are to be sacrificed. It is men and not principles; it is acute rather than wise men, subtle more than profound; men whom dark ages nurtured and who kept the ages dark;

it is these before whom we are to prostrate ourselves in a homage that enervates without truly humbling the spirit.

A low standard of thought and feeling is also presented in the worship authorized by Romanists. One hour of direct intercourse with the Judge of Heaven, is more invigorating to the mind than all their supplications to the souls of the dead. Yet it is easier for them to commune with saints than with God, and therefore, instead of refining their intellect by praying to the Spirit of truth, they often waste their time in calling on St. Anthony and St. Nicholas, St. Xavier and St. Cecilia to pray for them. They cherish an indolence of mind by their circuitous method of calling on inferior saints to implore the virgin Mary that she would beseech her Son to intercede for them before the Father. Our intellectual good requires that we pray directly to Jehovah in the name of Christ. In theory, Romanists distinguish between invocation and worship, and designate the homage which they pay to departed spirits by the word *δουλεία*, and that which they pay to God by the word *λατρεία*. Some of them regard this distinction in practice as well as theory; others do not, but apply the same language to those whom they invoke, which is proper for him only whom they adore. They debilitate their higher faculties by neglecting a thoughtful converse with the Redeemer of the world, and addressing sentimental praises to her whom they call the mediatrix between the Mediator and us.¹ Revering the Queen of heaven when they ought to be adoring an infinite spirit, they lose not only a degree of mental strength, but also that distinctive power of faith which dispenses with the aid of sight. Hence they require statues and pictures as helps to devotion, and thus enfeeble the intellect by the means which they employ to assist it. He who created the soul knew well the danger of sliding from the use of statues to the adoration of them, and therefore forbade all resort to these enervating expedients for easy worship. As men now use the crucifix, so there were Jews in the time of Hezekiah who employed the brazen image as a means of facilitating their approaches to Jehovah.

¹ The favorite mode of representing the Saviour as a child in the arms of a beautiful virgin, is exactly fitted to make the mother, more frequently than the child, the object of invocation, and to fascinate the eye with the graces of a human form more than to expand the intellect by an exhibition of divine excellence. She is familiarly addressed as "our Lady," "the Queen of the world as well as the Queen of heaven," "the Mother of mercy," "the Mother of grace," "the Mother of God," and is practically regarded, by Romanists in common life, as more kindly intent upon our welfare than is the Almighty himself.

No device of the kind could be more innocent; for this image had been once sanctioned of heaven for a moral purpose, and around it clustered the recollections of past deliverances. But it was seized and broken in pieces by the prophet, and called Nehushtan;¹ for he saw that the people would adore the memento of him who claims supreme worship for himself alone, and they would form gross conceptions of a deity who is accommodated to them through a gross medium. It is often said that the church of Rome is free from idolatry, because she reveres not the image but the spirit which it represents. Now there are three kinds of outward idolatry. One is the worship of a mere block or stone or plant; a second is the worship of the true Jehovah emblemized by some material object; a third is the worship of a spirit which is not the true Jehovah and which is bodied forth in some visible shape. The first kind of idolatry is chargeable upon no man that ever lived; for even the victim of feticism prays to a tree, not as mere wood, but as instinct with life, and that life is the object of his homage. The second kind is idolatry in form, though not in substance. If men worship the true God through an idol, then of course they are not revering a false God. The chief evil of this practice is that it leads to the third species of idolatrous observance, that which in its formal and essential characteristics is the adoration of a being other than Jehovah. Many of the Romanists are idolaters merely in mode not in spirit. The worship offered by their Fenelon may have been, for aught we know, even purer than that offered by our Leighton. But that some of them are idolaters both formally and really, is a truth as evident as it is unwelcome. The God who is often exhibited in their popular literature, in their pictorial representations, and in the host, is a venal and a partial and a sensuous being, fascinated with glittering ornaments, with vain pagantry. The statues which represent him are sometimes the identical figures which were carved for heathen divinities. Now it is improbable, that the image of Jupiter and Hercules will be a fit expression of the excellence which is found only in heaven. The *fac-similes* of pictures designed to give an idea of the powers that ruled on Olympus, cannot be expected to purify the Christian's faith in one who inquires, "To whom then will ye liken God, or what likeness will ye compare unto him?"² But even if the canvass and the marble suggested no false idea of

¹ 2 Kings, 18: 4.² Isaiah 40: 18.

Jehovah, still the use of any material representation of him deprives the intellect of a discipline, which God intended to be essential to its fullest development. There are some themes which may be illustrated by diagrams, but the divine attributes cannot be worthily studied except in spirit and in truth. The attempt to simplify them by any more visible symbol than "God is love," will bedim the mental vision as much as it gratifies the corporeal. Where men can walk by sight, they will not cultivate the principle of trust in him whom they have not seen. In order to become spiritual, they must *be shut up to the faith*.

It is not to be expected of men who allow a host of intercessors to obscure their view of the Holy One, and who use material representations even of these interceding saints, that they will place a high estimate on the preaching of the gospel. Accordingly we find that Romanism depresses the pulpit for the sake of aggrandizing the ceremony of the mass. In some ages of the church she has almost entirely discarded the sermon,¹ and sacrificed the instruction of the mind to impressions upon the sense. It is the prominence of the pulpit which gives impulse to general education, and the history of Romanism shows that where preaching is made secondary to forms, the mental character of both clergymen and laymen loses a quickening influence.

When a Protestant enters the sanctuary, he is made thoughtful by the words of prayer and the reading of the Scriptures; and we are unable to measure the degree of mental improvement which he receives from services thus adapted to his understanding. But the Romanist is not instructed by the reiteration of his stereotyped observances. He hears the Bible read in a language which imparts to him none of its meaning, and in some churches he cannot even distinguish the words of the scriptural lesson, for these are drowned in the tumult of the ringing of bells and the pealing of the organ, which are designed to honor the recital of what would be more truly honored, if it were simply made intelligible or even audible. The rational Protestant is instructed by the sacraments of Christianity. They were intended to be sermons to the mind, and thereby to the heart. But the genius of Rome has transformed them from symbolical discourses into a species of necromancy. They are described as operating not by rational appeal, but by a kind of talismanic in-

¹ See Father Paul Sarpi's History of the Council of Trent, p. 169, Fol. Ed. Sozomeni Hist. Eccl. Lib. VII. cap. 19.

fluence. Protestantism would sanctify men by the truth which enlightens the intellect, but Romanism depends on the mechanical working of rites that supersede our own activity. Protestantism insists, first of all, on faith by which man is to be justified, and faith involves a vigorous exercise of reason; but Romanism lays chief stress upon external ordinances which can renovate the soul without a rational contemplation of the truth addressed to it. As the supply of thought will not exceed the demand, we cannot look for mental exertion in receiving sacraments which operate independently of such exertion. In their scriptural simplicity, baptism and the Lord's supper are eloquent expounders of great truths; but a recent author commends the Romish method of administering baptism because it "envelops the originally simple act in a great abundance of significant ceremonies," and of "the most diversified symbols."¹ This imagined excellence is one of our objections to the Catholic ritual. That ritual burdens the truth, and covers it up with outward trappings. It multiplies emblems, until the principle shadowed forth by them vanishes into thin air. It appeals to the fancy, and leaves the judgment uncultivated. It is a form of ocular worship which causes the mind to linger on the surface of things, and holds it back from profound meditation. It is arbitrary and artificial, and ceremonies which are not commended by a sober judgment cannot be repeated in the church without injury to the intellect. They foster a puerile habit of thought, and a taste for meretricious display. We can see little more than an unreasonable affection

¹ See Moehler's *Symbolik*, Sechste Auf. S. 276. "As the Lord once cured the physical deafness of a man by a mixture of spittle and dust, so is that mixture applied in baptism likewise, for the purpose of denoting the spiritual fact, that the organs of the mind are now opened to receive the mysteries of the kingdom of God. The burning candle denotes that now indeed the divine light from above has fallen into the mind, and the darkness of sin is changed into a celestial brightness. The salt designates the wise man who is freed from the foolishness of this world. The anointing with oil designates the new priest, for every Christian is a priest in the spiritual sense of the word, who has entered into the inmost sanctuary and has renewed the most living communion with God in Christ Jesus. The white garment denotes that the believer, washed pure in the blood of the Lamb, desires hereafter to retain the innocence which he lost in the first Adam and regained in the second. All these symbols are used for the sake of expressing in the most diversified methods, the one idea that a complete, permanent change should take place in man, and a new, higher, and continued existence should begin in him."—S. 276, 277. But this one idea is far more perspicuously expressed when the ordinance is left in its original plainness, and not overlaid with the fantastic devices of idlers.

in the attempts of the Romish priest to portray the nature of his office by the quality, figure, and coloring of his vestments. He is a ruler in the church; why does he not wear a crown upon his head? He is the enemy of sin and the defender of his people; why does he not gird on the sword as an emblem of the sword of the Spirit? Why does he not present himself at the altar arrayed in the symbols of that panoply which is described in the sixth chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians? Why are there not twenty sacraments prescribed? There is as much reason for twenty sacraments as for seven.¹ We can see no grounds for adopting the Romish ceremonies and omitting others which the fancy may invent, save the fact that the former have been established already. But they were established for temporary or for local causes; and the same reason which at first suggested them, may now require a change. The truth is, our religious observances ought to express the reason of their institution. They ought to be chaste portraitures of such truth as can be portrayed in a manly way. They are healthful to the intellect when they are naturally appropriate to the things which they signify. The pensive brow of the preacher ought to be his mitre of gold; his look of kindness ought to be his sprinkling of the people with holy water; his elaborated discourses are more significant than his kneeling before an illuminated Bible; his earnest tones are an expressive substitute for his making the sign of the cross; and his freedom from artificial adornings should be the tasteful memento that his life is hid with Christ in God. This is a Puritan, this is a rational system of ecclesiastical forms; and as it obeys, so it improves an enlightened intellect. The antiquity of the Romish observances is indeed an argument in their favor, but their antiquity is often that of the darkest ages, and sometimes that of the letter merely, not of the spirit. There was once a reason for ceremonies which are still continued, after the excuse for them has ceased to exist. Before the invention of printing men were profited by hieroglyphical signs, more than they can be since books are become accessible to all. But the Catholic worship is a complicated system of hieroglyphics, and they are more numerous now than they were

¹ On the same principle that matrimony and ordination are sacraments, may the reading of the Bible, the giving of alms, prayer, the dedication of churches, civil oaths, the coronation of kings, and indeed all the more important acts of our life be considered sacramental.—See Nitzsch's *Prot. Beant. der Symbolik* Dr. Mochler's, S. 186, 187.

when circumstances partly justified them. There was once a propriety in using the Latin tongue in the services of the Roman Church. It was vernacular with those who heard it; therefore it was employed in prayer. At this day it is not a living language; the reason for its use has vanished; the use itself is retained in opposition to the principle which first recommended it. The original custom was to pray in the Roman tongue, but not the original custom to pray in words which had ceased to be understood; not the original and apostolic custom to use the Latin language in America; not the primitive custom to use a dead language either in America or Rome.¹ The form of the ancient practice, as now preserved, is subversive of its ancient spirit; for the principle of the early church was, that it is better to speak five words with the understanding, than ten thousand words in an unknown tongue.²

There is the same objection to the whole structure of the Romish theology. It is capricious and irrational, adhering to the letter of certain antique standards and rejecting the meaning of them. It encourages an arbitrary method of investigation by its tenacity of circumstances and disregard of the substance of things. It ascribes great authority to the metropolitan church at Rome. There was a time when that church deserved a peculiar deference, for it was the scene of apostolic labor; and if the very individuals who had been addressed in words of inspiration, still survived in that ancient city, they would still merit our homage. But the circumstances which gave at first a standard character to their church, have long since disappeared. What was begun with a valid reason, is continued without one; and the claims of that ecclesiastical body have become the more exorbitant, as the rightfulness of them has diminished. There was a day when tradition was the most important means of learning the truth. The Gospels were not published, and the only attainable knowledge of them was to be gleaned from those who had listened to the earliest preachers. Time enough had not then elapsed to allow confusing or corrupting changes in the traditionary accounts of

¹ It is not pretended that the Romanists allege no arguments for their use of the Latin language in worship beside the antiquity of the usage; but this is the real and original reason for which the custom is retained, and the other arguments in its defence seem to be devised as secondary supports of that which would be continued without them.

² In like manner the withholding of the Bible from the laity is often justified because it was the early custom; but the invention of printing has made the spirit of the modern practice entirely different from that of the ancient.

our Saviour. These accounts were the New Testament, written in the hearts of men. But now, what was once tradition has become Scripture; the oral instructions of the first teachers are transferred to the written page. Our appeal to the recorded Gospels is the same in substance with the primitive appeal to the remembered narratives; it is a reference to the authority of inspired men. But the Romanists adhere to tradition, as if it were as pure in the nineteenth century as it was in the first; as if the testimony of the early churches were as ancient as the record of the apostles themselves; as if that which was needful in certain circumstances were needed when the circumstances are essentially diverse. The original arguments for such antiquated dogmas having lost their force, new arguments are invented, and we know that all reasonings which are sought out and pressed into our service from afar, tend to impair the spirit of candor. The theology of Rome, symmetrical and artfully compacted as it is, yet is so constrained, and requires such fantastical explanations, as to make the mind of its students disingenuous. Even its "golden rule," as laid down by Vincent of Lerins, is one which cannot be obeyed without violence to the judgment. It sets up the standard of truth as *quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est*. It therefore obliges an inquirer for the right faith to reconcile the creed of the bishops in any one age or nation, with that of the same functionaries in every other. But this cannot be done without a tortuous and inept construction of words. The clergy of no two nations agree in every item of their belief; for they have their national peculiarities. The theologians of no two ages are precisely alike in the shading of their faith; for every age has its own spirit. Nay, if we could ascertain the exact meaning attached by independent men to the same terms, we should perceive that no two thinking divines, the world over, have adopted in all points the same views of truth. When the light shines, the rays will fall differently upon the retina of men in different positions; and the only way in which all eyes can be made to see alike is, to leave them in total darkness where they may agree in seeing nothing at all. There is a standard of truth; but the attempt to discover it among the writings of the church-fathers and schoolmen, is an attempt to coërcé them into a system which they never in all particulars believed. It is an attempt to *create* in their writings what never existed there. It leads to a process of special pleading, that vitiates the sensibilities for the truth. It may exercise a subtlety like that of the doctors

of the Sorbonne, but does not train the mind to an enlarged Christian philosophy. We acquire a love for the truth by seeking it in the standards which God has written for us, in the volumes of nature and grace; but we imbibe a jesuitical spirit, by endeavoring to fabricate a theological creed from materials which can be fitted into their desired position only by distorting them.

These tendencies of Romanism are illustrated by fact. A deference for truth as such, does not characterize the Romish literature. Even the writings of Moehler,¹ Klee and Wiseman are distinguished for ingenuity rather than fairness. The Tridentine fathers displayed far less of disposition or ability to decide for themselves what is truth, than of cunning in transporting from the Quirinal palace the decisions which the Pope had made for them, and in securing a majority of votes for the decrees thus clandestinely prepared, although ostensibly inspired.² The themes with which Catholic authors are most intimate are of inferior worth. They are the endless genealogies of bishops, the fables of the apostolical succession, the niceties of the schoolmen, themes of external interest—seldom of inward dignity. It was the di-

¹ It is difficult to mention any modern theological work more ingeniously fitted to produce an impression which, on the whole, is incorrect, than Moehler's *Symbolik*, a translation of which has been published in England, and also republished in this country. See *Bib. Sac.* Vol. I. 554, 555. Its sophistry consists, first, in concealing the most obnoxious phases of the Catholic doctrine; secondly, in the undue prominence which it gives to such truths as have been defended by Romanists against the ill-judged attacks of Protestants; thirdly, in its appeal to the writings of individual Protestants with the same freedom as to publicly authorized Confessions of Faith, as if the works of Calvin and Melancthon were our Symbolical books; fourthly, in quoting the impassioned and extravagant remarks of Protestant controversialists, without attempting to modify those remarks by reference to the circumstances or the idiosyncracies of the men who uttered them;—a course of treatment which the writings of Martin Luther, for example, are peculiarly ill-fitted to endure; and fifthly, in tacitly assuming that the creeds and standard treatises of Protestants are as authoritative, as those of the Romanists; that the Augsburg or Helvetic Confessions are as completely and unexceptionably expressive of the private opinions of Lutherans or Calvinists, as the Tridentine Catechism or the Bull *Unigenitus* are indicative of the universal Catholic faith. Protestants, allowing as they do the right of individual judgment, are not to be bound down to their symbolical books, as Romanists are to theirs. The faith of Catholics is in their Councils; our faith is in the Bible.

² The disregard to truth, the sacrifice of principle to expediency, the dishonorable, not to say dishonest, methods of conducting theological discussion, which were sanctioned by the Tridentine Council, are well illustrated in Father Paul Sarpi's *History of that Council*, pp. 215, 346, 365, 497, 503, 621, 684, 815, et al. Fol. ed.

vine commendation of Aaron, "I know that he can *speak* well;"¹ but the Romish priest is required from the nature of his office to *chant* well, and to be a religious martinet, rather than a comprehensive reasoner. Where so little is demanded of the teachers of the people, what can be expected from the people themselves?

We have no wish to deny that many illustrious names are enrolled among the scholars of the Catholic church. The human mind will rouse itself into action in despite of all the sedatives that are applied to it. Nor would we intimate that Romanism is devoid of all tendencies to quicken the intellect; for it is not a tissue of unmingled error, and the truth which it retains is like truth everywhere, of renovating power. We yield high praise to many of the Benedictine and Augustinian monks; of the Jesuits and the Jansenists. But when we reflect on the leisure, the retirement, the wealth and the vast multitude of the Romish clergy, we ask why are there so few accomplished scholars among the hosts who ought to have been our intellectual benefactors. There must be some radical fault in the system which has reared from its millions of preachers so small a number like the French Triumvirate, and from its cloistered students so few philosophers like Malebranche, Campanella and Des Cartes; and of these few, so large a proportion who "groaned being burdened" under the faith which had been imposed upon them. We admit that Romanism encourages a spirit of inquisitiveness into the history of the past; but why has it trained no more historians like Du Pin and Jahn and Döllinger, and why has its historical curiosity been so far controlled by its sectarian interests? We commend the Romish priesthood, that they kept the records of ancient wisdom during the middle ages; but was it not characteristic of them to *keep* these records to themselves rather than disseminate them among the people? We praise them that they have fostered a taste for the fine arts; their theology is more indebted to Raphael and Michael Angelo than to all their Hugs and van Esses. But does not the taste that is nurtured by Romanism in painting, music and architecture, favor a gaudiness of ornament, an overlading of beauties? We further concede, that a rare talent for controlling the popular mind is nourished by the distinction of orders and offices in the Catholic hierarchy; by its leisure also, by its facility of transmitting principles of finesse from one generation of its priests to another, and again by the

¹ Ex. 4: 14.

very fact that it has an established character for sagacious diplomacy, and this character is retained from age to age, as by prescriptive right. Woolsey, Fleury, De Retz, Richelieu, Ximenes and Mendoza learned many lessons of cunning from their mother church. But the powers and inclinations for intrigue need not be fostered by a *religious* institution. The very circumstance that the Romish clergy will gain by artifice what they lose in argument, gives an intimation of the peculiar intellectual spirit of their system. But the most impressive commentary on its influence is seen in the fact that learning revived when the Reformation began; that the mother church of Rome has trained for the last three hundred years a smaller number of original thinkers than have arisen from even a half of the Protestant churches, all of which united are a minority when compared with the Papal. Why at the present day are Lucerne, Freiburg and Uri so much less enlightened than Basle and Berne and Geneva? Why is Spain so much more degraded than Holland, Portugal than Denmark, Ireland than Scotland? Why are the Austrian clergy so far inferior to the Prussian, the Bavarian to the Saxon, the French to the English? Why have the universities under the Papal system so much less of scientific enterprise, than those under the Protestant? The fundamental reason is this; the inward tendencies of Romanism are to encourage the swinging of censures more than the contemplation of truth, the adherence to authority more than principle, to systems for which there was once an apology more than to those which now vivify the intellect. Romanism is so contrived as to save men the trouble of thinking for themselves. It adopts the principle of vicarious reasoning, as well as of vicarious virtue. It does not harmonize with the natural laws of evidence; it bends them into conformity with itself and thus makes the very science of theology sectarian. It does not look outward and upward for light, but searches into its own history for justification, and seeks the living chiefly among the dead.

As feeling is elicited by thought, we must presume that a theological system which is unfavorable to the intellect will also be injurious to the heart. The doctrines of Romanism become, often, morally injurious by means of their peculiar tendency to be perverted. Many of them involve so much nicety of distinction, that they cannot be safely stated without being critically explained. But the whole system of Romanism is averse to explanation. It needs in a preëminent degree the discussions of the pulpit, but it gives little time for those instructive addresses without which its

dogmas will be misunderstood. It teaches the intellect so seldom, and beguiles the fancy with such a gorgeousness of rites, that the people will often imbibe pernicious ideas of even the truths which it unfolds. Its appeals to the imagination are so striking, and to the judgment so feeble, that men will form such notions of it as are most agreeable to their vitiated tastes. When a man is bowed down under a thought of his sinfulness, and is therefore simply commanded to eat no meat for a month, he will not understand the nature of faith, and will misunderstand the nature of Christian works. There is danger, in promising a stricken penitent that, if he will give alms to the church, he may have a dispensation from rehearsing the prayers which had been required of him as a penance. He will thus regard prayer as an evil, and simony as a virtue. There must be danger, in exposing the relics of saints or of the true cross to the gaze of men, who are not cautiously guarded against the deification of that which so overawes their sensibilities. There is great danger, in employing more of religious machinery than is often and fully, in its working and its nature, explained to the people. Romanism makes shipwreck of the faith, because she has so much more sail than ballast.

There is, for example, some truth in the doctrine of satisfactions for sin, as laid down in a few standard treatises of the Catholic church.¹ The doctrine is, that certain temporal evils ensue from moral delinquency, and that these evils may be removed or at least mitigated by certain penitential acts. These acts are termed satisfactions, and may, whenever the punitive evils can be prevented without them, be dispensed with by the church. These dispensations are called indulgences; and indulgences from one form of penance, may sometimes be procured by submitting to a different form of it. But there is reason to fear, that men who have made satisfaction for the temporal penalties of the law, will consider themselves as having satisfied its eternal demands. If their sins are cancelled for this life, they will presume on the life to come. If they can obtain a dispensation from one species of suffering by the endurance of another, they will endure the loss of money as an equivalent to some physical torture; and their willingness to part with their silver will be regarded as the proof of their contrition; and their contrition, as the means of

¹ See Catech. ex decreto Concil. Trident. pp. 343, 347, 352; Moehler's Symbolik, 275—298; Wiseman's Lectures on the Principal Doctrines and Practices of the Catholic church, pp. 35, 68, 69.

their deliverance from punishment here below ; and this their temporal deliverance, as a pledge of their never ending blessedness. Thus the whole scheme of penances and satisfactions tends to abuse. It may be explained as comparatively innocuous ; but it is very seldom thus explained by the clergy, still more seldom is it thus understood by the laity ; and the history of it shows, that it encourages a spiritual commerce, a barter in the things of heaven, and converts the spirit of the Gospel into a gross speculation at the shambles.¹

Romanism becomes injurious to the moral feelings by the mystical working of its machinery. It is a discriminating remark of Schleiermacher, that " Protestantism makes the relation of an individual to the church dependent on his relation to Christ, but Catholicism makes his relation to Christ dependent on his relation to the church."² Irenaeus, has said, " Where the church is, there also is the Spirit of God ; and where the Spirit of God is, there is the church and all grace."³ Now the Protestants insist on the last clause of this sentence, as true independently of the other ; the Romanists insist on the first clause as true, even when they deny the second. The most accomplished Catholic Symbolist of modern times avows, Our doctrine is that " the visible church comes first, then comes the invisible ; the former is the origin of the latter. The Protestants say, on the other hand,

¹ The expression that the doctrines of the Church of Rome are peculiarly liable to be misunderstood, is far milder than the truth will justify. Her dogmas are commonly taught in a far more objectionable form, than that in which her standards express them. The people do not generally *pervert* the instructions addressed to them, when they believe that the Virgin Mary has divine attributes, that penances in this life will supply the place of punishment in the life to come ; that indulgences are a legitimate article of traffic, etc. Romanism, as taught by the Council of Trent, leads to abuses ; as taught by the majority of its priests, it is abused. It may be said indeed that the system of the Tridentine fathers is not and never has been the Catholicism generally prevalent in the Papal church. Dangerous as that system is, it is far better than the theology with which the laymen of Italy, Austria, Spain and France have been contaminated. For an exposition of Romanism as it is, in distinction from Romanism as it is described by its apologists, see *Letters to N. Wiseman, D. D.*, by William Palmer, M. A., of Worcester College, Oxford. The sophistry of Catholic theologians is often manifested in confining the attention to their system, as cautiously expressed in their most ingenious symbols, and hiding from their readers the system, as it is commonly taught and believed. It is therefore necessary to show that, in its most plausible form, their theology exerts a deleterious influence.

² Glaubenslehre, I. S. 24. 2. Aufl.

³ Adv. Haer. Lib. 3.

that the visible church comes from the invisible, and the latter is the ground of the former.¹ According to the Romish doctrine, there can be no Christian goodness save that which is derived from membership of an ecclesiastical body; and the first duty of men is, not to be what they ought to be, but to connect themselves with the church; and then, nor till then, will they receive a power of doing what their conscience assures them is binding at present. Here is a collision between the ecclesiastical ethics and those of the moral faculty; and the vigor of that faculty is impaired when its demand for inward goodness is postponed to the claims of a mystical institution. The Tridentine fathers assert that man is renewed by the baptismal water,² and hence, reversing the biblical arrangement of precepts, they enjoin on men to be baptized and repent. Our feeling of moral responsibility must be weakened when we are turned away from meditation on a spiritual duty, and directed to appear before a font, where we are to receive, as by a spell, the virtue that ought to be required of us as an immediate exercise of our free will. Conscience receives its most healthy stimulus from the mandate, "Work out your own salvation," and is made inert by the proposal, that we become the passive recipients of a change wrought by the manipulations of the priest. The pressure of immediate obligation to perform our duty, is also relieved by the Romish doctrine of the Lord's Supper. That doctrine does not require us to bring our feelings now into harmony with the divine, but to make use of a sacramental charm from which will ensue a mysterious new life. It calls on us not first to live, and then to eat of the sacred emblem; but first to receive the wafer, and then to be raised from the dead by its miraculous energy. No wise method is this, however, of securing the active virtue of a Christian. We must be summoned to walk in the right way, not merely in the way to that way; summoned to do the very thing which is itself an imitation of Jehovah, not merely to perform the means of doing that thing; summoned to reduce our own wills into a state of unison with a spiritual law,

¹ Moehler; see Nitsch's *Protestantische Beantwortung der Symbolik Dr. Moehler's*, S. 233.

² Per baptismum Christum induentes nova prorsus in illo efficiamur creatura, plenam et integram peccatorum omnium remissionem consequentes. Concil. Trid. Sess. 14. Recte et apposite definitur, baptismum esse sacramentum regenerationis per aquam in verbo; natura enim ex Adam filii irae nascimur, per baptismum vero in Christo filii misericordiae renascimur. Catech. Rom. 2, 2, 5. See also Catech. Rom. 2, 2, 44 and 2, 2, 50.

while God worketh within us to choose that which he demandeth of us ; summoned to a rational work, by rational motives, and in a rational way ; not to use an amulet by which evil may be spirited from our hearts, and virtue mystically diffused through them. The great complaint of the Reformers against the Catholic system was, that it does not represent religion as resulting from profound thought so much as from sensuous impression ; that it does not, like the Gospel, work from within outward, but from without inward ; that it represents a sacrament as communicating, rather than presupposing, a fitness to receive it ; as an *opus operatum* in itself, and dispensing with the *opus operantis* in the recipient.¹ It is true, the Council of Trent insist, that a partaker of the divine ordinances shall not interpose an obstacle to their efficient action ; the forbidden obstacle, however, is not sin as such, not sin in the general, but a particular species of it,—sin against the church,—and this is the sin unto death.² Even Bellarmine, who demands of such as receive the sacraments a certain

¹ Melancthon says, in his Apology, Art. 7, *Hic damnamus totum populum scholasticorum doctorum, qui docent, quod sacramenta non ponendi obicem conferant gratiam ex opere operato sine bono motu utentis. Haec simpliciter iudaica opinio est, sentire quod per caeremoniam iustificemur sine bono motu cordis, h. e. sine fide.*

² Si quis dixerit, sacramenta novae legis non continere gratiam, quam significant : aut gratiam ipsam non ponentibus obicem non conferre, — anathema sit. Si quis dixerit, non dari gratiam per huius modi sacramenta semper et omnibus, quantum est ex parte Dei, etiamsi rite ea suscipiant, sed aliquando et aliquibus, anathema sit. Si quis dixerit, per ipsa novae legis sacramenta ex opere operato non conferri gratiam, sed solam fidem divinae promissionis ad gratiam consequendam sufficere, anathema sit. Sess. VII. Can. 6, 7, 8. From these canons it is evident that no positive excellence, but only a negative state is required of the person receiving a sacrament. The phrase *opus operatum*, used in reference to a sacrament, denotes, according to Bellarmine, that the sacramental grace is conferred "ex vi ipsius actionis sacramentalis a Deo ad hoc institutae, non ex merito agentis vel suscipientis," and thus excludes the idea of requiring a positive Christian virtue from either the individual administering or the individual receiving a sacrament ; See Guerike's *Symbolik*, § 54. From the administrator it is simply required, that he have intentionem saltem faciendi, quod facit ecclesia ; Conc. Trid. Sess. 7. Can. 11 ; and from the recipient it is also barely required that he have the intention of receiving what the church imparts. In performing the rite of baptism it would appear absurd to demand of the recipient, that he exercise a Christian grace antecedently to his being made a Christian at the font ; this would be a demand for the effect before the cause, the fruits of regeneration before regeneration itself. See Nitzsch's *Prot. Beant. der Symbolik* Dr. Moehler's, S. 159, Wiseman's *Lectures on the principal Doctrines and Practices of the Catholic Church*, Vol. I. pp. 63, 64.

kind of faith and of sorrow for sin, does not yet venture to require that distinctive grace which constitutes the Christian life. He simply insists on a preparative for this grace. He teaches, if we may borrow one of his illustrations, that as the wood to be burned must first be dried, and thus fitted for combustion, so that the fire may of its own energy consume the wood; in like manner must the soul be chastised into a state of reciprocity for grace, before the sacrament can exert its transforming power.¹ This state of reciprocity is altogether distinct from one of holiness, being a freedom from that specific obduracy which is manifested in a disrespect for the ordinances of the church, and not being a freedom from that generic sinfulness which is the ruin of the soul. Nothing but evil ensues, however, from so lightening the burden of duty as to ask for a merely negative excellence, or a merely ecclesiastical virtue. The heart will be influenced by the standard with which it is required to conform, and when our Saviour bids us to be perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect, he holds up a criterion which tends to elevate the character; and if men do not really attain perfection, they may with heaven's aid reach a higher degree of improvement than if they had aimed at a lower mark. Is it not the experience of every day, that when an outward observance is deemed the preliminary to inward goodness, and a holy motive is not insisted on as a prerequisite for the service of God, then the feelings are debased by so ignoble a standard, and religion becomes a bodily exercise that profiteth little? If baptism be regeneration, then no evidence exists that any of the apostles, except one, were ever regenerated; and even that one felt thankful that he had never performed this renovating miracle at Corinth, except upon Crispus and Gaius and the household of Stephanas.² If it had been useful to regard the sacrament as an indispensable channel³ of grace, would

¹ Si ad ligna comburenda primum exsiccarentur ligna, deinde excuteretur ignis ex silice, tum applicaretur ignis ligno, et sic tandem fieret combustio; nemo diceret, causam immediatam combustionis esse siccitatem, aut excussionem ignis ex silice, aut applicationem ignis ad ligna, sed solum ignem, ut causam primariam, et solis calorem seu calefactionem, ut causam instrumentalem. Bellarm. de Sacramentis, Tom. III. p. 109, quoted in Moehler's Symbolik, S. 257. That the faith and penitence which Bellarmine requires are not true holiness, is further evident from his remark, that they "solum tollunt obstacula, quae impedirent, ne sacramenta suam efficaciam exercere possent, unde in pueris, ubi non requiritur dispositio, sine his rebus fit justificatio."—lb.

² 1 Cor. 1: 14, 16.

³ Quasi alveus, as the Tridentine Fathers express themselves.

the failure to administer it have been pronounced by an inspired man a fitting cause of gratitude or of submission? Would the Lord's Supper have been instituted by our Saviour in so informal a method, and left with so few rules for its observance, if he had looked upon it as a magical ceremony, or as claiming precedence of the silent graces of the heart?

The Romanists affirm that their view of the eucharist enlivens the believer, while ours is cold. There is a warmth in their doctrine, but an animal warmth. The mystery startles the natural sensibilities, more than it edifies the spirit. We, more than they, may be cheered by the Real Presence, not indeed of a material nature, but of an unseen friend who is ever with us at the breaking of the bread. We more than they may be animated by a transubstantiation, not indeed a gross and repulsive change of the fruit of the vine into literal blood; but the ennobling transference of the virtues of Jesus to our souls. It is a subjective transubstantiation, and therefore refines the spirit which is made sensuous by an objective one.

But nowhere is the mystical agency of Romanism so injurious as in its reference to the ministers of the gospel. It affects their personal qualifications. The Protestant regards them as teachers, and therefore requires them to possess and exhibit worth of character. The Romanist regards them as Priests rather than instructors, and assigns to them, as their principal duty, the offering of a vicarious sacrifice. The manœuvres which they perform at the altar demand but little of moral excellence; and what is not *demanded* of us, we seldom furnish as a gratuity. But more; the qualifications which they receive for their chief, that is, their sacramental duties, are not so much personal as official. Their whole doctrine of the priesthood abstracts the officer from the man. The grace bestowed upon the clergyman, is said by the schoolmen to be *gratis facta*, but not *gratum faciens*. It is by an electric influence from another's hands that he receives his sacerdotal virtues. Better were it for him, if they were to be obtained only by a prolonged discipline of his own heart. There is committed to him a jurisdiction over the body of Christ, but there is required of him a mere intention to fulfil the design of the church in communicating the mysterious elements. This intention is not a moral but simply an ecclesiastical one. If he do not purpose to give the real body and spirit of Jesus to the layman, then is the sacrament null.¹ Like the mesmeric performer, he may

¹ Conc. Trident. Sess. 7. Can. 11. Catech. Rom. 2. 1. 25.

refuse to will, and the mysterious change does not take place. If there were certain defects in the laying on of hands, then his ordination was not valid; he did not receive the imagined ecclesiastical virtue, nor did he ever become a true priest, even although he may have been inwardly consecrated by the chief Shepherd of our souls. We know that it is uncertain whether Archbishop Tillotson were ever baptized at all; whether he were ever ordained a deacon, and whether his ordination as a priest were canonical. He appears to have been an instrument of good in the church; but whether he *did* accomplish what he *seems* to have done, will depend in great measure, according to the Romanist, on the question of his receiving or not receiving the requisite grace through the sacramental avenues. If he did receive it, then all of his apparently good influence may have been really good. If he did not receive it, then of course he could never have imparted it, could never have regenerated man at the font, nor confirmed him at the altar, nor revived him by the eucharist. The same talents, the same learning, the same moral worth, the same weight of character, which appear to have been a blessing to the church, may have been, through a mere formal inadvertence, the means of deluding thousands of souls into a false and fatal security. But can it be of other than mischievous tendency, to represent the minister as indebted for his influence to the manual contact of a fellow creature, more than to his own virtues, received by communion with his bishop in the heavens? Is not his heart sluggish enough, even when the interests of a church depend upon his sanctity, and will it not become still more sensual, when he prizes his baptism with water above the baptism of the Holy Ghost and of fire? The spirit of ministerial unfaithfulness goeth not out save by prayer and fasting; and he who relies on the magic of an ordination for his official excellence, will be the less inclined to purify his soul by obeying the truth through the Spirit. If a sermon be in its nature fitted to exert a good influence, and if the preacher be in his character fitted to give emphasis to his sermon, may he or may he not anticipate success? The Romish doctrine is, that all depends upon his ecclesiastical relations; that distorted truth, from one canonically ordained, will have a better influence than well arranged truth from one whose anointing was not according to the rubric; and even a Protestant divine has recently sanctioned the idea that a substance which is little better than poison out of the true church, becomes nutritious within it; and falsehood, though deadly when uttered in unsanc-

tified places, becomes instructive when it falls from the lips of a preacher apostolically ordained.¹ Where then is the motive for high religious culture in one who may fulfil the duties of his calling by a sacramental incantation, rather than by wrestling with his own spirit? And when the ministry, which is the heart of the ecclesiastical body, becomes enfeebled through want of moral stimulus, what shall we expect in the extremities but languor and disease?

This is another evil ensuing from the mechanical view of church officers. Such a view injures their public influence. They come to be regarded as conduits of gold or iron, through which a virtue flows, but into which it does not penetrate, and laymen become the inert receivers of a good thus mysteriously and coldly conveyed to them. Hence they look up to their pastors with awe, but feel little sympathy with them as brethren in Christ. The fact that a priest is thought to have a magnetic power, and that the people are dependent upon his will for their salvation, gives him a degree of spiritual authority that can be safely entrusted to no son of Adam. He is induced to claim and to receive a homage that is appropriate only to Jehovah. Earthly rulers bear sway over the present, but he extends his dominion over the present and future. Monarchs can afflict the body, but he has a mysterious power to destroy both soul and body in hell. Therefore does an emperor become a vassal of the confessor. The throne of the Caesars courts the favor of the Vatican. By the Pope kings reign and princes decree justice, and almost the

¹ The excellent Mr. Melvill, in his discourse on Heb. 8: 2, speaks of "a succession of men who derive authority in an unbroken series from the first teachers of the faith," some of whom may be "deficient and untaught, so that (their) sermons exhibit a wrong system of doctrine;" some may administer the sacraments with "hands which seem impure enough to sully their sanctity;" and yet the ministrations of them all may be made useful by the Saviour, "superintending their appointments as the universal bishop, and evangelizing, so to speak, his vast diocese through their instrumentality." "We behold the true followers of Christ enabled to find food in pastures which seem barren, and water where the fountains are dry." "When everything seems against them, so that on a carnal calculation, you would suppose the services of the church stripped of all efficacy, then, by acting faith on the head of the ministry, they are instructed and nourished, though in the main the given lesson be falsehood, and the proffered sustenance little better than poison." Christ is represented as so taking "upon himself the office of preacher, as to constrain even the tongue of error to speak instruction to his people." These imitations of Romanism are intermingled with remarks both rational and important, and thus are made the more deleterious by the truths with which they are connected.

omnipotence of God is wielded by the vanity and selfishness of man.

Romanism exerts an unfavorable influence upon the heart by the monotony of its observances. In all lands and in all ages it seeks to preserve the same routine of forms, and thus exhibit an appearance of unity. Wherever her children wander on the earth, she aims to cheer them with the identical words, as well as gestures, that have been hallowed by their earliest associations. There is something of good in this arrangement, but more of evil. The heart of man craves a variety of appeal. It longs for a different spirit in the ceremonies observed in hours of gladness, from that which breathes through the forms for affliction. And if one man require a change for the varied circumstances of his life, much more must the wants of different men, and especially of different nations, still more of dissimilar ages, be diversified. But Romanism approaches a dying bed with the same pomp and over-awing authority with which it dedicates a cathedral. The Catholic who expires with the blessing of his priest marches forward to meet the eternal One amid the illumination of sacred candles, the glitter of a crucifix and costly vases, and with a company of those who serve at the altar, all of them arrayed in white garments like angels of light, and escorting the anointed sufferer from the church militant, to that which will prepare him for the church triumphant. The same spirit of exact discipline and of etiquette, diffuses itself through the nuptial rites and those for taking the black veil. If the expression of the ceremony for one of these occasions were appropriate, that very circumstance would render it inappropriate for the other.

It is only on a superficial view that the evil of this undeviating formality can be deemed unimportant. When the rites of a church cease to be congenial with the peculiar circumstances of men, they cease to be inlets of instruction. The fact that they are inflexible, makes them ostentations. The fact that they are ostentatious, withdraws the mind to them, and away from what they ought to signify. The fact that forms are made more attractive than meditation, converts the spirit of piety into a love of display; and when even the altar becomes a scene of parade, what must we look for in places of inferior sanctity. Some observances of the church ought to be private. It chills or shocks or degrades our sensibilities, to make known the most sacred of our feelings in methods exposed to the ribaldry of coarse men. But when these observances are stereotyped, they become pub-

lic. They destroy the delicacy of emotion that shrinks away from the world's gaze, and check the spontaneous development of a religion that is healthy no longer than it is left to its own impulses. The practice, for example, of auricular confession is in itself innocent. Men ought to confess their faults one to another; but at the prompting of their own hearts, and in a manner accommodated to their peculiar susceptibilities. When that which ought to be voluntary becomes an exacted form; when the layman, who is bound to confess his sins to those who are sinned against, is required to divulge them to a priest,¹ and doomed to a penal infliction unless he succumb to this demand; when the confessor is seated in an inquisitorial chair, and the story of the penitent is whispered through a grate, in a kneeling posture, and before a crowd of strangers who are tremblingly waiting to pass through the same ordeal, then that which was a duty becomes a ceremony; attracts to itself the confidence of its performers; is regarded as a substitute for inward penitence; is transformed from a gushing out of warm feeling that cannot be repressed, into a cold and forced obedience to a law; and hence the confessional, one of the appropriate sanctuaries of piety, has been a scene of which we blush to repeat what we have heard, but of which not the half will be made known, till all the dark things which have been *whispered to the ear* in closets shall be revealed upon the house-tops.²

The influence of Romanism appears unfavorable to the heart, in its tendency to separate religion from good morals. The essence of morality consists in such constitutional affections as are amiable, and such external deportment as is in harmony with them. The essence of religion consists in holy exercises of the will, in making all our emotions and external deeds subordinate to the universal good. Religion, therefore, is the life of morals. It can no more safely be separated from them, than the soul from the body. But Romanism undervalues morality as distinct from religion, and thus gives a false idea of religion itself. It represents our obligations to Heaven as synonymous with our duties to the church; and our duties to the church, as synonymous with certain outward observances; and those observances, as the

¹ The Romish "confession to the priests," is not regarded by them as a confession to their fellow men, so much as to God, who is represented by the priest.—Moehtler's *Symbolik*, S. 284.

² The early Reformers denominated the confessional, *Carnificina conscientiarum*.

proofs of that love which is the fulfilling of the law. It so commends the use of the rosary, as to make a small matter of the doing of justice. The kissing of a golden crucifix is one of its most honored ceremonies in worship; and it therefore seems a comparatively humble virtue, to speak the truth. A pilgrimage to Jerusalem is esteemed of more value than the performance of one's domestic duties, and a crusader is canonized when an honest man is forgotten. There are passages in the discourses of so good men as Massillon¹ and Bossuet, which tend to divorce morality from piety, exalting the latter on the ruins of the former. Not only from the writings of Sanchez, Escobar, Molina and Lipsius, but even from the records of the infallible councils, we should be led to predict, that many Romanists would call certain frauds pious, and would therefore practise them, would keep no faith with heretics, would trust in the goodness of the end for the sanctifying of the means; that priests would ostensibly perform miracles when the people were ignorant enough to be deluded, and would cease to perform them when the laity were able to detect such imposition; that cunning men who had succeeded in their displays of miraculous power, and had made certain sacrifices for the church, would be admitted to the calendar of saints in the ages of darkness, but that promotions to this sacred class would be less frequent in the days of increasing light. All such things we should predict as the legitimate results of Romanism; but its tendencies are better developed in history than in prophecy. What is suggested as probable by the very genius of the system, is found to be actual in the narratives of freebooters who have been careful to say the apostles' creed as soon as they have secured their prey; of assassins who have made atonement for their profitable crimes by enriching their priests; of cathedrals erected, monasteries endowed, and bishops' palaces adorned at the expense of innocent men who were plundered of their treasures for the glory of religion. The spirit of mediaeval piety was in too fearful a degree the spirit of robbery and burnt-offering; of falsehood and devotedness to the church; of Ave Maria on the lips and carnage in the act. It is in the records of monks and nuns who have left their duties in the world for the observance of fasts and vigils,

¹ See a discourse of Massillon on giving his benediction to the standards of the regiment of Catenat, and the comments made upon one of its paragraphs by Adam Smith in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Part III. chap. II, and by Frederic von Raumer, in his *Discourse on Frederic the Great*, delivered before the Berlin Academy of Sciences, p. 25.

that writers on conscience have found their most humiliating examples of the perversion of that faculty; of complacency in immoral conduct when associated with ecclesiastical observances; the immorality being the more stubborn because it was sanctioned as religious, and the religion being made the more powerful by its sympathy with the natural selfishness of the heart.

It is often claimed, that to some of our constitutional emotions, Romanism is peculiarly beneficial. It is said to have a favorable influence upon the principle of fear. It does indeed arouse this emotion, but not so as to make it harmonize with a proper self-respect, with manly courage, with firmness of resolve. It inspires an awe in view of the priest who openeth and no man shutteth, who shutteth and no man openeth; but this dread of man precludes that fear of the Lord which is the beginning of wisdom. All his life long is many a Romanist held in bondage by the thought of the enginery of punishments, that may be plied against him by the church. Thus is engendered a craven spirit, predisposing him for the endurance of ecclesiastical and political tyranny. Thus also is cherished a dread of suffering, more than of wrong; of God's punitive inflictions more than of his inward disapproval. The doctrine of purgatory too, is a heavy burden upon the mind of its believers. It presses them down with the dread of a retribution from which "the pitifulness of Christ's great mercy" may not deliver even the penitent. The dying man, although of a contrite and trustful heart, is not cheered with the hope of being this day with his Redeemer in Paradise; but a long and tedious process of purification awaits him after death, and too often must he profane his last hours with calculations on the price to be paid for his ransom from suffering. Pervading the literature of Rome there is more of an effort to intimidate men than to cheer them. The spirit of Thomas à Kempis even, and of Pascal, is not exactly that of adoption. They have an asceticism that is not found in the gospel, all the breathings of which are of peace and good will to such as receive it. Many of their imitators have less of that love which casteth out fear, than of that fear which suppresses love. They seem not to have solved the enigma of being sorrowful yet always rejoicing. Their sorrow is too much a thing by itself; and their cheerfulness too little attempered by the penitence for sins forgiven. Their practical theology is too mercantile, tinctured not enough with the scheme of grace, too much with that of penances and satisfactions. Instead of representing wisdom's ways as ways of pleasantness, it often exacts the most sacred

duties as punishments for sin. It commands the *Pater Noster* to be repeated five times in the day, not because the repetition is a cordial to the soul, but because it is a fitting penalty for past misdeeds. Romanism hires men to perform holy acts by a promise of indulgences; and thus implies that such acts are in their nature distasteful to the soul of him who submits to them through fear of something worse. It says too much of the mortifying of self, and too little of the fulness and freeness of divine grace; it says too much of ecclesiastical discipline, and too little of brotherhood with the Saviour; it has imbibed too many influences from heathenism, and has incorporated with itself too many of the Jewish peculiarities, to breathe into the spirit that peace which passeth all understanding. It is a hard religion to bear, and its subjects lie under it rather than live in it.¹ It holds forth a chilling doctrine concerning sins after baptism; and no man can heartily believe that doctrine, and at the same time be truly glad in the spirit. Not but that they are often happy; but it is one thing to rejoice, and another, to rejoice in the Lord. Not but that we are bound to cherish what the apostle calls a godly fear, but we must

¹ Protestants are said to contradict themselves in calling the Romish system, at one time, more austere than their own; at another time, less so: see Wiseman's Lectures, Vol. 2. pp. 27, 28. But the two charges are mutually consistent; for in some relations Romanism is too onerous and severe; in other relations, too easy. First, it multiplies austerities which are not needed, which do no good; and it may with justice be denominated cruel, simply because it inflicts upon its believers unnecessary hardships, imposes burdens which are not demanded by the conscience, which do not impart spiritual peace. Its numerous physical inflictions are, in themselves, difficult to be borne; and the more so, because they do not relieve the necessities of our moral nature. Protestantism, on the contrary, requires the performance of such duties only as are rational, and conducive to the tranquillity as well as the sensitiveness of the moral powers. It is an easy system, because it imposes upon us nothing more than is requisite for our spiritual good. Secondly, Romanism is difficult in its relations to our constitution. Its pains and penalties are disagreeable to man as man. The Protestant religion is difficult in its relations to our depraved nature. Its duties are burdensome upon man not as man, but as a sinner. On the other hand, Romanism is comparatively pleasant to man as a depraved being; for it substitutes external performances for the moral submission which he dreads: and the Protestant system, though hard to our vitiated nature, is easy to our constitutional powers; for it demands only such exercises as are congenial with the principles of the soul as God originally made them. Just so, "the way of the transgressor is hard," as it ultimately affects the human constitution, but easy, as it gratifies our depraved inclinations; and the yoke of Christ is difficult to be borne by a man, viewed as one whose "heart is fully set to do evil," but is not burdensome to a man viewed as one made for the purpose of wearing it, having a constitution fitted for it, as well as fitted by it.

avoid an excess of natural fear ; for perfect love casteth out all inordinate dread ; there is no ill proportioned fear in love ; and that fear which exists without love, is often one of the most debasing passions of our nature.

It is cheerfully conceded to the Romanists, that their system fosters, in some respects, a spirit of reverence. Too often, however, it inspires a veneration for some ancient relic more than for the genius of a man like Luther ; for the casula and holy oil more than for such piety as that of Huss or Wickliffe. An undue veneration for what is subordinate, leads to a comparative disrespect of what is of higher worth. The extravagant estimate which has been placed upon baptism, has in part occasioned the levity with which the usage of our mother tongue now treats the word Christening.¹ If it be the intimate association of contraries that produces the ludicrous, we cannot expect that even an ordinance truly noble will be regarded as such, when it is raised above its appropriate sphere, and described in phrases incompatible with its nature. Neither can we expect that the sublime mysteries of our religion will be revered as they should be, when they are brought down from the region of spirit into that of sense. We do not venerate that which costs us no effort to understand. Intellectual truths receive a deeper homage than ocular representations. But the whole tendency of Romanism is to lower the dignity of the gospel, by attempting to make its principles easy of entrance into the mind through the eye. It allows the spirit to be controlled by symbols, instead of using them as servants. The sight of a cross may fill the beholder with awe for a time, but will lose its permanent influence unless it be preceded by a devout contemplation of its meaning. Romanism, however, obtrudes this sign upon us before we have subdued our hearts to a feeling of its import, holds it out on the tower of the cathedral and at the corners of the streets, amid the tumults of business and in the moments of mirth. The cruciform church does not perpetuate a feeling of veneration for the image, part of which is daily trampled under foot. Neither does the ceremony of the Mass cause us to reverse the principle involved in the crucifixion, when that ceremony is known to be in part a theatrical exhibition of the scene that oc-

¹ A similar remark may be made in reference to the words *priest*, *purgatory*, etc. Centuries will not banish the real irreverence, which has been occasioned by the attempt to give these words a more awful import than the truth will justify. See this subject well illustrated in Whately's *Errors of Romanism*, pp. 21—80.

carred on Calvary. Some of the priestly vestments are designed to represent the garments worn by our Saviour in his last hours. The sacristy is sometimes made to resemble his tomb. In the darkness of that tomb we may discern an image made like unto the Son of Man, lying a corpse with the linen napkin about his head. Wax figures are employed in many churches to illustrate the occurrences at Gethsemane. The darkness that covered the earth from the sixth hour to the ninth, is rudely imitated in the *Tenebrae*; so is the quaking of the earth and the rending of the rocks. Nay, there has sometimes been a living imitation of the Saviour's punishment on the cross, of his burial, and rising again, and ascending toward the skies. We even see in many Catholic churches pictorial representations of God himself; one person in the Trinity is painted as an aged man, another as a youth, a third as a dove. But where is the limit to this infatuated symbolism? We cannot define the precise limit. We must have some symbols; we do employ them in the structure of language, in figures of speech, in the very exercise of the imagination. We may use any symbols which do not supersede the exercise of faith, nor interfere with the spirituality of our devotion, nor satisfy the mind with the show instead of the substance. There is a religious tact, which will determine their number and character, better than any rule can define them. And it is this Christian sense which decides that the symbols employed by Romanists are so multiplied, so complicated, so ostentatious, as to stifle man's reverence for the power of godliness, and in the end for the very form of it. The same effect is produced by some of the Romish phraseology. What profaneness were it to speak of a Jehovah College, or a God church-edifice; yet we hear of a Trinity College, and a Trinity house of worship, from those who believe the name Trinity to be synonymous with Deity.¹ We hear of a Society among the brethren of Jesus, that is called "the Society of the Holy Ghost." From this kind of familiarity with sacred things, we should anticipate what we find, the frequent display of an irreverent spirit at the Romish altars. Not at all wonderful is it, that even the Bishops of Trent exhibited sometimes a profane and sacrilegious temper even in their worship at the holy convocation.²

¹ In some places the street, contiguous to the Trinity church, is called Trinity street, the school-house in the neighborhood is distinguished by the same epithet, and this "incommunicable name" is even applied to the parsonage, the sexton, etc. etc.

² Sarpi's Hist. pp. 714, 727, 728.

Not at all wonderful is it, that the world has never witnessed such revolting forms of infidelity, as where the church has demanded so great reverence for her trinkets, that men at length lost their veneration for real worth. When we first think of the blasphemies of Voltaire, we are surprised at his depraved tastes; but we learn to regard him as no causeless phenomenon, by considering the tendency of the religion that was paraded before him, to provoke the scorn which a more modest ceremonial might have allayed. Men had learned in the sanctuary to combine dissimilar ideas, and it was in the extending of this combination that the wit of the French infidels in great measure consisted. It was a baleful wit; it was without excuse; but never would it have been so effective upon the people, if they had been trained by the church to revere principle and character, more than officers and their gewgaws. Never had the goddess of reason been so worshipped, if men had honored the true God more rationally; nor would "crush the wretch" have been so popular a watchword, if Jesus had been revered in the life as much as in the host,—if his instructions had been venerated, as much as the pictures of his infancy, or some feigned relic of his garments.

There is another emotion on which the influence of Romanism is said to be favorable, but on which it is really injurious. That emotion is the love of power. A multitude of offices, one excelling another in the splendor of its insignia, tends to inflame the desire of preëminence. A domineering temper is fostered by the very nature of the Romish priesthood. When the mother brings her only child before the man of God, and feels that from his hands must issue the mysterious essence without which it had been good for that infant had it never been born;¹ when in the darkness of the night the minister with his retinue moves from the temple, from the altar, from the tomb of Jesus, to the chamber of the dying, and bears with him the body of the Lord of hosts, whereof if the dying eat he shall hunger no more; when the weeping children hang around the neck of the only one whose prayers will be availing to save their deceased father from the severities of purgatorial discipline, then is the priest clothed with a majesty and an awe which frail man was never made to associate with his own person. Seldom, seldom is it in the nature of one who has this strong hold on the sympathies of the ignorant, to resign the crown which they are so eager to place upon one's head.

¹ See Conc. Trid. Sess. 7. Can. 5. Cat. Rom. 2, 21.

There is something too in the selection of the clergy of Rome which increases their eagerness for power. The great majority of them are from the lowest of the people. They are flattered by their elevation from such great obscurity to such singular honor. Almost at one bound they spring from a menial service to an intimacy with the papal See, and are prepared to be obsequious to the dignitaries by whom they have been made kings and priests unto God. Their numerous relations are elated with the idea, that here and there a vicegerent of heaven has been chosen from their own families. Thus are they rendered submissive to any exactions which may be made by the sacred college. Being required to live in celibacy, the priests are distracted by no household cares, they have an undivided heart, and that is given to the church. On the other hand, there is a limited number of those holding the keys of heaven, who are selected from noble families. It has always been the policy of Rome to adorn its priesthood with some of royal lineage,¹ and this band of the Lorraines and the Francis de Borgias receive as much obeisance from the plebeian clergy, as the latter receive from the mass of the people. Such a gradation of honors affords a like temptation and a like indulgence to the ambitious spirit of all, from the pope and the cardinals down to the acolyths and the ostiarii. It is this spirit that suggested the seven orders of the clergy, and the ordination of even the doorkeepers of the church. The very structure of language gives proof, that the tendencies of Romanism to foment the desire of power have been developed in fact. We have the word *bishopric*, but not the word *servantdom*. We hear much of *hierarchy*, never of *hierodoulia*. The Romish polity is thought by its friends to have been suggested by an intelligence superior to the human; and they can adduce no better argument for their belief than the exquisite fitness of this polity for holding dominion over the mind of man. Its very genius is to make the officer despotic, and the people submissive. Hence has one of its learned proselytes, Frederic Schlegel, been successful in his attempt to prove that Romanism is the natural ally of a monarchical government. It so flatters the love of power, that it will be probably sustained by kings, long after it has been abandoned by scholars and philanthropists.

Another principle to which the tendencies of Romanism are less favorable than has been claimed, is that of benevolence.

¹ See Paul Sarpi's History of the council of Trent, pp. 489, 490, 737.

The very effort to coërcé men into a unity, prevents their desired communion. The system which encourages a love of office, must occasion feuds; and where there is a contest for preëminence, there is but little kindliness of feeling, either in him who obtains, or him who loses the mastery. The visibleness of the Catholic religion narrows the sphere of its charities. Baptism is a sign that cannot be mistaken, and whoever has received this sign is thereby both designated and made an heir of bliss. Now it is dangerous for any man to feel assured, that such a rite has made him a favorite of Heaven. He needs something more than a baptismal regeneration, to save him from an uncharitable temper toward those who have not received this decisive token of their good estate. It is dangerous for any man who obtains his Christian spirit only from the wafer, to be confident of his elevation above such as live without this discriminating sign. If a man will not bow the knee at the lifting up of the host, he pours upon religion a contempt which is odious, and which is the more profane because the neglected service is so easy. And is there not danger of losing a brother's attachment for one who is thus evidently excluded from the precincts of mercy. No easy thing is it, to harbor in the embraces of earthly fellowship those who are daily incurring the anathemas of the church that we believe to be infallible. Difficult must it be to sympathize with those who are distinguished from us as by a mark upon the forehead, the mark of such as are given over to uncovenanted mercy. Our Maker never designed that the evidences of his approval should be paraded upon our persons, so much as exhibited in our life. He never intended that we should know his true friends by any superficial tests, but by their conduct. And as the conduct of a man is not always uniform, we are taught to be slow in deeming him a reprobate, and to have a charity that hopeth all things. It lies, however, in the very nature of a system that multiplies tangible criteria of discipleship, to nourish a pharisaical temper, and to confine all the benevolence of its disciples to their own clan. Such a system draws a dividing line between the church and the world, not according to developments of moral principle, but according to distinctions of form; and whenever we judge of men by their outward badges more than their general character, we imbibe an exclusive spirit which makes a sectarian of one who ought to be a Christian. By no means, then, is it a mere concomitant of Romanism, but rather its inherent tendency, to look upon all whom it shuts out from its communion, as worthy

of punishment, and to regard persecution here, as a means of saving them from greater woes hereafter. It has been in its very principle a persecuting religion, and has not only practised but *reasoned* on the ground, that if man cannot be converted save by its forms, and if the pincers and the rack can induce him to comply with these forms, then such instruments of cruelty must be used, and a benevolence seeing far into the future should suppress the impulses of kindness for the present. Wherever the ecclesiastical spirit prevails over the Christian spirit, persecution comes to be regarded as a duty, and conscience adds impetus to revenge.

It is the principle of faith, to which the Romanist claims that his theology administers peculiar strength; and he even adopts as a commendation, what Hume intended as a sarcasm, in the remark, 'our holy religion is founded on faith, not on reason.' Now faith, viewed as a moral principle, is a spirit of love to the truth wherever found, and has no sympathy with the disposition to inquire 'who is the man that speaks,' rather than, 'what is the word spoken.' The treasures of excellence that are spread out before us by Fenelon and Bossuet, we as Protestants rejoice in, if we have faith; for this principle causes goodness as such to be our delight. But when the amiable sentiments of a Zinzendorf or a Spangenberg are presented to the Romanist, are they welcomed by him? Is it not a sacrilege to receive instruction from one who is not connected with the apostles by the only chain which conveys the needed electric influence; from one who being unbaptized and unordained falls under the anathema of the church for venturing upon the sin of Korah, Dathan and Abiram? There is not another sect made so impervious by its very constitution to the influence of a candid statement, as that which calls itself no sect but the church, and a dissent from which is viewed as in its nature schismatic and heretical.—The principle of faith is also distinct from an unwarranted confidence in human merits. But the genius of Romanism is a trust in the supererogatory performances of the dead, and the genuflexions of the living. Its cardinal dogma, that we are able to do no more than God requires of us, tends to inspire a confidence in ourselves which is incompatible with true reliance on the grace of heaven.—The principle of faith is likewise a feeling of dependence on the one sacrifice upon Golgotha; but the faith of the Papist is too often a trust in the sacrifice that is offered in the daily mass. He beholds the body broken and the blood shed under a gorgeous canopy, amid clouds of incense and the melting strains of the harp

and the dulcimer. He *sees* a real sacrifice, miraculous in its origin and influence. He sees one whom he believes to be a God, offered as a victim by a man, and he confides in what he sees, rather than what he has read of as done in Judea of old. Why not? Vision is more impressive than memory; an oblation made before our eyes, than one looking dim through the vista of ages. The priest who offers the beautiful and wonderful sacrifice to-day, imposes on the eye and the fancy, while the ancient man of sorrows who was meek and lowly, hath no comeliness, that men should love him or hold him in remembrance. In fact, his crucifixion is not remembered, by multitudes, who suppose themselves to be redeemed by the missal oblation. This is the profaneness of Romanism. It thrusts itself between the throne of mercy and the suppliant. It practically makes an atonement of its own; and the High Priest of our profession, who was the only Mediator between God and man, is thus shorn of his distinction, and every performer of a mass becomes, by that ceremony, a Redeemer.

I might continue this train of remark, and show that Romanism encourages a haughty temper, by teaching among other things of like kind, our competence to perform works of supererogatory merit; that it fosters a spirit of indolence and procrastination, by teaching, with many things of the same character, that our present life is not our sole opportunity of preparing for heaven, and that after we are dead we shall be subjects of prayer. But I must close. I should not have detained you so long, did I not believe that our beloved land is threatened with serious evil from the inroads of the papal church. This church is the work of ages. Thousands of minds have contributed to the perfectness of its organization, and it is so modelled that, wherever it exists, it will have influence. It will, at least, infuse its peculiar spirit into other religious systems. Such is its ecclesiastical police, that it will be more efficient than Protestantism, in its control over those men who act in masses. Its tendencies are so congenial with our vitiated inclinations, that argument will often give way before it. It will attract the poor by its tinsel, and the rich by its outward magnificence; the ignorant by its dispensing with the need of erudition, and the learned by the scholastic air of its literature. It allures the historian by the extent of its records, and the poet by the romance of its nunneries; the painter and the sculptor, the architect and the antiquarian, it fascinates by its masterpieces of art. It overawes the timid, and enlists the ambitious in its ser-

vices. It captivates the proud by doing homage to their good works, and deceives the humble by its parade of self-mortifications. Some men will feel the power of its exclusiveness, and regard it as the safest church, if not the only true one. Others will be overcome by its dogmatism, and carried away by the mere positiveness of its claim. Some will be charmed with its ostensible oneness; many will be taken captive by the stratagems which it is so well contrived to employ; and many more will be consoled and flattered with its allowing them to be religious by proxy, with its making the priest a vicarious officer for the layman. Conservatives will admire it for its steadfastness, and radicals for its innovation upon our Puritan usages. Men of influence will often sustain it, because it gives facilities for managing the populace. Infidels will be glad of its conquests, because it makes war upon the spirituality of religion. Some of the bereaved will be drawn toward it, by its pretending to retain an influence over their departed relatives; some friends of the truth will love it, because in some things it has "kept the faith;" and all may be affected by it, because it becomes all things to all men.

As this church will have an influence, so this influence will be peculiarly injurious to a republic. Our government requires the diffusion of learning through the multitude. Romanism prefers the concentration of it among a few leading minds. Our government requires that every citizen be himself a man; forming his own judgments, acting agreeably to his independent moral principle. Romanism encourages the majority not to think for themselves, but to do what the reverend chapter may think out for them. A republic will best flourish when each of her citizens has a personal interest in her soil; but the papacy aims to monopolize for itself what is due to the State. Each of its ordained leaders is divorced from the world, and married to the church. "He hath no children," and nearly all his interests are garnered up with the Holy See.¹ He is, besides, amenable to a transatlantic government. This is said to be a spiritual government, but it is also a temporal one, and as such, is intimately allied with European despotisms. At the best, it is difficult to separate altogether our religious from our civil relations; and the court of Rome, which has been so long addicted to political manoeuvres,

¹ See the arguments for celibacy and kindred abuses in Father Paul Sarpi's *History of the Council of Trent*, pp. 469, 680.

will be slow to abandon a policy which its unerring Councils have sanctioned. Its conservativeness of ancient customs is an omen of its continuing to interfere with the affairs of State.¹ It has more than one imperious motive for mingling in our political contests, and making them subservient to itself. As it has the motives, so it has the means for attempting to modify the operation of our government. Many of its friends have avowed their purpose of using these means. Many, who have formed no such purpose, are blind instruments in its execution. For the truth is, it is not congenial with the nature of a Republic, that a compact multitude of its voters should put their moral sense into the keeping of a few individuals; especially, of individuals who are accustomed to use authority instead of argument; still more, of individuals who are absorbed in their church more than in the common weal; who are ecclesiastics rather than citizens, and Jesuits more than patriots; who hold their office by tenure from a foreign power; who are accountable for their conduct to transatlantic overseers, the professed enemies of our republican system; who are banded together in an organization having all the efficiency and all the evils of secret societies, and depending for its influence, if not for its maintenance, on such a state of public feeling as is congenial with political despotism, but averse to the very constitution of a self-governing people. The danger is, that these uneducated masses of laymen will be bought and sold by their leaders to political demagogues. The very existence of such a multitude who may be disposed of in the gross, is a temptation to a species of chicanery which a free government is not fitted to endure. Our institutions were not made for embracing an eccle-

¹ It is one of the most discouraging characteristics of the Church of Rome, that she regards her past history with so much reverence as to make it a model for her future conduct. This veneration for herself, as she existed in times gone by, creates a repugnance to all change, even where the change would promote her interests. Her former faults will be her future character, because she incorporates herself with her history. If her past developments had been more consonant with the spirit of the gospel, her tenacity of ancient customs would be a virtue; but now her reformation is made the more improbable by the fact that she has needed, for ten centuries, to be radically reformed. This necessity of a thorough improvement has become part of her unchangeable character, and the fact that she deems herself infallible, perpetuates the most grievous of her faults. Her misfortune is, that her past history has settled down like a permanent incubus upon her spirituality; that her character is established, and that she is determined to perpetuate whatever has been already sanctioned. Hence all attempts, like those of Luther, Ronge and others, to abrogate her time-honored abuses, must end in secession from her community.

siastical empire within their elective forms ; especially an empire whose history has been one of contest for sway.

I am no alarmist. I have strong confidence in the Protestant mind. It will at last prevail over Papal discipline. Our system is sustained by reason ; and in the sweep of years reason will prevail over tradition. Our system is favored by conscience ; and in the end conscience will triumph, though her victory be long delayed. Our system is founded on the Bible, and the word of the Lord endureth forever. We must imbibe, however, somewhat of the zeal of our aggressors. We must be munificent to our schools of learning. We must dedicate them, as this is dedicated, "to the truth,"¹ not to prejudice ; to Christ first, as the incarnation of benevolence, and then to the church, as the company of all the good ; not to the church first as an outward corporation, and to its spiritual Head as the second object of homage. We must be rational Christians, and thus oppose the spirit of Romish credulity ; liberal Christians, and thus rebuke the sectarianism which excludes from the covenant of grace all who follow not us. We must be evangelical Christians, and thus condemn the formality of those who boast of fasting twice in the week ; biblical Christians, and thus reform the faith of such as lose the Bible among the tomes of the fathers. We must be Christians, and thus reprove the partialities of Romanism. We must be patriots, and thus resist its tendencies to monarchical discipline. We must be men, and thus frown upon the spirit of bondage that has so long made the layman a slave of his confessor. If we have no pictures of the saints, our life must be a *fac-simile* of his who went about doing good. If we have no imposing cathedrals, we must make even our bodies the temples of the Holy Ghost. *So will he who is mighty do great things for us, and holy is his name.*

¹ Two of the ancient mottos of the University are, "Veritati," and "Christo et Ecclesiae."

ARTICLE IV.

LIFE OF JOHN CALVIN.

[Based chiefly on a Life of Calvin by P. Henry of Berlin.]

By E. D. C. Robbins, Librarian Theological Seminary, Andover, Mass. [Continued from p. 356, No. VI.]

The Institutes of the Christian Religion.

MANY suppose that Francis I. in the earlier part of his reign, favored the reformed doctrines from conviction. Beza says: "This king was not like his successors; he was possessed of acute discrimination, and not a little judgment in distinguishing between the true and the false; he was a patron of learned men and not personally opposed to us." The same author supposes, that he was on the point of acceding publicly to the reformed tenets in 1534.¹ But the historian Robertson is probably not far from right, when he says, that 'his apparent willingness to hear the truth was a mere political mask, not the result of conviction.'² Whatever the king's real feelings may have been, he for a time lost the reputation of a good Catholic. His league with the apostate Henry VIII., his attack upon the emperor Charles, who made great pretension to zeal for the defence of the Romish faith, just as he was preparing for an expedition against Tunis, and his reception of the envoy of Solymán, contributed to this suspicion of his sincerity.³ But he was not long in finding an occasion for retrieving his reputation. The Sorbonne in 1534 forbade the protestant preachers, Girard Roux, Coraud and Berthaud, to hold public assemblies; and when they afterwards turned their attention to private instruction, they were kept in close custody.⁴

The Christians were, however, too decided in their belief to be thus thwarted. They determined, if their mouths must be shut, to appeal to the people by other means. Accordingly, a man named Feret, son of the apothecary of the king, was sent to Neufchatel to obtain a short summary of the reformed tenets. He re-

¹ See Beza, *Cal. Vita*, et *Hist. Eccl.* p. 15. Henry I. 72, 73.² Robertson's *Charles V.* Book VI.³ Robertson's *Charles V.* B. VI. Works, Vol. IV. p. 305.⁴ They were finally set at liberty through the intercession of the Queen of Navarre, and Coraud soon after went to Switzerland.—Du Pin, *Hist. Eccl.* Tom. 12. p. 175.

turned with manifestos against the mass and the pope, afterwards called Placards, which were scattered in every direction, and even put up in the king's palace at Blois. The intemperate zeal thus manifested is sincerely to be regretted; for, although these documents contained truth, the spirit exhibited in them, was not approved even by Coraud and his companions, who were temperate in their zeal. In consequence of them the martyr-fires burned with a brighter glow. The police were the obedient subjects of the furious king. The bloody Morin was indefatigable in inventing and applying new and frightful tortures. The Lustration, as it was called, was made by the king at Paris, January 29th, 1535. The image of the holy Geneveva, the patron saint of Paris, was borne in procession, a thing which was done only on occasions of imminent peril. The king with his three sons marched with uncovered heads and lighted torches, at its foot, through the city. The nobles and the court followed. The king declared before the assembled multitude, that if one of his hands were infected with heresy he would cut it off with the other, and that even his own children, if found guilty of that crime, should not be spared.¹ During this procession six men were burned in the most torturing manner in the frequented parts of the city.² The people were so enraged at the sight, that the executioners could scarcely prevent their victims from being forcibly snatched from the flames. The constancy of these martyrs³ exceeded the rage of the persecutors, and showed the influence of the doctrines of the Bible, as preached by Calvin, and his associates.

Soon after this infamous proceeding, the king found that he had gone further than was politic, in his attempts to appease the Catholics. The indignation of the protestant princes of Germany, whose favor he greatly needed in order to accomplish his political purposes, was roused. An explanation of his conduct was therefore published in which he represented, that he had only punished some enthusiasts, called anabaptists, who had substituted their own inspiration for the word of God, and set at defiance all authority both *civil* and ecclesiastical. He also sent for Melancthon

¹ Robertson's Charles V. Book VI. Works, Vol. IV. p. 306.

² Beza says, Vita, p. 3, Quatuor urbis celebrioribus locis octonos Martyres vivos ustulari juberet, but Du Pin says: Six Lutheriens " " furent brulez. Tom. XIII. p. 176.

³ See a sketch of their lives, and their firmness amidst the tortures prepared for them, Henry, I. 75 sq.

at this time, to come to France for the purpose of aiding in composing church-difficulties.¹ This was a decisive moment for the reformation in France. All eyes were upon the king, and as he decided, the current of public opinion would flow. Already in consequence of the late persecutions many weak adherents to the truth, had gone away and walked no more with their persecuted companions. Calvin, therefore, decided to publish his *Institutes*. They had been previously commenced for the purpose of supplying his countrymen with a compendium for their instruction in the principles of true religion. He says in the Latin preface to his *Commentary on the Psalms*: "Whilst I was living in obscurity at Basil, after many pious men had been burned at the stake in France, and the report of this had awakened great indignation in Germany, wicked and false pamphlets were circulated, in which it was said, that only anabaptists, turbulent persons, who in their fanatical zeal would not only destroy religion but even political order, had been thus cruelly punished. When I perceived that this was a court-device, not only to cover over the crime of shedding innocent blood, and to cast reproach upon these holy martyrs who had been slain, but also to give permission for the future to murder without compassion, I concluded that my silence, if I did not make a vigorous resistance, would be treason. This was the occasion of the first edition of the *Institutes*. First, I wished to vindicate from unjust opprobrium the character of my brethren, whose death was of great value in the sight of God. Secondly, since the same death threatened many unfortunate victims, I desired that other nations, at least, might feel some compassion for them."²

It is a much disputed point whether the *Institutes* was first published in 1534, 1535 or 1536. The oldest copies now extant bear date in 1536; but these cannot belong to the first edition, for in them Calvin mentions himself three times, and he expressly says, in the preface to his *Commentary upon the Psalms*, that the first edition was anonymous. There also could not have been an edition previously to 1535, since events which transpired at the beginning of that year and in the latter part of 1534, were the immediate occasion of publishing the first edition. Beza seems,

¹ See an account of the expedient by which Cardinal Tournon prevailed upon Francis to countermand the order for Melancthon's visit, in Browning's *History of the Huguenots*, p. 7.

² See further, in *Cal. Opp. Omn.* Vol. III, or an English Translation in *Walter's Calvin*, p. 235 sq.

then, to be right in referring this edition to 1535. It will be recollected that this work had been partly prepared in Angoulême during Calvin's stay there, so that the time from the last of January until August would have been sufficient for the preparation and printing of it; and it can hardly be believed, that in such urgent circumstances the publication was delayed a year. This edition, in order more effectually to reach the French court, was issued in the French language,¹ and the Latin Version was made in the beginning of 1536, with special reference to Italy, where French was not generally understood. In accordance with this view, the French edition of 1566 has the Preface to the king in Calvin's ancient style, dated: Basle le premier d'Aout, 1535, whilst in the ancient Latin editions, the date is 1536; and the modern editions follow their respective prototypes. The entire absence of this first French edition from all collections of ancient works, may be accounted for from a decree of the Sorbonne, that it should be suppressed.² A passage in a letter to Calvin from Samaranthus, Professor in an academy at Poitu, April, 1537, seems to have reference to such a proceeding: "I am grieved, since you are torn from us, that the other Calvin speaking to us, I mean your Christian Institutes, has not reached us. I envy Germany for possessing what we cannot obtain." In a letter to Daniel, Oct. 13, 1536, Calvin himself says, that 'he is daily expecting the French edition of his little work, which he will send to him with letters;' this, says his biographer, shows that there had been a French edition of the Institutes, for Daniel had long before received the other works of Calvin.³

This edition, a small octavo, of about 500 pages, was but a germ of the work we now possess, and cannot be compared with it, either for completeness of doctrinal statement or elegance of style; for the body of the work was prepared hastily, so as to meet a peculiar exigency. Yet the changes made were not in fundamental doctrines. Calvin's belief at twenty-five, was his

¹ Nearly all of Calvin's works were published both in French and Latin. The *Psychopannychis*, and the *Treatise on the Lord's Supper* (1540) appeared first in French.—Henry, I. 166.

² See Henry, I. 102.

³ The title of the First Latin edition is as follows: *Christianae religionis institutio, totam ferè pietatis summam, et quicquid est in doctrina salutis cognita necessarium, complectens; omnibus pietatis studiosis lectu dignissimum opus, ac recens editum.*—*Prefatio ad Christianissimum REGEM FRANCIAE, qua hic ei liber pro confessione fidei offertur. Joanne Calvino Noviodunensi auctore, Basilicae, MDXXXVI.*

conviction on the day of his death. This has justly been called his first and his last work. Beza, who had the best means of knowing, says: "True to the doctrines which he first promulgated, he never changed anything; which can be said of few theologians within our memory."¹ Joseph Scaliger remarks: "He made no retractions, although he wrote much; this is wonderful. I leave to your decision, whether he was not a great man."²

The reception which this book met at first, and Calvin's feelings in reference to it, are expressed in the Preface to the last edition published during his life: "Since I did not expect that the first edition of this book would meet so favorable a reception, I prepared it somewhat carelessly, seeking especially to be brief. But finding in process of time, that it had been received with a degree of favor which I did not dare even to desire, much less to hope, I felt the more obliged to acquit myself better, and with greater completeness, on account of those who received my doctrine with so much affection; for it had been ungrateful in me, not to comply with their desire, according to my limited capacity. Hence I attempted to do what I could, not when the volume was first reprinted only; every successive edition has been enlarged and improved. And although I have no cause to repent the labor which I previously bestowed upon it, I confess that I never satisfied myself until I had digested it in the order which you here see, and which I hope you will approve. And in truth I affirm, for the purpose of securing your approbation, that in serving the church of God, I have not withheld the exertion of all my powers; for last winter, when a quartan ague threatened my life, the more the disease pressed upon me, the less I spared myself, until I completed this book, which surviving my death, might show how much I desired to recompense those who had already profited by it."

Although the edition here spoken of, (that of 1559), received the careful revision of its author, the changes were merely in form. The second Latin edition, published in 1539, when Calvin was about thirty years of age, is justly considered as the perfected fruit of his mature studies. The occasion which called forth the first edition had passed away, but the value of the work was not limited by changing circumstances. Calvin now recurred to his original plan of making it a Manual for those who desired a cor-

¹ Vita Cal. Opp. Omm. Tom. I. at the beginning.

² Scaligeriana secunda. The testimony of Bossuet, Hist. des Variations, is to the same amount. See Henry, I. 134, 135.

rect knowledge of the truths of the Bible. He says in the Preface to this second edition : ' That he has arranged and treated the subjects introduced into this volume, in such a manner as to prepare the reader for the study of the Bible, and to enable him to understand its doctrines in their relations and practical bearing.' ' Thus,' he says, ' he shall not be obliged to introduce into his explanations of Scripture long doctrinal discussions. The utility of the volume in this respect, will be more evident by a reference to his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, than he can make it by words.'

It is not in accordance with the plan of this narrative, to give an analysis of the Institutes. A few particulars concerning its external history is all we have room to add. It was, even in its first edition, the most extensive and systematic exposition and defence of the reformed tenets which had then appeared,¹ and was an invaluable auxiliary in the work of reform. If Luther's words were " half battles," Calvin's writings were a well furnished store-house both for offensive and defensive war. The testimony of men of all parties and of all ages since its publication, in favor of the talent exhibited in the work is decisive. Paulus Thurius, a learned man from Hungary, affirms that, " since the time of Christ, except the writings of the Apostles, no age has produced anything equal to this book."² " It contains," says Bretschneider, a leading rationalist of Germany, " a treasure of excellent thoughts, acute analyses, and apt remarks, and is written in an elegant, animated and flowing style. The only thing analogous to this in the Lutheran church, is the celebrated *Loci Communes* of Melancthon, which for symmetry, for solidity of argumentation, polemical strength, and systematic completeness cannot be compared with the work of Calvin."³ I scarcely need to add, that even the most bigoted Catholics, although they strenuously maintain that the doctrines contained in this work are false, and that great injury has resulted and must result from their diffusion, are compelled to acknowledge that the language in which the

¹ Hallam's *History of Literature*, Vol. I. p. 192, Harpers' edition.

² *Reformat. Almanach*. S. 107.

³ J. Focanus says of it : *Qui liber non solum abundat rebus optimis, sed et nitido, puro, gravi, magnifico et latinissimo stylo conscriptus est.* Daniel Colonus of Leyden, in a work upon the Institutes also says :

Aureus hic liber est, hanc tu studiosa juvenas,
Si cupis optatam studiorum attingere metam,
Noctes atque dies in succum verte legendo.

work is written is good and pure for the age in which Calvin lived, and that much acuteness of mind and discrimination in reference to theological subjects is exhibited in it.¹

If further testimony in favor of the work is desired, it may be found in the numerous editions of it in the original, and in translations, which have made it not only the common property of Europe, but known and valued in other quarters of the globe. It has been translated by E. Icard into modern French, by Julius Paschalis into Italian, by Cyprian of Valera into Spanish, and by Thomas Norton and J. Allen into English; several translations have been made into German, and it is also found in the Dutch, the Hungarian, the Greek, and even the Arabic languages.

But Calvin's work was not done when he had prepared this summary of, and apology for the reformed doctrines. The apparent relenting of Francis gave him hope of exerting an influence directly upon him, and the importance of the king's course at this time was too great, to allow any measures for interesting him in the truth to be left unemployed. Calvin accordingly dedicated his Institutes to him. This dedication was written with great care, and will always remain an ornament to the Christian church. "There have been in the world of Letters only three great Prefaces, that of Thuanus to his History, that of Casaubon to his Polybius, and that of Calvin to his Institutes."² "This last," as it has been said, "is a tribute worthy of a great king, a vestibule worthy a superb edifice, a composition worthy of more than a single perusal."

In this dedication Calvin exerted all the powers of his vigorous mind. He was pleading for the honor of his Maker, for the life of his friends, for those in whose breasts his admonitions and instructions had enkindled a love of the truth. It cannot be doubted too, that he in some degree foresaw the evils that would come upon France, unless the king could be influenced, and the tide of persecution stayed. No wonder that under such influences he wrote with power. But Francis was as unmoved as the emperor Charles V., when the Confession of Melancthon was read before him at Augsburg. He had encased himself in armor that could not be pierced by the most polished weapons. It has been supposed that he did not read the appeal, but that is scarcely possi-

¹ See Fleury's Hist. Eccl. Tom. XXVIII. p. 114.

² Quoted by Henry, I. 80, from S. Morus Panegyrique, p. 108. Inst. Ed. Icard. et *Mélange Critique* de feu M. Ancillon, Basle 1698. T. II. p. 65.

ble.¹ He was too much interested to know what was scattered among his subjects, if he did not heed the entreaties of his noble sister, to leave it unperused. But the die was cast. The desolating current had set upon the fair fields of France, and wave after wave swept over it, especially under the dominion of Francis's successor, Henry II., and of Catharine De Medici, and still later under the administration of Richelieu. 'The time of this gracious visitation passed by,' says Henry, 'and France, like Jerusalem, which our Saviour wept over, knew not the things that belonged to its peace.'

Calvin's Journey to Italy, and relation to the dutchess of Ferrara.

Calvin was not satisfied to confine his exertions to those who spoke the French language. His benevolence was not shut in by city-walls or limited by state-boundaries; wherever there were those who had erred, his desire was to bring them back to the fold of Christ. He loved his native France and wept over it, but when persecuted in one country, he fled to another; when cast out and reviled by the pharisee of the French capital, he remembered the gentile nations. Accordingly, after he had completed the Latin edition of his Institutes, probably at the end of March or beginning of April 1536, he decided to visit Italy. The journey was dangerous for him, and in order to avoid interruption he assumed the name of Monsieur Charles d'Espeville. This name he afterwards also sometimes adopted in his correspondence with his friends, so as not to expose them to danger.

Many circumstances contributed to awaken in him an interest for Italy. The power of the pope was resisted there, even after it was acknowledged by the western churches.² The way for the abandonment of superstition and bigotry and religious domination had been none the less really, if less palpably, prepared by Dante, Petrarch, Ariosto, Boccacio, and even by the illustrious princes of the houses of Este and Medici, than by Arnold of Brescia, Bernard, Savonarola and Picus of Mirandola. Before a taste for literature the power of superstition must disappear; but there is danger that indifference or skepticism will take its place, as they were already beginning to do in Italy. The appeal of Leo

¹ Brantôme rapporte qu'un jour où le Roi s'expliqua sur ce sujet, il lui échappa de dire : que cette nouveauté tendoit du tout au renversement de la monarchie divine et humaine, etc. Henry, l. 99.

² M'Crie's Reform. in Italy, p. 1.

X. for means to aid in the aggrandizement of the Holy See, had called forth a response from the German monasteries, which was as little expected as desired. The cry of Antichrist and Babylon, issuing from the German forests, echoing from hill to mountain, gaining new force from resistance, and redoubled as it poured down from the Alpine heights where Zuingli was posted, had reached even to the Vatican, and struck the death-knell upon many a heart resting there in fancied security. The German troops and Swiss auxiliaries of Charles of Bourbon, as they poured into Italy in 1526, scattered the principles of the reformation with one hand, while they dealt death blows with the other. The confinement of the pope, the vicar of God, within prison walls, the waving of the soldier's plume where mitred heads were wont to appear, the gleaming of the soldier's steel upon "The Transfiguration," could not, while it excited the horror of the people, fail to lessen the reverence which they had been taught to feel for everything connected with papal Rome. The thunders of the Vatican, at which Europe just now trembled, reverberating through hall and along corridor, no longer issued forth as aforetime. They died away with a murmur, and a voice was heard saying, "Watchman, what of the night? And the watchman answered: The morning cometh and also *the night*."

Ferrara was at this time an object of special interest. Under the dominion of the dukes of the house of Este, it had long been the rival of Florence, under the government of the Medici, in the patronage of learning and the arts. Ariosto lived at the court of Alfonso I., Tasso at that of Hercules II. At the time of Calvin's visit, Ferrara was not only a seat of learning and refinement, but also a refuge for the persecuted, who fled from other parts of Italy and from foreign countries. Its reigning duke, Hercules II., had married Benée or Renata, daughter of Louis XII. of France. This accomplished woman became acquainted with the reformed doctrines before she left her native land, at the court of the Queen of Navarre. For their introduction into Ferrara, she at first limited her exertions to entertaining, as men of letters, those who favored these doctrines. Afterwards she selected the instructors of her children, with reference to the dissemination of the new views. In addition to the men of liberal and independent minds who were connected with the University of Ferrara, and permanently attached to the Court, Calvin met there Madame de Soubise,¹ and

¹ Governess of the dutchess, who while in France was the means of introducing several men of letters there.—M'Crie's Reform. in Italy, p. 8.

her daughter Anna of Parthenai, distinguished for her elegant taste; also her son, Jean de Parthenai, afterwards leader of the protestant party in France, Count de Marennes, the future husband of Anna, and Clement Marot,¹ a poet of considerable eminence, who after "the placards" had been compelled to flee from France, and was at this time secretary of the dutchess.

The duke of Ferrara sometime during the year of Calvin's arrival there, 1536, entered into a league with the Pope and the Emperor, a secret article of which required him to remove all French residents from his court. The dutchess thus saw herself compelled to part with Madame de Soubise and her family. Marot retired to Venice. Calvin did not escape this persecution. The eyes of the inquisitors were soon upon him, and he sought safety in flight.² It is to be regretted that he was compelled to leave Ferrara, when he had been there not more than two or three months. Such a mind as his must have found much sympathy in the cultivated circle by whom the dutchess was surrounded. He seemed to need just such an influence to counteract the rigid severity, which the opposition that he was compelled to encounter, must almost necessarily superinduce in one of so strong powers of mind, and scrupulous conscientiousness.

Although Calvin's visit to Ferrara was so short, that he says, 'he only saw the frontiers of Italy to bid them farewell,' it was not unimportant in its influences. He subsequently maintained a correspondence with the children of Madame de Soubise, and without doubt aided them much, (especially Jean de Parthenai,) in the important work which they were called to perform in favor of the reform in France. But the person over whom his influence was most exerted, was the dutchess of Ferrara. She had previously to his visit a reputation for piety, but Calvin's influence greatly strengthened her faith and increased her zeal. After his visit she embraced the principles of the reform, in distinction from those of Luther which she had previously favored, and maintained them to the end of her life. Calvin never saw Renée after this time, but he frequently exchanged letters with her. One of the last letters which he wrote was directed to her. Beza³ says that "she esteemed him above all others⁴ while he lived, and when

¹ See Hallam's *Hist. of Literature*, Vol. I. p. 220, Harpers' ed.

² The Catholic historian Fleury says: Hercules, fearing for his standing with the pope, warned this heretic to flee to France immediately, if he wished to escape the Inquisition.—*Hist. Eccl. Tom. XXXVIII. p. 136.*

³ *Calvini Vita.*

⁴ *Semper unice dilexit.*

he died, gave the most conclusive proof of her regard for him." He always admonished her with perfect freedom, and she relied implicitly upon his counsel. Once, she was forced into concessions to the Catholics, which caused him sorrow. The Pope, perceiving her influence, left not a measure untried to cause her to retract. Her husband and her nephew Henry II. of France, were his willing instruments. She bore all her annoyances with magnanimity, except the reproaches and low intrigue of her husband. After her children were taken from her, and she herself detained as prisoner in the palace, she relented and made some retractions. Calvin says of this occurrence in a letter to Farel, dated 1554: "The sad intelligence has arrived, that the dutchess of Ferrara, overcome by threats and reproaches, has fallen. What shall I say, but that an example of constancy among those of the higher ranks is rare."¹ After the death of the duke, in 1559, she returned to France, took up her residence in the castle of Montargis, made an open profession of her sentiments, and protected the persecuted protestants. Her reply to the duke of Guise, the husband of her eldest daughter, Anne of Este, when he came with an armed force before her castle, and threatened to batter down the walls, if she did not give up the rebel protestants whom she harbored, was worthy of the daughter of Louis XII. and the disciple of Calvin: "Tell your master to consider well what he does, for I will place myself foremost in the breach, and see if he dare kill a king's daughter." A letter is still preserved, which she wrote to Calvin from Montargis, thanking him for all his good and faithful admonitions, which she always gladly received and listened to, and wishing him long life, and subscribing herself "*La bien Votre.*"²

I cannot perhaps better close these notices of Calvin's visit to Italy than by an extract, showing the influence of Renée in favor of the reformation in Italy, as her influence was so much modified by the instruction, admonition and encouragement received from time to time from the great reformer. That the labors of the early preachers at Ferrara "were successful, is evident from the number of persons who either imbibed the protestant doctrine or were confirmed in their attachment to it at Ferrara. The most eminent of the Italians who embraced the reformed faith, or who incurred the suspicions of the clergy by the liberality of

¹ Quid dicam nisi rarum in proceribus esse constantiae exemplum.

² MSS. Gothanaea. See also two letters from Calvin to the Dutchess, quoted from the MSS. of the Genevan Library, in Henry, i. 159, 160.

their opinions, had resided some time at the court of Ferrara or were indebted, in one way or another, to the patronage of René."¹

Calvin's Farewell to Noyon.

From the court of Ferrara Calvin hastened to his native city Noyon, to greet it for the last time, and take a final farewell. After disposing of his estate there, and arranging all his domestic concerns, he departed, accompanied by his only brother then living,² Antony and his sister Maria, a distinguished judge of Noyon and his family, and some other of the citizens.³ His design was to go directly to Strasburg and Basil, but as the direct way through Lotharinga and Flanders was obstructed by a war at that time in progress between Francis and the emperor, the travellers were compelled to take a circuitous route through Savoy, and the passes of the Alps to Geneva. His feelings on leaving his native country are best described by an extract from a letter to a friend, written while he was on his way out of France: "I am driven out of the land of my birth. Every step to its borders costs me tears. But since the truth may not dwell in France, neither can I. Her destiny is mine." The providence of God in conducting Calvin, when he could not remain in France or Italy, where he might exert an influence upon both countries as well as extend his exertions in other directions, certainly deserves notice.

His influence in scattering the seed by the wayside, in his journeyings, is shown by an account from the archives of the village Aosta. Either on his way to or from the court of Ferrara, probably when he was returning to France, he preached the new doctrines in this little village with great acceptance, until he was compelled by persecution to leave. There is now found at Aosta a pillar, eight feet in height, on which is this inscription: "Hanc Calvini fuga erexit anno 1541, religionis constantia reparavit anno 1741." This monument, it seems, was erected in 1541, but the circumstances which it commemorates undoubtedly took place in 1536; for Muratori says in his annals: "In this same year [in which he was at Aosta], this wolf, when he saw that he was detected here, fled to Geneva."⁴—After spending the months of

¹ M'Crie's *Reform. in Italy*, p. 94.

² *Vies de Calvin et Beza*, p. 18.

³ Drelincourt as quoted in Henry, i. 156.

⁴ Ma nel presente anno veggendo sì scoperto questo lupo se ne fuggì a Ginevra.

April, May and June in Italy, Calvin went in July to Noyon through Aosta, and arrived in Geneva in August of the same year.

Geneva; Calvin's arrival and first Labors there, Aug. 1536.

The year 1532 is considered as the era of the first introduction of the reformed tenets into Geneva. The clergy of this city had shown themselves corrupt in their lives and unfaithful in their political relations. Even before the death of Zuingli, in Oct. 1531, Farel wrote to him from Grauson that the Genevans would receive the gospel, if it were not for the opposition of the Catholic subjects of Savoy, by whom they were surrounded. Strengthened by the encouragement of Berne, they soon after became decisive for reform. Farel accompanied by Anthony Saunier visited Geneva in September, 1532, and instructed the people in private at his own lodgings. But he was compelled to flee from the violence of the clergy. In November of this year, Anthony Froment from Dauphiny was constrained by Farel to take up his residence in the city. But the success which attended his preaching roused the clergy again, and he also was expelled. A series of petty contentions ensued, in which the reformers were supported by the protestants of Berne, while the Catholics were urged on by the inhabitants of Friburg. Finally, through the interposition of the Bernese, a discussion was held between Guy Furbiti and Farel, which resulted in the triumph of the reformed cause. Farel first preached the new doctrines publicly, on Sunday March 1, 1534. He with Viret and Froment remained in Geneva and preached regularly at the church of the Franciscans de Rive and in that of St. Germain. The finishing step, however, in the establishment of the reformation in Geneva, was a discussion, favored by the council, but violently opposed by the clergy, between Bernard, a citizen of good family, Farel and Viret, and Peter Caroli then a Sorbonnist and J Chapuis, a Dominican of Geneva. Almost the whole city in consequence of this discussion went over to the reformed party, and by the close of February, 1536, the claims of the duke of Savoy had been resisted, and the civil and religious freedom of Geneva obtained. But the importance of this place as the centre of the great religious revolution for the South could not have been anticipated at that time.

Although the people who remained in Geneva had in general nominally professed to favor this reformation, so sudden a change in so corrupt a city was necessarily superficial, and it cost Fa-

rel and Calvin many severe struggles to maintain the ground which they had obtained. Its location on the shore of the beautiful Lake Leman, surrounded by fertile vineyards, high Alps, and glaciers, crowned by the majestic Mont Blanc would indicate a paradise where sin and wrong could not find entrance; but evil mars the fairest abodes of this earth, and even the classical associations¹ and delightful scenery did not furnish a sufficient inducement for Calvin to remain amidst so much confusion, any longer than it was necessary. He says: "I did not wish to spend more than a night there, where everything was yet in disorder, and the city divided into hostile factions. But I was discovered by a man [Du Tillet], who afterwards went back to popery; and Farel, inflamed with an incredible zeal for the spread of the gospel, exerted all his power to detain me." Calvin's answer to Farel's request was dictated by his youthful enthusiasm: "His wish was not to bind himself to any one church, but to serve all, wheresoever he might go: If he stayed in Geneva, he should have no time for his own improvement, and he was not one of those who could be always giving out and never taking in." Farel's reply to him was in terms befitting his character: "Now I declare to you, in the name of Almighty God, as you make your studies a pretext, that if you do not apply yourself with us to this work of God, His curse will rest upon you, since you seek not so much the glory of Christ as your own honor." Like the voice of God to Saul on his way to Damascus, these words of Farel sunk deep into the heart of Calvin. He never forgot them; twenty years afterwards he says: "Master William Farel finally retained me at Geneva, not so much by counsel and exhortation, as by a solemn adjuration, as if God from on high had stretched out his hand to arrest me. Through fear of this, I relinquished my purposed journey, but conscious of my diffidence and timidity I did not at first bind myself to any fixed charge."

Calvin was soon chosen preacher and teacher in theology, but would at first accept only the latter appointment. But in the following year, at the solicitation of the citizens, he accepted the

¹ Geneva was known as a border city of the Allobrogi in the time of the Caesars. On being burned, it was rebuilt in the reign of Aurelian, and called Aureliana. In the fourth century it was the residence of a Christian bishop. Its government was various. Sometimes it was the chief city of a flourishing empire, and again subject to France, or Germany. At the beginning of the sixteenth century it had been long claimed by the duke of Savoy, but the bishops and the counts had maintained a formidable opposition to him.

office of pastor, in addition to that of professor. Calvin was now twenty-seven years old and considered himself as bound for life¹ to Geneva. With what zeal and success he labored there during the greater part of the remainder of his life, is recorded in the annals of the church, and in heaven. So important were his labors for the city of his adoption, that the author of the *Spirit of Laws*, says, "Geneva should celebrate as festivals the day of Calvin's birth and the anniversary of his arrival there." At first he was dependent upon small contributions from the State for his support, but in February of the next year, the council decided that he should receive as a stipend six golden crowns.² His view of the importance of this position after he had labored long, is indicated by a letter to Bullinger in 1549: "Should I regard my own life or private interests I should instantly depart. But when I consider the importance of this little corner for the spread of the gospel, I am full of solicitude to retain it; even your prosperity and quiet depend upon it."

The enthusiasm of the Genevans at the first appearance of Calvin among them, must have been gratifying to him who had been driven from his own country and Italy for the sake of the gospel. After his first public service, crowds flocked to his dwelling, to express their satisfaction with his sermon, and constrained him to repeat it on the following day, for the benefit of those who had not been able to hear it. Even the Catholic historian, Fleury says, the reputation of Calvin daily attracted families from abroad to Geneva.³

The establishment of the reformed religion in Lausanne is an event so closely connected with Calvin's first labors in Geneva, that it deserves notice here. In September, 1536, a disputation was held there between Catholics and reformers, at which Calvin, Farel and others were present. Farel's eloquence, boldness and readiness were here especially conspicuous. Calvin said very little, but he spoke with power. One monk persuaded by him, deserted the Catholics and united himself with the reformers on the spot. Calvin wrote to his friend Daniel while in Lausanne, Oct. 13th, concerning the success of this dispute: "Already in many places the images and the altars are overthrown, and I hope that others will soon be purified. The Lord grant that idolatry be banished from every heart. Incredibly small is the number of the preachers in comparison with the churches which need them.

¹ MSS. Tigur. 13th Oct. 1536.

² Registres du 13th Febr. 1537.

³ Tom. 38 p. 136, 137.

—O that there were now among you some bold spirits who seeing the necessities of the church would come to her help."

At the beginning of Nov. 1536, Bucer, perceiving the noble spirit of Calvin, wrote to him from Strasburg. He takes the position of a learner and invites him to hold a consultation with him on some disputed points in theology. He desires a union of opinion among all the reformers, and requests Calvin to designate a place where they may meet, at Basil, at Berne or even at Geneva, if it must be, in order that they may conscientiously examine the truth, "in which," he says, "you indeed may be established in opinion, but we on account of our weakness need explanation."¹

Relation of Calvin to Farel, Viret and Beza.

From the time of Calvin's arrival in Geneva, he was united in heart and in labors with Farel and Viret. These two men had been sometime in French Switzerland before Calvin came there, and had been assiduous in their exertions for reformation. Geneva in particular owed much to them; but the incidental allusions which have already been made, are all that we can at present offer in reference to their earlier course. As companions and fellow-laborers with Calvin, they deserve a brief notice. In the beginning of his Commentary on Titus, the following memorial of their friendship is found: "Since my relation to you [Farel and Viret] so much resembles that of Paul to Titus, I have been led to choose to dedicate this my labor to you in preference to all others. It will afford our contemporaries at least, and, it may be, those who come after us, some indication of our holy friendship and union. I do not think that two friends have ever lived together in the common relations of life, in so close a friendship as we have enjoyed in our ministry. I have performed the duties of pastor with you both, yet so far were we from the feeling of envy, that it seemed as if you and myself had been one." This friendship was not limited by their residence together at Geneva. It continued while life remained. It is conspicuous throughout a frequent correspondence, especially with Farel, which closed with these fitting words from the death-bed of Calvin: "Farewell, best and dearest brother! since it is the Lord's will that you survive me, be mindful of our friendship; its fruits, since it has blest the church of God, are laid up for us in heaven. Do not mourn

¹ Calvin, Opp. Amst. Tom. 9, p. 2

for me,"¹ etc. The friendship between these men is the more remarkable, perhaps, from the singular dissimilarity of their characters. Calvin was naturally timid and gained confidence only by struggling against opposition, Farel knew not fear; Calvin, a scholar and thinker, lived much within himself, Farel delighted in action; Calvin was an elegant writer, Farel an eloquent speaker; Calvin feared Farel and dared not resist his adjurations, Farel respected Calvin and was ever ready to acknowledge his superiority; Farel would face the most violent opposition and confront the most imminent peril, whilst Calvin preferred to retire before the gathering storm of opposition, and seek out some more excellent way of meeting his antagonists; Farel loved best to use the club and battle-axe, whilst his leader chose to hurl the polished shaft or storm the citadel from his own well-fortified intrenchments.

Beza says: "Calvin enjoyed exceedingly this hearty friendship which was as odious to the bad as pleasing to the good; and truly it was a pleasant sight to see these three extraordinary men acting with such unanimity and endowed with so various gifts. Farel was distinguished by a greatness of soul, and no one could listen to the thunder of his words without terror, or hear his most fervent prayers without being exalted, as it were, to heaven. On the contrary Viret was so winning in speech that his hearers hung upon his lips whether they would or not. But Calvin filled the minds of his hearers with as many weighty sentiments as he spake words. Thus, I have often thought, that, the union of the gifts of these three men would constitute the most perfect preacher of the Gospel."²

With Beza although somewhat younger than Calvin, and his pupil, a friendship not less constant and warm, though of a different cast, existed. He was a man of great learning, taste, eloquence and piety, combined with much sensibility, poetic genius,

¹ Geneva, May 2nd, 1564. Opp., ed. Amsterdam, T. IX. p. 172.

² The following epigram of Beza although somewhat common deserves repetition here:

Gallica mirata est Calvinum Ecclesia nuper
 Quo nemo docuit doctius;
 Est quoque te nuper mirata, Farelle, tonantem,
 Quo nemo tonuit fortius;
 Et miratur adhuc fundentem mellea Viretum,
 Quo nemo fatur dulcius.
 Scilicet aut tribus his servabere testibus olim,
 Aut interibis, Gallia.

and a fine person and manners. He was of a softer temperament, and in some respects the Melancthon of Calvin, but one with him in sentiment and feeling. The pupil not only thought with and wrote for his teacher, but even neglected his own duties to be with and aid his friend. The power and enthusiasm with which he devoted himself to him whom he called 'Father' could have been the result of nothing less than the most ardent love.

X Who can contemplate the great Reformer in reference to his intercourse with these three men without interest? Even if we forget his youthful attachments, yea even all else in his character that is fitted to awaken our love, we cannot look upon him as that cold and unfeeling controversialist merely, which he has too often been represented to be. We may wonder that the happiness of such strong attachments should fall to the lot of one, who was so rigid in his opinions, so firm, sometimes even to obstinacy, and who occasionally suffered his indignation to pass the bounds of moderation. But this merely shows that some traits of his character, such as unbounded confidence in and affection for his friends were brought less distinctly to view in public than in private life. So true is it that "we know more of the heads of celebrated men than their hearts; they have sketched the former in their works; their heart is found in their secret actions." We most cordially respond to the sentiment of his biographer, that "the highest reverence must be awakened by the whole course of his life, which was little else than a sacrifice, without a thought for himself. Even his excesses were for the most part the result of extraordinary conscientiousness, and these faults were easily forgiven by those who knew him."

Struggles with the Anabaptists and Caroli—Expulsion from Geneva.

The favor which Calvin's labors in Geneva met in the beginning, was not destined to continue. He says of his life at this time: "Scarcely had four months passed [after his arrival in Geneva], when we were attacked on the one side by the Anabaptists, and on the other, by a vile apostate, who in consequence of the support of some of the leading men caused us much trouble. Besides, domestic seditions agitated us continually. I who am obliged to confess myself to be of a timid, soft, and shrinking nature, was compelled to sustain a conflict with these tumultuous waves as soon as I entered upon my office. And although I did

not suffer myself to be overborne by them, yet I was not sustained by sufficient magnanimity, to prevent me from rejoicing too much when I was expelled by a faction from my office." The result of the contention with the Anabaptists may be given in the words of Beza: "The devil desired to crush this church in its beginning, but God forsook it not. The Anabaptists were so effectually vanquished, through the power of the divine word, by Calvin and his associates, in a public discussion, before the council and the people, that from this time (March, 1537) they were no longer seen in the town."¹

The other attack of which Calvin speaks, was much more annoying. Peter Caroli, an arrogant, vain, restless, fickle man, and unworthy of notice but for the fact that he aroused the anger of Calvin, accused the Genevan preachers of Arianism. The accusation was seized with avidity by those persons who were watching for some ground of hostility to those whose restraints upon them were burdensome. The question was brought first before the Synod of Berne, and then before that of Lausanne. The whole trial is characteristic of the noble-minded Calvin. A principal ground of accusation was that the word *trinity* or person was not found in the Genevan confession. Caroli demanded that the Genevan preachers should subscribe the three most ancient creeds, the Apostolic, Athanasian and Nicene; but they rejected the proposition with disdain. They wished not, by their example to sanction the arbitrary assumption in the church, that every one who would not adopt the words of another at his pleasure, should be accused of heresy. The result was, that in a full synod at Lausanne, where there were present one hundred of the clergy from Berne, twenty from Neufchatel and three from Geneva, the Genevan Confession upon the Trinity and the Lord's Supper was pronounced "*sancta et catholica*." Caroli was deposed from his office as pastor, and banished by the council of Lausanne. Calvin's defence of his own faith and that of his comrades was pronounced admirable, and if he did show a little bitterness² in

¹ The council passed a sentence of banishment for life upon all who should teach the doctrines of the Anabaptists at Geneva.—Calvin and the Swiss Reform. p. 328.

² He accuses him in open council of "having no more religion than a dog or a sucking pig." He also says in a letter to Bullinger, that when he calls Caroli a church-robber, an adulterer and a murderer, he makes no accusation which he cannot sustain by valid proofs.—Henry, i. 182, 184. For a fuller account of this whole matter see Henry i. 178 sq.

his treatment of Caroli, we can scarcely reproach him for it, when we consider the worthlessness of Caroli, and the injury he was doing to the cause of truth.—Calvin afterwards came into conflict with Caroli at Strasburg and treated him with a lenity which we could hardly expect, endeavoring to reclaim him from his errors. But it was in vain. He again returned to the Romish church from which he had repeatedly separated himself, and died at Rome in an hospital of a loathsome disease.

One circumstance gives special interest to Calvin's conduct in the struggle with Caroli. He always appealed in confirmation of his orthodoxy, not directly to the Institutes which might have set the matter forever at rest, as far as he was concerned, but to the Catechism which had been published in French under the sanction of the associated clergy of Geneva; thus with himself acquitting both Farel and Viret. And immediately after the decision of the Synod, he published this Catechism in Latin so that all might be able to read the Apology for his belief.

These victories, however, were not sufficient to secure permanent quiet. The preachers were urgent in their demands for a reformation in the morals of the corrupt community about them; but many of the citizens who were ready to accede to the formulary of reformed tenets, rebelled under the severe restrictions now imposed upon them. The council, in order to aid the reformers, passed prohibitions of many of the pleasures of the inhabitants, which were thought to conduce to profligacy: A milliner, for example, was subject to an arrest of three days, because she had ornamented a bride more than was becoming. The mother and two female friends of the bride, who after assisting at her toilet, accompanied her to church, were compelled to submit to the same punishment. But notwithstanding the severity of the laws against immorality, a person who was guilty of lewdness, was chosen six times in succession to the office of Syndic, through the influence of the party of the Libertines and Independents.

In order to check the immorality and impiety which was so prevalent, Calvin and his associates induced the senate and the people in a public assembly, July 20, 1537, to abjure popery and subscribe to a formulary of doctrine, contained in the catechism which has been previously mentioned. But this did not reach the source of the evil, the heart. The disaffected party looked with suspicion upon the preachers who, they thought, were establishing a new kind of popery; and the preachers in turn denounced more loudly than ever the licentiousness of the people,

and the supineness of the magistrates in checking it. Coraud, who, it will be remembered, had been expelled from Paris for his faithfulness,¹ though feeble, old and blind, yet full of youthful zeal, was led to the pulpit where he inveighed against the indecision of the council in suppressing wickedness, and as a consequence was thrown into prison. His associates remonstrated in vain with these rulers for their treatment of him. Bitter animosities and strifes were cherished between many of the first families, and the city was divided into the most hostile factions. Excommunication against offenders had been often threatened, but could not be carried into effect, and the preachers came to the conclusion that they could not administer the communion in a city, which, although so corrupt, would submit to no church discipline. "We thought," says Calvin, "that our duty was not done, when we had merely preached the word. With much greater assiduity must we labor for those whose blood, if they perished by our neglect, would be required at our hand. And if at other times these cares gave us solicitude, as often as the seasons of communion occurred, we were filled with anguish; for although the faith of many seemed to us exceedingly doubtful, all without exception came to the table. And they rather ate and drank the wrath of God, than partook of the sacrament of life."

Their resolution was put into effect simultaneously in the different churches. On Easter day, in 1538, Calvin and Farel both preached without administering the communion. The whole city was in a ferment. They united with their other accusations against Calvin and his associates, their neglect to conform to the decree of the synod of Lausanne, which had required the Genevans to use unleavened bread in the sacrament, and in other respects to conform to the ceremonies of the church of Berne. The council forbade the use of their pulpits to their ministers. They however did not heed the prohibition. The two councils in turn, and finally the assembled people (April 23, 1538) passed an order for the expulsion of Calvin, Farel and Coraud from Geneva. They were ordered to leave the city in three days. When Calvin was informed of the decree of the assembly, he replied with dignity: "Had I been the servant of men, I were now ill-requested; but it is well that I have served Him who always bestows upon his servants what he promises them."²

¹ See page 489 and note.

² When the decree of the council was announced to Calvin and Farel, that they must leave the city in three days, in consequence of disobedience to the magistrates, their reply was, "Well, it is better to serve God than man."

Calvin's Exertions for France, and for Union.

Notwithstanding the manifold difficulties and labors in which Calvin was involved during his first stay at Geneva, he was not unmindful of the claims of the reformed church abroad upon him, and especially of his persecuted brethren in France. A letter to the preachers at Basil, from Geneva, November 13th, 1537, exhibits something of their persecutions and Calvin's vigorous exertions in their behalf: "We will explain to you in few words why we send this messenger. The enemy have recently visited their wrath upon our poor brethren at Nismes in a way that we had little expected.—Two of the faithful have been burned, of whose death the witness himself will give you an account, if he can make himself intelligible to you in Latin. Many are in fetters, and their life is in jeopardy, if the rage of the persecutors is not checked—drunk as they are with the blood of these two. Both of them exhibited noble constancy to their last breath, although their patience was tried by the most excruciating tortures. But is it certain that the others will show equal magnanimity? We must therefore bring help as speedily as possible in order that the weak yield not to fear. Farther we must see to it, that we count not the blood of the saints of little account, which is in so great honor with God." Afterward in the same letter it is said: "Christ not only commands us with a loud voice to help our brethren, but warns us that in forsaking them we forsake him."

In this same year, 1537, Calvin published two small works for the confirmation of those who were compelled to suffer martyrdom, and for the prevention of apostasy. One of them, dedicated to Nicholas Chemin, called "*De fugienda Idolatria*" was designed to counteract a prevalent error in France, "that a person might attend mass and yet adhere to the truth," the other was upon church-benefices and some of the other abuses of the papists.¹ A remark of Beza concerning Calvin, seems to be fully justified by these two little works: "Among other very excellent qualities which the Lord has bestowed very liberally upon this holy man, are two specially fitting him for controversy; a wonderful quickness of mind which enables him to apprehend at once the precise difficulty of a question, and to resolve it easily, and also a strict conscientiousness, which leads him always to avoid all

¹ For a particular account of these Treatises see Henry, I. 185 sq.

vain and sophistical subtleties with all ambitious ostentation, and to seek only the simple and pure truth."¹

Calvin was not unmindful of the progress of events in Germany. The sacramental controversy between the German reformers and the Swiss church, had been sometime in progress, and Calvin in a letter to Bucer, January 12th, 1538, expresses strong disapprobation of the conduct of both Bucer and Luther in this matter, and shows that he had never inclined to Luther's views of the physical presence of Christ in the bread and the wine of the sacrament. Yet he strongly desires unity, if it can be obtained in consistency with the maintaining of the truth, and the good of the cause of the reformation. "If Luther will embrace this [probably the Genevan Confession] as a brother, nothing will give greater joy. But regard must be had, not to this individual alone. We are cruel and barbarous if we have no regard for the thousands who will be outraged under the pretence of this unity. What to think of Luther I know not, although I have the greatest confidence in his piety.—Nothing will be sacred so long as this rage for controversy agitates us.—The past must all be forgotten." He goes on to speak with some severity of Luther's belief and conduct in reference to the points in dispute, and exhorts Bucer, if he will act the part of a mediator in the controversy, to use exertions to induce Luther to conduct himself with more moderation, and not merely to demand of the Helvetians to lay aside their obstinacy.² He also shows the injury that would result from the course they were pursuing: "How," he says, "the enemy are now triumphing and glorying, that we are inflicting wounds upon one another, in the presence of the most powerful and well armed antagonists."

Calvin in Exile from Geneva.

Calvin and Farel first went to Berne to justify their conduct to their friends there, and then to Lausanne, where a synod was then in session. For the sake of the peace of the church, they assented to the use of unleavened bread, and the baptismal font, and to the observance of the feast days required, under certain restrictions, but demanded the introduction of church discipline, and the right of excommunication by the church and their pastor, and some other regulations for the better order of their worship. The

¹ Henry, I. 191.

² "Si ab Helvetiis postulas ut pertinaciam deponunt, age vicissim upud Lutherum, ut tam imperiose se gerere desinat."

synod were satisfied with their conduct, and wrote to Geneva in behalf of the preachers. At the same time they requested, that messengers should be sent from Berne to second the request for their return. The exiled preachers went back to Berne, and thence, with the two messengers from Berne, set their faces again toward the scene of their persecutions. But they were met at a little distance from the city and not allowed to enter. The councils and the citizens were assembled, and after much abuse of the preachers, the decree for banishment was confirmed by an almost unanimous vote. Calvin and Farel returned to Berne, and from thence went to Basil. Calvin again took up his abode with his old friend Grynaeus. Bucer soon wrote to him from Strasburg, inviting him to accept an appointment there, but Calvin at first refused, since on account of his strong attachment to Farel, he was unwilling to separate himself from him. But Farel soon after accepted an invitation to Neufchatel, and Calvin sometime before the close of the year went to Strasburg.

There are several letters sent by Calvin from Berne and Basil of much interest. To Peter Viret he writes: "We finally arrived at Basil thoroughly drenched with rain, and almost dead from fatigue. Besides, we were not strangers to peril on the way; for one of us was near being swept away by a swollen stream. But we found the floods more compassionate than man. For men in opposition to right and duty have driven us into exile, but the torrent, since it rescued us, served as an instrument of the compassion of God."¹ He also wrote several times to Farel at Neufchatel, exhibiting his strong attachment to him, and especially his conscientious desire to act for the advancement of the cause of truth. In all these letters not a word of bitterness or ill feeling escapes him.²

Calvin, when he went to Basil, desired to remain there in retirement. He was wearied by a constant struggle with an unbelieving world. But his Master had need of him, and led him by a way that he would not. He says: "When I was released from the duties of my office [at Geneva], I at first determined to repose myself in quiet; but that most excellent minister of Christ, Martin Bucer, in a manner similar to Farel, constrained me by an execration to accept of a new office. Terrified by the example of Jonah, which he held up to me, I immediately took upon myself the duties of teacher. Although, as I was wont to do, I avoid-

¹ The last of May, 1538. MSS. Geneva. See further in Henry, I. 203 sq.

² See Henry, I. 205 sq.

ed public notice as much as possible, yet I was induced to attend the imperial Conventions, where, willing or not, I was compelled to appear publicly in the presence of multitudes."¹

In addition to Calvin's love of retirement, his feeling of the responsibility of the office of the preacher led him to shrink from it. In his Commentary on Ezekiel 3: 18 he says: "Nothing is dearer to God than the soul, which he created in his own image, whose father and redeemer he is. Since the soul's salvation is an object so dear to him, we perceive the care with which the prophet and preacher should perform the duties of their office. It is as if God committed souls to their trust, on the express condition that they should render an account for each one of them."

Notwithstanding Calvin's reluctance to go to Strasburg, he received a most cordial welcome from Bucer, Capito, Hedio and other distinguished friends, and found it a pleasant and profitable retreat from the tumults of Geneva. His labors and experience while there were an important preparation for his subsequent work. During his abode of between two and three years in that city, in addition to his regular duties as professor of theology, he published his first exegetical works, and a more complete edition of his Institutes, and what is of more value, says his biographer, he received a new and higher impulse in his religious feelings. He forgave his enemies, and with truly apostolic love exerted himself for the church which had spurned him from them. He established a reformed French church, into which he introduced his discipline, and made it a model for all the reformed churches in France. He also became better known to Melancthon and the other German reformers, and held several public discussions on important theological topics. In one of his letters he says, "I have lately been induced by Capito to give public lectures, and therefore lecture or preach every day." He also writes, April 20, 1539: "When the messenger called for my book I had twenty sheets to revise, to preach, to read to the congregation, to write four letters, to attend to some controversies, and to answer more than ten persons who interrupted me for advice." In 1539 Calvin obtained the right of citizenship in Strasburg; and he was in great repute among the citizens. Sturm says: "The French church here increased from day to day. Very many students and learned men came to Strasburg from France, on account of Calvin."

¹ Preface to the Psalms.

One letter, among many written soon after Calvin's arrival in Strasburg, containing an account of his feelings on the death of Coraud, who was banished with himself and Farel from Geneva, and was now as he supposed murdered, is not only interesting as an indication of his attachment to his friends, but also as showing his strong religious feeling. We give only an extract: "I am so much overpowered by the death of Coraud, that I can place no limits to my sorrow. My daily avocations have no power to withdraw my mind from continually revolving these thoughts. The miserable torments of the day are followed by more torturing sorrow at night. I am not only troubled with restlessness, to which I have become accustomed; but I am nearly dead through an entire want of sleep, which is more than my health will endure. My soul is most wounded by the aggravating circumstances of his death, if my suspicions, to which I am obliged, however unwillingly, to give some credit, are true.—It is no small indication of the anger of God, that, when we have so few good pastors, the church should be deprived of Coraud, one of the best. Can we do otherwise than bewail our loss? Yet we are not without consolation. It is a great solace, that all by their affectionate sorrow show their confidence in his ability and piety. Moreover the Lord will not suffer the wickedness of our enemies to remain concealed from men. They have gained nothing by his death. For he stands before the judgment seat of God, the witness and accuser of their crimes, and with a voice stronger than when it shook the earth, will proclaim their everlasting misery. But we, whom God still allows to live, will quietly follow in his footsteps until we shall have completed our course. And however great the difficulties may be which oppose us, we will not be prevented from attaining that rest into which he is already entered. If this hope were not held out to us, what reason should we have for despair? But since the truth of God remains firm and immovable, we will continue our watch until the end, when the kingdom of Christ, which is now hidden, shall appear."¹

In the spring of 1539 Calvin went to the imperial diet at Frankfort, where he first saw Melancthon. His object in going there was to plead the cause of those who had espoused the reformed tenets in France, and incidentally to use his influence to bring about an amicable adjustment of the difficulties between the German and Swiss churches. He writes to Farel from Strasburg after his return from Frankfort: "Bucer having informed me that

¹ Oct. 24, 1538.

he could accomplish nothing for our persecuted brethren, I was anxious to go there, in order that their safety might not be neglected, a thing not uncommon, amidst the multiplicity of business ; and also that I might confer with Philip upon religion and the church. Both causes will commend themselves to you as important. Capito and the other brethren also advised the measure. Besides the company for the journey was agreeable ; for Sturm and several other good friends made up the party."—In 1540 Calvin was also present at the diet assembled by the emperor at Hagenau and at Worms, to effect a union between the Catholics and Protestants. To the latter he was sent as representative of the city of Strasburg at the urgent request of Melanchthon. He was also present in 1541 at Ratisbon.

The letters written to Farel during his attendance at the diets of Germany, show Calvin's keen observation of the conduct and motives of the several actors, and his thorough comprehension of the state of things in that country. Political intrigue and desire for personal emolument, were as readily detected by him as religious bigotry and superstition. These journeyings of Calvin seem to have been beneficial in many ways, although they did not accomplish all that was desirable for the union of the conflicting parties of the reformers. Calvin felt that Melanchthon and Bucer although they had the interests of religion at heart, were too temporising when treating with their opponents. In a letter to Farel from Ratisbon he says : Philip and Bucer framed an ambiguous and deceptive confession concerning transubstantiation, endeavoring to satisfy their adversaries without yielding anything. This method does not please me," etc. The diet at Ratisbon closed, as is well known, without any agreement between the Catholics and Protestants, with the understanding that they would hold a further discussion at a future time. The differences which separated the French and Swiss churches were also not settled ; but the two parties learned more definitely the positions they each occupied, and looked for a time with more forbearance upon one another. Luther when his attention was directed to the severe manner in which Calvin had written of him and his party, is said, among other things in his favor, to have replied : " I hope Calvin will ere long think better of us, yet it is but right to bear much from such a genius." Calvin wrote to Farel on seeing the kind feeling expressed by Luther : " If we are not softened by such moderation we must be made of rock. For my part, I am broken down, and have accordingly written an apology which shall be

inserted in the Preface of my Commentary upon the Epistle to the Romans."

X In respect to the persecutions in France, Calvin accomplished all that he anticipated. An epistle was sent from the "Protestant Princes and States of the Empire assembled at Ratisbon, to Francis I. King of France," expostulating with him for his cruelty to their Christian brethren in his dominions, imploring his clemency, and promising, on condition of his complying with their request, to "testify their gratitude by all the kind offices in their power."

Calvin did not forget the church in Geneva amidst all his labors at Strasburg. Neither did he return evil for evil, but contrarywise blessing. As early as October 1st, 1538, he wrote them a letter full of good counsel, and exhorted them to have courage and rely upon God's goodness and mercy, and his assurances of pardon. He again wrote in June of the following year, and admonished them with affection for their treatment of their ministers, with whom they had again had a difference. He urges them to live in peace with them, and treat them with reverence as long as they preach the true gospel, even if they have their imperfections. It should be recollected to the honor of Calvin's forgiving, charitable spirit, that the timid and time-serving conduct of these ministers at the time of his banishment was not altogether satisfactory to him.

But an occasion soon offered itself for rendering the Genevans a more important service. The pillars of the reformation had been forcibly wrested from Geneva. Their pastors had been set at nought, and their places filled by those who were incompetent to the task of defending and sustaining the sinking cause. Those who watched over the interests of the papal church did not lose the opportunity for attempting to seduce the 'wandering dove to return into the secure ark of the true church.' Cardinal Sadolet, a man of learning and good moral character, bishop of the see of Carpentras in Dauphiny, on the borders of Savoy, was desired to make the effort. He addressed a letter to "his dearly beloved brethren the magistracy, council and citizens of Geneva," (Calvin retorts upon him his newly awakened interest in them,) which was written with so much art that if it had not been in a dead language, it would have done much mischief. As it was, it needed to be answered, and no one was found in Geneva qualified and inclined to do it. Calvin stepped forward, and gave such an answer that Sadolet lost all hope of accomplishing his object, and

the magistrates of Geneva not only did not show a disposition to return to the Romish church, but soon after came to the resolution to exclude from the city all who would not abjure the Roman catholic religion.¹

This reply of Calvin, although so perfectly annihilating to his antagonist was without the least bitterness, and indeed in a style so kind, that it inspired even in Sadolet respect for the banished minister. Several years after, when this prelate was travelling through Geneva *incognito*, a strong desire seized him of seeing the man who had written against him with so much success. He expected to find him in a palace, surrounded by servants and all the appliances of luxury. Judge then of his surprise, when a small house was pointed out to him as Calvin's, and the renowned man himself, clad in the most simple garb, answered his knock at the door. Then, if not before, he believed the declaration in the letter addressed to him by his antagonist: "I do not speak of myself, willingly, but since you do not suffer me to be silent, I will say that which is not inconsistent with modesty. If I had sought my own aggrandizement, I should not have withdrawn from your faction."

Calvin also wrote while at Strasburg his work on the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, "*De Coena*," and published it in French for the use of his congregation. Beza thinks that this ought to have terminated all controversy upon this subject, but those who had been contending so long and violently were not thus to be quieted.—He seems, too, to have been successful in reclaiming the Anabaptists of Strasburg. Among others, who were convinced of their error, Paul Vossius is mentioned, to whom Erasmus had dedicated his "*Enchiridion*" and who became a pastor in Strasburg, and also the husband of Idelette de Bures, whom Calvin afterwards married.

Calvin and Melancthon.

Calvin first saw Melancthon at Frankfort, in the year 1539. He had previously submitted to him several propositions on the Lord's supper, in order to determine whether there was a difference in their belief. But before Melancthon had answered his letter, Calvin met him at Frankfort, whither he had gone to the diet held there, and learned from him, that he approved of the

¹ Calvin and the Swiss Reformation, p. 334.

doctrines which had been submitted to him. "With Philip," he says, "I have conversed on various topics. I had previously written to him on the subject of a union—and sent him a few articles in which I had summed up the substance of the truth. He assented to them without opposition, but thought there were those there, who required something more full and explicit."

This acquaintance was continued at Worms ; where Melanchthon was so much fascinated by the learning and spirit of Calvin that he publicly gave him the name of "the Theologian," which from the lips of Melanchthon was not an unmeaning designation. After these interviews these two men ever valued each other, notwithstanding some slight differences of opinion. It is true their characters were very dissimilar. Calvin was more impetuous, firm and rigid than Melanchthon, but equally forgiving, warm-hearted, and even mild and gentle, when not restrained by consequences. The Genevan preacher fully understood and appreciated his German brother, and often took counsel with him. The Wittenberg professor also had the highest regard for the opinion of his more sturdy friend, and generally received his fraternal reprimands with meekness. Before the assembling of the diet at Ratisbon, Calvin writes to Farel from Strasburg: "The Senate has ordered me to join Bucer. Melanchthon obtained this order by particular application.—He so earnestly entreated to have me sent with Bucer, that I was quite put to the blush ; and when I expostulated with him, he answered me, that he had the best of reasons, and that my excuses would not prevent his urgently insisting, that I should be sent to that diet."—When Calvin with Sturm and Grynaeus, went to take leave of their friends, "Philip said : the others may go but I will not suffer Calvin to go at this time." Calvin often expressed his love for Melanchthon in his letters to him. In one written November, 1552, upon the Lord's supper, he says : "Would God that we could confer together. Your candor, ingenuousness and moderation are known to me, and of your piety the angels and the whole world are witnesses. It would be no small comfort to me, in the midst of trouble and sorrow, to see you again and embrace you before we die."

After a severe rebuke from Calvin for a want of decision and firmness, Melanchthon was offended, and a coldness and cessation of correspondence ensued, but Calvin wrote to him, that their friendship which was the result of similar religious feeling, must be unchanging and eternal, especially since the good of the church

was connected with their harmony. In the year 1554, Calvin used severe language in reference to Melancthon, but they afterwards were more closely united than before. Even before the end of this same year, Melancthon wrote, expressing his entire approval of Calvin's conduct in reference to Servetus. After Luther and Melancthon had both died, and left Calvin a solitary mark for the aim of the enemies of truth, when wearied with struggling against the adversaries of the church, and heart-sick, as Melancthon when alive had often been, at the religious contentions, the want of Christian love and forbearance which met him at every step, we find him from the depths of his soul apostrophizing his departed friend: "O Philip Melancthon! for to thee I direct my words; to thee who now livest with Christ, in the presence of God, and awaitest us, until we shall be gathered to thee in blissful quiet. Thou hast said an hundred times, when wearied with labors and oppressed with troubles, thou hast laid thy head affectionately upon my breast: 'O that I might die here.'¹ But I afterwards wished a thousand times, that we might live together: thus hadst thou been more fearless in conflict, and hadst more heartily despised and contemned all malice and false accusation; thus the wickedness of many who grew more audacious in insult by what they termed thy timidity, might have been restrained."²

Calvin as an Interpreter of the Bible.

During the year 1539, while at Strasburg, Calvin published his Commentary upon the Epistle to the Romans. A brief summary of his Exegetical works, and some of his characteristics as a commentator may not be inapposite here, for few men's lives are made up more of their works than Calvin's. In incidents his life is poor, and is not to be compared with that of Luther.

It is not strange that Calvin selected the Epistle to the Romans as the first Epistle³ for public lectures, and afterwards for publi-

¹ Utinam, utinam moriar in hoc sinu.

² De v. partic. Chr. in coena contra Heshusium. Opp. 724. The few extracts above given are but a specimen of the expressions of the regard of Calvin and Melancthon for each other. Those who would see more, can consult the original letters in the last vol. of Calvin's Works, (Ed. Amat.), the Dedication of Calvin's Com. on Daniel to Melancthon, and other writings of both these men. Many more passages are also quoted in Henry, I. 245 sq.

³ Calvin had previously lectured on John's Gospel at Strasburg.

cation with notes. It exhibits the fundamental doctrines of Protestantism, and is directly opposed to the Pelagian tendencies of the Catholic Church. It exalts God and abases man. It clearly shows that man is not justified by works, but by the grace of God through Jesus Christ, who is the justification and the life. This was a cardinal doctrine in Calvin's scheme. But he did not stop with the explanation of this Epistle. His was no narrow, contracted mind which always dwelt upon one idea. With him 'All Scripture given by inspiration of God is *profitable*.' With the exception of the books of the Judges, Ruth, Samuel, the Kings, Esther, Nehemiah, Ezra, Proverbs, Koheleth, the Song of Solomon and the Revelation of John, he commented on the entire Scriptures. His commentary upon Joshua was his last work. He first seized upon those parts of the Bible which contain the germs of Christianity, and when these had been rescued from the oblivion into which they had fallen, he turned his attention to the less practical though not less important portions of the sacred Canon.

Numerous editions of his Commentaries and parts of them have been published, both in the Latin and French languages. The best entire edition of them, is that of Amsterdam, 1617, in nine volumes. The style and value of the explanation of different books is various. Upon some he furnished a complete commentary, upon some he published lectures, and some, as the first book of Samuel and Job, he explained in Homilies. His Commentaries upon the Pentateuch, the Psalms and Daniel are superior to those upon the other books of the Old Testament. His own course of life, his vivid feeling of the greatness and omnipresence of God, his continual warfare with the enemies of good and truth, his holy indignation against wrong doers, gave him a peculiar sympathy with the Psalmist. His strong religious feeling also breathes through every part of these works.

The peculiarities of the author are more seen in his remarks upon Paul's Epistles than on any other parts of the New Testament. There is a living energy in him, which is not found in the best commentaries of modern times. He seemed to descend to the depths of the thoughts and feelings of the great apostle, as few if any besides have done.¹ The same characteristics are however apparent in other parts of the New Testament, especially in the Acts of the Apostles. Indeed the whole New Testament history is

¹ Tholuck, *Literarischer Anzeiger*, 1831, No. 41.

with him animated. He lives in the individual acting or speaking, whether bad or good, and explains his language out of his circumstances, and out of his own soul.

Calvin's commentaries, especially when the age in which he lived is taken into the account, are remarkable for elegance and conciseness of style. This is particularly true of his Prefaces. The beauty of his style consists less perhaps in the choice of words, for he has none of the affected purism of a Bembo or a Castalio, than in the whole air of the composition. There is however no appearance of a slavish imitation of Ciceronian diction; his language seems to come warm from the heart; and from his scholarlike habits, flows naturally and easily into plain and concise, if not graceful periods.

A good degree of impartiality and independence is exhibited in Calvin's exegetical writings. He does not, so much as Luther and Melancthon, and others of the early expositors, make the text of the Bible a mere means of sustaining his peculiar doctrines. He gives a connected exposition, and does not merely explain those parts which favor his scheme and leave other places, equally or even more difficult, unexplained. He is independent and yet not reckless. Whilst the authority of the church alone is not deemed sufficient to establish the authenticity of any book or passage, all historical testimony is not discarded. The inquiry with him is not always whether the explanation he gives will aid in the establishment of Christian doctrine. He labors to give the most natural and probable meaning, not fearing that the truth will not be sustained, although one and another proof-passage is given up. He also felt strongly the inutility of sustaining a good cause by false proofs. This disposition is especially evident in the Psalms, where, although as firm a believer in the sacred Trinity as his predecessors, he often finds only David where they found Christ, and thus diminishes the number of proof-passages for that doctrine in the Old Testament.¹

Calvin shows less critical learning in his commentaries than some of the other biblical interpreters of his age, as Erasmus and Beza. He is often uncritical in his philological remarks, but it seems to be from his desire to be practical rather than from inability. His object was to form a compendium not for scholars alone, but for all students of the Bible. Accordingly he passes over minor variations in words and expression, and seizes upon

¹ See other proofs of this same characteristic in his Comment. on Isa. 4: 2. 6: 3, and also in his remarks on the *Iva πληρωθῆ* of the New Testament.

the leading ideas, and in consequence of a peculiarly happy exegetical tact, he seldom makes forced explanations. Still he was far from undervaluing learning of any kind. Upon Corinthians 8: 1 he says: "Science is no more to be blamed because it puffs up, than a sword is, when it falls into the hands of a madman. This is said in reference to certain fanatics who violently exclaim against all arts and learning, as if they were calculated only to inflate the mind, and were not the most useful instruments both of piety and of common life." On Titus 1: 12, where Paul quotes the poet Epimenides, we find this remark: "We gather from this passage that those persons are superstitious who never venture to quote anything from profane authors. Since all truth is from God, if anything has been said aptly and truly even by wicked men it ought not to be rejected, because it proceeded from God," etc. Calvin also often makes acute philological explanations of both Hebrew and Greek words, and very often quotes from the Roman and Greek classics.¹

'Let then,' says Tholuck, near the close of the Article on Calvin as an Interpreter of the Bible, 'this great teacher of a true and profound knowledge of the Scriptures go forth anew into an age to which he had become in a great measure a stranger. We know he will find numerous friends. His view of Predestination, which appears in all its sternness whenever opportunity offers, is the only thing that makes us solicitous about this new circulation of his Commentaries. But we believe that even this part of them will do more good than hurt.' — "There is always something more noble and majestic in the power inherent in the iron view of Calvinism than in the weakness of a carnal Pelagianism."²

In connection with Calvin's exegetical labors, the French Translation of the Bible published by him in 1540 deserves a passing notice. It was a revision of the version of his friend Robert Olivetan. His biographer regrets that he did not undertake the translation of the Bible anew. He might then have acquired an influence over the whole structure of the French language; and instead of the Academy and the Parisian stage, Calvin would have been the standard, as Luther has been in Germany. But other labors, which he

¹ See *Liter. Anzeig.* Aug. 1831. S. 335, 336; also *Bibl. Repos.* Vol. II. p. 558, 559.

² See a more extended discussion of the characteristics of Calvin as an Interpreter, by Tholuck, *Liter. Anzeiger*, 1831. Nos. 41, 42, 43; S. 323-344; and also a Translation of the same, *Bib. Repos.* Vol. II. p. 541 sq.

deemed of more immediate importance, left him no leisure to do more than revise the Translation which had been already made.

Calvin's Marriage and Domestic Character.

Although Calvin's marriage took place some time before he left Strasburg, I have omitted to mention it until now, in order to cluster with it several particulars which, it seems to me, present one of the phases of the character of this truly great man, which has not been sufficiently noticed. The first mention made in his letters of the subject of his marriage is in an epistle to Farel, May 29, 1539. "Concerning marriage I now speak more openly.—You know very well what qualities I always required in a wife; for I belong not to that passionate race of lovers, who, when they are captivated by beauty of external appearance, embrace with it all the faults it may conceal. Would you know what beauty alone can captivate me? It is that of modesty, gentleness, economy and patience, combined with solicitude for my health and comfort."¹

In a letter to Farel, Feb. 6, 1540, after speaking of several items of a political nature, he says: "Amidst all these commotions I enjoy so much quiet, that I venture to think of marriage. A young lady of rank has been proposed to me, who is superior to me in station, and is rich. Two considerations withhold me from this alliance; first, she does not understand our language, and then I fear she will make too much account of her rank and breeding. Her brother, a truly religious man, insists on the union; and indeed only because he is so blinded by his love for me, that he neglects his own interests. His wife rivals him in her exertions; so that I should have been almost constrained to make the alliance, if the Lord had not set me free. For when I answered that I could not do anything about the matter, unless the young lady would engage to learn our language, she asked time for consideration. Soon after, I sent my brother in company with a certain good man to make proposals for another, who if she equals her reputation, will bring an ample dowry without money; for she is much praised by those who know her. If she consent, which we confidently hope, the nuptials will not take place later than the tenth of March. I wish you could be present to add your blessing, but I have troubled you so much during

¹ *Haec sola est, quae me illectat pulchritudo, si pudica est, si morigera, si non fastuosa, si parca, si patiens, si spes est de mea valetudine fore sollicitam.*

the past year, that I do not venture to ask it. If however any one of the brethren intends to visit us, I hope he will lay his plans so as to take your place. But I am only making myself ridiculous, if I should happen to be disappointed in my expectations. Yet trusting that the Lord will be with me, I speak of it as a certain event."¹

Two or three weeks later he writes again to Farel: "Oh that I were permitted to pour my feelings confidently into your bosom, and listen again to your counsel, so that we might be the better prepared!—You have the best occasion for coming here, if our hopes concerning the marriage shall be realized, for we expect the young lady immediately after Easter. But if you give us the assurance that you will be present, the marriage shall be postponed until your arrival, for we have yet time enough to inform you of the day. First, then, I ask of you, as the greatest favor, that you will come, and secondly that you write that you will come. For it is necessary in any case that some one of you be here to add your blessing to the marriage; but I prefer you to any one else. Consider therefore whether I seem to you worthy of the trouble of this journey."² Another letter to the same individual, shows that the day was appointed, and Farel informed of it, but no bride appeared: "I fear," he says, "if you wait for my nuptials, it will be long before you come. The bride is not yet found, and I doubt whether I shall seek further."

Calvin finally married sometime during this year (1540), Idelette de Bures, the widow of a man in Strasburg, whom he had rescued from the errors of the Anabaptists, a woman worthy to walk by the reformer's side amidst the storms of life. Beza speaks of her as a person possessed of much natural dignity and nobleness, and also as highly cultivated.³ Calvin, according to the custom of the time, wished the wedding to be as joyous and festive as was consistent with moderation. He accordingly invited the consistories of Neufchatel and Valenciennes to be present at the festival, and they complied by sending representatives.

There are not many documents existing; showing specifically the domestic relations and enjoyments of Calvin during the nine years of his married life, yet expressions are found scattered here and there through his letters, which show conclusively that the union was a most happy one, and that the man who has been represented as 'devoid of all the sympathies which sweeten life,'

¹ Genevan Manuscripts.

² MSS. Gen. Feb. 26, 1540.

³ He calls her "*gravis, honestaque foemina*," and also "*lectissima*."

was a most delicate, tender and affectionate husband. Many of the passages which best show this, cannot be quoted, as they owe their charm to the incidental connection in which they are found. In a letter written soon after his nuptials, giving the details of a distressing illness, he says: "In order that my marriage may not bring too much joy with it, the Lord has checked our happiness, and so restrained it that it shall not exceed measure."¹ One little expression of Calvin, who was sparing in his praises, and never spoke without meaning, is a good testimony to his appreciation of his wife: She was a woman of rare excellence, "*singularis exempli foemina*."

Idelette de Bures had several children by her first marriage, but by the second one son only, who died soon after birth. Many of the catholics who falsely deny that Calvin had any children, represent it as a judgment from God, "lest the life of so infamous a man should be propagated."² Calvin's reply to the reproaches of Balduin is as simple and touching as it is dignified. "Balduin," he says, "reproaches me as childless. God gave me a little son,—he took him away."³ Soon after the death of this son, Calvin writes to Viret: "Salute all the brethren, your aunt also and your wife, to whom my wife gives many thanks for her kind and Christian condolence. She is unable to write except by means of an amanuensis, and dictating would be burdensome to her. The Lord has indeed inflicted a deep and painful wound upon us by the death of our little son. But he is a father, and knows what is best for his children. Again farewell. The Lord be with you. I wish that you could be with us, I would gladly spend half of the day in talking with you."

Calvin's letters during his wife's protracted sickness, often contain allusions which bear not less positive witness to the tenderness, faithfulness and solicitude of the husband at the side of the meek sufferer's couch, than do his other writings to his fidelity and constancy, as an admonisher of the disobedient and erring. But we have only room for extracts from some letters bearing date after her death.

To Viret, April 7th, 1549, he writes: "Although the death of my wife has been a sore affliction to me, yet I strive as much as possible to overcome my sorrow, and my friends endeavor to excel each other in their exertions to console me. It is true, both their and my efforts have failed to accomplish all that is desirable ;

¹ MSS. Gen. Oct. 12, 1840.

² Brietius, Jesuita, Tom. VII. p. 192.

³ Dederat mihi Deus filiolum, abstulit.

but however small it may be, it is nevertheless a consolation greater than I can express. Knowing as you do the sensibility or rather weakness of my heart, I need not say, that it required the most vigorous exertion of mind in alleviating my anguish, to prevent me from sinking. And truly the cause of my sorrow is not small. I am deprived of the best partner of my life, *optima socia vite*, who, had it been necessary, would have been my willing companion not only in banishment and want but in death itself. During her life she was a true helper in my official duties. She never in the least thing opposed me. She had no anxiety about her circumstances, and during her whole sickness, was careful to hide from me any anxiety she felt for her children. But fearing that this silence might aggravate her solicitude, three days before her death, I introduced the subject and promised to do all that should be in my power for them. She immediately replied, that 'she had committed them to God,' and on my saying that that was no reason why I should not care for them, she answered: 'I am confident that you will not forsake children thus committed to God.' — I also learned yesterday, that when she was advised by a female friend to speak with me about the children, she said: 'The only thing necessary is that they fear God and be religious. There is no need to ask my husband to promise to bring them up in the fear of God and with good discipline. If they are pious, he will be a father to them, unasked, and if they are not, they do not deserve the request.' Be assured, this greatness of soul was more effective with me than all entreaties could have been." Four days later Calvin wrote to Farel a letter in the same spirit, giving most interesting details of the last days of his wife.¹

In 1556, after seven years, we find him cherishing the same tender regard for the memory of the chosen companion of his life. For he thus writes to Richard de Valleville, preacher of the French church at Frankfort, on the death of his wife: "I feel in my heart how painful and agonizing this wound must be, which the death of your excellent companion has caused, remembering my own grief seven years ago. I call to mind how hard it was for me to gain the mastery of my sorrow. But you know very well what means we must use for restraining our immoderate grief, and it only remains for me to pray that you will make use

¹ See Henry, f. 422, and also a Translation of this letter into English in the Bib. Repert. Vol. XIII. p. 80.

of them. It is not one of the least of your grounds of consolation, (although our earthly part is thereby the more cast down,) that you have spent a portion of this life with a companion, whose society you joyfully hope to regain, when you are done with earth. Remember also that your companion has left you the example of a happy death.—But if our chief consolation is in the providence of God, through which our troubles conduce to our happiness, and if he only separates us from those we love, in order to unite us with them again in his heavenly kingdom,—then your religion will lead you to acquiesce entirely in his will.—May the Lord alleviate the pain of your loneliness by the grace of his Spirit, guide you and bless your labors.”

ARTICLE V.

PLATO AND THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY.

By Prof. T. D. Woolsey, Yale College.

Plato against the Atheists, or the tenth book of the Dialogue on Laws, accompanied with critical notes and followed by extended dissertations, etc. By Tayler Lewis, LL. D., professor of the Greek Language and Literature in the University in the City of New York. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1845.

It seems strange, if we take into view the intrinsic value of Plato's *Laws* and the difficulties attending upon the text and explanation of this work, that so little labor has been bestowed upon it by scholars. Ast's,¹ we believe, is the only separate edition since the invention of printing; and the editors of the general text of

¹ Published in 1814 at Leipsic. It is well known that this same learned man in his *Platon's Leben und Schriften*, published in 1816, after his study upon the *Laws* was over, maintained and endeavored to show that this treatise was not written by Plato, although quoted as such by Aristotle (e. g. in *Politics* 2.3). We must own that such an opinion, setting aside this strong historical evidence, seems to us astonishing. The style indeed is peculiar—far removed from the artistic elegance of Plato's most finished works, although somewhat like that of *Sophists* and *Politicians*; some of the opinions and modes of presenting truths may be peculiar also; but he who can doubt, after reading the work and receiving the general impression of it into his mind, that it is Platonic and that it is Plato's own, must, we think, be far gone in literary skepticism.

Plato furnish us either with no commentary or with a very brief one. Nor are we much better off in regard to translations. Schleiermacher went no further than the *Republic*; and we know of no other translator, besides Cousin, who unites scholarship, a philosophical spirit and familiarity with the Platonic dialogues to such a degree as to secure confidence in his interpretations.

The relation between the *Republic* of Plato and the *Laws* is one about which not a little difference of opinion has existed. A speaker in Cicero's treatise *De Legibus*, near the beginning, uses the following language: "*quoniam scriptum est a te de optimo reipublicae statu, consequens esse videtur ut scribas tu idem de legibus: sic enim fecisse Platonem illum tuum, quem tu admiraris, quem omnibus anteponis, quem maxime diligis.*" The opinion involved in these words that the object of the *Republic* was to show the best form of polity is implied also in the prevalent Greek title *πολιτεία*, and is embraced by many writers of note. If we take this ground it must be supposed either that Plato changed his views before composing the *Laws*, or what is more natural and is usually believed, that he regarded the form of polity in the *Republic* as of hopeless attainment on account of its perfection, and intended in his later work to bring down his scheme of government to the level of ordinary human nature. The one would thus be a *Eutopia*; the other an improvement on the Cretan and Lacedemonian legislation. Others hold that the views of government in the *Republic* were never meant to be realized and were introduced only to illustrate the nature of *politics*. Mr. Lewis goes so far as to say, in his first *Excursus*, that "a misconception of the end and scope of the *Republic*, or as it should be more properly styled, the dialogue on the nature of right and righteousness (*περὶ δίκαιον*), has subjected the name of Plato to great reproach. He has been charged with maintaining in the fifth book of that dialogue, sentiments which, if carried out, would result in the utter overthrow of all the domestic relations. A defence, had we space for it here, might be derived from the peculiar parabolical or allegorical nature of that work, and from the evident absence of any design that it should serve as the model of any actual existing polity."

In our judgment this view expressed by Mr. Lewis is not entirely defensible. We believe him to be in the right against those who, like Cicero, consider the best polity to be the end of the *Republic*. Its true aim, as we conceive of it, is to set forth the nature of righteousness, whether in the individual or in the State,

and more particularly in the individual. With this it begins and closes. Socrates wishes to reach the idea of righteousness, which, when beheld on the small scale of one man, is found to elude his grasp, by viewing it on the large scale of a State, and of its different classes of inhabitants. The great is for the small; or rather both are for something which is neither great nor small,—the underlying idea in both. It is as if one should draw a large equilateral triangle by producing two sides of a very minute one and uniting them by a line parallel to the third in order the better to show a child what was the nature of such a figure. Those who are familiar with the trichotomy in the Republic, will perceive why we have chosen this illustration.

But we cannot admit that Plato did not look on his model-state as a desirable and a good thing; nor can we free him from blame for his doctrine of the community of wives, and his permission of falsehood. This great philosopher somewhere regards the state of the mind in dreams as morally right or wrong. Had his theory been merely an ideal one, we should say of it, with far less severity than this rigidly Christian rule of his own contains, that he was accountable and guilty because of the immoral element in his dream of a perfect government. The theory, however, is more than ideal. According to the well known words of Plato, if kings were philosophers, or philosophers could become kings, it might be realized. Why else is so much time spent in the latter part of the fifth book in showing that such institutions, as we have spoken of above, would be salutary to a State; and that the reason why existing politics departed so much from Plato's model was that politics and philosophy were divorced from one another. The truth is that Plato, like modern socialists—though with infinitely more excuse—did not get a clear abiding sight of the corruption of human nature. The evil in civil society, therefore, was assigned by him to ignorance and to bad institutions; and its cure lay in philosophy teaching wisdom and devising a better framework of human intercourse. Even the family state, which Christianity looks on as fundamental for the moral training of our race, must be superseded by another system, in which parents and offspring should not know one another, but it should only be known in general, that a certain class of parents had given birth to a certain number of children. In this way Plato hoped to shut out whatever is exclusive and separating in family feeling and domestic life, to make men less selfish by making the notion of parent and child more general and abstract; just as in other com-

munities the spirit of covetousness is to be ejected by abolishing property and holding all things as a joint stock. He by no means undervalued the tie between parents and children, but idly hoped by artificially mending God's institution to extend and ennoble it. When, however, he shaped his legislation into a scheme more likely to be realized, he was content to follow nature in making the parental relation sacred, as other legislators had done before him.

There is a passage of the fifth book of the Laws, where Plato seems to refer to the objectionable features of the Republic with approbation, as being parts of the best system, and explains why he views them with so much favor. After saying (p. 739) that the form of polity which he is explaining holds the second rank in regard to perfection, he goes on to mention what he conceives to be the most perfect polity. It is one in which the principle of the old saying, *κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων*, prevails to its utmost extent; where *wives and children and goods are common*, where the notion of private and separate property is banished from society, and even things necessarily personal become common in a certain sort, as the operations of the eyes and ears and hands; where all persons praise and blame in the greatest possible unison, being delighted and grieved by the same objects. Whatever laws thus produce as complete a unity in the State as possible, surpass all others in respect to virtue; and such legislation is the highest end which one can propose for himself. A State so governed, if perchance gods or the children of gods do anywhere inhabit it, is one where happiness reigns. It must be made the exemplar in our polity, to it we must look, and bring our institutions into the closest resemblance to it. From views like these it is plain that the destruction of selfishness in society was the aim of Plato, and that he thought to gain his end by overturning, among other things, the relations of the family, and abolishing private property.¹

A considerable part of the Laws is taken up with general views of a moral or political nature, introduced by way of advice and admonition, as prefaces to the more important heads of legislation, with the purpose of breathing the spirit and general notions of his code into the mind of the reader before he proposes his details. In the tenth book Plato has reached that part of his criminal code which relates to violations of religious order. Impious words and actions, he says, never proceed from one who holds divine beings

¹ Comp. Aristot. Politic. 2. 3, who recognizes the identity of the system in the Republic and that in the Laws. See also Plat. leges 7. p. 806.

to exist, but from one who has fallen into either of these three errors: that of not believing in the existence of gods, or of denying their providence, or of affirming that they can be propitiated by sacrifices and vows. For the sake of such persons, and especially of young men misled into atheism by the sophistry of the day, he introduces a long prelude to his legislation on the being, and providence of the divinities. And this argument, which occupies nearly the whole of the tenth book, is the more interesting and valuable, because it is the only place where Plato professedly and at length offers his proofs upon these cardinal subjects.

It must strike every one on reading this book, that Plato speaks like the rest of his countrymen, of the *gods*, in the plural number, without being very careful to draw a line between the Supreme ruler whom he elsewhere recognizes, and those inferior deities, who in one of his works, are said to have been produced by the superior, like the souls of men. How shall we explain this and his treatment of the popular religion in general? Was it fear that led him to this course, or did he accommodate his language to notions which he knew he could not alter; or did he believe in the literal sense, as he says in the tenth book of the Laws that πάντα πλήρη θεῶν.

Some of the Fathers, who fancied that he was acquainted with the doctrines of the Old Testament, and were struck with his noble expressions concerning God, attributed to him so much knowledge on divine things, that they were compelled to impute his heathenish passages to an unworthy motive. Such accusations, for example, are made by Eusebius,¹ and by Theodoret in his excellent "Cure of Hellenic maladies." The latter says that Plato plainly stood in dread of the Athenian populace, and of the errors with which they were infected. And in proof of this he alleges the inconsistency between a noted passage of the Timæus, where Plato seems willing to receive the whole Pantheon handed down by tradition from the children of the gods and by law and usage established, and those parts of the second and third books of the Republic where his moral nature rejects with abhorrence the poetical mythology of Greece.²

¹ Euseb. Demonstr. Evangel. lib. 3. (p. 129. D. ed. Colon. 1688), θεὸν—ὃν πάλαι φιλοσοφῶν εἰς μόνους ὁ Πλάτων εἰδὼς εἰς πάντας ἐκφέρειν ὡμολόγει μὴ τολμᾶν.—Theodoret. lib. 3. p. 43. ed. Sylburg. and lib. 2. p. 33.

² The passage in Timæus (40. D) to which we allude, is quoted several times by Eusebius, and he finds in it on one occasion (Præpar. Evang. 13. 1.) derision of the Greek theologists. But as far as we can see, it has no marks of the Socratic irony, and is capable of only a literal interpretation. One might

This opinion we cannot regard as probable. On every side we find arguments against it. It is opposed to Plato's honest love of truth on the one hand; and to his reverence for tradition in the absence of positive and certain knowledge relating to God and nature, on the other. Why again should he write the parts of the Republic where he inveighs against the popular mythology and speak so often of the divine being, as far above all things, if he was afraid of a prosecution for heresy? Why did he, to whom philosophy and not the State was the centre of life, if he dreaded the hemlock of Socrates, return to Athens at all after his first retirement? The Athenians cared more for their democracy than they did for their gods: why then did he, who on the supposition was such a coward, write so boldly in Gorgias and in the eighth and ninth books of the Republic, against the principles and the practices too of the Attic commonwealth? How, finally, could he with such apparent honesty and consistency have approved of punishing heresies in religion, if laws against heresies deterred him from propagating the most important truths, and led him through fear to countenance mischievous falsehoods?

A theory which would reconcile the different expressions of Plato and do justice to his honesty and consistency would have the following outlines; which our space forbids us to fill up, and which, we trust will carry their own evidence with them to readers who have formed a conception of the mind as well as the opinions of the philosopher. 1. His notion of a supreme God was somewhat transcendental, and being aware of this he must have felt the difficulty of bringing it down to the level of the popular mind. Not that he made God an idea, as some have thought: or went to the length of some oriental philosophers, who ascribed only essence to God, divesting him of all quality and relation; but he at least taught that while accurate knowledge of ideas was difficult for man—true opinion being the limit to which most men can go—the idea of God was the last to be reached of all. Well therefore might he say in a celebrated passage, (*Timæus* 28. C), τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὐρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὐ-

be tempted with Stallb. (*Præf. to Politicus*, p. 112) to suppose that Plato's daemons were merely the "rays of the divine intelligence diffused through various parts of the universe," that is the divine attributes or more prominent relations hypostatized. But this notion seems to be too modern for Plato, and I know of no proof that he entertained it. It may be seen clearly expressed in the words of Lutatius, a scholiast on Statius, which are quoted by Lobeck (*Aglaophamus*, p. 598.) Compare a passage from Plutarch's treatise *De Ei* apud Delphos, cited in the same work, p. 712.

πόρτα αἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν, and teach with a very unprotestant spirit, in the twelfth book of the *Laws* (966. C), that while the guardians of the State—his ordained clergy—should be required to understand the truth about the gods, the mass of the citizens might be allowed simply to give their assent to the faith by law established. 2. His view of God taken in connection perhaps with the imperfections in the visible world, may have disposed him to confine God to the intelligible world and to introduce a set of mediators between the Supreme and the lower universe. Hence it may be that in the *Timæus* (41. A onwards) the created gods are set to work to make the human frame and whatever else is capable of decay, (69. C). 3. Plato's mind was by nature prone to believe in spiritual causes, and to look with reverence upon the tradition of the olden times. While therefore he revolted at the fables of the poets, he may readily have believed not only in gods tenanting the stars but also in others whose agency and character mythology had distorted. All this, like his cosmogony, was only probable in his view; we are not to suppose that the theology and physics of Plato stood on the same ground of certainty before his mind as his ethics and dialectics.¹ But receiving it as probable and being persuaded that religion lay at the foundation of the State, and that his doctrine of the supreme God could not reach the mass of men, he might reasonably content himself with proving in general that divine intelligences presided over human affairs. At least we are compelled to feel that those writers, who refer the marks of polytheism in Plato to mere policy, have not duly taken into account the position of a believing mind, surrounded by traditions and a mythology which are revolting to its moral feelings: it cannot run into atheism from its very nature: it cannot shake off tradition entirely, owing to its faith and reverence. It will therefore make a compromise so to speak, with its circumstances, and incline not wholly to reject the religion of all past time, when divested of the more exceptionable features.

Plato approaches the argument for a divine intelligence with a kind of reluctance, and as if forced to it by the mischiefs, which the irreligious writings of the sophists had wrought upon young men. Human nature should need no such proof. The disease of atheism indeed always will appear in some minds, but no one contracting it in youth carries it with him to old age and the end of life. Hence, bad as it is, it is less deeply rooted than the de-

¹ Comp. *Timæus* 29. C—D.

nial of providence and the ascription of undue influence to sacrifices and vows. The atheistical doctrine derives its force from false impressions in regard to mind and body. It starts with ascribing the greatest and most beautiful of things to nature and chance, to the mixture and union of blind elements, by which all things, even including animals and the mind itself, were generated. The mind thus produced gave birth to the arts, some of which, as that of legislation, are built on an unnatural, and untrue basis. Legislation in turn gave birth to the gods,—who differ with the laws of different States,—as well as to the shifting forms of moral beauty and justice. This theory must be overthrown by a truer view of nature, which putting the soul and all its kindred first in order of time, shall assign to what is vulgarly called nature a lower and posterior place. The proof of the divine existence is drawn from the subject of motion, *κίνησις*, which term includes changes of place, form and state in bodies, and the movements of minds. In the order of nature something which moves itself and other things, must be prior to that which can only move other things, and finds the beginning of its own motion out of itself. This self-moving or vital power belongs to what we call soul, which must therefore be prior to body destitute of such a power. And in the same way all the properties of soul must be prior to those of body.¹ It must then be the cause of all things, good or evil; and must regulate the heavens.

It will be seen that the idea of creation out of nothing no more enters into these views than into the common argument for a designing cause from the marks of design in nature. The interesting inquiry now arises, did Plato believe in a creation out of nothing, or did he like other physical inquirers of antiquity conceive of this as something impossible? Mr. Lewis, in a long Excursus upon the maxim, *de nihilo nihil*, has examined this point, but seems to have arrived at no certain conclusions. "It is by no means clear," he says, "that the eternity of matter was ever held by Plato.² Some *ἀρχή* or principle seems to have been in his

¹ Plato's words are these when literally rendered, (896. D): "characters and manners and wishes and reasonings and true opinions and attention and memory must have existed prior to length and breadth and depth and strength of bodies since the soul is prior to the body." At the close he seems to mean that mind must be the cause of these properties of particular bodies: that is, that the reason why one is as long as it is, etc. involves the antecedent existence of some mind. But what is intended by *ἐπιμέλεια* before the generation of things?

² Note 50. But in Note 17, he says: "It seems to us perfectly clear that in every sense of the word, as used by modern philosophy, he held matter to be junior to soul."

mind as the origin of matter, which was not matter; and yet something separate from the Deity and existing with him before the formation of the outward universe." But "in a passage of the Sophista, Plato speaks of a creation by the direct act of God, and that, too, from things which before were not."

Upon no part of philosophy could we more wish for a clear expression of opinion from Plato—a profession of faith not wrapped up in magnificent words and in a mythic dress—than upon this. It is this obscurity and vagueness, whether in his views or style, which has led philosophers to opposite sides in interpreting his doctrines. To mention but one or two opinions. Cudworth takes the ground that Plato teaches a creation out of nothing, while Mosheim and most writers since his day go over to the other side. Ackermann maintains that he held that while the world came from God, God was never without the world. Stallbaum contends that so foolish and absurd a thought as the eternity of matter was quite foreign to Plato's way of thinking, and seeks to remove the appearance of such a doctrine from the *Timæus*. To us it seems likely that Plato conceived of matter as an eternal principle by the side of God. But then it was a principle in a very different sense from that in which God and ideas were principles. It was not the cause of the reality and essence of outward things, but was rather to be classed itself with non-existences. To it was to be ascribed that there could be outward things, but the perpetual flux and the necessary imperfection of outward things were due to it also. Plato nowhere gives it the name which it afterwards bore, and contents himself with describing it as without form or quality, endued with a capacity of putting on every bodily form like the materials in the carpenter's hands. With such a view of matter, it is scarcely more strange that Plato felt no necessity of referring it to a cause, than that we feel none in respect to time and space.

The passage of *Sophista*, where Mr. Lewis finds creative agency ascribed to God, must receive, as we think, another explanation. In that place Plato speaks of animals, plants, and inanimate organizations existing in the earth, as caused by God to come into being, when before they were not (*γίγνεσθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα*). This is introduced as an instance of the *ποιητική δύναμις*, the definition of which is given in the words *ἥτις ἂν αἰτία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι*. This power thus mentioned is divided into human and divine, so that men are said to create in the passage just as much as God is. Nothing more then can

be intended than *generation*¹ implying elements or substance previously existing.

Having shown that soul is prior to body and the cause of all movement, Plato puts the question, Whether one soul is a sufficient cause or more than one. In answer he says we must not start with less than two, the one beneficent, the other able to do things of a contrary kind. The beneficent, endowed with reason, which is a divine thing,² guides all things aright and towards happiness; the other destitute of reason brings about the opposite result, 896. E—897. That the rational and virtuous kind of soul bears sway through heaven and earth and the whole circuit of things rather than the other is proved by the order and system of the world, which are akin to those of reason. Afterwards he says (906. A), that heaven (*τὸν οὐρανόν*, i. e. the visible world) is full of many good things, and many evils, which last³ are the more numerous, and that hence an eternal struggle arises, demanding surprising vigilance. For our allies we have the gods and daemons, whose possessions we are. We are destroyed by injustice and unbridled passion united to want of reason; and are saved by righteousness and self-restraint in alliance with reason,—virtues which have the vital forces of the gods for their abode, though a little of them may also be found dwelling in us here below."

These passages are remarkable, because they have the look of teaching something like dualism; a theory rather oriental than congenial to the Greek mind. In this manner Tennemann and C. F. Hermann have understood them.⁴ Mr. Lewis is of the same mind, and finds traces of this dualism in other passages which have eluded our notice. "We have here presented," he says, "that grand defect in Plato's theology, which mars by its presence almost every part of his otherwise noble system. It is

¹ Comp. Xen. Mem. 2. 2. 3. οὐς [i. e. παῖδας] οἱ γονεῖς ἐκ μὲν οὐκ ὄντων ἐποίησαν εἶναι.

² Here (897. B) there is much less MSS. authority for *θεὸς οὐσα* than *θεῖον ὁρθῶς*. But the great variations in this place throw suspicion even on *θεῖον*.

³ εἶναι—πολλῶν μετὸν ἀγαθῶν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, πλείονων δὲ τῶν μὴ. In this passage τῶν μὴ can only be τῶν μὴ ἀγαθῶν; which is the more natural, because *ἐναντίων* is the same as μὴ ἀγαθῶν. These words cannot be made to mean things neither good nor bad.

⁴ See Tennemann's *Gesch. der Philos.* 2. 230. 1st ed. and C. F. Hermann's *Gesch. u. System der Platon. Philos.* I. 552 and note 739. The latter author says that the tenth book of the *Laws* "eröffnet den Blick in einem ganz andern Dualismus als der des *Timæus* ist," by which I conceive him to intend a dualism in which God and an irrational *psyche* are the principles instead of God and *hylé*.

most clear from this and other passages in his dialogues, that he held the doctrine of two uncreated principles or souls, the one good, or the benefactor, as he styles him, the other evil." This principle he finds alluded to in the *Timæus*, as the source of wild and confused motion, before harmony was brought into the world by its builder. As however no personal existence is there ascribed to the source of disorder; and as this disorder existed in visible things, it may be that Plato there speaks of matter endowed with the power of irregular motion,—of a chaos in short, just like that of many other cosmogonies—than that he speaks of a malevolent soul.¹

Cousin endeavors² to smooth away the difficulties which these passages contain, by regarding the hypothesis of two principles as a point of departure for the question, whether a good or a bad principle governs the universe. If there is disorder and evil in the world, Plato would reason, a bad principle must reign in it; if order and wisdom, a good. As the latter is true we must reject the hypothesis of two principles, which was admitted for a moment. This however is not a satisfactory adjustment of the case, for Plato affirms that there is actual evil in the universe, though it may not be predominant. There must then be one or more evil souls though, not predominant. And indeed Cousin does not know what to do with the second of the passages, that in 906. A; in which place, if we interpret it of a moral dualism, there is a tone of despair utterly unlike Plato's general mood of mind.

Plutarch, near the beginning of his treatise 'on the procreation of the soul according to *Timæus*,' gives still another explanation, which deserves to be mentioned. After affirming that God made the essence neither of soul nor of body, but having these principles furnished to his hand, merely introduced order and reason into them, he goes on to find supports for this tenet in some of the Platonic works, and among the rest in the first of these passages. "Plato," says he, "in the *Laws* speaks of a soul without order and malevolent, which is soul in itself. It partook of mind, reason and harmony to become the soul of the world."³

If there is any justice in Plutarch's explanation, we might sup-

¹ We must certainly, if this be true, suppose an inconsistency between these two works in regard to motion, as on the supposition in the text the primordial matter was in motion.

² In Vol. VIII. p. 470 of his translation of Plato.

³ See § 6. 2. and 7. 4 of Dübner's edition, Paris 1841. The same opinion occurs likewise in the fourth of the Platonic questions.

pose that Plato finally rested in the notion of a substance existing prior to bodies out of which they were formed, and of another out of which souls were formed. The maxim *de nihilo nihil fit*, if received by him, might lead him to this result, provided he considered souls essentially different from bodies, as he doubtless did.¹ Now the existence of evil and that of motion were to be accounted for. The first he found for a long time in matter—in the necessary departure of generated things from their ideal type. But as matter was merely passive, he sought for an active principle, the cause of motion and of evil both. This he found in that primeval *soul-mass*, which, being destitute of reason, could of itself exert only a disorderly and misdirected energy of desire. Out of this substance human souls were made and derived from it their capacity to go astray. This theory might be called, as it regards the causes of good and evil, a kind of dualism, and as it regards fundamental causes in general, a theory of three principles.

For ourselves, not knowing of anything, which by clear interpretation can be construed into dualism in Plato, we feel constrained to explain these words in consistency with what is elsewhere taught by him concerning the origin of evil being found in matter. He was thinking in both passages of evil in the visible world and especially among men. The classes of souls doing good and evil, —for *ψυχῇ* in the first passage may be a collective,—are the divine on the one hand, and the soul of the world and human souls on the other. The causes of evil in the world cannot lie in the contrary impulses of two hostile gods, as Plato expressly says in *Politicus* 269. D; but in the fact that the world,—and the like is true of men,—although an animal and endowed with intelligence, yet because it partakes of a body, is liable to change and disorder.² To these souls, so connected with matter, belong false opinions and all the causes of unhappiness. To aid them in overcoming evil—and here probably the notion of human souls was especially in Plato's mind,—God has so arranged the system of things, as to throw the weight of his providence and government on the side of good. In the second passage, where it is said that heaven or the visible world abounds with good and evil but with the latter more, and that a ceaseless struggle is kept up, he was thinking particu-

¹ The soul of the world in *Timæus* (p. 35) is compounded in a way which we confess we do not understand. One of the parts, according to Stallbaum, is derived from the primitive matter, out of which bodies were framed. Others give very different explanations.

² Comp. Stallb. *Prolegom.* in *Politicum*. p. 106.

larly of mankind. Not that good and bad beings are fighting over us and for us,—for no malevolent *person*¹ superior to man, unless it be the mundane soul, is known to Plato,—but that in our race and in the world, and it may be in the soul of the world, good and evil are in conflict. The evils especially thought of are denoted by what follows: “injustice and unbridled passion, with want of reason destroy us.” Thus explained, the sentiment is parallel to that in a fine place of Theætetus: “It is not possible to destroy evils, for there must *ever be something opposed to good*; nor can they find their seat among the gods, but they, of necessity haunt our mortal nature, and the place of our abode. Wherefore we must try to flee hence and go thither, as soon as we can. And thus to flee is to be assimilated in the greatest possible degree to God; and to be assimilated consists in becoming righteous and holy in the possession of wisdom.”²

The argument against those who deny a divine providence is one of the noblest and best parts of Plato's works. It begins, as the remarks upon the atheistical spirit in general began, with the fundamental cause in human experience for such a malady of unbelief. A nature akin to the divine, leads men to receive a divine existence; but the sight of vice prospering inclines them to doubt, whether any care is exercised, at least in small matters, over human affairs. When they see the “prosperity of the wicked,” “they say, how doth God know, and is there knowledge in the Most High.”

This argument starts from the vantage ground of the first. If God is good, he cannot neglect what he ought to attend to, for that we feel to be a vice. If he is powerful and intelligent, he cannot neglect from impotence or ignorance. Nor is it hard for God to take care of the small. To attend to the small is not like seeing and hearing the small. The latter is difficult to sense; the former easy for reason. Nor is it indifferent whether God is mindful of the small or not. For the great cannot exist without the small. All the parts of the system are for the whole in the great art of universal government just as in human arts. Neglect anywhere therefore is injury to the whole. In the system the general good and the particular are made to coincide; and particulars are so controlled

¹ Some of the fathers understood these passages of evil angels. See Euseb. *Præpar. Evang.* 11. 26, who compares what is said of an endless battle with St. Paul's words: “We wrestle not with flesh and blood,” etc.

² Theætet. 176. A.

by general laws, which they themselves help to carry into fulfilment that character determines destiny, vice and virtue work out their own recompense.

Near the end of this argument Plato breaks into a sublime strain not surpassed by anything in all his works. "Boast neither shalt thou, nor any other who has attained to such an unhappy character of having escaped from this justice of the gods:—justice which they who established it established, as the highest of all kinds of justice, and which ought entirely to be revered. For thou shalt never be lost sight of by it. Thou art not so small as to hide in the depths of earth [and be lost sight of], nor mounting on high shalt thou fly up to heaven [and be lost sight of there]; but thou shalt receive thy due reward from the gods, either whilst thou stayest here, or in the realms of Hades, when thou hast passed thither, or when thou art conveyed to a more dreadful place still. And the same thou mayest judge of those, whom thou hast seen become great from small by unhallowed deeds, or whom by conduct of that description thou supposedst to have been made happy from being miserable; and therefore thoughtest thyself to have discovered in their history, as in a mirror, that there is no divine providence over all things, because thou knewest not how the contribution paid by them goes to the help of the general system."¹

The notion of those who thought that the gods might be rendered placable by sacrifices and vows is despatched in a few words. Any superintendent, who should be induced by a bribe to inflict the administration of justice, would commit a most obvious wickedness. But this is just the conduct, which this opinion imputes to the gods. Acting so they would act like dogs, who should take a portion of the wolves' plunder, and leave the flock to destruction, or like a pilot who should be led by libations and incense to overturn a vessel with its crew; or like a driver at the games, who should accept of a gift from the other party, and play the victory into his hands. The very idea is monstrous,

¹ A word or two on this passage. *Εἰ* before *ἄλλος ἀτυχῆς* is wanting in Eusebius, and therefore omitted by Ast and Stallbaum. The construction is certainly far easier without it. *Ἀτυχῆς* seems to denote infelicity of character. With *οὕτω μικρὸς ὢν*, and what follows, supply in thought *ὥστε ἀμεληθῆναι*. For *αὐτῶν τιμωρίαν* Ast reads after Eusebius *σαντῶ τιμωρίαν*, but *αὐτῶν*, i. e. *θεῶν*, is preferable. *Διὰ* in the two compound verbs denotes passage *across*, or *over* from the earth to Hades, etc.

and he who clings to such a doctrine deserves to be called of all impious persons the worst and the most impious.

These views are truly admirable, and occur, even more strikingly expressed, in the second book of the Republic. Had they been united with an understanding of what was meant by sacrifices and vows, of that acknowledgment of ill-desert or of dependence, that seeking for forgiveness or for aid, and that hope in the clemency or the benignity of God which these religious observances contain, Plato would have been as near to the Christian system as a large part of the Jewish people. But with all his penetration and moral feeling, he did not fully appreciate the efficacy of prayer, nor recognize a communion of the heart with God much beyond the contemplation of divine beauty and perfection, nor give the need of pardon and help their due place. Man was to become good by philosophy, and if bad, within the reach of cure, must suffer until his badness should be obliterated by suffering, which was the proper medicine of depravity.

The few closing pages of the tenth book contain the penal code for crimes against religious faith; and are of a nature, only not severe enough, to please the followers of St. Dominic.¹ The preceding discussion had brought a threefold division into crimes against the gods; and each sort of crimes may be again subdivided according as the person committing it had been led astray by error of judgment, being naturally mild and conscientious, or by the unbridled passions of an aspiring soul. A person of the first description must pass five years in the house of discipline, and then, if his error of judgment shall not have left him, suffer death; one of the other description must be committed for life to the central prison, and when he dies, have his body cast out beyond the bounds of the territory. And in order to suppress superstition and the impiety of those, who think that the deities may be propitiated by religious rites, it is ordained that no private religions shall be endured. Every person who wishes to sacrifice must go to the public priests who know what order and rules of purity such services require. They must lead in the prayers, and the sacrificer with such friends as may accompany him must follow their form.

These words give us no new legislation of Plato's own, but

¹ The following words sound like a regulation of the Spanish inquisition. 909. A, "During this time let no one of the citizens be with them except the members of the night-council, who are to converse with them for their admonition and the salvation of their souls."

are built on the general principles of the Greek States with regard to religious observances. It was a maxim that the state-religion was necessary to the safety of the State,—a maxim handed down from the old times, when faith was reposed in the protective gods, and not weakened in its force when the bad results of philosophical atheism upon the morals of young men were sufficiently tested. The Greeks allowed their comic poets to turn the gods into ridicule; and no wonder, for the epic poets had supplied the materials for that ridicule. But when a man came to the denial of the gods of his country he trod on dangerous ground. New gods might be introduced, but secrecy in religious rites was dreaded partly perhaps on superstitious grounds, but chiefly because the unions formed at mysteries or rites foreign of origin might be dangerous to the State. Plato however seems to have gone further than any State in seeking to abolish all private religious rites whatsoever.

In regard to the *text* of Mr. Lewis's work—which by the way is printed so far as we have noticed with great correctness—we quote the following words from his introduction. "We have followed [the text] of Bekker and Ast, who hardly differ at all either in words or punctuation. Wherever there has been a departure from them the reasons are assigned mainly in the shorter notes. The critical means within our power have been very limited, and we therefore in this department ask indulgence for any errors, which we have committed."

We believe that in Ast and Bekker, Mr. Lewis possesses the most important critical helps to be met with excepting the edition of Stallbaum. (Leipsic, 1821—5.) Of these editors Ast used the various readings of two manuscripts and had a pretty plentiful supply of his own conjectures always on hand; Bekker collated for the *Laws* seven manuscripts and has given the results with that usual brevity of his, which sometimes leads into doubt rather than certainty; and Stallbaum in a lucid manner gives the readings of as many more, some of which however were previously known. A number of passages seem to be restored to their integrity by this last editor, and his various readings are an important aid for one who would solve some of the problems which the bad text of the *Laws* presents.

The plan which Mr. Lewis pursues is this. After an introduction and a statement of the argument, the text appears accompanied by copious foot-notes, which take up about eighty pages; and then succeed extended notes and dissertations which fill about

three hundred pages more and relate to some of the principal points of Platonic philosophy and theology.

In the foot notes, which are occupied chiefly in illustrating and explaining the text, Mr. Lewis shows some of the best properties of an interpreter, such as the power of seizing upon the connection of thoughts and of unfolding it in clear language to the reader. Mr. Lewis loves Plato; and he loves him for his inculcation of moral truth and his believing spirit; and for these reasons he wishes to make his readers love him also. Hence he is neither a sleepy nor a merely philological interpreter. He finds a great deal of meaning in his author; more sometimes in words and phrases probably than Plato meant to convey; but it is better, if we may thus express ourselves, to repeat and make more intense every vibration of the original mind than only to give forth a weak and brief sound. The defects we have found in these notes are chiefly of a philological character. A number of difficulties and peculiarities of style are left untouched; some few speculations rest on questionable ground; and some explanations show a want of skill in developing the construction even when the general sense is well understood.

We add here some remarks which have occurred to us in examining a portion of Mr. Lewis's notes and those few of his Ex-curses which relate to his explanation of the text.

Page 14, end. 890. A.¹ "The article would seem to be required here before *ἐλκόντων*." "It seems to refer to *φασκόντων* above." The subject of *ἐλκόντων*, is not the same as that of *φασκόντων*, but it is either *young men* or a general word like *men* or *persons*, and therefore suppressed by good usage. It is not the sophists of whom *ἐλκόντων* is spoken, but their disciples, and this participle contains the cause of the seditions.

Page 16, line 12. 890. D. Mr. Lewis remarks that "there is a harshness here in consequence of the sudden change from the participle to the indicative mode *κέκτεται*. This however must be rendered as though it were *κεκτημένα*, if indeed this is not the true reading." As the manuscripts give no other reading, and as the supposed transition is known to the Greek writers, there is no reason for altering the text. But if we understand the passage, there is no transition here. The two predicates are *οὐ γὰρ λαπά τέ ἐστι* and *(οὐ) κέκτεται*. The sense, which Ficinus, and still more Cousin seem to have misapprehended is this: "But if

¹ We have added the pages of Stephanus for the sake of readers who may wish to compare other editions.

thus addressed to masses of men, are they not difficult to follow, and do they not moreover possess enormous prolixity?" The answer of Clinias shows that hardness to be understood by the common man ($\tau\tilde{\omega}$ δυσμαθεῖ there, τοῖς ἀνθρώποις above) and a long discussion are feared. Ast's version, therefore, otherwise good, of ξυνακολονθεῖν λόγοις *persequi oratione*, is inadmissible. That expression relates not to the difficulty which the legislator finds of expressing himself, but to the difficulty which the citizens find of following what he says.

Page 21, line 3. 892. D. "The common reading is εἰ καθάπερ. We have ventured to make the change [to καθάπερ εἰ] from the exigency of the place and on the authority of Stephanus." But Stephanus merely offered a conjecture, which the MSS. do not confirm. The exigency of the place requires εἰ, *whether*, after σκοπεῖτε, as much as it does εἰ, *if*, before ἴδει. As the sentence is constructed, καθάπερ seems to embarrass it, but was inserted on account of the comparison, which is not fully expressed. The construction without καθάπερ is clear if εἰ, *if*, is supplied. "Think whether,—if we three had to cross a river—and I made a proposal,—I should seem to have reason in what I said." Does not καθάπερ imply something like this: "Think whether *I shall seem to have reason in what I say*, just as, if we had to cross a river, etc.—I should seem to have reason in what I said." The thought for which καθάπερ is inserted follows in the next words καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, etc.

Page 26, 9. 894. C. Τίνα προκρίναμεν. The editor here says that "it is evident that ἄν should be supplied." As there are numerous examples of the optative in a simple interrogative sentence without ἄν, it is better to follow the MSS. See Hermann de particula ἄν, 3. § 5.

Page 30, 16. 896. B. We are unable to see any attraction in this passage, and cannot perceive the justice of the extended remarks upon it on page 203. Πολλοστὴν violates no grammatical construction, nor could any other form of expression stand as well in this place. If we just supply the nominative πολλοστὴ in thought, all will be clear. The word is to be taken twice; once in the relative clause, and once with τοσούτων, and in one or the other instance good usage would suppress it.

Page 40, 10. 999. B. Mr. Lewis prefers Böckh's emendation, εἰθ' for εἴθ' to Ast's ἐσθ'. But as ὁμολογῶν is found in five of Bekker's MSS., and three Florentine ones of Stallbaum, it is, we think, on the whole, to be preferred to ὁμολογεῖ, and then Ast's cor-

rection *ἴσθ'* follows by inevitable necessity. For the rest, *ἴσθ'* beginning a sudden interrogation, is quite as strong as the *ἴσα* of indignant questioning.

Page 42, 13. 899. D. *Συγγένεια* here and p. 44, 3, is no doubt relationship. *Πρὸς τὸ σύμφυτον τιμᾶν* cannot be *to a natural honoring*, but *to honor something akin to you*, or *towards that which is akin to you*, viz., *to honor it*.

Page 43, 6. 900. A. *Ὅσας*, inserted after *ταράττει τὰ νῦν*, on the authority of Eusebius and two Florence MSS. by Stallbaum, will bring order into this sentence. It is wordy and careless in its structure, like the talk of old men. To make two sentences of it, is to make Plato repeat the same identical thought, not by way of explanation, but as if he were saying something new. *Ἰδὼν* denotes observation in general, which is divided into that suggested by the reports of others (*ἢ αἰσθόμενος*) and that derived from one's own eyes. (*ἢ αὐτὸς αὐτόπτης*, etc.

Page 44, 2. 900. A. *Δῆλος εἰ μέμφεσθαι*. "A peculiar Graecism," says Mr. Lewis, "equivalent to *δῆλόν ἐστι σέ μέμφεσθαι*." But *δῆλος εἰ μέμφεσθαι* is not Greek. The construction is *δῆλος εἰ ἐνὶ ᾧ ἐθέλων μέμφεσθαι*. "It is clear that you cannot consent to blame."

Page 44, 8. 900. B. *Πᾶθος* cannot, we think, be in apposition with *τὸ νῦν παρὸν δόγμα*, but, if a part of the text, must be taken with *ἐπὶ μείζον*. "In order that your present opinion may not grow into a more considerable or pronounced state of feeling leading to impiety."

Page 44, 9. We see no so very great strength of meaning in *ἀποδιοπομηνίεσθαι*. It is found both before and after *καθήρασθαι*, as being nearly synonymous. It is used (Laws, 9. 877. E), in just the same way as *ἀποσιώω* in Laws, 9. 873. B. 874. A. Its verbal is used by Phrynichus (p. 306. Lobeck) as the opposite of *ῥητίον*. The *metaphor*, however, as the word is here used, gives the passage an intensity of meaning.

Page 46, 14. 900. E. *Καὶ τῶν μὲν προσήκειν*, etc. The editor justly finds fault with Ast's construction, but his own seems not to be unobjectionable. The sentence will have none of that complication which he gives it, if we take *προσέκειν* and *μετόν*, (i. e. *μετόν εἶναι*, comp. Soph. Electr. 459), as parallel, and supply *εσαυῶτα*, the antecedent of *ἔπεσα* with *τῶν*. *Τῶν* then refers to both *αἰσχρά* and *καλά*. "And we will affirm that of the things mentioned, so many as are bad pertain to us, if they do to anybody, but

that the gods have no share in any such things (i. e. *φλαύρων*) great or small."

Page 46, 5. It might be added in support of *συνεξετάζωμεν*, that Eusebius has that reading. (Praepar. Evang. 12. 52.) But *συνεξετάζοντων*, which has the authority of the MSS. in its favor, can be borne with, if taken as a participle.

Page 48. 3. 901. A. The editor here supplies *θεός* as the subject. But against this there are serious objections. It is not in the near preceding context, and the author names *τόν γε θεόν* first a few lines below. But worse than this, it is unmeaning. The sense would be, "such a deity would be to us all, i. e. in our opinions, indolent, careless and lazy, etc." Such a deity as what? Either such a one as is indolent, careless and lazy, which is nonsense, or such a one as is vicious, which is not necessarily true. Apparently the text is imperfect. Ast supplies *μοσητός*, and Ficinus may have found a similar word in his authorities, since his version is *odio nobis habetur*. But this does not explain the answer. Possibly the word of Hesiod, *νέμεσητός*, with another reference to him, may be wanting after *ἡμῖν*. The sense is, "a person, if indolent, careless and lazy, one whom the poet declared to be just like dock-tailed drones, would be to all of us [an object of indignation, as he says]." To which Clinias replies in a common formula, "and very correctly too." To this the answer is, "then we must not say of God, at least, that he has a character of that very sort that he himself hates. The words *αὐτός μοσεῖ* contain an allusion to Hesiod's words, *τῷ δὲ θεοὶ νέμεσῶσι καὶ ἀνέρες*; and *πᾶσιν ἡμῖν*, if that, and not *πᾶς ἡμῖν*, be the true reading, alludes to *θεοὶ καὶ ἀνέρες* in the same passage.

Page 50. 3. 901. B. *Ποῖόν δὲ* ;—answer *λέγομεν*. Better as Eusebius has it, *ποῖόν δὲ λέγομεν* ;—answer *ἡ διαφέρων*, etc.

Page 52. 11. 902. A. The reading from Eusebius preferred by Ast and Stallbaum, *τοῦ γιγνώσκειν* instead of *τὸ γιγνώσκειν*, seems to suit the ensuing context best. The sense is, "what remains but the opposite of knowing," (i. e. not knowing that they ought to attend to *all* such things). With the vulgar text, which the editor retains, the sense is, "what remains but that they know the opposite ;" and it must be confessed that a good sense can be derived from this reading.

Page 52, 13. 902. A. The construction of this sentence might be made clear by remarking that two forms of expression, both common after words of *saying*, are used together: *λέγοντα ὡς ἀγνοοῦντας*, and *λέγοντα γιγνώσκοντας οὐ ποιεῖν*.

Page 53. 7. 902. B. We prefer *ὥσπερ* the vulgar reading, which Mr. L. retains, to *ὡσπερ*, Ast's and Stallbaum's reading, which is found in one MS., in the margin of another, and in the version of Ficinus. *Ὡσπερ* denotes merely comparison; *ὥσπερ* contains an argument from the greater *τὸν οὐρανόν*, to the less *τὰ θνητὰ ζῶα*.

Page 54. 6. 902. D. *ιατρῶ δῆ*, etc. Mr. Lewis gives a far better construction to this sentence than Ast does. We are surprised that he can hesitate for a moment as to the question whether *προσεταιγμένον* can be ever used as an impersonal absolute.

Page 55. 11. 902. E. We see no use for the mark of a broken sentence at the close of this passage, and we doubt if the structure be anacoluthous, common as that structure is in these books of the Laws. Supply, if anything, not *εἶναι* but *ὄντα* with *φανλότερον*. In *τὸν δὲ θεόν*, *δὲ* has its usual place after a parenthesis, and may mark contrast likewise. The construction proceeds thus. "Let us not think that God, inferior to mortal workmen,—that God, I say, takes no care of things small, but [does take care] of the great." In this sentence *μᾶ τέχνη* is beautifully contrasted with *σοφώτατον*, the single art of human artists with the boundless wisdom of God.

Page 57, 2. 903. A. In separating *ὁρθῶς* from *μὴ λέγειν* and assigning it to another speaker, the editor is obliged to give to *μὴ λέγειν* the sense of "saying nothing to the purpose," which he affirms to be common in Greek. We wish that he had given one example, for although *μηδέν, οὐδέν, λέγειν* are often so used, we are not aware that the other formula occurs with this sense. *Ὁμολογεῖν μὴ λέγειν* can only mean, we believe, *to own that he does not talk*, or *to promise not to talk*. The same words with *ὁρθῶς* have the sense desired, viz. *to own that he is not right in what he says*.

Page 57, 10. 903. B. *συντεταγμένα* cannot mean, "so arranged as to coöperate with the universal guardian," but *arranged together in a system*.

Page 57, 14. 903. C. *ἀπεργασμένοι*. This word seems to us incapable of receiving the sense of *appointing* or *constituting* an officer, as Mr. Lewis understands it. But the meaning is not clear. If *τέλος* could denote *perfection* here, we might translate thus: "having brought about perfection even to the ultimate division, i. e. having carried perfection into things the most minute." Cousin's version is something like this.

Page 58. 6. 903. C. The reading of Eusebius, approved by Stephanus, Ast and Stallb. *πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ ξυντείνων βέλτιστον*, *referring*

them, or making them all aim together at a common good, seems to us much better than the vulgar text, πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ ξυτταίνον βελτίονον, which the editor (on p. 291) prefers, and which has indeed the manuscripts in its favor. For besides the harshness of συτταίνον κοινῇ instead of εἰς, ἐπὶ, or πρὸς τὸ κοινόν, the highest good, which is aimed at and is only a result, is awkwardly said here to aim or tend. For the active use of συτταίρω comp. Gorg. 507. D, Republic 591. C, ὁ γὰρ σοὺν ἔχει πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ εἰς τοῦτο ξυτταίνας βιώσεται.

Page 59. 7. 903. E. We think that the editor has well comprehended the scope of this difficult passage, in note 53—far better indeed than Cousin; yet there are several points in his explanation of it which do not satisfy us. We have strong doubts about ὄδαρ ἐμψύχον,—cooling water, not frozen, as he has it,—which is only an emendation of Cornarius. ἐμψυχον, animated, is favored by ἐμψύχους πρᾶξεις just below, and by 895. C (ἴατε ἰδωμεν etc.). In his version of τῆς . . . κοσμήσεως he neglects the article; nor is it possible to supply μετασχηματισματα here. To make sense as well as grammar we seem obliged, with Ast, to supply τὰ before τῆς, which had also occurred to the writer. The sense is, “the altered arrangements”—i. e. the changes of arrangements—“would be endlessly numerous.”

Page 60. 6. 904. B. Ἀγαθὸν after ἀρετῶν deserves to be expunged, as wanting in four Florence MSS. and in Eusebius; and as hurting the sense, which is “and that whatever good there is pertaining to the soul naturally tends to benefit, and evil to injure.”

Page 61. 8. 904. B. We like the view given in note 57 that μικρότερα τῶν ἡθῶν is contrasted with μείζων δὲ δὴ ψυχῇ, and that πλείω δὲ is a subordinate member of the first clause. This had also occurred to the writer. But the words μείζων, καταλάβη, have scarcely a shadow of manuscript authority and must give way to μείζω, μεταβάλῃ. The meaning however will not then be essentially altered. The principal divisions of the sentence still begin with 1. *smaller traits of character* when they change less, and when they change more and for the worse; 2. *when the soul undergoes greater changes*, i. e. when its leading or larger traits of character are altered. In the latter part of the passage, the mention of some better place immediately after that of a “place surpassingly excellent and altogether holy,” together with the use of the aorist μετακομισθεῖσα are difficulties which trouble us, and which the editor does not remove. As for the rest, Mr. Lewis

will compare very advantageously with Cousin in translating this intricate passage.

Note 4, p. 99. Mr. Lewis thinks that *οἱ παλαιότεροι* (on page δ, 886. C) must refer to some productions older than the *Iliad* and the *Theogony*, probably to the Orphic poems. But as the words mean nothing more than the oldest of the poets and prose writers mentioned; and as Plato proceeds to speak of compositions to which the *Theogony* exactly answers, this interpretation is needless. Whether the Orphic forgeries were received by Plato as genuine or not, cannot be determined from the slight reference to them in his works. Nor would his opinion weigh much on a matter of historical criticism against that of Herodotus, Aristotle and a host of others, who brand these productions as impostures of the Pythagoreans. But if the *Theogony* of Orpheus were genuine, it cannot be made out that the hymns were known before the second century of our era. These remarkable poems seem to have grown like the epistles of Ignatius, until the worthy old Thracian became something of a Neoplatonist.

Page 118. "The Athenian [speaker in the *Laws*] who undoubtedly represents Socrates." We cannot agree with this. The Athenian in the *Laws* is quite an abstraction without that playful irony and many of those delicate traits, which are so delightful in the Platonic Socrates. The scene moreover is laid in Crete, where Socrates, according to dramatic propriety, should not be. Perhaps the absence of the conception of his master from this work will account for its inferiority, in form and life, to the other Platonic dialogues. The soul of Plato's world is here wanting, notwithstanding the extreme weight and importance of the subject-matter.

Page 262. The speculations here pursued at length "on the peculiarities of certain negative forms of Greek verbs," seem to be unnecessary, when one considers, 1. that such verbs are not derived from the primitives directly, but in the third degree, *through* or *as if from* some privative adjective, of which the derived verb expresses the meaning in the active,—the appropriate voice,—as ἀμείλιος of ἀμελής. 2. That this is true of all composition except with prepositions, as well with ἐν or πάλι, as with ἀ or δις. There are a few middle forms commencing with the privative ἀ, and as many with ἐν. For the middle of the primitives, when they are found, there is a good reason in each case.

Page 302. αἰὼν is here derived, after Aristotle, from αἰεῖν, and αἰεῖ "from αἶω, αἰέω or αἶημι signifying primarily to blow, to breathe,

secondly *to live, to pass or spend one's time*. "*ἄω* seems also to be related to *αἰώω*, *to feel life, to be conscious*, from whence some would derive *αἰών* in the general sense of existence. Homer uses *ἄω* or *αἰώω* in the second of the above meanings, as in the *Odyssey* 3. 151 and 490. Because this verb is thus used in several places of the *Odyssey*, in connection with *νύξ*, some lexicographers absurdly render it *to sleep*. It is however only thus employed because by night the flow or succession of time becomes a matter of distinct observation and consciousness more than by day. Hence, as the context shows, it is generally used of wakeful and anxious nights." One is tempted to regard these remarks as a bit of pleasant irony against the philologists, like the Platonic *Cratylus*. As however some may think that the author is in earnest, we will just remark that the derivation of *αἰών* given above, seems to be forbidden, among other reasons, by the laws of formation within the Greek, which would require the *τ* of *ών* to be retained, and by the cognate languages which have the same root in a simpler form, showing *ων* to be a mere ending; (*aevum*, in Latin, for instance; *ewa*, in High German,) that *ἄω* never means *to live, to pass or spend time*; that the *αἰώω* referred to and occurring once in Homer, (*Iliad* 15. 252,) means probably *to breathe, breathe out*; that so respectable a critic as Buttmann, in his *Lexilogus*, (No. 67,) gives *ἄσσαν* the sense of *schlafen*; and that though *αἰών* probably means no more than *to rest at night, or pass the night resting*, yet of the seven passages where it occurs, in two only can wakeful nights be thought of. In *Odys.* 16. 367 it is used where resting by night ashore is opposed to sailing until morning, and in *Apol. Rhod.* 4. 884, it is found in a most general description of going to bed: *ῥῆς ἐνι* (i. e. in their ground-beds) *δασάμενοι νύκτ' ἄσαντες ὡς τοπαροῖθεν*. It is a cognate of *ἰαίω*, which occurs (*Odys.* 19. 340) in the expression *ἄντρον νύκτας ἰάνον*, and yet in *ῥήγετον ἄντρον ἰαύεις, ὕστατον ἄντρον ἰαύεις* (*Hymn. in Ven.* 177, in *Merc.* 289). Even *εὔδω* is used of simple rest without sleep in *Odys.* 15. 5. These are small matters, and it is irksome to dwell upon them; but Plato teaches us, in the text which Mr. Lewis has edited, that the great cannot exist without the small, and that large stones, according to the masons, do not lie well in their places without little ones.

The greater part of the work before us is taken up with remarks, suggested by Plato's text, but pursued to a length and branching off into topics which required another place besides the foot of the page. If any person on first noticing the great

extent of these remarks should think that they were irrelevant, he would find himself much deceived: they grow, to a considerable degree, naturally out of the text; they tend to make it intelligible; and the reader who is fond of Plato will find them none too long. These discussions chiefly aim at a comparison between the Scriptures and Plato; at illustrating portions of his philosophy; and at applying his views to the correction of some wrong principles and modes of thinking, which are supposed to prevail in the present age.

There must ever be points, in which moral systems, the most remote as to the place, time and manner of their origin, resemble one another. But the resemblance between the Scriptures and the works of Plato has seemed to multitudes, since the origin of Christianity, to be of an intimate kind: otherwise Plato would not have been supposed to borrow from the Old Testament; and such devout minds as Marsilius Ficinus and Henry More would not have felt a powerful attraction towards the Athenian philosopher. Nor is the resemblance hard to be accounted for, though we reject the notion that Plato visited our fountains. For besides his near connection with Socrates, his own mind, in which were united imaginativeness, quick moral susceptibilities, logical power, and philosophical intuition, was preëminently fitted to see and receive that part of religious truth, which lies open to the reason of mankind.

But in drawing such a parallel a writer is in danger of being partial and one-sided. If it is our professed object to find points of union between two favorite authors, we have a double liability to be warped in our judgments. We cannot bear to think that the differences between those whom we love are great, and we wish to make out our point as well as we can. And in the same way those who aim exclusively at unfolding the differences between two authors, one of whom perhaps they dislike or are afraid of, are apt to place them at a far wider distance from one another than the truth will warrant. In all such cases some of the following considerations ought to be borne in mind.

In the first place, it is very plain that the true relations of two authors or of two systems are not known until we know both wherein they agree and wherein they differ. Thus for instance, if we are told that the supreme God of Plato is a being of boundless perfections who exercises a watchful providence over men; that human nature is felt by Plato to be in disorder and that the great aim of his philosophy is to restore and purify it; that for

the purpose of renovating it, he would raise up a body of good men and found a State on better principles; that he had a believing spirit and a reverence for the old and the traditional; that he held to something like a divine influence on the minds of certain men;—when we hear of these and many such things, which are in harmony with the Scriptures, we must be gratified, we must admire, we may feel that such accordance is to be explained only on the ground that both systems are rooted in the truth: but then to judge of the relations of the two we must take into account likewise that Plato's God is somewhat too lofty for human nature to behold, although probably not a *creator*; and is separated practically from us by mediating intelligences also called gods; that Plato held to the existence of a soul of the world, and of human souls formed before the formation of material things and passing through a multitude of bodies; that man being evil only through ignorance and bad circumstances, he would restore him to goodness by intellectual means, and by outward institutions in which the virtue of the mass would be little more than civic; that he could allow of deception, and conceive without disapproval even of the family state being destroyed; that he judged the improvement of the individual to be the chief foundation of punishment:—at these and many unchristian or not Christian things must we look,—to say nothing of the truths of positive revelation such as the object of the death of Christ,—in order to strike the balance in our judgment as to how near Plato approaches to the Scriptures. If when we first looked only at the beautiful and bright parts of that philosophy which arose in “the olive grove of Academe,” we thought that

“ that bright tower all built of christal clean
Panthea, seemed the brightest thing that was”

when we look again after the comparison we shall say

“ But now by prooffe all otherwise I ween :
 For *this* bright city that does far surpass
 And this bright angel's tower quite dims that tower of glass.”

We do not intend by these remarks to accuse Mr. Lewis of throwing out of view the differences between Plato and the Bible. This is by no means the case. We refer the reader to the note “on the defect of Plato's theology in regard to the doctrine of atonement and the necessity of an expiation”, and to the remarks on his Pelagian views of human nature, for the proof that Mr. Lewis is alive to such differences even in very important

points. But what we mean to say is this : that when a man sets out with the object of finding parallels between a favorite heathen author and the Scriptures, he necessarily conveys to the reader false ideas of the relations between the objects compared,¹ if he does not change those relations by putting a higher sense upon the heathen author than his words will warrant.

In the next place, in the very points where two authors or systems resemble one another there may be found great practical differences between them ; as great indeed as between glass and diamond. When the witch in Spenser creates a perfect counterfeit of the fair Florimel, all the knights are deceived and put upon a wrong pursuit ; but the substance of the false lady "was purest snow in glassy mould congealed," and a "wicked spright" took the place of a soul.

As an example of this let us take Plato's soul of the world, which has been compared to a divine providence. The first from under which this tenet appeared in Greece seems to have been that of a general vital energy running through all things, acting not according to the designs of intelligence but according to certain necessary laws. This view of a part of the Ionic school, was received by the Pythagoreans, if we have a right impression of the matter ; but in a greatly modified form. In their hands this vital energy became a divine intelligence controlling all things, which dwelt in the centre of the universe and from which human souls were emanations. So far God and the world were confounded or united together ; but by and by Anaxagoras with his doctrine of a divine mind, separate from the world, and introducing order and harmony, made a new era in philosophy. The doctrine of Anaxagoras had a considerable influence upon the opinions of the Socratic school ; but the doctrines of the Pythagoreans also helped to shape the system of Plato, and it seems to have been from these two sources that he derived the dogma of a supreme divine intelligence on the one hand, and the soul of the world on the other. Now what is there here really resem-

¹ Comp. Note 60, where Mr. Lewis shows "that many of Plato's thoughts are capable of being fairly accommodated to a spiritual sense higher than his author himself had intended to convey," and closes with advising preachers "to read the Bible in close connection with our philosopher and they will understand Plato better than he understood himself." If this is anything more than a strong expression of enthusiastic admiration, it puts an "elasticity" of import into Plato, something like that which certain writers have given to the word of God to make it suit their theories.

bling the Christian providence. If he conceived of a God exercising providence over his works, as far as that doctrine of providence was concerned, the soul of the world was superfluous. If he did not, he separated providence from God and gave it to another being. If man could be brought to believe in a soul of the world, ever present and intelligent and perfectly good yet distinct from God, it is plain that such a belief would practically thrust God out of the world by bringing something divine between men and him. It is worthy of remark that this soul of the world is made little of in the Platonic system, great as was the part which it played in the system of the Pythagorizing Neo-platonists.

So, too, the State of Plato has been compared to the Christian church; and there are, certainly, points of resemblance between them. Both are unities in which each member performing his right part, lives for all. Both have a class of guardians selected for their fitness to perform the office, and educated in the study of truth and of God. But how great the difference. In the one, men are to be made good by the study of wisdom. In the other, doing the will of God and doing good, are the key to wisdom itself. In the one, the common people are to obey and mind their business; and hence this system is praised the most loudly by those who would have the private Christian believe on authority and submit implicitly to his priest. In the other, there is no common people. All Christians belong to the aristocracy, for they are kings and priests unto God. In the one, destruction is necessary according to some fatal law. In the other, perpetual progress ends in the heavenly state. The one must have a certain form, that it may begin its activity: it is the product of reforming philosophy. The other is a vital energy: it is leaven, that penetrates into all forms of government and all states of society.

Perhaps nothing in Plato is more noble and scriptural than his idea of loving God, expressed in the *Symposium* and elsewhere, and the confidence that God will always help the good man, which he manifests towards the close of the *Republic*. In this latter passage he almost falls into the same language with St. Paul: "We must conceive this of the righteous man, whether he is afflicted with poverty or disease or any other seeming evil, that all will at last turn into good, either in this life or after he is dead. For surely *he* is never neglected by the gods, who zealously seeks to become righteous, and who desires, by studying virtue, as far as it is possible for man, to be assimilated to God." We admire

and revere the mind in which such thoughts could dwell. But when we consider that the love of God is the love of the beautiful and the good, as showing itself in the contemplations of theoretical philosophy; and that Plato's righteous man is not so much one whose transgressions are forgiven, whose sin is covered, as one who by studying truth has purified himself into virtue; we compare such philosophy to the 'cold flame' of which Pindar speaks, and would prize it, with all its beauties and glories, below one confession of sin or one prayer for divine aid.

A number of the Excursuses are principally taken up with illustrating portions of the Platonic philosophy. The method of explaining any system of dogmas by means of notes, has in it this necessary imperfection: that some parts of the system must be omitted because they are not alluded to in the text, and that thus, the connection being lost, the other parts cannot be understood in their true relations. Perhaps, however, no portion of Plato's works, so small in extent, suggests a greater number of references to his system, than this which Mr. Lewis has edited. There is also this advantage attending the method here pursued: those who study the text will find it necessary to read the remarks in these longer notes, in order to gain full possession of the meaning. They will thus reach a certain point of knowledge which will be far from contenting them; and having the appetite sharpened to know more of a philosophy which appears in specimens as one of surpassing beauty, will not rest until they find out what that philosophy is as a whole, and in a methodical arrangement. We trust that the present editor, after awakening that spirit of inquiry, will take measures to satisfy it. If he pursues the plan mentioned in the introduction, of editing another of Plato's dialogues with an accompaniment of remarks on the doctrine of ideas, it will be no doubt of great service to inquirers in this branch; but, if we may offer our advice, a better course still would be to give to the public Plato's views in a scientific form and with the requisite proof-passages.

Mr. Lewis shows in his remarks a great familiarity with the works of Plato, a fearless independence in ascertaining for himself what are the doctrines of the philosopher, and a most ardent attachment, involving some partizanship, to the leading features of the system. He unfolds his views with great ability, and not without much reflection. The present work is to be regarded as the result of long examination untrammelled by authorities, and the expression of mature judgment. Mr. Lewis seems to possess

a highly philosophical mind, in which the moral element is duly combined with the metaphysical. To physical inquiries he seems averse, and looks on them with suspicion as beginning or ending in atheism. But a system like that of Plato, in which God and the good are the end of science, and which places the ethical in a far higher rank than that science occupies which has to do with phenomena, has high claims for him, and finds in him a congenial mind. As specimens of the ability of Mr. Lewis to handle the Platonic philosophy, and of his peculiar manner, we recommend to the notice of our readers the remarks on the doctrine of the four elements; on the philosophical use of *εἶναι* and *γίγνεσθαι*; on the question, do all things flow; on the Platonic doctrine of the evil principle, especially those on *ἀνάγκη* at the end of note 31; and of a moral sort those upon *ἀνδρεία*, and the four cardinal virtues. The most prominent faults we have noticed are a desire to make that absolute which is in its own nature relative, and a disposition to speak with too much severity or contempt of those who differ from Plato or from himself. Thus on page 167, we find the following strange remark. "The velocity of the hour-hand of a watch, that revolves once in twenty-four hours, is the same as that of the earth on its axis." But this is changing the definition of velocity. Everybody knows that such an hour-hand would describe the same arc in the same time with the earth. But that is not, according to the acceptance of that term, velocity. The end of the hour-hand has one velocity; and any other point in its length another. So, too, in regard to *αἰών* and time, (No. 55,) there is truth in the representation that "God fills his own eternal now," but yet we are compelled to believe that in the view of God's mind, the death of Christ took place before his resurrection, and that the fulfilment of the promise to Abraham was posterior to the promise itself. On page 165, Mr. Lewis says, that "Playfair and others seem to have greatly bungled in their efforts to amend by substituting a far more complex idea for this old and perfect definition of Euclid" [of a straight line]. But the mathematicians will tell us, that Playfair gave a new definition because Euclid's could not be made the basis of mathematical reasoning. Nothing can be deduced from it, they say, and Euclid deserted it himself, when it came to be applied. Mr. Lewis is particularly hard upon Aristotle. There is an old Platonist who says, that "of all who differ from Plato, the Peripatetic differs the most." The one he compares with an animal of the earth, the other with a bird of heaven (Euseb. *Praepar. Evang.* 15. 4). And thus the Academy

has always looked with contempt or dislike upon the Lyceum. But Mr. Lewis is in some respects severer yet. He says (note 26), that "Aristotle was never careful to do Plato justice; although it would be easy to show—the modern declamation to the contrary notwithstanding—that their philosophy was substantially the same; the main difference arising from the Stagirite's studious care to adopt, in many cases, a different phraseology, for the purpose of creating the appearance of a wider disagreement than really exists, and from his continual disposition to pervert and distort Plato's real meaning. His misrepresentation here, whether wilful or not, arises," etc. And a little below, "We have likewise an example of the gross manner in which Aristotle misstates Plato in another assertion." "One cause of Aristotle's misconception may have been his own unsound definition of motion." We had supposed, in reliance on the word of Aristotle himself,¹ that he thought there was a difference between himself and Plato on so important a matter as the doctrine of ideas, and that he regarded Plato as one for whom he felt a friendship. If misconception, then, really existed, we should deem it involuntary, arising from the different structure of his mind, and his different principles of thinking. But no. His system, it seems, was about the same as Plato's, and to produce the appearance of a difference he changed his own terms and perverted Plato's meaning. Surely a judgment of this kind is a harsh one towards the dead or the living.

We subjoin a few miscellaneous observations that have occurred to us in reading the notes. On page 108, it is stated that the *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras "was only another name for the physical truth of things in which the Atheist contends there may be science on his hypothesis, as well as on any other.—It might be regarded as the instinct of the universe working in the great whole." Final causes "were studiously excluded from his philosophy."—"He seems to have been a regular priest and poet hater." There is, we think, some injustice done here to Anaxagoras and his merits as a philosopher. As for final causes, no one of his school or his time thought of them. The problem to be solved was a physical one. He was as far then from studiously excluding moral causes as the people of the fourteenth century were from excluding America from their thoughts. Anaxagoras, we grant, conceived of a *νοῦς*, limited in its agencies, and of materials in which all the future properties of things lay, and speculating as a physical philosopher, it is not likely that he thought much about the moral attri-

¹ Eth. Nicom. 1. 6.

butes of his supreme intelligence. But *he* ought to be gratefully remembered who separated *νοῦς* from all things else,—a separation, perhaps, without which neither Socrates nor Plato could have been what they were. When he put an end to the reign of chance and of necessity, when he introduced a mind possessed of the knowledge of past and future, and standing apart from the materials to be reduced into shape and order,¹ he brought one element into Greek philosophy, which was of unspeakable importance—the rudiments of a doctrine of a divine soul distinct from the world, and of a point of time when that soul brought all things into order and beauty.—That the friend of Euripides hated poets needs evidence.

Page 124. We had thought that in the lines of Prometheus,

ὦ πάντων
Αἰθὴρ κοινὸν φῶς εἰλίσσων,

(v. 1090,) there was allusion to nothing more than the revolution of the sun in the sky; but Mr. Lewis thinks that “the poet clearly regards it [the aether] as the source of vision, and seems to have held respecting it something like the modern undulating theory of light. At least we can make no other sense of *εἰλίσσων*, which in connection with *αἰθὴρ* and *φῶς* suggests at once to the mind that waving or enlarging spiral motion, which the air undergoes in the propagation of sound; and which, in the theory referred to, is supposed to take place in that universal fluid, whose vibrations or undulations give rise to the phenomena of vision.” If this be so, the naturalists would do well to study the old poets, for no doubt something not yet known may be elicited from them. But what shall we say to the sun,

Θοαῖς Ἰπποισιν εἰλίσσων φλόγα—(Eurip. *Phoenissæ*. 3.)

or to Artemis, as the moon-goddess,

Τὸ λαμπρὸν εἰλίσσουσ' ἐν εὐφρόνῃ φῶς—(id. *Iph. in Aul.* 1571),

or to Ares as a planet,

πυραυγέα κύκλον εἰλίσσων
Αἰθέρος ἐκπαρόροις ἐνὶ τείρεσι.—(Hom. *Hymn. in Mart.* 6.)

On page 175, amid some valuable remarks on the very important distinction between *εἶμι* and *γίγνομαι* in their strict philosophical use, (which is however, as might be expected, not always strictly observed just as in the case of *ἰδέα* and *εἶδος*.) we read the follow-

¹ See especially the eighth frag. in Schaubach's Collection, and comp. Ritter. *Gesch. der Phil.* 1. 311 seq.

ing: "Even the etymological origin of these two verbs may, without any extravagance of fancy, be supposed to betoken the vast difference between them. The primary elements of the one (*ew, z, u*), are found in the most aethereal of vowels. The other (*yaw, y*) has for its ultimate radical the hardest, and we might almost say, the most earthly of the guttural mutes." Unfortunately for this theory the radical part of *εἶμι* is *éσ*, so that the Doric *ἔσω*, and *essentia*, with the serpent's hiss contained in them, represent the root better than *εἶμι* itself, and far better than *οὐσία*, which have felt the influence that sweeps over generated things, and been departing from their primitive type since the earliest times, so that the noun has lost all vestige of the radical syllable. Nay it is more than probable that the vowel itself was originally *α*. And is not the name of *ideas* themselves derived from an act of one of the senses? Is not *γέρος*, which is now and then a synonym of *εἶδος* (comp. *Sophista* 253. B) from this very root which is allied to all instability? We should hardly have noticed this, were it not a sample of a number of instances in which the author, led astray by perverted ingenuity, has disregarded facts and looked beyond what lay at his feet in search of something more profound.

On page 234 the editor says, "We have every reason to believe that Plato meant no more by his soul of the world whether in respect to the universe or to its particular parts than Cudworth intends by his famous plastic nature, to which in some places he seems inclined to ascribe a species of obscure animate existence." But we need an explanation how this is consistent with passages in Plato in regard to the soul of the world with which the editor is familiar. In *Politicus* (269. D, a passage once before cited) it is called an animated thing and endowed with *φρόνησις* by its framer, (*ζῶον δὲ καὶ φρόνησιν εἰληχὸς ἐκ τοῦ συναρμύσσαντος*), and in *Timaeus* we find it said that the world was composed by uniting reason to soul and soul to body, (30. B).

On page 236, the editor quotes a passage from the *Troades* of Euripides, (890 seq.) beginning *ὦ γῆς ὄχημα καὶ γῆς ἔχων ἔδραν*, with the remark that he does not "know which to admire most, the philosophy or the poetical beauty of these remarkable lines." The last part of the verse is applicable, he thinks, only to "a soul which, although pervading, is also at the same time above and distinct from the world or universe which it moves; for *γῆ* here is evidently to be taken in this large sense." But what authority is there for giving this latitude of meaning to *γῆ*? The line we

have quoted is understood by the writer of the scholia first made known in 1821 to refer to the *aether*; and so, Forster on *Phaedo*, (p. 390) and Valckenaer had already interpreted it. Although we will not affirm that this is the sense, (and to do so would be the more dangerous on account of the loose and unsettled nature of the poet's views,) yet it well accords with another passage from a lost play of Euripides, which runs as follows: "Thou seest that boundless aether which on high, with humid arms embraces earth around, τοῦτον νόμιζε Ζῆνα, τόνδ' ἡγοῦ θεόν." In the third line—Ζεὺς, εἰτ' ἀνάγκη φύσος, εἰτε τοὺς βορῶν,—if the latter part means *reason such as man's*, something irrational was contemplated by the first clause, so that the poet seems to be at a loss whether a blind law or reason guided the world.

On page 253, the author thinks that when the goodness of the gods is spoken of (p. 51, 901. D, ἀγαθούς τε καὶ ἀρίστους ὁμολογήκαμεν αὐτοὺς εἶναι, πέντε ὄντες,) the appeal is made to the moral sense. "Plato," says he, "does not hesitate to appeal here to the consciences even of his supposed opponents, and therefore he says πέντε ὄντες, *all five of us*, namely the three parties to the dialogue and the two imaginary disputants who speculatively deny a providence." But it is clear, we think, that there is no reference to the intuitions of the moral sense whatever. The imaginary opponents are supposed to have been present during the former argument, and to have been forced by Plato's logic (see p. 34,) to admit that a good soul governed the universe.

We will only add one remark on the meaning of the phrase καθάπερ οἱ κατὰ νόμον ὄντες θεοί, (p. 60. 904. A,) in which the editor translates κατὰ νόμον by "according to the decree of fate (fatum) on which their existence depended." In this he follows Ast, and with that editor defends his version by κατὰ τὴν τῆς σιμαμένης τάξιν καὶ νόμον. (p. 61, 7. 904. C.) Ficinus seems to have been troubled by the place; since his rendering "neque tamen aeternum esse, qua lege Dii sunt," departs widely from the sense of the text; and yet mention is made of no variant in the MSS. Cousin's French is "comme les vrais dieux," as if there had been no κατὰ νόμον in the passage. If we are not deceived, the meaning is nothing more than *the gods who are pronounced by law to be such, the established objects of worship*, i. e. τοιοῦτοι θεοὶ οἷον φησὶν ὁ νόμος. (See p. 15. 9. 890. B.) How νόμος even in the singular without some restricting word can be understood of a *fatal necessity*, or of a *law of their nature as originally given them*, we do not see. The view of Mr. Lewis in opposition to that of

other interpreters that καθάπερ in this passage relates not merely to οὐκ αἰώνιον, but to ἀνώλεθρον δὲ . . . ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰώνιον, when taken in connection with the passage of Timaeus which he cites, is very ingenious, and deserves most respectful consideration.

It is an object which Mr. Lewis has much at heart in these excursions, to correct some false views and oppose certain wrong tendencies which seem to him to be prevalent in our day. On this subject he speaks as follows, in the Introduction.

"We believe that in this age there is a peculiar call for a deeper knowledge of Plato. Some acquaintance with his doctrine of ideas seems needed as a corrective to the tendency, so widely prevalent, to resolve all knowledge into an experimental induction of facts, not only in physical, but also in ethical and political science. 'If the Good, to adopt our author's own style, is something more than pleasure or happiness, either present or anticipated—if the True is something higher than past, present or future *facts*—if the Beautiful is something more than a generalization from pleasing individual sensations—if the Just and the Right involve inquiries far above those endless logomachies, and questions of casuistry, which form the main features of modern ethics—if the State is a reality transcending a present aggregation of flowing and perishing individuals—if Law is a spiritual power distinct from the muscular force of a majority of present wills—if God is something more than gravitation, or the eternal development of a physical fate, which is only another name for an eternal succession of inexplicable phenomena—if there is a real foundation for the *moral* and religious, as distinct from, and not embraced in, the *natural*, or, in other words, if penalty and retribution are terms of far more solemn import than the modern jargon about physical consequences—then surely it is high time that there should be some disturbance of this placid taking for granted of the opposing views; then surely should Plato be studied, if for no other purpose, as a matter of curiosity, to see if there may not possibly be some other philosophy than this noisy Baconianism, about which there is kept up such an everlasting din, or that still more noisy, because more empty, transcendentalism, which some would present as its only antidote. In place of all this, we want the clear, simple, *common sense* philosophy of Plato, commending itself, when rightly understood, to all the κοινὰ ἔννοιαι, or universal ideas of the race, in distinction from that miscalled common sense which is only the manufactured public opinion of the moment—a philosophy most religious—most speculative, and yet most practical—most childlike in its primeval simplicity, and yet most profound."

And after a few words he speaks in these terms of the tendency towards atheism in the present age.

"He who thinks most deeply, and has the most intimate acquaintance with human nature, as exhibited in his own heart, will be the most apt to resolve all unbelief into Atheism. Especially will this be the case at a

time when physical science, in league with a subtle pantheism, is everywhere substituting its jargon of laws, and elements, and nebular star-dust, and vital forces, and magnetic fluids, for the recognition of a personal God, and an ever wakeful, ever energizing special providence. Theism, we admit, is everywhere the avowed creed, but it wants life. It is too much of a mere philosophy." — "We want vividness given to the great idea of God as a judge, a moral governor, a special superintendent of the world and all its movements, the head of a *moral* system, to which the machinery of *natural* laws serves but as the temporary scaffolding, to be continued, changed, replaced, or finally removed, when the great ends for which alone it was designed, shall have been accomplished. Just as such an idea of God is strong and clear, so will be a conviction of sin, so will be a sense of the need of expiation, so will be a belief in a personal Redeemer, and so will follow in its train an assurance of all the solemn verities of the Christian faith, so strong and deep, that no boastful pretension of that science which makes the natural the foundation of the moral, and no stumbling-blocks in the letter of the Bible will for a moment yield it any disquietude. There is a want of such a faith, as is shown by the feverish anxiety in respect to the discoveries of science, and the results of the agitations of the social and political world. This timid unbelief, when called by its true name, is Atheism."

It is a noble aim to seek to reform the errors of our time ; and the aim is the nobler, the more vital these errors. The means too by which the bad tendencies of the reigning philosophy are to be met and checked, have something lofty in their nature. They are the inculcation of that philosophy which rises above sense, and fixes its eye on immutable verities ; which sees the masses of generated things perish and assume new forms beneath its feet, while above it lie the pure region of moral truth and the throne of infinite goodness. This philosophy too claims to be more nearly allied to Christian truth than any other, and doubtless such a claim must be allowed to it, at least before every ancient system ; since it actually led numbers into Christianity in the first ages, and held in common with Christianity the doctrines that the soul is immortal, and that there exists a God of boundless perfections, who is the highest object of science. These and other elevating truths were the means by which many were called away from a direct contact with the corruption of the early centuries, and put in training for admission into a higher school. There is no doubt, moreover, that the study of Plato, by its *unmaterializing* influence would have a most desirable effect upon our own age and country. And if we descend from the essence of the Platonic philosophy to the form and manner in which it is conveyed to us, the advantage to the taste, of reading such ex-

quisite productions as many of the dialogues and more particularly the Republic, is a good of no small value. The moral traits too of the Platonic Socrates, his humility of judgment, his gentleness and good nature, his constant desire to know the truth, his superiority to show and pretence, tend to make one not only love him, but love and wish to have the character which is so attractive in him. For these among other reasons we are advocates for the study of Plato, and believers in its happy results.

But those who are smitten with the beauties of Plato ought ever to remember that his was a system imperfect and limited, necessarily one-sided, sometimes chiming in and sometimes making discord with Christian truth. We have already spoken on a part of this subject. We will here add, before closing, a thought or two on certain tendencies which ought to be taken into view in connection with the admiration which we may be disposed to feel for the great Athenian philosopher.

And first Platonism in some degree unfits its adherents for active life. It is the glory of Christianity that it leads men to *do* something, that it carries them out of themselves in labors for God and mankind. There have been all over the world, for ages, theosophies, which have aimed to bring the soul to God by begetting internal purity through the contemplation of virtue. But they could neither operate effectually on mankind, nor have they done much to their votaries besides shutting them up in the solitude of their own thoughts. Platonism, in common with all these systems, puts the contemplative before the active, gnosis before love. Its idealism separates its adherents from the mass of men, and inclines them to complain of the present. Hence its audiences have ever been few, especially among those practical nations which have had the most influence on the destinies of mankind. Now it may be asked, granting that all this is true, is it not desirable to have an antidote to the excessively practical spirit of the present day, which runs forward into action before it has any capital-stock of principles to sustain it. We admit that such an antidote is desirable; but there is danger, too, that the antidote will become the only food of those who use it. The mischief is, that we are likely to have one-sided practical men, or one-sided men of the Platonic sort; men who, like Plato himself, have more faculty of seeing the evils of society, than of mingling with and improving it.

The only other remark we will make is, that physical science is a most important handmaid even to religious truth, and that there is danger of its being undervalued. Socrates began a new

impulse in philosophy by turning his attention away from physical science to the study of the human mind. This new direction was of inestimable service to science; but it seems as if a certain narrowness was imparted by it to the Platonic school, which has ever adhered to that body. Few, we believe, are the names and small the success of natural philosophers belonging to the Academy. They have usually looked on the study with dread or contempt, either as leading to atheism or as employed about transitory and particular things. But here again the one-sided tendency is unfortunate. At least it may well be doubted whether physics and metaphysics can be understood fully when disconnected, and whether the observation of events and of nature is not as essential even to a true theology as the intuitions of reason. Is not every general process in nature a contribution to our knowledge of God? Could the essential excellence of justice convince us that God was just, if we did not discover here on earth precisely such a system of imperfect justice, as is possible in a probationary state? Is not the fact open to our observation that "the earth is full of the goodness of the Lord" as necessary to satisfy our minds as are the original convictions of our reason upon that subject?

But it is said there is a decay of faith at the present age. The leaning is towards materialism. There may be truth in this, but we may doubt whether the cry on this subject is not too loud, as long as we see the numbers of devout naturalists who flourish in these times, and especially as long as we see that it is a most religious age, full of hope and full of effort for the spread of Christianity. This certainly does not look like the increase of atheism and unbelief.

We would wish then to see a milder spirit than many now exhibit, shown towards the reigning philosophy. It has made known a multitude of particulars calculated to throw light on the wisdom of God, and to fill the mind with wonder and reverence. It is an humble philosophy: so far from boasting that it has opened the inner chambers of nature, it only claims to have just reached the threshold. If charged with not having the nature of true science, which is concerned with the absolute and the invariable, it quietly replies, that however that may be, it has treasured up a store of facts and of laws, if they may be called so, for future generations and younger philosophies to use. If accused of being noisy, it may urge that however loudly its achievements may be talked of, it is not noisy in its own nature. Its path is along the still valley and on the hills, where the solitary flower and the lonely

crystal have their abode; its communion is with the silent stars; it evaporates its liquids, and analyses its compounds in noiseless experiments. It may have tendencies which need to be resisted, but it is nevertheless not to be despised as a helper in acquainting us with God.

ARTICLE VI

ROMAN SLAVERY.

Translated from the German of Dr. W. A. Becker, Professor in the University of Leipzig. By J. O. Lincoln, Prof. of Latin in Brown University.

[The following article is a translation from a learned work of Prof. W. A. Becker, entitled "A Manual of Roman Antiquities," now in course of publication in Germany. The first Part appeared in 1843, and is devoted to the subject of Roman Topography. It consists of two minor parts, the first embracing the sources of information, and the literature of the subject; and the second, the Topography itself. Accompanying this Part are a Plan of the City, prepared under the personal direction of the author, and four Plates, illustrative of the Fora, the Capitol, Fragments of the Capitoline Plan and Roman Coins. This Treatise on Topography has attracted great attention in Germany; and has been the subject, for the most part, of very favorable criticism; and even its severe reviewer, Prof. Preller of Dorpat, in the *Jena Journal*,¹ concedes to it the highest distinction in this department of labor, and calls it "the most useful Manual of Roman Antiquities." This review has elicited a rejoinder from the author, which has appeared as a Supplement to the First Part of the Manual, under the significant title of "A Warning," and, we fancy, will effect the author's purpose, of clearing the lists of all antagonists, who are not duly armed and equipped for the contest. The controversy involves the merits of what may be called the Italian and the German schools of Roman Topography; and Prof. Preller, a distinguished laborer in classical Archaeology, having spent the winter of 1843—44 in Rome, and prosecuted his topographical investigations in habits of daily intercourse with Canina and with the scholars there associated

¹ *Jena Allgem. Liter. Zeitung*, 1844, Nos. 121—127.

in the Archaeological Society, has come forth, on his return to Germany, as the champion of the Italian school, to rescue its fallen honor from the victorious hands of Dr. Becker. This matter is perhaps not yet at an end; but it may be safely concluded, that Roman topography has suffered no material injury under the treatment of Dr. Becker. The truth is, and we speak not without personal knowledge, the labors of Prof. Preller, though characterized by great ability, and conducted in connection with daily investigations on the spot, have not sprung from purely professional aims, nor been animated by an independent love of science, but have been largely mingled with private and local prejudices, and imbued with the zeal and spirit of party. This whole subject deserves an extended review; but we only remark in this passing notice, that it remains to be seen, whether the thorough philological cultivation and learning of a German scholar, aided by a personal examination of Roman localities, will not, in the settlement of the vexed questions of Roman Topography, prevail over the inferior classical scholarship of Italy, though combined with the great architectural skill and knowledge of Canina, and his long and intimate acquaintance with all the local antiquities of Rome.

It is from the second Part of the above mentioned work, only the first subdivision of which has very recently appeared, that the following account of Roman Slavery has been translated. This Part is devoted to the subject of Political Antiquities, and the present subdivision embraces three chapters, the first on the Origin of the Roman State, the second on the Divisions of the Roman Population, and the third on the Civil Constitution under the Kings. The account of Slavery occurs as one of the sections in the second chapter. In its character and method, it illustrates the learning and scholarship of the whole work. On account of its intrinsic merits, as well as the fact of the prevailing interest in our country on the general subject, we have thought it worthy of being rendered accessible to the American reader. We have not been unmindful of the valuable Essay on this subject by Prof. B. B. Edwards, which appeared in the Biblical Repository, Oct. 1835. The great merit of that Essay is too well known, to need any notice from the Translator of this Article; but its plan and contents were so far different, as not to render the present account superfluous or needless. It embraces some topics that lay beyond the present author's design, and on others did not profess to give minute and detailed information. The various forms of manumission, the civil position of the Libertini, and several other topics, are here

discussed more fully, exactly and satisfactorily, than in any other account that we have been able to find. We hope that the article itself, as well as the learned notes of the author, will prove useful to teachers and all others, who are interested in obtaining exact information on the subject of Roman Slavery.—Tr.]

In Rome, as in all the States of antiquity, the whole population fell into two classes, the *liberi* and the *servi*, the free, and the not free, or the slaves. In the earliest periods, the free were those who formed, in the tribes and the curiae, the *populus Romanus*, and there were no gradations of liberty; except that the clients (*clientes*) held a peculiar relation of political dependence, and enjoyed only a partial freedom. But when liberty came to be bestowed upon slaves, and there arose a class of persons, who were free, and yet did not stand upon a level of equality with the originally free, it became necessary to distinguish degrees of freedom.

The idea of freedom was defined by the Romans only in a negative manner. The lame definition,¹ according to which liberty is the natural power of doing anything that one will, unless hindered therein by violence or by law, was scarcely noticed in political and civil law, and the free were regarded only in opposition to slaves—a free man was one, *qui servitutem non servit*, who did not serve as a slave.

The free were divided into the *ingenui*, the freeborn, and the *libertini*, the freed, or the freedmen.

It was sufficient to the claim of free birth,² to be born of a free

¹ Inst. I. 3. (Justinian's Institutes.) Summa igitur divisio de jure personarum hæc est, quod omnes homines aut liberi sunt, aut servi. Et libertas quidem est naturalis facultas ejus, quod cuique facere libet, nisi si quid vi aut jure prohibetur. Also, Theophilus I. 3. p. 22. Goth. (Godefroy's Edition) p. 43. Reiz' do. εὐχέρεια φυσικὴ ἐκάστῳ συγχωροῦσα πράττειν, ἃ βούλεται, ἐν μὴ νόμος ἢ βία χωλίζει, etc. Comp. Gaius, I. 9. Cicero also contents himself with the same definition in Paradoxa 5. 1. Quid est enim libertas? potestas vivendi, ut velis. An quisquam est alius liber, nisi ducere vitam, cui licet ut voluit?

² It is probable that, in the earliest times, the condition of free birth was guarded with more strictness; that only the patricians were at first considered *ingenui*, then afterwards also the plebeians; but the son of a freedman would scarcely have been so considered. But it is certain that very early the notion of *ingenuus* was confined to free birth, in distinction from manumission. Thus Gaius I. 11. (a jurist in the time of Aurelian) *Ingenui sunt, qui liberi nati sunt*. Isid. Orig. IX. 4, 46. (Isidorus Originum, sive Etymologiarum.) *Ingenui dioti, qui in genere habent libertatem, non in facto, sicut liberti*. Thus it appears that the *ingenuus* was born at once to freedom and to citizenship, and came directly with birth into the class of the free.

mother; and the further development of this condition led to the mild practical view, that in all cases the decision should be made in favor of the child. Thus the condition was secured if the mother were free at the time of the birth, although the emancipation had taken place during pregnancy; on the other hand, it did not derogate from the freedom of the child, if the mother became a slave during pregnancy, and became a mother as a slave; and finally too, the children of a free woman by a slave, were considered free persons.³

Besides the natural freedom by birth, there was the liberty by manumission, as in the case of *liberti*, *libertini*, which will be more particularly explained below.

A Roman could be deprived of liberty in more than one way, but the gradations of civil freedom always remained unchangeable. The freedman could never gain the rights of free birth, and again these rights could be lost only with freedom itself. Hence when a freeborn Roman fell into slavery by captivity in war, and afterwards regained his liberty by manumission, and coming back to Rome was again invested *jure postliminii* (by the right of return) with his former rights, he passed notwithstanding the manumission, not as a *libertus*, but as *ingenuus*, according to the principle, *natalibus non officere manumissionem* (that manumission is no hindrance to one's birth-rights).

The class opposed to the free, as already mentioned, was the slaves. In reference to their position, it was the fundamental

³ Inst. I. 4. *Ingenuus est is, qui statim, ut natus est, liber est; sive ex duobus ingenuis, sive ex libertinis duobus, sive ex altero libertino et altero ingenuo. Sed etsi quis ex matre nascitur libera, patre servo, ingenuus nihilominus nascitur, quemadmodum, qui ex matre libera et incerto patre natus est, quoniam vulgo conceptus est (vulgo, illegitimately). Sufficit autem liberam fuisse matrem eo tempore, quo nascitur, licet ancilla conceperit. Et e contrario, si libera conceperit, deinde ancilla facta pariat, placuit, eum qui nascitur, liberum nasci, quia non debet calamitas matris ei nocere, qui in ventre est. Comp. Marcian. Digesta, I. 5. 5. and XL. 2. 19. The principle that one born of a free mother, but of a father who was a slave, is free-born, held *jure gentium*, by the law of nations, Gaius I. 82. On the other hand, several legislative enactments, as the *Lex Aelia Sentina*, and the *Senatus Consultum Claudianum*, did not acknowledge it, Gaius I. 83—86. Comp. Tacitus, *Annals*, XII. 53. and Suetonius, 'Vespasian,' p. 11. By the above S. C. the free woman, who became pregnant by a slave, without the consent of the slave's master to such intercourse, became the female slave of that master, and her child was a slave; if the master gave his consent to the intercourse, the mother remained free, but the child was at once slave and the property of the master. Hadrian altered this law, in favor of the freedom of the child, in such cases, where the mother remained free.*

opinion of antiquity, that they were subject, it is true, contrary to their natural destination, but yet not the less *jure*, to the power and dominion of another.⁴ In relation to his servitude, the slave was called *servus*, in Greek, δούλος; to the master's right of property in him, *mancipium* (ἀνδράποδος); in respect to his employment and services, *famulus*, *puer* (οἰκέτης, παῖς).

Slavery was established among the Romans upon a two-fold basis, *jure gentium*, by the law of nations, and *jure civili*, by the civil law. *Institutiones*, I 3. 3. (by Justinian) *Servi aut nascuntur, aut fiunt. Nascuntur ex ancillis nostris fiunt, aut jure gentium, aut jure civili.* The same is otherwise expressed in the *Digesta* (Pandects), I 5. 5. *Servi autem in dominium nostrum rediguntur, aut jure civili, aut gentium. Jure civili, si quis se major viginti annis ad pretium participandum venire passus est; (the pretium means the price of his freedom, in reference to the case of a free person fraudulently allowing himself to be sold as a slave for the sake of a share in the purchase-money) jure gentium servi nostri sunt, qui ab hostibus capiuntur, aut qui ex ancillis nostris nascuntur.* The former of these divisions explains the origin of slavery, in its relation to the slave, the latter has regard to the legal title of the master. The latter is the more useful and logically correct, for the distinction *aut nascuntur, aut fiunt* has no practical value, and those *qui nascuntur*, belong to the class of slaves *jure gentium*.

Accordingly, slavery could take place :

1. *Jure gentium*, by the law of nations, and

a) By capture in war, since the captured enemy, in common with all that was taken, became the property of the victor. Such prisoners of war were either destined, as *servi publici*, to the service of the State, or sold, as in the majority of cases, for the benefit of the public treasury.⁵

⁴ Florentius, *Digesta* I. 5. 4. *Servitus est constitutio juris gentium, qua quis dominio alieni contra naturam subicitur.* So *Inst.* I. 3. Theophilus I. 3. 2. Δουλεία δὲ ἐστὶν ἐθνικοῦ νομίμου διάντησις ἐξ ἧς τις υποβάλλεται τῇ ἐτέρου δεσποτείᾳ, ὑπεναντίον τοῦ φυσικοῦ νομίμου. In regard to the efforts of Greek philosophers to justify slavery, see Charicles II. p. 21 sqq. [a work on the Private Life of the Greeks, by Becker, the author of the present article, and resembling in plan and character Gallus, the corresponding work on Roman life, which has already been translated in England, though not yet re-published in this country.]

⁵ The expression for the sale of prisoners of war was *sub corona venire*, as Livy, II. 17. IV. 34. IX. 42. Caesar, *Bellum Gallicum*, III. 16. Sometimes the more general expression occurs, *sub hasta venire*. The words *sub corona*

b) By birth. All who were born of a female slave, were slaves by birth, and belonged to the master of the mother, whoever might be the father, and whether a slave or not.⁶ Some exceptions to this rule were made by particular laws (*Lex Aelia Sentina*, *Senatus Consultum Claudianum*), by which in certain cases the child of a free person became a slave, and vice versa of a slave became free. (See above, Note 3.) The special name for slaves by birth, is *verna*.⁷

2. By the civil law. A free-born Roman could become a slave on several grounds: when unfaithful to his duties towards the State; when an insolvent debtor (since, according to the earliest legislation, the creditor could sell the debtor); and also when he had been guilty of certain crimes. Here, too, belongs the case of a free person fraudulently participating in the act of selling himself as a slave, for the sake of gain. But all these cases do not here deserve special notice, because it is very doubtful, whether a free-born Roman could ever become the slave of a Roman citizen. These various instances have respect to the loss or deterioration of the position of a free citizen in the State, by which he became more or less liable to certain civil and social disabilities. The practical servitude resulting from *mancipatio*, *nexus*, and *addictio* (as in case of debtors), cannot be considered genuine slavery.⁸

are to be understood literally. As in Caelius Sabinus, in Gellius VII. 4.—*Mancipia*—*coronis induta*—*idcirco dicebantur venire sub corona*. So Cato in Gellius, and also Festus, p. 306. *Sub corona venire dicuntur, quia captivi coronati solent venire*, etc. [Thus it appears that the captives were brought to market crowned with garlands, like the victims destined for sacrifice in the temples, and hence *sub corona venire*.]

⁶ According to the principle, that in the cases, where there is no *connubium* (i. e. lawful wedlock, marriage between free persons) the children followed the mother, *partus sequitur matrem*. Ulpian, (a jurist in the time of Constantine,) *Digesta*, I. 5. 24. *Lex naturae haec est, ut qui nascitur sine legitimo matrimonio, matrem sequatur, nisi lex specialis aliud inducat*. Gaius I. 82. [*Connubium* is the word for the marriage-relation viewed from the position of the State, valid, lawful marriage, to which it was necessary that both parties be free persons—*matrimonium* has, properly, reference to the position of the wife (from *mater*, mother), meaning the honorable connection of a woman with a man as her husband. The word for the marriage connection between slaves, is *contubernium*.]

⁷ [Dr. Becker introduces here a long and learned note upon the etymology of *verna*; which, however, goes no further than to make out the above fundamental meaning of the word. Döderlein, V. 137. considers it as exactly corresponding to the Gothic word *barn*, one born, a child.]

⁸ [The author has here a paragraph of considerable length on the supposed import of *injusta servitus*, as opposed to *justa servitus*, the *servitus* being *injusta*, e. g. when a free-born Roman was taken prisoner in war. But he contends

With the Romans, a slave passed indeed for a human being, but one without any personal rights; in the legal sense he had no *caput*, no legal rights, no legal capacity.⁹ He was in the *potestas* (power) of the master; but in a different manner from the case of children, in the power of the head of a family—with the slave it is a *potestas dominica, dominium*.¹⁰ In consequence of this *dominium*, the master had entire right of property in the slave, and could do just as he pleased with his person and his life, his powers and his earnings.¹¹

In regard to the power of life and death, it was unlimited. The master could use the slave for any purpose that suited his own pleasure. He could punish him, put him to pain and torture, and, free from all obligation to give an account of his actions, could put him to death in any way that pleased him. This right of unlimited dominion continued down to a late time, and certainly through the whole period of the Republic; and it can even be safely assumed that it was in less actual exercise in the earlier than in the later periods of Roman history. The arbitrary exercise of this power, which had been previously only subject to censorial animadversion, was gradually limited, at first by the operation of the *Lex*

that the expression never occurs in such sense either in classic or in legal use; and that, on the contrary, where it does occur, it has an entirely different sense. *Iusta servitus* means regular, lawful slavery. If one is emancipated from such slavery, he becomes *libertinus*, a freedman. On the other hand, in cases where a person serves as a slave, but in such circumstances that, if he is freed, he becomes not *libertinus*, but returns to the class of the *ingenui*, the free-born, the condition cannot be called *injusta servitus*, but only not *iusta servitus*, because to this latter is necessary not only *servire*, but also *jure servire* or *servitutem servire*. The true distinction of *injusta servitus*, on the contrary, is established upon a different, upon a philosophical basis. It is the Aristotelian justification of slavery on the ground of the original destination of some to be slaves and of others to be masters, of some to be rulers, and of others to be subjects, etc. De Rep. 1. 6. According to the view of Aristotle, there occurs an ἀδίκος δουλεία, *injusta servitus*, when the ἀνάξιος δουλεύει, i. e. the individual serves as a slave, who was designed ἄρχειν and δεσπόζειν, to be the master. To such an *injusta servitus*, there can indeed be the antithesis of a *iusta servitus*, but not at all in the sense of Roman law; it would mean a *servitus* in which the φύσει δούλος, i. e. the slave by nature—intended to be such—δικαίως δουλεύει, serves justly.]—TR.

⁹ Digesta 1. 19. 32. Quod attinet ad jus civile, servi pro nullis habentur; non tamen et jure naturali, quia, quod ad jus naturale attinet, omnes homines aequales sunt. IV. 5. 3. quia servile caput (civil condition of a slave) nullum jus habet, ideo nec minui potest.

¹⁰ Potestates verbo plura significantur, in persona magistratuum imperium; in persona liberorum patria potestas; in persona servi dominium. Dig. L. 15, 215.

¹¹ See Becker's *Charicles*, II. p. 25.

Petronia, which forbade that any one should give up his slave, arbitrarily (*sine iudice*), *ad bestias depugnandas* (to fight with wild beasts); perhaps even in the time of Augustus, though the story of the cruelty of Vedius Pollio (Dio Cass. LIV. 23. Seneca de Ira, III. 40) seems to prove, that up to that time there was no legal restriction on the right of the master. We find that Claudius took some measures to arrest the hard-heartedness of masters; but for the first time under Adrian, and afterwards more rigidly under Antoninus Pius, was it determined by legal enactment, that any one who should, of his own will, put a slave to death, should be just as liable to punishment, as if he had taken the life of any other person, over whom he had no control whatever. In addition to this, it may be observed, that the Grecian principle was introduced by Antoninus, that slaves who had sought refuge in a sanctuary from the excessive severity of a master, could not be brought back by force, but the master was compelled to sell them.

In reference to the second point already mentioned, that all which the slave earned, belonged to the master, the Roman was much more rigid than the Grecian law. Although in Greece the slave was considered *ἡμψυχον ὄργανον* or a *κτῆμα* (*a mere instrument endowed with life, or a possession*), yet there were there many slaves, who worked as tradesmen, and paid their master only a trifling tax upon the results of their labor; and apart from such a tax, the slaves in these cases had an independent title to the work of their hands. In Rome, on the contrary, the slave could indeed, by great diligence and economy, acquire a scanty property (*peculium*); but strictly considered, all this together with the slave himself, belonged to the master, and might be retained by him even at the period of manumission. The limitations of this legal provision were only of a practical nature, and grew out of the indulgence of the masters; so that the master not only allowed a slave to acquire property, but also took special occasion to bring about such a result. In these cases, the master either suffered the slave to retain the property, or to purchase with it his freedom.

The slave was not capable of a legal marriage connection, either with free persons or with slaves. The only sexual connection was a *contubernium*, (a mere living together) without any of the legitimate rights of marriage. See above, page 570.

The slave had no regular legal name, none except that which happened to be given him by his master. Thus he was called Marcipor, (*Marci puer*) Publipor, Quintipor, etc., according to the

name of the master. In other cases, some arbitrary name was given, or one borrowed from his native country, as Lydus, Syrus, a Lydian, a Syrian. Among the Greeks, a slave could bear any name belonging to a freeman, because with the Greeks the name itself was something accidental and changing; whereas with the Romans, as a name was a mark of a free citizen and a family inheritance, it could not be given to a slave.

Thus the slave was treated among the Romans, not as a person, but as a thing, yet always as a human being. He was destitute of all legal capacity; every injury, every offence done to him concerned only the master, and to him alone satisfaction was given, restitution was made. But not all that would have passed for an injury in reference to a free person, was so considered in reference to a slave; on the contrary, a slave could be insulted, and even be struck with the hand, with impunity. On the other hand, too, the master was held responsible for all offences committed by the slave; he could free himself from such responsibility, in cases of private injury, by giving up the slave to the injured party. In regard to offences committed against the master, the punishment was in general left with himself; but in case of the murder of the master in his own house, the punishment was administered by the State, (*publica quaestio habebatur*), and on this point, owing to the great number of masters whose lives were threatened by slaves, the barbarous practice was thought necessary, of putting to death, without a single exception, all the slaves who were under the roof of the deceased at the time of the commission of the murder.¹³

¹³ The necessity of this practice was argued on the ground, that only thus could the murder of masters be prevented, and their lives held secure. It was held the duty of every slave to hinder by all means the murder of his master, and he was kept bound to this duty by the application of the principle of fear for his personal safety. The first decree of the Senate on this point was the Silanianum, under Augustus, 763 of Rome. Its provisions were increased by Nero. (Tacitus, Ann. 13, 42.) We give it in English: "*A decree passed the Senate to protect the lives of masters by the punishment of offending slaves. With this view it was decreed, that in the case of a master slain by his slaves, execution should be done, not only upon all actual slaves, but also upon all who had received their freedom, but were still living under the roof of the deceased, at the time when the murder was committed.*"

This decree was executed with the utmost rigor, notwithstanding the tumult of the people, in the case of the Prefect of the city, Pedanius Secundus, slain by one of his slaves, in the year 61 A. D. Tacitus, in Annals, 14. 42. thus writes: *According to usage, every slave in the family was subject to capital punishment; but the people, pitying the fate of so many innocent men, assembled in*

Manumission.

Since as we have already remarked, slavery among the Romans existed *jure gentium* and *jure civili*, and no one was a slave *jure naturae*, nothing hindered a slave becoming a freedman. This change of condition was effected by what is called manumission, (*manumissio*) inasmuch as the master released the slave from his own power—a right, which seems to have belonged to the master from the earliest times, although mention is found, that before Servius Tullius, the manumission formed the basis of no claim to citizenship.

In reference to this right of manumission, as it gradually developed itself, we have to observe two kinds, the *formal*, (*feierliche*, solemn,) and the *informal* (*unfeierliche*, not solemn,) *manumission*. The formal manumission took place by means of a solemn act, in which the master renounced his power forever, and its consequence was unrestricted freedom, and citizenship: by the *informal* manumission, the slave was only practically free, and, *jure Quiritium*, passed still for a slave, if the formal act did not follow.

Of the *formal manumission*, there was in the earliest times only one kind, the *manumissio vindicta*; afterwards three kinds, there being added to this one, the *manumissio censu*, and the *manumissio testamento*.

The *manumissio vindicta* was a symbolic action, by means of which the master declared before a judicial tribunal, that the slave should henceforth be free. The action itself consisted in this; the master appeared with the slave before the Praetor or some other one of the higher magistrates,¹³ and a third person, in later times always a lictor, by an outward sign divested the mas-

crowds, bent upon opposing the execution, and the affair well nigh came to a sedition insurrection. And 14. 45—Then the emperor issued a proclamation, and all the streets, leading to the place of execution, were lined with soldiers under arms. The unhappy victims suffered death. The number in this case was four hundred.

¹³ This act of emancipation always occurred before a magistrate; Livy (41. 9) names dictator, consul, interrex, censor, praetor; in the times of the republic, at least in the best times, in Rome, before the Praetor, and in the provinces, before the Proconsul or Proprætor. Afterwards, however, there was a departure from this rule, and it was sufficient that the emancipation took place before a magistrate, and in any place. Digesta, 40. 2. 7. Gains (1. 20) says that the manumission sometimes occurred in the street, when the magistrate happened to be going to the bath, or to the theatre. At such a time, it was not necessary that the lictor be present. When a magistrate himself wished to emancipate a

ter of all power over the slave. The lictor laid a little staff¹⁴ (*festuca, virga, vindicta*) upon the head of the slave, and solemnly pronounced these words: *Nunc ego hominem liberum esse aio*, I declare this man to be free.

The master then took hold of the slave by the hand, or by some other part of his body, turned him round,¹⁵ uttering, at the same time, these words: *hunc hominem liberum esse volo*, (I choose that this man be free,) and then let him go. The magistrate finally ratified the declaration of the lictor (or *asseror in libertatem*;) and formally announced that the ceremony of manumission was complete, after which the master and others present congratulated the *novus libertus* in these words: *cum tu liber es, gaudeo*,¹⁶ (I rejoice that you are free.) It is probable that the grounds of emancipation were given to the court by the master, and afterwards put on record, but this does not clearly appear, in regard to early times; afterwards as limitations of the right of manumission were introduced, such a course was unquestionably necessary.

slave, the ceremony always was observed in presence of an officer higher in authority than himself. Thus in *Digesta*, 40. 1. 14. *Apud eum, cui par imperium est, manumittere non possumus. Sed praetor apud consulem manumittere potest. Apud collegam suum praetor manumittere non potest.* Hence the emperor could emancipate without the *Vindicta*, because there was no one higher than himself, as in same passage, *Imperator cum servum manumittit non vindictam imponit, sed cum voluit, fit liber is, qui manumittitur, ex lege Augusti.*

¹⁴ Cicero's *Topica*, 2. 238. *Vindicta vero est virgula quaedam, quam lictor manumittendi servi capiti imponens, eundem servum in libertatem vindicabat, dicens quaedam verba sollemnia, atque ideo illa virgula vindicta vocabatur.* Comp. Horace, *Sat.* 2. 7. 76. Persius, 5. 83. But the proper name was *festuca*. Gaius, 4. 16. *Qui vindicabat, festucam tenebat, etc.* See Plautus *Miles* 4. 1. 15 and Persius 5. 175. The lictor gave the slave with it a *slight touch upon the head*, which is the meaning of *imponere vindictam*. In other places it is represented as a blow given the slave. Claudianus de quarto consulatu Honorii 615—*grato remeant securior ictu, Triestes conditio pulsatu fronte recedit.* A still more striking mention in Sidonius Apollinaris, *Carmina* 2.—*Quorum (i. e. freedmen) gaudentes exceptant verbera malae (cheeks), where we might understand a veritable blow upon the cheek—especially when we compare a passage from Phaedrus, 2. 5. multo majoris alapae mecum veneunt. The same word alapa (a blow on the cheek or a box on the ear) occurs in Isidorus, Origines 9. 4. Apud veteres quando manumittebant, alapa percussus circumagebant.*

¹⁵ This act of turning the slave round seems to have been an essential part of the ceremony. Appianus relates of Labeo,—*τῆς δεξιᾶς λαβόμενος, καὶ περιστρέψας αὐτὸν, ὡς ἐθὺς ἐστὶ Ῥωμαίοις ἐλευθεροῦν*, etc.—*having taken him by the hand, and turned him about, according to the custom of the Romans, when freeing a slave, etc.*—So also Persius 5. 75. *Una Quiritem vertigo facit—one turn makes a Roman citizen. And also ib. 78.*

¹⁶ This occurs frequently in the comic writers. Plautus, *Menaechmi* 5. 7. 42. and 5. 9. 87. Terence, *Adelphi*, 5. 9. 15.

This *manumissio vindicta* may justly be considered as the oldest form of emancipating, although the Vindicius mentioned in Livy, B. 2. 5, who made known the conspiracy of the Tarquins, is called the first one *vindicta manumissus*; ¹⁷ he was probably so designated, because that affair presented the first occasion of recording in history this ceremony of manumission.

The great importance of this formality is put beyond the possibility of doubt by Gaius, in his Doctrine upon the general subject of *Vindicatio*, (that is, Assertion of ownership, Appropriation). See in particular, Gaius, 4. 16. He is there treating of the *vindicatio* proper, where two parties in court contend for the possession of anything, and he instances in illustration the case of a man as the thing claimed. Hence the technical legal expression, applied to every species of property, *vis civilis et festucaria*, that is, the civil force, outwardly indicated by the *festuca*, resorted to, in asserting and maintaining an exclusive right of ownership. (This subject is fully discussed in Gellius, 20. 10.) Thus the *manumissio vindicta* was a particular case of this legal *vindicatio*, though necessarily somewhat modified in form. The *vindicatio* in this particular case was a *vindicatio in libertatem*, where the licitor or whoever else was the third party appeared as the *assertor libertatis*, that is, appeared as a *quasi* opponent of a master, and asserted a claim to the liberty of a slave. The two contending parties, then, were the licitor and the master, and the matter at issue the freedom of a slave. The modification of the ceremony consisted in this: the claim of the licitor having been put in, the master waived his right as the other party, being willing that the slave should be free, and instead of using the ordinary form, *hunc hominem meum esse aio*, I declare that this man is *my property*, uttered the expression, *hunc hominem liberum esse aio*, I declare this man *to be free*, and thereby gave his consent to his freedom. According to Gaius, ¹⁸ the *festuca* must be traced to the usages of war, as it represented the spear, *hasta*, the common emblem of rightful ownership. The name *vindicta* was unquestionably of later origin. The second kind of *formal manumission* was called *manumissio censu*, as the master had the name of the slave at once entered into the lists of

¹⁷ Livy, 2. 5. Ille primum dicitur vindicta liberatus, etc. and Plutarch, Poplicola, 7. If the name *Vindicius* itself be not a fiction, it might have been derived from the *vindicta*, the person there referred to having been perhaps the first one, who was publicly freed.

¹⁸ Gaius, 4. 16. *Festuca* autem utebantur quasi *hastae loco signo quodam iusti domini*; [omnium] enim maxime sua esse credebant, quae ex hostibus cepissent.

the censors as a citizen.¹⁹ This act of registry presupposed that the slave had already a sufficient *peculium*, or that the master gave him with his freedom a private fortune. The simple entering of the name upon the lists of the assessors, without any farther legal procedure, was all that was necessary to render the emancipation good in the eye of the law; the question, however, has been started, whether the person became a free citizen immediately, or at the next following lustrum.

The precise age of this form of emancipation cannot be pointed out. It is perhaps very old. It seems to have been preserved until the time of Adrian, though under altered relations, and after that period to have fallen into disuse.²⁰

The *third form* was the *manumissio testamento*, manumission by will. This was common in early times, as it is mentioned in the laws of the twelve tables. It took place either directly, by an express clause in the will, or indirectly by a *fideicommissum*, legacy in trust, in accordance with which the heir was to effect the emancipation. This latter method was also extended, by means of purchase, to the case of slaves, belonging to the heir or to the legatee, or to any other person.

In the former of these just mentioned modes, where the slave was freed directly, he became the freedman of the testator, and was consequently without a patron, though sustaining a similar relation to the heir of his former master. Such a slave was called *libertus orcinus*,²¹ (*orcus*, death, because freed by the last will of his master). The slave freed by legacy in trust became *libertus manumissoris*, the freedman of the legatee, who actually effected the emancipation. To the condition of these last, previously to

¹⁹ Götting, (Staatsverfassung,) thinks that this manumission by the Census was at first only an accidental appendage to the *manumissio vindicta*, and that in all cases this latter had already taken place. But this seems to me very improbable. The person freed by the Vindicta was unconditionally free, and there can be no doubt that he himself as already a citizen, had his name entered with the censors, without the intervention of his patron. What proof can be obtained from the passages cited, in Plutarch, Poplicola 7. and Livy, 2. 5. 41. 9. seems to me unintelligible.

²⁰ Huschke, Verf. d. Serv. p. 544. thinks, that this was the last form of the *justa manumissio*, after the introduction of the twelve tables.

²¹ For the explanation of the word *orcinus*, see the Digesta, 26. 4. 3. The same word is ironically applied by Suetonius (Augustus, 35) to the senators who crept into the Senate by various illegitimate means, after the death of Caesar. These, too, were called by Plutarch, (Anton. 15) *Χαρωνίται* (from *Χάρων*, Charon).

the attainment of freedom, is referred the expression found in inscriptions, *libertus futurus*.²²

Sometimes slaves were emancipated by will, with a condition annexed, *sub conditione*, for instance the payment of a certain sum to the heir, a point which is mentioned in the Twelve Tables.²³ Such slaves were called, up to the period of the fulfilment of the condition, *statu liberi*, but during the interval still remained slaves.²⁴ But if the heir himself in any way hindered the due fulfilment, the slave was free without it.²⁵ For a slave to have an interest in the inheritance, it was a requisite condition, that his freedom had been declared in the will. In such case, he was called *necessarius haeres*, that is, a necessary heir, one who must become at once free and an heir, *volens volens*.²⁶

The Limitation of the right of Emancipation.

By the law of nations every slave was capable of freedom.²⁷ But in particular cases it could happen, either by special laws, or by some express appointment of the master, that the emancipation might either be entirely hindered, or at least limited.²⁸ The growing abuses²⁹ of the right of emancipation finally introduced important limitations, which affected both the slave's capability of freedom, and the master's capability of unconditional manumission. In regard to the qualification of the slave, it was provided

²² Orellius *Inscriptiones Latinae*, 2980. 5006. Yet this is scarcely correct, or at least is to be understood as applying especially to those *sub conditione manumissi*.

²³ There were various conditions, besides the one mentioned above. Thus for instance (*Digesta*, 40. 4. 44), lighting a lamp every other month, and observing other solemnities, at the tomb of the deceased master, serving the heir of the deceased (as in *ib.* 52) during the period of youth, or (*ib.* 5. 41) for ten years, or (*ib.* § 10) for sixteen years. Similar things are also mentioned in connection with persons liberated by *legacy*, § 13, 14. Such instances of emancipation also occur in Greek wills. [We give here the substance of the author's note, without the numerous Latin quotations.]

²⁴ Ulpian 2. 1. *Digesta*, 40. 7. 1. 9.

²⁵ Festus, p. 314. Ulpian, 2. 5. *Digesta*, 40. 7. 3. 19. § 3. Compare Rein, *Römisches Privatrecht*, p. 284.

²⁶ Gaius, 2, 153. *Instit.* 2. 19. 1. Ulpian, *Fragm.* 22. 11.

²⁷ Ulpian, 1. 1. 4. Theophilus, 1. 5.

²⁸ *Digesta*, 40. 1. 9. Here, too, belongs the ordinance of Adrian (*ib.* 1. 6) that no slave should attain to actual freedom, who had been freed in order that he might escape the consequences of crime. Up to Adrian's time, it frequently occurred, that a slave was emancipated for the purpose of shielding him from the *quaestio, judicial investigation*, as for instance in the case of Milo.

²⁹ Dionysius, 4. 24. gives a dark picture of these terrible abuses. Compare *Dio Cass.* 39. 24.

by the *Lex Aelia Sentina*³⁰ (757 of Rome) that no slave, who had been the subject of a disgraceful legal punishment should attain to regular liberty and citizenship, but could only be admitted to the lower degree of freedom conceded to the *peregrini dediticii*, (foreigners, captive by surrender). This law also determined, that the person freed, who was under thirty years of age, could attain to regular citizenship, only under certain conditions.

In regard to the master, the same law provided that he must not be under twenty years of age; yet this provision was liable to some exceptions.³¹

A still more important limitation was introduced by the *Lex Furia Caninia* (year 761 A. C.), which put a check to the disorder occasioned by unlimited emancipation, by providing that in proportion to the number of slaves that any one possessed, only a certain portion could be freed. For one or two slaves there was no definite provision; but between the numbers of three and ten, only half could be emancipated, of any number under thirty, a third, under a hundred a quarter, under five hundred a fifth part, and in no case whatever more than a hundred.

Sometimes the State itself granted liberty to slaves, upon such, for instance as had given information against persons guilty of criminal offences.³² It is not clear what form of emancipation was in such cases selected. It were the most natural supposition that the *manumissio censu* was then used, but the case of Vindicius already mentioned, and also one that occurs in Varro, seem to be in favor of the *Vindicta*. There is no reason for supposing, that in such instances the rights of citizenship were not also united with the gift of freedom.³³ On the other hand, it is cer-

³⁰ Gaius, 1. 13. Theophilus 1. 5. 3. Comp. Suetonius, Augustus, 40. Ulpian, Fragm. 1. 11. Dio Cass. 56, 33.

³¹ This, as well as the limitation in the preceding sentence, was left liable to the decision of a council consisting, in Rome itself, of five senators and five knights; and, in the provinces, of twenty Roman citizens; by whom exceptions were admitted, if there seemed just cause for emancipation. Gaius, 1, 18. and § 19. Compare also Gaius, 1. 20. Rein, Röm. Privat. R. p. 278. Walter, Rechtsgeschichte, p. 499.

³² Cicero pro Balbo, 9. Also his Phillip. 8. 11.; pro Rabirio, 11. So in Livy, 26, 27. the thirteen slaves, by whose exertions the temple was saved from fire; and, on the promise of the Senate to reward with liberty and money, the discoverer of the incendiary, a slave made known the conspiracy, and was rewarded with liberty and twenty thousand *asses* (*viginti millia aeris*). So the two slaves who informed of the conspiracy of the Carthaginian hostages, Livy, 32. 26. and the informers of the slave conspiracies, Livy, 4. 45. id. 22. 33. and 27. 3.

³³ Götting (*Staatsverfassung*, p. 14. 3) expresses this opinion. The single

tain from this very case of Vindicius, that slaves who had made discovery of a crime that endangered the peace of the State, even at the expense of betraying their own masters, were emancipated by the State, and invested with the fuller immunities of the *juxta libertas*. Indeed citizenship was not withheld from such a slave even if he attained freedom by an action, which was acknowledged to be in itself penal; but he was executed as a *civis* by being thrown from the Tarpeian rock, a capital punishment that was inflicted only upon a Roman citizen.³⁴ In concluding this part of the subject, it is to be observed that there is much obscurity hanging about the civil position of the slaves called *volones* (volunteers), who served in the second Punic war.³⁵ The supposition that they had previously gained their freedom, and the assertion that after the attainment of a well-earned freedom they had become independent of the State, and free from all civil duties, are equally destitute of foundation.

The Liberti or Libertini.

A preliminary question here arises concerning the distinction between the words *libertus* and *libertinus*. In reference to this point, it may be said with certainty, that in the earliest times, the name *libertus* was applied to a person who was himself freed from slavery, and the name *libertinus* to one who was the son of a freedman; but in the lapse of time, as the distinction between the children of freedmen and the freeborn gradually faded away, there was less occasion for the former being called *libertini*, so that finally this word *libertinus* was also given only to persons themselves made free. Thus both these words, *libertus* and *libertinus*, came to mean a *freedman*, with this distinction between them as synonyms, that *libertus* had reference to the manumission and to the

instance, in which any doubt can be maintained of the truth of the above position, is that of the Volscian slave who betrayed the fortress of Ardea to the Romans. But this was a foreign slave, and his conduct merited contempt; for if in ordinary instances duty to the State was deemed paramount to duty towards the master, no such view could be taken of the act of base treason, of which this slave was guilty. Yet it is difficult to determine what relation of freedom this Servius Romanus held, for his name shows that he was a freedman, and he had become a land proprietor; but where is there, in that period, a class of Roman freemen, destitute of citizenship?

³⁴ An instance of this kind occurs in Plutarch's Life of Sylla, in the case of the slave who betrayed Sulpicius. "Sylla gave the slave his freedom, and then had him thrown from the Tarpeian rock." — Also Valerius Maximus, 6. 5. 7. Dio Cass. 48. 34.

³⁵ Livy, 22. 57. It would seem, that, at the outset no certain promise of freedom was given. Hence Tiberius Gracchus, whose army was composed chiefly

relation to the former master and now patron, *libertinus* to the rank of the freedman, and his position in the State. [Thus for instance, in practical use, if you wish to designate a person emancipated by Augustus, you would say *libertus Augusti*, not *libertinus*; but if you wished to designate the civil position of a person thus freed, you would call him a *libertinus*, not a *libertus*.]

The first result that emancipation effected, was that the freedman received a name, which distinguished him as a Roman citizen. If he had been freed by a citizen, he took the name and the christian name (Nomen and Praenomen) of his patron, and was admitted into the house (*Gens*) to which he belonged, although he did not become a partaker of all the rights belonging to the membership of this political union.³⁶ For a family name (Cognomen), he either retained his slave name, or took one borrowed from his natural descent, or from some other source.³⁷ It is less certain, how it was in early times with slaves who received their freedom from the State. It is probable that for the most part the name *Romanus*³⁸ was given them as a Praenomen, but in later times they took the name of the magistrate by whose official services they had been freed.

The new freedman, bearing now the name of a citizen, gave token also by other outward means of his change of condition.

of *volones*, proposes their freedom in the senate, in the second year of their service, when they began to show symptoms of disaffection, Livy, 24. 14. On the bestowment of freedom, after the battle of Beneventum, they appear in the usual dress of the *libertinus*, ib. c. 16. Götting, p. 145, says, "They are free, but not citizens, and scatter after the death of their commander, who freed them;" and intimates that they passed into a condition of absolute independence of Rome. In regard to this Livy, indeed, says (25. 20), that "the volunteer army, who had served with great fidelity while Gracchus yet lived, forsook the standard on his death, as if they were discharged from service;" but this does not seem to have been the case in general, nor had they any right to pursue such a course, and the State regarded those as deserters, who had abandoned the army. In proof of this is the direction sent to the consuls, mentioned in Livy, 25. 22 that "they should take care to collect again the deserters from the volunteer army, and bring them back to military duty." This again in Liv. 27. 38. Therefore it is clear, that they were still regarded as *Volones*, and must be considered as holding a peculiar relation, which is to be distinguished from that of the other *libertini*.

³⁶ [For an account of the division of the Roman people into tribes, *curiae gentes*, and families, see Niebuhr on the Early Constitution of Rome, Hist. Vol. I. c. 21].

³⁷ For instance, P. Terentius Afer, Cn. Publicius Menander, and many others in Cic. pro Balbo, 11. Also see Cic. ad Atticum, 4. 15.

³⁸ Götting thinks that any name taken at random was assumed for the Nomen (the name of the *Gens*), and the word *Romanensis* was added for a Cog-

He assumed the toga, the dress of the free-born Roman, had his head shaven, and wore a hat (*pileus*), or else a white woollen band about his head.

For the future, the freedman remained in a relation of dependence to his former master, that resembled the old clientship, which in early times was held with great strictness, but gradually became more and more loose and uncertain in its character. He sustained various obligations to his patron; but these, with the exception of such as were expressly stipulated at the time of emancipation, grew rather out of a kind of filial relation, than out of any legal relation which involved mutual rights and duties. It is evident from the very nature of the relation of patron, that the freedman was under obligation to cultivate and observe a courteous and respectful demeanor towards his former master, that he should aid him so far as possible in misfortune, and never, except under very special circumstances, sue him at law. But if on the other hand, the freedman should show himself ungrateful to his patron, it does not clearly appear that the latter had any legal means of punishing him and bringing him back to his duty. In the early period of the Empire, however, the patron could banish an offending freedman a hundred miles from Rome:³⁹ and an instance is mentioned by Götting, taken from an inscription, of a female slave who was denied by her patron, burial with the usual honors in the family sepulchre. In later times, the prefect of the city, and in the provinces the proconsuls were at liberty to inflict corporeal punishment upon freedmen who had been guilty of gross departures from the duty they owed to their patrons; but nothing of this kind is on record, which has reference to the period of the Republic. It is probable that the increasing corruption of morals and the dissolution of social relations gradually brought about such an indecent and reckless conduct of freedmen towards their patrons, that it became absolutely necessary to fix severe judicial penalties, and in cases of aggravated offence, even to order back a freedman to the condition of slavery.⁴⁰

To the more important rights of a patron, belonged that of in-

nomen. But this cannot be, as *Romanensis* does not occur, either as *Nomen* or *Cognomen*. The appeal to Varro, *Lingua* Liv. 8. 41. is inadmissible, for the word itself is a mere arbitrary emendation by Müller. For further information on this point, Dio Cass. 39. 43.

³⁹ Under Nero bitter complaints were made concerning the conduct of freedmen towards their patrons. Tacitus, *Ann.* 13. 26.

⁴⁰ Comp. Walter, *Rechtsgeschichte*, p. 509.

heritance to the goods of a freedman. By a provision in the Twelve Tables, the patron inherited, when the freedman died without a will, and without heirs of his own (*sui haeredes*); but by a praetorial edict this was modified, the half of the inheritance being allowed to the patron, if the freedman left no children; and the Lex Papia Poppaea granted the patron a portion, even when the freedman left children, if the number was less than three.⁴¹ The death of the freedman put an end to this relation of inheritance, since his children were freeborn. On the other hand, on the death of the patron, the children succeeded to the rights of their deceased father. In the case of freedmen who died without nearer heirs, the members of the house to which his family belonged, shared the inheritance.⁴²

Having thus discussed the subject of the *formal or regular manumission*, with its civil consequences, it remains only that we mention the *informal manumission*. This consisted, in general, in the mere private declaration of a master, that his slave should be free. Such a declaration occurred in various ways. But the most common expression for this kind of emancipation is *manumissio inter amicos*,⁴³ (manumission among friends,) by which is meant that the master signified his willingness to the freedom of a slave, in the midst of a company of his friends. In other instances, the master declared his will by letter, *per epistolam*, or only in a tacit manner, by inviting a slave to the family table, (*manumissio per mensam*).⁴⁴ Such an emancipation formed the basis of a merely practical,⁴⁵ not a legal condition of freedom, and the individual still remained a slave in the eye of the law. Yet a recall of such a declaration was not allowed to the master, but the praetor protected⁴⁶ the slave against all attempts of the master to reduce him again to actual slavery. This continued to be the arrangement, until the enactment of the *lex Junia Norbana*, (772 A. U. C.) which secured to such slaves a right similar to that enjoyed by the Latin colonies, and created the order of the *Latini Puri*.

In conclusion we have to notice some special forms of manumission. The first is the one that took place, *adoptione*, by adoption, a kind of emancipation which is recorded as a possible one,

⁴¹ Gaius, 3. 40. Ulpian, Fr. 29.

⁴² Cic. de Oratore, 1. 39.

⁴³ Seneca, de vita beata. Gaius, 1. 44.—Instit. 1. 5. 1. and Theophilus 1. 5. 1.

⁴⁴ Theophilus, 1. 5. 4.

⁴⁵ Cic. pro Milone, 12. Pliny, Epist. 4. 10. Dositheus, de manumissione, 4.

⁴⁶ Gaius, 3. 56. Comp. Tac. Ann. 13. 27.

rather than as one that actually obtained.⁴⁷ It is probable that in instances of this kind, the adopter was obliged to declare the slave in the presence of the praetor, at once as free, and as his adopted son.

Another special form of manumission, in relation to which there exists much obscurity, is the *manumissio sacrorum causâ*, (manumission for the sake of sacred rites, which the slave was to perform). Festus is the only writer, who mentions this form of emancipation, and the text of the passage is in such a sadly mutilated state, that we can gather from it nothing more than the conjecture, that the emancipation occurred in such cases, for the purpose of investing the individual with certain priestly functions. So far as the mere form is concerned, this species of emancipation mostly coincides with the *Vindicta*, though the same words were probably not employed.

A third special kind to be mentioned, is that in which the master emancipated a slave on his dying bed. This is mentioned by Labeo, cited in Appian, Civ. 4. 135. It is singular, that Labeo there imitated the action of the *Vindicta*, and it may well be questioned, if such a declaration of the master's will was regarded as a form of the regular manumission, or merely of one that occurred *inter amicos*.

Finally, is the instance only once mentioned, of a sick slave being emancipated, that he might die a free man.

These last four species do not form new kinds of emancipation; the first two might be classed under the *Vindicta*, the third either under the *manumissio testamento*, or the *manumissio inter amicos*; the last stands by itself, as an instance of an informal manumission.

⁴⁷ Gellius, 5. 19. Instit. I. 11. 12. Comp. Quintus. Declin. 340. 342. See also Huschke, Studien d. Röm. Recht. p. 212.

ARTICLE VII.

MAPS OF PALESTINE.

By Rev. Samuel Wolcott, former Missionary in Syria.

New Map of PALESTINE, from the latest Authorities ; chiefly from the Maps and Drawings of Robinson and Smith, with Corrections and Additions furnished by the Rev. Dr. Robinson, 1845. New York : J. H. Colton.

PALESTINE AND MOUNT LEBANON ; enlarged from Kiepert's Map, in Robinson and Smith's Biblical Researches ; with Additions and Corrections, principally from the same Authorities ; by Joseph Tracy. Boston : Crocker and Brewster.

A NEW interest in Biblical Geography has been awakened in our country by the recent publications of Professor Robinson, of which the Maps above named are at once the evidence and the fruit. The importance of this science needs no vindication to the readers of this Journal. It is a department which has furnished some of the clearest explanations and most striking confirmations of the declarations of Scripture ; and without some acquaintance with the geography of Palestine, no one can be an intelligent reader of the sacred volume. An authentic Map of Palestine, in the form in which these are prepared, has long been regarded as a desideratum by the careful student of the Bible. The simultaneous appearance of the two maps before us is a proof of the general demand.

These maps are mainly, as they profess to be, an enlargement of the one which was published in the *Biblical Researches*. The map thus used as a basis was a great advance on any previous publication of the kind. Very few points in Palestine had been accurately ascertained, either by astronomical observation or geometrical survey. The designations of most travellers had been indefinite and loose, and often fabulous and legendary. Robinson and Smith were deficient in instruments, most of their bearings having been taken with a plain pocket compass ; an imperfection which was in a measure supplied by the rigid and minute correctness of their specifications. They furnished invaluable materials ; but there are few readers, we apprehend, who fully appreciate the difficult and perplexing task performed by the individual, who

had this and all other accessible and available information to reduce to the consistency and completeness of a Map. The patient industry and fidelity with which he labored in his art, are apparent both from his maps and from the interesting Memoir which accompanied them.¹ All things considered, his Map of Palestine must be pronounced one of the finest achievements of modern cartography; and those of our readers who have learned to value the splendid results gathered by our countrymen and embodied in the *Biblical Researches*, will acknowledge with much satisfaction their obligations to Heinrich Kiepert of Berlin.

The maps before us, so far as they claim to be an improvement on Kiepert's, refer to Professor Robinson as their principal authority; by which we do not understand him to be responsible for the plan or the execution of either, but simply that he has furnished materials which the respective editors and publishers have used according to their own judgment and taste.

The map of Mr. Colton, published in New York, is an engraved one, 3 ft. 2 in. by 2 ft. 2 in. Accompanying it are sketches, on a larger scale, of the Plan, and the Environs of Jerusalem. It is prepared with excellent taste, and well executed, and is certainly the most elegant Map of Palestine which we have ever seen. The names of the leading divisions of the territory, as Judea, Samaria, Phœnicia, etc.; of the minor divisions, as the Twelve Tribes, and the neighboring provinces and tribes; of distinct regions, as plains, deserts, mountains, etc.; together with those of the prominent towns and villages, are engraved on it in full, in type so clear and judiciously varied, that the whole can be read at a glance without the least confusion. The water-courses are so carefully delineated, and the hills and mountains so nicely shaded, as to convey a very striking and just impression of the physical features of Palestine. In this respect of course it equally illustrates the ancient and modern country; in almost every other it is exclusively a map of Ancient Palestine, modern sites and the modern names of ancient sites having been introduced very sparingly.

It is announced on the map that 'Modern Names are engraved in Italics.' It is important that they should be distinguished. and the method proposed is a very suitable one; but it has not been applied by the publisher with entire accuracy. For instance, the name of the small town and bay north of Beirût, Jûneh, is modern, and Khashm Usdum is the modern Arabic name of the Salt Mountain near the southern end of the Dead Sea, though

¹ Robinson's *Biblical Researches*, Vol. III. App. B. pp. 29—55.

not so represented here. On the other hand, the following names which are *italicised*, are all of them ancient; viz. the promont. Album; the rivers Lycus, Tamyras, Bostrenus, Leontes (once in Roman and once in Italic letters), Hieromax, and Kishon (modern!—"that ancient river, the river Kishon"); the lakes Phiala, and Samachonitis; and the town Chabarzaba. Other names, of the same class and date, are given correctly in Roman letters; and there is no reason for the distinction.

The places are mostly set down on the map by their most ancient names. In some instances the Roman name is given in connection with the Hebrew, as Bethshean, Scythopolis; in others the Hebrew stands alone, as Shechem. The more modern name is sometimes printed first, as Legio, Megiddo; and sometimes last, as Rabbath Moab, Areopolis. The modern Arabic name is occasionally given with an ancient one, as Bozrah, Busaireh; but is usually omitted, as Ajalon, Kirjath Jearim, Coreae, etc. Places whose position is doubtful, not having yet been identified, are printed properly with an interrogation mark, as Mt. Nebo, Ramoth Gilead, Mahanaim, Bethabara, etc.; other sites, which are equally conjectural, are given as if ascertained, as Machaerus, Phasaëlis, Edumia, Akabi, etc. In the correction of Kiepert's map, and the introduction of new matter (of which there is very little), there has evidently been, on the part of the publisher of this map, no new construction of bearings or distances. Hence, in removing Masada to the North, as he had occasion to do, he has transported it fairly over the Wady Seyâl.

The map before us is in no sense original, and as a "New Map" has no valid pretensions; it cannot lay claim to a shadow of science or geographical knowledge. What we praise in it, is its felicitous arrangement and tasteful mechanical execution. At the same time, its general groundwork is so correct, that for all ordinary references it will be a very serviceable map of Ancient Palestine; and we have no doubt it will prove a popular and saleable one.

The map of Mr. Tracy, published in Boston, is a lithographic one, 4 ft. 8 in. by 2 ft. 8 in.; there is also accompanying it a small Plan of Jerusalem. It is prepared in a somewhat similar style with his well known "Monthly Concert Maps." The mission-stations are indicated in the same manner; which has conveyed the impression that it belongs to that series. The compiler probably contemplated the use of it at the concert; but his map of Western Asia answers, for this end, the general purpose of a map of Syria, and he has evidently prepared this for closer inspection and more con-

stant reference. It would, we think, have been better, if the design had been palpably distinct; for, as the "Monthly Concert Maps" are known to embrace only the leading outlines and most prominent points, those who regard this as belonging to the same class (which will be the general impression) will be liable to overlook the labor which has been bestowed on its details.

The editor of this map has made an independent and faithful use of his materials, and many sites appear on it which are not to be found on any other. In attempting to harmonize his new results with those which had been previously adopted, he has doubtless discovered a great degree of indefiniteness in many of the calculations on which the cartographer is as yet obliged to depend; and we take it for granted that his unquestioned love of accuracy has been severely tried. No map of the country can, from existing data, be anything more than an approximation to the truth. To the compiler of this must be awarded the merit of having, on the basis of Kiepert, constructed not only the largest, but the most complete and correct map of Palestine which has yet been issued in the English language.

It is deficient in some of the minor characteristics of a good map, designed for general use, for which the other will be preferred. Without the engraver's art, it lacks the finish and beauty which we have commended in that. It fails in that kind of bold and distinct delineation and shading, which conveys to the eye a faithful and vivid impression of Palestine as 'a land of hills and valleys.' The names of the principal divisions, as Judea, Peraea, etc., are printed in letters so small as not to be obvious at a little distance. The names of the Twelve Tribes are not printed at all on the body of the map; but the divisions are simply numbered, referring to a list in the margin. The names of places are printed in uniform type; and in the case of double or triple names, the author has proceeded on the plan (with perhaps half a dozen exceptions) of giving but one, and that (with two or three exceptions) the oldest. It is hence impossible on this map to distinguish between ancient and modern sites, or to learn from it the present names of the former. Its list of modern names is uncommonly copious, especially in the Lebanon district; and had they been uniformly given, it would have been a very full map of the modern country. Almost every important place ascertained is given under some appellation; the most noticeable omission, which we observe, is that of Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal. Lake Phiala is designated as a town.

A few positions are given without question, as in the other map, which remain to be established, or are yet to be discovered, as Machaerus, Archelaïs, Phasaëlis, etc. The first-named is so minutely described by Josephus, that it could hardly fail to be identified;¹ and possesses unusual interest as being, according to him, the castle in which John the Baptist was beheaded.² But no modern observer has seen it; and there is no authority for the place assigned it on these maps.

The boundaries of the Twelve Tribes, as given in the two maps, are not coincident; one of them, for instance, including in Benjamin the north-western coast of the Dead Sea for several miles, and the other running its southern boundary quite to the north of the Sea. These boundaries are of necessity, to a considerable extent, conjectural, nor can more than a general correctness ever be attained in respect to them. Kiepert did not attempt to draw them; but they are indispensable to the biblical reader.

We think it important that every prominent place should be given by all the names by which it has been currently known, and that the different ages should in all cases be carefully distinguished; as they might easily be, by giving the Hebrew name in small capitals, that of the Greek or Roman period in Roman letters, and the modern Arabic in Italic, as *SHACHEM*, Neapolis, *Nébulus*; *MEGIDDO*, Legio, *el-Lejjûn*. There are many places to which there is occasion for reference under each of its names, of which the maps before us contain but one. The distinction of age is as important in the case of single names, and would, if uniformly observed, render the map, without confusion, both ancient and modern, which it cannot otherwise be. Names which are merely modern, need not be introduced to such an extent as to crowd and obscure the map. And one on the scale of these could conveniently contain nearly every site which has been definitely ascertained, and which is of any account. Conjectural sites, we think, have no place on the face of a map.

We should like to see a Map of Palestine, prepared in the manner indicated, and embracing the various excellencies which we have enumerated in the two before us. Indeed, if the labor expended on these two had been combined, we should have had very nearly what we wanted—one good editor, one good publisher, and one good map.

The superiority of these maps appears in a striking light, by

¹ Joseph. Bel. Jud. VII. 6. 1, 2 seq.

² Jos. Antiq. XVIII. 5. 2.

comparing them with those on a similar plan which preceded them. The latter, without an exception that we have seen, are full of legendary and fictitious sites; professing to define a multitude of such sites as Mount Nebo and the Valley of Achor, Gath and Chorazin; one including all Phœnicia within the tribe of Asher, and another placing Engedi off the southern extremity of the Dead Sea; and nearly all designating, though with great variations, the exact positions of Zeboïm, Admah, Gomorrah and Sodom in its very bottom!

From all such apocryphal matter the maps before us are free, and will therefore speedily supersede the use of all others. And while we cannot regard either of them as fully meeting, even with our present knowledge of the country, the requisitions of a Map of Palestine, Ancient and Modern, we welcome them both as a great improvement on all which had preceded them, and as the undoubted harbingers of a further improvement.

ARTICLE VIII.

SELECT NOTICES AND INTELLIGENCE.

Classical Literature. The reviving attention in our country to the works of Plato, of which there are many indications, may render a brief reference to the principal helps to the study of these works not unacceptable to our readers. First in importance is the edition of the Platonic Dialogues by Stallbaum of Leipsic. This eminent philologist was born in 1793. He was educated in the Thomas school and in the university at Leipsic, under the direction of Rost, Hermann, Beck and Spohn. From 1817 to 1820, he was a teacher in the Latin school and in the Paedagogium at Halle. While here he studied with great industry the works of Plato, as a fruit of which his edition of Philebus appeared in 1820 with rich prolegomena and notes. At the same time, he undertook the charge of an edition of the text of Plato, which was published at Leipsic, in 1821—25, in twelve volumes, the last four volumes accompanied with critical remarks. This edition retained a special value after the appearance of that of Bekker. Subsequently, Stallbaum edited Eustathius, Rudiman's *Institutiones Grammaticae Latinae*, and Terence. Since 1820, he has been connected with the Thomas school. When Rost left the

rectorship in 1825, Stallbaum was appointed in his place, which he now fills with distinguished honor. In 1840, he became professor extraordinarius in the university. About the year 1826, he undertook a new edition of Plato, to form a part of the series of the "*Bibliotheca Graeca*," published by Hennings of Gotha, under the charge of professors Jacobs and Rest. The first volume was published in 1827, and contains the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Phaedo* and *Symposium*. A second edition appeared in 1833—36. The second volume contains the *Gorgias* and *Protagoras*, 2d ed. 1840. The third volume includes the *Republic*; the fourth, *Phaedrus*, *Menexenus*, *Lysis* and *Hippias Major and Minor*; the fifth, *Laches*, *Charmides*, *Alcibiades Major and Minor*, and *Cratylus*; the sixth, *Euthydemus*, *Meno*, *Euthyphro*, *Theages*, *Erastus* and *Hipparchus*; the seventh, *Timaeus* and *Critias*; the eighth, *Theaetetus* and *Sophistes*; and the ninth, *Politicus* and *Philebus*. The tenth volume, not yet out of the press, contains the *Leges*.¹ The first volume contains an interesting essay of about forty pages on the Life, Genius and Writings of Plato. Each dialogue is preceded by an Introduction designed to place the reader on the right position to understand the argument of the philosopher. Grammatical and critical explanations accompany the text, written in Latin, remarkable for its clearness and purity. The merits of Stallbaum, and which have made him *facile princeps* of all living students of Plato, are accurate and profound philological learning, sound judgment, freedom from prejudice and party spirit, comprehensive acquaintance with the Greek philosophy, and an admirable method and style in the exhibition of his opinions. His philological notes, unlike those in many German text books, are pertinent and really meet the wants of the American scholar. Love of truth, more than of theorizing, distinguishes him from Ast, Schleiermacher and other Platonic scholars. We may add that he published in 1839, independently of the *Bibliotheca Graeca*, an edition of the *Parmenides*, "which, by the amount of profound inquiries into the history of ancient philosophy has first shed a clear light on this interesting monument of the old Greek philosophical speculation."

C. A. Brandis, professor of philosophy at Bonn, and in 1816, Niebuhr's secretary in the Prussian embassy at Rome,² published in Berlin in 1837, the first volume of a "*Manual of the History of the Greek and Roman Philosophy*," a work of much value for the student of Plato.

Prof. K. F. Hermann, formerly of Marburg, now in K. O. Müller's

¹ The price of the nine volumes in this country is about twenty dollars.

² "How dear Brandis is to me, and of how much worth his presence is, thou knowest. A purer, nobler, more unassuming disposition, the world cannot furnish, to which his fine understanding and his lively perception of everything noble, give a rare value."—*Niebuhr, Lebensnachrichten*, II. 271.

place in Göttingen, published in 1830, the first part of his *History and System of the Platonic Philosophy*, in a volume of 718 pages. The first book exhibits Plato's life and his relation to the outward world; the second, a view of his predecessors and contemporaries in their relation to his doctrines; and the third, Plato's written remains as sources of his system examined and arranged. About 260 pages are taken up with notes and illustrations. The remaining volume, not yet published, will contain three books, the fourth to include a development of the principles of Plato's philosophy in the manner in which that of his predecessors is exhibited in the second book, and the fifth and sixth, the details of the Platonic doctrines both theoretical and practical. Should circumstances permit, the author intimates that he may portray the subsequent fortunes of Platonism, down to the closing period of classical antiquity. We may add that Hermann has a high and increasing reputation in Germany, and that his *History of the Platonic Philosophy* will be found well worthy of study. It is written in German, and not in the easiest style.

Ast's "*Lexicon Platicum, sive Vocabulorum Platoniarum Index*," 3 vols., Lips. 1835—38, is of considerable value, especially as a concordance. We may, also, mention as helps, of more or less importance, Schleiermacher's German translation, 3 vols., Berlin, 1817—28, with a general and with special Introductions; Cousin's French translation; Van Heusde's *Initia Philosophiæ Platoniciæ*, 3 vols., Utrecht, 1827—36; Ackermann on the "*Christian Element in Plato*," Hamburg, 1835; and Zeller's *Platonic Studies*, Tübingen, 1839, embracing essays on the Origin of the Laws, on the composition of the *Parmenides* and its place in the Platonic dialogues, and on the exhibition of the Platonic philosophy by Aristotle.¹ To these may be added Ritter's *History of Philosophy*, Vol. II., English translation, pp. 142—452. We have not space here to notice valuable editions of single dialogues.

In the *Leipsic Jahrbücher* of Jahn and Klotz, for Sept. 1844, is a review of the most recent literature relating to Herodotus by Bähr, the veteran editor of the father of history. One or two paragraphs of this article we here translate: "We turn from Old England and direct our eye to North America, where classical studies in connection with the study of Oriental languages, gain from day to day an increasing influence and an ever widening extension. A proof of this is furnished by the American Oriental Society, founded in Boston in 1843, and which has established a *Journal*, the first No. of which lies before the reviewer. It may

¹ See a review of Zeller by Stallbaum, in Jahn's *Jahrbücher*, vol. xxxv. Stallbaum successfully refutes the opinion of Zeller, that the *Laws* are not the production of Plato.

be seen from the Address contained in it, in which Mr. Pickering gives a summary view of Asia, its languages and culture, of the condition of the studies of the present age directed thereto, etc., with what zeal, and also with what thoroughness, American scholars are now directing their attention to that part of the world, its history, population, and its languages and literature; with what knowledge and insight they form a judgment in regard to the notices of Herodotus and Diodorus respecting Egypt and India, etc., and how zealously some in Boston are employed in the deciphering of the hieroglyphics and in the study of Egyptian antiquities! The labors of American missionaries in Asia support and advance this tendency not a little."

Bähr devotes two or three pages of his review to the edition of Herodotus edited by C. S. Wheeler of Harvard college, who died greatly lamented at Leipsic in 1843. It is commended to young Englishmen on the continent, as being superior, in several respects, to some English works on Herodotus which had been named; it is said to be well fitted to its end as a school-book, and to show that the author was not a mere compiler, but exercised an independent judgment, etc.

Among the recent works illustrating Herodotus, mentioned by Bähr, are two dissertations by William Hupfeld of Marburg, *De Rebus Assyriorum* and *De Vetere Medorum Regno*; Herodotus and Ctesias the earliest historical investigators of the East, by Blum; Forbiger's *Manual of Ancient Geography*; H. Lobeck's *Geography of Herodotus*; Eichwald's *Ancient Geography of the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus and Southern Russia*; F. A. Brandstätter's *Scythica*; Lindner's *Scythians and the Scythians of Herodotus*; Charles Texier's splendid work, published under the auspices of the French Minister of the Interior and of Public Instruction, entitled, *Description of Armenia, Persia, and Mesopotamia. I. Part., geography, geology, ancient and modern monuments, manners and customs; Researches in Asia Minor, Pontus and Armenia, with some account of their Antiquities and Geology*, by William J. Hamilton, Secretary to the Geological Society; and the results of the investigations of M. Botta on the site of ancient Nineveh, published in the *Journal Asiatique*, 1843.

On p. 400 of this Journal is a notice of a new edition of the *Fables of Babrius* by Boissonade, who supposes that Babrius lived at the time of Alexander Severus. In the last No. of the *London Classical Museum*, is an article by Prof. Bergk of Marburg, in which he attempts to show that Babrius flourished about 250 B. C., in the time of Alexander, the son of Craterus, who revolted from the Macedonians and made himself master of Euboea and Corinth. Bergk supposes that Callimachus, who flourished about 240 B. C., composed his *Choliambics* in imitation of Babrius. On a

close inspection, many allusions to this period are found in the fables. From some lines in the second Proemium, it would appear that Babrius was the first who treated the brute-fable as a distinct species of poetical composition. But Callimachus wrote fables and in Choliambic verse, and it is impossible that Babrius could have been ignorant of the prior existence of so eminent a poet.

In 1839, Prof. Droysen published a dissertation, in which he contested the genuineness of the Documents in the Oration of Demosthenes on the Crown. This first appeared in the *Marburg Zeitschrift für die Alterthumswissenschaft*, and was afterwards reprinted separately in Berlin, in 1839, 1 vol. pp. 205. The genuineness of the documents has been since defended by Prof. Vömel, in four separate programmes, Frankfort, 1841—44, entitled, "the Genuineness of the Documents in the Oration of Demosthenes on the Crown vindicated against Prof. Droysen." It would seem, that Vömel's essays are not at all distinguished for candor and fairness; and that personality, to some extent at least, takes the place of argument. The opinion of Vömel on the genuineness of the documents is expressed as follows: "It must be here repeated that these documents are not those which Demosthenes himself gave [to the notary] to be read aloud, but that, as Böckh has made very probable, they have been introduced—in part at wrong places—out of a collection of decrees and protocols which was taken from the archives." In the first Vol. of the *Classical Museum*, Rev. Francis W. Newman attempts to prove the spuriousness of these documents.

Prof. Westermann has published a volume entitled *Vitarum Scriptores Graeci Minores*, containing all the minor Greek biographies of literary men that have come down to us, excluding of course those of Plutarch, Diogenes Laërtius and Philostratus. Many of these lives are the productions of unknown grammarians, and many are taken from the *Lexicon of Suidas*. It includes no less than eight Lives of Homer. It is accompanied by copious indexes and critical notes.

Prof. L. Urlichs has entered the lists on the question of Roman Topography (see p. 566 above) and published, in opposition to Becker, a Tract entitled, *Die Römische Topographie in Leipsic*. See also *Classical Museum* No. VIII. p. 194.

The Coptic-Latin and Latin-Coptic Vocabulary, edited by Parthey, Berlin, 1844, contains, among other things, an *Index Geographicus Latino-Copticus*, important for the knowledge of the ancient Egyptian; *Vocabula Ægyptio-Graeca*, useful for Hesychius and other grammarians; and *Vocabula Ægyptio-Latina*.

Dr. K. W. Krüger has published a Greek grammar for schools. The first part is on the Common Dialect, particularly the Attic Prose. A re-

viewer, in a late No. of the *Zeitschrift für Alterthumswissenschaft*, commends the work in the highest terms. It is said to be characterized by great brevity, clearness and precision.

Ernest Curtius has published a little tract on the Acropolis of Athens, describing its history from the time when a mighty city lay at its feet, lingering long on the glorious period of Pericles, when architecture and sculpture reached their perfection. The same author, it is said, has in preparation a Topography of Greece, as the result of a long personal examination.

In the Preface to Schmitz's translation of Niebuhr's *Lectures on Roman History*, it is stated that Niebuhr did not proceed in his course beyond the death of Constantine the Great. Here the work of Schmitz ends. But Wilhelm Vischer of Basil states that he has MS. notes of Niebuhr's Lectures down to the end of the western empire, or to the overthrow of Orestes and Romulus by Odoacer, together with some remarks of the lecturer on the duration of Roman life in the language and literature.

E. Zeller has published the first volume of a work on the Philosophy of the Greeks, to whom a reviewer awards the praise of an exact study of the sources, and an acute judgment of the most important points of difference among the historians in their representation of particular doctrines of the Greek philosophy, while the main problem—the exhibition of the character, course, and essential points of Greek philosophy—is not solved so happily.

The following are among the more important classical works, or those illustrating the classics, which have lately appeared on the continent: *Plutarchi Scripta Moralia*, by F. Dübner, Paris, pp. 1402, Greek and Latin; *Prolegomena et Annotationes in Theætetum Platonis Dialogum*, by Dr. Burger of Leyden, employed particularly in determining the time of the authorship of the dialogue; *Plutarch on the Delay of the Divine Justice in the Punishment of the Wicked*, translated into French, with notes, by the Count De Maistre, Paris; the first vol. of the 3d ed. of Bähr's *History of Roman Literature*; the *Oldest Inhabitants of Egypt, their Languages, principal Divinities, etc.*, by C. W. Bock; *Manetho u. Hundsternperiode*, by A. Böckh; *Zur ältesten Völker u. Mythengeschichte*, by F. Hitzig, vol. I.; *Technologia Verborum Graecor.*, by C. A. Lobeck; *Polybius, ex recensione I. Bekkeri*, 2 vols. 8vo. Berlin; *Seneca L. Annaeus, Opera*, ed. C. R. Fickert; *De Ciceronis ad Brutum Epistolis*, by A. W. Zumpt; *Die Religion der Römer*, by C. G. Zumpt.

In England, the following works have lately appeared:—The first vol. of a new edition of Thirlwall's *History of Greece*, with maps and plates; the second edition, revised and enlarged, of Liddell and Scott's *Greek-*

English Lexicon, based on the German work of Passow ; Vol. 3d of the 2d edition of Arnold's History of Rome ; Rules of Greek Construction, by J. W. Donaldson ; the 12th Part of Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography ; and Charicles, or Illustrations of the Private Life of the Ancient Greeks, with Excursus and Notes, by W. A. Becker, translated into English by Rev. F. Metcalf.

Church History. It is well known that Professor Torrey of the University of Vermont has been preparing, for a number of years, a translation of the great work of Neander on the History of the Christian Church. Much desire is felt in many quarters that it may speedily be published, especially as the author is now bringing out a new edition of the original, the first vol. of which has been some time before the public. All must rejoice that the translation of this great work has fallen into hands in every respect so competent as Prof. Torrey's.

Dr. Neander is chiefly known to the English and American public by his "History of the Planting and Training of the Christian Church by the Apostles," in two vols., an English translation of which by J. E. Ryland, of Bristol, England, was published in 1841. In 1812, Dr. N., while professor extraordinarius at Heidelberg, published a work on the Emperor Julian and his Times ; in 1813, a monograph on St. Bernard and his Times ; in 1818, a Genetic Development of the Gnostic System ; in 1821 (second ed. 1832) Chrysostom and the Church, particularly in the East, in his Times ; and in 1825, the Antignostic Spirit of Tertullian. In his "Memorials from the History of Christianity and of the Christian Life," 3 vols. 2d ed., Berlin, 1825, he has attempted to impart to general readers the substance of what would be most interesting to them in the general history of the church.

All the above treatises, however, were only preliminary to his "General History of the Christian Religion and Church." This, so far as published, embraces five volumes, and extends to A. D. 1284. A second edition, of Vol. I. appeared in 1842. This is the work of which Prof. Torrey has furnished a translation.

Dr. Neander is regarded, throughout Christendom, as the most eminent living church historian. In some respects he is more distinguished than Mosheim, Planck or any of his predecessors. His chief excellencies may be stated as follows: *First.* Profound and varied learning. He seems to be equally at home in every part of the immense field which he cultivates. In this respect he has no competitor among his many learned countrymen. It is now nearly forty years since he turned his attention to church history. *Second.* A clear perception of the spiritual nature of Christianity. The position from which he surveys the whole subject of church history is of

the most elevated kind. This leads him to exhibit with great prominence the vital spirit of Christianity in distinction from all rites and forms, to oppose with much decision every attempt to unite the church and the State, and to cherish towards real Christians of every name the most fraternal good-will. *Third.* In general, an admirable method of representation. Nothing can be further from his plan than the formal dryness of statistics, or the skeleton-like regularity of some "centuriators." He evolves his subject rather than counts up his facts; strives to develop the causes of events more than to copy them in their outward order. He is occasionally doubtless too subjective, and runs into something approaching mysticism. In this respect Planck is his superior. Yet his great familiarity with the subject enables him to unite clear and comprehensive general views with instructive details. In his high estimate of spiritual religion, he does not overlook the intellectual and political bearing of different measures and courses of policy; in his delineation of the outward forms of Christianity and of the melancholy defections from its spirit and doctrines, he does not forget that our Lord has always had a true church, and that the historian must ever trace out, with special care, the current of living piety, however small, at various times, it may have been. We may add that the entire History is pervaded by a spirit of real candor. It has for us a special value from the many interesting notices which it contains of the efforts made in different ages to propagate Christianity, and from the light which it casts on various important questions now agitating the American churches.

At the same time, it should be added, that Dr. Neander entertains some opinions on a number of important points, e. g. inspiration, miracles, the Christian sabbath, the Trinity, etc., with which evangelical Christians in this country do not coincide. He has been, in some degree, injuriously affected by the sentiments prevailing around him. On the other hand, it should be remembered that, from the nature of the case, these erroneous or doubtful opinions, must be confined, for the most part, to the volumes already before the public, on the Planting of the Church. They relate, of necessity, to the age of the apostles and of miracles. So far as they may be found in the pages of the General History, they can be easily met by the notes of the learned and excellent translator.

It is interesting to observe the special attention which is now directed, throughout Christendom, to the life and labors of the reformers of the sixteenth century. Those who acted a secondary or subordinate part in the stirring events of that period, now find able biographers. The life of Oecolampadius together with a history of the Reformation of the Church at Basil, has recently appeared from the pen of Prof. J. J. Herzog of Lau-

sanne, in 2 vols. pp. 366 and 307. The work seems to have been performed with ability and with true German patience, the author having examined the archives of Basil, Zürich, St. Gall, Neuenberg, Strasburg, etc. — J. W. Baum, professor in the protestant Seminary of St. William in Strasburg, has just completed a Life of "Theodore Beza prepared from MS. sources," etc. One vol. of 525 pages is now published. A 2d vol. will complete the work. The author passed a long time in the libraries at Zürich, Berne, Geneva, etc., and collected a rich store of materials. About 700 letters of Beza were transcribed, besides a considerable amount of extracts and notices from the letters of others. — The Life of Dr. Paul Eber, the pupil, friend and associate of the reformers, has been written by C. H. Sixt, pastor at Sennfeld, near Schweinfurt in Bavaria, in a volume of 284 pages, accompanied by 49 original documents. Eber was born in 1511, and died in Wittenberg in 1569. In 1557, he became preacher and professor of Hebrew at Wittenberg. Here he took an important part in the famous Sacramentarian controversy. — It is announced that biographies will soon appear of Victorin Strigel, Von Flacius, Thamer, Hunnius, and others, who occupied the third rank in the list of reformers, or who belonged to the second and third generations after Luther, Calvin and Zuingli.

We have received the 7th vol. of Dr. Henry Ritter's great work on the History of Philosophy, or the 3d vol. of the History of Christian Philosophy. It begins the history of philosophy in the Middle Ages, and embraces 760 pages. Another volume, of like size, will complete the work. "No part of my labor," the author remarks, "has been so difficult as this. Sometimes I have almost despaired of being able to discover the sense of a complicated Dialectic, whose doctrines, for the most part, are very far removed from us. I have then wished for myself, in this work, the powers of a younger man; still I know not whether a young man could be advised to enter on this labor which indeed promises rich instruction, but which would fatigue and even confound strong powers. It may be regarded as a problem for the present age, to learn to understand the philosophy of the Middle Ages, in the same manner as other aspects of this period are coming to be better understood. Yet the mass of scholastic literature is too great and hitherto too little examined to enable us adequately to apprehend the nature of the problem. One must hope that it may be gradually solved by a union of powers." Ritter speaks of having confined himself to the reading of the principal works on mediaeval philosophy. Many valuable MSS. yet lie uninvestigated, and even the printed sources have not by any means been thoroughly explored. It is only at Paris where one could find full materials for a work of this nature. The volume embraces, among other things, an Introduction to the Philosophy of the Middle Ages,

course of development, schools and scientific literature in reference to philosophy, division of the subject, transition from ancient philosophy to modern, Isidore, Bede, Alcuin, Duns Scotus, scattered efforts to construct a theological system, rise and progress of dialectics, Anselm, Nominalism and Conceptualism, Platonists, Adelard, Bernard, etc., Platonism in theology, Abelard, Honorius, Gilbert, etc., theological collections, Peter of Lombardy, mysticism in the 12th century, and the Arabian philosophy.

The wish expressed by Ritter in the preceding paragraph seems likely to be gratified. Many individuals are zealously laboring in mediæval theological and philosophical literature, and from time to time publishing the results of their investigations. We may mention Liebniz's *Hugo St. Victor*; J. Voigt's *Writings on Gregory VII*; F. Hurter on *Innocent III*; Ellendorf's *Writings on the Carolingian period* and on *Bernard of Clairvaux*; Von Raumer's *History of the Hohenstaufen*; Baur's *History of the Doctrine of the Atonement and of the Trinity*, in respect to the Middle Ages; Dorner's *Historical Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*; the *Writings of Hjort*, *Fronmüller* and *Staudenmaier* on *Duns Scotus*; Neuter's tract on *John of Salisbury*; Helfferich's *Christian Mystic*, in its *Development* and in its *Monuments*; Martensen's *Master Eckhardt*; Engelhardt on *Richard St. Victor* and *Ruysbroech*; Schmidt on *Johann Tauler*, the last two "fundamental and excellent works;" and *Anselm of Canterbury*, by J. R. Hasse, professor extraordinarius at Bonn. The life of Anselm only is yet published. "It is the work of a quiet, clear-headed, conscientious investigator, the ripe fruit of the examination of materials carried on with love and zeal through a series of years. It is composed in a pure historical style."

The first part of the first vol. of the fourth and greatly improved edition of *Gieseler's Manual of Church History* has been published at Bonn. —The 10th and last vol. of the 3d edition of a *Selection of Luther's Works*, "adapted to the needs of the times," is announced.

Mignet, perpetual secretary of the French Academy of Moral and Political Sciences and author of the *History of the French Revolution*, is preparing a *History of the Reformation, the League, and the Reign of Henry IV. in France*, in 10 octavos, to be published in the same manner as the *Consulate and Empire of M. Thiers*. Mignet's place, as head of the Bureau of Archives in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gives him eminent facilities for his work. The Royal Library, to which the historian has access in the French capital, now consists of nine hundred thousand volumes and seventy thousand considerable MSS., besides numberless maps, medals, engravings and antiquities of every kind.

Biblical and Oriental Literature. The third vol. of Hengstenberg on the Psalms extends only to Ps. 91, instead of completing the work as was promised in the Preface. The 72d Ps. Hengstenberg considers as Messianic, first from its predictions of the eternal duration of the dominion of the king mentioned in it; second, from the emphatic declaration that the king, in distinction from all his predecessors, shall reign over the whole earth, *all* kings shall fall down before him; and third, this king shall obtain his dominion, not by war and conquest, but by righteousness and love. Hengstenberg decides in favor of the Mosaic origin of Ps. 90. It bears throughout the character of high antiquity. There is no song in the Psalter which makes the impression so strongly that it is an original production, first breaking its way. It has striking affinities to some things in the Pentateuch, etc.

Prof. Lassen occupies the whole of the first No. of the 6th vol. of the *Zeitschrift für die Kunde d. Morgenlandes* with an essay on the ancient Persian arrow-headed inscriptions, found at Persepolis. Westergaard, author of a Sanscrit Dictionary, has spent some time at the ruins, compared anew, in the most careful manner, all the inscriptions which had been before copied, and transcribed the remainder. The results were communicated to Prof. Lassen. "We now possess," says Lassen, "in a collected form, all which Persepolis furnishes for this species of inscription; and if anything is still wanting, it can only be, that I have not been able fully to perform the duty towards science which the confidence of my friendly correspondent has imposed upon me." Westergaard, who seems to possess every qualification for his work, is now employed in copying the inscriptions of Bisutun, the largest and most important of all. It is to be hoped that the knowledge of the alphabets in which these inscriptions are found, will lay the basis of wider discoveries, and will throw light upon the remarkable inscriptions on the rocks at Van and the lately discovered ruins at Nineveh.

Rev. William Tait of Wakefield, Yorkshire, England, has published two vols., entitled *Meditationes Hebraicae*, or a doctrinal and practical Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews, in a series of Lectures. The writer appears to follow the general course of argument pursued by Prof. Stuart in his Commentary on the book, while its general contents would seem to be of a more practical and hortatory kind.

"Critical History and Defence of the Canon of the Old Testament," is the title of a duodecimo volume from the pen of Professor Stuart, now in the press at Andover. Its main object is to present a critical and historical view of the Jewish Canon of Scripture in the days of Christ and

the apostles, and to show that this Canon, as received by the Jews at that time, was declared by our Saviour and his apostles to be of divine origin and authority, and was treated by them as entitled to these claims. If this can be shown, then it unavoidably follows, that the books of the Old Testament have received the sanction of an authority from which there is no appeal; and that one who admits the divine authority of Christianity, of which the New Testament contains a credible and authentic account, then he must be altogether inconsistent, if he does not admit the divine origin and authority of the Old Testament. There can be but one opinion in regard to the urgent necessity of a thorough discussion of this subject. On the minds of most evangelical theologians, much darkness rests in relation to the history of the Canon of the Old Testament, or on what grounds we should receive this volume as of divine authority. Its claims are loosely taken for granted. Few can clearly state to themselves the solid evidence on which they rest. In Germany the subject has not been discussed with much ability. One writer has copied the indefinite and ill-digested statements of his predecessor, without sifting the original authorities. The incorrect or random assertions which critics of distinguished name have made on the History of the Canon, are certainly not a little remarkable. A fresh and adequate examination of the subject will, therefore, be very seasonable.

The Chaldee Grammar, alluded to on p. 400, is now published. We trust that it will be the means of directing increased attention to the study of those portions of the Old Testament which are written in this dialect. It is a very well-prepared and convenient Manual, and contains the fruits of the latest investigations on the subject by Gesenius, Ewald, Fürst, Winer, and others. In this edition, many of the topics are discussed with much more fullness and completeness than in the first, while some are almost entirely new. The Syntax has been rewritten and brought into a much better condition. Prof. Hackett proposes to add hereafter a few pages, containing something like an analytical key to the Chaldee portions of the Bible, for the convenience of those who wish to prosecute the study privately. While there cannot be, from the nature of the case, a very rapid sale of a grammar of either of the dialects cognate to the Hebrew, we hope, that our biblical scholars will avail themselves of a work so useful and so faithfully prepared by the author and translator.

In 1842, a society was formed in New York, entitled, The American Ethnographical Society, to embrace, as its objects, inquiries into the origin, progress and characteristics of the various races of man. It numbers 36 resident members, 42 corresponding members, and 43 honorary

members. Its president is the venerable Albert Gallatin. The first vol. of its Transactions, just published, contains 491 pages, with a few drawings, plates, etc. The subjects of the articles are : I. Notes on the semi-civilized nations of Mexico, Yucatan, and Central America, by Mr. Gallatin ; II. An Account of Ancient Remains in Tennessee, by Dr. G. Troost, professor of Natural History in the university at Nashville ; III. Observations on the Grave Creek Mound in Western Virginia, by Henry R. Schoolcraft ; IV. The recent discoveries of Himyaritic Inscriptions and the attempts made to decipher them, by Wm. W. Turner, Instructor in Hebrew in the Union Theological Seminary ; and V. An Account of the Punico-Libyan monument at Dugga, and the Remains of an ancient Structure at Bleas, near the site of ancient Carthage, by Frederic Catherwood. Under the modest title of Notes, Mr. Gallatin has furnished a very able and instructive article on the languages, numeration, calendars and astronomy, history, and chronology of the Mexican and contiguous nations, and on the origin of semi-civilization in America. In regard to the source of American civilization, Mr. G. argues that all the probabilities point out Asia ; first, the physical type of the Americans, color, shape of the skull, etc., is more analogous to that of the Eastern Asiatics, than to that of the inhabitants of any other portion of the globe ; second, the proximity, or rather the greater facility of communication, is also in favor of Asia. A migration from Asia is much more probable than from Scandinavia. The most striking points of resemblance, which have been observed, between the Americans and the inhabitants of the other hemisphere, refer almost exclusively to Asiatic countries.

The article on the Himyaritic Inscriptions by Mr. Turner furnishes a clear and highly creditable account of the principal facts connected with the discovery of the inscriptions, and of the interesting though scanty results which have already been made by the attempts to decipher them. We are glad to learn from a notice in this article, that a Frenchman, M. Arnaud, has visited Southern Arabia, reached Mâreh, the ancient capital of Hadramaut, and there found the remains of the celebrated dam and the ruins of several great monuments ; but above all, succeeded in copying sixty Himyaritic inscriptions. These are about to appear in the Asiatic Journal. There are also other explorers in the field, and some new inscriptions are said to have been sent to England.

Miscellaneous. We are happy to perceive an increasing demand for the old English Prose Authors, especially those of a religious character. The writings of Jeremy Taylor, South, Barrow, Chillingworth and others, of which no clergyman's library should be destitute, are now furnished to our scholars in a convenient form, in good type and at a moderate price. We have

long felt desirous of seeing many of the treatises of Bishop Hall republished in our country, and have been gratified with the recent perusal of several of these treatises, as they have been in process of publication by Allen, Morrill and Wardwell of Andover. They are soon to be issued from the press, without mutilation, and with no change of their original form except in respect of orthography, punctuation, etc. They are published under the editorial supervision of Mr. A. Huntington Clapp, of Andover Theological Seminary. Some of them have very seldom met the eye of American scholars. Particularly rare is the "Account of some Specialities in Bishop Hall's Life, written with his own hand," which is to appear in the forth-coming volume, accompanied with notes and additions selected by the Editor. The remaining contents of the volume are: Meditations and Vows, Divine and Moral, serving for direction in Christian and Civil Practice; Holy Observations; Characterisms of Virtues and Vices; Heaven upon Earth, or of True Peace and Tranquillity of Mind; six of Bishop Hall's Epistles, on themes of especial interest to a clergyman. It is superfluous for us to speak a word in praise of a divine who has been styled, by an eminent English barrister, the Seneca of English literature, and whose writings have been recommended to the legal profession by one of their own number, as an admirable means of mental discipline, imparting a power of compressed thought, and of racy expression. Few writers are so sententious, apothegmatical, terse, definite and vigorous as Bishop Hall. His faults are those of the age in which he lived. They are such as modern writers are but little inclined to imitate. His excellences are those of sound English mind penetrated with deep religious feeling. Dr. Doddridge speaks of him as "the most elegant and polite writer of his age. He abounds rather too much with antitheses and witty turns. In some of his writings he seems to have imitated Seneca and Austin. — His Contemplations are incomparably valuable for language, criticism, and devotion." We will only add our expression of the wish that Mr. Clapp would prepare other volumes of select old treatises like those which compose the present work.

The same publishers, who are issuing the above named work, have also in press a collection of standard treatises on preaching and pastoral duties. The volume will contain Fenelon's Dialogues on Eloquence, Herbert's Country Parson, Baxter's Reformed Pastor, and other Essays of English divines. With these and similar writings our clergymen ought to be not only acquainted but familiar. Even if it should be said, as it cannot be with truth, that modern treatises on the pulpit are intrinsically superior to those of Baxter, Burnet, and Doddridge, still these modern treatises are not clothed with that authority which belongs to the more ancient. A rule prescribed by a living teacher, even if in itself better expressed

than the rules of his predecessors, is still destitute of the sacredness and binding force which belong to the treatises already consecrated by time. The good maxims which our fathers loved, we love on that account so much the more. Their authority is not diminished by the imperfections of the men who established them ; for we are not affected by the faults of the dead, even if we notice them at all, as we are by those of the living. The lapse of ages mellows the good name of the virtuous, and effaces their deformities from our view ; hence the spiritual writings which are hallowed by influence of antiquity, will have a certain degree of power which cannot be acquired by any fresh treatise, however excellent in itself. May the time be far removed, when the wholesome words of Herbert and of Jennings shall cease to command the homage of our ministers ! By all means would we encourage the publication of original *Essays* on the pulpit ; the more we have, the better ; we are suffering for want of more ; but these *Essays* must be added to, not substituted for the standard writings of our fathers.

An edition of the *Psalms* in Hebrew has just been published at the Andover press, in a convenient pocket edition, with uncommonly beautiful paper and type. It will well compare with the miniature editions published by Bagster.

An interesting *Life* of the philosopher Leibnitz, has been published the past year, by John M. Mackie, from the German biography of Dr. G. E. Gubrauer. Mr. M. has wisely rewritten the *Life*, for the purpose of divesting it of its German peculiarities and of presenting it in a more acceptable form to the American reader. Leibnitz was the great man of the age in continental Europe ; to him modern German philosophy looks as its father ; he was engaged in earnest disputes with the greatest thinkers among his contemporaries ; the mere literary man must admire his wonderful mental activity and the extraordinary compass of his views. A popular and readable *Life* of the philosopher, such as Mr. M. has now prepared, has long been a desideratum.

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ARTICLE I.

REMARKS ON SOME PHILOSOPHICAL OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE
DOCTRINE OF THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY.

By Rev. Joseph Tracy, Boston.

THAT the bodies of the dead shall, at some future time, be raised to life, is the obvious doctrine of the Scriptures. This is conceded by all men, whether Christian or infidel. Some, however, maintain that the doctrine cannot possibly be true; and hence they infer that the Scriptures, which teach it, cannot be from God. Others, again, deny the truth of the doctrine; but instead of rejecting the Scriptures, maintain that on this subject, their obvious meaning must be rejected, and that another interpretation must be given them, consistent with the teachings of philosophy. With both these classes of men, our controversy has respect to facts, rather than principles. We readily admit that science may teach us some things with absolute certainty, and that, with respect to those things, it is neither our duty, nor is it possible for us, to believe the contrary. If a professed revelation, when taken in its obvious sense, teaches anything that science demonstrates to be false, we must either find, by fair means, another interpretation, not inconsistent with known truth, or reject the professed revelation, as not from God.

But are we under any such necessity, in respect to the resurrection? Has philosophy proved, or can she prove, that the obvious doctrine of the Scriptures on this subject cannot be true?

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Are we thus forced, either to find a less obvious interpretation, consistent with the teachings of philosophy, or reject the Scriptures?

To bring us to such a conclusion, philosophy needs to argue with amazing force. Nothing short of absolute demonstration will answer her purpose. She must produce arguments strong enough to balance and neutralize all the evidences of Christianity. The arguments from history, from miracles, from prophecy, from our own intuitive perception of the truth of the great doctrines of the gospel, from the demand of conscience that we receive it as true, and from our own experience of its power to heal the diseases of the soul, are not lightly to be set aside. Nothing short of an absolute demonstration, in which we know certainly that there is no mistake, can be allowed, on philosophical principles, to justify our apostasy in the face of such evidence. No mere theory, unsupported by facts; no collection of facts which may be imperfect, either because all the facts in the case have not been observed, or because some of them have been observed imperfectly, can be sufficient. The evidence in favor of Christianity is too strong to yield to any imperfect proof.

Nor may we reject the natural and obvious sense of Scripture for any less sufficient reason. It is a well established canon of criticism, that the Scriptures are to be understood in their natural and obvious sense, unless we are absolutely compelled to seek another. It is not allowable for us to say that 'the Scriptures do, indeed, in their obvious sense, teach the doctrine of the resurrection; but we reject it, because another opinion appears to us more probable;' thus exalting our own opinion of the probability of opinions above the authority of the word of God. Nothing short of certain and infallible knowledge that the obvious meaning of Scripture cannot be true, can justify us in rejecting it, and adopting another interpretation, which we perceive to be less obvious. We must be brought to the necessity of finding another meaning, or rejecting the Scriptures altogether, before we can be justified in resorting to forced and unnatural interpretations. We do not admit, as a matter of fact, that such a case ever occurred, or can occur. A certain interpretation may *appear* to certain men or sects to be the most obvious, because their minds are beclouded by ignorance, or distorted by prejudice, and a meaning less obvious *to them* may be the true one; but that Scripture, in the sense which is most obvious to well-informed and candid minds, is ever false, we by no means concede, except hypothetically, for

the sake of argument. On the subject before us, it will not be denied that the Scriptures, taken in the sense most obvious to candid and well informed men, do teach the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. Force is needed, not to make them utter this doctrine, but to prevent it. That force we are not justified in applying, without absolute necessity. The exigency must be one which will justify us in rejecting the Bible, unless we can find another meaning.

Nor can the force of this reasoning be evaded, by an appeal to passages of Scripture which speak of the sun as rising and setting, and the like. The obvious meaning of the writers, in such passages, is not to settle the question of the sun's diurnal motion, but to speak of these phenomena as they appear to the senses; or rather, to designate an event of daily occurrence, by its usual name. The resurrection is an event of a different class, and lies entirely beyond the range of this principle of interpretation. It has no sensible appearance, exhibited before the eyes of all men, and giving rise to a current phraseology. The appeal fails, also, for another reason. Science has *demonstrated* that the phenomena of sun-rise and sun-set are caused by the earth's motion, and not by the sun's. We are compelled, therefore, either to reject the Scriptures, or to receive them in a sense consistent with this known fact. To make the cases parallel, the impossibility of the resurrection of the body must also be *demonstrated*, and we must be made to *know* it, as we know the fact of the earth's rotation on its axis. Apparent probabilities, deriving their plausibility, perhaps, from our own ignorance, will not answer this purpose. We must have *demonstration*. Whether philosophy has furnished it, or can furnish it, is the question before us.

If we receive the Scriptures, the necessity of turning what they say of the resurrection from its obvious meaning, must be evinced by higher testimony than that of the senses. There must be a necessity of *reason*. The obvious meaning must be shown to be irreconcilable, not merely with facts which we suppose our senses have observed, but with those intuitive truths which every rational mind must of necessity believe.

According to the Scriptures, the apostles believed, on the testimony of their senses, that the body of Christ,—the same body which he had before and at his crucifixion,—was actually raised from the dead. Here we need not go over the ground which has been abundantly discussed in treatises on the evidences of Christianity. It will doubtless be conceded, that the apostles were as

well convinced, by the testimony of their senses, of the resurrection of Christ's body, as they ever were of any fact whatever. They knew that he was alive, in that body, after his crucifixion, just as they knew that he was alive in it before. They knew it by seeing him, by hearing him, by conversing with him, in short, by the same testimony of sense, in both cases. They no more suspected, and had no more reason to suspect, an illusion in one case, than in the other. If Christ's body which they saw after his crucifixion, might be a mere phantom,¹ then, on the same principle, the body in which they knew him before his crucifixion may have been a mere phantom. And not only so, but their own bodies may have been nothing but phantoms; and indeed, all human bodies may be nothing but phantoms. Interpret Scripture on this principle, and the doctrine of the resurrection becomes the doctrine of the reproduction of the same phantom that existed before death. Such a doctrine, we suppose, would not be easily overthrown by reasonings about carbon, and nitrogen, and phosphate of lime, and chemical decomposition. If we have only phantom-bodies now, then only phantom-bodies need to be raised; and we do not see how chemical changes, alleged or actual, are to prevent the raising of them.

This argument goes deeper than some may at first suppose. The seeing of Christ by the apostles after his crucifixion, whether fact or illusion, was not a mere casual event. It was brought to pass by the power of God, for the sake of making the very impression upon their minds which it did make. God placed those phenomena before their senses, with the intention of thereby making them believe that the body of Christ had risen from the dead; and they did believe it. Were they right, or wrong? When God speaks to us by sensible phenomena; when he produces phenomena before our eyes for the sake of making us believe a certain proposition, is he to be believed, or not? Does he always speak according to the actual fact, or does he sometimes deal in illusions? If the latter, how are we to distinguish illusions from facts? How are we to know when he exhibits a fact, and when he deceives us with an illusion? How can we know

¹ We do not use the word *phantom* invidiously. If it offends, substitute any more acceptable phraseology in its place. Say that the witnessing of the phenomenon of Christ's risen body by the apostles was subjective, and not objective; or that the eyes of their spirits were opened, to see spiritual objects; or express the idea in any other terms whatever. So long as the idea is retained, the applicability of our reasoning is not impaired.

that all the miracles recorded in Scripture were not illusions? Indeed, what certainty have we, that the whole visible and tangible universe is not an illusion? Even supposing that we have bodies which are not phantoms, how do we know that all the phenomena of death are not illusory? If the body of Christ was miraculously removed from the sepulchre, and a phantom shown to the apostles instead of it, how do we know that the body itself was not carried, with its identity unimpaired, to heaven; and how do we know that the body of every man is not, at death, removed, by a similar miracle, to some place where it may remain in safety till the last day, and a phantom-corps substituted for it, to be buried, and make the needful moral impression upon the minds of survivors? How do we know that the phenomena of chemical decomposition, and of the dispersion of particles, and of their entering into new combinations, do not all belong to the phantom-corps, while the true body is saved from any change that can be supposed in the least to affect its identity? Evidently, we can have no such knowledge. We must admit that all this may be, or that the body of Christ, which was crucified, was actually raised to life, and seen by the apostles.

Nor can this reasoning be met, by referring to the appearance of angels in human form, recorded in several places in the Old Testament. In those cases, there was no deception. As soon as attention was called to the question, whether the visible form belonged to a man or an angel, the truth became known. The apostles, on the contrary, "supposed that they had seen a spirit"—a phantom; but were brought to believe that they saw the real body, which had been crucified. And besides; how can it be shown that those angels, whenever they appeared to men, did not make themselves visible by assuming, for the time, real material bodies, such as they appeared to have?

If, then, the body of Christ was raised from the dead, philosophy is bound to take notice of the fact, and to admit that the resurrection of a dead body is not impossible. The argument is forcibly stated by the "philosophic Apostle," to the Corinthians. The substance of the gospel, he says, is this:—That Christ died for our sins, was buried, and rose again. 1 Cor. 15: 3, 4. But if dead men never rise, this cannot be true. You must therefore admit that Christ rose from the dead, or reject the gospel as a fable. Verse 13, 14. But we know that Christ is risen from the dead; and therefore we are authorized to expect the resurrection of others also. Verse 20 and onwards. The ascertained fact,

that the body of Christ was raised from the dead, actually nullifies all arguments against the credibility of the doctrine of the resurrection; just as the first arrival of the Great Western at New York nullified Dr. Lardner's arguments against the possibility of steam navigation across the Atlantic. The doctrine of the resurrection is, henceforth at least, a credible doctrine, and if we find it in the Bible, there is no reason why we should not receive it.

As this is a vital point, let us look at it in still another aspect. What is *matter*? What is *body*? How do we get our idea of *body*? We stand before a tomb-stone, for example. In a certain portion of space, which we regard as its surface, certain phenomena are observed, giving us conceptions of color, shape, resistance to the touch, and other sensible qualities. Our observation of phenomena, however, extends only to the *surface*. Between the interior and our senses, there is no communication; there can be none. If we cut or break the stone, new *surfaces* appear, and exhibit their appropriate phenomena. We then look upon what we suppose *was* the interior; but is not the interior *when we look upon it*. Sense can observe nothing but phenomena at the surface, or, in the language of the old logicians, only the *qualities* of bodies, and not their *substratum*.

Whence, then, comes the idea, which is in all sane minds, of solidity? What puts it into our minds, that the tomb-stone is not a mere phantom,—a mere play of phenomena at certain points of space,—but has a solid interior? The answer is this:—God has so made us, that those sensible phenomena do necessarily excite in us the idea of a solid interior, and enforce a belief of its existence. The phenomena constitute a language which he addresses to our senses, informing us that the substance is there. We do not mean to say that this constitution of our minds is merely an arbitrary appointment of the Divine Will, and that we might have been made otherwise, and still have been rational beings. On the contrary, this law of our minds is evidently a part of our rationality itself. The idea of solid substance, thus excited, is a rational idea, and we are bound, as rational beings, to rely upon it as according to truth. Our senses deal only with sensible phenomena, which are exhibited at the surface; but these phenomena are our testimony, and the only testimony that we can have, of the existence of the solid interior.

Apply these principles to the facts concerning the body of Christ, as seen by the apostles after his resurrection. All the sensible phenomena of a real body were actually exhibited. The facts

which met their senses were in all respects the same as the presence of the real body must have produced. The presence of the real body was evinced to them, in the only way in which the presence of a body is ever evinced to any human being. Doubt whether they saw Christ's real body; and on the same principle you may doubt whether any man ever saw any thing. Observe, —it is conceded on all sides that there was no hallucination; no mere brain-image, existing only in their own diseased imaginations. It is conceded that the sensible phenomena did actually occur, and that the apostles, in the healthy exercise of their senses, correctly observed them. They had, therefore, all the evidence of the presence of a real body, that any person ever has, in any case whatever.

Keeping this in mind, let us look at the chemical argument against the possibility of a resurrection. The dead body, we are told, is decomposed, and its particles enter into new combinations. The lime of the bones of those who fell at Waterloo becomes, first, a constituent part of the wheat that grows over their graves, and then a part of the bodies of other men, so that the same particles belong successively to different bodies. But we ask, how do we know all this? How do we know that lime is a constituent part both of bones and of wheat? By chemical analysis. But how does the chemist know that he is analysing a bone at one time, and wheat at another, and that lime is one of the results? By the testimony of his senses. The sensible phenomena of bone, wheat and lime are exhibited before him, and from them he understands that bone, wheat and lime are actually present. If the sensible phenomena are not proof of the presence of the real substance, then his analysis must go for nothing, and we have no reason to believe that human bodies are decomposed, and parts of them enter into new combinations. If they *are* proof, then the body of Christ was actually raised from the dead, and therefore other resurrections are possible.

None will suspect us of intending, by these remarks, to bring into doubt the conclusions of chemistry. We only mean to say that, resting, as they do, on the testimony of sense, they cannot overthrow the testimony of sense, and therefore cannot disprove a fact which is supported by the strongest testimony that sense can give. They can never overthrow the principle, that when the sensible phenomena are actually exhibited, the real body is present. They can never disprove the resurrection of Christ's body, without nullifying the evidence by which they themselves are

sustained. It being admitted that in the case of Christ's body there was no mistake of the observers with respect to the phenomena, and that the sensible phenomena did actually occur, it follows that the evidence of his real, bodily presence was as complete as the evidence of sense can be. If there were any suspicion of mistake as to the occurrence of the phenomena, the certainty might be increased by a greater number of observers, or of observations; but the supposition of mistake being excluded, and the actual occurrence of the phenomena being admitted, the fact of the real presence of the body becomes invested with all the certainty which the evidence of sense can give; and no science which rests on the testimony of sense for its own support, can be permitted to bring it into doubt.

Now, so far as we have ever read, or heard, or can imagine, all objections against the possibility of the resurrection of the body rest, ultimately, on some supposed testimony of the senses. They are derived from the fact, that men have *seen* bodies burned, or bones decomposed, or something of the kind. They can, therefore, never disprove a fact which is sustained by the highest testimony that sense can give; a fact, indeed, which cannot be called in question without impeaching the credibility of sense as a witness to any thing.

But a question is raised concerning the *identity* of the body before and after the resurrection. Granting that we are to live again in a body, will it be the *same* body in which we lived on earth; or will it be another body?

Here let us recal to mind, that we are arguing with those who admit that the facts narrated in the Scriptures actually occurred; that the Scriptures, taken in their obvious sense, do represent the present and future body as the same; and that no mere appearance of probability, nothing short of absolute knowledge, can justify us in rejecting the obvious sense of Scripture, and forcing another interpretation upon its words. Keeping these things in mind, we remark,

That, the body of Christ, which the apostles saw after his resurrection, was the same body in which he was crucified. The apostles evidently regarded it as the same. It was proved to be the same by all the evidence by which the identity of any object of sense is ever evinced. They knew its identity, just as they knew that the body in which he was crucified, was the same in which they had seen him three days before; just as any one knows any object now before his eyes, to be the same which he

has seen at some previous time. We must admit its identity, therefore, or admit that we know nothing about the identity of bodies in any case whatever. It is conceded, let us remember, that there was no mistake in the observations; that the sensible phenomena by which the body was recognized as the same which had been crucified, did really occur. If, therefore, the ground on which the idea of identity of body rests, is not substantial in this case, then, for the same reasons, it never can be substantial in any case, and we must confess our ignorance whether the same body ever yet existed at two distinct points of time; in other words, that our idea of the identity of bodies is a mere figment of the imagination, not authorized by any thing we know, or can know, of the external world, and therefore, not only this question, but all questions concerning the identity of bodies, may be dismissed at once, as mere nonsense. As the human mind cannot receive such absurdities, we are compelled to admit, in one instance at least, the identity of the body, before death and after resurrection. And if the identity was preserved in one instance, why not in all?

The objector's reply is doubtless ready. The body of Christ "saw no corruption," and therefore could be raised; but most human bodies are either decomposed in the earth, or burned, and thus their "constituent particles" are dispersed; and how can those particles be gathered up again? And, if Omnipotence is exerted to collect them and reconstruct them into a body, how can it be the *same* body as before their dispersion, and not a *new* body, constructed out of the same materials? There is still a further difficulty. During this life, the constituent particles of our bodies are continually changing, the vital power casting off some, for which it has no further use, and taking others into their places, so that the whole are changed in about seven years. A man who dies at seventy, therefore, has had ten different bodies; and after the decomposition of the last, the particles of all those bodies have been dispersed. Which is to be gathered up and reconstructed? And still further;—who, in the resurrection, is to have those particles which have belonged to several human bodies?

Our first reply is, that those who urge such objections, misapprehend the idea of bodily identity. That idea is one which every rational being must of necessity have, as its absence is incompatible with rationality. What, then, is the idea which men intend to express, when they use the words, "the same body?"

Do they mean to assert the identity of the constituent particles? Seldom, if ever, does the thought of constituent particles enter their minds; and yet the whole idea of bodily identity is present. The particles of a man's body, we are told, change ten times in seventy years; and yet, according to the idea of bodily identity, as it exists in all sane minds, the man has all the time "the same body." In perfect accordance with the same idea, all the particles may be changed again, during the process of death and resurrection, and the body yet retain its identity.

We have said that *this* idea of bodily identity exists in all sane minds. We are aware that some have also affixed another meaning to the words, which they esteem more philosophically exact, making them imply identity of constituent particles. But this is not the idea of bodily identity which Christians generally suppose that they find in the Bible. Neither the Scriptures, in their obvious sense, nor the common belief of Christians, assert any closer identity between the present and future body, than exists between the body in manhood and that of the same person in his youth. If it be granted that the identity remains as entire from the age of seventy to the resurrection, inclusive, as it did from birth to the age of seventy, all is granted which the obvious sense of Scripture, or the common belief of Christians, requires.

But this claim of superior philosophical precision in the use of terms is untenable. It rests wholly on an overlooking of the difference between the idea of *body*, and the idea of *certain particles*, of which the body is supposed to be made up. Particles, merely placed in juxta-position, do not constitute a *body*. There must also be a uniting power, combining the several parts into a unity. Subjection to that uniting power is what makes any portion of matter a part of the body. A thorn, thrust into the flesh, is no part of the body, for it is not subject to that uniting power. A tooth, when extracted, the paring of one's nail, or any other portion of matter when removed from the dominion of the uniting power, ceases to be a part of the body. The identity of a body, according to the common sense of mankind, and according to the deepest and most exact philosophy, is found in the identity of that uniting power, and not in the continuous presence of the same particles. Questions, therefore, of the presence or absence of certain particles which once belonged to the body, are altogether irrelevant.

But does not the action of the uniting power terminate at death? To this question, philosophy, without the Scriptures, can give no

answer. We know that, at death or soon after, that power ceases to hold together certain visible portions of the body as formerly; but whether it ceases to act, or whether it still retains its control over certain portions of the matter of the body, and whether it will afterwards resume its control over portions which it has cast off for a time, or whether it will subject to itself other portions of matter, making them parts of the same body; these are questions concerning which philosophy can neither affirm nor deny. The uniting power is not necessarily vital. In many bodies, it is evidently not vital. Nor can philosophy disprove the continued vitality of some portion of the matter of the human body. Nor can it disprove the possibility that the uniting power may be dormant for a time, and again resume its empire over matter, and thus preserve the identity of the body.

But the argument against the possibility of the resurrection, from the dispersion of the constituent particles of the body, is exposed to another difficulty. The whole theory of "constituent particles" is mere hypothesis. We know that little pieces may be cut or broken off from a body, and that little pieces may be cemented together, or otherwise united, so as to form a larger body; but this is not what is meant by the hypothesis of "constituent particles." That hypothesis assumes that every body is composed of certain indivisible atoms, placed side by side, and coexisting as particles in juxta-position. It is a very convenient hypothesis; so convenient that its phraseology has passed extensively into the language of science, and even of common life, and modifies the usual forms of thought on many subjects; as was the case a century ago with the hypothesis of "animal spirits," flowing from the brain along the nerves. Thus we are in the habit of speaking as if the body of an infant were composed of a certain number of particles, placed in juxta-position, and as if growth consisted in adding other particles to the structure.

But these coexisting constituent particles have never yet been shown. They have neither been exhibited to any of our senses, nor proved to exist by facts evidently inconsistent with any other hypothesis. Chemists tell us,—though in the language of a vowed hypothesis,—that a drop of water is composed of a certain number of particles of water, each of which is composed of a particle of oxygen and a particle of hydrogen. We know very well, that, of a quantity of water, a certain definite proportion may be made to assume the form of oxygen, and that the remainder will then assume the form of hydrogen. We know, too, that by com-

bustion, these two gases may be made to assume the form of water. All this has been abundantly proved by experiment; but no experiment has ever yet shown oxygen and hydrogen actually coëxisting in water. All known facts are consistent with the supposition, that oxygen, hydrogen and water are only the same substance in three different states. So some maintain that positive and negative electricity are different fluids, and that electricity in equilibrium is a compound of both; while others suppose that electricity, positive, negative and in equilibrium, is the same fluid. And the same principle applies to all chemical combinations and decompositions. None of them ever show the "constituent particles" of matter, either to the senses, or by necessary logical inference.

Nor are we compelled to adopt this hypothesis by any necessity of reason, such as compels us to regard matter as something more than mere sensible phenomena. It is not impossible to think on the subject, without such an assumption. However small a primitive particle may be, it is still, if there are such particles, of *some* size; it is some part of a foot in diameter; for otherwise, no amount of particles could ever constitute a body, having diameter. Being a primitive *particle*, it is of course a homogeneous substance throughout its extent. It is indeed theoretically divisible, in the sense that a mathematical plane, having no thickness, may be imagined to pass through the middle of it; but it is not divisible in the sense of being made up of smaller particles, separable from each other. It is one uniform, continuous mass, from top to bottom, and from side to side. Absolute continuity of substance, not made up of particles, is therefore conceivable, or the theory of constituent particles must be inconceivable; for, according to that theory, every constituent particle is such a continuous substance. But if uniform, continuous masses are possible, reason can set no limits to their size. If a body, the diameter of which is a millionth part of the diameter of a hair, may be one continuous mass, not made up of smaller particles, no reason can be given why the same may not be true of a body whose diameter is twice as great; or ten, or a thousand, or a million times as great; or, indeed, why a continuous substance may not be a foot or a mile in diameter, or large enough to fill the orbit of Saturn. Nor can it be demonstrated that the diameter of a continuous substance must be a fixed quantity, incapable of increase or diminution. For example, if a drop of water is one continuous substance, not made up of particles, and if another drop be added to

it, doubling its size, the union that takes place between them may be such that the continuity shall extend through the whole. So, too, a fibre of muscle in the human body may be one continuous substance, not made up of particles, during all the stages of its growth, and, if fibres ever diminish, of its diminution.

The theory of "constituent particles," therefore, is a mere hypothesis, not proved to be true, either by observed facts, or by reasoning *a priori*. It may be, that no such particles exist; and if so, the identity of a body cannot depend on the identity of its constituent particles.

But our present bodies are material, and our future bodies will be spiritual. How can they, then, be the same?

In reply, we ask, what is meant by a spiritual body? A body not composed of matter? Certainly not. A body must be matter, or it could not be a body.¹ The term *spiritual*, applied in Scripture to the glorified bodies of risen saints, is evidently derived from the term *spirit*, in its original, physical sense, of *wind, breath, air*; and not from *spirit* in its metaphysical sense, of an immaterial, self-conscious agent. It is used as the representative of an idea with which the human mind is not yet furnished. Leaving out of view instances of miraculous appearances, which furnish no ideas except to those who see them, spiritual bodies have never yet been objects of perception to human minds. We have not, therefore, had the indispensable means of forming our idea of such a body; and as the idea is not in our minds, no word can express it to us, any more than the name of a color can con-

¹ There is a difficulty in writing on this point for the public, arising from the fact, that some readers have no conception of spiritual existence. In their minds, spirit is nothing but attenuated matter. That which has not the attributes of matter, appears to them to be nothing. They see nothing absurd in the question, whether spirit may not be so condensed as to become matter, and matter so rarefied as to become spirit. Even the Divine substance is, according to their idea of it, really nothing but attenuated matter, universally diffused. Such persons will find no difficulty in conceiving of a body composed of what they call spirit, though it has all the essential attributes of matter. Such men are really, though they are not always aware of it, materialists. They may talk of spirit, like other men; but whatever words they may use, according to their ideas, nothing exists which has not the attributes of matter. To be consistent, they should deny that any events occur in the universe, except such changes as may happen to matter; they should say that love is nothing different in kind from attraction, and diminishes in proportion to the square of the distance at which it is exerted; and should maintain that the firmness of a wall may be so great as to amount to down-right obstinacy; for if there is no difference in *kind* in the substances, there can be none in the attributes.

vey the idea of that color to a man born blind. Hence, in speaking of such bodies, it was necessary to represent that idea to us by the least objectionable word; and the word chosen was *spiritual*, meaning ærial, or gaseous. The apostle's contrast is not between a material body and an immaterial, but between an "earthy" and an ærial body. Gaseous bodies, we know, actually exist. It is supposed that all matter is capable of assuming the gaseous form; and it is certain that nearly the whole substance of our bodies,—the hydrogen, the nitrogen, the carbon, the phosphorus, the oxygen of the lime,—are frequently found in that form. The material elements,—the constituent particles, if such there be,—that now compose our bodies, may exist in other forms, besides those of "flesh and blood." That very matter, or so much of it as may be needed, may form the spiritual bodies in which we are to live hereafter; and the chemical decomposition of the body may be only a part of the process by which the form is changed, while the identity is preserved.

But if so, must not the resurrection take place at death? Not necessarily. Death, indeed, must be regarded as the beginning, or a preliminary, of the process; but its completion may be suspended, we have no means of determining how long. If we believe the Scriptures, the resurrection of Christ did not take place at the time of his death, but on the third day after it; and it seems, for important purposes, to have been miraculously hastened. Lazarus was not raised till the fourth day. This, we know, was not a case of resurrection to immortality, in an incorruptible body. He was evidently raised with a corruptible body, still subject to death; but we cannot suppose that this would have taken place, even by miracle, if he had been raised in a spiritual body, incorruptible, at the time of his death. Philosophy is bound to recognize these facts; and the inference is, that the resurrection does not take place at death. And if not at death, we have no premises from which to calculate the time. It may be years, or centuries. As the resurrection of Christ was hastened, perhaps that of others may be retarded, and like the silk-worm's eggs, they may be kept from waking into active life till the time of their Proprietor is fully come. Perhaps the human race is so constituted, that a given time from its origin in Adam is required, to ripen its several members for incorruptibility.

The apostle refers us, for analogies, to the germination of seeds. Their germination, we know, must wait for favorable circumstances. Wheat, found in an Egyptian mummy, has been made

to grow, after its vital energies had lain dormant three thousand years. Some seeds, after coming to maturity, need the frosts of winter, and then the warmth and moisture of spring, to bring their vitality into action. Germination, too, may be artificially hastened; and the wheat of this year's harvest, and of last year, and of three thousand years, may all be made to grow up together. The process of germination itself, after it has commenced, may go on with greater or less rapidity, as circumstances are more or less favorable, and may be artificially regulated, so that seeds planted at different times shall all spring up at once. Similar principles may regulate the resurrection of the bodies of men. There may be, in ordinary cases, a necessity of waiting for favorable circumstances, such as have not yet occurred; circumstances of which we know not the nature, and cannot predict the occurrence. Various analogies, both in the vegetable and the animal world, allow us to suppose that, in the great multitude of the dead, the process is suspended, or is retarded in different degrees, so as to be completed in all, when the set time shall have fully come.

But what shall we say of instances of violent deaths; of cremation; of those devoured by wild beasts, or by cannibals? Must they not, of necessity, interrupt the process which is to result in the formation of a spiritual body?

In the first place, we say that some of these cases bear equally hard on all theories which admit a future body, to be derived from the present. If we suppose the future body to be evolved from the present at death by a natural process, all analogy would indicate that the process requires death *by old age* in order to its completion. The caterpillar which prematurely dies of disease, or is crushed, never becomes a butterfly. If natural death at full age is the natural process by which the spiritual body is evolved, it would seem that a violent extinction of life by crushing the body while yet immature, must render that process impossible, and thus prevent the result. If, however, the resurrection is a distinct event, occurring, not at death, but afterwards, then none of these things, happening to the body, is demonstrably incompatible with its resurrection. Not knowing what the process is, by which the body becomes spiritual, we cannot know that any of these events must of necessity disturb it. If the body is crushed, its substance still remains. If burned or eaten, we know not what may have taken place in it after death, and while yet entire. If burned, the greater part of it is transformed into gases;

and how can such a transformation hinder its rising as a spiritual, that is, a gaseous body

But are we, in the world to come, to have only gaseous bodies ?

As we have already suggested, the apostle selected this word, spiritual, or gaseous, to convey to our minds the best idea that we are capable of receiving, of a kind of bodies, such as we have never seen. It would be unreasonable to suppose that the idea which the word conveys to our minds now, fully answers to the fact as we shall hereafter find it. Doubtless, the glorified bodies of the saints will be far superior to anything which we are now able to imagine. Yet we may easily imagine a gaseous body to possess important advantages. Observe, it is to be really a *body*, all the parts of which will be combined into one system by one uniting power, and animated and controlled by one intelligent spirit. It may resist whatever would dis sever its parts, with a force proportioned to the strength of the uniting power. It may be capable of we know not what degrees of condensation. The carbonic acid gas has actually been condensed into a solid, so that pieces could be seen by the eye and taken in the fingers. It may also be capable of indefinite expansion ; so that the body may be able, at the spirit's bidding, to assume any size that convenience may require. Its form, or the form of any of its parts, may be equally subject to the will. The force which condensed gases may exert, is shown in every explosion, as of gun-powder. By contraction and expansion, the body may be able to change its specific gravity, so as to sink, or ascend, or float, at will, either in an atmosphere like that of our earth, or in that subtile ether, which, as some suppose, pervades the intervals between the different planets and planetary systems. Nor can we easily conceive, that such a body should need sustenance, or "see corruption."

Philosophy, then, is obliged to confess that the doctrine of the resurrection is not within her domain. She can neither disprove the possibility of a future life in the body, nor the possible identity of the future body with the present. Her own light is sufficient to show, that her most plausible arguments to the contrary will not bear the test of a rigid examination. Her own laws of reasoning compel her to admit that, in one instance at least, the dead has been raised, in the same body in which he lived before his crucifixion ; and therefore, that such resurrections are proved, by actual experiment, to be possible. Having brought us to this conclusion, she has done her work, and if we need further know-

ledge, bids us seek it from some other source. Without stultifying her own decisions on subjects amenable to her tribunal, she not only admits, but vindicates, our liberty to believe what the Scriptures teach concerning the life to come. She imposes upon us no necessity for wresting the Scriptures from their obvious sense, or of forcing out hidden meanings from their language by the pressure of violent interpretations : but leaves us free, without restraint from her, to receive and rejoice in whatever of glorious hope we may find set before us in the gospel.

ARTICLE II.

OBLIGATIONS OF THE EASTERN CHURCHES TO THE HOME MISSIONARY ENTERPRISE.¹

By B. B. Edwards, Professor at Andover.

THE reflecting Christian, as he surveys the condition of our country, will be the subject of various and conflicting emotions. There are lines of light bordered by the deepest darkness. While we seem to hear encouraging voices, there are other sounds which whisper that there is little hope. As we are reading the plain language on one leaf of God's Providence, another is turned whose hieroglyphic we cannot decipher. It is somewhat like standing on an eminence a few miles from a great city. We can catch the hum of its mighty population. But the murmur is distant and indistinct. It may be labor awaking to its daily toil, the tokens of a peaceful and prosperous commerce, or it may be that hurrying to and fro which precedes some deciding battle, some anticipated dire calamity.

We sometimes exultingly say that our territory extends from sea to sea. But in passing from East to West, shall we not find the poor remnants of once powerful tribes, far away from the graves of their fathers, and now congregated together as if to come more surely within the grasp of the Shylocks around them ?

¹ It is thought best to insert occasionally in this Journal an Article of a miscellaneous character. Yet the bearings of the topic discussed in the following pages upon the objects for which the Bibliotheca Sacra were established, are thought to be by no means indirect or unimportant.—EES.

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We speak of thirteen feeble Colonies grown into twenty-eight sovereign States, extending across the temperate zone and embracing the products of almost every clime. But may not all this be inherent weakness, presaging, that the country, like Rome, will fall by its own weight. We also boast of the federal constitution, simple in its forms, admirably adjusted in its various provisions. Yet does not our short history prove how easy it is to nullify that sacred instrument? We have in the bosom of our soil, it has been lately said, that dust which is immortality. Yet have not the countrymen of Washington been for several years, a bye-word and a hissing in most of the civilized countries of the earth, on account of our Punic faith? Light, it is thought, is breaking in upon that dark cloud which covers our southern horizon. Through the operation of certain powerful causes, the day of deliverance is supposed to be drawing near. But are not multitudes eager to spread the accursed thing over wide and fair regions yet comparatively free?

We may suggest that there is much which is encouraging in the decided testimony which is borne by men in our national councils, high in public life, in favor of the principles of morality and religion. But may not this testimony be utterly weak or positively pernicious when it is not carried out and affirmed in the morals of the private life?

We are also accustomed to trust in the hopeful prospect which attends the various efforts for the diffusion of the gospel, at home and abroad. But is it not with the extremest difficulty that the churches can retain the ground on which they stood six years since? How much actual progress is made towards the perfect consummation of our hopes?

Finally, we point to the revivals of religion, which have for many years gladdened the American churches, and on them place our sure confidence. These have been, indeed, the means of inestimable good on earth, and they have filled heaven with joy. Still, do they pervade the masses of society? Do they touch the springs of our political movements? Can we trace their influence in any perceptible degree among the great body of the members of two of the learned professions? Till something like this is effected, how can we remain satisfied with these partial and entirely inadequate exhibitions of divine grace? In the degree in which they have been enjoyed, can they save the country?

With all which is encouraging in the signs of the times, and

which we should be among the last to underrate, is there, on the whole, any real advance made? Do our efforts keep pace with the progress of society? Are our prayers and charities commensurate to what is at stake? Has any American Christian an adequate apprehension of the energy of evil that is at work in our land, or the comparative feebleness of the means which are employed to extirpate it?

While we look at the subject even cursorily, as one mystery of iniquity after another in the drama of public affairs is unfolded, as the springs of national faith seem to be corrupt to the bottom, we are almost tempted to try to rend the vail which hides the secrets of the invisible world, and see if there be not some mightier benignant agency there, some hitherto untried cause which can work out our deliverance.

There are moments, perhaps, when all Christians are tempted to believe in the literal fulfilment of the prophecies, in the visible and personal advent of our Lord in the clouds of heaven, when he shall set his foot visibly on the Mount of Olives, and shall summon all nations to the decisive encounter. To our despondent hearts, some miraculous agency is demanded. All the old signs fail. The Lord answers no more, either by dreams, or by Urim or by prophets. We would interrogate the grave. The nation would hear, if one came to them from the dead.

But all these are idle imaginations. We have no need to force open any magazine of God's dread instrumentalities. We have the sovereign remedy; a cause which is adequate to produce any moral effect. It has been tested on the largest scale. It scattered to the winds the elaborate mythology of Greece; it overturned the throne of Augustus Caesar; before it, in the sixteenth century, demons fled like the mists of the morning; it has made Britain, from being the worshipper of a misletoe, the mistress of the world. It is the simple preaching of the gospel, particularly in the controlling part of our country, the western regions, which is the sure and sufficient remedy. If we are only disposed to apply it thoroughly, we are safe.

In this Article, we wish to call the attention of the reader to some of the grounds, why Christians in the Atlantic States, or the Eastern Churches, are called upon to assume and accomplish this work.

Before doing this, however, we will mention some of the reasons of the comparative apathy which has hitherto existed on the subject,—why it has failed to secure that attention which it de-

serves. The subject is so important that it is worth while to remove even slight obstacles.

Our indifference has not been owing to a deficiency in the *amount* of information. For twenty years we have had line upon line, precept upon precept. The details of geography, the laws of political economy, the mournful effects which result, where the laws of a higher economy are neglected, have been faithfully and in innumerable forms spread out before us.

Neither has the cause been want of resources. The State of Massachusetts is perfectly able to do all which has hitherto been done. No one pretends that we are taxed in any measure according to our ability, or that any inroad whatever has been made upon the luxuries even which we enjoy. There has been no approach yet to the liberality exhibited by the supporters of the British Wesleyan and London Missionary Societies, the great proportion of whom are poor or dependent, taxed in almost every conceivable form, even for the light of the common sun; yet in their deep poverty, the riches of their liberality have superabounded. Within a short period the Free church of Scotland—not a rich church,—has raised millions of dollars. We know little yet of self-denial. Were the Congregational churches in Massachusetts so disposed, they could endow half a dozen literary institutions of a high character, and support each its missionary in that wide western field. We should do it if we had a little more of the *perfidum ingenium Scotorum*.

1. One reason why a deeper interest has not been felt in evangelizing the West, is the indiscriminate calls which have been made upon the benevolence of the eastern churches.

No very accurate chart of the field to be cultivated has ever been drawn; no controlling centres of influence have been pointed out; no impartial and comprehensive exhibition of the arguments for or against any particular locality as the seat of a literary institution has been made; there has been little careful adjustment of the relative claims of different States and Territories. The whole subject has been left far too much at haphazard, or to the interested exhibitions of the friends of rival institutions. Hence our attention has been in a measure distracted; our sympathies and funds have been in a degree either withheld or wasted. We have learned to look with suspicion or indifference upon objects which are really worthy of entire confidence. Another unhappy result is, that twice as many institutions have been commenced as the necessities of the country require. Four or five well en-

dowed colleges in Ohio would be worth the score almost which the State professes to have, just as six liberally endowed colleges in New England would accomplish more than the twelve she now numbers.

2. Too great prominence has been given to the merely physical aspects of the subject. The capabilities of the soil, the magnificence of the prairies, the magnitude of the rivers, the exuberant mineral riches, the gigantic mass of annual production, have been described disproportionally. The truth may not have been at all colored. To us, who are accustomed only to the granite rocks and pine plains of New England, sober statement may be incredible, simple fact a tissue of exaggeration. Still, we are not *deeply* affected by truths of this nature. Only so far as they are connected with mind and morals, only as they bear on the destiny of the country and the salvation of the soul, can they touch our deeper sensibilities. Mind must agitate the inert mass. Mere physical productiveness cannot create any lasting interest. The plain of Sodom was rich as the garden of the Lord. The most pestilential regions of the tropics produce two or three harvests in a year. Our most interesting associations are not connected with places of rank vegetation, where nature lavishes her bounties. These things tend, unless counteracted, to form an indolent, luxurious, imbecile character. Force of mind, virtue, simple manners, nobility of character, true piety have flourished among hills and sterile mountains, rather than on sunny plains and luxuriant meadows.

Again the undue prominence which is given to this class of motives, sometimes tends to counteract the very effect which they are designed to produce.

If the resources of the Western States are so abundant, if the materials of wealth lie there in boundless profusion, if, as in the fabled golden age, the earth produces spontaneously and by handfuls, why the necessity of aid from regions comparatively unblest, why should application be made for the income of our parsimonious soil, of our rocks, useful only to dry the fisherman's nets? Why ask one for help, over half of whose year winter holds unmitigated sway?

3. Some diminution of interest in the western country has been occasionally caused by the vivid coloring which has been thrown over its future destiny. Its prospective growth has often been placed in the entire fore-ground. Very comprehensive inferences have been made from existing data. Liberal recourse has been had

to the principles of analogy, if not to the records of the imagination. Now all these predictions may fall far short of the reality. History sometimes out-runs the dreams of the most excited fancy. The western country and the whole United States may be destined to a career of prosperity such as the boldest seer has never pictured. There is certainly ground for large expectations. The past will justify confident hope for the future.

Still, it is better to err on the side of caution. Suspense in judgment is preferable to the suspicion that there may be exaggerated coloring. On questions relating to population and national growth, the past furnishes no absolutely sure premises. Unseen influences arise which no political economist can predict or guard against. In a country like ours, there must be disturbing forces which will act on a large population that would not interfere with the growth of a smaller. The experiment of a republican government even is considered by some as extremely problematical. Besides, we know nothing of the secret plans of the Almighty, or the sad reverses which he may have in store for us.

While, therefore, we argue from the past to the future, while we make all possible preparation for the destiny which seems to be before us, let us act and speak with becoming diffidence in respect to the uncertainties of all earthly things. Let us not throw discredit upon unquestionable realities by a too ardent divination into coming events. Happily there is no need to overdraw upon the fancy. The reality is sufficiently startling. If the exigencies of seventeen millions cannot awaken us, neither could those of seventy millions. If the fact that the western valley now contains a majority of the population does not make a deep impression, shall we be more earnest when three-fourths or nine-tenths may be there? We have only to open our eyes and hearts on existing truths. We have only to look at the stern realities which are now forcing themselves upon us.

4. Another cause why the interest in the moral condition of the West has been diminished, at least in some minds, is the hackneyed language which has been often employed on the subject.

The terms, or phraseology which have been used in relation to the various objects of benevolence have never received that attention which they deserve. We are creatures of association and feeling. We are influenced in relation to a particular object in a thousand ways which we should find it difficult to describe. The real merits of a question are sometimes the last things which

come into the account. Revivals of religion have often been injuriously affected by the unhappy language which their advocates have employed. Some of the phraseology used in describing their various causes and effects, is connected with unfortunate associations, or it involves some solecism, some curious ambiguity, or flagrant violation of taste. The uncouth phrase repels a certain class in the community from the thing itself. Religion is made to bear the opprobrium of its unskilful advocates ; it is inevitably associated with their infelicitous diction. The practice also leads to erroneous views of piety. Incorrect language is not the only source of mistake. Ill chosen terms have the same tendency. Heresy may be as certainly the result in the one case as in the other. We are never at liberty, especially on religious subjects, to deviate from propriety in speech, on the ground that it may be harmless. Poison may lurk in a luckless metaphor.

Some of the terms which have been adopted in describing the condition of the western country, or in enforcing its claims upon our notice, have become inoperative by repetition. They have ceased to be symbols of anything but weariness. They fall on unwilling ears and on unimpressible hearts. They have lost all power as the representatives of momentous truths which we shall neglect at our peril. Or, if they awaken any emotions, it is those of pain.

We now proceed to exhibit some of the grounds why Christians in the older States should render efficient aid in laying the foundations of learning and religion in the western country.

1. An obligation results from the principle of gratitude. In the infancy of our institutions we received liberal assistance from our friends across the ocean.

We are living on the capital furnished by others, reaping fields not planted by our hands. We are enjoying benefits earned and secured by preceding generations, not by those simply who have lived on this soil, but of multitudes on the other side of the sea. Much of our present prosperity is owing to the timely aid which distant benefactors extended. These goodly churches and institutions which have been the glory of the Atlantic States, were liberally fostered by Christians in Europe. It is doubtful whether some of the more important of them could have survived without this generous sympathy. The munificent founder of Harvard College could hardly be called a resident of this country. It was only a few months of languish-

ing illness that he passed in New England. For a century and a half Harvard College, so dear to the early churches, was often remembered by the large-hearted Christians of the parent country. Some of the most eminent men of the seventeenth century vied with each other in their generous donations. Dr. John Lightfoot and Dr. Theophilus Gale gave the whole of their select and invaluable libraries to the college. An English nobleman erected a principal edifice at his sole expense. No father ever provided for his children with more solicitous care than Thomas Hollis, or rather the constellation of generous spirits of that name, watched the progress of the pilgrim's college. They never saw it; they were three thousand miles away, yet the flame of a most disinterested charity was quenched only by death. George Whitefield, besides those gifts which gold cannot purchase, procured valuable donations for the same institution. We might allude to the foreign aid bestowed on almost every other Seminary founded in our country before the revolution, and on some since that event. Several bear the name of their British benefactors.

But this beneficence was not confined to academical institutions. It flowed wherever a channel could be opened for it. The first printing-press in this country was a donation from Holland. The whole expense of that extraordinary undertaking, the printing of the first edition of John Eliot's Indian Bible, was borne in England. The apostle himself, the Mayhews and other missionaries even down to David Brainerd, were sustained, in a great degree, from the same source. The name of Robert Boyle is scarcely more renowned in science or in piety, than it is from its connection with our early Indian missions. The great New England theologian, after his disruption from his pastoral charge, was cheered in his exile with the warmest and most generous sympathy from friends in Scotland, who had never seen him. It is not, perhaps, too much to say, that some of the greatest of his productions would never have been written, but for the M'Cullochs and Erskines of that country. Even the enmities excited by two wars have not been able wholly to dry up these streams of benevolence. Within a very recent period, an Englishman has been more ready to bequeath his property for the diffusion of knowledge among us, than the Congress of the United States are to employ the gift.

It is a remarkable fact in relation to these English benefactors, that they were, for the most part, members of different religious

communions from those of the pilgrims. Bishop Sherlock made a valuable donation to Harvard College. Bishop Berkeley has immortalized his name in connection with Yale. The Earl of Dartmouth was an Episcopal nobleman. Thomas Hollis was a Baptist. When he transmitted one of his gifts he remarked, that he did not know that his portrait would be safe from insult in the hall of the college which he was so liberally endowing.

Besides, these noble benefactors were not discouraged, though some of their funds might be misapplied or wasted. They generously overlooked many irregularities. They patiently bore severe disappointments and heartily rejoiced in a small measure of success.

We now stand in the same relation to the Western States that the English philanthropists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries stood to our fathers. Freely we have received, freely let us give. Nobly did the good and great men of England succor us in our low estate. Let us testify our gratitude by reaching the cup of salvation to others. Let the law of a disinterested reciprocity prevail. Westward, not only the star of empire, but of the gospel takes, and always has taken its way. From the Holy Land its beams fell upon Greece and Rome. From the latter the British Islands were illuminated. Thence our land received the heavenly vision. Let us faithfully transmit the inestimable gift to our friends and countrymen in the West, that they, in their turn, may bless the wide and benighted regions beyond.

II. Another obligation arises from self-interest, from a proper regard to our own reputation and to the well-being of our posterity. We are called upon to do good in self-defence. Inactivity is degradation and ruin to ourselves.

It has been remarked by a distinguished head of one of our colleges, that in a recent visit to England, he found but two men who had any clear idea of the distinction between our national and State governments; one of these was the well-known John Foster. There would seem to be an original incapacity in the European mind, at the present day, to understand our political relations, an ignorance not so much wilful as organic. That there should be any middle ground between a wild democracy and a consolidated monarchy, appears to many in Europe to be incomprehensible or impossible. At the same time, it is for the interests of the governments of Europe to deepen and perpetuate this ignorance. The stability of their thrones and their desire to prevent emigration hitherward, leads them to put a ban upon the diffusion of

accurate information respecting the United States. At the same time, everything which occurs among us that shows the insecurity of life and property, everything which can awaken prejudice and disgrace us, even in the view of barbarians, is eagerly caught at and translated into the principal languages of the continent. All is put down as so much proof from Holy Writ, that our free institutions work nothing but mischief.

In such circumstances, it will be readily seen that one delinquent State involves all the rest in the infamy of its crimes. Massachusetts is held responsible for the Vicksburg duellist, and for a weak and corrupt judiciary in Arkansas. The shame of four or five dishonest States is fastened, like the oriental plague, on every member of the confederacy. No allowance is made for the irregularities and lawlessness, which are always found in the outposts of civilization. The government of the United States, it is thought, should instantly repress an outbreak on the Red River, or the Aroostook, just as the king of Prussia would stop a riot in Berlin.

We are, therefore, shut up to one alternative. We must evangelize the nation. We must plant the vallis of the West with the seeds of divine truth. The gospel must find a universal lodgment. God's authority must be made paramount, where now there is no fear of God or man. Either unexampled efforts must be made to purify the entire national character, or we must be content to lie under our present load of disgrace and infamy. But what will become in that case of our capacity to do good to other nations? How can we evangelize the pagan world? Our power of doing good is our reputation. Our American name was formerly a passport to the confidence of the most distant communities. A good national character was found to be better than all the spices of the East.

III. A purification of our national councils can be effected only by the extension of morality and religion in the Western and South Western States.

Ministers of the gospel and Christians can exert a political influence, for the most part, only in an indirect manner. They may and must deeply regret the violation of good manners, the rude attacks on private character, the shameless infraction of law both human and divine, so often witnessed in the lower house of our national legislature. Yet this regret and disgust furnish no remedy. Indignant remonstrance does not stop the mischief. That public body which should be the exemplar of all which is gentle-

manly in manners, dignified in debate and venerable in wisdom, is in fact the reverse of all this, and becomes a principal source of national corruption and a standing proof how small is the intelligence and virtue of those who are thus represented.

But though the religious public cannot apply a direct remedy to this enormous evil, there is an adequate one perfectly within their reach. The constituencies of these unfaithful representatives may be reached. The communities from which they come may be civilized. It is not the delegates from the Eastern States, with very rare exceptions, who thus dishonor their country. These are overborne by, perhaps, a small minority of an opposite character. It is those who come from the half-organized communities of the West and South West. It is those who have never received the advantages of liberal culture, whose only school has possibly been that of the libertine and skeptic, or whose narrow understandings totally unfit them for the seats which they occupy. No effectual amendment can be expected until the gospel exerts its controlling influence in all the States and Territories of the Valley. The purification must begin at the source. The principles of Christian education must be taught in the family, the school-house and the church. Our great hope for the abatement of this national nuisance is, under God, in the vigorous prosecution of the Home Missionary enterprise. If that is successful, our legislators will become peace, and our counselors as at the beginning.

IV. The principles of a wise Christian economy urge us to the performance of this duty. The whole world lieth in wickedness. Misery in a thousand forms meets us everywhere. Innumerable souls, for whom Christ died, are, consciously or unconsciously, imploring help. Still, we are not to rush heedlessly to their relief. We are bound to act with a wise foresight, to select our points of influence and to accomplish the utmost possible with our means. The apostles might have plunged into the wilds of Scythia, or expended their labors on the scattered wanderers of the Arabian desert. Souls were perishing, in great numbers, beyond the boundaries of the Roman empire. But the apostles did not hasten on a mission to these distant heathen. They pursued a more sagacious policy. They first bearded the lion in his den; they first summoned the murderers of their Lord to repent; they filled the proud metropolis with their doctrine. They then hastened to the great thoroughfares of commerce, to Caesarea, Samaria, Damascus and Antioch. Asia Minor—the garden of the

world—was the scene of their most strenuous exertions. Ephesus and Corinth, the great apostle labored fully to evangelize. The Holy Spirit himself called him away from the comparatively uncultivated Bithynian, to mould anew the genius of the versatile Greek, the apostle all the while keeping his eye steadily on the imperial city, determining to lay the proudest trophies at the feet of his Lord, and to encircle his brow with the most brilliant gems.

It is sometimes said that one soul is as precious as another. No matter where we labor, if we only find men who need the gospel. In one sense this is true. All men are alike made in the image of God and in need of pardon and sanctification. Yet how wide the diversities! How unlike the amount of influence exerted on the world by different Christians and different races of men; a diversity which will no doubt remain forever. All analogy forces us to believe that the same relative differences will exist in heaven as on earth. No one can imagine that Cowper and Pascal are on a level in the world of glory, with men whose imbecile intellect hardly glimmered like a taper. If this reasoning be correct we are bound, with Providence and the Holy Spirit as our guide, to choose carefully our fields of action. The foreign missionary must not toil among races that have lost their intellectual energy, whose hold on animal life even is of the feeblest kind, provided that pagans of firmer and more elastic frame are ready to receive him. He is not called upon to preach the gospel to the effeminate and worn out population of Central Asia, if he can enlighten and save the Armenians of Turkey. We are to lay our plans with a wise adaptation to the largest and most beneficial ultimate results.

On these grounds, our efforts to plant the institutions of the gospel in the Western States receive a most ample justification. It is a field of promise such as the world has rarely seen. There is an extraordinary combination of favorable circumstances. The immensity of the territory, its great physical features, its undeveloped resources, it is hardly necessary to name. They have already been repeated in a great variety of forms. The population is now nearly ten millions, doubling itself in about nine years. And what is a most important consideration, the great majority speak, or will speak, the English language. We have not the laborious process to go through of learning a strange dialect. We have the preliminary advantage in respect to most of this population, of the impressive recollections which are included in identity

of speech and ancestry. Besides, we have a vigorous stock of mind wherewith to deal. It is no decaying and effete race.

"Men are the nobler growth that soil supplies,
And souls are ripened in those western skies."

It is so from the nature of the case. An emigrant to a new country has marked characteristics. The very fact that he is found a thousand miles from home implies this. And then his soul must be strongly influenced by external nature, by the novelty and grandeur of the objects with which he meets. It is an *old* country. He traverses forests ancient as the creation. God's name seems never to have been erased. Man's puny works nowhere distort and belittle the view.

The two prominent characteristics of the inhabitant of the Valley are vigor of mind and generosity of feeling. He has not indeed the slow and calculating wisdom, the steadiness, the taste and refinement which men possess in older countries. But he has a fearless energy and a kindness of heart which are unknown to them. He has the foundation at least of a nobler character, the elements for exerting a wider and better influence. In seeking to bring him under the influence of the gospel, we have ample encouragement. He will not hide his light. He will not be ashamed to bear his cross. He will be willing to endure hardness as a good soldier of Jesus Christ. He will not neutralize his influence by his parsimony, nor degrade his religion by his meanness. He will give a more attractive example of what Christianity can do in enlarging the mind, invigorating the affections, and in overcoming the grasping selfishness so common in older communities. In evangelizing the Western States, therefore, we are contributing effectually to enlarge the Redeemer's kingdom. We are enlisting a fresh and vigorous band of combatants for the holy war. We are setting in motion causes which shall work far beyond even the wide Valley. We are, in short, adopting most effective means to create a salutary reaction on ourselves, and to bless distant pagan tribes. This immense region, larger than half of Europe, once illuminated, may become the favored seat of Christianity, the central earthly source of its life-giving beams.

V. The thorough evangelization of the West is inconceivably important in respect to two great questions of the present age—civil freedom and the independence of the church.

The question in regard to our political freedom is simply this :

Shall that which has cost many years of hard toil be thrown away? Shall an experiment begun under an extraordinary concurrence of providential circumstances, which never existed before, and may never exist again, miserably fail? Fail it most assuredly will, unless that part of the country which is overshadowing all the rest, is pervaded by the spirit of the gospel. The waves of an ungodly and most heterogeneous population will sweep away every landmark which the blood and toil and wisdom of ages has set up. No effect can be more indissolubly linked to its cause.

Our civil institutions do good according as they are thought of and spoken about in Europe. A thousand unfriendly eyes are watching for our fall. A few select spirits pining away in the dungeons of Lombardy, or among the wastes of Siberia, pray earnestly for our success.

The other question is of no less interest. Shall the church be armed with civil power? Shall political and ecclesiastical law emanate from the same person? The struggle on this momentous subject has begun at several points in the old world. The Protestant Church of Scotland, though possibly in some measure theoretically wrong, is practically right. In England, in the two extremes of the Episcopal Church, there are unequivocal indications that the burden is felt to be too heavy to bear. No intelligent man expects to see any radical and immediate changes there or on the continent. Institutions which have the moos of the middle ages upon them, cannot be altered in a day. But the leaven has been thrown in. The current has set in the right direction. The inherent and immedicable evils arising from the union of Church and State are beginning to attract serious attention. This unnatural coalition has indeed in its favor, thrones, aristocracies, standing armies, imprescriptible rights, and an iron custom. But these are not invincible. Truth will triumph over all. The question when or how, depends greatly on our decision. Can we live without direct aid from the State? Can we spread the gospel, as it was in the early ages, against the State, if need be? Is there vigor enough in the voluntary principle to dispense with all foreign alliances? This question must be substantially settled by our Home Missionary Societies. If a pious and learned ministry can be established on every important point within our borders, then a great step is taken, not only towards our own salvation, but to the disenthralment of Europe. A practical demonstration has been given on the broadest scale that the gospel needs no artificial props. Our struggling brethren in Scotland are furnish-

ed with an encouragement better than thousands of gold and silver.

If the preceding considerations are founded in truth, it follows that the youthful minister of the gospel, who wishes to accomplish the greatest good, will establish himself on some important point in the western Valley. Let him possess a disciplined mind, a heart filled with love to God and man, the steadiness, the practical wisdom, the invincible habits of study, the refinement and cultivated taste, which he may, and which he ought to possess, and plant himself on some controlling centre, and identify himself with the country of his adoption, and preach the gospel faithfully, and lay the pillars of learning and of the church on solid foundations, and when he dies, he will have done more, far more, for the good of his country, and of Europe too, than is possible for any to accomplish in our old, fast-moored, inert communities. He will be a benefactor to the world as truly as Howard or Wilberforce or Henry Martyn. He will be acting on as broad a theatre as either of them. Indeed, we do not know why the devoted pioneers of our Western Missions, the Bacons, the Badgers, the Blackburns, now gone to their reward, are not as fully entitled to the honorable name of Christian philanthropists as any that adorn the records of the church. In heroically meeting some forms of personal danger even the great apostle did not exceed them.

The value of the labors of the Home Missionary Society, it should seem to be almost impossible to exaggerate. It is God's appointed instrumentality, showing its wisdom and its efficiency in every step of its progress, its indirect blessings great beyond comparison, cementing the union of the States, binding together the most distant communities, building up the cause of learning in all its departments, besides the direct good which it effects in churches planted, in souls saved, in the Redeemer glorified. With it are bound up in no small degree the hopes of the East and the West. It should have the means of greatly widening its influence. It ought to be able to place all its missionaries and agents above the depressing necessities which now surround many of them.

If we are true to ourselves, if we are faithful as Christians and scholars, a brighter vision will dawn on us than that beheld by the ancient prophet. The wilderness and the solitary place

will be glad *for us*, and the desert shall rejoice and blossom as the rose. Yea, in regions, which prophetic ken could never discern, far beyond even the fabled Atlantis, the Islands of the Blessed, shall streams break out and waters in the desert. Over those wide and beautiful vallies, no lion shall be found, no ravenous beast shall walk there, but from their peaceful and happy bosom, the ransomed of the Lord shall return and come to Zion with songs and everlasting joy on their heads.

ARTICLE III.

TRIAL AND MARTYRDOM OF JEROME OF PRAGUE.

A Letter from Poggio Bracciolini to his friend Leonardo Aretino, giving an account of the trial and martyrdom of Jerome of Prague.

Translated by Rev. Oliver A. Taylor, Manchester, Mass.

INTRODUCTION.

MILNER in his Church History, giving an account of the trial and martyrdom of Jerome of Prague, remarks that "Poggius, a celebrated Florentine, who had been the secretary of John XXIII, and was present at these scenes, has left the most unequivocal testimony to the abilities, fortitude and eloquence of Jerome." This testimony is contained in a letter of Poggio to his friend Aretino; and here follows. I became interested in it, several years since, while engaged in literary labors; and supposing others might also find it equally interesting, have here attempted to give it in an English dress. It is to be found in the "*Historia et Mon. Joannis Hus atque Hieronymi Pragensis*," Ed. Norimb. 1715, Tom. II. p. 532. It derives its value, not so much from the fullness of the account, as the fact that, while it was written by an adversary and may be relied on as true, it gives us a glowing description of the manner in which this holy martyr, through the grace which God conferred upon him, was enabled to stand up bold before his enemies, and faithfully to hold out to the end. In order to be fully appreciated, it should be read in connection with some account of the trials and sufferings of Jerome, drawn out more at large, either that of Milner, or else the one to be found in Fox's Book of Martyrs, in some of its forms.

It may, however, be premised, in this place, that Jerome was not only a man of great natural abilities, but that he had been honored as among the most learned men of his age. He received his first impulse as a reformer, it should seem, from reading the works of Wickliffe, while at Oxford, about the close of the 14th century; soon after which he returned to his native place, and connected himself with John Huss and his associates, in earnest efforts for restraining the despotism of the papal court, and reforming the licentiousness of the clergy. Of an ardent temperament and a bold, independent address which did not often stoop to conciliate, he soon became suspected of heresy; and upon his removal to Vienna, he was thrown into prison, on account of his opinions,—a confinement from which he was delivered, in consequence of the solicitation of the university of Prague. As soon as he heard, in the year 1415, that his friend John Huss was at Constance ready to appear before the council, he pathetically exhorted him to maintain a firm and unyielding temper in his great trial, and strenuously insist upon the necessity of a reformation among the clergy, assuring him, at the same time, that, if he should receive information that his adversaries were likely to overpower him, he would immediately repair to Constance, to aid him in his defence. Having privately visited Constance, and in vain made the attempt, he set out on his return to Bohemia. On this journey at the village of the Black Forest he accidentally fell in with some priests, to whom, in a warm and unguarded conversation he denounced the council of Constance, as “the school of the devil and a synagogue of iniquity.” This language being carried to the ears of the magistrates, he was arrested and delivered into the hands of the duke of Sultzbach, who was ordered to send him to Constance. On his way thither, he was met by the elector-palatine, who conducted him in triumph to the town, himself riding on horseback, with a numerous retinue, leading Jerome after him, in fetters, by a long chain. As soon as he was brought before the council, the clamor against him became loud and tumultuous,—John Gerson, chancellor of the university of Paris, one of the most learned men of his time, taking an active part, and the rectors of the universities of Cologne and Heidelberg concurring therein; while Jerome had no opportunity to reply. A thousand voices burst out from every quarter, “Away with him! Burn him! Burn him.” After an interval of about half an hour, the tumult having partly subsided, Jerome availed himself of a momentary pause, and looking round

upon the assembly with a noble air, cried out aloud, "Since nothing can satisfy you but my blood, God's will be done." From the assembly he was carried into a dungeon, and placed in one of its cells under a guard. While here, a certain Bohemian, having found out where he was, ran up to the window and addressed him aloud in these words, "Be of good courage, Jerome; and remain steadfast,—never fearing to die for the sake of that truth, in defence of which thou hast said so many things, when thou wert in the enjoyment of freedom." "I give thee thanks, brother," replied the intrepid prisoner, directing his eyes to the window from which the voice proceeded, "for thy kind office in deigning to comfort an abject man. That I fear not death, you know; as in times past we have often conversed together on that subject; but now the time has come to try the thing itself, which is the hardest part of the matter." The Bohemian who thus spoke, was Maddonwitz,¹ who had rendered services to Huss. The guard became alarmed at his voice, and immediately drove him away from the windows. In like manner, a person named Vitus, one of the family of John de Chlum, was seized and severely reprimanded for addressing Jerome in a friendly salutation. These incidents were made a pretence for a more severe treatment of Jerome; for he was immediately conveyed to a strong tower, where, with his hands tied behind his neck, and his feet confined in the stocks, so that he could not lie down, he was kept for many days on bread and water. These severities were inflicted with the design of forcing him to a recantation; and the illness which they occasioned, afforded a favorable opportunity for pressing him with arguments to this effect. Still he remained immovable. In the meantime Huss was burnt, when another similar attempt was made with no better success. However, though he was not to be subdued by the simple fear of death; imprisonment, chains, hunger, sickness, and even torture, through a succession of many months, united with strong importunities, became too great a trial for human nature to bear. Three times was he brought before his council and carried back to his dungeon before his enemies could prevail against him. At length he began to waver; and, on the 23d of September, a fatal day, on which he ever afterwards reflected with the deepest sorrow, he signed a written recantation of all the opinions he had maintained, in such words as the council had dictated,

¹ So Rees. He is called Peter in another account before me.

denouncing therein Wickliffe and Huss as heretics, expressing his entire consent to the death of the latter, and declaring himself, in every article, a firm believer in all the tenets of the Romish church; while he called down the vengeance of the council and of eternal fire on his head, should he ever swerve from this recantation.

Having thus acted against his conscience, he retired from the council with a heavy heart. His chains, indeed, were taken away, but the load was transferred from his body to his mind. Vain were the caresses of those about him; they only mocked his sorrow. Being returned to his prison again, it became indeed a gloomier place than ever before, notwithstanding his greater freedom. The anguish of his own thoughts made it such. Paletz and Du Cassis,¹ the chief managers against him, soon perceived this change; and they determined to bring him to a new trial. Several persons, however, and particularly the cardinals of Cambray and Florence, objected; but their endeavors were ineffectual; a torrent of zeal and bigotry bore down all opposition; and even the learned Gerson again disgraced himself by joining in the tumultuous clamor,—with great indecency, employing his pen as well as his tongue, upon this occasion. This kind of agitation continued for about half a year, before Jerome was again called before the council; some of the preachers, in the meantime, making a great show of reforming the church, and preaching against some of the vices of the clergy, while they acknowledged and extolled the purity and power of the pope. At length, they actually proceeded to examine Jerome again on the same articles on which he had previously been tried, others having been collected together against him in Bohemia, by certain Carmelite friars, who made themselves very active in the case, and now for the first time, brought them forward, until the whole number amounted to 107. Then it was that this great man, whom a long series of affliction and cruel persecution, and, above all, the consciousness of his late prevarication had brought to the lowest distress, began to exhibit that strength of mind, that force of genius and eloquence, and that integrity and fortitude, which will be the admiration of all ages. He refused to make any reply in his prison, demanding a public audience, before which, he said he wished to express his final thoughts. At length, on the 25th of May, A. D. 1416, he was again brought be-

¹ So Rees. In Latin, Michael de Caussis.

fore the council, in the great cathedral church;¹ and here it is, that the following account of Poggio begins.

It may here be further added, that both Poggio and Aretino were natives of the Florentine republic; and, not only intimate friends, but eminent among the revivers of literature in Italy, during the 14th and 15th centuries. Both of them were members of the Catholic church, and enjoyed excellent opportunities for becoming acquainted with the secret springs of its action. Poggio himself was born in 1380; and after having held the office of apostolic secretary under several pontiffs, and published a great variety of works, some of them quite popular in their day, died at last, chancellor of Florence, in 1459. There are two other accounts of this trial, more at large, in the works of Huss, the one called "*Narratio de M. Hieronymo Pragensi*;" and the other, "*Alia de eodem Narratio*," from which, in connection with Rees and Milner, the preceding particulars, with a few notes, have been chiefly drawn.—*Tr.*

Poggio's account of the Trial and Martyrdom of Jerome of Prague.

From the baths,² when I had been there some time, I wrote a letter to our Nicholas, which I suppose you will read. Having thence returned to Constance,—soon afterwards the cause of Jerome, publicly arraigned as an heretic, was taken up. Of this cause, in part for the graveness of the matter, but more particularly in consideration of the learning and eloquence of the man, I have resolved to give you some account. I confess that I have never seen any one, who, in pleading, especially in a capital offence, approached nearer the eloquence of the ancients, whom we so greatly admire. It was so amazing to see with what fluency of language, what force of expression, what arguments, what looks and tones of voice, with what eloquence, he answered his adversaries and finally closed his defence. It was impossible not to feel grieved, that so noble, so transcendent a genius had turned aside to heretical studies, if indeed the charges brought against him are true. This, however, in a cause of such magnitude, is not for me to determine. I acquiesce in the opin-

¹ *Ad majorem ecclesiam cathedralem.*

² The baths here referred to, were those of Baden, to which Poggio made an excursion in the spring of 1416.

ions of those who are regarded as wise. Nor must you suppose that I report to you the trial as orators do, entering into each particular. This would be a long task, and require many days. I shall touch only upon some remarkable passages, which will enable you to obtain a clear view of the genius and attainments of the man.

As many things had been collected together against this Jerome, by which to prove him guilty, and these things had been affirmed by witnesses, it was at length determined that he should publicly reply to each thing that had been objected against him. Having been brought forth into the assembly and had commands laid on him to this effect, he for a long time refused, asserting "that they ought to permit him to defend his own course, before he replied to the maledictions of his enemies. He ought to be heard," he affirmed, "in his own defence, and then he should come naturally to reply to the wicked things which his opponents had heaped together against him."

When he found himself denied this condition, he arose in the midst of the assembly and said :

"What iniquity is this! For three hundred and forty days have I lain in your most rigorous prisons, in dirt, in nastiness, in dung, in fetters, in want of all things, and yet to my enemies and slanderers you have allowed the fullest scope of accusation, while to me you deny the least opportunity of defence! Not for a single hour will you hear me. To them the ears of every one of you have been open all this time, and you have allowed yourselves to be persuaded that I am a heretic, an enemy of the faith, and a persecutor of the priesthood; but to me no opportunity can be given of making a defence. You have adjudged me a wicked man in your minds, before it was possible for you to find out what I was. Were you gods, of perpetual duration,—but you are not! You are men,—and mortal, liable to err, exposed to fall,—and may be blinded, deceived, seduced. You sit here as the lights of the world, and are called the wise men of the earth. So much the more does it become you to beware lest you do any thing rashly or against the demands of justice. For myself, indeed, poor caitiff that I am, whose life is now at stake,—a mortal at the best,—I speak not these things; but it seems to me unworthy of wisdom, that so many men, should determine any thing against me, contrary to equity, which might prove injurious, not so much in this particular case, as by the dangerous precedent it would furnish."

These and many other things he spoke with great eloquence,—his discourse being interrupted, as he proceeded, by numerous murmurs and groans. At length it was decreed that he should first reply to the charges brought against him; when such permission to speak would be given as might seem best. Accordingly the heads of his accusation were each one read over from the pulpit and then confirmed by testimony, when he was asked whether he had anything to object. It is incredible with what shrewdness he replied, with what arguments he defended himself. He brought forward nothing at any time, unworthy a good man; so that if the sentiments of his faith corresponded to what he professed in words, there was not only no just cause of death to be found in him, but not even an occasion of the least offence. He pronounced all the crimes alleged against him false, the fictions alone of his adversaries.

When that part of his indictment was read in which he is accused of being "a defamer of the papal dignity, an opposer of the Roman pontiff, an enemy of the cardinals, a persecutor of the prelates and clergy, and a despiser of the Christian religion," he arose, and with outstretched hands and with lamenting tones, exclaimed: "Whither now, conscript Fathers, shall I turn myself? Whose aid can I implore? Whom supplicate, whom entreat for help? Shall I turn to you? Your minds have been fatally alienated from me by my persecutors, when they pronounced me an enemy of all mankind, even of those by whom I am to be judged. They supposed, should the accusations which they had conjured up against me, seem trivial,—you would, by your decisions, not fail to crush the common enemy and opposer of all,—such as I had been held up to view, in their false representations. If, therefore, you rely upon their words there is no longer any ground for me to hope."

Some of them he wrung hard by the sallies of his wit; while others he overwhelmed with biting sarcasms; and from many, even in the midst of sadness, he forced frequent smiles, by the ridicule which he heaped upon their accusations.

When asked what he thought of the sacrament, he replied: "At first it is bread; afterwards, the true body of Christ," and so on, according to the faith. Some one then remarking, "it is reported that you have said it remains bread after the consecration," he replied: "with the baker it remains bread."¹ To one of the

¹ Some one then said to him, Jerome, "There is a very general report that

Dominicans or preaching friars, inveighing bitterly against him, he said: "Hold thy tongue, thou hypocrite." To another, taking an oath against him, by his conscience, he said, "This is the securest way of deceiving." One of the chief of his adversaries, he never addressed, except to call him a *dog* or an *ass*. As the trial could not be brought to a close in one day, on account of the number and weight of the accusations alleged against him, it was postponed to the third. On this day, after the heads of the several accusations had been read over, and established by numerous witnesses, he arose and said: "Since you have given such careful attention to my adversaries, it is proper also that you should lend an impartial ear to me." Much noisy opposition was made to his request; but at length, notwithstanding, he received liberty of speech.

He began with earnestly entreating God for grace so to govern his heart and lips that he might advance nothing but what should conduce to the benefit and salvation of his soul. He thus proceeded to say, "I am not ignorant, reverend doctors, that many most excellent men have suffered things unworthy their virtues, overwhelmed by false witnesses, and altogether iniquitously condemned." In confirmation of this, he began with instancing Socrates as one who had been unjustly condemned by his countrymen, and refused to make his escape from prison and death, those terrors of the human family, even when it was in his power to do so; and then he adduced the captivity of Plato; the flight of Anaxagoras; and the torments of Zeno, relating also many other cases of such unjust condemnations, from among the gentiles, as the exile of Rupilius, the unworthy death of Boethius and others, as Boethius himself has recorded them.

Having done this, he passed on to examples from among the Hebrews. And first he said that Moses, that liberator and law-giver of the Jews, was often calumniated by his own people and represented as a contemner and seducer of the nation. He then told how Joseph, sold by his brethren through envy, was after-

you consider it as bread upon the altar, and hold to this belief; to which he pleasantly replied, "I believe indeed that it is bread with the baker, but not in the sacrament of the altar." "Aha," rejoined one of the preaching friars; "so then you trifle with that which no one calls in question." This petulance Jerome put down, by saying, "Hold thy tongue, monk, thou hypocrite," which he did accordingly. Another one crying out in a stentorian voice, "I swear by conscience, that what thou deniest is true," he replied, "so ho, thus to swear by conscience is the securest way of deceiving." Thus in one way or another, were all compelled to be silent.—"*Narratio alia*," etc.

wards thrown into prison on account of a suspicion of having committed adultery; and went on to say that, in addition to these, Isaiah, Daniel, and nearly all the prophets, had been treated as despisers of God, as full of seditious purposes; and had been encompassed on all sides with iniquitous opinions. Here also he added the false sentence which had been pronounced against Susanna; and spoke also of many others, who notwithstanding they had stood forth as the holiest of men, fell victims at last to unjust decisions. Then adverting to John the Baptist, and to our Saviour, he said, "that they were condemned by false witnesses, is a thing manifest to all." He then brought forward the case of Stephen slain by the college of priests; and showed how all the apostles had been condemned to death, not as good men, but as those who excited the people to sedition, treated God with contempt, and were constantly engaged in wicked works. "That one priest," said he, "should be condemned by another unjustly, is an abomination;" and he taught that this had been done by a council of priests, in a most iniquitous manner; he showed that even this very thing had happened. These things he discoursed with elegance—the attention of all who heard him being greatly excited.

As the entire merits of the case were inherent in the testimony, he showed, in various ways, "that no confidence was to be placed in the witnesses;" and especially so, since everything they uttered, had proceeded, not from the truth, but from malevolence, envy and hatred. He thus gave such an explication of the "causes of this hatred," as came but little short of persuasion. They seemed so probable, that, (the cause of the confidence excepted,) but little reliance could be placed on their testimony. The minds of all were greatly moved in his behalf and strongly inclined to mercy; especially as he proceeded to tell them that he had "come to the council of his own free will," in order to clear up his character; and laid open before them his course of life and his studies, all which had been filled up with duties and adorned with virtue;—declaring at the same time, that "it was a custom among the most learned and the holiest of the ancients, so to manage their difference of opinion in matters of faith," as not only not to employ it for the destruction of the faith itself, but even to make use of it as the means of discovering the truth; while he quoted "Augustine and Jerome" as instances of those who had thus disagreed,—the one holding opinions not only dif-

ferent from, but even contrary to the other ; and that too, without incurring even so much as the suspicion of heresy.

All were expecting he would clear up his character at once, by retracting the things which had been objected against him, and asking pardon for his errors ; but, instead of this, he asserted that " he had not erred ;" and showed that he had not the " least disposition to retract the false crimes which others had laid to his charge." At length, launching out in praise of John Huss who had been condemned to the fire, he pronounced him a good, just, and holy man, altogether unworthy of such a death,—adding that he was also prepared to undergo, with fortitude and constancy, any punishment whatsoever, yielding himself up to his enemies and the impudent lying witnesses, " who would, at length, have to give an account of all they had uttered, before God, whom they could not possibly deceive." Great was the grief of all that stood around him. There was a universal desire among them to save so noble a personage, could his own consent be obtained. Persevering, however, in his opinions, he seemed voluntarily to seek death ; and, continuing his praise of John Huss, he declared that man had never conceived any hostility to the church of God ; but that it was to the abuses of the clergy, and the pride, pageantry and insolence of her prelates alone he felt opposed ; for, since the patrimony of the church was due, in the first place, to her poor ; then to her guests ; and finally to her own workshops ; it seemed to that good man, a shameful thing, to have it expended upon courtezans and in banquets ; for the sustenance of horses and dogs, the adornment of garments and other things unworthy the religion of Christ.¹

Most exalted was the genius of which he showed himself pos-

¹ " He then extolled the character and piety of John Huss, asserting that he had known him from his youth ; and that he had neither been a fornicator, nor a drinker, nor otherwise addicted to crime ; but a chaste and sober, as well as upright and just preacher of the holy gospel ; adding, that his faith was the same catholic faith as was that of Wickliffe and Huss ; and that he held and would hold, firmly and irrevocably, even to death, to the same opinions against the abuses, enormities and pageantry of the prelates ; while he averred that, of all his sins, none had ever occasioned him such remorse of conscience as the one which he had committed in that pestilential cathedral, when, in his recantation, he had unjustly spoken against that good and holy man and his doctrines, and especially when he had assented to his condemnation ; and, in conclusion, he solemnly declared, that he entirely revoked the recantation, which through pusillanimity of mind and fear of death, had been made by him in the aforesaid accursed place."—*Narration*, etc.

sedded! Often was he interrupted in his discourse by various noises; and greatly vexed by those who carped at his opinions; yet he left none of them untouched, but equally avenging himself upon all, he either covered them with confusion, or else compelled them to hold their peace. A murmur arising against him, he paused for a moment; and then, having admonished the crowd, proceeded with his defence,—praying and beseeching them to suffer one to speak whom they would soon hear no more. At none of the noise and commotion around him did he tremble, or lose, for a single instant, the firmness and the intrepidity of his mind.

Admirable indeed was the proof he gave of a comprehensive and tenacious memory! For three hundred and forty days had he lain at the bottom of a dark and fetid tower, of the severity of which treatment he himself complained, asserting, that he did not groan, as it became a firm and good man not to do,—on account of the indignities which he suffered, but he was filled with amazement on account of the inhumanity exhibited towards him,—in a place in which he was neither permitted to read, nor even so much as to see,—to say nothing of that anxiety of mind, with which it was natural for him to be daily agitated,—enough of itself alone to put all recollection to flight; and yet even under these unfavorable circumstances, such was the number of the wisest and most learned men whom he adduced in favor of his opinions, as well as of ecclesiastical doctors whom he brought forward in confirmation of the sentiments to which he held, that it would have not only been enough, but more than enough, to occupy the whole of this time, had he enjoyed the greatest leisure and tranquillity, and been altogether given up to the studies of wisdom. His voice was sweet, open and sonorous,—marked with great dignity; and his manner oratorical,—fit either for exciting indignation, or moving to compassion; which, however, he neither asked for, nor desired to obtain. He stood undaunted and intrepid,—not merely contemning death, but coveting it,—so that you would have pronounced him another Cato. A man worthy to be held in eternal remembrance of the human family! If he maintained any opinion contrary to the institutes of the church, in that I praise him not. I admire his learning, his varied and extensive knowledge, his eloquence, his suavity of speech and the acuteness of his replies; but I fear lest all these things may have been conceded to him by nature only for his destruction.

In the end, there was allowed him the space of two days for

repentance. During this time, there came to him many of the most learned men, in order to draw him off from his opinions; and, among others, the cardinal of Florence visited him,—endeavoring to bring him over to the right way. As, however, he continued, pertinaciously to hold on to his errors, he was condemned by the council for heresy, and committed to the flames.¹ With a pleasant countenance and a gladsome look, he approached the closing scene. He neither shrank from the fire, nor trembled in view of its torment, or the mode of his death. No Stoic ever suffered death with that constancy of mind and fortitude with which he seems to have sought it.

Having arrived at the place of execution, he stripped himself of his garments. Then falling upon his knees in adoration, he embraced the stake to which he was afterwards bound,²—being

¹ On the last day of his life, when he was finally brought forth into the same cathedral church, to be condemned, he was again exhorted to recant what he had said in praise of Wickliffe and Huss; but he utterly refused, fearlessly reaffirming it all, with additions. "In the presence of God and this audience," said he, "I most solemnly affirm and declare that I believe in and hold to all the articles of faith, just as does the holy Catholic church herself; while at the same time I profess to you, that I ought to be condemned, because I did not refuse to give you my assent to the condemnation of those holy men just named, whom you have iniquitously condemned, because in some things they denounced the practices of your lives." The bishop of Lodi then preached a sermon from these words: "He upbraided them with their unbelief and hardness of heart;" in which he exhorted the prisoner not to show himself incorrigible as he had hitherto done, and highly extolled the lenity and generosity with which he had been treated by the council. Nor did Jerome allow this to pass by in silence. Among other eloquent things which he uttered, turning to his judges, he said: "You will condemn me iniquitously and unjustly, and when I am dead, I shall leave remorse in your consciences and a dagger in your hearts; and soon, within a hundred years,—you will all have to answer me, in the presence of a Judge most high and perfectly just." After having been condemned, and delivered over to the civil power, he was attired as Huss had been, with a large long cap of paper, on which were painted devils, and thus led to execution. When it was brought to him, he threw down his own cap, in the midst of the prelates and took it, saying: "Our Lord, when about to suffer death for me a miserable sinner, had a crown of thorns put upon his head. Most gladly, instead thereof, will I, out of my love to him, wear such a cap as this." On his way from the cathedral to the place of execution, he repeated the apostles' creed, "credo in unum Deum," chanting it with a loud voice through the whole, as is done in the church, elevating at the same time, his eyes to heaven, and exhibiting great animation. He then chanted the whole of the litany; which being brought to a close just as they were going out of the city gate which leads to Gothleben (Gottlieben?) he chanted the words, "Felix namque ea sacra virgo, etc. (*Narratio, Milner, etc.*)

² The post to which he was chained was hewn and ornamented into a ridi-

fast strained up to it naked; first, with wet cords and then a chain; when wood, not in small size, but large sticks, was heaped up around him as high as his breast,—layers of straw being interposed. When the torch was applied, he began to sing some hymn,¹ which the smoke and fire scarcely interrupted. Of the constancy of his mind, he gave the highest indication, in this,—that when the executioner was going to set the pile on fire behind his back, in order that he might not see it done, he cried out to him, saying, “come here and kindle it before my eyes; for had I been afraid of it, I should never have come to this place,—having had opportunity to escape.”²

In this way was consumed a man of excellence beyond belief. I saw his end, and looked on every part of the scene. Whether perfidy or pertinacity have done the work, certainly, out of the school of philosophy, you would have given a description of the man's death. My narrative has been drawn out to considerable length, for neither did Mutius suffer his limb to be burnt with such unshrinking boldness as this man did his whole body; nor did Socrates himself drink the poison with such a readiness as he actually gave himself up to the flames; but of all this enough.³

culous figure and likeness of John Huss; and the spot where he was burnt was the very same on which this martyr had suffered before him.

¹ While they were piling up the wood around him, he began to sing: “*Salva, festa dies, etc.*” Having finished this hymn, he repeated, as he had done before, with a loud voice, “*credo in unum Deum,*” chanting it through. He then turned to the people and addressing them in the German language, said, “My dear children, as you have now heard me sing, thus, and not otherwise, do I believe; and that is my creed. And now I am to suffer death, because I would not agree and act with the council in regard to John Huss, holding and maintaining with them that he was righteously and justly condemned,—which I could not do; as I had known him to be a true preacher of the gospel of Jesus Christ.”

² After the wood had been piled up around him nearly to the top of his head, all his garments were laid upon it. When the fire was beginning to burn, he repeated with a loud voice, “*In manus tuas, Domine, commendo spiritum meum;*” Ps. 31: 5. When the fire began to take hold of him with a raging heat, he was heard to say, in the common Bohemian tongue, “Lord God, Father omnipotent, have mercy on me, and pardon my sins;” adding soon after, “for thou knowest how sincerely I have loved thy truth.” His voice was then suffocated by the vehemence of the fire, and nothing further could be heard,—only there was a constant motion with his mouth and lips, as if he were intensely engaged in repeating something, and in prayer. The flames, having burnt all around him and consumed even his beard, were suddenly parted asunder by the intensity of the heat and the wind, leaving his body exposed to view, all covered with large blisters, a dreadful spectacle to behold.

³ When the body of Jerome had thus been consumed, all his miserable ef-

Forgive my verbosity, if I have been too long. The affair itself demanded a much more extended narration; but I was unwilling to be too loquacious. Farewell, my dear Leonard. Written at Constance, May the thirtieth, the day on which this Jerome made expiation for his heresy. Continue to love me; farewell.

ARTICLE IV.

NEW PLATONISM.

A translation of the 15th Book of Constant Du Polythéisme Romain.

THE last sect of which the history of ancient Philosophy makes mention, sought to satisfy the desire of the human mind for unity, without rejecting the reminiscences of Polytheism. It was the last effort of the human mind not to reject all that it had believed, while it attained at the same time what it had need of believing. This sect has been unfairly judged by the most opposite parties. The Christians have decried them as the defenders of Polytheism; while the unbelievers of modern times, seeing in them enthusiasts and fanatics, have taken occasion from them to declaim against enthusiasm and fanaticism. We agree with Christians, that the New Platonists had the misfortune to defend some of the forms of a religion, not susceptible of being defended; and with unbelievers, that they threw themselves into a system of exaltation and ecstasy which made them visionaries. But neither of the above parties has sufficiently examined how far the mistakes and excesses of this sect were the natural result of their situation and an inevitable error of the human mind, at a time when the absence of all belief had abandoned it to the agitation and pain of a religious sentiment condemned to vagueness, and blindly seeking a form in which it might rest. Both parties, who have judged it, have constantly considered this sect with reference to what existed before it, and not as the effect of a universal tendency towards something which was about to exist. It has been reproached with obstinately maintaining, by

facts,—his sleeping rugs, cloak, boots, cap, and other things,—were brought forth out of the prison, and committed to the fire; after which the dust and ashes that remained were carried away in a cart and thrown into the Rhine.

means of unintelligible abstractions, a fallen religion, without its being considered that the progress of knowledge had pushed it upon the extreme frontier of this religion, where it met enemies, who agreeing with it, without knowing it, in more than one point, would not understand it, and it was forced to combat with the arms it had in hand.

II. A complete exposition of the New Platonism is not within the plan of our work, any more than that of the preceding philosophers. And it would be peculiarly difficult; for the partisans of this system, founded upon the most abstract metaphysics, and nevertheless, having for an end to bring back man to the most exalted religious enthusiasm, were obliged, in order to reach this end, by so unsuitable a method, to fall into frequent sophisms, too near to excessive subtleties, and to change, without giving any warning of it, the expressions always equivocal, which they employed. To follow out all these things would lead us to subtleties which few persons of the present day would be disposed to go into, even for the purpose of refuting them.

We shall then only relate those hypotheses of the New Platonism which are indispensable to show how they composed a religion; that is to say, those which show that this philosophy was an effort to reestablish the communication between heaven and earth which seemed to be interrupted; and to bring man again near to the Divinity from whom he found himself separated, by the downfall of the public belief.

As we have followed the ancient philosophers of Greece in all the steps they made to go from Religion; so we will follow the New Platonists in all those which they made to return to it.

III. The elements of the New Platonism were, first, the principal dogmas of the sacerdotal religion, viz. the principle of emanation, the fall of man, demonology; second, abstractions, the most difficult to be seized, of the Greek philosophy; and, third, an absolute belief in all the marvels of astrology, divination and magic.

The union of these three apparently incompatible elements, had already been tried by the New Pythagoreans. Abstraction had conducted them to Pantheism, for they admitted only one substance which they called God, and which, at the origin of the world, being divided into matter and form, had ceased to exist by itself. However, their passion for the marvellous took possession of this Pantheism, by supposing that the Divinity, so transformed, was, as it were, in a chrysalis state, and developed himself under

a thousand successive appearances. This hypothesis opened a vast field to magic, and those supernatural operations which influence the series of divine metamorphoses. The New Pythagoreans were soon tired with the abstract part of their doctrine; and, giving themselves up exclusively to the marvellous portion, they finished with being only vulgar sorcerers, who founded their individual, isolated practices upon almost no theory. The New Platonists, on the other hand, sought a *theory* for these practices. They tried to remain faithful to the marvellous and metaphysical at once, and to combine them with each other. The end certainly was chimerical, but it was the only one, which, at that epoch, the human mind could admit; the only one which could inspire in it any interest, or awaken it from its apathy. When man experiences an imperious want, moral or physical, no philosophy which speaks to anything but this want can be listened to. We do not mean that the New Platonists, having felt this want, had adopted this truth, as a means of success; they experienced this want, like all of their age, and in good faith, undertook to satisfy it.

IV. The tendency to the marvellous, to ecstasy, to supernatural communications, and everything which characterizes, in so remarkable a manner, the new Platonism, has been, in our days, attributed to a philosophy represented as peculiar to the East long before the epoch in which it was spread in the Roman Empire, and which penetrated the latter only by the mixture of nations, and the knowledge that the Greeks had thereby acquired of the dogmas of that part of the world.¹ This question is very important; for, if it were proved that this system had been transported entire from abroad, to the Greeks inhabiting Alexandria, it would not be a necessary progress of ideas, but the course of the human mind would seem disturbed by a purely accidental circumstance.

Doubtless all the elements of a pure Platonism, such as we find them in Plotinus, in Porphyry, and Jamblichus, are to be met with in the oriental philosophies and religions; we see in these emanations, the immobility and impassibility of the first principle, the hierarchy of spirits, means of human communication with spirits, and among these means, ecstasy, fasts, macerations; but we have in the former part of this work demonstrated, that these things are spread through all religions subject to priests, and were known to the Greeks a long time before the confusion of all opin-

¹ Opinion of Brucker and Mosheim.

ions in the great Empire. We found traces of them in the first founders of the Ionian School. Pythagoras was instructed in them. Plato, although he presents them only as allegories or traditions, sufficiently indicates that he would have had no repugnance to adopting them. The mysteries, also, revealed to the initiated the fall of souls and their return to the Divinity. The Greeks therefore had opportunity, very early, to give themselves up to that enthusiastic system; but their national *belief*, still in its strength, and their philosophy, which followed an entirely opposite direction, held them back. It was not till after this belief was overthrown, and this philosophy fallen into Epicurism and skepticism, that the human mind in its poverty (*misère*), seized with avidity all the sacerdotal dogmas which presented themselves, and composed this system out of them.

Every dogma, therefore, of the new Platonism, goes back to an anterior epoch, and belongs to a foreign religion; but the combination of these dogmas, the action of reducing to a philosophical principle all that is borrowed of the marvellous, of recurring to dialectics to excite enthusiasm, of having, in fine, instead of pretending to impose silence upon reasoning, in order to recommend belief, declared reasoning the basis of belief and the means of the supernatural; all this is what characterizes peculiarly the New Platonists, or rather the age of which this sect was only an expression or organ. And because it characterizes the age, it merits a serious attention. There is not here a religion which comes, with miracles, to tread reason under foot, and to order it to renounce itself; it is Reason, which again demands a belief, Reason trained without interruption during 800 years, (for from Thales to Plotinus there had been no break in the march of the Grecian philosophy). And this exercised Reason, after having employed the most subtle dialectics to destroy all the ancient dogmas, made use of these dialectics, its only instrument, to reconstruct new dogmas.

V. If we ask what were the principal wants of the mind and soul at this epoch, we shall find among the most imperious, first, that desire of absolute unity of which we spoke just now; secondly, the desire of an excessive abstraction, a remnant of the habit of philosophizing; thirdly, the desire of the most refined spirituality, (for souls were excited against doctrines which represented intelligence as a fortuitous and transient product of combinations of matter); lastly, the desire of the marvellous, which should furnish new means of communicating with the Divinity,

in the place of those that the ancient worship had offered, and in which most confidence had been placed. The New Platonists undertook to satisfy these different desires or necessities of the epoch.

VI. Plotinus gave the New Platonism the most regular and complete form. Many of his disciples considered him as the true founder of their sect and named their doctrine from Plotinus.¹ His works alone, of all these philosophers, have been preserved entire. We take him then for the representative of this epoch of philosophy, as we took Plutarch for the representative of the preceding epoch, and we shall indicate his predecessors, only when we shall be obliged to do so, in order to remark some important difference between him and them.

Plotinus was born in Egypt, towards the commencement of the third century of our era.² The place of his birth is not precisely known. He concealed whatever related to it, *being ashamed*, as he said, *of his body*. After having frequented many philosophical schools, without having been satisfied with any, he fell into an absolute discouragement and melancholy. He afterwards assigned supernatural causes to this disposition, but it was the effect of the general condition in which the human race saw itself plunged. Its degradation, its privation of hopes, the misfortune of the world, (in the time of the wicked Roman emperors,) the absence of heaven, oppressed minds, even without their being aware of it. What proves this is, that this sadness, this oppression, were reproduced at the same epoch in almost all the men who still preserved some moral strength or intellectual force. Some wished to fly into the desert, others threw far from them the burden of life; and why had their life become so insupportable?³ Many of them were in opulence. Almost all could count upon places and honor; they all lived in the midst of a refined civilization, in the bosom of luxury, surrounded with all which rendered existence easy, and which diversified pleasure. But they had lost the two great interests without which all is empty, dead, and without charm, religion and liberty.

Plotinus believed himself born again, when he heard the first lessons of Ammonius, who had risen by his talents and eloquence from the most abject state, for he had been a street por-

¹ Proclus, in Theol.

² Under the reign of Septimius Severus.

³ Porphyry mentions himself as having taken this resolution. It was Plotinus who prevented him.

ter. Ammonius taught a philosophy composed of Greek opinions and Jewish, Oriental and Egyptian dogmas. He claimed supernatural inspiration. Ecstasy seized him in the midst of his lessons, and the respect and confidence of his auditors were without bounds.

It is no matter what judgment we pass upon Ammonius. Whether he was a knave or enthusiast is indifferent, but it is remarkable that philosophy, which had labored with so much zeal to destroy religion, and which was so proudly applauded for having succeeded, was reduced to put on the appearances of a religion in order to be heard.

After having attended the lessons of Ammonius for eleven years, Plotinus resolved to go into the East, to contemplate for himself that wisdom and those prodigies of the Magi and the Brahmins of which his master boasted to his auditors.

The further particulars of his life do not concern us. It is pretended that, on his return from these lands, which were interrupted by the bad success of the army of Gordian, (in whose train he had gone), he obtained of the emperor Gallienus, a ruined city of Campania, on which to found a republic upon the model of Plato's, but that the ministers of the prince were frightened at this apparent resurrection of republican forms, and put obstacles in his way. They might have been reassured; the time when such projects are formed is never the time in which they can succeed. All the talent of Plato could not have given a real life to a State, whose members wanted the two elements necessary to its existence, individual energy and political liberty. Despotism had nothing to fear from a republic permitted by a successor of Caligula and Domitian!

The works of Plotinus are formed of his responses to the questions of his disciples. Hence result numerous gaps, frequent repetitions and much incoherence.

These defects and the exaltation of this philosophy, have made him fall into a great discredit with the moderns. But these very errors which we shall do enough to set forth, seem to us of a vivid interest, when we consider them under their true point of view, that is to say, as the proofs of a religious sentiment reborn of its ashes, by the necessity of our nature. Plotinus had studied the works of all the ancient philosophers. He transformed some fragments into a regular whole, and whatever is our opinion of his starting point, of his route, or of his end, we cannot, when we study him, refuse to acknowledge in him, *that* of which in

truth most of those who have judged him are destitute,—viz., a great force of meditation, many original thoughts and an extreme subtilty of view.

VII. No philosophy was more strongly imprinted with the idea of UNITY than the New Platonism. Plotinus not only recognized but one first principle, but he would grant to no being an individual and separate existence, different from this unity.

What he called the primitive intelligence was an emanation of the first principle; but this emanation made only one and the same being with that from which it emanated. In this primitive intelligence were contained the forms of all things; forms produced by the action of this intelligence upon itself; but these different forms were so connected with each other, and all with the primitive intelligence, that no separation could in reality have place. This intelligence was the image of the universe, the prototype of all species, of all kinds, of all individuals. Particular souls, races, generations, forces of nature, were only forms of it, and as the primitive intelligence, in emanating from the first principle, was not separated from it, so the forms which emanated from this intelligence did not really go out of it, or take an existence apart. This intelligence contained all forms, as a soul possesses multiplied acquirements, without being itself a multiple being.

The idea that all particular souls emanated from the supreme intelligence, or from the soul of the world, was already received in Stoicism and the Old Platonism. But Plotinus pushed it much further than those sects had done. They recognized a multiplicity and numerical difference of souls. Plotinus declares all multiplicity, all numerical difference, irreconcilable with the indivisible nature of the soul of the world; and across much logomachy and unintelligible subtilty, he wishes to prove, and he concludes, that all particular souls make one with the great soul, not only as its parts, (this word implying a division which cannot take place,) but as the same substance, the same being, the same nature. He returns upon himself in a thousand ways. The multiplicity of beings which exist in the universal intelligence imply no point of separation, he says, but a simple difference in the qualities. These beings form only one like so many thoughts, which exist together, without injuring the unity of the thinking being; as the force employed to carry a burden, although the burden is composed of objects of different kinds, is only one and the same force; as a luminous body, which spreads its light upon a

thousand other bodies, without this light ceasing to be one and the same; as a sound heard by many, an object perceived by many, without the sound or the object being multiplied; as a seal and many impressions, a race and many individuals. We designedly repeat all these comparisons, which are all defective, because their multitude and their very defects (vices) prove the desire of unity that tormented Plato, the characteristic desire of the age of the New Platonists.

VIII. To this necessity of unity, was joined that of an excessive abstraction, the heritage of eight centuries of argumentation and sophisms. Minds were given up to the practice of magic; but they were accustomed to philosophical formulas in theory. Prodiges were necessary to persuade them, but subtleties, if they began to reason. Plotinus himself said that the soul was united to God by dialectics, and one of his successors pretended to demonstrate theology by mathematics.

The New Platonists therefore did homage to the taste of their age, in going back to the first principle of all things, and in endeavoring to conceive it in as abstract a manner as possible.

The cause of the universe, said Plotinus, must be perfectly simple. To discover its nature it is sufficient to take from all beings all the qualities which distinguish them, and to see what remains when this is done. Animals, although mutually at war, have this in common, that they are all comprised in the category of animate beings. It is the same of inanimate beings, which, however diverse, are united in the opposite category. In continuing this operation, the mind comes to a single point,—in which all beings resemble each other. This point is existence; existence is then the first being, the first principle!

We feel, without indicating it, the fundamental viciousness of this reasoning. It is not true that in taking away all the differences which exist among partial beings, we arrive at a real notion. This point, in which all beings resemble each other, is not the first being, but only the quality, the common condition of all beings. The personification of this quality, of this condition, is an arbitrary act of the understanding, a creation which it permits itself without being authorized to do so, in order to have some personages that it can make move at its will.

The human mind, when it meditates, loves abstraction. Abstraction delivers it from the chaos which results from the confusion of appearances and the variety of phenomena; it classes its notions according to a regular symmetry, an ideal order, and

it often takes the satisfaction which this order inspires, for the feeling of the reality of its conceptions. Thus some of the more ancient philosophers made first principles of space, emptiness, the unknown. The same gratuitous personifications are found at the beginning and at the end of the Greek philosophy; but it is no less an error for being eight centuries old. Plotinus is also obliged, in order to arrive at his result, imperceptibly to falsify his terminology. He first went up towards a simple and general notion, that of existence. In substituting for the word *existence* the denomination *being*, he had given to this notion a reality. By calling the first being *principle*, he had transformed a fact into a cause; he at last personified this cause, by designating it as God.

IX. The same necessity of abstraction which obliged Plotinus to make an abstract notion of his God, or of his first principle, to which he could give an apparent existence only by successively denaturalizing each one of the expressions that he employed, pursues him in his ulterior definition of this first being.

No quality, said he, can be attributed to God, without his becoming a mere combination of qualities. He has no substance, nor life, nor movement, nor activity, nor feeling, nor knowledge, nor thought.¹ He is above all these things, because they all imply duplicity. In activity there is the active subject and the passive object; in feeling, the subject which feels and the object which is felt; in knowledge, the subject which knows and the object known; in thought, the subject which thinks and the object upon which thought is exercised. The first principle gives to beings emanating from it, all these qualities, without having them.

He is eternal, for if he had begun, the cause which produced him would have existed before him, and then this cause would have been the first principle. He is immutable, for he could change only from existence to nothingness. He is perfect, for the perfection of a being is to unite all that constitutes him what he is; he has no faculty, every faculty supposing in a being a tendency to become what he is not, a tendency incompatible with the simplicity and immutability of the first principle.

¹ Elsewhere, the necessity of putting his god into animated relations with men, dictates to him the contrary assertion. From the general perfection of the first principle, results, he says, that he must possess all particular perfections. His life is one with it, then he must be endowed with it, (Ennead. III. 7. 2. But if we would unravel all the contradictions of Plotinus we should fill many volumes.

This definition recalls, on the one hand, the Supreme Divinity of the sacerdotal religions, that Divinity without notion, apathetic, without qualities, without affections; their nothingness (*néant*) placed in a cloud at the summit of their celestial hierarchy; on the other hand, it recalls the first cause of many Greek philosophers, no less despoiled of every attribute and composed of accumulated negations. The first principle of Plotinus reminds us of the two sources whence it was drawn.—It is at once the God of Aristotle, the unknown of Anaximander, the Zervan Akerene of the Persians, and the primitive night of the Egyptian priesthood.

5/10-2. X. Most of the philosophers after Anaxagoras and before Plotinus, had recognized two substances. Those who had denied this division, had declared for matter. Plato had attributed to matter a real existence, since he had accused it of all the vices which the Divine wisdom could not correct. And Alcinoüs, a New Platonist, preceding Plotinus, considered it a mass without form, existing by itself. But the necessity of spirituality had increased in proportion as the materialistic doctrines had become more gross and revolting, and man experienced more repugnance for the degradation that they had wished to make him undergo.

Plotinus then found himself placed between the hypotheses necessary to his system of emanation, with its further suppositions, and this necessity of spirituality.

At first, he appeared to recognize matter as a substance. Bodies, said he, are formed of a first matter; for when the fire became air, if there had not been a first matter, upon which this transformation was exercised, the fire would have commenced by annihilating itself, and the air would afterwards be produced from nothing. But there is only a change of forms, the subject remains the same; matter is this subject, which form can only modify. It is clear that in this definition, borrowed from Aristotle, matter is something real.

But, after having recognized it for such, Plotinus annihilates it anew. Form is, according to him, the true substance, the veritable force, the veritable being. Bodies, without form, do not really exist; form creates and fashions them. Souls are no longer in bodies; bodies are in souls. Matter has no quality, nor extent, nor thickness, nor warmth, nor cold, nor lightness, nor heaviness. If it had a quality, form would be obliged to submit to it, and thus find itself dependent upon it. Matter then is nothing by itself, but it has the faculty of becoming something, and this faculty exists not as something which is, but as something which

can be. Such a faculty, attributed to a matter defined in this way, is a contradiction in terms; and it is by the aid of this contradiction that Plotinus believes that he arrives at spiritualizing matter, merely in preserving a denomination which is useful to him, whenever he would treat the phenomena and appearances which strike our senses.

It is not the object here to unravel the errors of a defective and almost forgotten metaphysics; the labor would be useless or puerile; but it is curious to show with what force human nature reacts against philosophers who would place the soul of man in the number of the fortuitous and transient phenomena of the physical world. Epicurus seemed to have triumphed over all the theories of spirituality and immateriality, and behold we see minds of great force and profound sagacity accumulate subtleties to resuscitate these theories.

When we see men remain obstinately attached to certain opinions, it does not follow, that because they defend these opinions by sophisms, they ought to be disdained. On the contrary, it follows, that they have need of these opinions, and that they defend them as they can, because they do not know how to defend them better.

XII. One would have supposed that after having annihilated matter a second time, Plotinus would not have known how to continue his romance upon the intellectual, celestial, and sensible union of different souls with bodies; but the sacrifice that he had made of matter to spirituality is, so to say, *by parenthesis*, he loses sight of what he has just affirmed and pursues his career.

Particular souls are contained in the soul of the universe; but they conceive the desire of becoming independent and separating from it. This desire itself separates them, and this separation corrupts them. They seek an exterior object; this object is matter, and thus they precipitate themselves into bodies.

Nothing is more contradictory than this series of suppositions, (which was drawn from the mysteries, and which also recalls the Indian metaphysics,) to all assertions of those that preceded Plotinus, but in order to advance, this philosophy was necessarily obliged to abandon its first basis.

We remark here that this hypothesis of the fall of souls had already appeared in the philosophy of Plato; but this age of the disciple of Socrates had not the same religious wants as the age of Plotinus. A positive worship still existed, which could menace and persecute. Nothing which tended to bring philosophy

and religion together could be adopted then ; on the contrary, at the epoch of the new Platonists, the world thirsted for a religion, and hypotheses which Plato's successors had hardly deigned to consider, were seized on with enthusiasm.

XIII. Having once arrived at the fall of souls, Plotinus found it easy to deliver himself to that *penchant* for the marvellous, which characterized his age and himself. Souls, fallen into bodies, sought to rise from this fall. It is manifest that the imagination, launched upon this stream, would refine forever upon the means of reünion.

Souls, said Plotinus, approach the Divinity by contemplation and ecstasy. He himself had succeeded, four times in his life, to identify himself with the Supreme Being by this mysterious contemplation, which delivers man, he adds, from all ideas, all notions, all sensations foreign to the object which he contemplates. He feels himself transported into an atmosphere of light, because God is nothing else than the purest light. He is plunged into a profound repose and enjoys a boundless felicity.

It is not necessary for us to pause to discuss this theory of the reünion of the soul with the Divinity, because it is literally the same as that we have already remarked upon among the sacerdotal religions, especially of India.

But it is curious and necessary to remark upon the prodigious growth of the marvellous thus introduced into the new Platonism. Our readers will recall the fact, that up to the epoch when Polytheism was totally discredited, we have seen the marvellous constantly diminishing ; we shall now trace it continually increasing in this new philosophy,—a proof that the human mind was returning upon its steps and forcing itself to remount the heights that it had taken so much pains and pleasure in descending.

Maximus of Tyre, anterior to Plotinus, had positively declared that man upon the earth could not come to the contemplation of the Divinity. Plotinus pretended to attain to it by ecstasy, but he understood by this word only a mysterious self-recollection, an effort of the soul to elevate itself, by a progressive simplification of all its ideas, to the most abstract notion that it could conceive. He had probably borrowed this subtlety from Aristotle, who said man could become like God *by speculation*. The disciples of Plotinus left their master very far behind them. Ecstasy was, with them, no longer an interior state of the soul, but a means of subjecting it to exterior forces, of corresponding with invisible beings, and of resting on their protection. Porphyry and

especially Jamblichus, combined with the return of souls towards the Divinity from which they are separated, the demonology of which we have already spoken in treating the sacerdotal religions, but to which we must now return, to indicate the use the New Platonists made of it.

XIV. Plato, transporting oriental ideas into Greek philosophy, had reorganized invisible beings whom he had named demons. He places them in the stars, whose courses he supposed they directed; men, he said, owed homage to them as superior beings. He also peopled the air with demons who presided over sublunary things, who were the tutelary geniuses of men, and to whom was confided the administration of the terrestrial world. But Plato did not admit any possibility of establishing, by rites, invocations, or prayers, a communication, at once habitual and miraculous, between these demons and the human race.

Alcinous had added to the hypothesis of Plato some details upon the number of these supernatural essences. Instead of merely filling the air with them, he had introduced them into all the elements, nor could he believe, he said, that any part of the universe was desert. Instead of considering them as withdrawing themselves necessarily from the regards of mortals, he had supposed that they were visible, or at least that they were able to manifest themselves visibly. Finally, he had admitted communications between them and man, not yet individual and particular, but general and regulated by fixed laws.

Maximus of Tyre had gone further. He composed a hierarchy of these demons, which descended by a graduated scale, from heaven to the earth, and since it was always necessary that reasoning should come to the support of marvellous hypotheses, he founded his upon analogy. He said there was no break in the chain of beings. From man to inanimate beings, the interval would be immense; animals served as intermedial. From man to God the interval must be still greater, and it was filled up with demons.

Finally, Plotinus determined of what substance these demons were formed, in what they differed from the Divinity, and in what they differed from men. More material than the first, more immaterial than the second, they participated equally of the divine and the mortal nature. Each man had a demon for protector, for tutelary genius; but there was not, in any of these suppositions, a motive for worship, or a road opened into the invisible world.

Porphry first overleaped the barrier, within which his predeces-

sors had remained. After having added new developments to the celestial hierarchy, by more positive distinctions between the different classes of invisible beings, he divided them into good and bad. The first warned men by dreams, prophecies, apparitions; the second sought to make themselves pass for gods, in order to obtain adorations and offerings. They prepared philters; they procured power and honors; but their benefits were deceptive and short; and some were pleased with bloody sacrifices, because they were nourished with the steam of the blood of the victims!

We here see clearly the germ of the religion that the New Platonism was going presently to teach. However, Porphyry still hesitated. Restrained by the example of his master, he indicated no other or more positive means of communicating with divine natures, than the ecstasy already recommended by Plotinus. But we see that he is carried beyond this boundary, and his hesitation dictates to him the most contradictory propositions. Now the rites of magic (*théurgie*) seem to him fatal and sacrilegious; now he recognizes in them a utility which he nevertheless bounds to the relations of man with the objects which surround him in this world; and he believed them efficacious only to procure terrestrial and transient good.

The last step was made by Jamblichus; he transferred to beneficent beings what Porphyry had said of bad genii. He taught that, by words, sacrifices, and other ceremonies, they were to be engaged and even constrained to appear to us and fulfil our wishes. Dating from Jamblichus, magic (*théurgie*) became a regular worship and the New Platonism a positive religion. The progress of the thing is manifest. Plotinus does not speak of *theurgy*. Porphyry expresses himself on the subject with diffidence and uncertainty. Jamblichus professes it openly. By the aid of this *theurgy*, he elevates himself into the air, his vestments change color at his will, he invokes invisible spirits, and makes them appear under forms which he prescribes to them! Sopater enchained the winds! Sosistratus appeared at the same hour in many places at once! Synesius interpreted dreams with such certainty, that every man thirty years old, who did not comprehend their significance seemed to him plunged in stupidity and ignorance! Proclus dissipated or raised storms, made it rain, arrested earthquakes, commanded the infernal gods! Minerva called him to Athens; Apollo conducted him; *Æsculapius* embraced his knees and cured him of a malady. He delivered At-

tica from the pestilence ; he appeared in the midst of his disciples with his head encircled with a brilliant halo ; and whenever a question embarrassed him, he consulted the divine wisdom, which presided, unperceived, over his teaching, and dictated to him lessons.

Here we shall again demand what could have plunged the human race into this excess of credulity and blindness ? The men who gave themselves up to these extravagant theories, and superstitious practices, and put boundless faith in these pretended prodigies, consumed their days in reading the wisest and most profound sages of antiquity. One of their oracles was Aristotle, whose severe reason seemed to have armed logic against all the wanderings of an unregulated imagination. They studied attentively the works of the Epicureans and Skeptics,—to refute them, it is true, but so as to be penetrated with their arguments, and nourished with their doubts. How was it that incredulity, lately so contagious, no longer found access to any mind ? How did it happen that all preservatives against it were powerless ? It was because there was an irresistible necessity of satisfying by new communications with heaven that want of the soul, which was no longer satisfied by the discredited religion.

XV. Astrology was introduced into the New Platonism at the same time with Theology ; it even preceded it, for Plotinus shows that he is imbued with all the opinions of the sacerdotal nations upon learning the future by the observations of the stars. But who would believe it ? it is to its first principle, to this abstract notion, not to be seized by the understanding, that he attaches Astrology ! He would prove it by metaphysical subtleties.

The soul of the world, he says, may not receive sensations from abroad, for it includes everything which exists. But it must have interior sensations, for it knows everything which passes within itself. Consequently this soul of the world and the souls of the stars, which make only one with it, have a complete knowledge of all things, and foresee the accidents which attend men. As we may read, he says, in the looks of men, their dispositions, and the actions they meditate ; so it is equally possible to read, in certain parts of the universe, the events that are coming. The stars are these prophetic parts of nature. We may see here very distinctly, the double movement of the minds of Plotinus' time,—their habits of abstraction and their avidity of belief.

XVI. If we proposed to give a complete picture of the New Platonism, we should have to speak of many dogmas drawn from

the Egyptian, Indian and Persian doctrine. Among these dogmas, the trinity of Plotinus, a little different from that of Plato, would have occupied an important place. But we wish only to speak of what is necessary to show that this philosophy unites all the characteristics of a religion properly so called; and what has been said is enough for this purpose.

The New Platonism established mysterious connections between heaven and earth. It admitted a reciprocal action of the Divinity upon man, and of man upon the Divinity, although the latter was expressed only tacitly, as it always ought to be; for if our hopes have need of believing that we can act upon the gods, our respect has not less need of believing that these gods are impassible. He prescribed, in fine, modes of adoration of a kind more pure and elevated than the sacrifices in use among the vulgar Polytheists, but which tended to the same end and were dictated by the same aspiration of the soul.

Between the gross notion of offerings, which seduce the gods and the sublime notion of the adoration which pleases them and assimilates men to the divine nature, there is only one difference; it is this; in the first case, men wish to leave the gods to their own will, while, in the second case, men wish to bend themselves to the will of the gods. In both cases it is an effort for harmony between the divine and human, and the difference arises only from the difference in the state of knowledge, that is from *the epoch*.

The new system of religion had—or appeared to have many advantages. It brought together, by means of the names employed to designate the demons or subaltern gods, the belief formerly professed, and the reminiscences of which were associated in many minds with ideas of piety, hope and confidence, that they no longer possessed, but which they regretted, and envied passed ages which had possessed them.

It also contrasted in nothing with notions to which all polytheistic nations were accustomed from time immemorial.

The idea that man could come, in this life, to the contemplation of the Divinity, was not new, although it had put on successively different forms. The first Greeks conceived it in the most material sense, admitting the apposition of gods to warriors, divines and heroes. The priests of Egypt boasted of an habitual communication with the Divinity;—the recompense of initiation into the mysteries, was the enjoyment of the presence and of the light of the divine nature.

It was not difficult for the New Platonists to find in Pythagoras and Plato confirmation of their doctrine. What these philosophers had said upon the necessity of repulsing exterior distractions and impressions on the senses, in order to enter deeply into profound meditations, the new philosophers applied to ecstasy.

Their doctrine, therefore, was equally conformed to the precepts of the philosophy and the reminiscences of the religion of the Greeks.

The New Platonism was favorable to morality. In the midst of its enthusiasm, it pointed out virtue as a preparation necessary to ecstasy. Ecstasy was the end ; virtue the means. Moreover this system seemed to be seized upon or admitted the more easily, that, at this epoch of history, the real world had become uninhabitable for souls not entirely degraded. It offered them a refuge in an ideal world, where they found again that of which they were deprived upon earth. In fine, the New Platonism satisfied, as we have seen, many of the principal wants which the human race then experienced, viz. that of abstraction—that of spirituality—that of the marvellous. It appeared therefore perfectly adapted to the epoch in which it appeared.

XVII. The advantages of the New Platonism procured for it some successes, which seemed to promise a complete and durable triumph. No system ever exacted more enthusiasm from its birth to its fall. Hardly had Plotinus commenced teaching, than he was surrounded by auditors who considered him as a divine man. Rich families appointed him tutor of their sons ; pleaders implored his arbitration ; women followed him in his retreats and renounced the delights of the capital of Egypt to hasten to the sexagenarian philosopher in solitude. His disciples, taking in a literal sense his maxims of detaching themselves from terrestrial things, abandoned their property, to lead a life purely contemplative. One of them, Rogatian, prætor at Rome, left his house, freed his slaves, gave up all his offices, and wishing no longer to have a fixed habitation, demanded of his friends a shelter each day. Ædesus, disciple of Jamblichus, having formed the project of passing his life in an inaccessible retreat of Cappadocia, a crowd of young people followed him thither, surrounded his house, and after having tried to soften him by their prayers and groans, threatened to tear him to pieces, if he persisted in burying in a desert so much celestial light. Eustathius, disciple of Ædesus, hesitating to go into Greece, the Greeks addressed public prayers to the gods, that they might induce such a man to honor their

country with his presence. Proheresius, in his lessons, so charmed his auditors, that they prostrated themselves before him, to kiss his feet and hands.

We cannot consider the philosophy of an epoch, of which we remark such symptoms, the cause of that disposition of minds, but rather as one of its effects. Even if it is pretended that there was in this enthusiasm something factitious, we must recognize that it was the effort of a corrupt generation (but painfully affected by its own corruption), to raise itself to enthusiasm. No interested motive dictated these exaggerated demonstrations. It was not at the feet of power, that it prostrated itself; and if it did not feel everything it pretended to feel, it attested by these prostrations the desire that it had of experiencing such sensations. It sought to disguise to itself its impotence, to deceive itself concerning its own fall; a manifest proof that this impotence and fall were not its natural state, but an accident, a misfortune against nature.

XVIII. In view of this universal enthusiasm, of which we have just cited the proofs, it is doubtless astonishing that the new Platonism has had only an incomplete and transient success. This was because, notwithstanding its efforts, it only imperfectly satisfied the tendency towards unity. It offered, indeed, to the mind, a philosophic unity; but the soul did not find in it the religious unity of which it had need.

Because Plotinus spoke of an abstraction, he did not arrive at theism, which could have been made the foundation of a religion, but to Pantheism on which could be founded only a philosophy.

He himself recognizes this in different places. Everything appears, says he, to be at bottom only a single substance, which has differences and divisions, only in our conceptions. We perceive only some parts of it, out of which, through ignorance and our want of power to embrace the whole, we make real beings.

The New Platonists, however, approach theism manifestly in their expressions. The one God, or rather the Supreme Being, says Jamblichus, has many names, according to the different functions he exercises. As Creator of all things, we call him Ammon; as having finished and made them perfect, we call him Phthas; as the author of all that is beautiful and useful, we call him Osiris. But, notwithstanding this formal profession of faith in the first principle of all things, by the New Platonism, in this only really existing being, this universal soul, containing all souls (but being only a single indivisible soul) this matter created by form, and one

with it, and all the other subtilties of this philosophy for maintaining its absolute and complete unity, too strongly approach Pantheism not to end by falling into it; the only difference was in the spirit of the epoch. This Pantheism had conducted Xenophanes to incredulity: it conducted the New Platonists to enthusiasm; but this enthusiasm could only be individual and momentary. Pantheism is not compatible with a public worship, with a popular religion except when it insinuates itself in the train of this religion and in the secret doctrine of the priests. This is what we have seen in India. But when it shows itself openly, in the moment a religion is to be reconstructed, it becomes an obstacle to the establishment of all belief, that no subtilty can surmount.

There must be a God separate from man, in order that the latter may invoke him with confidence. There must be a God separate from the universe, in order that the mind may not confound this God with the necessary rules and mechanical forces of nature, and that the religious sentiment may find, in the object of its adoration, the elements which it demands, hope, respect and love.

The attempt of the New Platonists to render to man a religion by metaphysics was therefore chimerical and illusory. It was vicious at the basis. The subaltern gods, and all the hierarchy of demons, by which this sect believed itself to reanimate Pantheism, and give life to the emanations of its first abstract and inconceivable notion, could not take root in this arid soil. It was like endeavoring to make the branches of a withered tree grow green.

In fact this connection, that the New Platonists wished to establish, between their doctrine and the ancient Polytheism, far from being useful to the kind of religion that they taught, discredited it all the more, both because it was built upon ruined foundations, and because it was composed of fantastic interpretations of the ancient fables. The recollections of Philosophy and of Polytheism alike injured the New Platonism: the former, because they made it approach Pantheism; the latter, because they made it approach Polytheism.

ARTICLE V.

REMARKS ON THE DIVINE AUTHORITY AND AUTHENTICITY OF THE PENTATEUCH.¹

By E. B. Edwards, Professor at Andover.

§ 6. *The Command of God in respect to the Destruction of the Canaanites vindicated.*

THERE are many clear indications that the Author of nature, of the human mind and of the Scriptures is one and the same Being. The more profoundly we study the laws which regulate the material universe, the more closely we examine the structure and operations of our own moral and intellectual constitution and the more intimately we become acquainted with the Bible, the more convincing will this unity of authorship in them all appear.

And yet these various revelations which God has made of himself, often seem to come into direct conflict. There appear to be not only apparent discrepancies but positive contradictions. The course of nature apparently runs counter to the written revelation; the law engraven on the tablet of the heart does not accord with that on the tablet of stone.

Sometimes our misgivings can be quieted only by presumptive reasoning. Difficulties once existed which have disappeared; discrepancies which formerly perplexed the Christian student have vanished. The works and word of God, once on various points discordant, are no longer so. Therefore we have confident hope in respect to existing difficulties. Past experience on this subject furnishes presumptive ground for future reliance.

On no topic brought forward in the Pentateuch has greater perplexity been felt by the pious mind, than in relation to the command of God to destroy the inhabitants of Canaan; on none would there seem to be a more startling contrariety between the teachings of our moral nature and those of the Scriptures. Here, too, deism has, in all ages, forged one of its principal weapons. English infidelity, the parent of much of the Continental skepticism, has adduced it as a triumphant argument in its attack on

¹ The following Article was prepared some months since and was intended for publication in connection with an article on the general subject inserted in the May No. of the present vol. of the Bib. Sacra.

revelation; and the impugnors of the Old Testament in our own day and country have urged it as decisive against the divine authority of patriarchs and prophets.

It may not, therefore, be unseasonable to examine this point as fully as the limits which we have prescribed to ourselves will permit. If all Scripture be given by inspiration of God, if it be profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, then every obstacle which lies in the way of its influence should, as far as possible, be removed. All those causes which occasion perplexity, misgiving, harassing doubt, or which furnish a plausible pretext for skepticism, should be fairly and fully considered. It is to be feared that the piety of some is built on a partial reception of divine truth, on what they view, subjectively, to be the instructions of the New Testament, as distinct from those of the Old. Such persons do not remember that if the declarations of our Lord and his apostles respecting Moses and the prophets be not admitted, then the whole basis of the new dispensation is undermined. All the declarations of Christ are to be received, or else all are to be rejected. If Moses were not inspired, then Peter and Paul spake not as the Holy Spirit moved them.

In discussing this subject, we will first state the prominent objections to which the command in question appears to be liable.

It will be recollected that it is of the most preeminent and exclusive character. It required an extirpation of the Canaanites root and branch. Women and children, the decrepit man as well as the armed warrior, were to be swept away. No truce was to be made, no mercy to be shown; it was excision without mitigation or exception. The more speedy and universal the infliction, the more pleasing to Jehovah.

Now this command seems to come into sad conflict with some of the original and most benevolent instincts of our nature. It would seem harshly to interfere with that fellow feeling common to man, to blot out those sensibilities which are weak enough at the best, but whose agency only, in the absence of revelation, renders human life tolerable. There are moments in the existence of the sternest men when sentiments of tender compassion are felt towards the most forlorn of the race, because they share in our common humanity. Names that will be the last to perish from the page of history are those whose philanthropy was most comprehensive. The man who has learned to look habitually with cordial good will upon the feeblest and most degraded, comes

the nearest to Him whose great object on earth was to reunite the family of man.

But the command, which we are considering, would seem to repress all these tendencies and to make the executors of it selfish, malevolent and ferocious. In order to cultivate benevolent dispositions, we must perform beneficent actions. But the edict of Jehovah to extirpate the Canaanites involved the necessity of inflicting all possible injury. Could philanthropy, or even the slightest feelings of humanity, exist in such scenes?

It was the maxim of a stern judge, Sir Matthew Hale, that "if in criminals it be a *measuring* cast, to incline to mercy and acquittal." It is a dictate of humanity and of sound reason, as well as a rule of the courts, that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent person should suffer. The foundations of justice are more endangered by a too rigorous enforcement than by an excessive leniency. Yet in the extermination of the inhabitants of Canaan, these merciful maxims were reversed or confounded. The destruction was indiscriminate. The whole Canaanitish race were involved in a common overthrow. The innocent, the comparatively innocent at least, suffered the same fate with the most atrocious criminals.

Again, the conquest of Canaan would seem to excuse, if not to justify, war, and war in its more offensive forms. It might appear that this terrible scourge of the human race would not receive even a tacit toleration on the part of the kind and universal Parent. What then shall be said of a war of aggression, of foreign conquest, of extermination? The battle-field when two armies meet in deadly encounter is not the most sorrowful spectacle which war presents. The combatants are hardened soldiers. The little boys who once played before their fathers' door have become bronzed veterans. They are familiarized to these fierce strifes and have become what the great captain of the present age declares soldiers ought to be, obedient machines, without a personal will or moral feeling. The most promising soldier is one who can most readily divest himself of the higher attributes of man. When such men fall in battle too, there is often no bitterness in death. The overwrought passion destroys or suspends all sensibility to bodily pain. In the maddening excitement, the deadly blow has been inflicted moments, possibly hours, before it is felt. Death on the battle-field is by no means always the king of terrors.

War is seen rather in the storming of a fort or in the sacking

of a town, especially in those few preceding hours which concentrate a life of agonizing expectation, when the faint possibility of escape or rescue every moment becomes weaker as one barrier after another is stormed. The horrors of war are felt when the wall is scaled, or the gate burst open. Its saddest sight is the domestic hearth reddened with blood, or the little child mourning on the bosom of its dying mother,—scenes in which imagination must not enter and which transform earth into hell.

Now parts of the Pentateuch and the book of Joshua in particular are a history of the sacking of cities, of the pillage of houses, of the destruction often of an unarmed and unresisting population. On the most favorable supposition, the track of the invading forces must have been marked with scenes that would appal every heart, except that of a trained warrior. A torrent of fire rolled over those fair fields that had flowed with milk and honey.

It was no light thing that would justify this invasion. No common cause, nothing short of invincible necessity would seem to furnish adequate grounds for the infliction of such dire calamities.

Again, this command seems to be adverse to many declarations found in the Old Testament, even in the earlier books.

The general rigor of the Mosaic system is abated by many kind and generous provisions. Not a few gentle precepts are thrown in to check the natural selfishness and cruelty of the people. Special and reiterated directions were given to the Israelites not to oppress or maltreat the stranger, the Egyptian, the Edomite and others. The Pentateuch is not destitute of those gracious pre-intimations of mercy towards the Gentiles, the full benefits of which, the prophet greater than Moses was to confer on the whole race.

Now why should the Canaanites be excluded from these benevolent provisions? Why should they be devoted to excision, while the tyrannical and oppressing Egyptians are carefully recommended to mercy?

The doctrine of personal responsibility is often and plainly taught in the Old Testament. The soul that sinneth, *it* shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son; the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him. Now this rule, perfectly reasonable, was not observed, it is said, with the Canaanites. The guiltless

son did bear the iniquity of his father. The aged polytheist and his innocent grandson, who could not discern between his right hand and his left, were involved in a common doom. The righteousness of ten righteous men, if such there were, did not save even themselves, much less the cities where they dwelt from destruction. The people of Nineveh, the cry of whose wickedness went up to heaven, were spared partly, it should seem, from the fact that there were more than six score thousand persons in it who could not discern between good and evil. Were the Canaanites worse than they? Was this doctrine of personal responsibility to hold in every case but theirs?

It is hardly necessary to say, that the destruction of the Canaanites seems to be adverse to the spirit and precepts of the New Testament. Our Lord came on an errand of good will to man; not to destroy human life, but to save it; not to call down fire from heaven but to heal every form of bodily disease and to summon the dead to life. The gospel breathes a spirit of the profoundest and most comprehensive charity. No one can lay claim to its blessings, who does not heartily love his enemies and do good to his bitterest foes. Every separating wall, national distinction and narrow-minded or sectarian prejudice, it sweeps away forever. Universal love is its characteristic mark; fervent charity, the most honorable badge of its disciples.

How can the precepts and spirit of such a religion be reconciled with the invasion of Canaan and the indiscriminate destruction of its inhabitants? In the one case, provision is made for the utmost care and tenderness in respect to the preservation of the earthly life; in the other, the infliction of the greatest possible amount of pain and distress is positively commanded.

The principal objection, however, which has been urged against the extirpation of the Canaanites relates to the employment of human agency in it. If the country were needed by the Israelites, if the wickedness of the people made them ripe for destruction, why were they not, it is asked, swept off by famine or fire? Why were they not overwhelmed, as Sodom was, in a moment? The mystery of this summary visitation we might not fully fathom. Yet its awful justice we should be constrained to adore. But if the Almighty entrusts the work to human agents; if he commissions an army to ravage the land; if he lays maledictions upon them if they do not fully perform the hard service; if he summons those to this work who have themselves hardly emerged from the savage state—not a few of

them as ripe for ruin as any whom they are directed to destroy,—then an unbridled license is given to some of the worst passions of our nature ; temptations are spread before man, which, it should seem, are irresistible. He is divinely commissioned to do that which he cannot perform without committing sin. One community is to be destroyed by means which will make another ripe for the same overthrow. What more fatal school of vice exists than the camp and the battle-field ? God, says the apostle, is not tempted of evil, neither tempteth he any man. Yet God commands that to be done whose certain tendency seems to be the indulgence of vindictive and cruel passions. Consequently, either the moral character of God is impaired, or a considerable part of the Pentateuch and Joshua is not inspired. There is no other alternative. The eternal foundations of justice are undermined, or those books are spurious or merely human productions. We must give up either the absolute perfection of the Almighty, or a part of his supposed revelation. The law written on the heart stands in irreconcilable hostility to that on the written page.

Various methods have been proposed to remove these formidable objections. The friends of the Bible have sometimes resorted to expedients by which the difficulties in the case do not seem to be fully appreciated. In their anxiety to vindicate the inspired page, they have multiplied arguments which are rather plausible than sound or pertinent.

1. The attempt is sometimes made to remove these objections by an appeal to the sovereignty and power of God. He made man. The nations of the earth are the product of his power ; they lie in his hands as the clay in the hands of the potter. He holds the keys of death and of life. If he may create when and how he pleases, then he may recall or destroy what he has created. The life of the Canaanites was a mere trust. The Lender might justly demand it at his own discretion.

This method of solution, however, overlooks the main difficulty—the manner in which the destruction was accomplished—the employment of human agency. In the assertion of his absolute power over man's life, the Almighty would not, we are sure, impair his own attribute of justice, or infringe, in the slightest degree, the moral sense of his creatures. These must be preserved inviolate. Far be it from God to pervert or confound the moral sentiments of his creatures, or to sanction unlawful means for the attainment of desirable ends. The mere fact that he has

an uncontrolled right over human life cannot authorize acts which do not commend themselves to the enlightened judgment of his creatures. He has made them capable of seeing and approving the rightfulness of his actions and commands.

2. Another way in which it has been proposed to remove the difficulty is by representing it as designed for the trial of man's faith. The subject is confessedly encompassed with objections. It therefore presents an occasion for the exercise of profound reverence and of unquestioning faith. It was intended, like other "hard things" in the Scriptures, to be a test of moral character. The right use is made of it when we regard it as an inexplicable mystery. We must humbly adore rather than curiously examine. It is an important part of our moral probation quietly to acquiesce in the wisdom of Him whose path is often in the mighty waters.

But it ought, also, to be remembered that the rewards of faith come not with an *indolent* reception of the truth. Resignation, prior to inquiry, is not a duty. Faith cometh by hearing, by reading and by meditation; without these, it is dead. The events of Providence and the difficulties which we meet in the Scriptures are for the trial of our intellect as well as of our moral powers. Do we feel interest enough in these difficulties patiently to examine them? Are we willing to task our powers on these highest of all questions? The fatal sin of the ancient Israelites consisted in the fact that they would not consider the operations of God's hand. They were inclined slothfully to neglect to inquire into the reasons of his terrible judgments. The "hard things" which are found in the Scriptures, were intended for "our learning." Some of them can be solved by earnest and reverent investigation. It is the office, the noblest office of reason, to institute such an inquiry. It is only after we have made these efforts that we are authorized to rest and tranquilly appropriate to ourselves the promised blessings of an implicit faith.

Besides, this method of removing the difficulty will have no weight with a skeptical opposer. He has no faith to be tried. Our only course is to reason with him in respect to the objections that he propounds. We are to contend earnestly for the divine authority of every part of the Bible. It is our duty to search out and candidly present the best explanations which the nature of each particular case admits. One of the principal duties of Christians is, to vindicate the ways of God to men, and to convince gainsayers, not by calling upon them to believe without evidence, but by showing them what the evidence is, and that to reject it is to act in contrariety to their own reason and judgment.

It may be said, indeed, that this can never be done perfectly, that there is a depth that no line can fathom, a limit beyond which is darkness impenetrable, and that the objector will as really need faith or a believing spirit as any other man. This is undoubtedly true. Moral subjects do not admit of mathematical evidence. On every doctrine of the Bible, on every dispensation of Providence, difficulties will rest which no wit of man can solve. And yet they are accompanied with sufficient evidence. Every considerate man will admit them, notwithstanding their difficulties. So he acts in a thousand other cases. If reasons in favor of a particular course preponderate over the objections, then he is as really under obligations to pursue that course as if no difficulties existed. A doctrine of the Bible is attended with some real objections, yet the weight of evidence is in its favor; therefore whoever rejects it, pursues a course as unreasonable as it is pernicious. A command of God is accompanied with some unexplainable mysteries; yet if it has solid arguments in its favor, those mysteries constitute no real objection.

3. The extraordinary wickedness of the Canaanites is commonly adduced as an adequate justification of their overthrow. That they had attained to a bad eminence in crime, there can be no doubt. The apostle's fearful portraiture of heathenism, in the first chapter of the epistle to the Romans, might find its prototypes in certain insulated passages of the Old Testament referring to the Canaanites. The very soil is represented as impatient of the abominations of which it was compelled to take cognizance. The people had reached that last stage of moral corruption in which they appeared devoid of natural instincts. That brief sentence, "they caused their children to pass through the fire unto Moloch," expresses about all which the imagination can conceive both of impiety and inhumanity. It combines the essence of idolatry and ferocity.

Still this fact does not seem to remove the serious objection which is adduced against the *method* by which the Canaanites were destroyed. If the earth had become weary of those who trod upon her bosom, why did she not open her mouth and swallow them up? Men who emulated the sin of Sodom deserved her fiery end. It should seem that an immediate judgment from Heaven would in a moment rid the land of transgressors so abandoned. Still, the indirect, the mediate course was preferred. Human agents were employed as the ministers of vengeance. Hence we must seek for other grounds on which to vindicate the

justice of God. The simple wickedness of the Canaanites does not seem to authorize the mode for their destruction which was adopted.

4. It is argued by some that the children of Israel were the lawful heirs to the soil of Canaan and that in taking possession of the country, they were merely asserting their legal and indisputable rights. The Almighty had in a solemn manner and on repeated occasions promised it to the patriarchs. The Proprietor of all things had given only a lease of it, for a few generations, to the Canaanites. The time was now come when the lawful owners must take possession of the long unreclaimed inheritance. The legal rights, which had been in a kind of abeyance, must be forcibly asserted.

But there would seem to be but slight foundation for an hypothesis of this nature. The Canaanitish tribes had in very ancient times, acquired a right to the soil which was everywhere acknowledged, and by none more readily and fully than by the Hebrew patriarchs. Abraham confessed to the children of Heth that he was a mere stranger and sojourner in their country, and that he could acquire a right in the soil only by fair purchase. Accordingly, he bought a piece of land for a family burial-place. In like manner Jacob purchased a parcel of a field where he had spread his tent, at the hand of the children of Hamor, for a hundred pieces of money. In short, the Canaanites seem to have had all that right to the country which can be acquired in any case. It had been theirs from time immemorial. They were in full possession of it before Abraham had left his Chaldean mountains. Portions of it had been bought and sold in innumerable instances. Even if their original right were defective, of which there is no evidence, long and undisputed possession would have given them an ample title.

We come now to what, in our opinion, may be considered a satisfactory vindication of the benevolence and justice of God in relation to this question. Men, or any created beings, may be innocently employed in inflicting deserved punishment on their fellow creatures. The service imposes upon them no necessity of committing sin. On the contrary, the execution of such a command, on the part of man, is perfectly consistent with the maintenance of sound moral feelings and a benevolent temper.

I. This point receives some confirmation from what appears to be implied, if not directly taught in the Scriptures, viz. that crea-

tures of a higher order than man, have been, and will be employed in executing the wrath of God on their disobedient companions and on sinners of the human race. The Scriptures contain several intimations, hints or fore-shadowings of this truth as well as direct assertions of it. Angels were employed in the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. Subsequently the Assyrian army fell beneath the sword of the destroying angel. In the last great day, the Son of Man shall send forth his angels and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend and them that do iniquity and shall cast them into a furnace of fire. Now God is not tempted of evil, neither tempteth he man or angel. This hard duty imposed upon the creature is not necessarily sinful. The angel might cherish vindictive feelings and he might not. He may execute these sentences of divine justice without one wrong emotion. And what is possible for him is possible for man. What may be done without sin by the one may be by the other. What would lay upon either a natural necessity to sin would not be imposed upon either. God's command to men is not graduated according to the sinfulness of the creature. It may involve a severe temptation to evil, but if there be no invincible necessity in the case, then it may be right. The prophet Samuel destroyed a prince of the Amalekites in a terrible, and what some would pronounce a shocking manner. He did it, there is every reason to suppose, in accordance with the divine will, and without committing sin in the act. On the contrary, for not doing it, Saul fell under the divine displeasure and was deprived of his kingdom and his life. Now what was practicable for Samuel and a virtuous act in his case was so for every other Israelite.

II. We should be led to infer the rightfulness of the command from the ordinary operations of divine Providence. Individual men and nations in numberless instances have been made the instruments of inflicting terrible evils on other individuals and communities. Doubtless in most of these cases they have done it in order to gratify their own selfish passions. They were unwilling instruments in the hands of God. Through them he made the wrath of other men and of other nations to praise him. An immense amount of good was accomplished, yet it was in direct contrariety to their intentions. But has it been so in every instance? Has no man or community consciously and willingly executed the commands of God? Have all, who have been the instruments of the Almighty, been forced into his service against their will? Has selfish or malignant passion been in every in-

stance the controlling motive? Were the Waldenses, when they rolled down the rocks from their Alpine fastnesses on the heads of their blood-thirsty foes, performing an act out of which and against its nature, God, in his wonder-working Providence, educed good, while these wretched wanderers were only gratifying their personal ill-will? No! Every true Protestant on the face of the earth, from that time to the present, would affirm that the deed was right in every aspect of it. So also when the people of the Low Countries rose up and burst open the Inquisition and expelled the Spaniard from the country, at the cost of rivers of blood, was it a sinful instrumentality? Were the feelings actuating these oppressed Netherlanders necessarily wrong? No! is the unanimous verdict of every impartial historian in Christendom.

But however it may be in these cases, there is one instance fully in point and where we cannot be mistaken. God commissioned Cyrus, king of Persia, to destroy Babylon and deliver his chosen people. He called him by name more than a hundred years before his birth and designated him to the work. This divine commission was made known to the Persian king either by direct revelation, or by Isaiah's prophecy, so that he acted, as he himself informs us, as the conscious and willing instrument of Jehovah. Babylon was, therefore, destroyed by him in obedience to the will of heaven, and not simply to carry out his plans of conquest. He acknowledges the authority of Jehovah and earnestly promotes the restoration of the exiles. Here then is a case precisely analogous to that of the Canaanites, and against which, so far as we know, no objection is urged. Yet the destruction of Babylon involved an amount of suffering, an indiscriminate slaughter of the innocent and guilty, which, perhaps, transcended all that was inflicted on the people of Canaan.

From this and other analogous instances, we may certainly infer that human agents may be innocently employed, and consciously so to themselves, in administering punishment on sinning nations and individuals. This would be a natural presumption from the general course of divine Providence. If the fearful tragedy enacted within the walls of Babylon was right, if the scenes which were witnessed in the vallies of Piedmont and the glens of Scotland, when those who had been hunted like sheep on the mountains, rose on their merciless foes, cannot be proved to be wrong, then the tribes of Canaan might be destroyed in consistency with the moral attributes of God.

III. The position may be fully established from the recognition of civil government in the New Testament. Rulers are ordained of God. Whoever resisteth them resisteth the ordinance of God, no matter what the form of government may be. Now the very statement of the case shows that it is their right and duty to use forcible means if necessary, in administering the government. They bear not the sword in vain. They are a terror to evil doers. But if this were not directly asserted, it would follow from the nature of the case. If a command be lawful, all those steps which are necessary in order to execute that command are lawful. The indispensable means as well as the end are sanctioned. Now it is the duty of the magistrate, made so by the word of God, to suppress an insurrection, peaceably if he can, forcibly if he must. In this popular tumult, a city or province may be involved. To suppress it may demand a great sacrifice of life both of the innocent as well as the guilty. It may be utterly impracticable to make the discrimination. Every instance of this kind has doubtless led to the destruction of persons who were not guilty. Yet the magistrate was not in fault. He could not maintain his authority and put an end to the mischief without storming a city. Is he to desist because of the hazard to the innocent women and children within its walls? Certainly not, if human government is to be maintained. The right and the duty of maintaining this, the New Testament positively affirms. Now no government has ever existed on earth for any length of time, which has not found it necessary, in the execution of its orders, to inflict suffering even unto death on the innocent as well as on the guilty. Without the power to do this, it could not exist. But if it were wrong, then the Bible has been virtually in opposition to all actual governments, or, in effect, in opposition to its own precepts. It follows that the children of Israel were not necessarily committing sin in extirpating the Canaanites, though innocent children and others not specially in fault were involved in the common doom.

IV. It may be shown, from its effects on the Israelites, that the infliction of suffering and death on one's fellow creatures does not of necessity lead to sin. It was the means of salutary moral discipline. Though painful, it produced the peaceable fruits of righteousness.

It was, doubtless, a hard task for Sir Matthew Hale to pronounce some of the sentences which he did pronounce,—as they carried extreme sorrow and wretchedness into many families. Yet who can doubt but that the judge was eminent-

ly conscientious, that his decisions were generally just, and that they contributed to his own moral improvement. There is no doubt but that General Washington assumed the command of the American army as a matter of duty. He had no love for war or military distinction. The sad scenes through which he passed did not harden his heart or enkindle any revengeful or malignant passions. His recorded sayings and his subsequent life most fully confirm this. Yet his was a fearful path. He unsheathed the sword against the native land of his ancestors. He took up arms against his own kindred. He, more than any other American, was the cause of unutterable distress to many families left without husband or father.

Not altogether dissimilar was the situation of the leader of the Israelites in the conquest of Canaan. He accepted his commission in obedience to the command of God. He and his immediate associates, performed what they considered to be an unquestionable duty. They found in their career no invincible temptations to the indulgence of malicious or cruel passions. The work was conscientiously undertaken and there is not the slightest intimation that the result was in any degree unfavorable to the character of these leaders. The contrary is perfectly obvious. A firmer trust in God, a more entire devotedness to his service, illustrate the last days of him on whom the mantle of the law-giver descended. He was thus counted worthy to stand in that illustrious company, who through faith subdued kingdoms, escaped the edge of the sword, out of weakness were made strong, waxed valiant in fight, turned to flight the armies of the aliens.

Now what did not prove an incitement to sin in the leaders, could not necessarily be so to the mass of the soldiers. If the one party escaped the fiery trial, unharmed, the other might escape. That which strengthened the virtuous principle, or increased faith in God in one man, might accomplish the same in ten or one hundred individuals, acting in similar circumstances.

What now was the great moral effect which God intended to produce on the minds of the Israelites? It was evidently this, —to awaken in them the deepest abhorrence of idolatry, a detestation of the worship of false gods, an inextinguishable hatred of its untold cruelties. Now the destruction of the Canaanites by an immediate divine judgment could not have made the lesson so impressive. The Israelites might have been filled with astonishment in seeing God's wrath descending, as it did on Sodom, in a storm of fire. They might have been overwhelmed

with terror, as some of their fathers were when the earth opened her mouth and swallowed up Korah and his company; and yet in the space of a month or a year, they might have been ripe for the same rebellion and the same end. A slower process, a more detailed exhibition of God's punitive justice was needed. Idolatry must be seen in its horrid *particulars*. No impression could be so deep as that made by personal observation. Long-continued inspection of the pagan rites must have taught lessons that could never be effaced. "Here," the invading army might say, "the Supreme God was publicly dethroned in mock solemnity; yonder in that valley, Moloch was worshipped

—besmeared with blood

Of human sacrifice and parents' tears;

on that high hill, under that lofty oak we saw abominations practised for which happily we have no name. The bestiality of Sodom infected the land. The very soil seemed to cry aloud for purification and the air itself loathed the corruption that it was compelled to sustain."¹

In such circumstances, much of the horror which commonly accompanies warlike scenes would disappear. The dreadful human sacrifices offered up by the Mexicans, greatly diminish the sympathy which we should otherwise feel for them when attacked by Cortez. Those who demolished the Bastile in Paris, and the prisons of the inquisition in Spain, were really laborers in the cause of humanity, though human life was to some extent sacrificed. The Hebrews—worshippers of one God and taught to hold idolatry in the greatest abhorrence—might regard themselves as innocent executioners of a richly deserved punishment. A virtuous indignation might have been the predominant feeling in their breasts. Every sentiment of compassion towards the Canaanites must have been shocked, if not wholly paralyzed, by the cruel and obscene rites, the proofs or the actual performance of which, they were often compelled to witness. They were not dealing with personal foes, nor gratifying private malice. They were the appointed ministers of Him whose pe-

¹ The moral corruption of the descendants of some of the Canaanitish tribes that were spared, e. g. the Carthaginians, was proverbial throughout the pagan world. Increasing refinement had almost annihilated among other nations the cruel practice of offering human sacrifices, but nothing could prevail upon the Carthaginians to abandon it, though thereby they became an abhorrence to all civilized men. The licentiousness of the Syrians was equally proverbial with their cruelty. See Hengstenberg Beiträge II. 506.

oulia glory the people of Canaan were foully desecrating. The invading army were under no more necessity of indulging in personal ill-will or cruelty than the individual judge or magistrate of the present day when called to pronounce or execute the sentences of the law. If the temptation to sin were greater in the former case, so would the rewards of successfully resisting it be correspondingly greater. That the temptation in question was resisted, we have incontrovertible evidence from the history. The age of Joshua was the golden age of the Jewish people in respect to true piety or obedience to the laws of God. In confirmation of this, we might advert to the circumstances and happy settlement of the difficulty which occurred between the warriors of the two tribes and the half tribe whose abode was on the east of the Jordan and their brethren who lived west of the river. Both parties were actuated by fraternal feelings and by a high regard for the true religion. So in Judges 2: 7, there is the following decisive testimony: "And the people served the Lord all the days of Joshua, and all the days of the elders that outlived Joshua, who had seen all the great works of the Lord, that he did for Israel." This passage proves that the people came out of the war true and zealous worshippers of Jehovah, and it also indicates the manner in which they maintained their integrity and derived moral benefit from the scenes through which they had passed. It was a holy war which they had waged. They were the soldiers of the Lord of hosts. They had taken up arms not so much against human life, or a public enemy, as against a most revolting form of polytheism. They boasted not as if their own arm had gotten them the victory. It was "the great works of the Lord" that had secured the triumph. The stars in their courses fought for Israel. For them the sun had stood still on Gibeon and the moon in the valley of Ajalon. To their Almighty Deliverer, they felt disposed to raise, at the close of the strife, the grateful song of thanksgiving.

ARTICLE VI.

ON CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS IN PULPIT ELOQUENCE.

An Address delivered before the Porter Rhetorical Society, Andover Theological Seminary, Sept. 2, 1845. By Rev. Nehemiah Adams, Boston.

WHOEVER undertakes to address the members of his profession on the subject of eloquence seems to think it modest and proper to deprecate the expectation of a perfect conformity in him to his own rules and precepts. Such a graceful and conciliatory exordium, though approved by the masters of rhetoric, is peculiarly needless in addressing an assembly of preachers, who never profess to have themselves attained to the high standard of moral excellence which they preach, but would be considered as yet striving after it;—and who also know that bitter experience, and a consciousness of inward evil qualify them to speak with the greater confidence against sin. Being, therefore, defended by the good sense, not to say the consciences, of those of my hearers to whom I owe the greatest deference, from being dealt with by them as they are never willing that their hearers should deal with them, I proceed at once to the main subject of my address.

The world has always assigned a high place and great honor to the employment of public speaking. The savage, even, feels reverence for that member of the tribe who by his skill and power is the most effective orator at the council fires. The nations which have attained to the highest point of cultivation have put the employment and the art of public speaking at the head of human accomplishments. Two great names of distinguished orators first present themselves, like mountain summits, when we look towards Greece and to its rival in the West. Philip of Macedon owes much of his celebrity to the orator who inveighed against him, and Catiline, through the eloquence of Cicero, enjoys the good fortune of that one insect in a swarm for whom a drop of amber makes a transparent and imperishable tomb. The speeches of the chieftains of hell do not yield in their power over us to any part of Milton. The conference of the Grecian heroes by night in the tent of Achilles, the fierce and stormy accusations and replies of Achilles and Ulysses, of Agamemnon and Ajax, excite as much interest, as the death of Hector; and when that

garrulous old Nestor, the statesman and hero, composes the strifes of the chieftains, his eloquence is to your mind what Homer beautifully says it was on the assembled warriors, like the composing effect of the soft falling snow. Men never read anything with more of a thrill than the description of a powerful speech, and of its effect at the time of its delivery. Indeed no man ever occupies a more sublime and honorable place than when, for a good purpose, he stands up to address his fellow-men.

When the God of nature determined to give the world a sign of his covenant with the earth, instead of creating an emblem expressly for this purpose, he took one which already existed, a product of his established laws. So when he chose an instrument by which to reform, instruct, and save the world, what did he appoint for this purpose? He chose and appointed that which had always had the greatest influence over the human mind. Human oratory is the great instrument in the spiritual renovation of our race.

We are met together in a place where some who are to use this great means of influence, are preparing for their office and work. Public sentiment here permits a Rhetorical Society to engage the public attention in a prominent manner at the anniversary of this Institution. This illustrates and confirms what has already been said respecting the universal assent to the high importance and interest of the power to speak well.

We, the graduates of this Seminary, went from the Institution professedly with a finished education as public speakers. We have put our knowledge and accomplishments to the test. But if we were to relate our experience as public speakers, as we propose this week to relate our experience in other things, it is no risk to say that in no respect have some of us been more dissatisfied with ourselves. In some of you this might justly be regarded as excessive modesty, but as to others they expect no compliments for saying as they do with all sincerity, that they have never yet learned to speak with the satisfaction to themselves, or with the evident effect upon others, which they desire. They think that they should have found it out long ago had they been blessed with distinguished oratorical powers, inasmuch as a good speaker and a handsome person are generally conscious of their charms. It is not a feeling of despair nor of indifference, but sober conviction which leads them to say that they never expect to impress the world by their great oratorical talent. In vain are they reminded of Demosthenes and his pebbles, and of

the sword suspended from the ceiling. Their doctrine is that orators and poets are born, not made.

The first time that public speaking is distinctly alluded to in the records of the human race, we have an accomplished scholar, bred in the learning of the Egyptians, expressing his diffidence of his qualifications as a speaker, and declining a mission, on this account, to the court of Pharaoh. We know not whether to wonder most at his want of confidence in God who appeared to him and gave him his commission, or at the distrust of an ability to speak well in a man who afterwards as a lawgiver, judge, military commander, historian, and poet, showed more versatility of eminent talents than any man who has appeared since his day. There are educated men, however, who sympathize in the feelings of Moses with respect to public speaking, and entertain a secret feeling of interest in him on account of those feelings;—somewhat as Charles Lamb felt who says, “When a child I had more yearnings towards that simple architect that built his house upon the sand, than I entertained for his more cautious neighbor; I grudged at the hard censure pronounced upon the quiet soul that kept his talent; and felt a kindliness for those five thoughtless virgins.”¹ But nothing ever reconciles these preachers to the effort of public speaking, and in reflecting upon their public efforts, they have almost any other wrong feeling than self-esteem.

One cause of their despondence is an erroneous impression respecting the supreme importance of Oratory as distinguished from Rhetoric. They were taught in early life, that the power to impress others by public address, is something to be put on from without, rather than to be put out from within; and having been unsuccessful in acquiring the graces of a good delivery, and being conscious of awkwardness, they question whether they did not mistake their calling in undertaking to preach. And yet there are times, perhaps, when each of these men is eloquent to a degree that could not be surpassed. In private, or familiar efforts, at the bed of sickness and death, at the funeral, in seasons of deep religious feeling among their flocks, or when they find it necessary to reprove or rebuke, they say right things in the right manner,—and what definition of eloquence can be more just than this? But when they come to address the great congregation upon ordinary occasions, they have such distrust of their

¹ Essays of Elia, “All Fool’s Day.”

manner that they uniformly sink to the mere effort of reading what they may as listlessly have written. The expectation of ever becoming acceptable and impressive public speakers, or even of having a moderate degree of comfort in their public efforts, has long since been utterly abandoned. Yet they feel that they are doomed for life to the task of public speaking.

Is it not also a fact that many young men think and feel that success in public speaking depends first of all upon acquiring a good delivery? This is owing in part to the effort which they are obliged to make at school to affect the art of oratory by declaiming the compositions of others; and when in after life they are delivered over to the elocutionist, the conviction is deepened that all success in public speaking is to be secured by the eloquent pronunciation of their discourse. Some of them when at school were distinguished as declaimers; eminent success as future public speakers was predicted for them. But in their profession they find that their early promise of success is not fulfilled, while some who were clownish and in every way unpromising as declaimers, have been impressive orators.

In what I am now to say, the reason will appear why such thoughts as these have led me to speak at this time *On certain Elements of Success in Pulpit Elocution.*

Many a young man would have been a successful public speaker had he begun his literary course under the influence of this truth, it is the man and not any manner which he may acquire, which lays the foundation for successful public speaking. When a man rises to speak, he soon makes the impress of his mind upon us; he shows us his mental qualifications as an orator. By this impress he succeeds or fails in making us feel that he is an eloquent man; he will succeed in spite of what the elocutionists would pronounce a bad manner, or he will fail though he speaks all the parts of his discourse as he has been taught. Every hearer knows that a public speaker soon convinces him of the speaker's power or weakness by what he says, independently of the manner in which he says it. The speaker may do with his hands whatever he will; the hearer may not know that he has any hands except as he turns his leaves. He may shut up any number of his fingers, and even all of them, or project one of them with such an arrowy or dirk-like motion, that the hearer might think, "Is this a dagger that I see before me?" He may thrust his hand into his bosom, or place it on his side. His principal gesticulation may consist in taking off a pair of spectacles and shaking

them at his respected hearers. The afflatus of inspiration may appear to be on him by his brushing back the sleeves of his coat, or some other ungainly sign. He may stand with the correctness and beauty of the Apollo Belvidere, or half lie down, or rock on his feet sideways, or note the arsis and apodosis of his sentence by leaning first backwards and then forwards. His voice may be set on a gamut of only three notes, and no chromatic intervals. But that man may interest and sway an audience as much as human oratory can ever do it, and he who does not feel that the speaker is an eloquent man, has no true susceptibility to eloquence. On the other hand, a man may speak before you accomplished in all the rules of the schools, and if he will speak Shakspeare, or Indian talks, or Scott, or Burke, in short any eloquent composition of another, he will make you feel that he is a powerful speaker. But let him write his own speech and try it upon your sensibilities, and all his external accomplishments may not make you feel that he is an eloquent man. If he be a preacher his hearers will be weary of him. They will complain that he tires them, and does not feed them. They were pleased with him at first, but he does not grow. If he is a lawyer, and thinks that his oratory will gain his cases for him, he will be secretly laughed at by the bench, bar, jury-box and constables. A young man who thinks that because he has learned positions and gestures, and can trill the R's, and has subdued his voice far down into the base clef, will be counted an eloquent man, will soon find himself put to shame. Mankind know what is eloquent and what is pretence, though nine tenths of them can quote no rules to show the difference. The man, independently of his manner, will convince them that he has power over their hearts and minds; or on the other hand, the manner, however orderly and elegant, will fail to convince them that there is much in the man besides his manner.

In speaking of manner, I mean that which a man has learned and put on; that is, how to stand, how to make gestures, how to modulate his voice. This is the manner, and is altogether different from what we call the manners, which are always the expression and exponent of the inmost self. For there is no greater mistake than is frequently made in apologizing for a rude address or answer, it is only in his manners. In the manners, the inward sentiments of deference, love, kindness, or of contempt, selfishness, and pride, involuntarily appear. Now as a man shows his secret feelings in his manners, so a public speaker will involun-

tarily show his mind and heart to the popular discernment, let him put on what manner of behaving and expressing himself before them he may.

In seeking to make ourselves or others good preachers, we must do what nature does when she makes eloquent men. She makes the man first, and his manners are the consequence of what the man is. A humorous old book on angling professes to give directions how to dress a dolphin. It says, 'first, catch a dolphin', and then, by fascinating digressions turns, to another subject, knowing, that when the reader has caught the dolphin, he will be at no loss how to dress it. We must catch the dolphin for the Professor of Sacred Rhetoric; he must be furnished with those whose previous training has laid the foundation ready for his hands. The responsible work of doing this falls upon the teachers of Rhetoric in our colleges. We will suppose a Professor of Rhetoric in a college looking at the new Freshman class. These young men are not all to be public speakers by profession, yet two thirds of them may be expected to be, and none of them will fail to see times when rhetorical instructions will be of the greatest use to them. The first thing which he endeavors to do is to direct their studies by his Lectures with a remote reference to their ability hereafter to express themselves with truth, and strength, and beauty, and with fitness. He does not begin with the voice. He does not first of all place the pupil on a stage with a chirometer of wood and wire around him, to show him how high he must raise his hand when he expresses a certain emotion. He begins with the taste, the power of discerning and distinguishing what is right and suitable in discourse. He thus lays the very foundations of the mind with reference to the future employment of public speaking. For Quintilian says: "*Haec precepta eloquentiae—cogitationi sunt necessaria*;"¹—the rules of Eloquence apply to the way of thinking, as well as of expression.

If a man does not think rightly, you cannot make him speak so. The first thing, therefore, to be done with a youth is to make him susceptible to all those things in discourse which enter into the idea of eloquence;—simplicity, propriety, passion, beauty; to teach him when he is thinking for his public addresses, to think in forms suited to the act of addressing men by the voice rather than by the written or printed page. For in this perhaps

¹ *De Institutione Oratoria*, X. 1.

is the great defect in our preaching. We write compositions and read them, and we succeed, more or less, in conveying instruction; but a public address is not the mere reading of a dissertation. If we wish to exert influence as preachers we ought to mould what we say in reference to its being delivered by us in person better and to greater effect than we can do it by the pen. God did not ordain public preaching as the great instrument of publishing the Gospel with a view to its accomplishing only that which the printing-press can do as well. It is a self-denying work, it costs a struggle with the love of ease and the fear of man, to preach—in the fullest sense of that word—to preach, rather than to read. The pulpit and a written discourse are too apt to be what the gunwales of ships are to the assailant who fears to land on the enemy's territory; but to throw yourself forth upon the attention of your hearers with the boldness and familiarity which preaching to them, in the true sense of that word, requires, is like burning the ships, and standing out upon the plain, throwing everything upon the success of the onset. Though a missionary may not neglect or shun the arduous work of preaching to the natives, he will tell you that it is far more grateful to flesh and blood to put books and tracts into their hands; and we, from our experience in reading our sermons to the people, can readily believe him. Your hearer is before you when you preach, like an organ with many a wonderful stop, and many banks of keys. Any man may play his dull tune there. But a father of all them that handle the organ can make it utter tones and combinations of sounds from all its recesses; and we ought to approach our fellow men when we address them, not to state mere facts in theology and ethics, but to play skilfully upon their susceptibilities. Now to do this, is it sufficient to be instructed merely by the Elocutionist, or can the Elocutionist lay the foundation for it in the speaker? We cannot hesitate to answer, No. We must be acquainted with the forms of thought in which the greatest and best thinkers have spoken. The ancient writers on oratory insist so much on this as to discuss the question with what authors the pupil shall make himself most familiar. With regard to one author they say with one accord, let the young man read, study, commit to memory, the verses of Homer. One of them says, that as Aratus in his poem begins with Jove, “‘ab Jove incipiendum,’ putat, so, we think that the youth should begin with Homer. For he has given to all parts of eloquence birth and example, as the strength of rivers and the course of foun-

tains are ocean born. In great things no one excels him in sublimity, or propriety in smaller things; nec poeticâ modo, sed oratoria virtute eminentissimus."¹ The influence of a teacher of rhetoric ought to be everywhere present with the students from the beginning to the end of their college course. Instead of coming into this department as he comes into an advanced study, the pupil ought to be born into it as a child is born into parental love and care. So far from interfering with the other departments of instruction, the teacher of rhetoric can promote scholarship in them all, better than the teacher in any other department. For all studies flow into his field; all prepare the pupil to do what he is set to teach him. He says to the young men, You have come here to learn how you may influence your fellow men for their good. The most of you are to do this by public addresses. Remember from the first hour in which you get your first lesson, that you are studying for this great purpose. In the languages, analyze to the roots. Every original word is an image of a thing. Study etymology in every sentence. Tell why this word is used rather than its almost apparent synonym. Observe the delicate turns and shades of thought; search out the allusions; translate literally and also in idiomatic English. He will prepare attentive hearers for those who lecture on the history of the literature in each learned tongue. He will follow the student in his study of the mathematics and natural philosophy, and show him what resources he may obtain for his future employment as a public speaker.

There are some preachers whose manner is clownish; their reading of hymns is execrable; as to any knowledge of the rules of speaking, "fair science smiled not on their humble birth." Yet if I were to choose the preacher under whose instructions I should prefer to sit year after year, it would be one of these men. They subdue me—they lead me captive—they make me weep, they make me glad, as no other men do. I remember their wise, beautiful, eloquent sentiments as I should the words of an oracle. Compared with them, a man who assails my senses with his elocution, and is always thrusting upon my notice his motions, his tones of voice, and making me think of him as a good speaker, is a mere mountebank, from whom I wish to flee, and whom I think of as I do of a man whom, with all his pious tones, I believe to be a hypocrite. Let us have preachers who will commend themselves to our sense

¹ Inst. Orat. X. 1.

of propriety in the arrangement, proportions, illustrations and unity of what they say. To effect this, we must train young men to think and to write well. In making public speakers for the pulpit we ought to labor most with the pupil's mind. He who succeeds, for example, in preventing a youth from using incorrect figures, and by the acuteness of his criticisms, represses the prurient fancy, and compels the pupil to analyze his metaphors, and use them with care, who shows him why it is false taste to talk of "the green carpet of nature," and why it is wrong to speak of "the attitude of the mind;" who will not suffer the young writer to discuss various topics under a text which naturally confines him to one, and he who succeeds in making him comprehend the architectural beauty of some model speech or sermon, will do more to make that youth a good preacher than all the elocutionists could do without him. He will pass through the region of that young man's mind and make it all a well; and while drought and heat consume the snow water of mere artificial and superficial oratory, perpetual springs will arise there. For the fundamental excellence in all addresses is not the manner, nor a great variety of smart things, nor fine conceits, "like orient pearls at random strung." The fundamental excellence in all addresses is logic. Logic is the common staple of the human mind. Reasoning is the employment of men in their daily life. They buy and sell, and settle accounts, they write letters, they talk with each other in the streets, and in their places of business, they quarrel, they are reconciled, they read newspapers, according to logic, and that when they cannot tell you what it is; yet it is the staff of life. We have an illustration of what I mean by logic in the answers of Christ to the sectarians of his day. He put three whole sects to silence by the way in which he reasoned with them respectively. He had a shorter method with Herodians and others, than we use with deists. It was not by miracle, nor preternatural influence; it was by the skilful selection of facts, and the conclusiveness of his inferences, which had no parade of reasoning, and yet were as resistless and sure as that lightning which we see dropping smoothly out of a cloud, so calm that a sense of beauty mingles with our dread. That which men aim at in their intercourse with men, that which chiefly affects them is, conclusive statements. A man who addresses his fellow men must commend himself first of all to their understandings; that is, they must see the connection and feel the conclusiveness of his thoughts. Yet in dealing with the understandings of men, he

who spends his time in processes of arguing will weary and not instruct his hearers, and he who imparts to them mere facts in theology will not arrest their attention. It is a great thing to be logically correct, and then to set on fire the reasoning with analogies and skilful illustrations, which cannot be done by the formal introduction of figures, but requires the spontaneous use of figurative words—words which are pictures—words, one of which will sometimes move a whole assembly. It is the work of a teacher of rhetoric so to instruct the pupil that this habit shall be a second nature with him. Perhaps there is no modern writer who exemplifies this power to reason by pictorial words, or who teaches us how to do it, better than Coleridge; and his 'Aids to Reflection' is, in this respect, one of the best of helps in composition. He makes the young man analyze the sentence which he has just written, and dissect each word to judge of its propriety or to see whether it be not used vaguely and without point.

The power of a public speaker over the human mind depends much on this faculty of presenting a thing at once and vividly. For though language is not given to man, as Talleyrand said, "to conceal his thoughts," yet it is only by skill and care in the use of it that the thought is not concealed, or imperfectly conveyed. One secret of the charm in the eloquence of our Aborigines, is, their words are images of things. But why do I refer to this or that man as an illustration of the power which this use of language gives the speaker or writer, when we have such an illustration of it in the case of Shakespeare. The more we know of writers, the more we study the laws of language, the more we trace out the secret of its success in various writers or speakers, the more shall we be astonished at the power of this man. That a man of no systematic knowledge or scholastic study should have comprehended all the powers and uses of the English tongue so as to speak as no other uninspired man ever spoke, understand all the springs of human motives, enter into every human character, male or female, English, Roman, African, Danish and Venitian, and put it on as though it were his own, and feel and speak as a king or clown, the crazy and the sage, the lover, the politician, the glutton, hoary age and the little child, this is the intellectual wonder of the world. It is his instinctive perception of what is natural, and the use of corresponding language that makes him the poet of human nature. When we perceive moral and spiritual things thus, and set them forth with the same truthfulness in form and manner, we have the highest mental qualifications to preach.

There is no risk in the declaration that, as a general thing, rhetoric has been too much regarded as a super-addition to a young man's education, the putting on of a mere dress, whereas it ought to mingle with the first elements of a liberal education. Until this becomes the general law, in vain do we seek to make men good preachers, a work which implies on the part of the pupil a knowledge of logic, a critical acquaintance with the use of language, a just discrimination and taste in the use of metaphors, and a familiarity with the best models of thought and expression. It is unjust to expect that a professor in a Theological Seminary will make men skilful in writing who have not addicted themselves to the study of it in their collegiate course. The teachers in the exegetical department in this Seminary do not undertake to teach the students Greek. The students are supposed to be familiar with the language, and all which the teachers of languages here do with regard to the Greek is, to teach the Greek of the New Testament, giving instruction in that department of the tongue which has special reference to the explanation of the Scriptures. By the same rule, we ought not to expect the Professor of Sacred Rhetoric to make men acquainted with Rhetoric, but to apply what they know to the department of writing sermons and preaching. We ought to encourage the rhetorical Professors in our colleges to extend their influence over the students in all their studies, and it will be well for the pulpit and the bar when the influence of this department is infused more into the earliest intellectual discipline of the scholar. The Rhetorical Professor in college who makes us feel his influence when we are studying Horace and Homer and the Greek Orators and Tragedies, and in our miscellaneous reading, will exert an influence over us which we shall feel and acknowledge whenever we write a sermon or rise to preach.

Now if the principal thing in learning to preach is not the manner, but the intellectual preparation, and if we may be so prepared by study to preach that we shall succeed in being acceptable and useful notwithstanding anything that we may suppose to be unfortunate and unalterable in our manner, we have no excuse if we do not improve as preachers every year. If learning to preach consisted in learning how to use the hands and the voice, I grant that two or three quarters with an Elocutionist might put us in trim order for the rest of life. But you might as well think to teach a child filial reverence by teaching him the most approved method of taking off his hat. It is our privilege

as intelligent beings always to be learning something. This we expect to do forever, and the professional man who is true to his own mind and heart will do it here. Some literary and professional men in their moments of rest employ members of their families to read Latin authors to them, a page or two only, it may be, at a time; but this serves to keep an atmosphere of purity and beauty about their thoughts, and refreshes them like the clear and outward air when oppressed with the confinement of their toils. Are we as good preachers as we ever expect to be? In the work of addressing our fellow men, we have an unbounded field for improvement, in learning continually how to preach. Our business, by the appointment of Him who spake as never man spake is, to learn, week after week, how to reach and affect the human mind and heart more than we have ever done before. Now if an unalterably bad manner sealed the doom of a preacher, we might, perhaps, be pardoned if, conscious of it, we ceased to exert ourselves in learning to preach better. But if the foundation for success is to be laid in the mind and heart, and the mind and heart can triumph over the outward man, we never can be released from diligent efforts to be more acceptable and useful in the pulpit.

It is a great encouragement to a preacher, old or young, to bear in mind, that while there may be some things in his personal appearance or manners which he cannot alter if he would, as for example, if he be awkwardly tall, that his shadow never can be less, or if he be a short man that he cannot by taking thought add one cubit to his stature, nor make his hands elegantly shaped, or his shoulders, which the Elocutionists say are the seat of oratorical action, otherwise than they are, he can by study, learn those things in preaching which in a few minutes after he has begun to speak, will make his hearers forget his manner. If God has called us to preach, but has withheld certain natural qualifications from us, he has certainly given us others, or he would not have called us to the ministry. This principle of compensation runs through all the works of Providence, and Anacreon taught us when we were at school that hares and dogs even enjoy the benefit of this law. If it be a fact that successful oratory depends first of all upon mental qualifications, nothing but indolence will prevent any man from growing more acceptable and useful as a preacher as long as his faculties are unimpaired.

I have spoken of mental qualifications as elements in success-

ful pulpit oratory, and as holding the first rank among them. I come now to speak of ART.

Are all the writers, ancient and modern, upon the subject of eloquence mistaken when they insist upon the necessity and the usefulness of art in learning to speak? My object thus far has been to assign their proper place to mental qualifications in the business of public speaking. But if there be truth in what has now been said upon this part of my subject, there is much to be said with regard to art in learning to speak and preach which is equally true. The least observation and reflection will show us that they who overcome the prejudices of their hearers, arising from some untoward manner, by the immediate force or persuasiveness of what they say, are few; they are the geniuses of the profession; but we are not to expect their success without labor and art. Indeed in the case of some to whom we attribute native genius as the cause of their eminent success, we shall find that they have either made art a second nature by intense study, or by their ready and quick perceptions and versatility of talent they apply the rules of art instinctively, as some children have a natural aptitude in speaking good grammar before they have studied the science. Only let us remember that art is a handmaid to nature, and oratory second to rhetoric, and there are no limits to the extent which art may have in our manner of speaking, and we cannot practise upon the rules of oratory to excess.

What instrument of music is regarded with such astonishment, or would be considered as attaining the height of perfection in musical sounds, if it could be perfectly constructed? Those organs which contain the vox humana stops, if the idea on which they are founded could be fulfilled in the execution, would turn the fable of Orpheus into a fulfilled prophecy, and the imagination of men would almost re-arrange the stars in the Constellation of the Lyre. Yet make such instruments as perfect as art could ever construct them, there would still be wanting in them the immediate connection of the soul of man with their sources of harmony, the operation of that ever varying and inimitable control which the feelings have over the human voice itself. Of all the beautiful products of God's benevolence and skill in the animal world, no beast, however great its joy, no bird, however rapturous its song, can smile.

"Smiles from reason flow—to brutes denied."

Now there is something on the face of speech, something in the

expression of the voice, which corresponds to that gleam of the soul which is seen in smiles, and that indescribable quality which no daguerotype can catch, but which sinks deep into the mind that perceives it, as the silver plate takes on itself the image which the sun makes from the human face, no art can imitate, no art can teach. When in a moment of high religious joy, or at an instantaneous conception of some affecting thought, the preacher breaks forth in some impassioned strain, if he chances to think, how must I pitch and modulate my voice, the charm of his eloquence is broken; he is artificial, and he feels it, and if he is pathetic, it is the beauty which death sometimes leaves upon the face. Yet in those very moments it is easy to show that art, of which, in such a connection, we all have such an instinctive dread, is, or may be, of the highest use. There is nothing more disagreeable than the effect in some public speakers of high emotion. When it comes upon them suddenly, it is almost as trying to the sensibilities of the audience, as though the speaker should have a short fit, giving his features a hideous look, and his voice the struggles of a paralytic. When some men are excited by their emotions, they will half talk and half cry; others will screech from the leger lines above, and others will stop short, not with that rhetorical pause which sometimes heightens the effect of a sentence, but because they cannot control themselves, and in this hiatus (*valde defendus*!) the condition of the nerves throughout the audience is truly pitiable. Is there no room for art here? Do you say, leave me to the natural operation of my own feelings. Why man, you do not know how to feel. You must not feel in the pulpit as you did when you were a boy in the street, and were whipped, or had your toy stolen. You must feel in a manner respectful to your audience, becoming the occasion, and consistent with the due and orderly enunciation of what you have to say. On special occasions, for example, in a funeral discourse, some of your faults of emotion might be excused; but the hearers wish to have a speaker, as a general thing, control himself, though at times they are willing that his feelings should be uncontrollable because, from the nature of the occasion, their own are so. How can we expect that our feelings will manifest themselves with propriety in the pulpit, if they have not felt the power of control out of it? Do we believe in the perfect sanctification of a preacher's voice at the ringing of 'the second bell,' that all his untutored powers and faculties will behave orderly and properly in the pulpit because the Sabbath has

come, as they say the oxen do on Christmas eve, who, as the legend is, reverently compose themselves and kneel, at twelve o'clock, because of the child that was laid in the manger? But the sensible ox is no such Puseyite, and sensible men, who are born to labor, ought not to think that sacred times and seasons have any charm or potent spell in them to supersede the necessity of self-discipline. Yet there is reason to believe that some despise all attempts to teach the use of the voice. 'It must all be left to nature.' Alas! that they themselves should have been left to nature, or else that they should not have known by nature how to "snatch one grace beyond the reach of art," or "rise to faults which critics cannot mend." Did you ever hear them ridicule the singing school? Shall singing be left to nature? Come on, inveigh against the artifice of learning to sing. Is singing correctly and skilfully natural to man? Or, to make the case entirely parallel, do you despise the art which brings out the voice of a pupil, and teaches those expressions of melody which move you while you never think of art as being the parent of them? There is not a bird on the spray who did not learn to sing by long practice. You may hear a young thrush trying different strains, and failing on certain notes or in certain trills or cadences, repeating them, till practice has made her perfect, and when by seeming accident she strikes upon certain notes of special sweetness and power she will delight herself and the listening groves by dwelling on them as constituting her own song, by which she is to be known in her musical world.

There is some disposition among us to regard those who seek improvement in the use of the voice in speaking, as influenced by a vain ambition; and many young men are prevented by a feeling of shame and fear of ridicule from applying themselves to this invaluable means of improvement as public speakers. There have been Elocutionists who have brought discredit on their profession by making their pupils imitate one set form of speaking; but a man of true taste and judgment in this profession is a blessing to the community. He will regard the constitutional differences which nature has made in different men and cultivate them. Style in writing is inseparably connected with character. So it is in speaking, and there is not one manner for all,—a truth which Elocutionists have not always considered. Instead of teaching excessive gesticulation, and prescribing certain motions for every sentence, a judicious preceptor will restrain the gestures, and make them the offspring of the speaker's feelings,

and not the offensive display of a declaimer who thinks that there is power in graceful movements without any reason for them in what they are intended to illustrate. There is hardly anything more awkward and ridiculous than the first efforts of a pupil to adjust his fingers to the keys of a musical instrument ; and what is more irksome than the exercises for the voice in learning to sing ? But how soon, in the rapid movements of the hand, and the exquisite tones of the voice, do we see the fruit of that toil ; and we never despise the proficient in music for the artificial methods by which he gained his skill, nor think that it would have been better if he had been left to nature to be made a musician and singer.

Musical sounds are heard at a greater distance than others. This may account, in some cases, for the fact that some voices which are not loud or strong, will fill a large house. The deficiency in the volume of the voice is compensated for by the harmonious conformity of its tones to the laws of acoustics. Thus nature and art are allies and friends. True art leads man back to nature, and nature receives and owns the perfect artist as her true child.

There is another illustration by which we may see the propriety, and in fact the indispensable necessity, of art in learning to preach. I have said, that we ought to make our sermons rhetorically adapted for delivery. A good delivery is not independent of the manner in which we write. We cannot take a sermon made up of very long sentences, or of very short sentences, written, as it were, for an asthmatic man to read, or a sermon made up of dull common place premises and conclusions, and deliver it well. You cannot put on your spirit of oratory, as men put on the gown and bands, let your sermon be what it may. We must be as eloquent in the secret chambers of the soul when we are writing the sermon as we wish to be when we are speaking. This will make us use the concealed arts of rhetoric, which the hearers cannot see, but they will feel the influence of them. It will make us, for example, throw a sentence into an interrogative form. It will make us begin a paragraph with a bold appeal. It will make us think longer for a more expressive word. It will make us relieve a long train of reasoning with some interesting and short digression. Having prepared a discourse which is susceptible of being delivered well,—in the effort to deliver it, the spirit under which we wrote it will appear in our looks and manner. Is not this our great fault as preachers, that we do not

make our sermons for the delivery? Here is an opportunity to practise art and to show skill. If when we are writing a sermon we fancy ourselves in the pulpit, with an audience before us, and remember how dull they look in listening to a monotonous flow of thoughts all run in the same mould, with nothing about them to stir a single faculty of the soul, we shall labor to put our thoughts into a rhetorical shape;—for the rules of rhetoric are as really drawn from the human mind and heart, as the rules of grammar are from human speech. By rhetoric, many understand high flown language; as when they say that a piece was highly rhetorical, meaning that it was ambitious and inflated. But this is an abuse of the word. If a man begins a discourse in a calm, dispassionate manner, rather than with violence, if he preserves the unity of his discourse, if he arranges his proofs so that the strongest will conclude the number, he is as really a rhetorician in so doing as in any other applications of rhetorical rules which the common mind can better perceive. The most finished models of human composition are highly rhetorical, that is, they are constructed according to rules drawn from the laws of the human mind, rules which have become instinctive with the writers; and such should be the perfection of art at which we should aim. Then, that which began in what seemed to our unskilled powers, artifice, becomes mental discipline and character.

As to the delivery of the discourse, if we think that merely to read what we have written answers all the purposes of preaching, and that we are to use none of the arts of oratory to make ourselves eloquent, we are rebuked by every public singer and stage-player.

On this subject I know of no better instruction for us than we find in Hamlet's Soliloquy on this very point, and it is one of the best lectures on oratorical delivery ever written. Hamlet's uncle, as you know, had poisoned the king, Hamlet's father, and had married the queen, who connived at the murder. Hamlet wished to convict his uncle and mother publicly of this deed. For this purpose, he employed a company of players to enact a play which he had written for them, and at the performance of which the guilty parties should be present. But in order to try their power, he first makes one of them speak before him a part of a play in which Pyrrhus murders king Priam; and Priam's wife, Hecuba, is represented in all the horror and agony of a faithful, affection-

ate, bereaved woman. After this rehearsal, when the players had left him, Hamlet said :—

“ Oh what a rogue and peasant slave am I !
Is it not monstrous, that this player here,
But in a fiction, in a dream of passion,
Could force his soul so to his own conceit,
That from her working all his visage wann'd;
Tears in his eyes, distraction in's aspect,
A broken voice, and his whole function suiting
With forms to his conceit. And all for nothing !
For Hecuba !
What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba,
That he should weep for her ? What would he do,
Had he the motive and the cue for passion
That I have ? He would drown the stage with tears,
And cleave the general ear with horrid speech ;
Make mad the guilty, and appal the free,
Confound the ignorant, and amaze, indeed,
The very faculties of eyes and ears.
Yet I,
A dull and muddy-mettled rascal, peak,
Like John a-dreams, unpregnant of my cause.

But I am pigeon-liver'd and lack gall.”

In mingling with the crowd on Boston Common in September of last year at the great Whig gathering, to hear some of the best public speakers address their fellow citizens preparatory to the election, I could not but say of ourselves as preachers,—comparing our subjects and the way in which we are too apt to handle them, with the way in which these men spoke to the voters,—as Hamlet did after hearing the players,

“ But we are pigeon-livered and lack gall.”

I saw that men love to be dealt with by a public speaker fearlessly. They love to have him make himself superior to them by his powerful reproofs, exhortations and directions, when he has convinced their understandings. Unless the soul of eloquence moves us at times to do the same, the popular mind feels that we are not competent to our work. It is a remark of Bucholtzer, a Dutch divine, that a speaker is known by his peroration. There is philosophy and truth in this remark. In the peroration, we make the appeal to the heart and conscience. If a man knows how to address his fellow men, it will appear in his peroration, when he has finished his argument, illustrated his subject, and it is time for him to apply it. Some men will break off their

discourse in a tame, unimpassioned way, as though their six or seven sheets were written full and they had no more to say. A man who, though he writes all he has to say, knows and feels the difference between reading a lecture and addressing an audience, will, at such a time, gird himself up to speak to them face to face with the confidence which his successful effort to convince and persuade his hearers will inspire, and with the accumulated force which his previous thoughts and feelings will have gathered together in his mind. Let us try ourselves by this rule. In the very best moments to influence our hearers, when we have them at our control, and when the human mind naturally expects a special appeal, have we the force and courage and the essential spirit of oratory sufficient to make us impressive then if we never are at other times? Do we at such times ever summon up the powers and faculties of body and mind to make a special impression? If we do, what is this but art, and why shall we not use her aid more to reform and quicken ourselves in every part of preaching?

Another of the chief elements of success in pulpit eloquence is *Professional Enthusiasm*.

Every man who is eminent in his calling is an enthusiast in it. If we would be eminently successful as public speakers, we must be enthusiastic in our profession. But this enthusiasm must relate to the employment of public speaking, and cannot be supplied by any zeal which we may have as students of sacred literature or theology.

We are constantly in danger of being too scholastic in our feelings. We cannot be too thorough as Hebrew and Greek scholars. We cannot be too well versed in theological science. The more we know the better shall we be qualified to exercise the art of addressing our fellow men—if we take care also to acquire that art. We should study under the impression that we are public speakers. We should study with our faculties somewhat disposed as those Jews were who rebuilt Jerusalem—half of them labored, and half of them held the spears, and he that blew the trumpet stood watch. We have seen men loading a vessel. They put everything in with reference to its being taken out. The delivery of the cargo is the great thing with them; they bear it in mind in deciding what they shall lower into the hold and how they shall stow it. Need I declare this parable further than to say that in all our studies we ought to remember that our employment is to influence the human mind by the form and

manner in which we deliver our knowledge? Suppose that on visiting the military school at West Point we should notice that the cadets spend most of their time in making powder, forging swords, and turning gun-stocks, and they should always appear with smutty hands and faces, and bent forms. They ought to know how to make powder, but the great thing for them to know is, how to apply it. They ought to study strategy and castrametation,—which will involve a critical knowledge of mathematics; but you expect to see them frequently armed, standing erect, wheeling, filing, attacking, retreating, and handling their arms with that utmost art which conceals itself. This is the rhetoric of arms, and we know that they are justly praised for their proficiency in such rhetoric. We may spend too much time in the mere making of ammunition, of which, indeed, we cannot have too much, but we ought to know as much about the manual and tactics of our calling, by constantly learning how to make practical use of our powers and of our knowledge in the great art of addressing our fellow men.

Some students, who, from the earliest part of their literary course have intended to be preachers, finish their studies in the theological seminary without any just conception of this thought, that their future employment is to consist in addressing their fellow men. Let a young man always bear this in mind, and it will have a great effect upon him in all his pursuits. He will not wait to be in his profession before he learns much from observation. His eyes and ears will always be open to learn something useful to him in his profession as a speaker. He will attend public meetings to observe and study the excellences and defects of public speakers. He will not pass a collection of boys in the streets, or see two men in earnest debate, or watch the motions and intonations of children, without receiving some hints with regard to oratory, as Handel caught the idea of one of his great pieces by hearing a blacksmith's hammer ringing on the anvil. The voices of the fishmonger, teamster, and sailor, the newsboys among the din of business, the soldier on parade, the graceful manners and motions of those with whom we associate only the ideas of beauty and grace, will afford the preacher hints and helps for his profession. He will notice how much better an effect a public speaker produces who keeps his feet in right positions to give his whole frame a proper inclination, than the man who stands like a pair of open dividers, or winds one limb round the other, or extends it behind him till his foot is a perpendicular. He will watch the mo-

tions of public singers ; he will get wisdom from an expert auctioneer ; he will be like an artist to whom the fashions and forms in the streets, the flowers, the unconscious postures of men, the hues of the clouds, new every morning and fresh every evening, and grand and picturesque at noon, are always suggesting something for his pencil.

Professional enthusiasm, if it were more common among us, as speakers, would drive out some intolerable faults, and we should see more general excellence in oratory. For the sake of exciting a little enthusiasm against one fault in particular, I shall allude to it here.

The general impression with regard to the use of the manuscript, in view of all the discussions about written sermons and extempore preaching on the Sabbath, seems to be this, that we ought to write our sermons, and with great care, and then instead of committing them to memory, be so familiar with what is written as to be easy and free in the delivery. This will probably continue to be the New England doctrine, and if so, it is to be hoped that the practice will increasingly correspond to it in all respects. But gesticulation during the actual reading of impassioned parts of a written discourse is awkward and frequently ridiculous. This habit is owing to a conscientious conviction on the part of the preacher that he must gesticulate while reading, so as to give signs of life during the period of apparently suspended animation. If a public speaker is ever excessively ridiculous it is when he begins to gesticulate, and with his hand extended by the apparent excitement of some thought, suddenly stops, and leaving his arm aloft, drops his head to search in the manuscript for the cause of the excitement. Charles Matthews once facetiously proposed that the principle of the division of labor should be extended to stage playing ; one actor being employed to make gestures while another does the speaking. Unless we can be sufficiently enthusiastic in our profession as public speakers to invent some way of remembering fully what it is which ought to excite us so much as to produce a gesture, it would hardly be more offensive to good taste if we should each have a colleague, in some young student of oratory, who should stand below the pulpit and do the gestures while we do the sermon. I would suggest the inquiry whether any gesticulation is of any use and whether it is not a downright fault, when it flows from a speaker's conscience, rather than his heart.

If I may be allowed to say a word here by way of digression

as to gesticulation in general, I infer from the remarks which sensible hearers drop in speaking of different preachers, that they are more apt to be wearied with gestures than to feel pained at the omission of them. If we can only give life to the thought and the expression, the hearers will not miss the gestures, nor think of the hand and arm, unless attention is drawn to them by their being stiff and formal. Garrick is said to have used but little gesticulation. The greatest offences in speaking are apt to be committed by the hands. People cannot endure to have a speaker protruding his long arms upon them without any reason; he must so affect them by what he says, that his motions will seem to be a part of it, but even then he ought to watch against excess. Common people are not pleased with this show of oratory, and there is more of innate sense of propriety among them than many suspect. Many years ago, one of the older students of a theological seminary, and, as I am informed, a most excellent man, went to the Isle of Shoals, in this neighborhood, to spend a vacation in preaching to the people. His brethren on his return to the seminary asked him concerning his success. He said among other things, that one of the fishermen told him that the people liked what he said in preaching, but they thought that there was too much lobstering with his hands. It was the last place in which he could have expected to be criticised as a speaker, but he probably never heard before or afterwards a more expressive criticism, nor one that better showed the fact that the first rules of art in speaking are drawn from human nature. Remember then, when some of you are preaching to those Choctaws, or Zulûs, and Mahars, that they understand gesture,—know when it proceeds from your heart, and are pained when it is unmeaning, or violent, or excessive. Let professional enthusiasm in the art of public speaking go with you if you go to the ends of the earth. Resolve that as a preacher you will aim at excellence in speaking, as the worthy members of other professions, and artists, aim at it in their callings.

But inasmuch as I have insisted on the supreme importance of mental qualifications as elements of successful pulpit eloquence, I should do injustice to the general subject and to this part of it not to say, that professional enthusiasm will show itself in constant efforts to feed the sources of eloquent thought and feeling within us by severe and faithful studies. Not to speak of sacred literature or theological and classical studies, when a young man enters upon his profession as a preacher, he should continue

either to read or to have some general knowledge of every book whose publication goes to make up the literary and theological history of his times. It is interesting to know how much time an enthusiast in his profession can find for everything that will help him in his calling. Whatever he reads is turned into material for instruction and illustration. An enthusiastic artist makes use of everything to correct, improve, bring out that gift by which nature has distinguished him from all others. We should do the same. For if we are natural, no man will write or speak so much like us that we shall not have our own way and manner. We ought to have that enthusiastic desire for excellence in our profession which will lead us to do for ourselves what God did for prophets and apostles. Inspiration excited each man's native genius, giving the peculiarities of each mind a beautiful prominence, and thus imparting a variety to the books of the Bible which is one of the greatest wonders of that book. Isaiah never touches certain chords which are familiar to Jeremiah; Amos, the herdsman, and the gatherer of sycamore fruit, shows us his pastoral tastes and habits, and Nahum, combining a minuteness of description with a majesty and terror of diction, is unlike them all. God has preserved in them the distinctive traits of their characters—teaching us that we must depend most on what we are by nature, improved by art, for the success at which we aim. As an encouragement to this, our hearers will know whether we are cultivating our minds; and the means by which we do it will appear. You never tasted two honeycombs that had precisely the same flavor. The ever varying kinds and degrees of richness and odors in the field and garden flowers, and the different wanderings of the bees; infuse different kinds and proportions of flavor into all the different cells of the same and of every hive. So our intellectual efforts will tell where our minds have gathered richness and sweetness, if they have any; whether in the pastures of Judea, in the meadows of the Ilissus, or on the Mantuan plains; where vineyards and the Rhine rejoice together, or where the Avon strolls along by the moss-grown sepulchres of England's seers. But I would say to a young man, Let the Old Testament form your taste and feed your imagination, and the Old and the New Testament fill your mind and heart with the spirit of illustration. Observe, and study, and imitate the moderate language of the Bible, its freedom from exaggeration, which is one of the secrets of its lasting power over the human mind. You may learn self-possession, and the command of your voice, by apostro-

phizing to the hoarse waves of some *Ægean*; you may acquire the graces of speech by copying and rewriting ten times in a sea-girt cave the speeches scattered through the history of Thucydides; but without the influence of the Old Testament literature, and the Old and New Testament spirit in your eloquence, it may be as unproductive as that meteor, the northern lights, "from which the mower filleth not his hand, nor he that bindeth sheaves his bosom."

By this enthusiastic effort after excellence in literary qualifications to preach, our sermons will be redeemed from the character of mere exhortations, which are confined to a few topics and conceived and delivered in a way exhausting to our sensibilities and to those of our hearers. Baxter and Edwards preached in such a way that they enlightened the age in which they lived while they turned men to God. But if a man preaches and labors merely to produce occasional excitements of religious feeling among his people, if he ceases to aim at the instruction and conversion of his hearers as individuals, and employs his talents and strength in procuring sympathetic movements which he calls revivals of religion, which, in their true sense, used to supervene when we were laboring for the conversion of individuals and have ceased very much with our direct efforts to produce them, he will not remain long as minister to that people. He will preach in a way which he cannot long sustain, nor a congregation endure. For the order of the divine administration in human affairs is, to advance intellectual and moral culture with the conversion of men. We cannot expect that God will permanently bless those labors which serve only to promote fanaticism. All the dispensations of Providence in the moral world are marked by the law of progress. We must follow that law in our professional pursuits. We must endeavor to improve as preachers, for its own sake, as well as for the greater influence on others; and as professional men, who have the noblest profession on earth committed to them, and who ought to contribute each one his part towards the honor of the profession. If, instead of this, a man studies or reads only for immediate effect, or not at all, and preaches only to produce immediate excitements of religious feeling, his mind will be like the island of Ichaboe, the means of some powerful crops, but soon exhausted, scraped, and forsaken. Rather let it be like those islands where the commerce of the world never ceases to gather the pearls of the deep sea, and beautiful wood to be inwrought into the dwellings of men and the palaces of kings.

Perhaps I cannot better signify the respect which I feel for such an audience as this than in being very brief in speaking, as I now propose to do, upon *Moral Worth* as an element of success in pulpit eloquence. I am aware that its intrinsic importance and the right proportions of the different topics in a discourse would require a more protracted exhibition of it. But I will only say that when a man comes to be known by the churches or by the heathen or pagan people among whom his lot is cast, he finds that it is the man, as much as anything that he says, or the way in which he says it, that makes one an acceptable and useful preacher. It depends as well on what we are as on what we say and on any grace or skill in saying it, whether we shall be permanently acceptable and useful preachers. We have some poets of enduring fame who were bad men, but why is it that there are not even so many distinguished orators whose lives were bad, that have handed down their productions to us? This is an interesting and instructive fact, and shows that goodness is essential to enduring excellence as a public speaker. A bad man may describe nature, and human passions; and his vices may give a certain power to his songs. But a bad man cannot instruct, exhort and persuade men on principles which are permanent because universal. Hence we see the reason why the ancients insist that the orator must be a good man. Cicero dwells much on this point. Solon had said before him, τὸν λόγον εἶδωλον εἶναι τῶν ἡγῶν, The discourse is the image of the conduct. And it startles one, as though inspiration had been there when you read in another writer, "Ut vivat, quemque etiam dicere." Every man speaks as he lives. If this be true in morals and politics, that a man's moral and political principles and feelings affect his eloquence, so that you might almost determine which side is right in great political controversies by taking the number of truly eloquent men on either side, not declaimers, but men whose eloquence has a tone which finds a response in the heart of man, much more is it true in those whose business it is to preach the law and the gospel of God, that their private principles and feelings will affect their influence as public speakers. It has often been observed that in regard to some of the greatest men whose names are immortal, we do not find in their writings enough to warrant the reputation of the men themselves. This is preëminently the case with regard to Washington; it was so with Lord Chatham and with others that might be named. The explanation is, that these men had personal weight of char-

acter which could not be transferred to paper. It had its influence in all their words and conduct, and its fruit remains, but the secret of it does not appear in what they wrote. Some ministers of the gospel whose names occur first when we wish to speak of preëminent worth and success in the ministry, are illustrations of the same thing. Their posthumous works do not sustain their reputation. It was the man, that gave weight and force to what he said, and tradition will keep their names before the world, while not one in ten thousand will ever see a word they wrote, or cease to wonder, if they read their discourses, what it was that gave them their reputation as preachers. What an illustration this is of moral worth as an element of success in pulpit eloquence. It will make up for many a deficiency in natural endowments, and indeed without it, a man with the highest natural endowments and acquisitions may succeed better, far better, in any other profession than in the pulpit.

But eminent moral worth may be united with eminent literary and professional attainments. Then, it is like "wisdom married to immortal verse." There are those whose writings support the reputation which they gained during their lives as preachers. These were scholars, with genius sanctified, with acquisitions increasing while they lived; and now they bless many people and strange tongues.

Now that I come to the close of what I have to say, and begin to think, as I naturally must, in the hearing of what members of my profession I have presumed to speak so freely on subjects of which they know so much more than I, it seems as though I understood how men felt in olden time when they found that through undeserved encouragement and kindness, they had been led to speak freely, perhaps too freely, in the presence of the angel. How sensitive we are apt to be to the opinions and feelings of our fellow men even when we are charged with the message of God to them.

In a certain congregation there was a hearer of whose presence the preacher was not aware during the delivery of his sermon. When the fact of that hearer's presence was made known to him, it had a great effect upon the preacher. The hearer had himself been unrivalled in his day in every charm that adorns the preacher, and in all respects as one entrusted with the care of souls had been preëminently faithful and successful. How did our brother feel when he knew that he had spoken in the hearing of

that man? His first feeling was one of self-distrust, but his next feeling was, if he could only enjoy the benefit of that hearer's free and affectionate counsels and advice with regard to preaching it would be invaluable to him. Who was the preacher and who this hearer? The preacher I doubt not may have been any young minister present, and the hearer was Jesus Christ. Every time we have preached we have had him for a hearer. When the great and the learned and the honored of the earth come to hear you, He is there, whose opinion of you, while it is infinitely more important than theirs, will either confirm or reverse their judgment of you. When we meet a few of our flock in that distant school-house in a dark and stormy night, and something whispers, Will you waste your time and strength on these few people, the Son of God is there to hear what you say to them, and to have an opinion of you for saying it which is or will hereafter be a greater reward to you than the applauses of a throng. In the bungalow, or under the plantain or the palm, or in those South African huts where you must creep like an animal to get in, remember that you cannot speak in his name but you will speak in his ear. He was once a preacher and a minister to souls. He knows all the trials of the profession, and all the secret influences which make thoughts and words eloquent. We shall agree that the secret of his eloquence consisted in what he was, and not in any artificial power. Whatever of grace or power there may have been in his natural manner, he was resistless as a preacher because he was, in perfection, that which we should aim to be in all virtue and knowledge. He never sought eloquence for its own sake, neither should we think that we can acquire it as men learn a trade. But seeking to be all that a good man and a scholar, and a minister to souls ought to be, in mental qualifications, in the arts of oratory, in professional enthusiasm, and in moral worth, eloquence may be expected to flow from us, and for similar reasons, as it did from him who had without measure that Spirit which he can also pour out on us. Let us not think that He does not condescend to appreciate our efforts when in his name we speak well. God who ordained the priesthood made Aaron his high-priest of whom He could say, "I know that he can speak well." This is our business, to speak well. I have endeavored to show what this implies. If we would speak well, it must be our constant aim to speak better. In doing so, we may remember that this life may not be the only term of service in which God may use us to influence others by the communication of our thoughts and feel-

ings. It cannot be that eloquent communication from mind to mind is limited to earth. Then what must it be for all the sanctified genius which has been eloquent in song on earth to be gathered together in heaven,

"And with its ninefold harmony,
Make up full concert to the angelic symphony?"

What must it be for the preachers of Christ from Noah to the last generation to meet there, and for angels to listen to the eloquence of earth flowing from what they never knew,—the experience of sin, repentance, and restoration. If the presence of this company of preachers makes one who speaks before them feel as Jacob did when he said, "This is God's host," where in the distance shall many of us stand when the tongues which were most eloquent here upon the themes of redemption, instruct and please the heavenly world? Where in the distance did I say? From your lips, if they have dwelt with peculiar love and power on the doctrines of the cross, may the inhabitants of other worlds learn things yet imperfectly understood by them in the history of redemption. It may be that you will then be called of God to be employed in wondrous acts of ministry to other worlds, because He can say of you, in remembrance of your earthly attainments and service, "I know that he can speak well."

ARTICLE VII.

LIFE OF JOHN CALVIN.

By R. D. C. Robbins, Librarian Theological Seminary, Andover, Mass. [Concluded from
No. VII. p. 537.]

Calvin's Return to Geneva.

WHILST Calvin was occupied with his various labors at Strasburg a change was effected in Geneva. After the banishment of their ministers, the people seem to have been left, for a time, to their own chosen way. Disorder reigned both in the Church and in the State. But God in kindness sent chastisements upon them. Those who had been most forward in opposing the restraints of their guides, received the just reward of their mis-

deeds. Within two years, one of the four syndics who were leaders of the faction in 1538, was executed for murder, a second convicted of sedition, in attempting to escape by a window, fell and was instantly killed; the other two, on account of treasonable conduct while absent from the city, were prohibited from returning. These disorders and changes prepared the way for the recall of the exiles. Calvin's declaration in his letter to Sadolet, "That he could not cease to love, as his own soul, the church of Geneva," which God had entrusted to him, and other expressions of regard, as well as his growing popularity abroad and the consequent disgrace of the Genevans, for having banished him,¹ caused them to especially desire his return. Hooker says, "they were not before so willing to be rid of their learned pastor, as now importunate to obtain him again from them who had given him entertainment, and who were loth to part with him, had not unresistible earnestness been used."²

The first letter to Calvin, requesting his return, was received just as the embassy was about to leave Strasburg for the imperial diet at Worms. Calvin showed it to Bucer and his fellow laborers at Strasburg, and they answered it. After admonishing the Genevans for their previous treatment of their preachers and commending them for the course they were now taking, they say: "The desire for your salvation, even at the expense of his greatest exertions and life itself, has ever ruled in Calvin's breast. What he will now do, he, as well as we, is unable to say. To-morrow or the following day he goes with us to Worms, where his presence is needed. We advise that you send for Farel and Viret."³ The people of Neufchatel wholly refused to part with Farel, and the Genevans repeated their request for Calvin's return, while he was at Worms. But the magistrates of Strasburg, learning that he was again invited to go to Geneva, wrote to their representatives, Bucer, Capito and Sturm, to use their influence to retain him at Strasburg. But the Genevans were not yet discouraged. They wrote to the churches of Berne, Basil and Zurich, asking them to intercede in their behalf. The letter sent to Zurich, now remaining in the library at Geneva, shows their earnestness. They say that the people of Strasburg must be

¹ "It was not unlikely, but that his credit in the world might in many ways stand the poor town in great stead; as the truth is, their ministers' foreign estimation hitherto had been the best stake in their hedge."—*Hooker*.

² *Eccl. Polity*, Preface.

³ *Mass. Gen.*

conscious that the ruin or support of the church at Geneva is their own ruin or support, they implore them therefore to restore their preacher; the magistrates and the whole people beseech it; into their hands they in a manner throw their salvation.

Jacob Bernard, a preacher in Geneva, wrote to Calvin, Feb. 6th, 1541: "Since all the other clergy had left the city, except Henry and myself, and the people were mourning their deserted state, I admonished them to turn to God in humble supplication, and ask him through Christ the great Shepherd, to provide them a pastor whom he would bless. I was not thinking of you, having given up all hope of your return. The people followed my advice with great earnestness. The next day the council of the Two Hundred convened and called for Calvin. A general convocation was assembled on the following day; and the cry was unanimous for Calvin, that good and learned man, 'Christ's minister.' When I heard this, I could not but praise God, and acknowledge that he had done this marvellous thing in our eyes, making the stone which the builders did refuse to become the head-stone of the corner. Come then, venerable father in Christ. Ours you are, for the Lord God has given you to us. All sigh for you. Your reception will show how much you are desired.—Do not then delay to come and see Geneva;—they are another people, changed by the grace of God, through the labors of Viret. The Lord hasten your return. Worthy is our church of your aid, and God will require her blood at your hands if you do not come, for he has made you a watchman of the house of Israel among us."

On the first of May 1541, the decree of banishment was formally annulled, and Ami Perrin, the ambassador of Geneva, formerly a syndic, went from Strasburg to Worms to intercede with the Strasburg theologians who were there, for Calvin's return. By representing to them in strong terms the favorable opportunity presented, for spreading the gospel in France, he secured their influence in favor of Geneva, especially that of Bucer, who in order to overcome Calvin's doubts, again suggested to him the example of Jonah. The Genevans sent the third urgent request, seconded by Basil, Berne and Zurich. Farel and Viret who was engaged in Geneva for six months, were importunate. In fine, not a measure was left untried to prevail upon Calvin to resume his former charge.

During all these proceedings Calvin was not an indifferent spectator. His struggles with himself were severe and show that he had not yet overcome that timid and shrinking nature of which

he so often complained. To his friend Farel with whom he had no secret, he writes: "You know that during these days I have been so agitated by trouble and anguish that I have not been able to half control myself. You will see why I am not willing, that what I now confide to your bosom should be divulged. When I recollect how miserable I was at Geneva, I tremble to my inmost soul at the slightest intimation of a return. I very well know that wherever I go, sufferings await me, and that if I live for Christ, life must be a struggle. But forgive me, if I think of that place with terror when I remember the torture of conscience, the agonies which destroyed all my comfort there. Next to God you can best bear witness, that I was retained there by no other bond than the fear to cast from me the yoke of my office, which God had put upon me. So long as I was bound to that place I preferred to endure anything rather than to think of a change, which sometimes obtruded itself upon me. But since I am now free by the grace of God, who can blame me if I do not willingly plunge myself again into the vortex from which I received so much injury. Besides I have lost the art of governing large masses; here, I have to do with but few, who, for the most part, respect me as their pastor and teacher. And if this is difficult, how much more the greater charge. But these reasons alone will not hinder me from obeying this call: for the more my heart recoils from it, the more am I suspicious of myself. Therefore I do not allow myself to give counsel in this matter, and ask our friends not to have any reference to my opinion,—and in order that they may be uninfluenced, I conceal from them a great part of my internal struggles. I protest however that I am not dealing craftily with God, nor seeking any evasion; but I so much desire the welfare of the Genevan church, that I am ready to suffer a hundred deaths rather than, by abandoning, betray them."

To Viret he writes about the same time: "I could not read the part of your letter in which you express so much anxiety for my welfare without a smile. Shall I then go to Geneva in order to be better off? Shall I not rather go to the cross?¹ To die at once, is better than, again in that place of torture, to suffer a living death."² Several other letters³ are found in which Calvin ex-

¹ Cur non potius ad crucem?

² Mss. in the Genevan Lib.

³ Extracts from some of them may be found translated, with some of those above given, in the Princeton Review for 1837, p. 69 sq.

presses his dread of again encountering the opposition which he knew awaited him if he returned to his former charge. Yet in them all he manifests an acquiescence in the leadings of Providence, and an unconquerable interest in that city, his first care, and his unceasing burden through all its obliquities. But Farel seems to have been the means of his final decision to return as well as of his first abode there. Calvin writes to him: "The thunder and lightning which you strangely, I know not wherefore, hurled at me troubled and terrified me very much. It is known to you, that while I dreaded this call I did not flee from it. Why then was it necessary to fall upon me with a violence scarcely consistent with friendship. My last letter, you say, left you hardly a ray of hope. If so, I beg of you, to pardon my want of caution. I wished only to excuse myself for not coming at once, since this necessary journey prevented me. As then, I was free from the design which you ascribed to me, I rely upon your forgiveness so soon as you have better examined and understood the case."

When the Deputation from Geneva met Calvin at Worms, he could scarcely restrain himself. He says: "Since I poured out more tears than I spoke words, they doubted not my sincerity; I was twice compelled to cease speaking and retire." But some time after when he had decided to return, he wrote to Farel: "If I had my choice, I would sooner do anything than that which you desire. But since it is not I that decide in this case, I offer my bleeding heart a sacrifice to God.¹ I have always conjured our friends to forget me and only take into the account the honor of God and the good of the church. Evasions would not have been wanting to me, although I am not very expert in such devices, but I knew that I was dealing with God, whose eye penetrates all disguise. Therefore I subject my soul bound, and constrained to the obedience of God." The influence of this entire renunciation of self, these heart breakings before God, is evident upon Calvin's whole subsequent course. They were by no means among the least influences by which he was fitted for the duties and trials which awaited him in Geneva.

He returned on the thirteenth day of September, 1541. The citizens and magistrates, who had sent a mounted herald to accompany him from Strasburg, received him with the greatest demonstrations of joy. His entrance to the city was a triumph.

¹ An allusion to his seal is perhaps here intended, on which were represented a hand offering a heart.

An attendant, three horses, gold and everything necessary to bring his wife and effects were gratuitously provided. They also furnished his house and appropriated eight dollars "pour la robe de maistre Calvin, ministre Evangelique." Antiquarians even now fancy that they can identify the house of Calvin in the highest part of the city in the Rue des Chanoines. Behind his house, it seems, was a garden, and not far off, the convent of St. Peter, where the meetings of the consistory were held, and the old Gothic church where he preached. A spot near also furnished a view of the fortifications of the city, and of Mt. Jura and other high summits around.

His return was looked upon as a special token of the favor of God. He had intended to address the citizens on his arrival, in justification of himself and his colleagues; "but," he says, "I found them so touched with remorse and so ready to anticipate me in the confession of their faults, that I felt that such a proceeding would not only be superfluous but cruel." A decree had been passed in the assembly of the people acknowledging "the great injury they had done him," and imploring "forgiveness of Almighty God." The protocol of September 20th shows that the council urged Calvin to decide to remain there during his life.¹ The Senate of Strasburg had assented only to his temporary return, but the Genevans desiring that it should be unconditional, the Senate yielded to their wishes, but still urged him to retain his right of citizenship in Strasburg and his annual salary. The salary he refused, but consented to be still ranked as a citizen of that city.

*Calvin's first Labors after his Return to Geneva.—The Court of
Morals, Church Discipline, etc.*

The era of Calvin's return to Geneva is important in the history of the Reformation. The struggle for religious freedom had been successfully maintained, for several years, but there was need of much labor to give permanency to the possessions achieved. Separate dogmas had been placed upon an immovable basis. The abuses in the Catholic system of doctrines and polity had been pointed out, but a system of church organization had not been established. The main features might be seen in the Institutes, but the practical details yet required develop-

¹ Ext. d. Reg. le 13 et 20 Sept. 1541. On prie tres instamment Calvin de rester ici pour toujours, et qn lui donne un habit de drap.

ment. The pendulum had been put in motion but it required a skilful hand to regulate it. The system of church government prepared by Calvin and put in practice at Geneva, was the basis for all those who acceded to his doctrinal views. It was subsequently introduced into France, England, Holland, and is now most nearly adhered to in Scotland and our own country.

The peculiar circumstances of Geneva at the time of Calvin's return, gave rise to some regulations which would not be necessary or politic elsewhere, and the spirit of toleration which was scarcely known in that age would undoubtedly have caused Calvin to pursue a different course if he had lived at a later day. The union which he established between church and State was also a source of annoyance. But when these things are taken into the account, we cannot but feel that his course must have the approval of all thinking men. Even the judicious Hooker the expounder and defender of the polity of the English church, after explaining Calvin's Court of Morals, the most peculiar feature of his system, says: "This device I see not how the wisest at that time living could have bettered, if we duly consider what the present state of Geneva did then require."¹

For a time after Calvin's arrival, the manners and morals of the citizens seemed to be much improved. In a letter to Farel he says: "The people here for the most part are obedient; at least they attend diligently upon our preaching. Their morals are tolerably good, but there are many vices of the head and the heart which, unless they are gradually cured, will, I fear, finally produce the most destructive effects. The struggle against such internal and secret enemies, as you well know, is maintained with the greatest difficulty. My fellow laborers are also known to you." Calvin did not, however, suffer these favorable appearances to cause him to relax in discipline. He felt that much must be done before the chaotic elements could be reduced to order and the church established upon an immovable basis. He very much desired the aid of Farel; but he could not be prevailed upon to leave Neufchatel. Calvin wrote to him immediately after his return: "I have now returned here, as you long ago desired me to do. But it is necessary that I still retain Viret, I can in no manner consent that he should be torn from me. It is also your duty and that of all the brethren to aid me, if you do not wish that I wear myself out in vain, and be, if useless, the most miserable of men."

¹ Preface to *Eccles. Polity*, p. 135. Ed. Oxford, 1807.

Calvin's first labor was to secure the proper administration of order and discipline in the church and State. It was for this that he had been banished and for this he had labored when in banishment, and he would not now when he was laying foundations, be less assiduous in his exertions. It was a matter of conscience with him dearer than life. And he pursued it during his whole course at Geneva with a resolution which could not be shaken. He first procured the establishment of a court of morals. He represented to the Senate the necessity of discipline to the existence of the church and requested that they should appoint persons to consult with the clergy. Six were chosen and they with the clergy drew up articles for the regulation of the church. This body was to try all cases of difference in the church, and had the right of discipline and even of excommunication. They were also the censors of the manners of the whole people. Thus the foundation of a civil and Ecclesiastical organization was laid. Such a tribunal and with such powers may seem to us to conflict with the highest freedom, but by giving the laity not only a voice but a double influence in counsel was a great advance upon the Romish hierarchy, and was all the liberty that the people of Geneva were at that time prepared to enjoy.

It required much struggling to carry these measures through. Many of the citizens who were obnoxious to this tribunal in consequence of their disorderly lives, opposed it. Even the clergy who were in the city when Calvin returned secretly disliked the measure, although they assented to the propositions made in the council. But Calvin had returned only on condition that discipline should be maintained, and when he had been back a little more than two months the formulary which had been prepared received the sanction of the senate and the people. Thus, says Henry, 'the church was closely connected with the State; the State protected the church which subjected itself to it, and the church on the other hand governed the State, since the consistory had the oversight of the conduct of all the citizens.' It is true that they had a political organization before Calvin's arrival there. But the establishment of the Court of Morals gave occasion for an entire change in it. The acquaintance with law which Calvin possessed was known, and the general revision of the laws was soon committed to him. The new code was not however completed until 1543, when the church also received its new liturgy. Our limits do not allow a full exposition of the previous govern-

ment of Geneva or the particular changes made in it through Calvin's influence. He perceived that disorders arose necessarily from popular dominion, where the people were as corrupt and ignorant as in his little State. He made his object to put a stop to these disorders. The honor of God and hatred of sin were the central doctrines of his system. In his legislation he seemed to copy the spirit of the Old Testament Theocracy, as his church organization was based on the precepts of the New Testament. Under his system much rigor was exercised in the punishment of crime, and the previous freedom of manners was much restrained, but it did not hinder the healthful growth of the State. People flocked to it from all quarters, and sent their children to be trained there in obedience to law. The restraints exercised in Geneva did not impede the soarings of the loftiest spirits, but rather aided them, for rigor operated only against vice, which is the greatest hindrance to the vigorous action of the intellect. In the rightminded, severe measures did not awaken hatred, but a feeling of the majesty of God in whose name they were employed. It must be acknowledged that Calvin persecuted with fire and sword; but vice, wickedness, was the object of the persecution. His laws were written with blood, but with the blood of those who had forfeited all judicial claim to mercy by despising and disregarding the laws of God and man.

In order to form a correct judgment of Calvin's system of Church organization we must take into account the difficulties with which he was obliged to contend. In the first place, he wished to avoid the despotism which the Roman Catholics had employed in order to secure the unity of the church. He wished also to guard it against the abuses of a hierarchy. But on the other hand he was too well aware that a strictly popular organization among such a people as those of Geneva, and at a time when the removal of the restraints of Rome had inclined the people to licentiousness, would lead to innumerable divisions and constant confusion and strife. The protestant principle of freedom of thought needed, he believed, and no doubt justly, checks upon it, or rather guidance. The Catholics contended that there was no middle course between the papal chair and anarchy. But Calvin wished to prove that they were in the wrong, and that the primitive church was a safe model; he therefore established synods to answer to the original church-councils. By this union of the clergy and laity for the decision of disputed points and for the expression of the truth in systematic forms, he hoped to avoid the

abuses of the papacy, and secure equally well the unity of the church. Henry sums up the fundamental principles of the reformer's system in the following manner :

1. " The gospel, not human institutions, forms the central-point of power, the animating principle ; it secures to men salvation through faith in Christ ; not through the visible church or external works.

2. The conscience and reason of men, enlightened by the Holy Spirit, recognize the truth in the Scriptures, and are again directed by the Scriptures, and secured against error and fanaticism. The Holy Spirit produces unity in the church, and secures its eternal existence under the different phases of the human mind. The synods give the final decision upon the meaning of the holy Scriptures, and they alone have the right to establish, alter or annul confessions of faith.

3. The fundamental principle of external organization in opposition to the catholic dominion, and the most effectual means for the crushing of spiritual domination, is that of the presbyterian government, in which Calvin opposed a double number of the laity to the clergy, in order that they might at any time overrule the clergy if they found it necessary.

4. The church, powerful through the spirit ruling in it, must be under the control of the State ; external submission injures it not.

5. Finally, in order to secure order in the church and make a reformation of morals possible, Calvin desired rules for discipline : (a) a law (rendered necessary by the circumstances of the times) against free-thinkers, and heretics, for the purpose of securing unity and establishing the Reformation ; (b) a disciplinary inspection, in order to guard against all immorality, a spiritual training, the Court of Morals, and the employment of forcible measures by it."

It is impossible to enumerate particular regulations which Calvin adopted in order to secure these ends ; many of them are well known, and have been the subject of much animadversion in every age since he lived ; but it should seem that much useless discussion might have been saved, if the relation of Calvin to his times had been kept more distinctly in view. He did not form a polity for every age and for all nations. He adapted it to his own little community and to the disturbed and restless age in which he lived. He, as it seems to us, wisely and skilfully steered between the extremes of tyranny and licentious-

ness, and deserves praise for what he did, rather than reproach for not doing what it was left for a later age to accomplish.

The labor required in effecting these changes in the government and internal civil and ecclesiastical regulations, must have required not a little of Calvin's time and attention. But he found leisure for much other labor. He immediately prepared a catechism for the better instruction of his congregation, especially the younger members of it, in the principles of religion. This was a new work¹ in questions and answers and divided into lessons for fifty-five sabbaths, and not a remodelling of his catechism published in 1536 and 1538, which was an abstract of his Institutes. This synopsis of doctrines has justly been much valued as a church-symbol. It was known and studied by all the churches until a comparatively recent period. "It is now," says Henry, "entirely banished from France. It is surely an indication of the folly of our century that it is making innumerable attempts to construct a new popular catechism, which it can never succeed in doing, because the best of this kind, is already in existence, and new ones, if compared with it, appear unsatisfactory, colorless and superficial." He also prepared a liturgy soon after his return to Geneva, which is the basis of the one now in use in the Reformed churches.—Every alternate week he preached every day, three times a week he delivered lectures on Divinity; on Thursday he presided in the consistory and on Fridays in what was called the congregation, a meeting for the collation and the exposition of Scripture. He was frequently called to assist the council with his advice; and his correspondence was very extensive, the fame of his piety and learning causing him to be consulted from all quarters. His labors in private in warning and admonishing offenders, in encouraging the faltering, in aiding the magistrates in reforming the manners of the Genevans, were constant and unremitting. Besides, he was often called to settle disputes and carry on controversies away from Geneva.² Yet with all these daily and hourly avocations he found time for the preparation of his Commentaries which appeared from time to time, and for his numerous writings

¹ This catechism was published first in French in 1541 and in Latin in 1545. It was translated into Italian as early as 1545, into Spanish in 1550, and into German in 1563. It has also been published in the English, Scotch, Belgian, Hungarian, Greek, Hebrew, Basque and Polish languages.

² Even the next year after his return, Calvin was away six weeks, at Strasburg, in order, if possible, to settle difficulties at Metz in France.

against the various errorists who sprang up in his little community, and for establishing and defending the several doctrines of the Christian system. It is wonderful that one man with such feeble health as Calvin had, could have accomplished so much. He should seem to have had a separate life for the employments of the study entirely apart from his life abroad, or rather as he himself says, the conflicts about him, which seemed to take so large a portion of his thoughts and energies, were, in his view, mere "skirmishes,"¹ not worthy to be taken into the account in enumerating his labors. His studies were pursued with the most perfect system and yet it appears that he was sometimes obliged to remain out of bed the whole night. He says: "When I get through with all my other duties, I have so many letters to write, and answers to give to so many questions that many a night passes without having brought to nature the offering of sleep."²

Together with his untiring industry, and the rigid system observed in his labors, an unusually tenacious memory, aided him much in the execution of so many and varied duties. It is said that he never forgot anything which pertained to his office, although he was interrupted on all sides and overburdened with questions. In the composition of his works he could break off from writing or dictating, and spend several hours in parish duties, and then go directly on, taking up the subject where he left it, without recurring to what he had before written. He also never seemed hurried, and was not conscious how much he performed.³ He however sometimes regretted that his numerous avocations did not permit him to make his writings more complete.

¹ Velitationes.

² Calvin had also many services to perform for his friends and fellow laborers. If they brought him their works to read, he found time to peruse them in the long night. To Viret he wrote, August, 1547: *Librum de ecclesia et sacramentis, cum voles, mitte. Libenter legam, etiamsi mihi id oneris non imponeres. Tantum abs te peto, ut commoditate mea uti liceat. Nunquam enim minus habui otii, sed jam aliquanto plus dabunt longae noctes.*

³ To Farel he writes, 10th Nov. 1550: *Hoc vero affirmo, non absque pudore me illam legisse epistolae tuae partem, ubi diligentia mea laudatur, cum mihi et pigritiae et tarditatis sim probe conscius. Faxit Dominus ut paulatim rependo aliquid proficiam.*

Exertions against the Catholics, 1542—1547.

In 1542 the Sorbonne encouraged by their previous success in opposing the truth, took a bolder step, and assumed the right to direct in matters of faith and practice. They published twenty-five new articles of belief, which, either from fear or folly, were subscribed by the king and sanctioned by an edict. Calvin perceived the necessity of withstanding them by strong arguments. He accordingly discussed each article, beginning with an ironical proof after the method of the Catholics and then closing with a thorough and earnest confutation.¹ A specimen of his manner in this discussion cannot be uninteresting. The twenty-third article of the Sorbonne declares: "It is certain, that there is by divine authority one chief Pontiff in the militant church, to whom all Christians must be obedient, and who indeed has power to grant indulgences."

Calvin says: "This proposition is proved by the declaration made to Peter: Thou art Peter and upon this rock, etc. If now the Lutherans say, that Peter is here named as one among a number of the faithful, and that the rock, the foundation-stone of the church is Christ; because Peter would be a bad foundation since he denied Christ; and, also according to Paul no other foundation can be laid than Christ; this must by no means be granted. For, when a different interpretation favors Rome, the principle of law is clear, i. e. that which is favorable must be extended (*Quod favores debent ampliari*). But the Lutherans here again object: Granted, for the sake of argument, that Christ really bestowed upon Peter the primacy, it follows not that he has also given it to all his successors, unless they are all willing to be called devils, since Christ says to Peter: 'Thou art Satan.' If then they inherit the one title, they must also receive the other. But here it is answered according to a principle of law, that things which are unfavorable must be restricted (*Odia sunt restringenda*). Or in yet another manner the dilemma may be avoided. In the first passage Christ spake to Peter as to a pope, in the second as to a private person. Furthermore they argue, why did Peter bequeath the primacy to Rome and

¹ This work was called: *Antidotum adversus articulos Facultatis Theologicæ Sorbonicæ*. In French: *Les Articles de la sacrée faculté de Theol. de Paris concernant notre foi et religion chrétienne et forme de precher. Avec le remède contre la poison*, 1543.

not to Antioch? for he was bishop in both cities. The answer to this question is: A place receives renown from the death of a man, especially if a martyr's blood is poured out, which is of great price in the sight of God, according to the responsive hymn sung in his feast. The objector still continues: From the same cause should not James and John have received the second and third grade of primacy in their respective churches, as Peter received the first at Rome; for Paul says that these three were esteemed as pillars of the primitive church? To this the answer is, that if the others were not sufficiently zealous or courageous to assert their rights, Rome should not suffer on that account. Jerusalem and Ephesus in consequence of their remissness and timid silence, deserved to be cast into the back-ground, but Rome which contended with all its might for the honor, especially deserves to be considered the first city." Calvin proceeds still further in this same strain and then turns to a more serious mode of argumentation. Ridicule was at that time the most effective weapon in France, and Calvin certainly showed himself no novice in its use.—In the controversy which soon followed this, with Pope Paul III, the manner of arguing is somewhat similar to that in the *Antidote* and the language used is indeed not less severe or effective than that which Luther sometimes employed in his controversies.

The controversies just mentioned had more especial reference to the Catholic church in general. But the work on the *Freedom and Servitude of the Will* against Pighius gave an opportunity for the discussion of particular dogmas of that church. It was a continuation of the controversy of Erasmus with Luther and a renewal of that of the Pelagians with Augustine. Pelagianism or semi-Pelagianism had been adopted into the Papal church, and had become a part of itself. Luther had revived the doctrines of Augustine, and in doing it, had made an attack upon the Catholics. Calvin defended the German theologian, who, he said, "had not himself spoken but God had hurled lightnings from his mouth," and also carried war into the enemies' camp. He called his antagonist a hungry dog, who avenged himself by barking since he could not bite. This might be in our own day termed a breach of the rules of Christian courtesy, but yet Pighius himself was convicted of his error by the perusal of Calvin's book,¹ and the gentle Melancthon, returned him a letter of

¹ Ancillon, (*Mel. crit.* Tom. II. 43, 44) says: Si les ennemis de Calvin le

thanks for having maintained his cause "both eloquently and piously.¹

The origin and formation of the council of Trent, and the nature of its decisions, are probably familiar to most of the readers of these pages. It commenced its consultations in January 1546. In 1547 after the doings of seven of its twenty-five sessions, Calvin published in Latin, *Acta synodi Tridentinae cum Antidoto*, the first review which had been made of its proceedings. His first object was to show that the decisions of such an assemblage had no obligatory force. He adduces the opinion of Augustine, upon the council of Nice, who says, in answer to the Arian Maximian: "Our questions are decided by the words of the Holy Scriptures, which belong neither to you or to me alone, but to us both." Calvin further shows how ridiculous it is, that such a council, when there were only about forty bishops present, should represent the whole church and be secure from error. The character of many of the bishops present at this council was by no means free from reproach. The only two who were there from all France, were both ignorant and stupid, and one of them, had been guilty of the grossest licentiousness. But, had they been the best of men and an adequate representation, it would not alter the case very materially as far as the binding nature of their decisions is concerned. For, he says, "they decree nothing except what the pope prescribes. The pope controls the Holy Spirit,² and as soon as a decree is prepared a courier immediately proceeds to Rome to see what their divinity thinks of it. The holy father calls his council together, and one takes away from, another adds to, and a third changes it and the courier returns. The article is read in the next session, and the dolts³ nod assent with their ears. Such is the oracle which is binding on the whole world."

After a discussion of the council and its mode of operation,

lisaient, il leur arriveroit peutêtre très souvent ce qui est arrivé à Albertus Pighius lequel comme le dit Crakanthorp : dum refellendi studio Calvini Institutiones et scripta evoluit, in uno ex præcipuis fidei dogmatibus factus est ipse Calvinianus.

¹ Non solum pie sed etiam eloquenter. See the letter, Calvin, *Opp. Omn. ed. Amat.* and in Henry II. 300, 1, and also an extract from Calvin's Dedication of the work to Melancthon, Henry 290.

² It was said rather aptly, in reference to the Catholics, than reverently, that the Holy Spirit was sent from Rome in a portmanteau.—*Browning's Huguenots*, p. 44.

³ Asini.

Calvin proceeds with logical power, great learning and a most bold and triumphant spirit to dispatch each session by itself. And although, favored by both pope and king, the decrees of this notable convocation are consumed and vanish into thin air, before the burning words of the servant of the God of truth.¹

Calvin's Power in Geneva not absolute.

The power of Calvin at Geneva has been so often spoken of both by his friends and enemies that it may not be amiss to give a few hints in regard to it. The plague visited Geneva in 1542, the year after Calvin's return there. Terror sat upon every face. Almost all shrank from a contact with the sick. But Calvin, Blanchet and Castellio, offered to attend upon those who were collected in the plague-hospital. They cast lots to decide which should take his turn first, and the lot fell upon Castellio. But he drew back and Calvin held himself in readiness for the work. But the council and Blanchet would not permit him to expose himself. Blanchet commenced the work alone and died in ten months. Another was required to take his place, but the council showed their regard for Calvin by commanding that he should not be allowed to stand in his lot with the other clergy, "for the church had need of him." The value that the council placed upon his advice and coöperation has been previously mentioned. Yet his authority was by no means absolute as it has sometimes been represented to have been. It varied with the opinion of a fickle multitude. A modified republican government, and a church polity in which the popular element predominated, did not allow the despotic authority of one man. His influence was indirect and changing. He never commanded as one in authority. Yet it must be allowed that a man of such strength of character and superior genius does in a great degree rule the minds that come in contact with him.

Letters and notices of different dates, however, show that he appeared sometimes to be almost without influence. In a letter to Bullinger while the trial of Servetus was in process, he says: "All that we say awakens their suspicion. If we declare that a thing is as clear as the mid-day sun they will forthwith question it." In the year 1556 when his influence was at its culmination,

¹ No one can fail to be interested in a perusal of some parts of this Antidote. See Opp. Omn. Tom. VIII. p. 216 sq. ed. Amst.

he writes: "I very well know what slanders the bad circulate about me, but I withhold my influence from the officers of government, since it is asserted, that I draw them to myself with absolute power; thus I live as a stranger in this city. The Senate never calls for my advice except when it is in the greatest extremity, and can contrive no other expedient for escape; either because it does not consider it proper to do so, or because it is not willing to call for help from abroad, or possibly because it sees that I avoid it."¹ Calvin was also compelled in 1554 to submit some of his writings to the censors, which was very annoying to him. "I had almost," he says, "made an offering of my book to Vulcan; for when I laid it before the council it was decided that it must be subjected to the censors. I was so much enraged when I received this answer, that I declared to the four Syndics that even if I were to live a thousand years longer, I would never publish anything in this city."²

Even in the consistory his power was not despotic. He commits to Viret the cause of a certain Sonnerius, for whom, he says, "he has done what he could, but without success; his colleagues in spite of all his exertions to guide them into milder measures, remained firm. Only two of the members voted with him while ten were against him." He also confidently appeals to his fellow counsellors to say whether they had ever felt themselves offended by his rule, and says that if those who accuse him of tyranny knew under what severe restrictions he held his office, they would blush at their ungrounded accusations in regard to the exercise of arbitrary power by him.

Again, towards the close of Calvin's life, the council and people of Geneva showed their great regard for their benefactor, and unlimited confidence in him. They appointed a herald to accompany him upon his journeys,³ and when sick a secretary was employed for him at public expense.⁴ In 1561 the dutchess of Ferrara desired to obtain a preacher from Geneva and was allowed a free choice from all except Calvin and Beza, who were indispensable to the State. Also when his life was in danger in his last sickness, March 10th, 1564, every one in the State was ordered to pray for his restoration to health.

¹ Mss. Gen. 1556.

² Mss. Gen. See also the Protocol of Sept. 1542.

³ Oct. 12, 1555, Jean Calvin remercie le conseil du héraut qu'on lui avoit donné pour l'accompagner à Francfort.

⁴ 1545.

Calvin as a Preacher.

Homiletics received little attention in France before the time of Calvin. The Reformation by raising the sermon from the low rank which it held in the Catholic church in comparison with the other exercises, made it a matter of no small importance for the preacher to be a good speaker. Even the Catholics found themselves compelled to emulate the Protestants in this particular. Thus a great change was gradually effected, and the French pulpit became deservedly distinguished. We are not therefore to compare Calvin with a Fenelon or a Saurin. He knew nothing of the rhetorical *art* of which they became masters; and besides, the French language of Calvin's time had neither the flexibility or polish which it exhibited a century later.

Simplicity is perhaps the most prominent characteristic of Calvin's sermons. They should seem to have been modelled after Seneca rather than Cicero. There is an admirable harmony between his style and character. He spoke out plainly what he thought or felt and moved straight forward to the accomplishment of his object, without turning aside, for striking antitheses, or metaphors or any of the outward adornings of rhetoric. He despised everything done for mere show. Gaudy trappings were not less out of place in the sermon or the essay than on the bride prepared for her nuptials. This simplicity appears more conspicuous when we compare his sermons with the artfully fashioned and somewhat pompous compositions of the preachers of the next century. "Thus it remains true," says his biographer, "that the greater genius is always the more simple."

The conciseness which is so nearly allied to simplicity and which Calvin loved so much, appeared in the length of his sermons as well as in the construction of sentences. The one hundred and fifty sermons on the book of Job could have seldom occupied him more than half an hour each in the delivery, and even the four against the Nicodemites which are more elaborate, would not require more than three quarters of an hour, even at a moderate rate of utterance, whilst those upon the Epistles are much shorter. Luther was less uniform in the length of his sermons, sometimes making them very short and at other times very long.

Calvin's sermons were especially practical; more generally so perhaps than Luther's. The latter bound himself to no particu-

lar form. Sometimes he spoke according to rule in short sentences, and in artificial order; sometimes his words flowed forth like a torrent without method. At one time he quietly gave instruction and again he spoke in anger and with reproaches. Calvin, like the Scriptures, dwelt much upon action in religion and seemed to have the condition and circumstances of his hearers always in view. He would often wander far away from his text to introduce and confute objections. The end of his sermons could not be seen from the beginning, but original thoughts and important truths, expressed in short, sinewy sentences, were scattered all along through them. He did not so often discuss doctrines as enforce duties. Still there is no want of acute criticism, nice discrimination or thorough investigation in the sermons of Calvin. He sometimes also employed satire to show the absurdity of an opinion and make the unbeliever ridiculous in his own eyes, but this was not his common method. Luther's words like fire from heaven, burned every garb on which they fell, especially the purple and the ermine, but Calvin, when in the pulpit, delighted more in the milder radiance of the mid-day sun. By his fervent appeals and simple argument he often extorted from those most opposed to him the confession, so often made by the audiences of the great Athenian orator, that "the truth must certainly be with him."

✓ Calvin preached extempore. We find no proof that he ever wrote his sermons. He expressly says: "I did not write out in my chamber the twenty-two sermons upon the eighth Psalm, but they were printed in the natural method in which they fell from my lips in the church. There you may perceive my ordinary style and manner." We are informed by Scaliger who was accustomed to hear him preach, that "it was easy to take down the whole sermon since, Calvin was troubled with a phthisis and spoke moderately."¹ Henry however thinks it proper to judge from his style that he spoke with zeal and warmth and uttered his sentences somewhat rapidly, but made long pauses to enable his hearers to comprehend the thoughts. The habit of dictating to amanuenses enabled him to speak with nearly the same correctness with which he wrote, and even in his last years his power of impressive speaking continued. The concourse of people to his sermons was so great as to receive in the Register of June, 19th, 1559 this notice: *Multitude prodigieuse de peuple aux sermons de Messrs. Calvin et Viret.*

¹ Scaligerana secunda.

Calvin published sermons upon almost all parts of the Bible, but the one hundred and fifty upon the Book of Job are among the most distinguished of them. Beza says that they were so much in favor, that they were read everywhere in the churches throughout France where preachers were wanting, and in families. Yet Calvin valued them so little that according to the preface of the French edition, they were published contrary to his wishes. We should be glad to give specimens of his sermons, but we are saved by want of space from doing him the injustice of quoting mere extracts, which, however striking they might be, could not give a just conception of the whole performance. The first sermon on Job might well be made to take the place of some of our modern introductions to a commentary on that book.

Calvin's appreciation of Luther.

The party of the Nicodemites was fast increasing in France, and as early as the beginning of 1545 Calvin felt called upon to expose publicly their errors. He accordingly composed two treatises against them.¹ The object of them was to show that God could not be worshipped in secret, whilst a person conformed externally to the requirements of false teachers. All hypocrisy and concealment were so odious to Calvin that he could not endure to see those who had adopted the reformed tenets, taking refuge under so hurtful an error. He was not willing that any should hide their light under a bushel and thus appear to prefer darkness to light. He appeared to some to preach a hard doctrine while other timid souls were nerved to a daring which the most excruciating tortures could not overcome. The influence of these treatises were not confined to France. In Switzerland and Germany too they were read and their influence was seen through long years of persecution. Although Melancthon, Bucer and Peter Martyr coincided with Calvin in belief on this point, yet all were not satisfied, and desired him to ask Luther's opinion by letter. This epistle, since it is the only one written by the Genevan to the German reformer, as well as for its characteristic peculiarities, deserves translation here: "My much honored father, when I perceived that so many of our friends in

¹ De vitandis Superstitionibus et Excusatio ad Pseudo-Nicodemites cum duabus epistolis ad ministros Ecclesiae Tigurinae.

France had only been turned from the darkness of Popery to purity of faith, but wished to make no change in their external confession, and to continue to defile themselves with the abominations of the Papists, as if they were wholly ignorant of the pure doctrine, I could not forbear to rebuke such culpable remissness with the severity which, in my estimation, it deserved. For, what sort of a faith is that which remains buried in the recesses of the soul and is not exhibited in a public confession! What sort of a religion is that which conceals itself under a hypocritical participation in Catholic idolatry! I will not however discuss this topic here, which I have somewhat particularly developed in two little treatises, from which, if it shall please you to run your eye over them, you will better understand my opinion and the reasons upon which it is based. Some of our friends have been aroused by these writings from the deep sleep in which they were before sunk, and begin to inquire what they ought to do. But as it is hard either by the denying of self to place life in jeopardy or with obloquy from every quarter, to take upon one's self the hatred of the world, or to yield up possessions and goods with native country, and voluntarily to choose banishment, many withhold themselves from a firm resolution. They however plead other and very specious reasons, from which it is evident that they seek only a pretext. Since they are now in a manner wavering and without established principles, they would gladly hear your opinion, which, as they justly so much respect it, will have great weight with them. They have accordingly desired me to send a trusty messenger to you in order to obtain your views upon this matter. I was not willing to refuse them, because I believed it very important for their good to have your authority, to prevent them from continually vacillating in uncertainty, and because I wished it, for my own aid. Therefore I conjure you in the name of Christ, my much honored father in the Lord, that you will take the trouble for their sakes and for mine, first, to read the letter which has been written to you in their name, and at some leisure hour to cast your eye over my two little books, or to commit this labor to another who will give to you the substance of them; and secondly, to communicate to us in few words what your opinion shall be. I obtrude upon you in the midst of your important and varied occupations with reluctance, but I am persuaded, that you will with your accustomed considerateness excuse me, constrained as I am to prefer this request. O that I could fly to you and

enjoy for some hours at least conversation with you. This I should much prefer, and it would be far more profitable for me to confer with you personally, not only upon this question but upon many other disputed points. But that which is not permitted on earth, will soon, I hope, be granted us in heaven. Farewell most illustrious man, most distinguished servant of Jesus Christ, and my ever honored father. May the Lord continue to guide you by his spirit unto the end, for the common good of his church."¹ This letter with the little volumes was sent to the care of Melancthon, with the request that he would present them to Luther, and use his exertions to prevent him from being enraged at anything in them which might be opposed to his views. But Melancthon on account of Luther's excessive irritability upon the Sacramentarian controversy did not venture to offer them to him: "I have not given your letter," said he, "to Doctor Martin; for he looks with suspicion upon many things, and is not willing that his opinion upon such questions as you propose should be circulated."

Luther died the following year (1546), and left Calvin to struggle in the tempestuous times which ensued without his aid. Calvin was now thirty-six years old, and the experience of the few past years had prepared him to take his position of leader of the hosts who were constantly seceding from papal Rome. The main object of the two men was the same, but their manner of accomplishing it was dissimilar. The one attempted to remove the antichristian element from Catholicism, the other went further and attempted to abolish everything which was found, on a critical study of the Bible, to be opposed to it. They never saw each other, and perhaps it is not to be regretted that they were separated. Both leaders by nature, they could not brook the contravention of their own plans. They however were not strangers to each other, and although their different views upon some points, as upon the Lord's Supper, caused a little bitterness of feeling between them, yet this did not prevent a just appreciation of each other's character and conduct. Calvin wrote to Bullinger November 25th, 1544: "I hear that Luther has issued a terrible libel not only against you but against us all. I can hardly ask you to remain silent, for it is not just to be so undeservedly abused without permission to make a defence. It is at least difficult to feel that this forbearance will avail anything. But I wish you to

¹ *Mss. Tig.* Jan. 30th, 1546.

give due weight to the following suggestions : first, consider how great a man Luther is ; by what extraordinary gifts he is distinguished, and with what power of soul and constancy, with what dexterity he has so prosperously struggled until this day, for the overthrow of the kingdom of antichrist.—I have already often said that if he should call me a devil, I would acknowledge him still as an extraordinary servant of God, who indeed is the subject of great faults as well as endowed with great virtues. Would to God that he had exerted himself more to subdue the tempest of his anger, which continually rages. Further also, consider that it will be of no advantage to you to contend with him, except to give the enemy occasion to triumph, not so much over our defeat as that of the gospel. If we revile and condemn one another, our recriminations will everywhere be gladly received as true.—This should you rather think of, than what Luther perhaps deserves on account of his violence, in order that the evil may not come upon us which Paul condemns ; that whilst we bite and devour each other we come to nought. Even if he provoke us to controversy, we must rather abstain from contention, than by our common fall, bring still greater injury upon the church.”—On the other hand, Calvin admonishes Melancthon not to yield too much to “ Luther’s imperious spirit which often knows no bounds ;” for says he, ‘ we set a poor example to posterity if we surrender our liberty rather than offend one man, who will also continually grow more exacting if everything is yielded to him.’

Institutions of Learning in Geneva.

Calvin’s influence in favor of education, is evident from all his works. But he was not satisfied with merely general exertions for the intellectual culture of the people of Geneva. One of his first labors after his return, was to reëstablish the school which Farel had previously founded, and which had been discontinued. He first procured the services of Maturin Cordier as teacher, and afterwards invited to Geneva for the same purpose the celebrated Castellio. In 1556 Calvin formed a plan for the establishment in Geneva of a large Gymnasium, and of an Academy especially for instruction in theology. The funds necessary were promised, but in consequence of the poverty of the little State, years passed before they could be obtained. Finally the noble Bonnivard gave his whole estate for this purpose, and the Gymnasium was

commenced in 1558 and the Academy in 1559. Just at this time a large number of intellectual men flocked to Geneva, who co-operated with Calvin in this good work. It was however found necessary to limit the number of Professors to as few as possible, instead of having one to each branch of learning as Calvin desired. These institutions were under the control of the clergy, who chose the rector, professors, and teachers, and presented their names to the council for their approval. Calvin prepared the laws for the Academy and the Articles of belief which all were obliged to sign. In addition to the principles of religion and the Latin and Greek languages, Dialectics were pursued in the higher classes, and were considered especially useful as a preparation for the Aristotelian philosophy.

'On the 5th of July 1559,' says Henry, 'the doors of St. Peter's church were thrown open, the magistrates, the clergy, all the educated men in Geneva, all the intelligent families and six hundred pupils assembled. Calvin rose and addressed them on the importance and value of institutions of learning, and admonished them to pray to God for their own. Roset, Secretary of State read the laws, and proclaimed Theodore Beza, Rector. Beza then arose and pronounced an oration in Latin, and Calvin concluded the exercises by a prayer. On the following day the classes were opened. Even to this day they celebrate in the same church, an annual school-festival, at which one of the pupils delivers an oration.' Calvin's correspondence shows with what zeal he labored for this school, and its influence in diffusing enlightened views in Germany, Holland, France and England, were a sufficient reward for his toil. Calvin stamped his own spirit upon all who dwelt in his little community. Even those who were driven to him by each successive wave of persecution and carried back by the counter current, bore with them "leaves for the healing of the nations."

Theological Peculiarities of Calvin.

Some account of the Institutes of Calvin has been given in a previous number of this Miscellany, but a very brief view of some of his theological peculiarities seems to be important in order to give anything like completeness to these notices of one who is perhaps best known in modern times as a theologian. The fundamental principle of Calvin's theology, which is everywhere apparent in his system, is, the greatness and majesty of God. A

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personal God, the Creator of all things and the constant Disposer of all events is everything to him. Man is nothing. The good in him is all of grace; hence the necessity of humility and self-abasement. Out of the same feeling, too, the desire to abase man and glorify God, arose his doctrine of predestination. The God which Calvin worshipped and preached was not the God revealed in the New Testament only, or the God who is manifested to our internal consciousness in nature merely. He was the eternal God who was known to Moses and the prophets, who appeared amid the thunderings of Sinai, whose voice rent the rocks and at whose presence the earth shook, and the foundations of the hills were moved. Luther was not so much influenced by the view of the unity and omnipotence of God as Calvin, and from this difference, arose many of the other dissimilarities in their teachings. Calvin probably more resembles Augustine in his reverence for God than any other theologian of ancient times. The spirit and life of Augustine are grounded on his love to Jehovah. He is "his light, his joy and his beauty." But although Calvin and Augustine agree in this general principle, they differ in the details. Augustine's love of God had more tenderness in it than that of Calvin; he dwells more upon the attribute of pity and Calvin more upon that of righteousness. The bishop of Hippo seems to take for his point of departure the weakness and corruption of man, and contrasts with that, the purity and power of his Maker. This is the natural result of his early course of sin and indulgence and the long struggling necessary to overcome perverse habits and inclinations. The pastor of Geneva was religious by nature, a strong sense of right and wrong ruled in him even before his conversion, which took place early in life. Hence the former felt more compassion for the weakness and excuse for the errors of his fellow men, although he perhaps had a more vivid and constant feeling of the odious nature of sin. It was not a want of sensibility in Calvin (here I apprehend he is misjudged), but the sensibility of mind of higher moral tone, of one less under the influence of the passions and appetites.—Closely connected with a reverence for God is a reverence for his Word. This feeling is shown in all Calvin's writings. With him the ground work of Christianity, the sole source of faith, the absolute and unchanging appeal is in the Word of God. "The Bible," says Chillingworth, "the whole Bible, nothing but the Bible, is the religion of the reformed church."

Calvin and Luther agreed in the fundamental doctrines of the

Christian system; they both believed in a trinity of the divine Being, in original sin, free grace, eternal life, the insufficiency of works and justification by faith alone. They both maintain the necessity of the influences of the Holy Spirit in conversion, and consequent dependence upon God, but Calvin insisted more strenuously upon this point than Luther, and thus seemed to conflict with the doctrine of the freedom of the will.

But one of the most considerable differences between the Lutheran and Calvinistic system is in regard to the connection of justification with predestination.¹ Calvin insisted as strongly as Luther on the necessity of Christ's atonement, but contended that it is conditioned by the decree of God, and hence deduced the dogma of the saints' perseverance, while Luther believed in falling from grace. Another deduction of Calvin from his doctrine of predestination was that baptism is not necessary to salvation, for if salvation is ensured by the decree of God, surely baptism cannot be a condition of receiving it, but a sign or seal that we have already been justified. Luther believed in the necessity of baptism in connection with exorcism for infant salvation. Calvin denied its necessity, but maintained its utility, since the manifestations of grace which constitute the new birth, are frequently made in connection with the sacrament.

Perhaps Calvin has not been more bitterly reproached for anything except his conduct towards Servetus, than for his defence of his doctrine of predestination. But in his view in maintaining this, he was defending the honor of God and in giving it up he was yielding up the citadel for whose defence he had been stationed. No wonder that, when he saw himself assailed by friend and foe, when he saw that the doctrine was perverted by base men, and that he was reproached as making God the author of sin, and men mere machines, he answered with warmth. Whether correct or not in the extreme to which he carried the doctrine, we believe that he was sincere and logical in his adoption and defence of it, and that its influence with all its roughness was infinitely more salutary than that doctrine against which it was aimed. Better far is it to place man lower than his rightful place with God on the throne, than exalt man to contest the seat of dominion with his Maker.

Another point of difference between Calvin and Luther was in regard to the Lord's Supper. And here Calvin also disagreed

¹ See a full account of Calvin's animated and persevering defence of this doctrine in Henry III. 44 sq.

with Zuingli, and struggled through many long years to unite the contending parties, between which he stood. Zuingli, at least in the early part of his life, believed that the bread and the wine in the Sacrament are merely symbols which represent to us Christ's death.¹ Luther maintained that Christ's real physical body and blood were present with the bread and wine which still remained bread and wine, and were partaken by all communicants, whether Christians or not. This, Calvin contended, was contrary to reason. To be sure reason must be silent when the Scripture speaks; but this, he maintained was not the meaning of the words of the Bible; and Christ could not be physically present in several places at the same time, since this is contrary to the nature of body.² On the other hand, Calvin could not agree with the Zuinglians that the bread and the wine were mere symbols; but in partaking of the emblems, he believed that a real, spiritual influence was communicated to the true participant. By faith the soul is, as it were, raised to heaven and united with the substance of the Lord. A real communication takes place between the soul and the substance of Christ's body, the moment that the bread and the wine are worthily received. In the controversies in which Calvin engaged on this subject, his desire was to be a peace-maker. But the accusation which has been made against him, that he was temporizing and did not act from conviction in this contest, appears to be utterly unmerited. His whole character and course of life, as well as the agreement of the doctrine maintained in the first edition of his Institutes with that expressed in his controversy with Westphal and Hess, utterly preclude the supposition that he acted otherwise than in accordance with his conscientious belief.³

In church-regulations Calvin departed further than Luther from the Catholics. He did not retain images, paintings, the altar and

¹ It is claimed, with apparent reason, that in the latter part of his life, his views were somewhat modified, and that he admitted a spiritual participation of the substance of Christ's body. He says: *In coena Domini naturale ac substantiale istud corpus Christi, quo et hic passus est et nunc in coelis ad dexteram patris sedet, non naturaliter et per essentiam editur, sed spiritualiter tantum. Christi humanitas non est aeterna, ergo neque infinita, si finita, jam non est ubique.—Mens reficitur hac fide, quam symbolis testaris.*

² *Misceri si volunt carnis substantiam cum hominis anima, quot se absurdis involvent?*

³ The whole controversy on this subject represents Calvin's character in a most interesting point of view, but we have not room to pursue it at present.

the cross, which the Lutherans allowed. Psalm-singing and the playing of the organ (with difficulty retained) were all the arts which found place in Calvinistic churches. This baldness in their worship occasioned the reproach of Erasmus: "they burned down the whole house in order to clear away the dust." The two reformers agree in the necessity of excommunication for offenders, but Calvin commits its execution to the consistory (i. e. to clergy and laity), and not to the clergy alone.

These are but some of the prominent points of agreement and difference between these two leaders of the church in the sixteenth century. Many others will of course be suggested to every attentive reader of the biographies of these men and the history of their times. In general, it may be said, that Calvinism is far more decidedly opposed to Catholicism than Lutheranism; and that in its origin it took a more decided hold upon the minds of thinking men, and its progress has been more uniformly and steadily onward. "Lutheranism is a reformation, the Reform a re-formation."¹

Calvin's Conflicts with the Anabaptists and Libertines, 1544—1555.

The Anabaptists and Libertines were especially troublesome at Geneva. The principal dogma by which the Anabaptists are known, is the rejection of infant baptism and the necessity of the performance of that rite in adult age. But this was only one manifestation of their error. The principle at the basis of their creed was, that Christians are guided by a higher revelation, an inward light, and that consequently all civil and ecclesiastical order, was not only useless but at variance with Christian freedom. All difference of rank was rejected and community of goods maintained, and family ties were not considered sacred. The Libertines went still further. Pantheists of the most dangerous kind, they struck at the foundation of morality as well as religion, and even reviled all sacred things. In 1544 Calvin wrote against both of these sects and Henry says, that these treatises are composed in so powerful and convincing a manner that they deserve to be read at all times. They are intimately related to each other, since the belief of individual inspiration was to be contended against in both cases. Calvin dedicates the volume against the spiritual Libertines to the people of Neuf-

¹ J. H. Merle d'Aubigné, *Lutheranism and the Reform.*
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chatel who had urged him to write it, "so as to show the mutual affection and agreement in doctrine between that people and himself." In it he confutes several of the errors of the Libertines specifically and at length, and deduces from their dogmas three propositions: 1. that God is the devil; 2. that men have no conscience to distinguish between good and evil; 3. that all crime is to be commended, and no sin is punishable, since all is the work of God. He then discusses their principles in a serious and conclusive manner, grounding his arguments on the Bible. Good common sense, learning and especially the instinctive perception of the right method of interpreting Scripture, are conspicuous in these writings. The Libertines, for example, believed in the community of goods, but Calvin showed them that the early Christians understood by this term only the greatest liberality and beneficence.

The most frightful state of morals ensued from the principles of the spiritual Libertines. The wife of one of the councillors, Ameaux, openly avowed the most indecent principles and was guilty of the most flagrant, and wanton conduct.¹ Somewhat later a fit representative of the same party was found in Raoul Monnet, who boasted of his intrigues with women of the first families in Geneva, and procured a set of obscene paintings which in derision he termed his New Testament. Another unequivocal indication of the state of morals appears in connection with the existence of the plague which during several years devastated Geneva and the region around. Even in the little city itself the number of the inhabitants was decimated; out of not more than 20,000, not less than 2000 lost their lives. It was at length supposed to be discovered that an organized band of men existed whose object it was to spread as widely as possible this terrible contagion. Even the overseer of the hospital, was among them. Their only object, it seemed, was to get possession of the effects of the person destroyed, and they had taken an oath not to desist until "Geneva could be fed by a bushel of corn," so that they might be masters of the whole city. To Oswald Myconius, Calvin thus speaks of this most atrocious conduct: "The Lord has tried us in a strange way. A little while ago a conspiracy of men and women was discovered, who during these three years have diffused abroad the plague by enchantments (veneficiis) with which I am unacquainted. Already fifteen women

¹ For an account of it, see Henry II. S. 412.

have been burned, and several men terribly tortured, have died in prison; twenty-five are yet in chains, and still every day the locks of our houses are besmeared with their virus. Such are the dangers by which we are surrounded. Hitherto God has preserved our house uninjured, although it has been often attacked. Good is it to know, that he careth for us."¹

Together with the spiritual Libertines another party arose in Geneva, which may be denominated the political Libertines. These people opposed the theocratic element in the system of Calvin. The reformation had been adopted by them merely as a means for throwing off the despotism of Berne and Savoy and establishing a free State. To these people Calvin was a stone of stumbling; for so long as he stood with his iron will, with the gospel in his hands, and with the thunder of his words in their ears, they could not move forward a step. They first tried covert attacks upon him. Refugees were constantly flocking to Geneva. New churches were formed for the Italians, English and Spaniards. The plague, which stared them in the face, the hatred and commotion which awaited them did not prevent multitudes from residing near the great man, whose powerful words they might hear, and whose energizing spirit they hoped to catch. Calvin wished all of these worthy people to become citizens of Geneva, so that they might be able to coöperate with him in the council.

The Libertines, seeing the operation of these causes, struggled to make the life of the refugees uncomfortable. They opposed the reception of new citizens, and wished to prohibit them from bearing arms. But the foreigners had the support of the consistory. And besides, an open opposition to the preachers and the refugees was opposition to God.² Calvin prevailed, by means of a majority in the smaller council, and three hundred, mostly from France, were admitted as citizens at one time. It cannot be thought strange that the rage of the Libertines was excited to the highest pitch to see themselves so completely discomfited by one man, and he "unarmed but by the sword of his mouth." It may be that Calvin sometimes allowed his indignation to be too far aroused by these fanatics, but we cannot blame him; we rather honor and reverence him for so firmly resisting their irreligion, which but for him would have undoubtedly brought a heavy

¹ Mss. Gen. 27th March, 1545. See also Henry II. 417 for other accounts of a like nature.

² See Galiffe, Not. Gen. p. 527—546, and the State-protocol for the time.

curse upon many succeeding generations. These opposers finally showed themselves openly. They gnashed their teeth in anger and cried out that the State was lost. But Calvin was not terrified. The more they raged the greater was his firmness. He permitted law to have its free course. The first councillor as well as the humblest citizen experienced its inflexibility and its power. Still the wicked were not humbled, but rather roused to new outbreaks. All were prepared for extremities, and demanded that they should not be called to answer for their misdemeanors before the consistory, but before the council of State. But the Ecclesiastical tribunal demanded the execution of its discipline which was sanctioned by the word of God, and called upon the civil tribunal for aid. It was granted, and Calvin triumphed.

Perhaps no single instance of altercation shows more distinctly the power of Calvin than that with Pierre Ameaux. This man was a member of the council of two hundred. His wife had been previously punished for her libertinism, he himself had consorted with bad preachers, and had in an evening meeting inveighed openly against the dogmas and person of the reformer. This was reported to the council, who cast Ameaux into prison, to await his trial. The council was immediately called together, and those who could not be present were required to send in their opinion in writing, to see whether there was anything punishable in Calvin's conduct. They bore most honorable testimony both to the purity of his doctrine, and the propriety of his conduct. They however wished to acquit Ameaux with a fine, since he had retracted his reproaches against Calvin, and promised all due respect in future. But this did not satisfy Calvin. He appeared, attended by the other preachers and church-elders before the council and complained of the remissness of the judges, and demanded that the decision should be reversed. The process was renewed, and the council now condemned Ameaux to suffer deserved retribution: He was compelled to go through the whole city, half dressed, with his head uncovered and bearing a lighted torch, and then to kneel down and publicly declare his penitence; this was "*faire amende honorable*."

This conduct of Calvin at first view appears exceedingly rigid and unkind. But it should be considered, that a principle was involved, and if Calvin identified himself with his doctrines, he knew that it was Christianity that Ameaux and his party hated in him. An attack upon him was an attack upon the consistory, and upon those measures upon which not only the well being of

Geneva, but of the reformation depended. In order to understand the full extent of his zeal for the truth in this case we must rather believe that he overlooked the odium which he might expect would come upon him in consequence of the appearance of revenge for a personal attack, especially as the individual punished was a man greatly esteemed by his fellow citizens. Calvin on other occasions abundantly showed that he knew how to forgive when only himself was attacked; and besides, the council would not have made the mere utterance of a few words against the minister so grave an offence. This decree for the punishment of Ameaux gave occasion to an outbreak of popular feeling against Calvin in one quarter of the city. He heeded their noise and tumult no more than the rustling of leaves among the trees. The council however went to the Gervais in a body and ordered a gallows to be erected there. This threat was sufficient; the tumult was hushed, and Ameaux received the punishment decreed to him, on the fifth of April, 1546.

It was deemed advisable in order to check the increasing tendencies to irreligious practices in the city, that more rigid laws should be enacted against every species of vice. A great number of persons were called before the consistory in order to make inquisition into the state of their morals. The most bitter hatred against all religious order was frequently exhibited by persons when brought before this tribunal. Faber, a man belonging to one of the best families in Geneva, was sent to prison, and as he went he continually shouted "freedom, freedom." Perrin, a member of the council of four, was also arrested. The spirit of Calvin in reference to this matter may be gathered from an extract of a letter to Farel. "Finally, I add, they must build them a new city, where they can live by themselves, if they will not consent to take upon themselves the yoke of Christ. So long as they remain in Geneva, they will strive in vain to escape subjection to law. For if there were as many diadems in the house of Faber as frantic heads, it should not prevent, that God should remain Lord." But we cannot detail all these cases of opposition to authority and their result. Perrin saved his life by flight. Whilst Gruet was soon after, July 25, 1547, executed for despising religion, contemning law, and for immoral conduct.¹

During these occurrences nothing was left untried to bring reproach upon Calvin and weaken his influence. Even in the

¹ For detailed accounts of these processes, see Henry II. S. 435 sq.

open streets and in the council, he was subjected to insult, and at times lived in constant expectation of a violent death. Among other reproaches, says Beza, some named their dogs Calvin, others turned the name of the reformer to Cain, the murderer of his brother, probably with reference to the death of Gruet. But he did not allow himself to show the least fear or disquiet. "I await quietly," he writes to Viret, "what the enemy may do. They leave not a stone unturned to ruin my influence; I sometimes do not appear to observe it, while at other times I freely declare that all their attempts only furnish me an occasion for derision. For they would believe themselves victorious could they but perceive an indication of fear in me."—Even the council often opposed him.

In 1545 a letter which Calvin wrote to Viret after an election of some of his enemies to office, was found, translated into French and circulated. The council in consequence of this accused him of having written, that the Genevans desire to be governed without reference to God, which was considered as a reproach to the whole council. In reference to this matter Calvin wrote to Farel, Aug. 10th, 1558. "As far as I can gather from the tenor of the accusations against me, my letters have been exposed, in which the worst passage is this: 'Our citizens wish to be ruled under the semblance of Christ without Christ.' This they think is a deadly arrow cast at them. I am still prepared to endure any death if it will serve for the advancement of the truth. Yet they are now ashamed to show these letters obtained by fraud, and they very well know that I am in a condition to abundantly substantiate these reproaches." His enemies believed at this time that they had the preacher under their control, but by his bold and judicious course he again came forth victorious. He however was subjected to a reproof from the council, which was considered by Farel and Viret a sufficient reason for going to Geneva in order to sustain him by their authority.¹

This did not prove as Calvin had hoped his last contest with the Libertines. In 1553—5 a last and more desperate war was waged which ended in the triumph of the truth and its champion. In the beginning of 1553, Calvin published his Commentary upon John's Gospel and dedicated it to the Council. In his preface he commends them for receiving so hospitably the oppressed

¹ They went there again subsequently for the same purpose.

stranger, and admonishes them to always remain superior to tumult and fear. He little heeded the gathering cloud which was soon to burst over him. A difficulty which had arisen between Berne and Geneva, encouraged the hostile party to lift its head again. The clergy were excluded from the council,¹ and the French refugees prohibited to bear arms.² Perrin now determined to crush the power of church discipline and with it the influence of Calvin. Servetus was at this time in prison, and his trial was in process.³ Philibert Berthelier had been excommunicated for disorderly conduct in the previous year. He now stepped forward and demanded of the council a veto of the decision of the consistory. This was virtually asking the council to take upon itself the government of the church, and to abrogate all those rights which Calvin had so long struggled to establish and maintain. Berthelier had many adherents in the council, and they decided that the clergy might, when the occasion demanded it, be required to appear in the council and absolve the guilty. Extremely excited, Calvin showed by the most powerful arguments, that it was the duty of the council to sustain and not annul the church-laws which were sacred. He went further, he assembled all the clergy within the jurisdiction of Geneva and went with them the next day before the council, where each one individually protested against such destructive measures, and declared that they would rather lay down their office and leave their churches, than sanction them. But the party of the Libertines by tumultuous conduct now obtained the victory. The case was brought before the great council, which confirmed the decision, and a document, on which was the seal of the State, was given to Berthelier to show his acquittal. The enemy now thought themselves sure of success, but they found that they had to do with one more powerful than all the combined forces of the opposition. This was an occasion for Calvin to exhibit the true greatness of his spirit. Insignificant by his side are the hosts of those who are ready to sit in judgment upon his conduct as severe and harsh, and who themselves are valiant champions, when the fastnesses of error like the walls of Jericho, are to be assailed with shouting and the sounding of rams' horns.

On the Friday before the first Sabbath in September, the day

¹ February 4th, 1553.

² April 11th, 1553.

³ The character of Servetus, and Calvin's relation to him, is deemed of sufficient importance to require a separate discussion, which may be expected in a subsequent number of this Review.

for the celebration of the Lord's Supper, Calvin decided upon his course. He forthwith demanded of the Syndics that the two hundred should be convened, and appearing before them he endeavored in an impassioned address to persuade those present to rescind their previous vote. He ended with the protestation that he would die sooner than profane the Supper of the Lord. "For nothing," said he, "is more unjust than what you require, that that man should take his place with the members of the church of God, and thus deriding them, incite others of like character to the same insolent behavior." The council were immovable and Calvin looked forward to a second banishment. The Sabbath arrived. The reformer entered the desk and the fire of his words went forth over the sacred mysteries and their despisers. At the end of the sermon he exhorted the members of the church with holy fervor to receive the emblems, boldly warned those who slighted the holy Sacrament, and declared that he would *not* distribute the bread and wine to those who were excommunicated. "If there is any one among you who will extort the bread of the Lord, let him know," said he raising his hand: "I will sooner lose my life than this hand shall offer holy things to those who have been pronounced despisers of God." A thunder-clap from heaven could not have filled Berthelier and his companions with more consternation;—Berthelier did not approach the table of the Lord, and the sacred Supper was celebrated in a silence as deep and with as holy a dread as if the eye of God himself were directly upon them.

In the afternoon of the same day Calvin appeared before the congregation for his second service, and announced for his text, the words of Paul found in the twentieth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, and turning to his church said: "Watch and remember that by the space of three years, I ceased not to warn every one night and day with tears. And now brethren I commend you to God and to the word of his grace. I am not one that will contend against the magistrates, or teach others to do so." After admonishing the assembly to maintain the doctrines which he had taught them and expressing his readiness ever to serve the church and every member of it, he concluded by saying: "The position of things here is such that I know not but that it is the last time I shall proclaim to you the Word of God, since those who have the power in their hands, wish to force me to do a thing which God does not allow. I must therefore say to you as Paul said to the elders at Ephesus, I commend you, dear

brethren, to the grace of God." His enemies were terrified and his friends strengthened by this appeal. The next day Calvin with the other preachers and all the members of the consistory appeared and demanded a hearing before the great council, since it had sanctioned the decision in question. As the easiest escape from the dilemma into which the council had brought itself, it was decided, to postpone the exercise of the regulation sanctioned by the two hundred, until they could consult the opinion of the Cantons, and, that in the mean time, the existing laws should be enforced.

On the first day of January, 1554, a public dinner was held at which Calvin with the judges and the members of the smaller council were present. "If any one breaks the peace," they say, "we will rise up against him;" and on the second day of February following, the people took an oath with uplifted hands, that they would from that time live according to the regulations of the reformer, renounce all hatred, forget the past and call down the vengeance of God upon the houses, persons and families of those who should break this sacred promise. But Calvin did not put implicit confidence in all these exhibitions of obedience.

It proved even worse than he had anticipated. The disaffected citizens again complained in the council of the decisions of the consistory and claimed that the elders should appear before the council to defend themselves. Calvin was also attacked in person, and as he was returning from preaching one day, a French refugee who was with him was wounded. The people assembled, swords were drawn and blood flowed. Cries of "slay, slay the alien," were heard in the streets. Similar proceedings took place daily. "See," said they, "how we are ruled by French edicts and Calvin." Calvin inveighed in the pulpit against these enormities; but was admonished by the council to moderate his untimely zeal.

But in the beginning of 1555 the Libertines gave occasion for their final subjugation. On the twenty-fourth day of January, the two hundred were convened to deliberate with the preachers upon the subject of church-discipline. After the members of the council had given their reasons for claiming the ultimate decision in civil and ecclesiastical matters, Calvin in behalf of the clergy arose and addressed the council: "It is," said he, "duty to be subject to the authority of Christ and his apostles to whom Christ gave power to loose and to bind, and also to administer the sacraments. The magistrate has no more power to oppose this than the clergy have to interfere in matters of civil jurisdiction. They

[the clergy] must see to it that the sacraments are not profaned. As all the clergy are entirely subject to the civil tribunal, so all worldly greatness must be submissive to the words of Christ." He then proceeded to show by Scripture examples the danger of civil rulers when they attempt to interfere with sacred things, and to adduce other arguments for the support of his cause. This appeal had the desired effect upon the minds of the members of the council; and they declared that all edicts sanctioned by the great council were of the nature of laws, and that consequently all discipline belonged to the consistory. The turbulent rabble saw that their sins would be restrained by the clergy in consequence of this decision, and now set themselves in array against them. They clamorously demanded that the sermon should be banished from worship, and the preachers limited to two, should only read the Scriptures without comment. They said it was not only unprofitable but dangerous to interpret the Bible so much, and that it was unnecessary to print so many "books and Commentaries." These people were still more enraged by the admission of fifty new citizens by the council. The strife and bloodshed and executions which ensued we will not describe.¹ Right finally prevailed, and Calvin was at rest from contention, and his spirit ruled in his church.

The effects of Calvin's long and arduous struggling at Geneva are happily recorded by eye witnesses. Knox who was in Geneva in 1556 wrote to his friend Locke: "In my heart I could have wished, yea and cannot cease to wish, that it might please God to guide and conduct yourself to this place, where I neither fear nor eshame to say, is the most perfect school of Christ that ever was in the earth since the days of the apostles. In other places I confess Christ to be truly preached; but manners and religion so sincerely reformed, I have not yet seen in any other place beside."² Farel also expressed his admiration and astonishment at the superior graces bestowed upon this church: "I have lately been at Geneva, and I was never so much delighted with it; I could scarcely tear myself away. I would rather be first in Geneva than last anywhere else;" etc. A hundred years later Drelincourt writing from Geneva says: "The order which prevails here is that established in the time of Calvin. A more beautiful blending of Church and State, the civil and ecclesiastical power, cannot be found."³

¹ See Henry III. 374 sq. ² M'Crie's *Life of Knox*, p. 141. Ed. N. York, 1813.

³ See Henry III. 379, note.

Calvin's last Days and Death.

The subjects of interest connected with the life of the great reformer multiply as it draws near its close. Numerous letters and incidents illustrating in the most satisfactory manner the excellence of his private character, the strength of the mutual affection and confidence between himself and his friends, his tender piety, his anxiety to injure no one, seem to demand a place in this imperfect sketch. His influence upon the northern countries of Europe, upon England and Scotland, and especially upon France, would also be a fertile topic of remark. But we hasten to speak of those things which have more immediate reference to his declining years.

Beza says that "Even in 1562 it might be seen that Calvin advanced with rapid strides to a better life. He did not however cease to comfort the sick and afflicted, to administer admonition to the erring, and even to preach and lecture upon theology."¹ He also prepared a new Confession of faith during this year to be sent to the diet at Frankfort. Although often confined to his couch by sickness during the last years of his existence, his activity in his studies was unceasing. When not surrounded by those who came to him for counsel and advice, he was engaged in dictating his works and letters to the young men whom he employed for that purpose. He often, it is said, wearied them out with writing whilst he was unwearied. In addition to the controversial writings which were forced upon him, the number of Commentaries either prepared anew, or revised and edited by him during these years is almost incredible.²

"The year 1564," says his contemporary biographer and friend, "was the first of his eternal felicity, but for us the beginning of a just and long sorrow. On the sixth of February he preached his last sermon, although much interrupted by a severe cough. From this time he laid aside his public duties, only permitting himself several times to be carried to the congregation, but for

¹ In addition to his own duties, he performed those of Beza who was in France during this year.

² He published, in French, a Commentary upon the Epistles of Paul and the Minor Prophets in 1560, upon the Psalms in 1561, and upon the Acts of the Apostles in 1563; in Latin, Lectures upon Jeremiah and Lamentations taken down by his pupils, in 1563, also Lectures upon Daniel, and a Commentary upon the last four Books of Moses the same year.

the last time on the last day of March, when he addressed the assembly in a few words."

Although he suffered exceedingly during his last days from a complication of diseases, yet no one of those who were constantly about him ever heard a word escape his lips, which was unbecoming a Christian or which indicated impatience. When his pain was most excruciating, he would lift his eyes towards heaven and say: "How long, O Lord!"¹ a phrase which was often on his lips when in health himself, he heard of the sufferings of his brethren, which always troubled him more than his own. When his friends importuned him to lay aside his writing and dictating he replied, "would ye, that the Lord find me idle when he comes?" In accordance with his scrupulous conscientiousness, he could not be prevailed upon to receive his salary after he had ceased to perform his public duties.

On the 16th of March, the council who well understood the greatness of the calamity which threatened them, ordered public prayers to be offered in behalf of the health of their pastor. On that day several of the clergy living near, visited him. "We found him," says one of the number, "dressed and sitting at his little table, where he was accustomed to devote himself to contemplation. When he saw us come in, after he had laid his forehead a long time in his hand in silence, as he was accustomed to do when in deep thought, he finally spake with a voice often interrupted, but with a joyful, smiling face: "dear brethren, I return you many thanks for your tender solicitude for me, and I hope in fourteen days [the day appointed for the 'censura morum'] to see you all assembled around me again, although for the last time. Then I think the Lord will reveal what he has decided concerning me, and he will after that take me to himself." On the day specified (March 24), he was present and after the regular exercises were finished, he said, he felt that some alleviation of his pain had been granted by God, and taking the New Testament in French, he read some of the Notes which he had made in the margin and asked the opinion of his brethren upon them, for he had undertaken to revise and correct them. The following day he was not so well in consequence of too great fatigue.

On the 27th he allowed himself to be carried to the door of the council-hall, and supported by a person on each side he as-

¹ *Usque quo, Domine?*

ceeded the steps to the chamber of convocation. After nominating a new rector for the school, he expressed his gratitude for the kindness the council had shown him, especially during his last sickness. "For" said he, "I feel that I am here for the last time." With difficulty pronouncing these words in a faint voice, he took leave of the councillors who were weeping from sorrow. On the second of April, although very weak he was carried in a chair to the church, listened to the sermon and received the sacred supper from the hand of Beza; he also joined, although in a tremulous voice, with the congregation in singing the last hymn, with indications of Christian joy conspicuous upon his face.

On the 25th of April, Calvin made his will which is so indicative of several traits of his character that a translation of a considerable part of it, is here given: "First," it is said, "I render thanks to God, that He has not only had pity on me, a creature whom he has made and placed on the earth, and taken me out of the thick darkness of idolatry, and brought me into the clear light of his gospel, and has made me partaker of the doctrine of salvation, of which I was entirely unworthy; but also that his compassion and kindness has borne so graciously with my numerous errors and sins, as to deign to use my exertions in preaching and promulgating his gospel. I testify, and declare my intention to pass the remainder of my life in the same faith and religion which he has revealed to me in the gospel; having no hope, but his gratuitous adoption, which is the only ground of my salvation; and with my whole heart I embrace the mercy which Jesus Christ has purchased for me in order that through his death all my sins may be blotted out. I also testify, that I humbly ask of him that he would wash and purify me in the blood of the exalted Redeemer, shed for the sins of the human race, that I may be permitted to stand before his tribunal in the image of the Redeemer himself. I declare, too, that according to the measure of grace which God has given me, I have taught his word faithfully and freely, both in my sermons, treatises and commentaries; and in the controversies in which I have engaged with the enemies of the gospel, I have not used sophistry, but with candour and sincerity have engaged in the defence of the truth. But alas! my good intentions and my zeal (if it is worthy of the name), have been so languid and cold, that I confess, that innumerable things have been wanting to the full discharge of my duties, and that without the unbounded goodness of God, all my right inten-

100 Page of John Calvin [1536.]
tions had been like the empty vapor. Moreover, even the gifts which God has bestowed upon me would have made me more criminal, if his grace had not aided me; hence I declare and affirm that I hope for no other means of salvation than this, that, God who is the Father of mercies, may show himself a father to me, who acknowledge myself a miserable sinner.

Further, I desire that after my departure from this life, my body be consigned to dust with the rites customary in this church and this city until the day of the glorious resurrection shall come.

In respect to the little patrimony which God has bestowed upon me, and of which I wish here to dispose, I make Anthony Calvin my very dear brother, my heir, and on account of respect for him, let him have and hold the silver goblet which was given to me by Monsieur de Varannes, with which I desire him to be satisfied; for whatever may remain of my estate I desire to commit to his trust, that he may bestow it upon his children when he dies. I bequeath ten golden crowns to be given by my brother and legal heir to the children's school, and the same amount, for the support of poor strangers. To Joanna, daughter of Constans and my half-sister on the paternal side, I also give ten crowns. To Samuel and John sons of my brother I wish forty crowns to be given after his death, and to Anna, Susannah and Dorothy, each thirty crowns, to David their brother on account of his notorious youthful levity and love of mischief only twenty-five crowns. This is the amount of all my estate as far as I can ascertain it from an estimation of my books, furniture and chattels of all kinds; but if there should be more I desire it to be distributed equally among my brother's children, not excepting David, if by the favor of God he shall conduct himself with propriety." His brother Anthony, and Laurence de Normandy, both of whom came with him from Noyon, were appointed by him executors of his will, and after it had been read "in a clear voice and with good articulation," it was signed by himself, seven witnesses and the notary.

After he had made his will Calvin sent word to the four syndics and the councillors that he wished to speak to them once more in the senate-room, before his death, and hoped he should be able to be carried there on the next day. The senators, entreating him to be careful of his health, sent back word that they would prefer to come to him. Accordingly they repaired the next day in a body from the senate-room to the house of Calvin. After mutual salutations, he said that he had long desired to speak

to them and give them his last testimony of affection for them and of attachment to the interests of their little State, but had postponed it until he was sure that he had not long to remain on the earth. Summoning all his strength, he then addressed them in a speech, a part of which, as taken down at the time, follows : " I return you many thanks, respected Lords, for having bestowed upon me, who am so unworthy, so many honors, and for often bearing so patiently with my infirmities, which I have always considered as a singular mark of your kind feeling towards me. And although in the exercise of my official duties I have been obliged to sustain various contests and endure many insults, which fall to the lot of the best of men, yet I know and acknowledge that they have not arisen from your fault. I earnestly implore you to ascribe it to inability rather than indisposition, when I have not performed my duties as I ought. For, I can assure you, that from my heart I have desired the welfare of your republic, and although I have not accomplished all that my station required, I have still labored with all my energies for the public good. I should indeed be guilty of criminal dissimulation, if I should not, on the other hand, avow that God has sometimes used my labors for good. But I must once more earnestly request your pardon, that I have accomplished so little both in my public and private labors, in comparison with what I ought to have done. I also freely acknowledge that I owe you much gratitude for having borne with patience my vehemence, which has sometimes been immoderate. For this sin I hope I also have the forgiveness of God. In respect to the doctrines which you have heard from me, I testify that I have not rashly or uncertainly, but purely and heartily taught the word of God entrusted to me, knowing that otherwise the anger of God would hang suspended over my head, whilst now I am confident that my labors in the ministry have not been displeasing to him. I make this declaration the more willingly in the presence of God and before you, since I have no doubt that the devil, in his usual manner will raise up many vain, dishonest and light-headed men, to corrupt the pure doctrines which you have heard from me."

Calling their attention to the unnumbered blessings which God had bestowed upon them, he continues : " I myself am the best witness from how many and how great perils the Lord has delivered you. Moreover you see in what condition you now are. Whether in prosperity or adversity, I entreat you to always keep in mind that it is God alone who is the preserver of cities and

kingdoms, and that he as such demands honor from men. Recollect that David, the illustrious king, testifies, that when he was enjoying profound peace, he fell so low, that he could never have arisen if God with singular favor had not stretched out his hand to him. What then may not happen to us poor weak men, if so powerful and brave a prince fell. You have the greatest need of lowliness of mind, that you may go on your way with the highest reverence for God, and the firmest confidence in his protection. Thus you will be certain of the continuance of the same protection which you have hitherto so often experienced, and be unmoved even when the prosperity and safety of your State is suspended upon a slender thread. If prosperity attend you, take care that you do not become insolent like unbelievers, but rather with humility of heart render thanks to God. But if misfortunes befall you, and death stare upon you from every side, still hope in him who even raises the dead. Then especially consider that you are thus chastised by God so that you may learn to trust him with more humility. If you would preserve in security this republic, look well to it that you pollute not by your wickedness these sacred seats, in which you are placed by God. He is the Most High God, King of kings and Lord of lords, who loads with honors those who reverence him, but casts low before him his despisers. Worship him therefore according to his precepts, and let them be ever present with you; for we are always very far from rendering to God his reasonable service. I know the disposition and manner of life of each of you, and am confident that you need this exhortation. Even the best of you, come short in many things. Let each one examine himself, and ask God to supply his deficiencies." After further admonitions upon the right performance of their respective duties, and a fervent prayer for God's guidance and blessing to rest upon them, giving each his hand, in turn, he bade them a sad farewell. They parted from him with deep sorrow, as from a common father.

On the twenty-eighth of April all the ministers within the jurisdiction of Geneva, at the request of Calvin assembled in his chamber, and he addressed them in these words: "Continue steadfast, my brethren, after my death, in this work, and be not discouraged. The Lord will preserve this republic and this church from all the threats of their enemies. Let there be no divisions among you, but embrace each other in mutual charity. Consider well what duties you owe to the church in which God has placed you, and permit nothing to separate you from it. It

will indeed be easy for those who are weary of their charge to find a pretext for escape, but let them be assured that they will find that God cannot be deceived. When I first came to this city, the gospel was indeed preached, but everything was in confusion, as if Christianity consisted only in the breaking of images. There were not a few wicked men from whom I suffered many base indignities, but the Lord God himself so sustained me, even me, who am by nature, (I speak the truth,) by no means bold, that I yielded to none of their assaults. I afterwards returned from Strasburg to this city, obeying the call against my inclinations, since I feared that my return would be entirely without profit. I was ignorant of the designs of God, and the undertaking was beset with many and great difficulties. But persevering in my work I found at length that the Lord blessed my labors. In like manner continue you in this work.—I declare to you, my brethren, that I have always lived with you, and now take my leave of you, in the bonds of the most sincere good will; and if you have ever found me during my sickness, too peevish, and impatient, I ask your forgiveness; and for discharging the duties of my office during that time, I render you many thanks." When he had finished these words, says Beza, he gave his hand to each of us; and we with sorrowing hearts and streaming eyes left him.

On the second of May, twenty-five days before his death, hearing that Farel intended visiting him, (Viret was too far distant to undertake the journey,) Calvin dictated to him a letter bidding him farewell, and entreating him to be mindful of their friendship, and requesting him not to give himself the trouble to make the journey to him. "My breath," said he, "is weak, and I am in constant expectation that it will leave me. But it is enough that I live and die in Christ, who is gain to his followers whether in life or death. Again farewell, with the brethren." But the good old man would not thus allow his friend to die without again seeing him. He came to Geneva, took sweet counsel with the dying man, embraced him for the last time and returned to his work at Neuenburg. But as they had been so closely united in life, in death they were not long divided. Farel lived only until the following spring.

The remainder of his days until death, Calvin spent in almost continual prayer, with a voice indeed so much broken by difficulty of breathing that it seemed little else than a continual sighing, but with eyes clear and bright to the last, and raised to heaven with such an expression of face that the earnestness of

prayer could plainly be perceived in them. In paroxysms of pain he frequently repeated with deep sighs the words of David : " Lord, I opened not my mouth, for thou didst it" and from time to time the words of Isaiah : " I did mourn as a dove." He was also often heard to say : " O Lord, thou smitest me, but I am abundantly satisfied, for it is thy hand."

His house was so thronged night and day by those who came from affectionate regard to see him, that the door would have remained constantly open, if all had been admitted. But as he could not converse, he desired that every one should be requested to pray for him, rather than afflict themselves by witnessing his suffering. His friend Beza says, that he often signified to him, who at least had sufficient proof that his presence was always acceptable, that he must not allow attentions to himself to take him from the duties which he owed to the cause of religion. Indeed Calvin was always so scrupulous in regard to encroaching upon the time belonging to the church, that he was not willing to trouble his friends at all, although nothing would have given them greater joy than to serve him.¹

He continued in much the same condition, " comforting himself and his friends" until the nineteenth of May, two days before the regular time for the administering of the Lord's Supper, and the day on which the ministers were accustomed to assemble for the " *Censura morum*" and partake of a friendly meal together. Calvin acceded to the proposal that the festival should be held at his house on that day, and when the others had assembled, summoning all his strength he was borne from his bed to the nearest chamber. " I come to you my brethren," he said, " for the last time. I shall no more sit at table with you." This, says Beza, was a sad beginning of the supper for us ; but he offered the prayer, ate a little and conversed as cheerfully as was proper for the occasion. Before the supper was ended, he requested to be carried back to his bed, and with a cheerful face he said to the company : " This wall will not prevent me though absent in body from being present with you in spirit." From this time he did not leave his bed. His body, with the exception of his face which retained a degree of freshness, was so emaciated that there seemed to be only the spirit remaining. But the energy and clearness of his mind did not appear to be affected by disease or age. His physical nature seemed rather to be wasted by the

¹ Beza, who is almost the only authority in respect to the last days of Calvin.

constant, intense activity of his mind. The grosser elements in his constitution, which indeed were always subordinate, were burned out by the fire within, that continually grew brighter.

On the day of his death, May 27th, Calvin seemed stronger, and spoke with less difficulty. But it was the last effort of expiring nature. About eight o'clock in the evening there appeared suddenly the certain indications of speedy death. When his friends, summoned by the servant came in, they found him perfectly tranquil without even a convulsion of the hands or feet or more difficult respiration than was usual. His reason and judgment even his voice remained, until his last breath. His face was so little changed that he seemed rather like one asleep than dead. "Thus," says Beza "on this day, with the descending sun, this most brilliant light disappeared from among us. During that night and the following day the sorrow was great in the whole city. For the whole State wept for a prophet of the Lord, the church grieved at the departure of their most faithful pastor, the Academy mourned the loss of a valued teacher and all lamented that a father, who under God was a true counselor, had been removed from among them. Many of the citizens desired to see him after death, and could not easily be torn away from his lifeless body. Some persons who had come from a distance for the sake of seeing him and hearing him speak, among whom was a distinguished man, the ambassador of the queen of England in France, were anxious at least to behold his face in death. At first free ingress was given to all; but since this appeared too much like mere curiosity, and as it might give occasion for calumny among the enemy, [as if too great honor was paid to a man,] his friends thought it best on the next morning, it being the Sabbath, to enclose his body, wrapped in a pall according to custom, in a wooden coffin. About two o'clock in the afternoon, he was carried out, without any unusual ceremony, followed by the syndics, senators, pastors and professors in the Academy, with almost all the citizens, weeping as they went, and deposited in the common burying ground called the "level court." According to his request no monument was erected to his memory. A plain stone without inscription was laid over the earth that covered his remains.¹

¹ Beza composed upon the occasion the following epitaph:

Romæ ruentis terror ille maximus,
Quem mortuum lugent boni horrescunt mali.

The place where Calvin was laid is now faded from the memory of man, whilst a monument stands in Geneva to point out the last resting place of Rousseau. But at the great day when the elements shall melt with fervent heat, Calvin will be found to have a monument more durable than brass and choicer than fine gold. His trophies shall be brought from the four quarters of the earth, and shall remain forever with him in glory. But he is not forgotten even now.¹ His works are known and read of all men. His spirit is abroad in the earth and prejudice and error flee before it. His example is mighty and will prevail.—At the time of his death, Calvin had been in Geneva nearly twenty-three years after his abode at Strasburg and was not quite fifty-five years old. But if length of days is computed by the amount accomplished, he “was gathered to his people” in the good old age of former generations.

*Ipsa à quo potuit virtutem discere virtus,
Cur adeo exiguo ignotoque in cespite clausus
Calvinus lateat, rogas?
Calvinum assidue comitata modestia vivum
Hoc tumulo manibus condidit ipsa suis.
O te beatum cespitem tanto hospite!
O cui invidere cuncta possint marmora!*

¹ A coin was a few years ago appropriated to his memory in Geneva. On one side is a head of Calvin, according to the picture in the Gen. Library, with the inscription: *Johannes Calvinus natus Novioduni, 1509. Mortuus Genevæ, 1564.* On the other side, Calvin's pulpit is represented with the phrase: *Il teint ferme comme s'il eust veu celuy qui est invisible, Heb. 11: 27.* *Genev. Jubel. Ann. 1835.* Around it are the words: *Corpore fractus; Animo potens; Fide victor; Ecclesiae Reformatore-Genevæ-Pastor et Tutamen.*

ARTICLE VIII.

THE CONTEST FOR SUPREMACY BETWEEN THE PAPACY AND THE EMPIRE IN THE MIDDLE AGES.¹

By B. Sears, D. D., President of Newton Theological Institution.

PROTESTANT Christians are beginning to perceive that there are in the Papacy, elements of moral power which deserve to be more carefully studied. The theological errors of the papal church were profoundly investigated and elaborately refuted

¹ This Article is founded on an oration delivered before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Brown University in 1844. Not only has it undergone considerable alteration in its form, but the subject has been investigated anew, and several points of inquiry prosecuted under the advantage of new helps. The authorities chiefly consulted in the preparation of the Article are the following: viz.

1. Luden's *Geschichte des teutschen Volkes*, in fourteen volumes, giving the history of the Germans from the earliest times to the close of the middle ages. To the preparation of this work the author devoted the best part of his life, and it is that on which his fame as a historian rests. It displays great ability and industry. The patriotic sentiments of the author give it a character of glowing enthusiasm and fervid eloquence, and his intellectual habits and tastes have led him to indulge largely in ratiocination upon the materials which his learning and industry had collected. To some, these features will appear as a recommendation, to others as blemishes of the work.

2. Leo's *Geschichte von Italien*, in 5 vols., one of the best productions of this acute and genial historian.

3. Planck's *Geschichte der christlich-kirchlichen Gesellschafts-verfassung*, in 5 vols., a work which gives evidence of extensive reading and reflection, and which has been much used in the preparation of this Article. Still we have not unfrequently found it wanting in that peculiar sifting and adjustment of conflicting testimony and that profound appreciation of characters and events which mark Neander's *Church History*.

4. Bower's *History of the Popes*, notwithstanding its deficiency in method and in comprehensive historical surveys, a rich collection of well authenticated facts drawn from works accessible to but few.

5. Eichhorn's *Deutsche Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte*, in 4 vols., an invaluable aid to one who would understand the legal relations of the Empire to the church and the Roman see. Indeed, no work casts more light on the subject of which this book treats.

6. Neander, Gieseler, Guericke, Hase, Hencke, Schröckh, etc. of the ecclesiastical historians.

7. Weissenberg's *Die grossen Kirchenversammlungen des 15ten und 16ten Jahrhunderts*, in 4 vols., the work of a very able, learned and candid living Catholic writer, of strongly Gallican principles, and therefore at war with the

by the writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The ethical principles inherent in the system, principles not only necessary to its aims practically, but growing out of it logically, are yet to be more perfectly analyzed. Reuchlin, in *Pascal's Leben*, has given some valuable hints on this subject. He has made it quite apparent that Jesuitism, as it is set forth by the early ethical writers of that order, is not, as many have supposed, a new scion, engrafted upon the old stock of Romanism, but a natural off-shoot, putting forth from its very root. Jesuitism was but the residuum of moral principles which was left in the Catholic church, when the Protestant elements were withdrawn. Herein lies the chief ground of the failure of the Jansenists in their controversy with the Jesuits. They were not in the old church where there had, for centuries, been a very respectable reforming and protesting party, but in the new church where that party no longer existed. They consequently found no sympathy; but, on the contrary, were accused, not without reason, of having Protestant tendencies. The spirit of Jesuitism has been the ruling spirit of the Catholic church from the time of the council of Trent to the present day. Hence, when it has been put down by political power, it has acted like a scrofulous humor when scattered from the point where it had been concentrated, retiring within and gather-

ultramontane party. The first volume contains an admirable outline of the rise of the Papacy.

8. Stenzel's *Geschichte Deutschlands unter den Fränkischen Kaisern*, in 2 vols., the most critical and elaborate history of the period, a model of special documentary history.

9. Jaffé's *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches unter Lothar dem Sachsen*, a Berlin prize essay, 1843, remarkable for the completeness with which all the known records of the period, whether printed or in manuscript, have been investigated.

10. Von Raumer's *Geschichte der Hohenstaufen und ihrer Zeit*. 2d ed. in 6 vols. The three last mentioned works form an unbroken series in the history of the Empire. The *History of the Hohenstaufens* has, deservedly, higher authority than any of the author's later historical productions. The haste with which he has written since he acquired a public name, has injured his reputation.

11. Hurter's *Geschichte Papst Innocenz des Dritten und seiner Zeitgenossen*, in 4 vols., the result of immense industry and labor, and presenting a magnificent panorama of the papal hierarchy at the height of its power. The author's interest in his theme, and imagined candor carried him beyond reasonable bounds. After laboring upon his work twenty years, as a Protestant, and enjoying for ten years longer a high reputation from it, as a learned biographer, not to say eulogist of the great papal monarch, he himself went over, in 1844, to the Catholic church.

ing new strength to make its appearance only the more formidably at another point.

The adaptedness of the papal forms of religion to the common mind, on aesthetic principles, was not a subject of much inquiry with the old Protestant writers. They labored rather to show that those forms were unscriptural and pagan. Others, at a later period, when the philosophy of these subjects began to be studied, discovered not only in the worship, but in the entire religious system of the church of Rome, a theocratic religion, a false Judaism, rendering the kingdom of Christ one of outward observation. Not a few of those who have speculated upon the subject, have believed, that inasmuch as the character of the people in the middle ages was no longer that of the primitive Christians, but one which was formed under the influence of a darkness as gross as that which hung over the mind of the ancient Jews, nothing could be better adapted to the condition of the people than just such a theocracy. It has furthermore been said that the majority of the common people are generally in a state of ignorance which requires a religion which shall address the imagination and the heart chiefly through the senses, and that it is one of the mistakes of Protestantism to address itself to a higher order of intellect than exists commonly among the people. The best reply to this is that it is the aim of Protestantism as it is of Christianity to elevate man to a higher degree of intelligence, in order to give them a purer and more solid morality. That Romanism, on the contrary, degrades the intellect and abuses human nature by keeping it in the fetters of ignorance, has been shown, with signal ability, in a previous number of this journal.

The interest now felt throughout the civilized world on the subject of the political influence of the see of Rome must necessarily call forth much discussion. That the whole Catholic church is, at this time, making a simultaneous effort to extend its political power, cannot be questioned. Many of the strongest minds of the age are deeply solicitous about the issue. Does the history of the past struggles of the Roman pontiff for political power throw any light on this point? We think it does; and though the subject has too wide a range to be fully illustrated in a single Article, we shall attempt, in the following pages, to bring forward, as a contribution to this end, some little light drawn from a historical examination of the protracted contest for supremacy between the Papacy and the Empire in the middle ages.

Though we are, in respect to the object proposed, more imme-

diately concerned with the origin and progress of the *political* influence of the Court of Rome, still as that influence itself emanated from the ecclesiastical relations of the pontiff, it will be impossible to obtain a clear view of the former without contemplating it in connection with the latter. In theory, the two kinds of papal power may be separated; in reality and in their practical operation, they go together. In the order of time, the ecclesiastical elevation preceded the political. Both ingredients were of slow growth, the former having its origin about the time of Cyprian, the latter about the time of the decline of the authority of the Greek emperors in Italy. Both were feeble in their beginnings and rose to power only by desperate efforts amid various vicissitudes of fortune, and reached alike the culminating point of their internal and moral vigor under Gregory VII, and of their physical and external sway under Innocent III. It would be interesting and instructive to trace out minutely all the successive steps by which the church of Rome ascended to her proud eminence. A mere indication of them is all that can be allowed in this place.

Its earliest distinction, that of being revered as an apostolical church, it shared in common with several others. The schisms and heresies which distracted the early church directed the attention of men first to the necessity, and then to the means of maintaining its unity. This unity was first sought in the bishops, already elevated to a superiority over the presbyters; and the bishops attempted to maintain it by means of provincial synods.¹ But when the theocratic conception of Christianity became general,

¹ *Episcopatus unus, episcoporum multorum concordie numerositate diffusus, one episcopal officer, diffused through a consentaneous multitude of bishops.* Cyprian's Ep. to Antonianus, cited by Guericke as the 69d, but numbered in Gersdorf; Bib. Lat. as the 55th chap. XX. sec. 16. *Episcopatus unus est cujus a singulis in solidum pars tenetur, the episcopal office is but one, of which each holds a part in conjunction with the rest.*—Cyprian, *De Unitate Eccles.* IV. cited by Wessenberg, I. 150, and by Rettberg, *Leben Cyprians*, p. 370. This unity was preserved by the mutual recognition, on the part of bishops, of each others rights and independence in their respective sees, and by acting together in synods in matters of common interest. *Manente concordie vinculo—actum suum disponit et dirigit unusquisque episcopus rationem propositi sui Domino redditurus.*—Cyp. Ep. 55. XVII. 13. "In which thing we do no violence to any one, nor impose on him any law, since the bishop (*præpositus*), in the government of his church, follows his own free will, having to give account for his action to the Lord."—Cyp. Ep. 72, end. With reference to the synods, see Cyp. Ep. 75—*per singulos annos seniores et præpositi in unum conveniamus.*

the want of a single organ and representative of union was felt. What could be more natural than that this should be found at Rome? It was a matter of convenience that there should be some one church, not, indeed, to control, but simply to represent the orthodoxy of all the churches. Then it would be easy to bring schismatics and heretics to a simple and decisive test. Such was the occasion of Cyprian's celebrated treatise on the unity of the church, a production which contributed more than any other of that age to the formation of the *Roman Catholic* church. Papal *authority* was not then contemplated; but the oldest, the most influential, and the only apostolical church in the Western empire, was selected as the most natural exponent of the orthodox faith. The idea of its being the mother church on account of its having been the *cathedra Petri* was an after-thought, brought in somewhat awkwardly to support a vague theory already in existence. But in the course of time that which was accessory came to be considered as principal, and the apostle Peter, who was brought into the church of Rome, as bishop, by a very doubtful and unsatisfactory tradition, was finally ascertained to be the chief of the apostles, and the ground of the argument so far changed, as to make the preëminence of the church of Rome depend on the prominence of Peter. Still the object was the same, the representation of the *unity* of the church by that organ, not the administration of its government.¹

¹ "The Lord said to Peter, Thou art Peter; upon this rock will I build my church, etc. I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom, etc. Feed my sheep. And though, after his resurrection, he gave the same power to all the apostles—yet, ut *unitatem* manifestaret, *unitatis* ejusdem originem ab uno incipientem sua auctoritate disposuit. *Hoc erant utique et caeteri apostoli quod fuit Petrus, pari consortio praediti et honoris et potestatis.*"—Cyp. De Unitate Eccles. IV. The same view was entertained by Augustine, as quoted by Guerike; *claves non homo unus, sed unitas accepit ecclesiae. Hinc ergo Petri excellentia praedicatur, quia ipsius universitatis et unitatis ecclesiae figuram gessit.* De Diversis 108, i. e. he possessed no superior power; he was merely the *representative* of the power of the church. So also Jerome, Ep. 101. Si auctoritas quaeritur, *orbis* majus est *urbe*, the authority of the whole church is greater than that of the church at Rome. When Stephen, bishop of Rome claimed to have authority over other bishops, none resisted him with more promptness than Cyprian. His theory of pontifical power must be interpreted by his practice. In Ep. 74 to Pompeius, he speaks thus of this haughty bishop of Rome: *Inter caetera vel superba vel ad rem non pertinentia vel sibi ipsi contraria, quae imperite atque improvide scripsit [Stephanus], etiam illud adjunxit, etc.—Quae ista obstinatio est quaeve praesumptio (of Stephen), humanam traditionem divinae dispositione anteponeere!*—Praeclara sane (sarcastic)

When the council of Nice recognized formally the three patriarchates of Alexandria, Rome and Antioch, giving them authority over their respective metropolitans, similar to that of the metropolitans over the bishops of their provinces, the church of Rome, like the other two patriarchates, had a jurisdiction, which was no longer founded on mere assumption. This jurisdiction was limited, however, to central and lower Italy, Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. That the church of Rome did not then constitute a court of appeal from the other patriarchates is proved by the twenty-eighth canon of the council of Chalcedon, where it is said that Constantinople was raised to a patriarchate *with the same privileges* (τὰ ἴσα πρεσβεία)¹ as those which had been

et legitima traditio, Stephano fratre nostro *docente*, proponitur!—Cur in tantum (to such a degree) Stephani fratris nostri *obstinatio dura* (in maintaining his own opinion against that of other bishops) prorupit?—Nec consuetudo, quae apud quosdam (at Rome) obrepserat impedire debet quominus veritas praevaleat et vincat. Nam consuetudo (even Roman) sine veritate vetustas erroris est.—Fit autem studio praesumptionis et contumaciae; ut quis (and, in this instance, the bishop of Rome) magis sua prava et *falsa* defendat, quam ad alterius recta et *vera* consentiat.—Oportet episcopum (no less at Rome than elsewhere) non tantum docere sed et *discere*. The next Epistle, the 75th, is from Firmilianus, bishop in Asia Minor, on the same subject and he is the representative of that country as Cyprian is of Africa. He says, Quantum ad id pertineat quod Stephanus dixit—plenissime vos respondistis, neminem tam stultum esse, qui hoc *credat* apostolos tradidisse—Eos, qui Romae sunt, non ea in omnibus observare quae sint ab origine tradita, et *frustra apostolorum auctoritatem praetendere*, scire quis etiam inde potest, etc.—Unde apparet, traditionem hanc (at Rome) humanam esse.—Atque ego in hac parte juste indignor ad hanc tam apertam et manifestam Stephani stultitiam, quod qui sic de episcopatus sui loco gloriatur et se successionem Petri tenere contendit super quem fundamenta ecclesiae collocata sunt, *multas alias petras inducat*. (Why is this epistle omitted in the Sämmtliche Werke der Kirchenväter now in a course of publication by the Catholics?) A council of eighty-seven bishops deliberated on the point in dispute between Cyprian, and the bishop of Rome and sustained the former. In the introduction to the acts of that council, Cyprian, with evident allusion to the assumption of undue authority by Stephen, uttered those memorable words, which Natalis Alexander (Hist. Eccl. IV. 236) has attempted in vain to weaken: Neque quisque nostrum (any one of us) *episcopum se esse episcoporum* constituit, aut *tyrannico terrore ad obsequendi necessitatem* collegas suos adigit, quando habeat *omnis* episcopus pro *licentia libertatis et potestatis suae arbitrium proprium*, tamque *judicari ab alio non possit*, quam nec ipse potest alterum judicare. Sed expectemus universi *judicium Domini nostri Jesu Christi, qui unus et solus habet potestatem* et praeponendi nos in ecclesiae suae gubernatione et *de actu nostro judicandi*. Sententiae Episc. 87, sive Concil. Carthag. in Cyprian's works. Are not the sentiments advanced in the foregoing extracts specimens of genuine Protestantism?

¹ See Suicer on the word, and Wessenberg I. 272.

given to Rome. The bishops of Milan, Ravenna, Aquileia, and of the churches in Africa and Spain and most of Gaul were still independent of Rome. But the circumstance that Rome was the only patriarchate and the only apostolical church in the Western empire, gave it great moral influence; and the judiciousness with which this influence was generally exerted and consequently the success which ordinarily attended the measures recommended by the Roman church, rendered the voice of the latter important to all contending parties, whether in church or in State. Persons wishing its support would naturally approach it in language of high respect and even of flattery, which the Roman bishops would take in earnest and lay up for future use. Neither princes nor prelates hesitated to acknowledge an extraordinary power, so long as it was on their side. It was almost uniformly the dependent person, struggling against a more powerful opponent, that exalted the pope, whose assistance he implored, but whose power he had, for the time being, no particular occasion to dread. Therefore it has been said by some writers, that the Roman pontiff was not specially in fault for assuming such power, for the people, in those times of general disorder, would have it so; and innumerable parties of various descriptions were continually compelling him to exercise it. All acts of this kind, however natural in themselves, were informal; and, until the consent of all the parties could be obtained, they were incapable of becoming a law. At the council of Sardica, in 347, which was not acknowledged to be oecumenical, a power of revision by a court of his own appointment was given to the Roman bishop Julian, in case of appeal by a bishop dissatisfied with a provincial trial.¹

In 385, Himerius of Spain, proposed certain questions relating to discipline and worship to Damasus, bishop of Rome, which, as the death of the latter soon ensued, were answered by his successor Siricius. The reply is the earliest decretal letter found in the collections of papal decretals, which in later times, but not in that early age, had the authority of law.² Innocent I. in 416, *was the first who laid absolute claim that all the churches of the Western empire should submit to his authority*, in matters of faith, in consequence of his being the successor of Peter, the chief of the apostles—a claim, however, which was far from being gene-

¹ Concilium Sard. canon 3.

² Hencke, Kirchengeschichte, Vol. I. p. 307.

rally acknowledged. In 445, pope Leo the Great, succeeded in convincing the emperor Valentinian III, then a minor, that one of the surest means of attaching the provinces to his throne would be to support the see of Rome in its authority over the churches.¹

There appears, on the whole, a striking analogy between the means employed by papal Rome and those employed by pagan Rome, for the subjugation of the world. The slightest show of reason and justice satisfied the Roman conscience, in each case, provided victory was on its side. The conquest of distant provinces was brought in to confirm the authority that was contested at home. Where was the Roman bishop first submitted to as absolute spiritual Lord? In England, whither Gregory the Great had sent Augustine and his forty associates, and in Germany whither Boniface and his coadjutors, under Roman dictation, had converted the rude tribes, at the same time to Christianity and to Romanism. How immensely did these two countries contribute to bring the other nations of Europe under the Roman yoke! How slow were the Gallic churches in submitting to Rome; and how successful would their resistance certainly have been, but for the opposing tide of influence that flowed in from Germany and England.²

¹ "Rome would not have been able to gain an entire ascendancy in the church, had not emperors and kings, who made use of bishops and popes as checks upon each other, lent their aid. It was these princes, who, to strengthen themselves by means of the papal authority, made that authority absolute in the church. The papal see was thereby raised to an eminence, from which it could look down upon kings as vassals. The history of the kings of Europe furnishes ample illustrations of this remark. Even Valentinian gave to the see of Rome absolute power in the West, in the hope of thereby binding the provinces more firmly to his throne."—Wessenberg, I. 274. Such is the language of an enlightened Catholic writer, who was for ten years bishop of Constance.

² "The church of Rome had extensive possessions not only in the immediate vicinity of the city and in the neighborhood of Naples, but also in the south of France, in Illyria, and, most of all in Sicily. How large the patrimony of the church of Rome was, especially in Sicily, may be learned from a letter of Gregory the Great. He says, in respect to the studs of horses on the Sicilian estates, that they were almost annihilated; that but little profit was derived from them; and that all the horses might as well be sold, except a very few, four hundred, for example. For the raising of such numbers of horses, large landed estates were necessary; and this will explain why the eastern emperor could safely leave Rome to take care of itself. The bishop provided for all the necessities of the city. He raised the money for the troops. He furnished corn to relieve the people from famine; and as most of

Intimately blended with the spiritual, was the temporal rule of the pope. It originated, partly in the extensive landed estates, which the benevolence of pious individuals bestowed upon it, and partly in the personal influence and authority of such men as Leo the Great and Gregory the Great, who, aided by their ecclesiastical position, acted a very patriotic part, at a time when political rule was nearly at an end in Italy.

It was about this time that the empire of the Franks or the German empire, whose many conflicts with the Papal hierarchy are soon to engage our attention, took its origin. While Goths and Vandals and Huns were pouring a tide of desolation over Italy, Gaul and Spain and all the territories from the north of Asia to the south-west of Europe and to Africa were in a state of the wildest disorder, the four German tribes, which were destined to become the regenerators of nearly all Europe, were emerging from their obscurity, and assuming importance as rising States. The homes of these tribes, known under the names of Saxons, Franks, Allemauns or Suabians and Bavarians, were between the Rhine and the Elbe, the Baltic and the Alps. The three great problems of historical interest to be solved by important events extending through successive centuries, were, first, Which of these tribes was to bear rule over the rest? Secondly, Whether they could ever be made to coalesce and be consolidated into one empire? Thirdly, Whether, they, while all the other nations of Europe were overrun, would be able to resist the furious assaults of the Slavonic race on their eastern frontier, the Northmen on their northern and western waters, and the Hungarians, on the south-east? The first problem, respecting internal rule, seemed to be solved by the supremacy of the Franks and the subsequent establishment of the Carolingian dynasty. But scarcely a century from the time of Charlemagne was to pass, before the fierce Saxon, who never forgot nor forgave the inhumanity of his humiliation, should, with a strong hand, wrest

the estates near Rome belonged to the church, and were cultivated by *coloni* under the bishop's direction, these cultivators of the soil came, by the Roman law, under his jurisdiction. Such authority became the more necessary as nearly all connection between the people of Rome and the exarch of Ravenna was broken off by the Lombards. Hence, after the invasion of Italy by the Lombards, we find the bishops of Rome at the head of all secular transactions in and about Rome, with almost princely power. They transact the business with the court at Constantinople. They treat with the Lombards respecting war and peace, and contribute from their own resources to defray the expenses of war."—*Leo's Geschichte Italiens*, Vol. 1. p. 143.

the imperial power both from the family and the tribe that had humbled him, and for a full century, under the two Henrys and the three Ottos, maintain his proud position as master of all the centre of Europe. Again the Frank was to recover his sway, and hold it a hundred years longer and then deliver the sceptre over to a stronger hand, from which it was to pass to the Hohenstaufens. Finally, the jealousy and hostility of the four great dukedoms, especially when divided into two nearly equal parties, as Guelfs, in Saxony and Bavaria, and Ghibilines, in Suabia and Franconia, were to rend the empire into fragments as fatal to its political power as they are, in their representation, unseemly to the eye that rests on the map of that unfortunate country.

We have anticipated our reply to the second inquiry. The third problem found its solution, in part, in the ultimate establishment of strong military colonies, extending in one unbroken line from the Baltic to the Adriatic. This boundary line of Marks between the two hostile races of men, the Teutonic and the Slavonic, was to wave backward and forward with defeat or victory for two centuries, and the territory between the Elbe and the Oder was to be drenched alternately with the blood of the one and the other, in many successive massacres of the whole population.¹ In consequence of the insignificancy and weakness to

¹ In 789, Charlemagne crossed the Elbe with an army and reduced the Slavi to a nominal subjection.

805, He sent his son to quell a revolt, who gained a victory at the mouth of the Saale.

923, The rebellious Wends (Slavi) were again subdued and Brandenburg, their capital taken by Henry I.

929, After another revolt in which the Slavi murdered the Christian population, they were conquered again.

938, After renewed massacres on both sides, Otto I. reduced all the country to a subject province.

983, Havelburg and Brandenburg were captured and burnt by the Wends and the inhabitants murdered and all the marks of Christianity and of Saxon rule east of the Elbe were utterly destroyed, and Saxony itself was invaded by an army of 30,000 men.

992, A war of extermination raged between the Elbe and the Oder, in which the Wends were finally victorious, and were not reconquered till 1155.

For a very minute and accurate account of these bloody scenes, the reader is referred to Spicker's excellent *Kirchen-und Reformations-geschichte der Mark Brandenburg*, vol. I. (the only one which has yet appeared, published in 1839) pp. 12—53. The Saxon Mark, on the Elbe, at its great bend below Magdeburg, was on the original boundary line. But as the Saxons extended their conquests to the east, the boundary was removed, and new Marks were

which the descendants of Charlemagne were to sink, the Northmen were to swarm all along the coasts of the Baltic and North seas, and penetrate to the interior on every navigable river, and hundreds of cities and towns, smoking in ruins, were to mark their desolating track. Meanwhile, the Hungarians, with the spirit of the old Huns, were to make their inroads upon the empire from the south-east, and carry their conquests into Bavaria and Suabia, and even to Thuringia and Saxony. But the empire was to be renewed, and its authority and power restored under the iron strength of the Saxon monarchs. Especially, under Otto the Great, the Northmen were to flee to their homes, and the Hungarians, after the battle of Lochfeld, were to retire below the Enns never to return. With these sketches of the rise of the empire, we must content ourselves, for the present.

How came the two powers, whose origin has been thus imperfectly described, the papal and the imperial, to form a connection with each other? The first act that tended to their union was the organization, by Boniface, of a national church in Germany, subject to the Holy See. The primate of Germany, the archbishop of Mayence, was brought into immediate connection with the government, and this relation led to measures of the highest importance to both parties. Soon, the circumstances under which Pepin came to the throne, to the exclusion of the royal family, rendered it necessary to satisfy the moral sense of the people by

established. The first was subsequently called the Old Mark; the second, the Middle Mark; and the third, which was farthest to the east, the Uker Mark, which were finally all united under the name of the Mark of Brandenburg, out of which the kingdom of Prussia has grown. That a similar struggle between the hostile races took place farther south, along the Elbe, might be inferred, if we did not know it otherwise, from the frequent changes of the Marks on the frontier. The old Thuringian Mark is soon found to be in the interior; and East Mark, and the Mark of Lusatia spring up successively in the east, and the new marks of Zeitz, Merseburg and Misnia in the south-east. In these destructive wars, fresh colonists were sent by the Germans, who were always crowding to the east, to fill the places of those that were slain in the frontier towns and fortresses. The *Slavi* or *Sclavi* in these districts were mostly annihilated, the remainder were reduced to bondage, and the very name of the people came to be employed to designate all who are in a state of servitude, in English, *slave*; in German, *Sklav*; in French, *esclave*. So the German race, formerly bounded on the east by the Elbe, spread themselves ultimately in a northerly direction over Mecklenburg and Pomerania to the Baltic; north-east to Russia and Poland; and south-east to the district around the Adriatic. The Bohemian boundary on the east of Germany remained unchanged. Hence the German language is spoken to this day west of a crescent line running from Illyria to Russia on the Baltic.

procuring the express sanction of the highest ecclesiastical authority in Christendom. Within two or three years from that time, the bishop of Rome, oppressed by the Lombards, and deserted by the Greek emperor, had occasion to look to Pepin for a reciprocity of favors. The brave Frank, at the request of the pope, crossed the Alps, conquered the Lombards and recovered the territories which they had seized; but instead of restoring them to the Greek emperor, who was supposed to lose his claim to them on losing his power to defend them, generously made a grant of them to the church of Rome, saying that he had fought, not for the Greeks, but for the apostle Peter. From this time, the pope became a temporal prince in reality. Twenty years later, on the renewal of hostilities by the Lombards, Charlemagne, at the call of the pontiff, destroyed their kingdom, became master of Italy and assumed the power which had formerly been claimed by the eastern emperors. Charlemagne, on his part, confirmed and increased the cession of territory made by his predecessor to the patrimony of saint Peter; and the pope, in return, gave a religious sanction to the bold and somewhat questionable step of Charlemagne, and consummated the union, to which so many measures had tended, by crowning him as Roman emperor.

Here we find the two great powers, which eclipsed all others in Europe during the middle ages, meeting and embracing each other with youthful confidence, and though united, destined to exist henceforth as jealous and contending parties. What arbiter, in case of dispute between them, was to decide whether the emperor elevated the pope, or the pope the emperor? Both had acted with selfish aims, and neither had sufficiently provided against the endless and bloody disputes, which finally grew out of these transactions.¹ Here we find in these potentates the two pivots on which turned the policy of European cabinets for centuries. Though rivals, they were mutually dependent on each other. Neither could exist alone. They were, to use the favorite metaphor of that age, the two great lights of heaven; only it

¹ "Charlemagne received through his coronation by the pontiff no real increase of power, but a higher dignity by which, in the view of the people, his power over the western empire was sanctified. All this existed only in thought; but the world is governed more by such ideas than by the sword. If the pope, by removing, in this manner, the empire in the West, solemnly acknowledged a sovereign over himself, he, at the same time, appeared to have created that sovereign by his own power."—*Hase's Kirchengeschichte*, p. 168.

was undetermined which was to rule by day and which by night. The pope conferred a moral sanction upon the state, the emperor gave protection to the church. The one was the spiritual, the other the temporal head of Christendom,—two dangerous powers when combined, as they often were, against the liberties of the people, and scarcely less so, when, as was most common, they were at variance with each other. The hapless condition of enlightened patriots, when emperor and pontiff should join hands in the work of persecution and outlawry, is illustrated in the fate of such men as Arnold of Brescia. The general state of wretchedness that ensued when, in case of dissension between them, either an angry potentate, in the three-fold character of German monarch, Lombard king and Roman emperor, should lead a veteran army over the Alps to take vengeance on the pope and his allies among the princes and free cities of Italy, or, on the other hand, the successor of saint Peter, at the alleged call of God and of the church, should ply the vast machinery at his command to arouse the superstitious consciences in the greater part of all Christendom to a sense of their religious obligations to abandon a sacrilegious sovereign—the general state of wretchedness, I say may be seen in the melancholy history of Italian campaigns, of cities sacked and plundered, and of armies perishing more by the plague than by the sword, or in the blighting curse of the ban which sanctified the unholy ambition of jealous princes and nobles, and called out from their lurking places in every corner of the empire all the fiendish spirits of rebellion.

The first century of the union of the two parties above named, reaching from the time of Charlemagne to that of the last of his descendants, is comparatively barren of interest, and may be passed over here in silence. During that period, the empire was dismembered, and went nearly to decay. Meanwhile the Roman bishops took advantage of the times, and wrested from the weak and contending princes a superiority which was far from being conceded by the founder of the empire. This was the time for the false decretals of Isidore, purporting to be a collection of the decretals of the bishops of Rome from Clement I. A. D. 91 to Damasus I. in 384, according to which, Christ himself gave to the church of Rome sovereign power over all other churches, to come forth probably from the hand of some writer attached to the court of the pontiff, and find the more support among the credulous from the fact that the civil power was not in a condition to make resistance. Thus Nicholas I. (858—867) could assume to

be the protector of the whole church, and with the general sympathies of the people, and the aid of servile bishops on his side, could humble the profligate Lothaire II, compel him to be re-united with his virtuous queen Theutberga, and could bring to terms the archbishop Hincmar of Rheims, who had strenuously and violently maintained the liberties of the Gallican church.

The most important and interesting period in regard to the contest with whose history we are concerned, embraces the four centuries from the last of the Carlovingsians, about the year 900, to the removal of the papal court to Avignon and its subjection to the king of France, about the year 1300.

The first century and a half, extending to the time of Henry III, being strongly marked by the predominance of the imperial power, may be conveniently contemplated by itself. At the commencement of this period, we find the empire in ruins and the Roman bishops in power. But the Saxon house soon ascended the throne, raised the empire from its impotency and dishonor, and gave it a new and almost independent form of existence. Germany was again united; its sovereignty was now established, not by papal influence or authority, but solely by Saxon heroism. France was left to become an independent kingdom, but Italy was conquered afresh and incorporated into the empire. Such a series of events was adapted to revive some old, and to give rise to some new questions of a very grave character. Was the empire, as it now existed, to be considered as the old empire founded by Charlemagne? or was it a new kingdom, won by the sword of Henry and Otto, and therefore dependant for its form on their power alone? If the former should be maintained, then the same relations of mutual dependence, whatever they were, which subsisted between the empire and the papacy would naturally be renewed; if the latter, then all such questions would remain yet to be settled. The respective rights and powers of the two parties in regard to each other, were, in point of fact, never definitely settled by agreement. What, then, determined the character of the subsequent relations existing between the pontiff and the emperor? We answer, *power*. So long as the latter could, and wherever he could, he put down and set up popes, at pleasure; when the former had acquired the requisite power, he disposed of the imperial crown with equal independence. Their weapons were different, but their authority was nearly equal. The power of the one was moral, that of the other physical. The one strengthened the military and polit-

ical bulwarks of the empire, in order to awe the Roman court into submission ; the other educated the consciences of the people and founded a system of canonical law by which all controversies between the church and the State were to be determined, and then securely relied for its execution on the moral sentiments of the age. Public opinion was his magazine of power, and in forming and employing that, he was as great an adept as any conscience manufacturer of later times.

With respect to the line of policy pursued by the emperors, we may remark that Otto the Great, the chief promoter of the Saxon rule, was so far influenced by the image of the old empire, floating in his imagination, that after having, as German king, firmly established his throne by driving back the Northmen and the Hungarians, who had swept over the western and eastern borders of the kingdom, he put forth his hand eagerly to seize the iron crown of Lombardy, and the more splendid one of the Roman empire. He therefore followed the example of Charlemagne, brought Italy into subjection, and annexed it to his dominions. Mistaken policy ! the cause of almost infinite evil to the empire, and, ultimately, as will appear hereafter, of the ruin of the most splendid family that was ever raised to the imperial throne of Germany.

Mountains, seas and rivers had marked out the natural boundaries of Germany. It had all the geographical advantages for a great and prosperous nation. It actually extended, at a little later period, from the Rhone to the Vistula, and from the Baltic to the Alps and the Adriatic. Its territory, though vast, was compact and well rounded. But when Otto annexed Italy to the empire, it was geographically divided, and its two parts so widely separated by the Alps, that they could never be closely connected. The Germans and Italians were, moreover, so diverse, not only in language, manners and institutions, but in the very frame-work of their intellectual and moral character, as to render it impossible for them ever to coalesce. The German was honest, plain, vigorous, high minded and enthusiastic ; the Italian was wily, intriguing, courtly, and incapable of high aims and great principles. They hated each other bitterly through all the vicissitudes of their political connection.

The project of a German Roman empire was magnificent, indeed, but impolitic and impracticable ; flattering to the ambition of great minds in that romantic age, but necessarily ending in ruin. Had the Saxon emperors employed their well-known energy in

strengthening and consolidating their government at home,—had they, in this respect, adopted the policy of the French kings, and reduced their powerful vassals to a greater dependence on the crown, they would have established their throne on an enduring foundation. But the false glory of a Roman empire, a nominal supremacy among the nations of Christendom, and the honor of being protector of the church, were too alluring to be resisted, and they acted with fatal efficacy upon the great and splendid qualities of ambitious emperors. The resources and best energies of the nation were exhausted in useless and worse than useless Italian campaigns. The blood and treasure wasted there were scarcely less than in one of the great crusades. The Lombard cities, burning with a spirit of freedom, would fight to desperation in defence of their liberties; and when defeated and such places as Milan completely leveled to the ground, the people would rise again in rebellion, immediately form a new confederacy, and even fall upon the returning imperial army in the very passes of the Alps and send the emperor home in disgrace after his most signal conquests. Often did he escape narrowly with his life on his way home, pursued and attacked, at an unguarded moment, by those very persons who had just received pardon from his lips, as they passed in long procession before him with halters about their necks. It thus became necessary at length, as we shall see under the Hohenstaufens, for the emperors to pass much of their time in Italy, and leave Germany, in the meanwhile, to the unsafe government of ministers. Thus the hearts of the people were finally alienated from their prince. They cared but little about an emperor whom they rarely saw, and conquests in which they had no interest. The nobles took this occasion to aggrandize themselves. The emperor, needing all their support in his Italian projects, especially in the time of the Hohenstaufens, would bestow upon them, in order to secure their military services, dangerous grants of power. It is easy to perceive that no individual would watch with more interest all these movements than the Roman pontiff. He did not relish the presence of the emperor with his military forces in the vicinity of Rome. He cunningly seized the moment when the malaria and the plague were sweeping away the imperial army, and then secretly pulled the wires, which, in his hands, generally acted upon the greater part of Italy, stirring it up to rebellion. With the large party of disaffected and ambitious princes and nobles, which could be found at almost any time in Germany, the pope never failed to be on good

terms and to keep up a confidential correspondence. One of two things he could always effect,—he could either create a political explosion in Germany, when the emperor was in Italy, or, if the emperor had returned home with his army, he could stir up the oppressed and exasperated Lombard and Italian cities to open revolt. Under the Saxon emperors, however, the empire had generally power enough to maintain itself firmly. Soon after its transition to the Franconian family, and just before it gave any indications of decline, it presented a most magnificent spectacle.

Let the reader imagine himself standing upon an eminence on the banks of the Rhine, a little above Mayence, about eight hundred and twenty years ago. He would have seen the German nation assembling, in a vast plain, on both sides of the river, to elect a new emperor. The four great duchies of Saxony, Franconia, Suabia and Bavaria, the heart and strength of the empire, and four other distant duchies, forming its greatest circumference, would have been seen represented by great armies under the command of their respective dukes, pitching their tents where their fathers had done, on similar occasions before them. The congregated thousands of feudal lords and vassals covered the whole plain. The complicated forms of election were passed through. Conrad, the first of the Franconian dynasty was elevated to the imperial throne; festivities of extraordinary brilliancy and pomp succeeded, and the people went, with increased enthusiasm and national pride, to their castles or to their huts. All this was not a vain show, but was a true index of the great resources and military power of the empire. The vigor of the government continued to increase through that whole reign; and during the next succeeding one the empire reached, under Henry III, the summit of its greatness, embracing nine duchies, besides the three kingdoms of Burgundy, Italy and Hungary. The emperor was without a rival among the sovereigns of Europe. The church bowed to his will, and four successive pontiffs received the tiara from his hand.

Here the scales begin to turn in favor of the papacy, and for about a century and a half, till the time of Innocent III, a very different period of history is presented to our view. This may properly be designated as the age of Hildebrand, inasmuch as it was peculiarly his policy that infused new life and power into the church and gave it a complete victory over the empire. It will now be necessary to go back and take up the narrative where we left it, in respect to the papacy.

The whole of the foregoing period, and even the time previous to that, as far back as to the age of Charlemagne, was one which did little credit to the Holy See. Otto I. found the papal court a perfect seraglio, occupied by a series of dissolute popes with no parallel in the history of the hierarchy, except, perhaps, in Alexander VI. at the dawn of the Reformation. From that time onward, cabals and violence prevailed over honor and justice at the apostolical seat. Unprincipled men snatched the tiara from the heads of their more successful rivals and drove them with armed forces from the city. A single noble family had for thirty years held forcible possession of the see of Rome, when Henry III. felt loudly called upon, by a regard to the public good, to put a stop to these abuses and restore the papacy to its ancient character. No one, therefore, was disposed to be very scrupulous about forms and to dispute his right, when he placed several successive popes on the throne.

But at this point a new era commences. A wonderful series of events gives a new and unexpected turn to the tide of affairs, and one of the most striking spectacles in the history of mankind, presents itself in the grandeur of the papal power from the pontificate of Gregory VII. to that of Innocent III. The papacy was reformed and invigorated beyond all former example. The most splendid talents of the age ruled in the college of the cardinals and on the pontifical throne. In the meantime, the emperors who succeeded were rendered wanton by their hereditary power, and abandoned themselves to cruelty and oppression, and every vice of royalty. They were quite destitute of that loftiness of aim and fixedness of purpose which rendered Gregory the wonder of the age, and consequently lost both the support of their great vassals and the moral consideration and respect which belonged to their predecessors.

In the year 1048, Henry III. was invited by the Romans to give them a new pontiff. He appointed a German bishop, a personal friend, whom he could safely trust as a determined reformer, and whom he hoped to retain in his interest. This individual (Leo IX.) took with him on his way to Rome, Hildebrand, a poor carpenter in his boyhood, afterwards a student at Rome, but now a monk at Clugny. From that moment he infused his own genius into the papal counsels, suggesting to the new pope, immediately on meeting him, to delay assuming his official character till he should reach Rome and receive from the church his appointment in due form, and thus avoid the appearance of re-

cognizing the emperor's authority in the election. This remarkable young man, henceforth the soul of the hierarchy, by forming a masterly system of policy, and carrying it into execution through five successive pontificates, wielded a greater individual moral power than any other statesman of the Middle Ages.

The great political power possessed by Henry III, and the extraordinary authority which he had assumed, began to be dangerous even in his hands. He built up and fortified the fabric of the State at the expense of the church. Especially in the exercise of the assumed right of investiture, did he squander the funds of the church upon his political tools and favorites. The bishops were at the same time temporal lords, enjoying large estates, and even commanding armies,¹ having been raised to great power as a check upon the secular vassals. It was this two-fold character of the bishops which lay at the bottom of all disputes about investitures. There was an obvious incongruity in their receiving ecclesiastical appointments from the crown, and yet the incongruity would be no less, if they were to be introduced to large estates and to political power by the Roman bishop. In the one case, the emperor would secularize and degrade the church; in the other, the hierarchy would control the civil administration. In point of fact, the German prelates were, at this time, like the secular princes, holders of estates and offices in feudal dependence upon the crown. In every controversy that might arise between the court of Rome and the emperor, they were bound by their allegiance in their secular character, to espouse the cause of

¹ "In Suabia from the time of its earliest dukes, the appointment of bishops was made by the kings, the election by the chapters being regarded more or less, according to circumstances. The bishops were in a state of dependence upon the throne. From the king they received their investitures; to him they took the oath of allegiance; at his command, they were bound to levy and even to lead armies, and were deposed in case of unfaithfulness or disobedience. On the other hand, as they were always to attend at court, they enjoyed facilities for obtaining grants of territory, and various privileges, such as the right of coining and levying taxes. Though often compelled to convert a part of their possessions into fiefs in order to support armies, they thereby came to have courts and cabinets of their own."—Stalin's *Wirtembergische Geschichte*, Vol. I. (published in 1841, the remainder has not yet appeared), p. 573. The same indefatigable and most excellent antiquarian, has given a complete list of the bishops of Suabia who accompanied the emperors in their Italian campaigns, many of whom, like others attached to the imperial court and army, lost their lives there. In this list are found the names of six bishops of Constance, four of Augsburg, four of Worms, two of Spire and two of Strasburg. See p. 519.

the latter; and he, to make the matter doubly sure, would ordinarily invest with the ring and the staff only those ambitious men on whose political influence he could safely rely. No wonder that the eagle-eyed Hildebrand should early perceive the true nature and importance of that policy and resolve on breaking it up. This was the chief, nay the essential point contested between the pope and the emperor. That gained or lost, all was gained or lost. For as the respective claims of pontiff and emperor, growing out of the double character of the bishops, as prelates and vassals, were equal, nothing but the superiority of one of the parties over the other could settle those claims. Thus the decision of the particular point in dispute involved the whole question of precedence between the respective parties. The emergency was met with a corresponding effort on both sides. On the issue the emperor staked his crown and the pontiff his see. The contest would seem to be unequal; for, on all questions of power, the emperor had the means of decision immediately at hand. Yet everything depended at last on the public sentiment. He who could wield that most effectually, was sure of victory in the end. This Hildebrand understood full well,—better than his opponents, who felt strong, not so much in the manifest goodness of their cause as in their arms. Still the patriotic feelings of the nation were on the side of the emperor. The contest opened on the part of Hildebrand sagaciously, if not nobly. His first great effort was to win for the church a solid reputation and permanent influence, founded on character, and thus to intrench himself and his cause in the hearts of all the conscientious, against the brute force of the emperor. The work of reform was commenced by the emperor himself. Hildebrand, while he was *apparently* a mere instrument of the emperor, coöperating with him through the agency of the pontiff whose adviser he was *in reality*, conducted the process in such a manner as to give the pope an extraordinary judicial authority, and directed the reform to such objects and such only as tended to increase and concentrate the power of the church.

Never was there a more complete change wrought in the posture of affairs than when Henry and the pope of his own nomination opened the campaign of reform. The reformation was, indeed, carried on, but under Hildebrand's direction, it was brought to an unexpected issue. Leo, the reforming pope, passed most of his pontificate in a novel manner,—in travelling from country to country, meeting synods, and sitting in judgment in

cases of simony. Never before did a pope exercise such a judicial power. Heretofore the provincial synods themselves were the judicatory for the trial of such offences. Thus the Holy Father monopolized, not only the legislative and executive authority of the whole church but the judiciary also.

Why was such an extraordinary procedure submitted to on the part of the emperor and of the synods? Because this unprecedented power was applied to a good end, the purification of the church;—because the emperor himself was the mover, and supposed there could be no danger, inasmuch as the pope was his own creature, and wholly in his power;—because numbers of the synods were the very persons to be tried;—because appearances of regular forms were kept up by making the synods the *place* of trial, though the tribunal itself was essentially changed;—and finally because only those notorious cases were taken up, where all the popular sympathies were on the pontiff's side.

It is impossible not to recognize the agency of Providence in the course of these important transactions. Precisely at this juncture a child, six years old, succeeded to the imperial throne, and different factions of German nobles and prelates successively had him under their direction. He grew up in all the wantonness of irresponsible power. Hildebrand, during this period of misrule completed his preparations for the crisis that was drawing on. The decisive battle was now to be fought. He therefore put the triple crown upon his own head, and under the name of Gregory VII made himself memorable in the history of the world. The right of investiture was not contested mainly with France or England, where the royal power was now strong, but Germany, was made the point of attack; because the empire was in a state of weakness and disorder, and the victory being once secured in such a monarchy, it would be easy afterwards, in more favorable times, to extend it elsewhere. The diplomatic skill also of Gregory was of the highest order.¹ Foreseeing that the prohibition of investitures by *laymen* (as he cautiously generalized the term for emperor), and the suspension of those bishops whom the emperor had inducted into office, would arouse the utmost indignation of the latter, and bring him immediately to Rome at the head of a powerful army, he entered into negotiation with the disaffected German princes and created such a fac-

¹ "Gregory VII. was intellectually the most powerful and the most genial statesman, of the middle ages."—*Leo's Universalgeschichte*, Vol. II. p. 124.

tion as to render it perilous for the emperor to leave the country. He also formed an alliance with the Normans, now masters of Naples and Sicily, and the most warlike and powerful people on that side the Alps. After taking all these precautions, the pope was ready for the onset. But in pursuing his main object, he proceeded covertly, and was careful, while drawing on the decisive action, to keep the religious sympathies of the public strongly in his favor. In his first skirmishes, he always managed to have the open rupture turn on a point where he was clearly in the right. He assailed, not the emperor, but the bishops invested with office by him; and not even such indiscriminately, but those only whose profligacy, or wanton abuse of power was notorious; and then he proceeded with amazing boldness and decision. When the provoked emperor espoused their cause, he himself was first warned, and then put under the ban for violating the established discipline of the church. But Gregory did not suffer such a crisis to come on till he knew the emperor's vassals were ready to break with him, and were eager to seize upon any pretence for revolt. Thus the passionate monarch found himself like a wild beast in a net. The moment he began to rage, the cords which held his subjects in allegiance were snapped; and yet in all this, the emperor alone seemed to be in fault.

The intelligent reader is familiar with the result, the most perfect triumph recorded in the history of political genius and statesmanship over the wantonness of mere physical power. The German diet, prepared for the occasion as it was, refused to acknowledge their emperor until he should free himself from the papal ban. The humbled monarch, who was now as destitute of fortitude as he had been of prudence, went in the character of a private individual and of a penitent to seek reconciliation with the pope. The scene of this unparalleled humiliation was at Canossa in Tuscany. There the emperor was compelled to stand in the open air, barefooted, three days in the midst of winter, before he could be admitted to the presence of the pope. This to be sure, was an ecclesiastical penance, from which royalty could not claim to be wholly exempted. But the severity of the holy father was dictated by something more than a conscientious regard to the discipline of the church. The humiliation was complete, and the right of investiture conceded to the pope.

Under the Hohenstaufens who, at a somewhat later period ascended the imperial throne, the empire was arrested in its fall and the papacy in its ascendancy by the brilliant qualities which

distinguished this family. It will be a pleasing relief to contemplate the state of the empire and its relations to the Holy See, under their reign.

Ascending the course of the Neckar from Heidelberg in a southern direction till we come opposite to Stutgard, and then facing the east, we behold two tributary streams flowing into the Neckar and on their banks, the loveliest vales in all Suabia. Between these rivers extends a broken range of the Ranne Alp, producing a pleasing variety of hill and dale. But high above every other elevation rises, in the form of a sugar loaf, the *Hohenstaufen*, with a smooth level summit from which more than sixty Suabian towns and villages can be seen.¹ Here was the castle of the family, which was raised first to the rank of Suabian dukes by the Franconian emperors, and then, by the other dukes and great vassals, to the imperial throne. Of this Hohenstaufen family the two Frederics were the most distinguished. They were in many respects the most splendid men that ever swayed the imperial sceptre of Germany. Manly beauty and strength, chivalrous daring, magnanimity, intellectual greatness, statesmanship and learning, unite to render them the favorites of poets and historians. The Franconian family, like the age to which it belonged, was nearly destitute of poetic and of all literary excellence. But the Hohenstaufens were themselves among the best representatives of a new age, an age of enthusiasm, of romance and of adventure, nourishing in great men a strong passion for glory. Christian Europe had been kept in a state of alarm for centuries by the Northmen on all the waters from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, by the Slavonic tribes, no less heathen and savage, covering all the territory immediately on the east of Germany, and by the Mohammedans, threatening the peace and the very existence of Christendom, on the south. All Europe had long been agitated as if rocked by subterranean fires and was like a trembling volcano, ready to pour out its burning streams at every opening. It was not Peter the Hermit, nor the popes, nor Saint Bernard that produced the crusades. It was the spirit of the age, formed by peculiar influences which had long been at work.² This same spirit had already reared the stupendous fabric of the empire with its many gradations of rank and feudal de-

¹ Raumer *Geschichte der Hohenstaufen*, Vol. I. p. 288.

² Gervinus, *Geschichte der poetischen National-Literatur der Deutschen*, Vol. I. p. 162.

pendence from the monarch to the serf, and the still more stupendous fabric of the church with its corresponding system of gradations in rank from the spiritual head of Christendom to the sacristan of its meanest chapel. It produced the Gothic cathedral and the scholastic philosophy, no less than the poetry of the Troubadours and of the Minnesingers. This age of high enthusiasm, in which a love of literature and art was united with heroic daring, an age distinguished for the influx of new ideas and tending to modern life, was led on in Germany by the two Frederics.

Germany was, furthermore, in a peculiar state politically, when the Hohenstaufens came to the throne. Saxony and Franconia had been long the competitors for the prize of empire. The latter, while in possession of the throne, stood in fear of the Guelfs, one of the oldest families, and most influential of the nobility. To counteract their growing influence and to have a balancing power at his command, in case of their union with the Saxons, Henry IV. raised the Hohenstaufens to political importance, by giving his own daughter in marriage to one of them, having first made him duke of Suabia. Thus the two great south-western duchies constituting half of the empire, were politically united by family ties, and in the following reign we actually find them both under the government of Hohenstaufen dukes. When the next imperial election took place, the princes and nobles followed their established policy, that of preferring the weaker candidate in time of peace, and the stronger one only in time of danger; and the duke of Saxony was chosen, because the Hohenstaufens, having connected themselves not only with the late imperial house, but with two other distinguished families by intermarriage, were considered as already too powerful. Lothaire, in coming to the throne, felt the necessity of strengthening his power by family connections, so as not to be overborne by the Hohenstaufens. He therefore formed an alliance with the Guelfs, by giving his daughter in marriage to Henry the Proud, who was, at that time, duke of Bavaria. The emperor afterwards went so far as to make his son-in-law duke of Saxony also. Thus the four great duchies of the empire were equally divided between two rival families. This is the origin of the feud, so celebrated in history, that of the Guelfs and Ghibelines or Hohenstaufens. On the death of Lothaire, who left no son to succeed him, the question, Who was to be the next emperor? was one of deep interest to the two parties. Henry the Proud was son-in law to

the late emperor; and moreover, his territories, the duchies of Saxony and of Bavaria, stretched from the Baltic to the Adriatic; and the estates of the family of Este to which he was heir, extended far into Italy. But that on which he founded his claim was turned to an objection; and even the pope, in this case, though the Franconian emperors and their protégés, the Hohenstaufens had always been arrayed against him, did not wish to see so powerful a prince as the young Guelf placed at the head of the empire. The choice therefore, (for the empire was still elective in reality, though nominally made hereditary more than half a century before,) fell upon one of the Hohenstaufens.

With these explanatory remarks, it will be easy to bring before our minds the state of the parties at the opening of the contest soon to be renewed between the emperor and the pontiff. The Guelfs were shut out altogether from the succession, the object of their highest ambition and of their most confident hopes; the Hohenstaufens were permanently established in power; and the papal court was now, as ever, enlisted in behalf of the excluded or offended party. The moral sentiments of the age were inclined to the side of the pope. The hierarchy had, in the previous struggle under Gregory VII, gained important points in precedent, if not in law; and the whole weight of the Guelf influence and power, both in Germany and Italy, was thrown into the scale of the pope. The undertaking of the Hohenstaufens to regain, in the rupture with Rome, what their predecessors had lost, was a fearful one. But, then, they were superior to all their opponents in statesmanship. Of the ten popes who wore the mitre during the first two reigns of this family not one equalled them in ability. In military talent, the Guelfs and Hohenstaufens were nearly on a level. A struggle was now to commence, as desperate in its character as that between Henry IV. and Gregory VII, and more decisive in its results. It was to terminate ultimately in the elevation of the papacy to its highest external grandeur, and in the execution of the last of the Hohenstaufens on the scaffold, in the kingdom of Sicily. But tragical vicissitudes of fortune, and great events were to precede this final catastrophe.

The first important advantage gained by the reigning family, was, that on the revolt of the Guelfs, the emperor succeeded in depriving them of their feudal estates, or the duchies of Bavaria and of Saxony, and in reducing them to their allodial possessions in Brunswick. The great duchy of Saxony spreading over all

the north of Germany from the Rhine to the Oder, was taken forcibly from the reigning duke, on his revolting a second time, and broken up into fragments, never again to be united. But there is a *Nemesis* in history. That ancient family is still perpetuated in the line of Brunswick, and a Guelph now sits as queen on the proudest throne in the civilized world. The Hohenstaufens, on the contrary, then the most splendid monarchs on earth, disappeared in history utterly after two centuries, and their territories shared the same fate with those of their rivals. Hence all the west of Germany, from Denmark to Switzerland, was torn piecemeal before the close of the thirteenth century, and no great state has ever risen out of it since.

The long reign of Frederic Barbarossa would of itself furnish materials for a separate history. He succeeded his uncle in 1152, and was crowned at Aix la Chapelle at the age of thirty-one. Everything seemed to conspire to invite him to Italy. Conrad, at his death, had advised him to proceed immediately to Rome and receive the imperial crown. In Italy, the pope was still aspiring to tread on the necks of kings; the inhabitants of Rome, under Arnold of Brescia, were meditating the restoration of the ancient republic; the cities of Lombardy, particularly Milan, were assuming airs of sovereignty and independence; and the kingdom of Sicily was extending its power. It is not strange that the ambition of a high-minded and powerful monarch, should lead him to contemplate Italy, in its present condition, as the chief theatre of his glory. The example of Charlemagne and of Otto I. tended to strengthen his desire. How little did he anticipate the result! Had he perceived that it was only Syren voices that were alluring him to Italy, that the mistakes of his great predecessors were to be illustrated in his case, that Italy was to be the grave of all the hopes of his splendid family; had he turned his whole attention to Germany alone, how different might have been the fate of the empire! Even had he determined still to go to Italy, a fore-knowledge of opposing powers, and of the great importance of public opinion, might have enabled him to retain Lombardy in his interest, to have supported Arnold of Brescia as a check upon the pope, instead of delivering him over to the latter as a heretic, deserving execution; and then he might have had power enough in Italy, and with moderation in adjusting the claims of Alexander III, have had influence enough over the common people, to render harmless that invisible, but all-pervading papal agency, which finally baffled him. But what the event has rendered

plain, was to him and to the most sagacious men of his age dark and unseen.

About the time that Frederic had reached Pavia, where he received the Lombard crown, Hadrian IV, a native of England, who, in his boyhood, came to Rome in indigent circumstances, was raised to the papal throne, and with this cunning and dogged pontiff, began the fatal strife. He had already put revolted Rome and Arnold of Brescia under the ban. He fled from the city at the approach of the emperor, but sent an embassy of cardinals to treat with him and induce him not to listen to the proposals of the Romans, but to seize and deliver up Arnold. Frederic was a rigid monarchist and therefore had no sympathy with republicans. He was protector of the church, and was now called on to defend it against a reputed heretic. He yielded; and not only sacrificed one of the noblest men of his times, but cut off the right hand of his own power. It was not republican Rome, it was papal Rome that endangered the empire. One of the leading objects of Arnold and his party, was to reduce the bishop of Rome to his ancient position and character, and make him simply a religious teacher. Nothing could have been more valuable to Frederic in the terrible conflicts that were to follow, than just such a coadjutor as he unwisely delivered to the pope, and the pope, to the flames. Hadrian was still suspicious of the emperor and would not meet him in person till he had obtained a promise upon oath that his life should be safe in the emperor's hands. As Frederic neglected the courtesy of holding the stirrup of the pope, the latter refused him the kiss of peace. The astonished emperor, after learning that Lothaire had performed that humble service on a similar occasion, finally consented, for the sake of peace, to make reparation by a supplementary act of complaisance. After being crowned at Rome, he abandoned, for the present, his enterprise in regard to lower Italy on account of the approaching hot season, and returned to Germany. In the following year he entered upon a second Italian campaign. Milan had revolted again, the pope had, contrary to agreement, supported and strengthened the king of Sicily, and, besides, written an insulting letter to the emperor, intimating that the empire was the gift (*beneficium*) of the pope. The latter, learning that the emperor was on his way to Rome, saw fit to explain. "It was never intended," he said, "on our part, to intimate by the words, *beneficium imperii Romani contulimus*, that the emperor was our vassal." Frederic, nevertheless, advanced with an army of over a

hundred thousand men, subdued Milan, and held, according to custom, a sort of imperial diet in the Roncalian plains, at which the rights of the emperor in respect to Italy were to be legally ascertained and decided. The four great jurists of Bologna, magistrates from fourteen cities were to give the legal decision. In Bologna, the authority of the civil law was revived, and the Roman code the emperor possessed almost unlimited power. The decision could hardly be otherwise than favorable to him. Indeed, one of the strongest supports of the imperial authority, in the time of the Hohenstaufens, was the inflexible study of the Roman law at Bologna. The emperor's rights accorded to him at Roncalia in such a manner that the opposition both of the pope, of Milan,—reading its oath of obedience,—and of other Italian cities during the year. The majority of the cardinals elected Victor III, the minority, Victor III, as successor. But the emperor for a confirmation of their election. Victor was, of course, preferred, and an ecclesiastic elected at Pavia by the emperor, and Victor acknowledged pope. Milan was next besieged, and after it surrendered, and was razed to the ground to favor the emperor's wishes. All Italy. The pope of his own choice was in preference to the cardinals' choice, Alexander III, was a Frenchman, France and England, jealous of the pope, acknowledged Alexander as rightful pope. The cardinals were actually seen, on a public occasion, the fugitive pontiff. In the meantime the emperor seized upon this moment. Alexander, he might have crushed him, but he was about to be formed against him to give victory to the papal pope. The occasion was termed. But this occasion was a success to Victor was appointed successor to Victor was appointed canonical than his. These events in the cause of Alexander, and this, his prospects brighten in Italy. He journeyed for nearly four years. Frederick now prepared for a foreign journey. Frederick had been received as pope, was but little regarded, but, in persuading the cities

But it is no less true, on the other hand, that the Roman Catholic church is capable of rising, under favorable influences, to an elevation of moral dignity and religious seriousness, which never fail to command very general respect. We refer not to the many single examples of excellence, of which no one can be ignorant, but to the general character of the church in such times as those of Gregory VII, and of the early Jesuits, when there was enough of moral force to strengthen the foundations of the hierarchy. The loss of that earnestness of religious character, at other times, (at the close of the Carolingian period, at the beginning of the reign of Henry III, and just before the reformation, for example,) was the chief cause of the waning power of the church. If even now, in the nineteenth century, the religious elements of Romanism should be extensively revived; if the work of missions should be prosecuted with as much pious zeal as in some earlier periods; if the education of the young should be conducted with the care and thoroughness which have been known to characterize some of their schools formerly; if, in this country especially, intelligence, dignity of deportment, seriousness and candor should ever come to be general among the Catholics, and such men as Möhler, Schlegel and Hurter should come before the public as their representatives, Romanism would yet acquire a power among us which could not be put down by violence, nor dislodged by abusive epithets. If such a time should ever come, superior moral excellence will be our only real strength; and truth and candor our only effective weapons. Public opinion will be the prize for which both parties will have occasion to contend, and this cannot be taken by storm. The triumph of Gregory VII illustrates the superior value of cool philosophy to passion and an immediate resort to force. Not only are Catholics men, and Protestants but men, but, what is of more consequence, the persons to judge between them are men.

We close with a remark, to which it will be well for American patriots to give heed, namely, that the papacy has always owed its elevation to the existence of political parties, between which it could hold the balance of power. Its entire history is but a continuous commentary on this fact. The character and constitution of the German empire, in respect to the power of its great vassals, and the encouragement held out to them by the history of the past, that they might one day take their turn and sit on the imperial throne; the loose manner in which remote duchies and kingdoms were attached to the empire,

giving them opportunity to revolt with comparative ease and impunity; and finally the high rank and great authority given to ecclesiastical dignitaries, when their elevation was resorted to as a check upon the dukes and other dangerous vassals, together with their dependence upon Rome,—these and other similar circumstances opened the way for a strong opposition to spring up in the heart of Germany. To keep such an opposition in existence, and to hold such other political connections as should enable him to give it effectual support, was the settled policy of the pope of Rome. Jesuitical, in this respect, he has always proved to be. He was not over anxious to inquire who was the rightful sovereign, or which the better party; it was enough to know which would be most obedient and make the greatest concessions to himself. Of all this the history of the Carolingians, of the Guelfs and of the Hohenstaufens furnishes abundant illustration. Such essentially has Romanism always been and will, no doubt, always continue to be. Never was there a more inviting field for the exercise of its political power than that presented by our popular government with its ever-growing factions. In the German empire open opposition to the government could be put down as rebellion, or made a cause of war; with us, it is claimed as a constitutional right. There profound secrecy was necessary, and exposure at too early a day was defeat. Here the mask may be thrown off at any time, and that which has ripened to sufficient maturity in secret council, may come forth and manifest itself like any other political scheme. In combination with any political party to which it may have sold itself, or rather, which it may have bought, Romanism, with its peculiar tactics, may with apparent honor enter into a political campaign, and not unfrequently control our popular elections. How can the danger which threatens us from this quarter be averted? By regulating emigration, and limiting the right of citizenship? Let the politicians settle that question. Let it be remembered, however, that it is not with emigrants alone, but also with their more numerous descendants, who will of course be native citizens, that our posterity will be concerned. These must be won over to a sincere love of our free institutions, and, if possible to a better faith and a better life. But, after all, it is in ourselves that the chief difficulty lies, and to ourselves that the remedy must be applied. It is our own corruption, our want of virtue and of union, our political rancor and strifes, our unprincipled recklessness of consequences in partisanship, it is this that gives the papists their

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